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EDWARD SAID AND GERMAN ORIENTALISM

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To Arnold Zingerle, Gabriele Cappai and Peter Schüll

One of the main points in which critics of Edward Said's *Orientalism*[1] agree is, without any doubt, that regarding its treatment or its (nearly complete) elision of the German field. «What German Oriental scholarship did was to refine and elaborate techniques whose application was to texts, myths, ideas, and languages almost literally gathered from the Orient by imperial Britain and France». (Said, 1994, 19). Even admitting that Said were right and Germany didn't have what one could call an «original Orientalism», would that be a convincing reason not to analyze the German case, especially when he himself recognizes that German Orientalism is highly important?[2] Not at all. If it were like that, if Germany had been really dedicated only to receive without original elaboration what England or France were producing, because of its significance it would have undoubtedly constituted an exemplary case of Orientalism as much as Germans would show themselves particularly enchained to the textually-based representation that characterizes Orientalism. Anyway, apart from that, Said's statement is completely unjustified. If the version of Orientalism he is offering ranges from the beginning of the nineteenth-century to our times, he would have had to take into account that German Orientalism doesn't finish in 1880, when Raymond Schwab (what a coincidence!) finishes his (not at all complete) itinerary[3]. If he is studying Orientalism in France, Great Britain and USA up to the 1970s, there seems to be no reason at all not to do likewise with Germany. In this way, even if we limit ourselves to Said's scheme, we will find in Germany a whole amount of original orientalists as much in the field of Philology, with authors like A. Weber, Th. Benfey, H. Jacobi, G. Bühler, L. v. Schroeder, H. Oldenberg, R. O. Franke, S. Lefmann, as in the studies of religion, Philosophy and Culture with R. Pischel, K. F. Geldner, P. Deussen, A. Baumgartner, A. Hillebrandt... and, why not, H. Glasenapp or W. Halbfass... Not to speak of the fields of Literature and specially Travel Books, with names like M. Dauthendey, H. Hesse, W. Bonsels, H. G. Keyserling, R. Kassner, S. Zweig, B. Kellermann or A. Paquet; even, many of these authors are going to have their own influence in the Anglo-French ambit[4].

1 Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1994 [1979]).

2 «Yet what German Orientalism had in common with Anglo-French and later American Orientalism was a kind of intellectual authority over the Orient within Western culture». (Said, 1994, 19).

3 Raymond Schwab, *The Oriental Renaissance. Europe's Rediscovery of India and the East, 1680-1880*, transl. Gene Patterson-Black y Victor Reinking (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

4 See, among other works, H. Bechert and G. von Simson (eds.), *Einführung in die Indologie. Stand.*

Our first conclusion could be that Said doesn't want to include Germany in his scheme at all.

There has been a lot of lucubration on the authentic reasons for that decision. In our opinion, the first one (by the way, quite understandable) could have been that he wasn't an area specialist or that he hadn't got enough knowledge of the German language and, because of that, he left that reflection for some other scholars. What sort of problems could have implied to admit completely this circumstance? First of all, that the book could have hardly been entitled *Orientalism*, because of his not including immense sectors of it. He ought to have accepted a much more modest title, such as *French, British and American Orientalism* or even more modest than that: *Orientalism and Islam in France, Great Britain and USA*, because such areas as China, India or the Far East, among others, are not at all well treated. Said knew perfectly that admitting cutbacks like those of the examples would have considerably reduced the power and repercussion of his approach and it is possible that we have to celebrate that he left things as they are. In order to be effective, his partisan reflection needed to embrace «the whole Orientalism» and to do so he had to get rid of all those areas he didn't have a good grasp of. Then he would obviously require an alibi.

But besides, Germany added a new problem to his approach because it seemed difficult to show the powerful German Orientalism as an ideological weapon, which justified and gave legitimacy to the colonial expansion...[5] simply because Germany lacked colonies.

The author may have seen no other way out than dodging the German case and expecting that the critics would not pay great attention to it. Indeed, his way of overlooking Germany will be at the same time abrupt, incomplete and unfortunate. Abrupt, as much as his reasons are not convincing – it seems that he extirpates that German case without any reflection; incomplete, because sometimes he has to resort to German examples to support some variable of Orientalism or to fill some gap left by the information he seems to know better; and unfortunate, because it happens that in one of the scarce appearances of the German case, the reasoning is not at all acceptable... specially in the case of Marx's Orientalism and his Goethian ascendancy.

