

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Bachelor in Global Communication

Final Dissertation

Information vs propaganda: To what extent do international terrorist organisations and the media help each other in the achievement of their objectives?

Author: Esther Ruiz Giménez

Supervisor: Prof. Almudena González del Valle

Madrid, June 2022

A mis padres, por luchar siempre por mi hermana y por mí.
A Paula y Camila por su apoyo incondicional.
Y a mi tutora por la paciencia que ha tenido durante estos meses.

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"Our new obsession with terrorism will make us its unwitting accomplices.
We will become (and have already become) merchants of fear."
– Robert J. Samuelson, *Washington Post* (2001)

1. INTRODUCTION

The appearance of communication technologies in the late twentieth century marked a major milestone in the history of mankind, but more so, it represented a turning point in the field of information. New computing and software technologies gave rise to the appearance of the Internet, a network connecting computers all around the world. The Internet created a dynamic and far-reaching platform where users could benefit from having access to abundant information in a *click*. The world became what media theorist Marshall McLuhan conceptualised as the *global village* (McLuhan, 1964). These advances in the fields of telecommunications placed a premium on instantaneity and changed our approach and consumption of mass media. The benefits of these new platforms are plentiful, but we must consider that these technologies can also be used for illicit purposes.

The relationship between terrorism and reporting is of unknown complexity. In a time of technological advancements and revolution, media outlets must decide where to establish the line between what is news and what is sensationalism. Media outlets are under pressure to attract the most attention from the audience by showing the most violent images and heart-wrenching videos. Journalism should provide citizens with solid and trustworthy information however, it can be side-tracked by the numbers, the views, and the revenue, and sometimes minimise accuracy. When doing so, the media may play into the interests of the terrorist organisations that instigate the crimes that the news reports.

Terrorism poses one of the greatest threats to national security and international peace. Since the attacks in New York on 11th September 2001[1], the fight against threats to

[1] Members of the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda hijacked and crashed two planes into the buildings of the Twin Towers in New York, another plane into the Pentagon in Virginia, and a fourth one in a rural area in Pennsylvania. With a total of 2,976 fatalities, 9/11 remains the most lethal attack in history of this nature. (FBI, n.d)

national security has undergone a radical change and incorporated the phenomenon of terrorism. Many scholars agree that terrorist organisations use violence to achieve various causes related to political, religious, or ideological objectives. Terrorists seek the publicity that the media give to make their causes widely known (Frey et al., 2007). Campos and Gassebner (2013) highlight that grabbing the attention of the public is essential so that the atmosphere of fear and terror is intensified. It is the psychology behind fear, the anxiety that comes with the possibility of a terrorist attack occurring that terrorist groups instil on the public. Without the coverage of the media, attacks are confined to the immediate victims rather than being broadcast for the world to see, from political leaders to citizens.

1.1 Hypothesis

This dissertation assumes that when media outlets extensively report on terrorist attacks; when they show the calamities terrorists provoke and the barbaric executions that they carry out, they are bringing terrorist groups closer to achieving their objectives, which are instigating fear and gaining additional supporters. At the same time, it is the achievement of these actions that gives media outlets attention-grabbing headlines that audiences are interested in and that will generate more profits for news media.

1.2 Objectives

The main objective of this dissertation is to assess whether there is a relationship between the media and terrorist organisations. Once this has been determined, an attempt will be made to establish the nature of the relationship. Furthermore, this study intends to analyse how the media react in the aftermath of terrorist attacks and the impact that the media coverage may have on the general public and the success of said attacks. The research will be based on the coverage from national media outlets after the November 13th, 2015, Paris attacks and the 2017 Barcelona attacks.

Specific objectives:

- Analyse the media coverage of terrorist attacks and determine whether the content of the articles is purely informational or bends towards sensationalism. For this purpose, articles in various digital newspapers, together with photos and videos released in these will be analysed.

- Determine if one of the objectives of media organisations when covering terrorist attacks is to increase readership through the publication and/or over-publication of sensationalist articles.
- Determine whether terrorist organisations benefit from media coverage in terms of increasing the organisation's (and attacks) visibility and reach.

2. STATE OF THE ART

There are diverging opinions amongst scholars about the interdependency between mass media and terrorism in the academic literature. Many academics acknowledge the importance of the role of mass media in spreading terrorist acts and getting them the attention that entails their raison d'être. Others downplay media centrality in terrorism.

Walter Laqueur (1976) endorses the idea that a terrorist act means nothing by itself, but the publicity that news media gives it means all. To follow the lines of this opinion, J. Bowyer Bell (1978) agrees that media coverage spreads the effects of an otherwise limited violent act. Without this coverage, the victims would just be those present and not a wider public. In the words of Paul Wilkinson (1997: 53), the "instrumental relationship between the terrorist and the media is intrinsic to the very activity of terrorisation". What these scholars argue is not that terrorism and terrorist acts would not be carried out if access to the media did not exist, but that the media is a significant factor in amplifying the act and its consequences on the public. This relates to the theories of agenda-setting and framing that will be discussed in the following section.

Terrorists advance in their goals because those violent acts are widely reported, televised, and shared on social media. These goals can be divided into three universal groups which all terrorists seek: attention by spreading fear among the targeted audience, recognition of their demands and causes, and respectability and legitimacy in society (Nacos, 1994). Nacos (1994) analysed the coverage of terrorism in newspapers and television to come up with the finding that reporting on these, advances two of their goals: gaining attention and influencing people's attitudes towards the demands and motivations of these acts, especially in local and vulnerable communities. Terrorist organisations make use of mass communication because they obtain gratifications from it, they satisfy some of the needs they have as an organisation and as individual terrorists. This idea was developed by Blumler and Katz (1974) in the Uses and Gratifications theory, which will be explained in the following section.

When it comes to literature that goes against these opinions of symbiosis between the media and terrorism, we have leading scholars such as Grant Wardlaw (1989: 78) suggesting that "there is no clear evidence that publicity (by the media) is responsible

for significantly affecting the occurrence of terrorism". Robert G. Picard and Miquel Rodrigo (1991) agree with Wardlaw's point of view. For them, no cause-effect relationship occurs between the two factors of this study. Rodrigo (1991) develops his point by adding that we cannot prove that terrorism has that communicating component for it is not fundamentally an act of communication. Hocking (1992) continues this downplay of media centrality by expressing that one of the common myths associated with terrorism is that its success depends on media coverage.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

To examine the relationship between the media and terrorism, there are two groups of theories that we could consider: those related to terrorism and those that relate to the media. Because this work is focused on the perspective of the phenomenon of communication, media theories and not international relations theories. Regardless of this, to understand and analyse the two variables and how they interact, some concepts need prior clarification.

3.1 Terrorism

Terrorism is a difficult concept to define because there are disagreements associated with its roots and causes and establishing when the use of violence is legitimate and when it is classified as terrorism. Despite the disagreements in these issues, the point of departure is the use of violence. For simplicity, we are going to follow Bruce Hoffman's definition of the term:

> *Deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change. All terrorist acts involve violence or the threat of violence. Terrorism is specifically designed to have far-reaching psychological effects beyond the immediate victim(s) or object of the terrorist attack. It is meant to instil fear within, and thereby intimidate, a wider 'target audience'. […] Through* ***the publicity generated*** *by their violence, terrorists seek to* ***obtain the leverage, influence, and power they otherwise lack*** *to* ***effect political change*** *on either local or an international scale.*
>
> Bruce Hoffman (2004:1)

As Hoffman (2004) points out, terrorists need to communicate their violence as it is part of their strategy. They need to send a message to make their ideology and political causes heard. They know the use of violence gains more attention than a peaceful protest, therefore they resort to this tactic to maximise the potential of their actions. The wider the audience is, the more attention that is given not only to the acts committed, but also what is behind them, the roots, and the causes of terrorism. For this reason, the media plays an important role. They are the primary supplier of communication and act as intermediates between terrorist organisations and the public.

We can extrapolate from Hoffman's definition the idea that the media is an intensifier of terrorism, and that without it, terrorist organisations would not be as impactful when it comes to their audience.

3.2 The concept of 'the media'

Having explained the phenomenon of terrorism, the next section discusses the media. When we mention this term throughout this work we are referring to:

> *The **vehicles or channels** which are used to **convey information**, entertainment, **news**, education, or **promotional** messages.*
>
> Mehraj, Bhat and Mehraj (2014)

The media can be divided into two groups: traditional media, which include radio, broadcast television, print, and billboard; and new media, which is "the means of mass communication using digital technologies" (Oxford English Dictionary, n.d.:1).

The European Court of Human Rights noted that one of the fundamental duties that the press has towards its citizens is to act as *public watchdogs* (Jersild v. Denmark, 1994). They have a part to play as a mechanism of prevention and investigation of malpractices (Francke, 1995). In addition, the media are not only a source of information, but they also have the power to influence society in many aspects of life whether it be political, cultural, or social (Mehraj, Bhat and Mehraj, 2014).

3.3 Describing the relationship as symbiotic

In biology, *symbiosis* can be defined as a relationship between two different species in which both gain benefits from the other that they did not have when living in isolation. If we apply this idea to sociology, it is taken to mean the "relations of mutual dependence between different groups of a community" (Wilkinson, 2006: 145). As Wilkinson (2006) argues, modern media technologies have exerted an influence on the increasing publicity of terrorism. He uses the example of the 1972 Munich Olympics[2] to build up his argument.

[2] At the 1972 Olympics held in Munich, the Palestinian terrorist group 'Black September' killed two members of the Israeli Olympic team and held hostage nine other as the terrorists

The events perpetrated by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September were "relayed to a worldwide audience of over 500 million" (Wilkinson, 2006: 145). Wilkinson continues his line of reasoning to mention that, as long as terrorists live they will ache for publicity as if it were their oxygen. If terrorist groups continue to commit acts of violence, the media will carry on covering them to satisfy the audience's curiosity for dramatic and sensationalist stories. Thousands of articles and stories were written about the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre because of their attention-grabbing nature. Even today, media outlets like the BBC carry on writing stories about what happened – see July 2021 articles about the Opening Ceremony of the Tokyo Olympics and how they relived what happened half a century prior in Munich.

In short, what Wilkinson (2006) says is that the psychological nature of terrorism depends upon communication, and the media squeeze terrorist attacks to write as many articles as possible – this is why, according to the writer, media and terrorism enjoy a symbiotic relationship.

3.4 Agenda-setting theory

The media have the power to control the level of importance of the information that will be disseminated in order to reach a larger audience, achieve a greater impact and create greater awareness of what they consider important and newsworthy. The agenda-setting theory, developed by Dr Max McCombs and Dr Donald Shaw (1968), studied the way the media influence their audience into establishing a hierarchical order of importance concerning the information delivered. If the media give more attention to certain topics over others, the viewers will automatically perceive it as more important news. At the same time, they also choose which topics not to include in the agenda. In sum, what this theory points out is that the media agenda becomes the public agenda.

3.5 Framing

Related to this theory is another paradigm in the field of communication is framing. Framing is the manner in which events and news are depicted by the choice of words,

negotiated the release of 200 Palestinian prisoners held in an Israeli Prison. All hostages were murdered as the German police attempted to rescue them. (T. Editors of Encyclopaedia, 2021)

visuals, and presentations. There is a selection process made by media outlets to identify problems and causes and make judgements about them in a certain way (Entman, 1993; McQuail, 2012). Citizens turn to the news media as a source of information because they are a cornerstone in modern democracies (de Vreese, 2005). But the media can influence, not only the importance that people give to a topic but also the way people view and think about issues and events. Because of how news stories are framed, i.e., by selecting, emphasising, excluding, and elaborating content in a certain way, the media have an impact on the way the audience processes that information (Tankard, et al. 1991). Framing is closely related to the agenda-setting theory but expands the theory by focusing on the contextualisation and presentation of a topic rather than on which information is chosen to be disseminated.

3.6 The theory of Uses and Gratifications

To reach a meaningful conclusion about the possible relationship between the media and terrorism, it is important to understand the reasons behind the activity of both elements of study. The uses and gratifications theory may be useful to predict how and why media is consumed in a certain way. This theory was developed during the 1940s by functionalist scholars that wanted to determine why individuals use certain types of media, what needs they have that lead them to use them and what gratification derives from using them (Sharma, 2017). The uses and gratifications theory is credited to Blumler and Katz (1974), to whom a referred before, who outlined the core ideas. This theory posits two assumptions: first, the audience takes an active role in selecting a medium and content they want to consume; and second, the audience chooses different media to gratify particular needs (Sharma, 2017).

The Uses and Gratifications theory sets forth that a variety of social and psychological factors influence people's communication behaviours, like environmental factors or opportunities for interpersonal interaction (Rubin, 2002). According to this author, these elements have an impact on the audience's choices and motivations for using the media and also the interpretation of the chosen media. For example, a public crisis like major acts of terrorism incites information seeking because, in times of fear and uncertainty, there is a need to collect information to rebuild a feeling of normality (Lachlan, Spence & Seeger, 2009).

4. METHODOLOGY

A core part of the research has been carried out through the analysis of primary sources. These were journals, papers and articles found in Research Gate, JSTOR, Dialnet and Google Scholar. This was a very important source in order to set the groundwork for the dissertation.

In addition to these primary sources, secondary sources were also consulted. These were official documents released by media outlets, newspapers, and photographs. The analysis begins by using the 9/11 attacks as a starting point, therefore, parallel to obtaining information from *How the World's News Media Reacted to 9/11* (Pludowski, 2007), the coverage of British, Spanish, and French newspapers were analysed. In order to have a broad view of how western media interacts with terrorist organisations, three newspapers from the abovementioned countries were selected, which are detailed in the table below:

COUNTRY	**NEWSPAPERS**
France	*Libération, Le Figaro, Le Monde*
Spain	*ABC, El Mundo, El País*
United Kingdom	*BBC, The Guardian, The Times*

These were selected so that different political positions could be represented in the study and to examine the approach each one takes on the terrorist attacks according to their ideology. The articles chosen to analyse the coverage of 9/11 were published the day of the attacks and the following two days (12th September and 13th of September). In the analysis of these sources, the inductive method was used to look for facts that would either support or contrast the initial views outlined in the introduction.

Given that the research is very extensive, it is determined that it is not feasible to analyse all the attacks carried out by terrorist organisations and their coverage. Therefore, after examining the 9/11 attack in New York, the analysis is set to cover the period between 2015 and 2017. Two case studies were used in the dissertation: the 2017 Barcelona attacks and the November 13th, 2015, Paris attacks. To investigate the coverage of the attacks in Barcelona, newspapers *ABC, El País* and *El Mundo* were used as sources. For the Paris attacks, French newspapers *Le Figaro, Le Monde* and *Libération* were selected.

The reason behind choosing these newspapers was, once again, to have a variety of ideologies.

The technique used to carry out this investigation was the *content analysis method*. The idea was to identify intentions and communication trends among the newspapers regarding the attacks. The type of content analysis used was conceptual analysis, whereby a concept was chosen for examination – the terrorist attack and its perpetrators – and then its presence was quantified and analysed. To prove if there was an existing pattern related to the initial assumption of the dissertation, the number of articles written about the attacks over the three days that followed was quantified. It was also investigated whether, over the following months, these newspapers continued writing about the events or the terrorist organisations that carried them out.

In addition to this, discourse analysis was conducted to check whether the newspapers used were engaged in disseminating information or whether they used sensationalist language to attract more readers. In this process, highly emotional language was searched to determine the extent of sensationalism. News stories involving the death of children or personal accounts of the victims of the attacks were also an object of investigation. Besides this, the research phase included examining whether these newspapers disseminated photos or videos of the attacks and whether they talked about the propaganda published by terrorist organisations.

To reach an understanding of the relationship that the media and terrorists may have, the last section of the dissertation draws on game theory. Roger B. Myerson (1991:1) defined this theory as "the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers". This theory helps to analyse the impact of choices individuals make in situations in which more than one actor is involved. In the context of this theory, this social situation is referred to as a *game*, and the *players* are those individuals involved. It is important to mention, that in game theory, the players are seen as rational because they make decisions that are in their interests and based on the *utility* of those decisions (Meyerson, 1991). The objective of each player is to maximise their utility.

This theory was applied to this investigation by visualising terrorists as Player 1 and the media as Player 2. The assumption used for the game was that terrorists are not only motivated by intrinsic factors such as beliefs, but they also place importance on external factors like power (Rohner & Frey, 2007). On the other hand, media outlets increase their share of news devoted to terrorism because it interests the public and, as a result, boosts profits (Rohner & Frey, 2007). The idea would then be that there is an existing common interest game between the players. Player 1 (*aka* terrorists) would devote more of their time and resources to committing acts of terror if Player 2 (*aka* the media) chose to allocate a section of their news to reporting on terrorism. By adjusting their actions to what the other players choose to do, they could find mutual benefit.

It was determined that by following these research and examination phases it was possible to test whether or not the assumptions made in the introduction were correct.

5. ANALYSIS

This section is dedicated to the study and analysis of the potential multidimensional relationship between terrorism and the media. After examining the two variables, we can hopefully determine whether there is, or not, a causal link between them. The investigation will begin by analysing the response of some of the main media outlets in the United Kingdom, Spain, and France to the September 11 attacks. These attacks will serve as a starting point for the analysis as I consider them to be the breaking point of the terrorist phenomenon in the 21st century and a foreshadowing of what there was to come in the following years. After this has been accomplished, the following section will discuss the intensification of terrorism in the decade after the 9/11 by covering two major terrorist attacks that occurred on European soil in the years between 2014 and 2017: November 2015 Paris attacks (France), and the 2017 Barcelona attacks (Spain).

5.1 The September 11 attacks and their legacy

When two hijacked planes flew into the towers of the World Trade Centre in New York, a shadow was cast over America and the world. The 9/11 attacks were covered in media outlets worldwide. In America, Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), FOX News, and the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) interrupted their daily program to constantly cover the attacks throughout the five days following the incidents (Fourie, 2010). The attacks that collapsed the Twin Towers became a global media spectacle for days in McLuhan's *global village*. The perpetrators of the events achieved what they were looking for: attention and recognition through blanket coverage (Nacos, 2002). What Brigitte Nacos means by *blanket coverage* is that the events were reported across all mass media channels and not in a targeted channel.

After a traumatic event like a terrorist attack, the media (among other actors in society) are obliged to communicate what happened and why it happened. Taking into consideration the abovementioned theories, the goal of the media is to frame and set the agenda. The media outline the problem and give their proper interpretations based on the conclusions they reach from the information that they gather. Tomasz Pludowski and other scholars elaborated a report where they gathered how media outlets around the world reacted to the events of 9/11. In their book *How the World's News Media Reacted to 9/11*, the authors analyse major newspapers from different regions of the

world. I have extrapolated some of the findings and applied them to the object of study of this work.

