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Digital Flames, Real-World Violence: Online Discourse on X and Anti-Refugee Violence in the 2024 UK Riots

Llamas Digitales, Violencia Real: El Discurso en X y la Violencia Contra Refugiados en los Disturbios del Reino Unido de 2024

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Acknowledgements:

For my dearest Edwina, Charlotte, and Fiona, the three pillars upon which I stand.

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Abstract

This study examines how online discourse on X (formerly Twitter) influenced the 2024 UK riots and violence against asylum seekers. It explores the interplay of language, framing, and influencer impact, and identifies key actors "othering" ASRs. Using content analysis and linguistic analysis of X posts, the research reveals dominant frames, including ASRs as identity threats, economic burdens, and security risks, which fuelled hostility. Findings link online disinformation directly to offline violence, stressing the urgent need for platform regulation and ethical considerations regarding misinformation and influencer power in the digital information ecosystem.

Este estudio examina cómo el discurso en línea en X (anteriormente Twitter) influyó en los disturbios y la violencia contra los solicitantes de asilo en el Reino Unido en 2024. Explora la interacción del lenguaje, el encuadre y el impacto de los influencers, e identifica a los actores clave que "otrizaron" a los Solicitantes de Asilo y Refugiados (ASR). Mediante el análisis de contenido y el análisis lingüístico de publicaciones de X, la investigación revela marcos dominantes, que incluyen a los ASR como amenazas a la identidad, cargas económicas y riesgos de seguridad, lo que alimentó la hostilidad. Los hallazgos vinculan directamente la desinformación en línea con la violencia fuera de línea, enfatizando la necesidad urgente de regulación de las plataformas y consideraciones éticas con respecto a la desinformación y el poder de los influencers en el ecosistema de la información digital.

Keywords

Influencers, Asylum Seekers, UK Riots, Social Media, x (Twitter)

Influencers, Solicitantes de asilo, Disturbios en el Reino Unido, Redes sociales, x (Twitter)

Glossary of Key Terms

- **Appeals to Fear and Emotion:** The strategic use of language and imagery in media to elicit strong emotional responses from audiences, such as fear, anxiety, or anger, often to influence their perceptions of a particular issue or group.
- **ASRs:** An abbreviation for Asylum Seekers and Refugees.
- **Attribution and Sourcing:** The practice in media of selectively highlighting the voices and perspectives of certain individuals or groups to lend credence to a particular narrative, while marginalising or excluding others.
- **Discursive Techniques:** The various linguistic and rhetorical strategies employed in communication to shape meaning and influence audience understanding. This includes, but is not limited to, metaphor, metonymy, narratives, and appeals to emotion.
- **Framing Theory:** A communication theory (Borah, 2013; Goffman, 1974) that examines how the selective presentation of information by media outlets and other actors influences how audiences interpret events and issues. Media "frames" emphasize certain aspects of a topic, thereby directing public understanding and opinion. Frames that depict ASRs as a crisis or threat can create a sense of urgency and potentially foster an environment where negative actions are perceived as necessary. The rapid spread of emotionally charged frames on social media can swiftly shape public discourse and potentially incite offline actions.
- **Influencer:** An individual who has cultivated a significant online following and whose opinions and perspectives on current events can significantly impact their audience, often operating outside traditional journalistic structures.
- **Intersectionality:** A theoretical framework (Crenshaw, 1989) that examines how multiple social identities, such as race, gender, class, and nationality, interact to create unique experiences of privilege and oppression.
- **Media Frame:** The specific angle, perspective, or set of interpretations through which media outlets present information, influencing how audiences understand and perceive an issue (Goffman, 1974).
- **Metaphor and Simile:** Figures of speech that create comparisons, often vivid and emotionally resonant. In the context of asylum and migration, examples include framing migration as a "flood" or asylum seekers as a "burden" (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).