Critics, on the other hand, quite self-assuredly, haven't got much indulgence in reminding Said of his outrage, in plain language. James L. Clifford will dedicate to him these words: «In effect, German Orientalism is too disinterested and thus atypical of a genealogy that defines the discourse as essentially colonialist. If Said's primary aim were to write an intellectual history of Orientalism or a history of

Methoden. Aufgaben (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1993). Helmut von Glasenapp, *Das Indienbild deutscher Denker* (Stuttgart: Koehler, 1960). Christiane C. Günther, *Aufbruch nach Asien. Kulturelle Fremde in der deutschen Literatur um 1900* (Munich: Iudicium Verlag, 1988). W. Halbfass, *Indien und Europa. Perspektiven ihrer geistigen Begegnung* (Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co AG Verlag, 1981).

[5] The idea of Orientalism as a machinery of legitimacy of the European imperialism is one of the main theses in Said's book.

Western ideas of the Orient, his narrowing and rather obviously tendentious shaping of the field could be taken as a fatal flaw». (Clifford, «*The Predicament of Culture. The Twentieth Century ethnography, literature and art*», Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988; see 267-268). Keith Windschuttle, moreover, will state: «It is quite clear, however, where Said derived the incentive for this strategy. The Germans were prominent Orientalists, yet Germany never went on to become an imperial power in any of the Oriental countries of North Africa or the Middle East. For the Germans, knowledge did not generate power in the way that Foucault's theory said it should. So, rather than admit this or try to explain it away, Said conveniently omits Germany from his survey». (Windschuttle, «Edward Said's Orientalism Revisited», *The New Criterion*, [Web Edition], January, 1999; see 10).

What seems to be beyond all doubt is that such criticism on Said's book knows German Orientalism at least as badly as he himself does. Otherwise, this criticism would necessarily be enunciated in a different sense.

The fact that Said avoided to a great extent talking about the German case as well as the fact that he probably thought that it could hinder his reasoning or frustrate the «political» character of his work don't put automatically aside author's ideas nor even imply that, if the German case had been studied his conclusions would have been substantially different (something that, maybe, the author himself believed). Accepting that not including the German case is a considerable deficiency doesn't ruin the formidable avalanche of suggestions and discoveries of Said's work. Critics as those we have mentioned allow us to deduce (implicitly, in Clifford; explicitly, in Windschuttle) that the inclusion of the German Orientalism would have upset the idea that Orientalism were the ideological foundation of imperialism and the legitimating discourse of colonization. It is precisely here where we think that Clifford and Windschuttle are wrong, as we will see at the end of this paper. In our opinion, Said's main problem is that he isn't capable of perceiving (or simply he doesn't want to perceive) that the main element in the creation of an «identity» in the Occident (we are speaking basically about the twentieth-century) is, without any doubt, History; or using Bermejo Barrera's expression, *historical discourse* (let assume here the cliché of that century as «the century of History»)[6]. It is in History, much more than in Philology, Lexicography, Literature or Politics, where the Occident is going to put on airs of superiority in front of the «Other», in general; in front of the «Oriental Other» in particular. The subordination of the «Other» requires an overestimation of «oneself» and this overestimation is going to receive its enunciation mainly in the teleologies of History, in the (Occidental) vision of human progress, and in the idea of Europe, European culture and the «Occident» as a destiny; all of them collected in the nineteenth-century philosophies of

[6] See J. C. Bermejo Barrera, *Psicoanálisis del Conocimiento Histórico* (Madrid: Akal, 1983); *El Final de la Historia. Ensayos de Historia Teórica I* (Madrid: Akal, 1987); *Replanteamiento de la Historia. Ensayos de Historia Teórica II* (Madrid: Akal, 1989); *Fundamentación Lógica de la Historia* (Madrid: Akal, 1991); *Entre Historia y Filosofía* (Madrid: Akal, 1994); or J. C. Bermejo Barrera and P. A. Piedras Monroy, *Genealogía de la Historia. Ensayos de Historia Teórica III* (Madrid: Akal, 1999).