British Media Outlets

The general response of the British media conveyed a feeling of "horror and outrage" as described by Brain McNair (2007:35). Unlike American media, in the UK they focused to a greater extent on the reasons behind September 11 and the global responses to what had happened, not just on the events that were taking place in the US. The *BBC* broadcasted images of Palestinian refugee camps all over the Middle East where there was an air of euphoria. This coverage of the *BBC* had lasting effects on the perception of many people of the Palestinian cause (McNair, 2007). As McNair (2007:35) continues to argue in *How the World's News Media Reacted to 9/11*, "the British media were somewhat freer to speculate on the underlying roots and causes of the attacks, simply because they had not occurred on British territory". This is one of the main differences with American media, which had to centre their coverage around a more emotional and less rational response.

Centre-right newspaper the *Times* framed 9/11 around the figure of Osama bin Laden. They quickly attributed the terrorist attacks to him and published a profile detailing his public appearances, his Al-Qaeda training camps, and a videotape of him (Barron, 2007). The leader and founder of the terrorist group Al-Qaeda was bestialised and, in the words of Barron (2007:43), depicted as "the enemy of the free world". The editorial also commented on the implications that the September 11 attacks would have on the rest of the world. It could be said that this article was a premonition of what was going to happen in the years to come.

On the other side of the approaches to the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, a narrative that was also popular in the UK was that of anti-Americanism, especially coming from the British left. An example of this can be seen in the British newspaper *The Guardian*. Just two days after the attacks, journalist Seamus Milne (2001: 33) wrote that because of their "unabashed national egotism and arrogance", Americans had gotten what they deserved. The line of argument was that America had given the terrorists a reason to perpetuate the attacks.

To compare and contrast the coverage of these two newspapers, we can mention that the *Times* was much more objective than the *Guardian*, which focused on the weaknesses of the American system (Barron, 2007). Despite this, they both aligned themselves with Western values and rejected the idea that the Middle Eastern jihad was trying to put through. The *Guardian* and the *Times* described the 9/11 attacks with words such as *terror, catastrophe, and carnage*.

The effect that the 9/11 attacks, together with the London bombings of 2005[3], had on the British press are still felt today. Journalists have decided to focus their attention on the issue of Islamic fundamentalism and the status of the Muslim community – especially in the country –, which in turn has affected the perception of the audience. These two elements have become a controversial and newsworthy topic for journalists in the United Kingdom. (McNair, 2007)

As we have seen, in the first hours of the attacks on the Twin Towers we could already distinguish the different social debates circulating amongst the different media outlets. This is a clear example of how, depending on the ideology, mission, and vision of the newspapers, the responses were leaning towards one frame or another. The way in which the media decided to display and narrate the terrorist attacks influenced the public's perception of, not only the events in New York, but the social reality on a local, national, and international scale. As McNair (2007) points out, not only did it influence the public opinion of the Muslim community in the United Kingdom, but also their outlook on conflicts happening in the Middle East.

Covering 9/11 from Spain

Just as it occurred with the British press, the editorial lines of the Spanish media were influenced by political ideologies. As reasoned in the findings of La Porte and Sádaba (2007), the definition of the conflict was not uniform among the different media outlets. However, as the hours since the first aeroplane crash went by, both the media and the

[3] On the 7th of July 2005, three bombs exploded in the Underground stations in central London and a fourth was detonated on a double-decker bus. These attacks, claimed by Al-Qaeda, remain the worst attacks that London has suffered since World War II, and the worst terrorist barbarity in Britain (Euronews, 2021).

politician's agenda was generally set on the frame of the *war on terror* (Wasburn, 2002). I will now proceed to analyse how newspapers *ABC, El País*, and *El Mundo* covered the attacks of 9/11 and how they differed from one another.

To begin with, it is important to note that *ABC* is a conservative newspaper that defends traditional values and institutions such as the monarchy and the Church. The *ABC* followed the lines of right-winged President Jose María Aznar and initially referred to the events as terrorist attacks. Despite their alignment with Aznar, reporting evolved to focus on the *war on terror* that the United States had proclaimed. In the issue of the 12th of September 2001, *ABC* begins to discuss the attacks using identifications and comparisons. Islamists are called *the guilty ones*, and some Middle Eastern states are blamed for "shelter[ing], funding and training terrorists" (ABC, 2001:1). Besides pinpointing the perpetrators and their accomplices, *ABC* also leaned towards comparing 9/11 to those attacks carried out by ETA, the Basque nationalist organisation classified as a terrorist group. Like so, the newspaper could connect more to their Spanish audience, which had been suffering the attacks of ETA since the late 60 and would continue to until 2011 when they announced the complete end of armed activities (Pereda & Aldayturriaga, 2021).

Continuing with *El País*, their first editorial informing about the attacks would already serve one of the purposes of terrorism – instil fear. They commented on how the actions of the terrorists were not only against the United States but against all civilisation and thus, they could likewise be committed on European soil in the future. *El País* can be classified as a progressive and liberal newspaper, pro-European and more in line with the political party PSOE[4]. From the analysis of several articles that were published the following days after the events, the frame was constructed around the identification of the *enemies* of civilisation and the need for an international coalition to combat worldwide insecurity. *El País*, like *The Guardian*, also manifested its criticism towards some of the American ways of conducting politics. For example, they denounced America's Manichaeism of *you're either with me or against m*e and their insistence on

[4] PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español) is a Spanish political party situated in the centre-left of the political spectrum. At the time of 9/11, the Secretary-General of the socialist party was José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero.

Pakistan's alignment in the international coalition against terrorism (La Porte and Sádaba, 2007).

In the newspaper *El* País, the framing of September 11 shifted towards Spain. Articles focused on the next steps to follow after what had occurred and how the contribution of Spain, because of their experience with ETA, could be of great benefit to the rest of the nations that had given their support to the US in the *war on terror*. *El País* also suggested, that "the Spanish secret services [...] must have special knowledge of the networks that may have been set up by Islamic terrorists in Spain" (El País, 2001: 115), which could have further terrorised the readers by the possibility of experiencing an attack as such closer to home.

To end with the Spanish press, *El Mundo*'s initial editorial avoided making a statement on the nature of the attacks and instead, it aimed to find any sign that would help to make sense of the events. It focused on the Middle East and the potential of violence while highlighting the significant economic consequences (El Mundo, 2001). A particular aspect of this newspaper is that it legitimised United States' involvement in a conflict with whomever the perpetrators and their accomplices were, but attention had to be paid to the degree of the involvement – the response, in their opinion, had to be proportionate.

All in all, the agenda of the *war on terror* monopolised the Spanish press. In contrast to the British approach to the 9/11 attacks, *ABC, El País,* and *El Mundo* found a way to link the events with the homegrown terrorism of ETA. The conclusion that we can take from this is that, by narrating September 11 in such a way, the readers could empathise more with what was happening in the United States and, at the same time, gain a greater sense of fear and threat for the possibilities of another attack happening closer to Europe and thus, Spain. This can be seen as a way of giving terrorists the platform to influence people's opinions and perceptions of danger and security.

The French response to the American tragedy

The clearest sentiment of Anti-Americanism after the events in New York came from the French press and intellectuals that voiced their opinions. At first, the response was more emotional as heart-wrenching images of the Twin Towers collapsing filled French

households. Yet this feeling of compassion and sadness was replaced by indignation and fear as President Bush's "incoherent policies [had] facilitated a chaos, provoking frustrations which were the nourishing bed of terrorism" (Tolotti, 2001:87). When trying to explain the reason behind the terrorist attacks, many attributed it to Bush's actions and his new order (Joxe, 2002). This especially came from newspapers considered to be leftist/centre (Portes, 2007). Apart from this reasoning, sympathy towards Americans was also limited due to France's ties and contacts with Arab and African countries. The daily newspaper *Libération* published an interview with political scientist Bertrand Badie (2001) in which he commented on the lack of empathy towards the death of Palestinians and the genocide in Rwanda, as compared to the victims in New York.

French novelist, philosopher, and journalist Jean d'Ormesson did not abstain from giving advice to President Bush. He wrote in the newspaper *Le Figaro,* "we live in a time when victims replace heroes and they count on your repression for bringing to their side the still vacillating masses" (d'Ormesson, 2001:87). This declaration is useful to be able to connect how the media could help in radicalising and legitimising terrorist organisations by bringing sympathisers closer to the terrorists. President Bush's response to the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers could have radicalised individuals in the Middle East, yet the media was the informant that provided people outside of that area with the reasons as to why terrorists thought it legitimate to perpetrate attacks in countries like the United States. Furthermore, specialists in geopolitics like Gerard Chaliand took it to French national newspapers such as *Le Monde* to explain the faults of the *war on terror* like the complexity of the concept. His assertions like "[Terrorism] will not be eradicated", or "we'll have to live with [it] as a recurrent form of harm" (Chaliand, 2001:87) could also be considered to have aggravated the atmosphere of terror sought by terrorists.

As illustrated, the coverage of the French press could have served as a tool for terrorists to legitimise their actions, especially because of the recurring theme of anti-Americanism followed by the press and intellectuals in the field of international relations. Their strong criticism of President Bush's administration and the strong statements made about the American *war on terror* could have intensified the anti-

American sentiment elsewhere in the world, as well as escalated the fear of citizens towards terrorism.

The perpetrators of the September 11 attacks achieved all their objectives that could relate to the media by targeting the United States. They were very much aware of the power that the media held in terms of furthering their publicity goals and consequently their greater objectives related to political or religious matters. Without the images that media outlets from all around the world spread, their success would not have had the same effect and intensity.

First, terrorists grabbed all the attention of American TV, radio channels, and newspapers. Coverage devoted to the attacks, their perpetrators, Osama Bin Laden, and the Middle East multiplied during and after 9/11. For example, many programmes addressed the causes behind the anti-Americanism of the Arab and Islamic world (Nacos, 2003). These types of programmes were not broadcast before the attacks happened, which demonstrate the terrorist abilities to control and set the media's agenda. Al-Qaeda was aware that grabbing the media's attention was not their ultimate goal, but one of the steps to reach their bigger objectives.

Second, terrorists spread anxiety and fear among the public and traumatised the world. According to Nacos (2002: 32), "nine in ten Americans worried about additional terrorist events in their country, and […] worried that themselves, or somebody close to them, could become victims the next time around". People were distraught by the images shown on TV, what they read in newspapers and what they heard on the radio. The coverage that the audience was exposed to, was the result of an abominable attack of terror – an attack whose victims could have been that same audience.

Third, it is important to note that one of the primary target audiences of Al-Qaeda was the population in Afghanistan and the regions where they carried out their operations. In terms of earning respect and legitimacy, Osama Bin Laden turned out triumphant. Bin Laden had become the leading newsmaker and *Public Enemy Number One* for Americans, which strengthened his popularity and legitimacy among millions of Muslims. According to Nacos (2002), Osama Bin Laden received much more attention

and was covered with more frequency than President Bush and some of the world's most influential leaders.

The September 11 attacks were a massive success for Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda in relation to these three objectives, partly because of the media's uncontrollable need for violence. There was no other news after the attacks on New York and the images were played over and over again. It seemed like the media developed an obsession with reporting about terrorism and even went to the extent of airing unedited statements coming from Bin Laden and other propaganda created by Al-Qaeda (Nacos, 2002). It is clear that the media has to inform about the events that are relevant to the public, yet it appears that, after 9/11 they did not know where to draw the lines between news and sensationalist reporting that makes a profit based on frightening the public. To repeat the quote cited at the beginning of this paper, "our new obsession with terrorism will make us its unwitting accomplices" (Samuelson, 2001:1).

5.2 Intensification of Islamic terrorism and media coverage

After the attacks of September 2001, the world witnessed the escalation of global Islamic terrorism, which peaked in 2014 (Hiro, 2014). With the appearance of new media technologies like smartphones and social media platforms, the coverage of conflict acquired new formats of broadcasting, new journalistic genres and narratives, and new audiences (Sacco, 2016). The development and evolution of media channels nevertheless strengthened the influence of traditional media on public opinion by creating a perception of reality that had an indirect impact on international relations and the management of domestic policies and legislations (Evans, 2010).

Traditional media channels like television and newspapers continue to be one of the most influential means of spreading information. Despite this, they have had to learn how to adapt to the changing technological environment now that citizens can access information through other means like the internet. According to Aguaded and Romero Rodríguez (2015), for reasons of economic subsistence, traditional media channels try to grab the attention of the audience by broadcasting pseudo-informative content with great emotional value but of little use in decision-making processes. Mario Vargas Llosa (2009) points out that we live in a civilisation of spectacle, a world in which

entertainment occupies the top place in the hierarchy of values. This propensity towards enjoyment and pleasure sometimes has unexpected consequences like the proliferation of frivolous and socially irresponsible journalism (Vargas Llosa, 2009). In these decades of intensification of terrorism, media outlets have found new forms of covering news by excessively using a tragedy as a means to grab the audience's attention. Terrorism becomes the object of the spectacle because of its sensationalist nature (Korstanje, 2012; Martini, 2015). For mass media organisations, terrorism is an endless source of visually compelling stories and readership.

Not only did global terrorism increase after 9/11, but there was also a significant increase in media coverage of terrorism (Sultan, 2016). This focus on terrorism was brought about with a concentration on Islam as the source of the phenomenon. Media contents depicted events in a reality that influenced media consumers by shaping their views of terrorism and intensifying the threat. Terrorism was framed in such a way that sought sensationalism and enlarged anecdotic stories (Vasterman, 2005). Because of its attractiveness, terrorist attacks provided a boost to media outlets in terms of ratings and profits (Sultan, 2016). Furthermore, it appears the press and academics began generating an obsession with terrorism, Islam, and its implications in the West (Sultan, 2016). This discourse was generally tinged with negative portrayals of the Muslim world and Islam, mostly associating it with violence and irrationality (Manning, 2003), and so, violent extremism resulted in the creation of a direct link between terrorism and Islam/Muslims (Sultan, 2016).

Terrorist organisations like the Islamic State (ISIS) often rely on international news and social media coverage to reinforce and encourage public appeal, radicalise new recruits, and motivate attacks against the *enemies* (Global Terrorism Index, n.d.). The GTI[5] shows how terrorist organisations thrive when they can increase their influence. Social media and news outlets give them the platform to connect with sympathisers and increase the fear and anxiety of the public towards terrorism. In the analysis of the GTI, it appears that the media uses the attacks as a justification to generate stories that focus on other

[5] Global Terrorism Index

aspects surrounding terrorism and terrorist groups, which are not necessarily the terrorist acts themselves (Global Terrorism Index, n.d.).

5.3 Attacking the heart of France

On the night of Friday 13th of November 2015, Paris was shaken by a series of coordinated Islamist terrorist attacks. The first three explosions were heard around the State de France stadium in the suburb of Sant-Denis, where a football match between France and Germany was taking place. A security guard at the venue reported to the *Wall Street Journal* that a man was prevented from entering the stadium after the security checkpoint examination (Robinson & Landauro, 2015). French police officers informed said American newspaper that the goal was to detonate the bombs inside the stadium, where French President François Holland was present (Robinson & Landauro). Shortly after gunmen arrived at different nightlife spots (Petit Cambodge and Le Carillon bar) and a shooting took place. Subsequently, the same events occurred at a diner in Rue de la Fontaine au Roi. Approximately twenty minutes after the first attack at Sant-Denis, the restaurant *Le Belle Equipe* encountered the fourth attack from two men who opened fire on the terrace of the restaurant. One of the terrorists then detonated a suicide bomb at the restaurant, Le Comptoir Voltaire. Unfortunately, the attacks in Paris did not end there. The most heard of and the deadliest attack took place at the concert venue Bataclan where nighty people died, and hundreds were wounded. The attacks in Paris recorded a total of 130 deaths and 350 people injured (Campion, 2021). The Islamic State (ISIS)[6] claimed the Paris attacks of November 13th, 2015.

5.4 Coverage of the November 13th, 2015, attacks

The night of the attack caused widespread confusion among the French. No one knew exactly what was going on except for the fact that Paris was under attack. The media chronology documented in the study *La Mémorisation et Perception des Attentats du 13 Novembre 2015 en France*[7] (see annexe Figure 1) shows that information on the bombings was shared very quickly and extensively through different channels of

[6] Islamic State (also known as ISIS, ISIL or Daesh) is an Islamist jihadist group founded in 1999 by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

[7] The Memory and Perception of the 13 November 2015 Attacks in France (translation made by the author).

communication. The first videos and photographs were shared on social media and the hashtags *#PorteOuverte* (doors opened)[8], *#PrayForParis*, and *#WeAreUnited* began trending on Twitter. 24-hours news channels interrupted their usual programmes to begin informing about the events with the little information they had gathered through social media and other official sources (CÉDOC, 2016). Traditional media channels like television, radio, and newspapers (digital format) played a decisive role in the initial communication of the attacks on the night of the 13th of November. According to CÉDOC (2016), eight out of ten French were informed through these channels. Social media platforms like Twitter, Facebook and Instagram played a less important role in the dissemination.

Le Figaro

When researching the coverage of the attacks, we find that *Le Figaro* was the newspaper that released the most articles related to the event, among those newspapers selected for this investigation. Between the nights of the 13th and 16th of November, 222 articles were published themed around the attacks (see annexe Figure 2). Among these, the majority tried to make sense of what was going on at the stadium, the restaurants and bars attacked and reported minute-by-minute the police intervention in Bataclan. The vocabulary used in these articles conveyed a sense of agitation, shock, and grief. Bataclan was described as *hell*, the Stade de France was *shaken* by the attacks, and the streets of Paris were *apocalyptic*.

Date	Nº articles published
13/11/15	6
14/11/15	99
15/11/15	71
16/11/15	46
Total	**222**

Table 1: Number of articles published by *Le Figaro*
Source*:* Author's own elaboration based on the quantification of articles published by *Le Figaro*

As we can see in Table 1, coverage of the attacks intensified on the 14th of November. The general narrative of these was that the homeland was under attack and the Islamic

[8] Translation made by the author.

State had committed an act of terror. Lawyer Hugues Moutouh (2015) commented that France had become a major theatre for military operations for the Islamic State. Many articles followed the same line of argumentation as the one described by Moutouh (2015) by voicing that Paris had become a warzone because of the implications of the West in Iraq and Syria. Some criticised how poorly French leaders understood the motivations and determination of the *enemies* in the Middle East because they failed to foresee what was about to come.

Besides the reports on the number of deaths and injured, the chronology of the attacks and the police operations, journalists working for *Le Figaro* wrote about the emotional response and implications for the victims after the attacks. In addition to this, they also released articles on how to stay safe and what to do in the event of more attacks taking place. These types of articles can be counter-effective because, despite the intentions being to try to calm the public and educate them on what to do if they were to be involved in an attack, they can also serve to fuel anxiety and fear among the public. As mentioned throughout this investigation, one of the objectives of terrorist organisations is to instil fear and create a constant feeling of threat – media outlets by releasing this type of content would unintentionally help them in achieving the said objective.

There are a set of publications that link the threat of terrorism to migrants coming from conflict areas like Syria and also blame the attacks that took place in Paris on the lack of border restrictions and control e.g., *À l'Élysée, Marine Le Pen établit un lien entre les attentats et les migrants*[9] (Galiero, 2015). In the event of a terrorist attack, especially when it comes from groups that are considered *outsiders* by extremist political groups, right-wing politicians like Marie Le Pen[10] take the opportunity to advocate for harsher border controls and migration policies. This reinforces the discourse of *us vs. them* that is also used by terrorist groups to persuade followers into joining the Jihad. By criticising

[9] At the Elysée Palace, Marine Le Pen makes a link between the attacks and migrants (translation made by the author).

[10] French politician who ran for the French presidency in 2012, 2017 and 2022. She is a member of the National Rally, a nationalist and far-right political party that defends anti-immigration policies.

the religion too and placing all Muslims under the umbrella of terrorism, news articles help to create a greater and unnecessary distance between the followers of Islam and the country under attack, in this case, France, as well as increasing racism among citizens.

A multitude of articles were devoted to the terrorists that had immolated themselves and the reactions and declarations of their families. Some were oblivious of the intentions and plans of the kamikazes, and others described their deaths as *beautiful* and *honourable*. We can also find among the various articles' descriptions of what strategy the Islamic State was following during that period and how they radicalised young people in Europe (mainly France). Transmitting this type of information through a very popular newspaper like *Le Figaro* can be dangerous because of the effect it may have on people, especially those at risk of being radicalised or in the process of radicalisation. Media outlets should evaluate the potential risks and damaging effects of publishing information about people glorifying these perpetrations before releasing articles as such.

The number of articles published in such a short amount of time may be deemed excessive and inappropriate and of a lucrative rather than informative nature. Many of these articles are instructional, however, the number of publications may be considered over the top. The task of journalists is to transmit relevant information about important events to the public, however, as we can see in Figure 2 (annexe) there are countless articles that somehow relate to the attacks but are not essential for the public. An example of this is how leading figures in the world of sport like Karim Benzema or Romain Grosjean reacted to the Paris attacks or how Hollywood paid homage to the victims.

Moreover, media reports on terrorism have the power to desensitise the publics' perception of the attacks by the exposure given to them. When media outlets such as *Le Figaro* publish more than 200 articles in three consecutive days on a single event, it can lead to information saturation among the public. As a result, readers could potentially miss important news because of the ocean of data to which newspapers expose them. Yet again, the news outlets should evaluate how many articles they

publish about a terrorist attack and to what extent they are genuinely relevant to the public. The journalist's purpose is to inform the public; therefore, they should focus on achieving these objectives and not on producing as many articles as possible in order to generate more revenue.

After pointing out the excessiveness in the number of articles published the weekend that the attacks took place, it is also important to mention that *Le Figaro* continued to produce articles about the events months after. These articles focused more on the Islamic State and the lives of the terrorists in France and the Middle East. Jean-Marc Gonin (2015) wrote a detailed piece about the enemy at hand[11]. He explained how this terrorist organisation was born and who and what is behind it. The mystical touch in the way the article is written may make the Islamic State sound intriguing and inviting to people at risk of radicalisation. Rachida Samouri (2015) takes her readers around the Parisian department of Seine-Saint-Denis where she visits one of the centres of radical Islam that claims to be part of the Islamic state. Just by reading the headline *En Seine-Saint-Denis, chez les salafistes*[12] one can notice the sensationalist nature of the article. The duty of journalists is to deliver facts relevant to the public, but when reviewing this specific article, one notices that the author has constructed this piece in a way that provokes interest and lures the reader into reading further.

As we can see *Le Figaro* exploited the attacks in Paris to release as many articles as possible themed around the events but not necessarily in an essentially informative manner. We could conclude that the newspaper is trying to maximise the profits that can be made from publishing articles about the matter. By using terrorism as a way to increase revenue, *Le Figaro* also gives free publicity to terrorist organisations like the Islamic State and helps to spread their propaganda. For terrorist organisations, it is of special interest when major newspapers like *Le Figaro* publish their videos claiming the attacks because it helps them reach a wider audience. This same argument could be applied to all the articles published on the lives of the terrorists who immolated

[11] *Daech, un mystérieux ennemi (Gonin, 2015).* Daesh, a mysterious enemy. (Translation made by the author).

[12] In Seine-Saint-Denis, among the Salafists. (Translation made by the author).

themselves as they could serve as a *courageous* and *honourable* example to other young individuals that think alike.

Le Monde

The newspaper *Le Monde* began covering the attacks in the early hours of the 14th of November, unlike *Le Figaro* which started moments after the first explosions were heard at the Stade de France in Saint-Denis. The number of articles released by *Le Monde* is incomparable to the previous newspaper analysed, yet as we can see in Table 2 below, they also produced what seems like an excessive number of publications.[13]

Date	Articles published
14/11/15	14
15/11/15	14
16/11/15	47
Total	**75**

Table 2: Number of articles published by *Le Monde*
Source*:* Author's own elaboration based on the quantification of articles published by *Le Monde*

When drawing up similarities between these two newspapers in the way that they covered the attacks, we can determine that *Le Monde* also published articles that could have helped to advance the terrorists' objectives, just like *Le Figaro* did. Journalists like Vincent, Borredon & Piel (2015) wrote a piece[14] detailing the life of Ismaël Mostefaï, one of the terrorists that immolated himself at Bataclan. As these authors point out, Mostefaï was a young French from Essonne that lived a relatively normal life with his family and played football but was known for committing petty crimes such as theft. His process of radicalisation can be attributed to an Islamist radical who visited his hometown on several occasions which motivated him to undertake a religious journey to Syria. Vincent, Borredon & Piel (2015) set out an example of homegrown radicalisation, they are able to connect with the French public in a way that ISIS terrorists cannot as they lack the cultural ties that *Le Monde* journalists share with citizens in

[13] See annexe Figure 3 for the list of articles.

[14] *Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, l'un des kamikazes français du Bataclan.*

Ismaël Omar Mostefaï, one of the French kamikazes of Bataclan (translation made by the author).

France. Articles as such, published in a national newspaper, serve as a bridge between the terrorist organisations and the public. Furthermore, young people particularly vulnerable to radicalisation, such as those that feel isolated, discriminated against, have low self-esteem and are easily influenced, can use Ismaël Mostefaï as an example and follow his path.

Connected to this last point, *Le Monde* tended to focus more on homegrown radicalisation than *Le Figaro.* As we have seen, this last newspaper party tended toward releasing as many publications as possible instead of concentrating on a specific subject related to the attacks. The coverage of *Le Figaro* was much more overwhelming in terms of numbers, but it can be said that *Le Monde*'s coverage touched the hearts of the French people. They portrayed some of the terrorists implicated in the attacks as next-door citizens, with normal lives and families, implying that even the least expected person could be or become a terrorist.

In addition to the abovementioned, another objective that media outlets help terrorists to advance is the amplification and intensification of fear and panic. *Le Monde* for example published *La vérité nous oblige à dire que le terrorisme peut frapper de nouveau dans les jours qui viennent*[15] (Manuel Valls, 2015). The headline of the article creates an atmosphere of fear and terror, especially for a vulnerable society that has just been caught in one of the greatest terrorist attacks of 21st century Europe. This article was written and published on the 16th of November 2015, when the attack was still fresh in the minds and hearts of the French. *Le Monde* used a bold opening with a similar discourse to the one used in 9/11 – "we are at war with terrorism" (Valls, 2015:1). The article continues to say that life will go on, but they were going to live for a long time with the terrorist threat. Preparing citizens for a possible imminent attack creates the climate of terror and panic that terrorists are looking to generate.

There are many articles published by *Le Monde* that construct this environment so sought after even months after the attacks. In March, Jolly (2016) wrote a piece in which he declared that terrorism was to become commonplace in France. The attacks in Paris

[15] The truth is that terrorism may strike again in the coming days (translation made by the author).

were only the beginning of the most heightened terrorist threat. It is clear that terrorist attacks sell newspapers, and even more so if they were committed on national soil. Taking this into account, it appears as *Le Monde* was very aware of the fact and exploited the Paris attacks to the maximum extent possible. Articles themed around the attacks continued to be published six months after the attacks, the last one being the 27th of April of 2022.

To be constantly writing and publishing articles about the attacks maintains an atmosphere of panic among the citizens. The media have the potential to create a heightened state of alarm beyond what is real. As we have seen, the narrative used by *Le Monde* is much more intense and emotional than *Le* Figaro and so the psychological impact on the public is different. *Le Monde*, while increasing the newspaper's profits, helps the terrorists (in this case ISIS) achieve several of their objectives.

Libération

Having analysed the coverage of *Le Figaro* and *Le Monde* and after pointing out the excessive number of publications released about the November 13th, 2015, attacks, the total published by *Libération* seems to be reasonable. The number of articles intensified the day after the attack, which would appear to be normal. Table 3 below details how only one article was published the night of the attack, whereas *Le Figaro* released six[16].

Date	Articles published
13/11/15	1
14/11/15	5
16/11/15	1
Total	**7**

Table 3: Number of articles published by *Libération*
Source*:* Author's own elaboration based on the quantification of articles published by *Libération*

Despite having relatively normal numbers in terms of total articles published, what strikes the most is the content, narrative, and discourse of those seven publications (see annexe Figure 4). The headlines have a very sensationalist wording, almost as if the attacks in Paris had become something out of a television soap opera. For example, the

[16] See Table 1

article *A Saint-Denis: La France est en guerre et elle peut compter sur ses banlieues*[17] (Mouillard, 2015) is eye-catching and generates reader interest because it makes one wonder why France is at war and why the suburbs are a place of interest in the conflict. *Libération* takes full advantage of the interest generated by the attacks to write different articles as per the norm that draw attention and thus obtain as many readers as possible.

Among the three newspapers discussed, *Libération* exploits terrorist propaganda the most. The Islamic State (ISIS) made a strategic move by not releasing the video immediately after the attacks but months later and by doing so, it did not get swallowed up in the tidal wave of coverage. Taking this into account, we could say that *Libération* helped ISIS is getting a second wind of coverage and making the video and the attacks a talking point months after[18]. In addition to this, we could point out that *Libération* cooperated with the terrorists by, once again, amplifying their reach. The journalists of the newspaper explain how the video is intended for two different audiences. The first being the West, the video is designed to make people afraid and think that ISIS terrorists are everywhere and omnipotent. The second audience is the young Muslims in the West, especially in France. The members of the terrorist group that appear in the video talk directly to them in French intending to make them feel guilty for not following the Jihad and not taking action against infidels. Moreover, they invite them to rise to the West and join the Islamic State (ISIS).

The coverage of the attacks by the newspaper *Libération* gives the terrorists implicated in the attacks and the head of the organisation at the time, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, celebrity status. *Libération* suggests that the central leadership of ISIS was much more involved in directing and coordinating the attacks than previously thought. The newspaper makes the Paris attacks a high-profile event and directs public attention to it. On the other hand, by clarifying that the leader of ISIS was the mastermind behind

[17] In Saint-Denis: 'France is at war, and it can count on its suburbs' (translation made by the autor).

[18] *Trois questions soulevées par la vidéo de l'EI sur le 13 Novembre* (Alonso & Le Devin, 2016) Three questions raised by the IS video on November 13th (translation made by the autor).

the attacks, it could suggest that France is the spotlight of the organisation's high-level objectives and therefore heighten the fear of the threat of terrorism.

To sum up, *Le Figaro, Le Monde* and *Libération* all cross the line between information and sensationalism with regard to the Paris attacks. Each one in different ways uses the attacks to generate profit without taking into account the negative implications it could have. First of all, they create a deeper divide in the *us vs. them* by separating Muslims in the West from the rest of the population. They incite populist discourses like that of Marie Le Pen (as mentioned before) which creates more tension and hatred from one side toward the other. Second, the narrative used by these French newspapers and the undue attention given to the members involved in the Paris attacks increases the climate of panic and terror so sought after by the terrorists. Third, by sharing the intentions of the terrorists, the processes of radicalisation and their propagandistic videos, they bring terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State closer to those individuals which are at risk or in the process of being radicalised. All in all, these newspapers, in the process of generating profits, help terrorists advance in their objectives of spreading fear among the targeted audience and increasing legitimacy and support among their followers.

5.5 Spain is struck again

After the notorious 2004 Madrid train bombings, Spain was attacked again in 2017. On the 17th and 18th of August 2017, two terrorist attacks were committed in Barcelona and Cambrils by members of a jihadist cell formed in Ripoll, in the north of Catalonia. The cell was formed by a group of 10 individuals, many of whom had been born or raised in Spain (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018). A member of the cell named Younes Abouyaaqoub drove a van to *Plaça de Catalunya* and drove into the pedestrian promenade of *La Rambla*, he deliberately rammed into pedestrians, zigzagging for several hundred meters. Thirteen people were killed and more than 100 injured. Abouyaaqoub fled the scene on foot and proceeded to hijack a car and kill its driver.
Almost nine hours after the vehicle attack on La Rambla, in the early hours of the 18th, another car with five members of the same jihadist cell attacked people on a coastal walkway in the town of Cambrils about 120 km from Barcelona. The car ended up

running into a vehicle belonging to the Mossos d'Esquadra[19]. The five terrorists exited the vehicle wearing fake suicide belts and indiscriminately attacked by-passers using large knives and an axe they had acquired hours earlier. One person was killed, and several others were injured before the terrorists were shot down by a police officer (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018). Overall, the two terrorist attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils resulted in the deaths of 16 people and 140 wounded.

The Islamic State (ISIS) claimed the attacks hours later through the news agency Amaq[20]. The 2017 Barcelona attacks have been the deadliest since the 2004 Madrid train bombings.

5.6 Coverage of the attacks in Barcelona

ABC

The coverage of the 2017 Barcelona attacks shares similarities to *Le Figaro* because of the number of articles that were published on the matter. Between the afternoon of the 17th and the 19th of August, a total of 130 articles were released. Although *Le Figaro* published double the number of articles (222 as mentioned before) 130 can still be considered a great amount. On the 18th, *ABC* doubled the publications as compared to the day of the attack and two days after the events.

Date	Number of articles
17/8/17	32
18/8/17	65
19/8/17	33
Total	**130**

Table 4: Number of articles published by *ABC*

Source*:* Author's own elaboration based on the quantification of articles published by *ABC*

Among the publications of the 17th, the majority shared videos and images of the state of La Rambla after the attacks and the people that had been caught up by Abouyaaqoub's van (see annexe Figure 5). Media outlets are often criticised for the

[19] Catalan autonomous police force.

[20] Amaq News Agency: appeared during the battle for control of the northern Syrian border in 2014. It has played an important role in issuing claims of responsibility for ISIS (Milton, 2018).

brutal images they publish in their newspapers or disseminate through their social media accounts (Covo, 2020). In the case of *ABC* and the Barcelona attacks, we could say that the photos they shared could have intensified the sense of shock among the public because of the presence of blood in the streets and on the injured. If we look at propagandistic videos or magazines created by Al Qaeda or the Islamic State (ISIS) we can appreciate that they usually use very explicit videos and images. This content is sometimes taken from the attacks that they perpetrated against their *enemies* in the West. We could say that the newspaper *ABC*, by sharing content that terrorists could potentially use in the creation of their propagandistic videos, unintentionally generated free propaganda for the Islamic State. As a western media outlet, the audience that *ABC* has is completely different to the one that consumes propaganda published by the Islamic State (ISIS), therefore the images reach a more extensive audience than if they were released by the terrorist organisation.

If we look at the headlines and the content of the articles that *ABC* released on the day of the attacks, besides the images and videos, many articles set out a detailed chronology of how the attacks had occurred and several declarations of victims of the perpetrations (see annexe Figure 5). These accounts help to narrow down the emotional connection between the readers and the victims of La Rambla and Cambrils. When you receive such personal statements from victims and witnesses, you feel the attack much closer and therefore have an increased sense that the same might happen to you.

In general terms, on the first day analysed for the coverage of the 2017 Barcelona attacks *ABC* tried to make sense of what had happened and express utter shock and disbelief. The following day, on the 18th of August, the news outlet began introducing more emotional discourse to their articles. A positive point to be made about coverage of the attacks on this day is that *ABC* spread a message of unity towards Catalonia and Spain, the central and regional governments, the security forces, and citizens across the country. *ABC* tried to convey strength in unity as opposed to the will of detachment and disengagement that terrorists have.

On the 19th of August, there is a shift in the way that *ABC* approaches the attacks. If we look at annexe Figure 5, we can see how it becomes more sensationalist. It no longer

reports what happened in the streets of Catalonia but discusses topics such as the Islamic State and its connection to Al-Andalus, the Jihad, Islam, and Younes Abouyaaqoub. The newspaper begins to give terrorists the same *celebrity status* that *Libération* gave to the perpetrators of the Paris 2015 attacks. *ABC* also focuses on the increasing threat of radicalisation in Catalonia and its status as a jihadist hotspot. A peculiar aspect of some of the articles on this day is that there is less of the sense of unity that was emphasised the day before. On the 19th, *ABC* went on to highlight the lack of police cooperation with regard to this attack. Terrorists seek to create chaos and separation among citizens and the government. *ABC* not only highlights the state of panic and fear but also conveys a sense of insecurity by publishing articles as such given that the police forces are there to protect the population.

El País

When researching the coverage of the attacks, we find that *El País* is the second Spanish newspaper analysed that produced the most articles themed around the events that took place in Barcelona and Cambrils. A total of 81 articles were published between the 17th and 19th of August, but coverage rose abruptly the day after the attack and continued to grow two days later.

Date	Number of articles
17/8/17	7
18/8/17	34
19/8/17	40
Total	**81**

Table 5: Number of articles published by *El País*
Source*:* Author's own elaboration based on the quantification of articles published by *El País*

Among these 81 articles, there seems to be a pattern in connecting Spain with the rise of terrorist activities and the threat of radicalisation (see annexe Figure 6). As Reinares (2017) highlights, Barcelona and Catalonia occupy a prominent place in the trajectory of jihadist terrorism in Spain. He continues to explain that four out of ten of those convicted of terrorist activities were based in the province of Barcelona (Reinares, 2017). The public is already shaken by what happened in Barcelona and Cambrils, so adding even

more stress to the issue intensifies the impact that terrorists have on the public when it comes to carrying out an attack.