History. The machinery that underlies the expression of identities in the Philology or in the Literature that legitimate the «Occidental» values needs at the same time a deeper «legitimation»: that which resides in the nineteenth-century foundation of History. If one doesn't take that variable into account, we will at best reach a feeble «fenomenology» instead of aspiring to an «ontology of Orientalism». Said's version of Orientalism checks over all that cohort of authors that established and spread its structure but not those who generated its being. There can be no genealogy of Orientalism without a profound reflection about the thinkers of Universal History. Said's background leaves that angle in the shadow. The wittiness of this thinker will clearly puzzle out the profiles of Orientalism but all the same it will be a failure in everything related to the sources. Thus, not having consolidated the idea of the base which upholds the whole edifice, his essay will find many difficulties in connecting the different manifestations of Orientalism or in establishing, for instance, its diachronic structure. For that reason, as we have already stated, when he tries to show how the enthusiasm of Romanticism about the Orient preludes directly the orientalist ideology that legitimates colonization, he mistakes not only the starting point (Goethe) but also the destination point (Marx), because the link (the «Orientalized Orient») is not well defined: «A wash of sentiment therefore disappeared as it encountered the unshakable definitions built up by Orientalist science, supported by 'Oriental' lore (e. g. the *Diwan*) supposed to be appropriate for it. The vocabulary of emotion dissipated as it submitted to the lexicographical police action of orientalist science and even Orientalist art. An experience was dislodged by a dictionary definition: one can almost see that happen in Marx's Indian essays, where what finally occurs is that something forces him to scurry back to Goethe, there to stand in his protective Orientalized Orient» (Said, 155).[7] One problem of Said's reasoning is that he is «representing» Marx. He is attributing to that Goethian quotation an epistemic value, where a not so interested reader could hardly see a rhetorical value (nothing more rhetorical than a German intellectual resorting to a Goethian quotation!). The problem of considering as «necessary» that which clearly seems to be contingent, multiplies in this case the errors at the same time as, for the author, multiplies the explanations. First of all, Marx is not a good example of orientalist ideology because if he outwardly may seem so (he appears to greet the British domination), at bottom he isn't such an example at all (his desire and theoretical objective is to free the people of India from every single chain, either Indian or British)[8]. In our opinion, there is an *unconscious Orientalism* that has to do with the bonds laid by form, concepts and inherited intellectual

[7] Said adds there as a proof the poem «*Sollte diese Qual uns quälen, / Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt; / Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen / Timurs Herrschaft aufgezehrt?*» (Marxian quotation of Goethe; see Marx, *Werke*, vol. 9 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1972, 133); Said's version in English is as follows: «*Should this torture then torment us / Since it brings us greater pleasure? / Were not through the rule of Timur / Souls devoured without measure?*» see Said, 1994, 154).

[8] In that sense, Gayatri Spivak is one of his most loyal supporters nowadays (see Gayatri Spivak, «Can the Subaltern Speak?», in *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory. A Reader*, ed. P. Williams, and L. Chrisman, (Prentice Hall, 1994, 66-111).

traditions in which possibly every author falls until Said and the postcolonial criticism (and even those are sometimes falling in)[9]; but there is also a *conscious* facies *of Orientalism* in which we can not include German authors like, for instance, Heinrich Heine, Karl Marx or Max Weber[10]. If the conscious level of one opinion has got any value (and we think it has), we also have to take that into account.

Otherwise, the enthusiasm for India of the German Romanticism would find its epitome neither in Goethe's *Diwan* (in fact, not referred to India) nor in any other part of his work[11]. Said unifies the Western idea of 'Orient' as if effectively every Oriental ambit had been identically treated throughout by Europe and as if the experiences with any Oriental area could be considered without any distinction. The treatment of India was different to the treatment of the Islamic world or of China. and not only in the authors of the Romanticism. These authors, in their invention of India, will depict a world of reverie, where they set the cradle of humanity (Herder) not so much as a moment of physical creation (*Erschaffung*) but as a moment of cultural blooming (*Ausbildung*, F. Schlegel); they will extol to the literary beauty of young Indian women living among ascetic saints and the love, transfigured into frenzy, which leads a woman to jump into the pyre of the dead husband or lover (Goethe); or even, they will put the brahmanical cord on themselves and they will impart living, moral, sentimental or philosophic doctrine (Herder, Rückert, Schopenhauer)[12].

9 See, for instance, Ziauddin Sardar, *Orientalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1999).

10 Talking about India, in quite a similar sense to our «subconscious Orientalism» speaks Richard Fox when he talks about «affirmative Orientalism», in which he includes some Western apologists for Indian culture such as Annie Besant, sister Nivedita or Tolstoy (see Robert King, *Orientalism and religion. Postcolonial Theory, India and «The Mystic East»* (London: Routledge, 1999, 86). In our opinion, the expression «subconscious Orientalism» is probably richer or, at least, with more nuances because it is not only opened to pro-orientals which despite everything cannot completely avoid some orientalist accents due to the limits of their time; Marx could also have been one of them (we don't know if Fox would agree) but also to other authors like Max Weber, who without having a militant pro-Indian bias, define their position openly against the conscious clichés of Orientalism (see over all Max Weber, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie I-III* (Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 9th ed., 1988.).

11 There's no doubt that Goethe is attracted by some Indian poetry (*Gita Govinda, Megha Duta, Sakuntala*) as one can realize in his *Indische Dichtungen* [1821]. For many years, he will work over Indian material for his own poems (e. g. *Der Gott und die Bajadere* ôr *Paria*; see Goethe, 1977, vol. I, 158-160, 468-473), and until his later years he will keep a great admiration for the Indian poet Kalidasa (Siegfried Kratzsch, «Goethe und Indien», in *Indien in der deutschen literarischen Tradition*, ed. H. Mode and H. J. Peuke (Halle: Martin-Luther Univ., 1979) 18-31, see 22). Anyway, we could hardly characterize Goethe as a lover of India. Not only is he not half interested in India than in other places such as England, Italy, Greece, Palestine or Persia but also in works like *Zahme Xenien* will he show his deep esthetic repugnance about Indian forms, for instance, about the representation of Indian deities. Nevertheless, behind Goethian prevention against Indian things lies a secret association between the enthusiasm for India and the aims of the German Catholic *Intelligentsia* (e. g. Friedrich Schlegel), which saw in India the cradle of the Catholic order of the world (Heinrich Heine, *Schriften über Deutschland*, in *Insel Heine* vol. 4 (Frankfurt: Insel Verlag, 1968, see 207).

12 See for instance, J. G. Herder, *Gedanken einiger Brahmanen* in *Sämtliche Werke* vol. XXVI (Anstalt: Weidmann Verlag, 1882) 406-416; Arthur Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung I y II* (Zürich: Haffmans Verlag, 1991); or Friedrich Rückert, *Die Weisheit der Brahmanen* in *Werke*, (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, 1897) 51-126.

It isn't, in our opinion, neither from enthusiasm nor from this constellation of geniuses' poetry and thought from where Orientalism arises in the conscious level. In that level, Orientalism will rather arise from the idea of History enunciated by some of them (like Herder or Schlegel)[13] and assumed uncritically by most of the others (with salutary exceptions such as H. Heine)[14]. On purpose or not, it will be in that conception of History where the Occident is going to become a destiny,