There are two styles of coverage related to the attacks: one has to do with the political response of the central and autonomous governments, and the other is based on delivering emotional and high-impact stories. The articles commenting on the late communication between the two governments and the call for unity by Mariano Rajoy, President of the government at the time, make it seem that the state and the regional government of Catalonia are in a moment of weakness. Often the strategy of terrorist organisations, especially when they operate in the Middle East, is to make citizens realise that the state is obsolete and weak. Once they internalise this, the idea is to make them believe that these terrorist organisations have the answer to their problems (Crenshaw, 1981). The tactic used when committing attacks in the West is different, however, we must take into account that one of the target audiences of terrorist organisations are sympathisers all around the world. The idea would be to lure them in into joining the Jihad - by highlighting the failures of Western governments, terrorists can gradually create a negative image of Western governments in the heads of their sympathisers and lead them to believe that following the path of jihad is the purest and most appropriate option. Therefore, by publishing articles of this nature, El País is helping to construct the narrative that the terrorists are hoping for.

The articles which deliver the emotional stories are characterised by using punchy and high-impact headlines which are not necessarily sensationalist but do catch the reader's eye. Some examples of these are: *La inociencia perdida (Amón, 2017), Todo empezó en Alcanar (Ramos-Salvat & Barroso, 2017), El ISIS, acorralado en sus feudos antes del ataque de Barcelona (Sanz, 2017), Terroristas Muertos (El País, 2017)*[21]. Headlines constructed in this way increase the recipients' interest and persuade them to read the article. once inside, we can see that the vocabulary used describes a gut-wrenching scenario. In addition to this, the article *La Inocencia perdida* (Amón, 2017) is especially powerful because of its content. This publication serves as a wake-up call for all the

[21] 'The lost innocence'; 'It all started in Alcanar'; 'ISIS cornered in its fiefdoms before Barcelona attack'; 'Terrorists Dead'. (Translations made by the author).

people in Spain who felt immune to terrorist attacks. Many felt reassured by the work carried out by the Spanish intelligence and security forces in neutralising attacks and dismantling terrorist cells in Spain. According to Amón (2017), others had the feeling that the quota of terrorist attacks was already full after the terrorism of ETA or the Madrid 2004 train bombings. The author stresses the need for Spanish people to familiarise themselves with the ferocity of jihadism because, as ISIS points out in their propaganda, Spain (Al-Ándalus) is also being targeted – the problem is no longer foreign to the Spanish.

These articles, along with those reporting on terrorist alert levels, contribute to terrorising citizens and making them feel unsafe to go out on the streets. This is especially relevant as some articles report on the safety measures taken in other cities far away from where the attacks took place. Surveillance measures were stepped up in many parts of Spain as the search for the suspects of the attacks was ongoing and the absence of information on other attacks taking place. When examining the articles released these days by *El País*, we can observe that they may have had a negative influence on the psychology of the readers. The public's panic in the face of terrorist attacks may have been reinforced after reading articles like these. Publications like Amón's (2017) help to deepen that sense of uncertainty over the possibility that one might also be a victim of an attack.

El Mundo

After pointing out once again the exorbitant number of articles released by the newspaper *ABC*, the share of publications written about the attacks by the journalists of *El Mundo* seems more appropriate. This being said, when compared to the French newspaper *Libération, El Mundo* doubles the number of articles. This number intensified the day after the attacks as we saw with *ABC*.

Date	Number of articles
17/8/17	1
18/8/17	10
19/8/17	6
Total	**17**

Table 6: Number of articles published by *El Mundo*
Source*:* Author's own elaboration based on the quantification of articles published by *El Mundo*

El Mundo appears to be the least sensationalist and most neutral newspaper of all the ones analysed in this section. If we examine the headlines (see annexe Figure 7) we can observe that the information on the attacks is conveyed clearly and concisely and without embellishments. It appears as *El Mundo* does not fall into the terrorist's trap as other newspapers do by giving them free publicity.

With this in mind, we could mention that, if the sole objective of the newspaper *El Mundo* was to inform the people about the attacks, they could have published fewer articles instead of repeating the information several times. Instead, we could argue that, while remaining cautious, *El Mundo* did slightly stretch out the Barcelona attacks. An example of this can be the various headlines dedicated to some individuals that were victims of the attacks. One of the journalists working for *El Mundo*, Ana Ortiz (2017), wrote a very emotive piece describing the apparently normal Thursday that the victims *Xavi* and *Paco* were having before being caught up in the rampage. The writer knows how to play with the emotions of the readers – she uses the story of a young child and his grandfather to put on display the tragedy of the events. Because this is such a heartbreaking article, it plays along with the terrorists' intentions of psychologically harming and perturbating people. This does not mean that Ortiz's (2017) actions had the intention of aiding terrorists, but that in the process of increasing readership and connections with the readers, she involuntarily contributed to advancing those objectives.

El Mundo is an example of a newspaper trying to be cautious about the number of articles published about a terrorist attack and the organisation that has perpetrated such an attack. However, before they are published, media outlets should take the time

to assess whether or not the content of those few articles is sensationalist or serve to instil fear in the public and thus help terrorist organisations achieve their goal.

5.7 Categorising the relationship between the media and terrorism

As we have seen, media reporting is sometimes associated with the idea that it has caused or at least intensified the threat of terrorism because they have supposedly helped terrorists in demonstrating their credibility by covering their atrocities. Michel Wieviorka (1993) distinguishes four distinct relationships between the media and terrorist organisations:

The first category referred to as *pure intelligence*, is when terrorists do not seek to terrorise the population beyond the intended victims, and therefore avoid wasting time on producing propaganda. This category seems to be slightly unreal as we know that one of the objectives of terrorism is to reach an audience as wide as possible to create a sense of threat, and gain credibility and supporters. Furthermore, even if the aim was to create that sense of panic amongst a targeted audience, communication still has to flow from the terrorist group to the intended public.

The second category is called *relative indifference* and deals with the disinterest of terrorists in making headlines in the news. This category points out that terrorist organisations have already established other channels of communication with the audience e.g., social media platforms, and thus feel that appearing in the newspapers, broadcasts and radio programmes is not essential. This category could be erased as it implies that there is no actual relationship between the two objects.

Wieviorka (1993) names the third relational model the *media-oriented strategy*. This is an instrumental relationship between the media and terrorism and the one on which this study is focused. The author explains what has been mentioned beforehand throughout this text – a relationship with the media is intrinsic to the nature and activity of terrorists. Media is used in some way or another for terrorisation purposes, to disseminate messages and create fear. Terrorists provoke the media into covering their attacks Wieviorka (1993).

Finally, the fourth model describes a *total break* in the relationship in the sense that terrorist organisations resort to the coercion of media organisations, journalists, and broadcasters. Wieviorka (1993) defends the idea that in this type of relation, terrorists view the media organisations as enemies and targets of their attacks. An example of this is the Charlie Hebdo shooting of 2015. On January 7th, two armed men entered the offices of the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo. The attack resulted in twelve deaths (including columnists, editors, and cartoonists) and eleven injured. A week after the events, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAB)[22], released a video on YouTube claiming the attacks and informing us they were made as vengeance for a cartoon published about Prophet Mohammed (France 24, 2015).

This last category does not imply that the relationship between the media and terrorist organisations has become non-instrumental. Despite the many attacks on journalists and media organisations, terrorists continue to acknowledge the relevancy of maintaining an instrumental relationship with media outlets (Wilkinson, 2006). However hostile they may appear, the media's coverage of attacks continues to be essential for terrorists and the achievement of their objectives.

5.8 The utility of terrorist activities

Using the findings from the analysis of the French and Spanish coverage of attacks and taking into account the above-mentioned, we can see how the media instrumentalises the terrorists attacks as Wieviorka's (1993) *media-oriented* model explains. Media outlets, besides informing the public about relevant events, take advantage of those incidents to produce as many articles as possible. Those publications, as we have seen, bend towards sensationalism because it is eye-catching. Increasing readership grows the marginal profits of reporting on the attacks. In addition, terrorists are aware of the influence they have on the media and rejoice in the free publicity they obtain. As discussed, media presence is imperative for terrorist organisations because it is the channel through which they make their actions known.

In relation to this theory and tying it back to game theory, the assumption is that terrorists and the media share a symbiotic relationship. This relationship was tested by

[22] Al-Qaeda's branch in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

Rohner & Frey (2007) using utility functions. The objective of their study was to formulate a common-interest game between the media and terrorism to find out the utility of terrorist organisations in conducting attacks and the utility of the media in reporting on terrorism.

Benefits for terrorist organisations

$$uT = \alpha QST\hat{}\theta + \beta L$$

If terrorist attacks (T) increase, so does the share of news (Q) and, as a result, so does the readership. If the coverage and the audience grow, the utility of terrorist organisations in planning and conducting those attacks also grows. The more sensationalist (S) the articles are, the more people read it and the bigger the impact. Rohner & Frey (2007) assume that there is a positive correlation between terrorism-devoted news and the utility of terrorists.

The media is a multiplying parameter (α) of the benefits that terrorists get from conducting an attack. These benefits are intrinsic and exogenous to terrorists themselves and include things such as subsidising funds, support, and ideological factors. The utility dependency of the function increases if these do so too. As mentioned, the media coverage of terrorist activities acts as a multiplier effect because increasing the coverage increases the motivations of terrorists to carry out more attacks. The more articles are released and the wider the audience is the more powerful economically and ideologically, and thus influential, they become (Rohner & Frey, 2007).

This multiplier effect comes from two sources: the number of articles devoted to terrorism, and the level of sensationalism used to write about it. As Rohner & Frey (2007) point out, sensationalist news help terrorist organisations establish a well-known brand, which facilitates fundraising and notoriety. The result of this is that sensationalist news fit the objectives of terrorist organisations.

Benefits for the media

$$uM = \chi TSQ^{\rho} + \delta R$$

As discussed, the utility of terrorist organisations is to increase notoriety, power, and ideological support (among others). For media outlets, utility comes from the amount

of profit they are able to generate. For this reason, the media have to choose if they allocate the available spaces in an issue to articles on terrorism (T) or articles covering other topics (Q). In the utility function of terrorist organisations, it is mentioned that readership increases with sensationalism, therefore Rohner & Frey (2007) conclude that media gains from terrorism increase with sensationalism. The more terrorist acts are committed, the greater the public's interest (χ) in them and the more that the media can publish on the matter. Utility for the media increases with the time that terrorist spend planning or conducting those attacks.

The optimal amount of time for terrorist to devote to conducting attacks and the optimal number of articles to write about those attacks depend on each other. The time that terrorist organisations choose to spend on those activities is influenced by the decision of the media to cover them. If terrorist act but the media does not write about it, the payoff for terrorists is zero. However, the media will still gain some profit for the articles that they publish on other topics. In the case that there were no attacks, terrorists dedicated their time to other activities, and the media chose to write about non-existent attacks the profit for the media would be zero because people won't read about events that have not occurred. The action profile of Nash equilibrium would be the best outcome given the choices of the players. If terrorist were to dedicate most of their time to planning and committing terror attack and the media chose to write sensationalist articles about these, both players would be benefitted from the choices of the other.

6. CONCLUSION

The present study has tried to find evidence that supports the main objective – if the relationship between the media and terrorist organisations is symbiotic. One of the pillars of terrorism is communication: if they do not find a way to communicate their actions, they not only fail to achieve the impact on the public that they hoped for, but they also fail to advance other objectives like legitimacy and notoriety. As mentioned in the last section of the study, terrorist organisations choose to allocate time and resources on attacks based on the repercussion and impact that they have.

On the other hand, for reasons of economic subsistence, media outlets have to find topics to write about that their audience will find interesting to increase readership. Terrorist attacks, because of their nature, increase newspaper sales. For this reason, if the opportunity presents itself, media outlets will write about those attacks as much as possible to maximise sales and profits.

As we have seen, there is a common-interest game between the media and terrorist organisations because they act accordingly to how the other player decides to act. Terrorists choose to act because they know that the media will report about it. The more spectacular and impressive they become, the more intense the coverage will be. The media decide to allocate spaces to publications themed around terrorism because they are aware of the attention these are given. In addition, the more sensationalist the news is, the more people are attracted to read the article. This refers back to the second specific objective which looks to determine if media organisations look to increase readership through the publication and/or over publication of sensationalist articles. Based on the theories provided and the common-interest game, we could say that this objective was achieved.

Throughout this investigation, we have seen that oftentimes, the media publishes an excessive number of articles related to an attack. The most notorious example is *Le Figaro's* coverage of the November 13th Paris attacks. When one notices how media outlets take advantage of an atrocity as such, one starts to wonder where the ethics in news coverage lies. There are other newspapers analysed that did abstain from creating that plethora of newspaper articles. However, they took advantage of readers'

vulnerability to publish devastating articles about the victims of the perpetrations, while generating further panic and fear over the possibility of being caught up in another attack like the one reported. From this, we can determine that the first specific objective of determining whether the content of the articles were purely informational, or sensationalist was achieved.

Just like the many authors mentioned throughout the investigation, media outlets seem to be unaware of the possible harm that they can inflict on the public when massively covering terrorist attacks. They not only allow terrorist to receive free publicity, but they also help them to cause psychological abuse by creating a constant state of fear in the minds of the population. In addition to this, when they create stories on the personal lives of the terrorists implicated in the attacks, they give them the *celebrity status* that they wish to achieve in the minds of their supporters. When they share propagandistic videos, the explicit images of the victims and the messages that terrorist organisations send out to claim the attacks, media outlets are bringing terrorist organisations closed to those at risk of radicalisation.

Based on the findings of the investigation and referring to the main objective of this dissertation, we can establish that the media and terrorist organisations share a symbiotic relationship. Terrorists follow the media-oriented model presented by Wieviorka (1993) because of the positive impact that media coverage has on the achievement of the terrorist's objectives. The success of the attacks increases the more articles are published on them, and the fear and psychological distress of the public intensifies with the media's coverage of the attacks. On the other hand, the media generate articles themed around those terrorist attacks, not only because the public needs to be informed about them, but also because of the interest they evoke. The more sensationalist the news are, the greater the reader's interest in those stories. We can conclude thereafter that the media cover the attacks for informational purposes, but also in order to generate profits.

One expects terrorist organisations to use and coerce the media into sharing information they want to disseminate, but it is worrying to learn that the media willingly succumb to the aims of terrorist organisations in order to maximise their profits. This

analysis allows us to evaluate the role of the media in times of crisis following terrorist attacks. We could say that the media should focus on transmitting information as neutrally as possible to prevent the impact of terrorist acts from being greater. Even if newspapers need to generate economic returns, they have to take into account the importance of security and the well-being of citizens. Having this in mind and tying back to the quote used at the beginning, we should try to avoid becoming the unwitting accomplices of terrorists and their merchants of fear (Samuelson, 2001).

7. LIMITATIONS

Throughout the development of this dissertation, the author encountered several difficulties related to various aspects of the investigation.

The proposed object of research turned out to be very broad and contained an excess of material. The initial idea was to analyse terrorist attacks in several European countries: France, Germany, Spain, and the UK. However, as the research progressed, it became clear that there was too much information to analyse given the length required for this dissertation. Therefore, it was decided to focus only on the Barcelona and Paris attacks.

Moreover, a better investigation would have required even more newspaper research, which would have allowed a more concrete conclusion to be drawn regarding the objectives of the dissertation. As mentioned above, the length of this work has made it impossible to develop some issues further.

Another aspect that was initially considered was to analyse the media coverage of the terrorist attacks by media outlets in Middle Eastern countries. This would have helped to further understand the relationship between the media and terrorist organisations and determine whether the phenomenon that this dissertation has attempted to demonstrate is particular to Western media, or whether it occurs in other regions of the world.