[13] These authors are probably two of the main genuine characters of the German *passion* for India. Herder's many essays and writings over India such as his already quoted *Gedanken einiger Brahmanen* or F. Schlegel's decisive *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (1808) are going to become paradigmatic examples of the Indian bias of German Romanticism. But in spite of this, in these thinkers there is something *rational* that stands in an open contradiction with their enthusiastic, *irrational* (and *literary*) love for India: his idea of History situates India and Orient as surpassed ages. On the one hand, from *Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der Menschheit* (1774) to *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* (1784-1791), Herder develops an ambiguous vision of History as progress for the better that goes from the idea that each epoch is a step forward in which the very epoch is an end in itself and the center of its own happiness (*Auch eine...*) but finally adds some variations to his theory, in the line of the Enlightenment, assuming clearly in his *Ideen...* the justification of Europe as an end. In that work, Oriental cultures are described with words such as: barbarism, despotism, fine sciences, rude obstinacy... Those cultures seem to be victims of his concept of *Humanität*, which from his *Ideen* on appears to be the main basis of the construction of his historical world. As F. Meinecke points out, so is our author losing his famous *Einfühlung* (empathy), one of his identifying marks (Friedrich Meinecke, *El Historicismo y su génesis*, transl. José Mingarro and Tomás Muñoz [Mexico: FCE, 1983] 364). It's true, that even in his *Ideen* is he more benign with India than with the rest of the Oriental areas (he even talks of Indian people as *schöngebildete Völker*: see «*Sämtliche Werke*», (Anstalt: Weidmann Verlag, 1882, vol. XIII, 221-228) probably because of the great fascination for India he had ever felt. On the other hand, Friedrich Schlegel's precarious idea of History, expressed in his lectures on Universal History of the years 1805-1806 and 1828 (see Friedrich Schlegel, *Vorlesungen über Universalgeschichte (1805-1806)*, [Munich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1960] and *The Philosophy of History in a course of lectures delivered at Vienna*, [London: Bell & Daldy, 1873 [7th ed.]), can be almost considered as a Theology. The object of History is going to be moral (also intellectual) development (*Ausbildung*) and Schlegel will describe its laws. The more ancient History (with its *wildere Nationen*) is nearer to nature; in this sequence India will be the first people with culture (*Bildung*). Nevertheless, the History which begins with Alexander can be easily defined as the History of Europe (see Schlegel, 1960, 5-6). Schlegel's (much as Herder's) version of History points to that end of Europe. It will probably be their fondness for places like India what prevents them from demolishing the «Oriental Other» as underdeveloped, brutal and stupid. Anyway, both philosophies of History are going to be the breeding ground for future ones such as Hegel's. Both Herder and Schlegel show a remarkable contradiction between their Romantic taste and their Western «pride». There's no way to consider the first as a path to the second; on the contrary, «Oriental enthusiasm» (in spite of its clear signs of unconscious Orientalism) seems to temperate the radical «ethnocentrism» and «Orientalism» which lies in such conceptions of History. Herder avoids the contradiction recreating Indian beauties; Schlegel placing in India his *Uroffenbarung* (God's original revelation). The results of this *pirouette* will be nothing but confusion. A much clearer definition of Philosophy of History will be set by Hegel. With him there won't be more links between enthusiasm and History, simple because he feels no enthusiasm at all. Delivered from the «Oriental passion», History reaches maturity and establishes the foundations for an omnipresent Orientalism. But because of that, we can't consider that «passion» as a way to explicit Orientalism in Said's sense.

[14] H. Heine's works as *Die romantische Schule* show that a fair appreciation of other cultures implies an effort of changing the point of view and, so to say, of looking through the Other's glasses in order to see what this Other do as something normal or, for instance, to realize how odd are also the things we think and do as normal ones (see Heine, 1968, 197).

where the Orientalist machinery is fine-tuned; Hegel's Philosophy of History will be its definitive version. Through his Universal History, Hegel lays the foundations of the historical discourse[15] and with it its ethnocentric component. In the case chosen by Said (India), Hegel will consider demolishing not only the idea that it could exist something positive there but also any trace of enthusiasm that this ambit of the human culture could arouse[16]. For the conscious Orientalism, love for India (be it an invented or a recreated India) is pernicious for its objectives of real and political affirmation (that is to say: colonization). So, when History wanted to legitimate colonization, it had firstly to liquidate the conscious bliss. in that moment, the probable subconscious Orientalism seems to be not too important to this end.

Said would have had to situate Hegel (this author is not once mentioned in the whole book), for instance, where he situated Marx. Even the most clear fragments of Marxist Orientalism are nothing but a pale reflection of the tremendous Hegelian original. He also would have had to forget the Indian bliss of the Romantics, because at least in the context of his exposition it doesn't work at all. Nevertheless, having included Hegel and History would have obliged him to leave a bit

[15] For Hegel, the human spirit progresses always in the direction of achieving a greater rationality not only in objective sciences, such as Physics or Mathematics, but also in its History. The chain of the different cultures shows the way of development of the objective spirit, whose laws can be established by the historian. Not only will Hegel give the historian categories such as process, space, time... etc., but also the idea that there's no history without conscience, what will open the way to the appearance of the Subject. The end of History will be Europe and the Subject of History will be consequently Occidental; so only his History will be truly «human». The steps before this Subject will be considered as unsuccessful moments of Human History.