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9. ANNEXE

Figure 1: Chronology of the dissemination of information related to the attacks within the first hours

Source: CRÉDOC based on *Le Figaro* (*Attentats au Stade de France: le déroulé d'une soirée dramatique, 2015*)

Encadré 1 : Chronologie des attentats et de la diffusion des informations dans les médias

	Evénement	*Diffusion médiatique*
21h17-21h20	Attaque suicide à l'explosif aux abords du Stade de France	*Explosion entendue par les occupants du Stade de France et des téléspectateurs du match. Premiers tweets des spectateurs faisant allusion à des « pétards ».*
21h19-21h30	Seconde attaque suicide à l'explosif aux abords du Stade de France	
21h25	Fusillade rues Bichat et Alibert, aux terrasses du « Carillon » et du « Petit Cambodge »	
21h32	Fusillade rue de la Fontaine-au-Roi, devant « À la Bonne Bière »	
21h35		*Diffusion sur les réseaux sociaux de photographies de victimes de la rue de Charonne.*
21h36	Fusillade rue de Charonne, à la terrasse de « La Belle Equipe »	
21h40	Attaque-suicide à l'explosif dans le « Comptoir Voltaire » sur le boulevard Voltaire.	
	Début des tirs au Bataclan	
21h45	Fin du premier temps de match au Stade de France.	*Les spectateurs du stade n'ont pas connaissance des attentats.*
21h49		*Un journaliste d'Europe 1, présent au Bataclan, communique sur Twitter à propos de coups de feu. Une autre personne présente au Bataclan lance un appel de détresse sur Facebook*
21h51	Intervention de la BAC de nuit du Val-de-Marne aux abords du Bataclan	
21h53	Troisième attaque-suicide à l'explosif au stade de France.	
21h57		*Diffusion de photos des secours rue Bichat sur Twitter*
22h	Prise d'otages au Bataclan	
Entre 21h30 et 22h		*Premières informations sur les chaînes télévision d'actualité en direct BFMTV et I-télé notamment Premiers fils d'actualité « live » sur les sites de journaux d'information (Le Monde, le Figaro, Le Parisien…)*
22h15	Entrée de la BRI au Bataclan	
Vers 22h30		*Diffusion de vidéos d'une des explosions ayant eu lieu au Stade de France sur Twitter*
22h50		*TF1 commence la diffusion d'une édition spéciale sur les attentats en basculant son antenne vers LCI.*
22h48	Arrivée de l'équipe rapide d'intervention du RAID au Bataclan	
22h57		*Édition spéciale de Soir 3 sur France 3, consacrée aux attentats*
0h00		*Interruption des programmes de France 2 pour une allocation du Président de la République*
0h18	Assaut donné par la BRI au premier étage du Bataclan	
0h58	Fin de l'attaque du Bataclan	
Après 1h		*Activation du Safety Check de Facebook Initiatives #PorteOuverte et partage de photographies de victimes présumées sur Twitter Lancement du hashtag #dondusang sur Twitter*

Figure 2: Articles published by *Le Figaro* themed around the attacks (13th – 16th of November 2015)

	Headline	Date	Translation
1	Plusieurs explosions près du Stade de France	13/11/15	Several explosions near the Stade de France
2	VIDÉO - Attentats à Paris: Hollande décrète l'état d'urgence sur tout le territoire	13/11/15	VIDEO - Paris attacks: Hollande declares a state of emergency throughout the country
3	Face à la menace terroriste, la légitime défense doit évoluer	13/11/15	In the face of the terrorist threat, self-defence must evolve
4	Attentats à Paris : Daech revendique les attaques	13/11/15	Paris attacks: Daesh claims responsibility for attacks
5	Attentats de Paris : «Oui, la patrie est en danger»	13/11/15	Paris attacks: "Yes, the country is in danger
6	Le Stade de France secoué par des attentats	13/11/15	The Stade de France shaken by attacks
7	«Ma copine était au concert, je devais me fiancer avec elle, je ne sais pas si je la reverrai»	14/11/15	My girlfriend was at the concert, I had to get engaged to her, I don't know if I'll see her again
8	Attaques de Paris : «Ceux qui sortaient leurs portables étaient exécutés au Bataclan»	14/11/15	Paris attacks: "Those who took out their mobile phones were executed at the Bataclan"
9	Ne pas faire la guerre avec les armes de la paix	14/11/15	Do not wage war with the weapons of peace
10	L'État islamique profite des divergences de ses ennemis	14/11/15	Islamic State takes advantage of its enemies' differences
11	Ambiance ville morte près des grands magasins de Paris	14/11/15	Dead city atmosphere near Paris department stores
12	Le juge Marc Trévidic : «Leur haine ne va pas s'arrêter là»	14/11/15	Judge Marc Trévidic: "Their hatred is not going to stop there"
13	«J'ai connu l'Occupation. Je ne vais pas céder à la terreur maintenant»	14/11/15	I knew the Occupation. I will not give into terror now.
14	Au Bataclan, la fusillade éclate au son de Kiss the Devil	14/11/15	At the Bataclan, the shooting erupts to the sound of Kiss the Devil
15	Pourquoi les chaînes de télévision n'ont pas retransmis en direct l'assaut du Bataclan	14/11/15	Why the TV stations did not broadcast the Bataclan attack live
16	«Ils ont touché un fief de la jeunesse parisienne»	14/11/15	They hit a stronghold of Parisian youth
17	Hollande à nouveau confronté à «l'horreur» du terrorisme	14/11/15	Hollande again confronted with the "horror" of terrorism
18	Antiterrorisme : un arsenal renforcé mais sous-dimensionné	14/11/15	Anti-terrorism: an arsenal reinforced but under-dimensioned
19	Le propriétaire du Bataclan : «Les mecs étaient armés jusqu'aux dents»	14/11/15	The owner of the Bataclan: "The guys were armed up to their teeth"
20	Terrorisme : Manuel Valls «prêt à examiner toutes les solutions», même celles de la droite	14/11/15	Terrorism: Manuel Valls "ready to examine all solutions", even those of the right
21	Audiences : 5,7 millions de téléspectateurs pour France-Allemagne, marqué par des explosions	14/11/15	France-Germany: 5.7 million viewers for the game, marked by explosions
22	21h17 au Stade de France, le bruit d'une explosion retentit	14/11/15	9.17pm at the Stade de France, the sound of an explosion resounds
23	Les premières attaques kamikazes perpétrées en France	14/11/15	The first kamikaze attacks in France
24	Lewis Hamilton a une pensée pour Paris	14/11/15	Lewis Hamilton has a thought for Paris
25	Romain Grosjean portera un brassard hommage aux victimes	14/11/15	Romain Grosjean to wear armband in tribute to victims
26	Pascal Bruckner : «C'est notre civilisation qu'ils veulent détruire»	14/11/15	Pascal Bruckner: "It is our civilisation that they want to destroy
27	Six attaques en 33 minutes : chronologie d'une nuit d'horreur	14/11/15	Six attacks in 33 minutes: chronology of a night of horror
28	Attaques terroristes sans précédent en plein Paris	14/11/15	Unprecedented terrorist attacks in Paris
29	Ibrahimovic solidaire avec Paris	14/11/15	Ibrahimovic in solidarity with Paris
30	«Acte de guerre», deuil national, le Parlement réuni en Congrès : l'essentiel de la déclaration de Hollande	14/11/15	Act of war, national mourning, the Parliament gathered in Congress: the essence of Hollande's statement
31	VIDÉO - Hollande annonce un combat "impitoyable" face au terrorisme	14/11/15	VIDEO - Hollande announces a "merciless" fight against terrorism
32	Fin de l'assaut au Bataclan, deux terroristes abattus	14/11/15	The end of the assault at the Bataclan, two terrorists shot dead
33	Au Stade de France, l'un des kamikazes détiendrait un passeport syrien	14/11/15	At the Stade de France, one of the suicide bombers is believed to have a Syrian passport
34	Le déroulé d'une soirée dramatique	14/11/15	The course of a dramatic evening
35	Pourquoi regardons-nous des images et vidéos morbides ?	14/11/15	Why do we watch morbid images and videos?
36	Images de guerre au cœur de Paris : comment en parler aux enfants	14/11/15	Images of war in the heart of Paris: how to talk to children
37	Attentats à Paris : 127 morts, environ 180 blessés dont 80 en "urgence absolue"	14/11/15	Paris attacks: 127 dead, around 180 injured, 80 in "absolute emergency
38	Attentats: Hollande a rencontré des blessés et le personnel soignant à l'hôpital parisien Saint-Antoine	14/11/15	Paris attacks: Hollande met with wounded and nursing staff at Saint-Antoine hospital in Paris
39	Attentats de Paris : un nouveau bilan recense au moins 129 morts et 352 blessés (procureur)	14/11/15	Paris bombings: new death toll at least 129 and 352 injured (prosecutor)
40	Hollande: «C'est un acte de guerre»	14/11/15	Hollande: "This is an act of war
41	Jérôme Fourquet (Ifop) : «Le sentiment d'insécurité monte crescendo dans le pays»	14/11/15	Jérôme Fourquet (Ifop): "The feeling of insecurity is rising crescendo in the country"
42	François Hollande décrète l'état d'urgence	14/11/15	François Hollande declares a state of emergency
43	Attaques à Paris : une unité nationale "difficile"	14/11/15	Paris attacks: a "difficult" national unity

44	Marché de l'art : «C'est comme le 11 septembre»	14/11/15	Art market: "It's like September 11".
45	Adel Abdessemed : «Je sais comment on recrute les jeunes»	14/11/15	Adel Abdessemed: "I know how young people are recruited"
46	Quand le terrorisme frappe des événements sportifs	14/11/15	When terrorism strikes sporting events
47	Terrorisme : l'Europe relève sa garde en urgence	14/11/15	Terrorism: Europe raises its guard as a matter of urgency
48	Dans les hôpitaux parisiens, les chirurgiens pratiquent la médecine de guerre	14/11/15	In Paris hospitals, surgeons practice war medicine
49	Trois frères impliqués dans les attaques, l'un recherché activement	14/11/15	Three brothers involved in the attacks, one actively sought
50	Le jour d'après, le syndrome du survivant	14/11/15	The day after, the survivor syndrome
51	Attaques de Paris : un rassemblement spontané à Dublin	14/11/15	Paris attacks: a spontaneous rally in Dublin
52	L'un des terroristes du stade de France est passé par la Grèce	14/11/15	One of the Stade de France terrorists passed through Greece
53	A Paris, des Français rendent hommage aux victimes	14/11/15	French people in Paris pay tribute to the victims
54	Le pape François : «Je pense aux Français et aux proches des victimes»	14/11/15	Pope Francis: "My thoughts are with the French and the victims' relatives
55	Hôpital Pompidou : «On a passé une nuit terrible»	14/11/15	Pompidou Hospital: "We had a terrible night
56	«La France est sortie de 70 ans de paix»	14/11/15	France has come out of 70 years of peace
57	Johnny Hallyday, Bono... Le monde de la musique «dévasté» après les attentats	14/11/15	Johnny Hallyday, Bono... The music world "devastated" after the attacks
58	Attentats de Paris : les musiciens des Eagles of Death Metal sains et saufs	14/11/15	Paris attacks: Eagles of Death Metal musicians safe and sound
59	Attentats de Paris : les réactions des chefs d'état étrangers à travers le monde	14/11/15	Paris attacks: reactions of foreign heads of state around the world
60	Bruxelles : un homme arrêté lors de perquisitions liées aux attentats de Paris	14/11/15	Brussels: a man arrested during searches linked to the Paris attacks
61	Attentats : Laurent Ruquier prépare une émission spéciale sur France 2	14/11/15	Attacks: Laurent Ruquier prepares a special show on France 2
62	Attentats de Paris : le point sur l'enquête 24 heures après les faits	14/11/15	Paris bombings: an update on the investigation 24 hours after the event
63	#PrayForParis: après les attentats à Paris, l'émotion et la solidarité sur les réseaux sociaux	14/11/15	#PrayForParis: after the attacks in Paris, emotion and solidarity on social networks
64	Attentats de Paris : comment les télévisions du monde entier ont annoncé la nouvelle	14/11/15	Paris attacks: how television stations around the world announced the news
65	Attentats de Paris : deux personnes proches d'un des kamikazes en garde à vue, suivez notre Live	14/11/15	Paris attacks: two people close to one of the suicide bombers in custody, follow our Live
66	Attentats de Paris: trois frères impliqués, dont un peut-être en fuite	14/11/15	Paris bombings: three brothers involved, one possibly on the run
67	Joann Sfar : un récit BD poignant en réaction aux attentats de Paris	14/11/15	Joann Sfar: a poignant comic book story in reaction to the Paris attacks
68	Sarkozy : «La guerre que nous devons livrer doit être totale»	14/11/15	Sarkozy: "The war we have to wage must be total"
69	Marine Le Pen : «Retrouver la maîtrise de nos frontières nationales définitivement»	14/11/15	Marine Le Pen: "Regain control of our national borders for good"
70	Le scénario noir tant redouté par les forces de l'ordre et les services de renseignement	14/11/15	The black scenario so feared by the police and the intelligence services
71	Fabius : «Il faut que la lutte internationale contre le terrorisme se renforce»	14/11/15	Fabius: "The international fight against terrorism must be strengthened
72	Daech menace la France de nouvelles violences	14/11/15	Daesh threatens France with new violence
73	Attentat au Stade de France: C'est mon portable qui m'a sauvé	14/11/15	Stade de France bombing: It was my mobile phone that saved me
74	L'attentat le plus meurtrier en Europe, après Madrid en 2004	14/11/15	The deadliest attack in Europe, after Madrid in 2004
75	Attentat au Bataclan : des fleurs et mots de soutien en signe de solidarité	14/11/15	The Bataclan attack: flowers and words of support as a sign of solidarity
76	Attentats à Paris : le monde entier solidaire de la France	14/11/15	Paris attacks: the whole world shows solidarity with France
77	VIDÉO - L'Etat islamique revendique les attentats de Paris	14/11/15	VIDEO - Islamic State claims responsibility for Paris attacks
78	VIDÉO - Attentats de Paris: cinq assaillants "neutralisés"	14/11/15	VIDEO - Paris attacks: five attackers "neutralised"
79	Les forces de sécurité en «alerte maximale» après les attentats	14/11/15	Security forces on "high alert" after attacks
80	Sécurité renforcée à New York après les attentats de Paris	14/11/15	Security tightened in New York after Paris attacks
81	Attentats du 13 novembre : Les réactions émouvantes des stars	14/11/15	Paris attacks: The emotional reactions of the stars
82	Le drapeau français se répand sur les réseaux en réaction aux attentats	14/11/15	French flag spreads on networks in reaction to the attacks
83	Attentats de Paris : "trois équipes de terroristes coordonnées" (procureur)	14/11/15	Paris attacks: "three teams of coordinated terrorists" (prosecutor)
84	Attentats de Paris : un coup dur pour le secteur du tourisme	14/11/15	Paris attacks: a blow for the tourism sector
85	Attentats de Paris : des rassemblements en hommage aux victimes partout en France	14/11/15	Paris attacks: rallies in tribute to victims across France
86	Attentats à Paris : les chaînes de télévision bouleversent leurs grilles	14/11/15	Paris attacks: TV channels shake up their schedules

87	Attentats à Paris : comment se mettre en sécurité ?	14/11/15	Paris attacks: how to be safe?
88	Attentats à Paris : le point sur ce qu'il s'est passé et ce que l'on sait	14/11/15	Paris attacks: what happened and what we know
89	L'Etat Islamique revendique les attentats à Paris	14/11/15	The Islamic State claims responsibility for the Paris attacks
90	Attentats à Paris : les premiers éléments de l'enquête	14/11/15	Paris attacks: the first elements of the investigation
91	Attentats de Paris : la chronologie des attaques en images	14/11/15	Paris attacks: the chronology of the attacks in pictures
92	Attentats à Paris : les six lieux des attaques	14/11/15	Paris attacks: the six locations of the attacks
93	Attentats de Paris : les premiers détails sur les terroristes	14/11/15	Paris attacks: the first details on the terrorists
94	Attentats de Paris : perquisitions en cours dans l'est de la France	14/11/15	Paris attacks: searches underway in eastern France
95	Attentats de Paris : les enquêteurs sur la piste «syrienne»	14/11/15	Paris attacks: investigators on the "Syrian" trail
96	Huit terroristes sont morts dans les attentats	14/11/15	Eight terrorists died in the attacks
97	La sécurité renforcée après les attentats	14/11/15	Security tightened after the attacks
98	L'impact incertain des attentats sur l'économie	14/11/15	The uncertain impact of the attacks on the economy
99	Attentats : pas de précipitation pour donner son sang	14/11/15	Attacks: no rush to give blood
100	Attentats de Paris : des victimes étrangères	14/11/15	Paris attacks: foreign victims
101	Le monde du classique réagit aux attentats	14/11/15	The world of classical music reacts to the attacks
102	Attentats de Paris : le jour d'après	14/11/15	Paris attacks: the day after
103	Après les attentats, Paris survit	14/11/15	After the attacks, Paris survives
104	Le «plan blanc», un outil pour gérer les situations de crise dans les hôpitaux	14/11/15	The "white plan", a tool for managing crisis situations in hospitals
105	Attentats de Paris : comment ne pas céder à la paranoïa ?	14/11/15	Paris attacks: how not to give in to paranoia?
106	Trois heures d'enfer au Bataclan	15/11/15	Three hours of hell at the Bataclan
107	Comment faire la guerre à l'État islamique	15/11/15	How to wage war on the Islamic State
108	L'islam de France démuni face à la puissance des réseaux sociaux	15/11/15	The Islam of France is powerless against the power of social networks
109	L'Est parisien, épicentre de la vie nocturne visé par Daech	15/11/15	The epicentre of nightlife in eastern Paris targeted by Daesh
110	Expulsion, déchéance de nationalité : les moyens légaux pour contrer la radicalisation	15/11/15	A new approach to the fight against radicalisation in France
111	Mouvements de panique dans le centre de Paris suite à une fausse alerte	15/11/15	Panic in central Paris after false alarm
112	L'un des kamikazes du Stade de France est bien passé par la Grèce	15/11/15	One of the Stade de France suicide bombers did pass through Greece
113	Bono dans Le Grand Journal : «Ces terroristes ont détourné l'islam, c'est une insulte à cette religion»	15/11/15	Bono in Le Grand Journal: "These terrorists have hijacked Islam, it is an insult to this religion"
114	Ismaël, petit délinquant radicalisé devenu l'un des tueurs du Bataclan	15/11/15	Ismael, a small radicalised delinquent who became one of the Bataclan killers
115	Terrorisme : une justice toujours déficiente	15/11/15	Terrorism: a still deficient justice
116	Quand les cinéastes s'emparent du terrorisme	15/11/15	When filmmakers take on terrorism
117	À l'école, une minute de silence sous tension	15/11/15	A minute's silence at school under tension
118	L'expulsion d'imams radicaux ne suffit plus, assurent les experts	15/11/15	The expulsion of radical imams is no longer enough, experts say
119	Bruno Le Maire : «Notre combat contre l'islamisme radical doit aller plus loin»	15/11/15	Bruno Le Maire: "Our fight against radical Islamism must go further"
120	La France bombarde «massivement» le fief de l'État islamique à Raqa, suivez notre live	15/11/15	France bombs Islamic State stronghold in Raqa "massively", follow our live
121	Gilles Kepel: «Daech veut montrer qu'il frappe où il veut»	15/11/15	Gilles Kepel: " Daesh wants to show that it strikes where it wants"
122	Des «psy» mobilisés au chevet de ceux qui ont vécu l'imminence de leur mort	15/11/15	Shrinks mobilised at the bedside of those who have experienced the imminence of their death
123	Daech veut désormais frapper l'ennemi hors du califat	15/11/15	Daesh now wants to strike the enemy outside the caliphate
124	Minute de silence, sécurité des écoles : l'inquiétude des parents	15/11/15	Parents concerned about silence and school security
125	Cazeneuve annonce la "dissolution de mosquées qui profèrent la haine", suivez notre live	15/11/15	Cazeneuve announces the "dissolution of mosques that profess hatred", follow our live
126	Joann Sfar : Daech, «régiment de pirates qui n'a rien d'un état»	15/11/15	Joann Sfar : Daesh, "a regiment of pirates that has nothing to do with a state".
127	Le monde du sport rend hommage à la France	15/11/15	The world of sport pays tribute to France
128	L'hommage de Madonna aux victimes des attaques de Paris	15/11/15	Madonna's tribute to the victims of the Paris attacks
129	"Nous sommes prêts à être braves et forts face aux ennemis"	15/11/15	We are ready to be brave and strong in the face of enemies
130	Du dimanche 11 janvier au dimanche 15 novembre	15/11/15	From Sunday 11 January to Sunday 15 November
131	Boualem Sansal : «La France laïque, adversaire majeur des islamistes»	15/11/15	Boualem Sansal: "Secular France, major opponent of the Islamists

132	Les médias anglais appellent les supporters à chanter La Marseillaise à Wembley	15/11/15	English media call on fans to sing La Marseillaise at Wembley
133	Mouvements de panique à Paris après une fausse alerte	15/11/15	Panic in Paris after false alarm
134	Adieu Véronique...	15/11/15	Farewell Véronique...
135	Molenbeek, plaque tournante des réseaux djihadistes	15/11/15	Molenbeek, hub of jihadist networks
136	Nicolas Sarkozy : « Le mot "guerre" n'est pas un mot que l'on choisit au hasard »	15/11/15	Nicolas Sarkozy: "The word 'war' is not a word chosen at random".
137	De «24 h chrono» à «Homeland», une autre vision du terrorisme	15/11/15	From "24 hours" to "Homeland", another vision of terrorism
138	Joann Sfar : « Les enfants de notre pays ont déclaré la guerre »	15/11/15	Joann Sfar: "The children of our country have declared war
139	Faire la guerre sans l'aimer	15/11/15	Making war without loving it
140	Yasmina Khadra : «Ils visent le cœur avant l'esprit»	15/11/15	Yasmina Khadra: "They target the heart before the mind".
141	Rassemblement au Bataclan : «Pourquoi ont-ils attaqué la musique?»	15/11/15	Rally at the Bataclan: "Why did they attack the music?"
142	INFO LE FIGARO - Attentats à Paris : trois fusils Kalachnikov retrouvés dans la voiture à Montreuil	15/11/15	INFO LE FIGARO - Paris attacks: three Kalashnikov rifles found in the car in Montreuil
143	Dépenses militaires: la question de leur sortie du déficit ressurgit après les attentats	15/11/15	Military spending: the question of their exit from the deficit resurfaces after the attacks
144	Attentats de Paris : Hollywood de tout cœur avec la France	15/11/15	Paris attacks: Hollywood's heart goes out to France
145	Deux ressortissants français résidant en Belgique identifiés parmi les auteurs des attentats	15/11/15	Two French nationals living in Belgium identified among the perpetrators of the attacks
146	Attentats de Paris : la police lance un appel à témoins, suivez notre live	15/11/15	Paris attacks: the police launch a call for witnesses, follow our live
147	L'émouvant hommage de "Saturday Night Live" après les attentats de Paris	15/11/15	The moving tribute of "Saturday Night Live" after the Paris attacks
148	À l'Élysée, Marine Le Pen établit un lien entre les attentats et les migrants	15/11/15	At the Elysée Palace, Marine Le Pen makes a link between the attacks and migrants
149	L'enquête, les faits et le deuil : le point sur les attentats de Paris deux jours après	15/11/15	The investigation, the facts and the mourning: an update on the Paris attacks two days after
150	L'enquête, les faits, le deuil : le point sur les attentats deux jours après	15/11/15	The investigation, the facts and the mourning: the point on the attacks two days after
151	Attentats de Paris: 103 corps ont été identifiés parmi les 129 victimes	15/11/15	Paris attacks: 103 bodies have been identified among the 129 victims
152	De New York à Stockholm, l'hommage du sport mondial aux victimes des attentats	15/11/15	From New York to Stockholm, the world's sport pays tribute to the victims of the attacks
153	Notre-Dame de Paris déborde de fidèles venus rendre hommage aux victimes des attentats	15/11/15	Notre-Dame de Paris overflows with worshippers to pay tribute to victims of the attacks
154	Attentats de Paris : U2 se recueille devant le Bataclan	15/11/15	Paris attacks: U2 pay their respects in front of the Bataclan
155	Attentat de Paris: un couple doit sa survie à sa dispute	15/11/15	Paris attacks: a couple owes its survival to their fight
156	Après les attentats de Paris, les distributeurs de cinéma s'interrogent	15/11/15	After the Paris attacks, cinema distributors are wondering
157	Attentats de Paris : le billet de ferry d'un des kamikazes retrouvé en Grèce	15/11/15	Paris attacks: ferry ticket of one of the suicide bombers found in Greece
158	VIDÉO - Attentats à Paris : une voiture des terroristes retrouvée à Montreuil	15/11/15	VIDEO - Paris attacks: terrorists' car found in Montreuil
159	Attentats de Paris : les chirurgiens préoccupés par le manque de matériel	15/11/15	Paris attacks: surgeons concerned about lack of equipment
160	Attentats de Paris : la traque se concentre sur un réseau franco-belge	15/11/15	Paris attacks: the hunt is on for a French-Belgian network
161	Attentats de Paris : cette fois, l'esprit du 11 janvier ne suffira pas	15/11/15	Paris attacks: this time, the spirit of 11 January will not be enough
162	Attentats de Paris : «Les terroristes? On aurait cru des morts-vivants»	15/11/15	Paris attacks: "The terrorists? They looked like the living dead".
163	Des ceintures explosives très délicates à manier	15/11/15	Explosive belts very delicate to handle
164	Attentats de Paris : le bilan s'alourdit encore	15/11/15	Paris attacks: the toll rises again
165	Stade de France : les attentats racontés de l'intérieur	15/11/15	Stade de France: the attacks told from the inside
166	Attentats de Paris : les illustrateurs brandissent leurs crayons	15/11/15	Paris attacks: illustrators hold up their pencils
167	Attentats de Paris : le monde des médias en deuil	15/11/15	Paris attacks: the media world in mourning
168	Attentats de Paris : le cinéma à l'épreuve de la terreur	15/11/15	Paris attacks: the cinema in the test of terror
169	Attentats de Paris : l'énigme du Stade de France	15/11/15	Paris attacks: the enigma of the Stade de France
170	Les attentats de Paris vus de New York	15/11/15	The Paris attacks seen from New York
171	Les attentats de Paris au coeur du G20	15/11/15	The Paris attacks at the heart of the G20
172	Ventes de Beaune:une partie pour les attentats	15/11/15	Beaune sales: a party for the attacks
173	Attentats : pourquoi s'inflige-t-on le traumatisme de l'information anxiogène ?	15/11/15	The attacks: why do we inflict the trauma of anxiety-inducing information?
174	L'imam de Nimes: Le vivre ensemble est menacé, la République est attaquée	15/11/15	The Imam of Nimes: Living together is threatened, the Republic is under attack

175	L'islam ne dit pas qu'il faut donner la mort à autrui	15/11/15	Islam does not say that one must give death to others
176	Les attentats de Paris s'invitent dans la campagne américaine	15/11/15	The Paris attacks are invading the American campaign
177	Attentats terroristes en France: 2015, «annus horribilis»	16/11/15	Terrorist attacks in France: 2015, "annus horribilis".
178	Lamia... Ils sont morts le 13 novembre	16/11/15	Lamia... They died on 13 November
179	Les joueurs du PSG choqués, inquiets et solidaires	16/11/15	PSG players shocked, worried and in solidarity
180	Attentats de Paris: dessins, chansons et poèmes - hommages des internautes du Figaro	16/11/15	Paris attacks: drawings, songs and poems - tributes from Le Figaro users
181	Comment les chaînes de télévision ont retransmis la minute de silence	16/11/15	How TV channels broadcast the minute's silence
182	«Si vous partez dans une guerre de culture avec la France, bonne chance, putain !»	16/11/15	If you go to a culture war with France, good f*cking luck!
183	Attentats de Paris : les incroyables témoignages vus à la télévision	16/11/15	Paris attacks: the incredible testimonies seen on TV
184	Après les attentats, l'Opéra de New-York entonne la Marseillaise	16/11/15	After the attacks, the New York Opera House sings the Marseillaise
185	Le monde universitaire pleure ses jeunes fauchés dans les attentats	16/11/15	The university world mourns its young people mowed down in the attacks
186	Attentats de Paris: Albert Uderzo rend hommage aux victimes	16/11/15	Paris attacks: Albert Uderzo pays tribute to the victims
187	Attentats de Paris : plus d'une demi-douzaine de concerts annulés	16/11/15	Paris attacks: more than half a dozen concerts cancelled
188	Le récap éco du jour spécial impact des attentats	16/11/15	The day's news roundup on the impact of the attacks
189	Expulsions, frappes en Syrie, Constitution : l'intervention de Hollande en 3 minutes	16/11/15	Expulsions, strikes in Syria, Constitution: Hollande's speech in 3 minutes
190	La minute de silence, un concept très variable pour les chaînes de télévision	16/11/15	The minute of silence, a very variable concept for television channels
191	Audiences : près de 24 millions de téléspectateurs devant les journaux de 20 heures	16/11/15	Audiences: nearly 24 million viewers in front of the 8pm news
192	La minute de silence de François Hollande à la Sorbonne	16/11/15	The minute of silence of François Hollande at the Sorbonne
193	Attentats : Imagine de Lennon, 2e morceau le plus téléchargé en France	16/11/15	Lennon's Imagine, 2nd most downloaded song in France
194	Lena Dunham, Bono, Marion Cotillard... les artistes partagent leur émotion	16/11/15	Lena Dunham, Bono, Marion Cotillard... artists share their emotion
195	Zapping TV - Attentats à Paris : l'hommage des chaînes de télévision à travers le monde	16/11/15	TV Zapping - Paris attacks: TV channels around the world pay tribute
196	Minute de silence mondiale en hommage aux victimes des attentats	16/11/15	A worldwide minute of silence in tribute to the victims of the attacks
197	La lettre touchante de Lena Dunham aux Parisiens	16/11/15	Lena Dunham's touching letter to Parisians
198	Le «pianiste du Bataclan» se lance dans un tour des lieux parisiens touchés par les attentats	16/11/15	The "Bataclan pianist" embarks on a tour of Parisian venues affected by the attacks
199	Attentats : le message du Bataclan sur les réseaux sociaux	16/11/15	Attacks: the Bataclan's message on social networks
200	Attentats de Paris: les mesures pour reporter son voyage	16/11/15	Paris attacks: measures to postpone your trip
201	Attentats de Paris : un nouvel appel à témoins pour identifier un des kamikazes	16/11/15	Paris attacks: a new appeal for witnesses to identify one of the suicide bombers
202	«Peace for Paris», l'histoire d'un symbole qui a fait le tour du monde	16/11/15	Peace for Paris, the story of a symbol that went around the world
203	Attentats : la presse passe en édition spéciale	16/11/15	Attacks: the press goes into special edition
204	Pourquoi certains sont capables d'actes héroïques ?	16/11/15	Why are some people capable of heroic acts?
205	Quand la jeunesse de France entre en guerre	16/11/15	When the youth of France goes to war
206	Attentats de Paris : sur Facebook, la mort des amis	16/11/15	Paris attacks: on Facebook, the death of friends
207	Attentats : une émission spéciale Des paroles et des actes sur France 2	16/11/15	Attacks: a special programme of words and deeds on France 2
208	Attentats à Paris : le reportage de 66 Minutes divise les téléspectateurs	16/11/15	Paris attacks: 66 Minutes report divides viewers
209	Attentats: la demande de sécurité privée en hausse, mais les effectifs ne suivront pas	16/11/15	Attacks: demand for private security on the rise, but staffing levels won't follow
210	Attentats: l'urgence des soins passée, les médecins digèrent le choc	16/11/15	Attacks: doctors digest the shock after the emergency
211	Réflexion sur 24 heures de télé en continu : la brutalisation de notre société	16/11/15	Reflection on 24 hours of continuous TV: the brutalization of our society
212	Au G20, les chefs d'État préparent une réponse forte aux attentats de Paris	16/11/15	At the G20, heads of state prepare a strong response to the Paris attacks
213	Attentats de Paris : «Les parents de Samy Amimour n'ont reçu aucune aide»	16/11/15	Paris attacks: "Samy Amimour's parents received no help
214	Trois des quatre kamikazes français identifiés ont été formés par Daech	16/11/15	Three of the four French suicide bombers identified were trained by Daesh
215	Islamisme : les propositions choc d'un groupe de hauts fonctionnaires	16/11/15	Islamism: the shocking proposals of a group of senior officials
216	Minute de silence : recueillement et émotion dans le monde étudiant	16/11/15	A group of senior civil servants have made shocking proposals to the French government on Islamism
217	" Nous n'avons pas peur ", le message des hashtags	16/11/15	We are not afraid, the message of the hashtags
218	Hôpitaux parisiens: le plan d'urgence est levé	16/11/15	Parisian hospitals: the emergency plan is lifted
219	Des blessures psychiques possibles dans tout le pays	16/11/15	Possible psychic wounds in the whole country
220	Face à Daech, Anonymous promet des cyberattaques «massives»	16/11/15	Anonymous promises "massive" cyber attacks against Daesh
221	Deschamps : «Montrer que nous sommes fiers d'être Français»	16/11/15	Deschamps: "Show that we are proud to be French"
222	Ce que contient le «pacte de sécurité» présenté par Hollande devant le Congrès	16/11/15	What's in the "security pact" presented by Hollande to Congress

Figure 3: Articles published by *Le Monde* themed around the attacks (14th – 16th of November 2015)

	Headline	Date	Translation
1	Ecoles et musées fermés, rencontres sportives annulées	14/11/15	Schools and museums closed, sports events cancelled
2	Attentats en France : Américains et Français réunis dans la peine à Washington	14/11/15	Attacks in France: Americans and French gather in sorrow in Washington
3	L'effroi et le sang-froid	14/11/15	The fear and composure
4	Pour Obama, les attaques de Paris frappent « toute l'humanité »	14/11/15	Obama says Paris attacks hit "all of humanity"
5	Depuis « Charlie », une série d'attaques ratées ou déjouées	14/11/15	Since "Charlie", a series of failed or foiled attacks
6	L'antiterrorisme à la peine face à une menace insaisissable	14/11/15	Anti-terrorism struggles in the face of an elusive threat
7	Attaques à Paris : le quartier touristique de l'Opéra sous le choc	14/11/15	Paris attacks: the tourist district of the Opera House in shock
8	« Depuis plusieurs mois, les services français ne cachaient pas leurs inquiétudes »	14/11/15	"For several months, the French services have not hidden their concerns"
9	Une attaque « complexe » inédite sur le sol français	14/11/15	A "complex" attack never seen before on French soil
10	Marine Le Pen : « La France n'est plus en sécurité »	14/11/15	Marine Le Pen: "France is no longer safe
11	De Séoul à Moscou, manifestations spontanées de solidarité après les attentats de Paris	14/11/15	From Seoul to Moscow, spontaneous demonstrations of solidarity after the Paris attacks
12	A Charlie, « on pensait avoir touché le fond, mais non... »	14/11/15	At Charlie, "we thought we had hit rock bottom, but no..."
13	A l'hôpital Lariboisière, « c'était de la chirurgie de guerre »	14/11/15	At Lariboisière hospital, "it was war surgery"
14	La France, ce pays que les djihadistes aiment haïr	14/11/15	France, the country that jihadists love to hate
15	Attentats du 13 novembre : des milliers de bougies en hommage aux victimes	15/11/15	November 13 attacks: thousands of candles in tribute to the victims
16	Attentats de Paris : le point ce dimanche matin à 10 heures	15/11/15	Paris attacks: update this Sunday morning at 10 am
17	« Fluctuat nec mergitur » : la devise de Paris devient un slogan de résistance	15/11/15	"Fluctuat nec mergitur": the motto of Paris becomes a slogan of resistance
18	« Après les attentats, la peur n'est pas bonne conseillère »	15/11/15	"After the attacks, fear is not a good advisor
19	Attaques à Paris : dans les rues vides des 10e et 11e arrondissements	15/11/15	Attacks in Paris: in the empty streets of the 10th and 11th arrondissements
20	A l'hôpital La Pitié-Salpêtrière : « Comme l'équipage d'un sous-marin en immersion »	15/11/15	At La Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital: "Like the crew of a submarine in immersion"
21	Après les attaques, l'université compte ses morts	15/11/15	After the attacks, the university counts its dead
22	Pour Valeria Solesin, italienne, morte au Bataclan	15/11/15	For Valeria Solesin, Italian, who died at the Bataclan
23	Attentats du 13 novembre : la minute de silence du G20	15/11/15	The G20 minute of silence after the 13 November attacks
24	A Paris, une génération visée	15/11/15	In Paris, a generation targeted
25	Le rassemblement de la place de la République perturbé par un mouvement de panique	15/11/15	The Place de la République rally disrupted by a panic movement
26	Attaques de Paris : ce que l'on sait des auteurs des attentats	15/11/15	Paris attacks: what we know about the perpetrators
27	La presse internationale s'inquiète du changement de stratégie de l'EI	15/11/15	The international press is concerned about the change of strategy of the IS
28	Les manifestations de soutien à la France en images	15/11/15	The demonstrations of support for France in pictures
29	Deux jours après les attentats : la France en deuil, un assaillant recherché	16/11/15	Two days after the attacks: France in mourning, an assailant wanted
30	#NousSommesL'Europe	16/11/15	#WeAreEurope
31	La sécurité de l'Euro 2016 en question	16/11/15	Euro 2016 security in question
32	La France se recueille	16/11/15	France mourns
33	Perquisitions, bombardement, recueillement... le point sur l'actualité à 8 heures	16/11/15	Searches, bombing, remembrance... news update at 8am
34	La Bourse de Paris peu affectée par les attentats	16/11/15	The Paris stock exchange little affected by the attacks
35	Craintes sur l'arrivée de terroristes avec les migrants	16/11/15	Fears about the arrival of terrorists with the migrants
36	Attaques à Paris : les enseignants s'efforcent de gérer le « cours d'après »	16/11/15	Paris attacks: teachers struggle to manage the "aftermath"
37	A Paris, « la vie continue » malgré la peine et la peur	16/11/15	In Paris, "life goes on" despite the pain and fear
38	Attentats de Paris : un commanditaire belge parti en Syrie	16/11/15	Paris attacks: a Belgian sponsor left for Syria
39	« La vérité nous oblige à dire que le terrorisme peut frapper de nouveau dans les jours qui viennent »	16/11/15	"The truth obliges us to say that terrorism can strike again in the coming days"
40	Le Front national lie les attentats à la crise des migrants	16/11/15	The National Front links the attacks to the migrant crisis