[16] Inside Hegel's schema of Philosophy of History, the position of India can't be more precarious. In his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, the German philosopher will demolish every single positive character that India could have produced. For him, only the romantic drunkenness of the discoverers of that intellectual, religious and artistic universe (so to say, the Herder, Schlegel, Novalis, etc.) had oversized the coarse features of it. In fact, Hegel's Indian reflections will be nothing but an answer to the Indian enthusiasm of Romanticism. Going against India, Hegel was attacking the core of Romanticism. And so, India for Hegel will be all superstition, full of dreamy fancies (*Träumerei*) and slavery (*Sklaverei*) (see G. W. F. Hegel, , *Werke*, vol. 12 [Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986] 208). His wild attack against India will be: a) *against the attractiveness of India* (its supposed beauty, its poetry, or its art; see Hegel, 1986, vol. 12, 175-176, 198 and 190, respectively); b) *against the romantic enthusiasm for India*, seriously damaging what romantic authors have appreciate the most there, specially the idea of India as the cradle of Humanity or the high concept of the brahmins in Romanticism (against Herder or Schlegel), the excellence of Indian Poetry (against Goethe) or the Indian Pantheism (against Schelling)... ; c) *against Indian people* in general, as abject and inane (see, for instance, 1986, vol. 12, 197-199); d) *against the idea that India had transmitted any kind of culture* (see, for instance, Hegel, 1986, vol. 12, for instance, 178 or 180-181); e) *against the idea of a Indian History* as facts or *res gestae* (they haven't got a real political being [*Zustand*]) because of their lack of History as historiography (*Historie*) (see Hegel, 1986, vol. 12, 203-205); f) so, *the only trustworthy testimonies coming from Indian are those made by strangers*... so to say, only Orientalism can produce acceptable documents of India because the Indian are incapable of appreciating their own cultural legacy (see Hegel, 1986, vol. 12, 199). We can then easily realize how incredibly momentous are going to be Hegel's ideas in the making and definition of Orientalism in general and particularly in the case of India. Anyway, even those few who have studied Hegel's position about India have never conveniently stressed the sharpness and violence of this author's attacks (see Ernst Schulin, *L'Idea di Oriente in Hegel e Ranke*, Italian transl.: Maurizio Martirano [Naples: Liguori Editore, 1999 (1958)]).

more aside his favourite hobby-horses (Philology, Literature, Politics.) and his beloved French and English cultures. Had he done that, his book would have reached more precision but it would also have probably lost some of its partisan power. And it wouldn't have had such a big repercussion.

However, Said's intuition knows no limits. Even with our critical reasoning we are doing no other thing than underpinning his own theses more and more. If Hegel and his German forerunners and epigones are so crucial as we think at the time of supporting and legitimating imperialism and colonialism ideologically, it happens that even the apparently most solid critical lines of argument of authors like Clifford and Windschuttle would have to be called into question. It would not at all be true that German Orientalism had shown disinterestedness for colonialism or that it would be impossible to set in a genealogy that defines this discourse as essentially colonialist. It would also be false that for Germans knowledge were not generating power in the same form as the Foucaultian theory was saying it did. If we put the main emphasis on the idea that the historical discourse is the most important foundation of orientalist ideology, we would have to admit that Germany contributed probably more than any other country to Orientalism and that it generated power according to, possibly, the most Foucaultian scheme. Besides if we have in mind that Hegel in his *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* identifies in India the British with the European: «In neueren Zeiten ist fast ganz Indien den Europäern unterworfen worden» (see Hegel, 1986, vol. 12, 205)[17], we will have to conclude that the German philosopher is setting himself consciously and actively on the side of the legitimation of colonialism, representing at the same time Europe as a whole, as an unitary essence in front of the 'Other'.

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[17] Translated: «Lately, almost the whole of India has been submitted by the Europeans».