41	Dans le 10e et le 11e : « Ici, chacun connaît un blessé, un mort »	16/11/15	In the 10th and 11th: "Here, everyone knows a wounded, a dead"
42	Attaques à Paris : les rédactions mobilisées, mais « l'ambiance est lourde »	16/11/15	Paris attacks: editorial offices mobilised, but "the atmosphere is heavy
43	La Belgique au cœur des réseaux djihadistes	16/11/15	Belgium at the heart of jihadist networks
44	« Ne tombons pas dans le piège tendu par Daech »	16/11/15	"Let's not fall into the trap set by Daesh"
45	Paris frappé par un terrorisme apocalyptique	16/11/15	Paris hit by apocalyptic terrorism
46	La France face à la guerre	16/11/15	France facing war
47	Attaques du 13 novembre : quelle riposte envisage Hollande	16/11/15	November 13 attacks: what response does Hollande envisage?
48	Attentats du 13 novembre, et après ?	16/11/15	Attacks of November 13, and after?
49	Attentats du 13 novembre : ce que veut dire la déclaration d'état d'urgence en France	16/11/15	November 13 attacks: what the declaration of a state of emergency in France means
50	Ces photos trompeuses qui circulent après les attentats du 13 novembre à Paris	16/11/15	Misleading photos circulating after the 13 November attacks in Paris
51	Attentats du 13 novembre : les questions que vous nous posez	16/11/15	November 13 attacks: the questions you ask us
52	Attentats du 13 novembre : le beau texte du « New York Times » était en fait un... commentaire	16/11/15	November 13 attacks: the beautiful text of the "New York Times" was in fact a... commentary
53	A la suite des critiques du monde arabe, Facebook veut étendre le Safety Check	16/11/15	Following criticism from the Arab world, Facebook wants to extend the Safety Check
54	Une minute de silence pour rendre hommage aux victimes des attentats	16/11/15	A minute's silence to pay tribute to the victims of the attacks
55	Anonymous menace à nouveau l'Etat islamique	16/11/15	Anonymous threatens Islamic State again
56	Paris se réveille et rouvre ses lieux culturels	16/11/15	Paris wakes up and reopens its cultural venues
57	La famille musicale endeuillée	16/11/15	The musical family mourns
58	Le Bataclan, un haut lieu de la culture ciblé de longue date par les islamistes	16/11/15	The Bataclan, a cultural venue long targeted by Islamists
59	« L'Etat islamique cherche à déclencher une guerre civile »	16/11/15	"The Islamic State seeks to start a civil war"
60	Jean-François Daguzan : « il faut une réponse à la hauteur de la menace »	16/11/15	Jean-François Daguzan: "We need a response that matches the threat"
61	De « Timbuktu » au Bataclan, un scénario effroyable et similaire	16/11/15	From "Timbuktu" to the Bataclan, a frightening and similar scenario
62	D'un vendredi à l'autre, une année « Charlie » en France	16/11/15	From one Friday to another, a "Charlie" year in France
63	Les musulmans doivent prendre publiquement leurs distances avec l'islamisme	16/11/15	Muslims must publicly distance themselves from Islamism
64	Métros, trains, universités... journée de psychose en France	16/11/15	France: A day of psychosis in the suburbs, trains, universities...
65	Terrorisme : quel est l'objectif des perquisitions administratives ?	16/11/15	Terrorism: what is the purpose of administrative searches?
66	Qu'est-ce que l'état de guerre ?	16/11/15	What is a state of war?
67	Les hôpitaux parisiens sur le front pour une « chirurgie de guerre »	16/11/15	Parisian hospitals on the front line for "war surgery
68	Attentats du 13 novembre : ce que l'on ignore encore	16/11/15	November 13 attacks: what we still don't know
69	Attentats du 13 novembre : le point sur la situation en fin de soirée	16/11/15	November 13 attacks: the situation at the end of the evening
70	La tour Eiffel aux couleurs du drapeau français	16/11/15	The Eiffel Tower in the colours of the French flag
71	Attentats du 13 novembre : quels sont les objectifs politiques pour Hollande ?	16/11/15	Attacks of November 13: what are the political objectives for Hollande?
72	Attentats du 13 novembre : la stratégie française en Syrie a-t-elle changé ?	16/11/15	Attacks of November 13: has the French strategy in Syria changed?
73	Attentats du 13 novembre : comment la police identifie-t-elle les auteurs ?	16/11/15	November 13 attacks: how do the police identify the perpetrators?
74	L'état d'urgence, un dispositif à géométrie variable	16/11/15	The state of emergency, a variable geometry device

Figure 4: Articles published by *Libération* themed around the attacks (14th – 16th of November 2015)

Nº	Headline	Date	Translation
1	Les attaques du 13 novembre 2015 sont sans précédent en France	13/11/15	The attacks of 13 November 2015 were unprecedented in France
2	Les attentats et tentatives en 2015	14/11/15	Attacks and attempts in 2015
3	Une décennie d'attentats dans le monde	14/11/15	A decade of attacks around the world
4	A Saint-Denis : «La France est en guerre et elle peut compter sur ses banlieues»	14/11/15	In Saint-Denis: "France is at war and it can count on its suburbs"
5	Farhad Khosrokhavar : «Un kamikaze ne se radicalise pas seul»	14/11/15	Farhad Khosrokhavar: "A suicide bomber does not radicalise alone"
6	Max, speaker du Stade de France : «Je suis heureux d'avoir montré aux spectateurs qu'ils n'avaient pas été abandonnés »	14/11/15	Max, announcer at the Stade de France: "I am happy to have shown the spectators that they had not been abandoned"
7	Comment Hollande a préparé son discours du Congrès	16/11/15	How Hollande prepared his Congress speech

Figure 5: Articles published by *ABC* themed around the attacks (17th – 19th of August 2017)

Nº	Headline	Date	Translation
1	Puigdemont, tras el atentado: «Cataluña ha sido, es y será tierra de paz, bienvenida y acogida»	17/8/17	Puigdemont, after the attack: "Catalonia has been, is and will be a land of peace, welcome and welcome".
2	La Audiencia Nacional ya investiga el atentado terrorista en Barcelona	17/8/17	The Audiencia Nacional is already investigating the terrorist attack in Barcelona
3	Vídeo: Atropello en Barcelona	17/8/17	Video: Hit-and-run in Barcelona
4	Un atropello arrolla a varias personas en La Rambla de Barcelona	17/8/17	A hit-and-run attack runs over several people on La Rambla de Barcelona
5	Vídeo: Así ha quedado la furgoneta del atropello en Barcelona	17/8/17	Video: This is what the van of the Barcelona hit-and-run has looked like
6	Más imágenes de la Rambla de Barcelona tras el atropello	17/8/17	More images of La Rambla in Barcelona after the hit and run
7	Imágenes de móvil de la furgoneta tras el atropello en la Rambla	17/8/17	Mobile phone images of the van after the hit-and-run in La Rambla
8	La policía confirma que el atropello de Barcelona fue deliberado y masivo	17/8/17	Police confirm Barcelona hit-and-run attack was deliberate and massive
9	La policía amplía el cordón de seguridad en Las Ramblas	17/8/17	Police extend security cordon on Las Ramblas
10	Imágenes de usuarios de Twitter de la búsqueda de los autores del atropello en Barcelona	17/8/17	Twitter users' images of the search for the perpetrators of the Barcelona hit-and-run
11	Al menos dos muertos y decenas de heridos en un atropello masivo en las Ramblas de Barcelona	17/8/17	At least two dead and dozens injured in mass shooting on Barcelona's Las Ramblas
12	«Esperamos órdenes de la policía para que nuestros clientes abandonen el restaurante»	17/8/17	We are waiting for orders from the police for our customers to leave the restaurant.
13	Atentado en La Rambla de Barcelona	17/8/17	Attack on La Rambla in Barcelona
14	Los políticos condenan el atentado de Barcelona por Twitter	17/8/17	Politicians condemn the Barcelona attack on Twitter
15	Declaraciones del consejero de Interior de Cataluña tras el atentado en La Rambla	17/8/17	Statements by the Catalan Minister of the Interior after the attack on La Rambla
16	Primeras imágenes del autor del atentado terrorista en La Rambla de Barcelona	17/8/17	First images of the perpetrator of the terrorist attack on La Rambla in Barcelona
17	Los taxistas Barcelona transportan gratis a transeúntes atrapados por el atentado	17/8/17	Barcelona taxi drivers transport pedestrians trapped by the attack for free
18	Declaraciones de testigos sobre el atropello en Las Ramblas	17/8/17	Witness statements about the attack on Las Ramblas
19	El Atentado de Barcelona deja al menos 13 muertos y 32 heridos	17/8/17	Barcelona attack leaves at least 13 dead and 32 wounded
20	Así contaban las redes la búsqueda de los terroristas	17/8/17	The search for the terrorists as told by the networks
21	Cronología del atentado en Barcelona	17/8/17	Chronology of the attack in Barcelona
22	Las Ramblas, vacía y acordonada por la policía	17/8/17	Las Ramblas, empty and cordoned off by the police
23	"La furgoneta ha dejado un reguero de cadáveres"	17/8/17	The van has left a trail of corpses.
24	El pánico se apodera de la Rambla de Barcelona	17/8/17	Panic grips Barcelona's La Rambla
25	La Comisión Islámica de España condena el atentado y expresa su compromiso contra cualquier tipo de terrorismo	17/8/17	The Islamic Commission of Spain condemns the attack and expresses its commitment against any kind of terrorism.
26	Duras imágenes tras el atentado de Barcelona	17/8/17	Tough images after the Barcelona attack
27	Puigdemont confirma 12 muertos y 80 ingresados, 15 de ellos graves	17/8/17	Puigdemont confirms 12 dead and 80 hospitalised, 15 of them in serious condition
28	Los Mossos d´Esquadra evacúan el centro de Barcelona	17/8/17	Mossos d'Esquadra evacuate the centre of Barcelona
29	13 muertos y 80 heridos en el atentado en La Rambla	17/8/17	13 dead and 80 injured in La Rambla attack
30	El presidente Page condena el «ruin y miserable» atentado de Barcelona	17/8/17	President Page condemns the "dastardly and wretched" attack in Barcelona
31	Los Mossos comienzan a evacuar a la gente de los comercios en los que estaban confinados	17/8/17	Mossos begin evacuating people from the shops where they were confined to
32	Los Mossos vinculan el atentado de La Rambla con la explosión de una casa en Alcanar (Tarragona)	17/8/17	Mossos link La Rambla attack to house explosion in Alcanar (Tarragona)
33	Rajoy decreta tres días de luto por el atentado de Barcelona	18/8/17	Rajoy decrees three days of mourning for the attack in Barcelona
34	Comienza el levantamiento de cadáveres en La Rambla de Barcelona	18/8/17	The bodies of those killed in La Rambla de Barcelona are now being recovered
35	La CUP rechaza «el terrorismo fascista fruto del capitalismo»	18/8/17	The CUP rejects "fascist terrorism, the fruit of capitalism".
36	Bruselas alerta sobre el retorno de hasta 3.000 yihadistas europeos de Siria e Irak	18/8/17	Brussels warns of the return of up to 3,000 European jihadists from Syria and Iraq
37	Barcelona sangra de realidad	18/8/17	Barcelona bleeds with reality
38	Cataluña es la comunidad con mayor riesgo de radicalización yihadista	18/8/17	Catalonia is the community with the highest risk of jihadist radicalisation
39	Defended a Occidente	18/8/17	Defend the West
40	Otra lección de la tarde más triste	18/8/17	Another lesson from the saddest afternoon
41	Cinco terroristas abatidos en Cambrils	18/8/17	Five terrorists killed in Cambrils
42	Rajoy: «Al terrorismo se le vence con unidad institucional»	18/8/17	Rajoy: "Terrorism can be defeated with institutional unity".
43	Conmoción entre los turistas que han presenciado la matanza en Barcelona	18/8/17	Shock among tourists who witnessed the massacre in Barcelona

44	Unidad nacional contra el terror	18/8/17	National unity against terror
45	Retiran la furgoneta con la que se ha cometido el atentado en Barcelona	18/8/17	The van used to carry out the attack in Barcelona has been taken away
46	Esta vez, Barcelona	18/8/17	This time, Barcelona
47	Los Mossos buscan a una tercera persona implicada con los atentados de Barcelona	18/8/17	The Mossos are looking for a third person involved in the attacks in Barcelona
48	Un abrazo a Cataluña	18/8/17	A hug for Catalonia
49	Gatitos contra el terror	18/8/17	Kittens against terror
50	A las doce del mediodía se guardará un minuto de silencio en toda España por los atentados de Barcelona	18/8/17	A minute's silence will be observed throughout Spain at 12 noon for the attacks in Barcelona.
51	Cinco claves del ataque contra España	18/8/17	Five keys to the attack on Spain
52	"Ha sido una noche muy larga y muy difícil para todos"	18/8/17	The attack has been a very long and very difficult night for all of us.
53	La policía científica investiga la furgoneta del atropello de las Ramblas	18/8/17	The scientific police are investigating the van used in the Las Ramblas hit-and-run attack
54	Barcelona recupera la normalidad el día posterios al atentado	18/8/17	Barcelona returns to normality the day after the attack
55	Los Mossos retiran el coche con el que los terroristas huyeron en Cambrills	18/8/17	The Mossos remove the car with which the terrorists fled in Cambrills
56	«Conducía haciendo eses, atropellando todo lo que podía»	18/8/17	He was driving as fast as he could, running over everything he could.
57	Detenido un tercer individuo en Ripoll vinculado con los atentados de Barcelona y Ripoll	18/8/17	A third individual arrested in Ripoll linked to the attacks in Barcelona and Ripoll
58	Cinco terroristas abatidos en el ataque de Cambrils	18/8/17	Five terrorists killed in Cambrils attack
59	El atropello masivo, un «modus operandi» utilizado en otros atentados en Europa	18/8/17	The mass shooting, a "modus operandi" used in other attacks in Europe
60	El atentado en Las Ramblas, un ataque al corazón turístico de Barcelona	18/8/17	Attack on Las Ramblas, an attack on the tourist heart of Barcelona
61	La prensa mundial recoge el «terror» provocado por los atentados de Barcelona y Cambrils	18/8/17	World press reports on the "terror" provoked by the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils
62	Luto en el Camp Nou por las víctimas del atentado terrorista	18/8/17	Mourning at the Camp Nou for the victims of the terrorist attack
63	Así fue el recorrido que realizó la furgoneta del atropello masivo de Barcelona	18/8/17	The route taken by the van that carried out the mass attack in Barcelona
64	El Ibex cae un 1,3% en la apertura tras el atentado en Barcelona !!!!	18/8/17	The Ibex falls 1.3% at the opening after the Barcelona attack !!!!
65	Llegan 31 inmigrantes a las costas murcianas en tres pateras !!!!	18/8/17	31 immigrants arrive on the coast of Murcia in three small boats !!!!
66	El padre del niño fallecido en la Rambla y el Imán de Rubí se funden en un abrazo	18/8/17	The father of the boy who died in the Rambla and the Imam of Rubí embrace each other
67	El terrorista de Daesh nacido en Córdoba que amenaza a España con nuevos ataques	18/8/17	The Daesh terrorist born in Cordoba who threatens Spain with new attacks
68	Reconstrucción de los movimientos de Younes Abouyakoub horas antes de atentar en La Rambla	18/8/17	Reconstruction of Younes Abouyakoub's movements hours before the attack in La Rambla
69	Colau, emocionada al llevar flores al altar por las víctimas en La Rambla	18/8/17	Colau, moved as she brings flowers to the altar for the victims in La Rambla
70	Aumenta la presencia policial en las principales ciudades del país después de los atentados de Cataluña	18/8/17	Increased police presence in major cities across the country following attacks in Catalonia
71	Vídeo: 12 horas de terror en Cataluña	18/8/17	Video: 12 hours of terror in Catalonia
72	El minuto de silencio en la Rambla acaba al grito de "no tenemos miedo"	18/8/17	The minute's silence on La Rambla ends with the cry "we are not afraid".
73	El Rey, Rajoy, Puigdemont y Colau encabezan un minuto de silencio en Barcelona	18/8/17	The King, Rajoy, Puigdemont and Colau lead a minute's silence in Barcelona
74	Las agencias de viajes creen que los atentados no mermarán el turismo	18/8/17	Travel agencies believe that the attacks will not reduce tourism
75	Los Mossos y la Guardia Civil realizan registros en Ripoll, donde reside el presunto autor del atentado de Barcelona	18/8/17	Mossos and Guardia Civil carry out searches in Ripoll, where the alleged perpetrator of the Barcelona attack lives
76	El terrorismo golpea a España con dos ataques en Cataluña	18/8/17	Terrorism hits Spain with two attacks in Catalonia
77	Madrid y Bilbao extreman sus medidas de seguridad	18/8/17	Madrid and Bilbao step up security measures
78	La tragedia de Barcelona irrumpe en la programación	18/8/17	The tragedy of Barcelona bursts into programming
79	La Fiscalía de París abre una investigación por terrorismo sobre el atentado en Barcelona	18/8/17	Paris prosecutor's office opens terrorism investigation into Barcelona attack
80	Buscan a Moussa Oukabir como presunto autor del atentado de Las Ramblas	18/8/17	Moussa Oukabir is wanted as the alleged perpetrator of the attack on Las Ramblas
81	Las banderas de las instituciones de la UE en Bruselas ondean a media asta por Barcelona	18/8/17	Flags of EU institutions in Brussels fly at half-mast for Barcelona
82	Buscan a Mussa Oukabir como presunto autor del atropello	18/8/17	Moussa Oukabir is wanted as the presumed author of the attack
83	Rajoy y Puigdemont presiden una cumbre para evaluar la situación tras los atentados	18/8/17	Rajoy and Puigdemont chair summit to assess the situation after the attacks
84	El atentado de Barcelona une a todos los grupos del Congreso en solidaridad contra el terror	18/8/17	Barcelona attack unites all congressional groups in solidarity against terrorism
85	Barcelona responde al terrorismo: «No tenemos miedo»	18/8/17	Barcelona responds to terrorism: "We are not afraid".

86	Gobierno y Govern, unidos contra el terrorismo	18/8/17	Government and Govern united against terrorism
87	El atentado terrorista moviliza a todos los hospitales de Barcelona	18/8/17	The terrorist attack mobilises all the hospitals in Barcelona
88	Monumentos del mundo rinden homenaje a las víctimas del atentado de Barcelona	18/8/17	Monuments around the world pay tribute to the victims of the Barcelona attack
89	Daesh reivindica la autoría del atentado en Barcelona	18/8/17	Daesh claims responsibility for Barcelona attack
90	Los explosivos de los terroristas abatidos en Cambrils eran falsos	18/8/17	The explosives of the terrorists killed in Cambrils were fakes
91	«Tengo un nudo en la garganta, pero ahora toca ayudar»	18/8/17	"The terrorists were killed in Cambrils attack, but now it's time to help
92	¿Qué implicaría activar el nivel 5 de alerta antiterrorista?	18/8/17	What would activating the level 5 anti-terrorism alert entail?
93	El Ministro del Exterior francés visita a los compatriotas heridos tras el atentado	18/8/17	French foreign minister visits wounded compatriots after the attack
94	Moussa Oukabir fue abatido en Cambrils	18/8/17	Moussa Oukabir shot dead in Cambrils
95	Las Ramblas recuerdan a las víctimas con flores y velas	18/8/17	Las Ramblas remembers victims with flowers and candles
96	Los Mossos investigan si en la explosión de la casa de Alcanar murieron dos de los terroristas identificados	18/8/17	The Mossos are investigating whether two of the identified terrorists died in the explosion at the house in Alcanar
97	El autor del atentado en Barcelona es uno de los terroristas abatidos en Cambrils	18/8/17	The perpetrator of the attack in Barcelona is one of the terrorists killed in Cambrils
98	Seguridad y yihadismo	19/8/17	Security and jihadism
99	La desconfianza política no enturbia una cooperación policial fluida	19/8/17	Political mistrust does not cloud smooth police cooperation
100	Interior duda de la eficacia de elevar la alerta antiterrorista a su máximo nivel	19/8/17	Interior Ministry doubts the effectiveness of raising the anti-terrorism alert to its maximum level
101	El sector turístico confía en que la imagen de país seguro evite una caída de visitantes	19/8/17	The tourism sector is confident that the image of a safe country will prevent a drop in the number of visitors
102	España unida grita: «No tinc por!» («¡No tengo miedo!»)	19/8/17	Spain united shouts "No tinc por" ("I'm not afraid!")
103	Los asesinos de Cataluña tenían decenas de bombonas de butano para atentar	19/8/17	The murderers in Catalonia had dozens of butane canisters to carry out the attack
104	«Cuando vi que se tocaba el cinturón, pensé que volábamos todos»	19/8/17	"When I saw him touching his belt, I thought we were all going to be blown up".
105	Ripoll, inesperado nido yidahista: «Era un joven sociable y simpático»	19/8/17	Ripoll, unexpected yiddahist nest: "He was a sociable and friendly young man".
106	El Coliseo se apaga en homenaje a las víctimas de los atentados en Barcelona y Cambrils	19/8/17	The Coliseum shuts down in tribute to the victims of the attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils
107	Todos los recursos contra el terror	19/8/17	All resources against terror
108	Independentismo e islamismo	19/8/17	Independence and Islamism
109	Zoido estudia incrementar el nivel de alerta terrorista	19/8/17	Zoido considers increasing the terror alert level
110	Interior mantiene el nivel 4 de alerta terrorista después de los atentados pero con refuerzos especiales	19/8/17	Interior Ministry maintains level 4 terror alert after attacks but with special reinforcements
111	Daesh afirma que los atentados en España fueron perpetrados contra «cruzados y judíos»	19/8/17	Daesh claims that the attacks in Spain were perpetrated against "crusaders and Jews".
112	Los Mossos registran la vivienda del imán de Ripoll	19/8/17	Mossos search Ripoll imam's home
113	Colau: "No vamos a elegir entre seguridad y libertad"	19/8/17	Colau: "We are not going to choose between security and freedom".
114	El islam en su laberinto	19/8/17	Islam in its labyrinth
115	Interior mantiene el nivel de alerta 4 de amenaza terrorista	19/8/17	The Interior Ministry maintains alert level 4 for terrorist threats
116	Los Reyes arropan a los heridos en los atentados de Cataluña	19/8/17	The King and Queen of Spain to attend to those injured in the attacks in Catalonia
117	Sáenz de Santamaría apela a la unidad contra el terror yihadista	19/8/17	Sáenz de Santamaría appeals for unity against jihadist terrorism
118	Tizas y pósits para homenajear a las víctimas del atentado	19/8/17	Chalk and pósits to pay tribute to the victims of the attack
119	Colau agradece la respuesta de Barcelona al atentado	19/8/17	Colau thanks Barcelona for its response to the attack
120	El Estado Islámico a la "reconquista" del Al Andalus	19/8/17	Islamic State to "reconquer" Al-Andalus
121	Cambrils recupera la normalidad dos días después	19/8/17	Cambrils returns to normal two days later
122	El Rey: «No tenemos miedo ni lo tendremos nunca»	19/8/17	The King: "We are not afraid, nor will we ever be".
123	El Gobierno mantiene el nivel 4 de alerta terrorista	19/8/17	Government maintains level 4 terrorist alert level
124	Los atentados en Cataluña amenazan también al sector turístico	19/8/17	The attacks in Catalonia also threaten the tourism sector
125	Younes Abouyaaqoub, se convierte en el hombre más buscado	19/8/17	Younes Abouyaaqoub, becomes the most wanted man in the world
126	Zoido da por desarticulada la célula terrorista de los atentados pero los Mossos	19/8/17	Zoido considers the terrorist cell behind the attacks to have been dismantled, but the Mossos
127	Puigdemont: "Nos querían de rodillas en Las Ramblas y nos hemos levantado muy alto"	19/8/17	Puigdemont: "They wanted us on our knees on Las Ramblas and we have risen very high".
128	Los Reyes realizan una ofrenda floral en Las Ramblas	19/8/17	The King and Queen of Spain make a wreath on Las Ramblas
129	Los Mossos investigan si un imán de Ripoll radicalizó a la célula terrorista	19/8/17	The Mossos investigate whether an imam from Ripoll radicalised the terrorist cell
130	La madre del terrorista huido: «Creemos que ha habido una cabeza más grande que les ha lavado»	19/8/17	The mother of the escaped terrorist: "We believe that there has been a bigger head that has washed them"

Figure 6: Articles published by *El País* themed around the attacks (17th – 19th of August 2017)

№	Headline	Date	Translation
1	Javier Cercas: "Habrán ganado si no seguimos haciendo nuestras vidas"	17/8/17	Javier Cercas: "They will have won if we don't go on living our lives".
2	La inocencia perdida	17/8/17	Innocence lost
3	Escenario central del yihadismo en España	17/8/17	The central stage of jihadism in Spain
4	Los vigilantes de Eulen de El Prat suspenden el paro por el atentado en Barcelona	17/8/17	Eulen security guards at El Prat suspend the strike over the attack in Barcelona
5	España, en riesgo alto de ataque terrorista desde 2015	17/8/17	Spain, at high risk of terrorist attack since 2015
6	Los ataques terroristas en Cataluña al detalle	17/8/17	Terrorist attacks in Catalonia in detail
7	Siete atentados con atropello en Europa en el último año	17/8/17	Seven hit-and-run attacks in Europe in the last year
8	Puigdemont afirma que los atentados no modificarán su "hoja de ruta"	18/8/17	Puigdemont says the attacks will not change his "road map
9	Rajoy y Puigdemont apelan a la unidad contra el terrorismo	18/8/17	Rajoy and Puigdemont appeal for unity against terrorism
10	Rajoy y Puigdemont tardan 20 horas en reunirse para coordinar la respuesta a la crisis	18/8/17	Rajoy and Puigdemont take 20 hours to meet to coordinate crisis response
11	Bruno Gulotta, un padre joven que dio la vida por su hijo	18/8/17	Bruno Gulotta, a young father who gave his life for his son
12	Un solo agente de los Mossos abatió a cuatro de los terroristas en Cambrils	18/8/17	A single Mossos agent shot down four of the terrorists in Cambrils
13	De la mano	18/8/17	Hand in hand
14	Los Mossos buscan a Moussa Oukabir, hermano de un detenido como autor del atentado	18/8/17	perpetrator of the attack
15	El sospechoso del atentado de Barcelona fue abatido en Cambrils	18/8/17	The suspect in the Barcelona attack was shot dead in Cambrils
16	Un ingeniero informático con ganas de futuro	18/8/17	A computer engineer with a bright future
17	Los Mossos encuentran otro cuerpo bajo los escombros de la casa de Alcanar	18/8/17	The Mossos find another body under the rubble of the house of Alcanar
18	Los bulos de WhatsApp: "Hay varias bombas por toda Barcelona"	18/8/17	The WhatsApp hoaxes: "There are several bombs all over Barcelona".
19	Así fue abatido el quinto terrorista de Cambrils	18/8/17	The fifth Cambrils bomber was shot dead
20	El alcalde de Alcanar: "Escogieron este lugar porque está muy poco transitado"	18/8/17	The mayor of Alcanar: "They chose this place because it is not very busy".
21	Primeras imágenes del paso de la furgoneta en el atentado de Barcelona	18/8/17	First images of the passage of the van in the Barcelona attack
22	El abrazo de Madrid al pueblo catalán tras los atentados	18/8/17	Madrid's embrace of the Catalan people in the aftermath of the attacks
23	"Los terroristas no son nada religiosos"	18/8/17	"The terrorists are not religious at all".
24	Francisco López Rodríguez, un tornero fresador que emigró a Cataluña	18/8/17	Francisco López Rodríguez, a milling lathe operator who emigrated to Catalonia
25	Los Mossos abaten a cinco terroristas que planeaban una nueva masacre en Cambrils	18/8/17	Mossos kill five terrorists who were planning a new massacre in Cambrils
26	Todo empezó en Alcanar	18/8/17	It all started in Alcanar
27	"No tinc por!", grita Barcelona	18/8/17	"Barcelona cries out "No tinc por!
28	Un atentado terrorista en Barcelona provoca al menos 13 muertos	18/8/17	Terrorist attack in Barcelona leaves at least 13 people dead
29	Donald Trump sugiere en un tuit matar al sospechoso detenido en Barcelona	18/8/17	Donald Trump suggests in a tweet to kill the suspect arrested in Barcelona
30	El ISIS mata a 14 personas en los atentados de Barcelona y Cambrils	18/8/17	ISIS kills 14 people in Barcelona and Cambrils attacks
31	España se suma al "no tinc por" de Barcelona	18/8/17	Spain joins the "no tinc por" in Barcelona
32	Todos los escenarios de los atentados en Cataluña	18/8/17	All the scenarios of the attacks in Catalonia
33	Tres (nuevas) claves tras el ataque de Cambrils	18/8/17	Three (new) keys after the attack in Cambrils
34	Rajoy pide en Barcelona "unidad institucional y colaboración policial" para vencer al terrorismo	18/8/17	Rajoy calls in Barcelona for "institutional unity and police collaboration" to defeat terrorism
35	El Estado Islámico asume la autoría del atentado de Barcelona	18/8/17	Islamic State takes responsibility for Barcelona attack
36	Cataluña, 'punto caliente' de las actuaciones policiales contra el terrorismo islámico	18/8/17	Catalonia, a 'hot spot' for police action against Islamic terrorism
37	Puig: "En Barcelona se ha atacado a toda la gente de buena volunta del mundo"	18/8/17	Puig: "In Barcelona, all the people of good will in the world have been attacked".
38	La Rambla intenta recobrar el pulso	18/8/17	La Rambla tries to recover its pulse
39	51 detenidos por yihadismo desde que comenzó 2017	18/8/17	51 arrested for jihadism since the beginning of 2017
40	Colau: "No permitiremos que el odio y el racismo se instalen entre nosotros"	18/8/17	Colau: "We will not allow hatred and racism to settle among us".
41	Tácticas de terror 'low cost'	18/8/17	The 'low cost' tactics of terror

42	Lecciones políticas del 11-M	19/8/17	Political lessons from 11-M
43	13 heridos de los ataques siguen en estado crítico	19/8/17	13 people injured in the attacks remain in critical condition
44	Emoción y convivencia	19/8/17	Emotion and coexistence
45	¿Hay que acostumbrarse a atentados como el de Barcelona?	19/8/17	Should we get used to attacks like the one in Barcelona?
46	Lazos familiares de la célula terrorista de Cataluña	19/8/17	Family ties of the terrorist cell in Catalonia
47	El último paseo por La Rambla de Pepita Codina	19/8/17	The last walk along La Rambla by Pepita Codina
48	El Gobierno y la Generalitat intentan evitar una imagen de descoordinación	19/8/17	The government and the Generalitat try to avoid an image of lack of coordination
49	Así es el imán de Ripoll, supuesto cerebro de la célula de Cataluña	19/8/17	The imam of Ripoll, alleged mastermind of the Catalonia cell, looks like this
50	Los Mossos blindarán el Camp Nou y Montilivi este fin de semana	19/8/17	The Mossos will shield the Camp Nou and Montilivi this weekend
51	Ana María Suárez y la triste fiesta de cumpleaños para su marido	19/8/17	Ana María Suárez and the sad birthday party for her husband
52	El misterio del fallecido dentro del coche que embistió a una agente	19/8/17	The mystery of the deceased inside the car that hit a police officer
53	La imprescindible unidad	19/8/17	The essential unity
54	Inmenso desafío	19/8/17	Immense challenge
55	Barcelona	19/8/17	Barcelona
56	Terroristas muertos	19/8/17	Dead terrorists
57	La política no volverá a ser igual	19/8/17	Politics will never be the same again
58	El niño australiano estuvo desde el inicio en la lista de víctimas y heridos	19/8/17	Australian boy was on the list of victims and injured from the start
59	El caleidoscopio ha cambiado y urge la inteligencia	19/8/17	The kaleidoscope has changed and intelligence is urgently needed
60	Una vela para recordar a la sonrisa perdida del mercado de La Boquería	19/8/17	A candle to remember the lost smile of La Boqueria market
61	Cinco interrogantes por resolver	19/8/17	Five questions to be answered
62	Ian Moore Wilson, un hombre de familia	19/8/17	Ian Moore Wilson, a family man
63	El sospechoso del atentado en Finlandia es un marroquí de 18 años solicitante de asilo	19/8/17	Finland bombing suspect is an 18-year-old Moroccan asylum seeker
64	Los Reyes visitan a víctimas del atentado terrorista de Barcelona	19/8/17	The King and Queen of Spain visit victims of the Barcelona terrorist attack
65	El silencio de los héroes anónimos	19/8/17	The silence of unsung heroes
66	Tres días de acciones terroristas en Cataluña	19/8/17	Three days of terrorist actions in Catalonia
67	El grupo terrorista preparaba un gran atentado con explosivos en Barcelona	19/8/17	Terrorist group was preparing a major bomb attack in Barcelona
68	Los Mossos registran el domicilio del imán de Ripoll	19/8/17	Mossos search Ripoll imam's home
69	Elke Vanbockrijck, la mujer que quería llevar a su hijo al Camp Nou	19/8/17	Elke Vanbockrijck, the woman who wanted to bring her son to Camp Nou
70	Atentado en Barcelona y Cambrils, últimas noticias en directo	19/8/17	Barcelona and Cambrils bomb attack, latest news live
71	El atentado en Barcelona golpea al sector turístico en pleno debate sobre sus límites	19/8/17	Barcelona attack hits tourism sector as debate rages over its limits
72	El Gobierno se inclina por mantener el nivel 4 de alerta, pero con medidas de refuerzo	19/8/17	measures
73	Las 24 horas que aterrorizaron a Cataluña	19/8/17	The 24 hours that terrorised Catalonia
74	El ISIS, acorralado en sus feudos antes del ataque de Barcelona	19/8/17	ISIS, cornered in its fiefdoms before the Barcelona attack
75	La conexión de Alcanar	19/8/17	The Alcanar connection
76	Los Mossos buscan al sospechoso del atropello en La Rambla de Barcelona	19/8/17	The Mossos are looking for the suspect in the attack on La Rambla de Barcelona
77	Terror en Barcelona	19/8/17	Terror in Barcelona
78	Tensión entre ultras y antifascistas 24 horas después del atentado de la Rambla	19/8/17	Tension between ultras and antifascists 24 hours after La Rambla attack
79	Los yihadistas buscaron el choque con los Mossos en el atentado de Cambrils	19/8/17	Jihadists sought to clash with Mossos in Cambrils attack
80	Barcelona recupera La Rambla 24 horas después del ataque	19/8/17	Barcelona recovers La Rambla 24 hours after the attack
81	Barcelona prescindió de los bolardos en La Rambla y optó por reforzar la vigilancia	19/8/17	Barcelona dispensed with bollards on La Rambla and opted for reinforced surveillance

Figure 7: Articles published by *El Mundo* themed around the attacks (17th – 19th of August 2017)

Nº	Headline	Date	Translation
1	Donald Trump sobre el atentado de Barcelona: "¡Os queremos!"	17/8/17	Donald Trump on the Barcelona attack: "We love you"!
2	Atentados en Barcelona y Cambrils: uno de los terroristas abatidos en Cambrils era el conductor de la furgoneta de las Ramblas	18/8/17	Barcelona and Cambrils attacks: one of the terrorists killed in Cambrils was the driver of the van on Las Ramblas
3	La atención psicológica, esencial tras un atentado para preservar la salud mental de las víctimas	18/8/17	Psychological care, essential after an attack to preserve the mental health of the victims
4	La ciudadanía se moviliza para donar sangre en Barcelona	18/8/17	The public mobilises to donate blood in Barcelona
5	Una australiana ha sobrevivido a tres ataques terroristas en tres meses	18/8/17	Australian woman has survived three terrorist attacks in three months
6	El muerto por arma blanca tras saltar un control policial había sido cooperante en el tercer mundo	18/8/17	Australian woman has survived three terrorist attacks in three months
7	El conductor del atentado de Barcelona aún no está identificado	18/8/17	Driver in Barcelona bombing still unidentified
8	Hizbulá condena los atentados en Cataluña "por difamar los principios del Islam"	18/8/17	Hezbollah condemns attacks in Catalonia "for defaming the principles of Islam".
9	Atentado en Barcelona: al menos 13 muertos y 100 hospitalizados tras un atropello masivo en Las Ramblas	18/8/17	Barcelona attack: at least 13 dead and 100 hospitalised after mass shooting in Las Ramblas
10	La CUP rechaza "el terrorismo fascista fruto del capitalismo"	18/8/17	The CUP rejects "fascist terrorism, the fruit of capitalism".
11	Los terroristas de Barcelona preparaban un atentado mayor	18/8/17	Barcelona terrorists were preparing for a major attack
12	Los Reyes rinden homenaje a las víctimas del atentado	19/8/17	The King and Queen of Spain pay tribute to the victims of the attack
13	Puigdemont asegura que "aún no se va a dar por desarticulado el comando" pero niega discrepancias con Interior	19/8/17	The Spanish government has not yet dismantled the commando", says Puigdemont, but denies discrepancies with the Interior Ministry
14	En directo: más control policial en plazas, paseos marítimos y zonas peatonales	19/8/17	Live: more police control in squares, promenades and pedestrian areas
15	Hallan al niño desaparecido en el atentado de Barcelona	19/8/17	The missing boy found in the Barcelona attack
16	Xavi y el tío Paco, una sonrisa antes de ir a La Rambla	19/8/17	Xavi and uncle Paco, a smile before going to La Rambla
17	Tres de los cuatro sospechosos fueron abatidos en el atentado de Cambrils	19/8/17	Three of the four suspects were shot in the Cambrils attack