- Metonymy and Synecdoche: Figures of speech where a part is used to represent the whole (synecdoche) or an attribute of something is used to refer to it (metonymy). For instance, referring to the UK government as "Westminster" or focusing on a small number of "illegal crossings" to represent the entire asylum system (Kövecses, 2010).
- Migration: The movement of persons from their usual place of residence, either across an international border or within a state (International Organisation for Migration, 2023).
- Misinformation: False or inaccurate information that is spread regardless of intent to deceive (Jerit, and Zhao, 2020).
- Narratives of Crisis and Threat: The construction of stories in media that portray migration as an overwhelming crisis or a direct danger to national security, cultural identity, or economic stability (Van Dijk, 1991).
- Othering: The process by which a group defines itself by contrasting itself with another group (the "other"), often emphasizing differences that can lead to exclusion, marginalisation, or the perception of the out-group as inferior or threatening (Said, 1978).
- Political Scapegoating: The act of attributing blame for societal problems or anxieties to ASRs, often for political gain or to divert attention from other issues (Cochrane and Nevitte, 2012). This tactic typically simplifies complex problems by identifying migrants as a convenient target and often incites negative sentiment to justify certain actions. It consistently relies on establishing an "Us vs. Them" dynamic, positioning the in-group against the migrant out-group as the source of various challenges.
- Refugees and Asylum Seekers: According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is an individual who has been forced to flee their country due to a well-founded fear of persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. An asylum seeker is someone who has fled their country and is seeking protection in another country but whose claim for refugee status has not yet been determined (UNHCR, 2019).
- Social Identity Theory: A social psychology theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) that explains how individuals categorise themselves and others into social groups, deriving part of their identity and self-esteem from these group memberships. The theory suggests a tendency towards in-group favouritism and potential negative attitudes towards out-groups.

- **Social Media:** Digital platforms that enable users to create and share content and participate in social networking. These platforms have become significant in political discourse, social movements, and the dissemination of information, often influencing public perceptions and societal attitudes (Fuchs, 2017).
- **Summer riots:** This is the decided term used to describe the period of unrest, within media, this has also been described as known as the July Riots, August Riots, The summer civil unrest, the race riots however they are all referring to the same period of time (Downs, 2024).
- **Traditional Media:** Established forms of mass communication, including television, radio, and newspapers. These media are often characterised by greater institutional control and have historically served as primary sources of information for the public (McQuail, 2010).
- **X (formerly Twitter):** A social media service that allows individuals and organisations to publish short-form content and view information shared by others they choose to follow.

Introduction

Following a tragic mass stabbing in Southport on the 29th of July, the summer of 2024 witnessed significant social unrest across the United Kingdom, with riots erupting in late July and early August (Home Affairs Committee, 2025). Representing Britain's worst internal disorder since 2011, the localised incident quickly escalated into widespread disorder marked by violence, arson, and targeted attacks on mosques and asylum seeker and refugee-related sites (ASRs) (Home Affairs Committee, 2025).

Historically (and concurrently) the contentious topic of ASRs has consistently attracted significant online media attention in the UK (Migration Observatory, 2016; Richards et al., 2025). Research widely acknowledges media's power to shape public discourse, particularly concerning marginalised groups, and in some cases, incite physical violence (Boukari and Devakumar, 2024). In the online sphere, platforms like X (previously Twitter) have become significant arenas for rapid information dissemination and public opinion formation (Ausat, 2023). Understanding the portrayals of ASRs in this context is crucial, especially given the social tensions and unrest of the 2024 riots, where there was a clear and direct connection between the 2024 UK riots and activity on social media (Ofcom 2024). This study investigates this interplay.

State of the Matter

Framing Theory, Social Identity Theory and Othering

Existing framing analysis offers a vital lens for understanding how media constructs narratives and shapes public perception regarding ASRs (Goffman, 1974; Entman, 1993). The 2015 'refugee crisis' marked a turning point in UK media representations of ASRs, with dominant narratives portraying them as either vulnerable or existential threats (Cooper et al., 2021). Times of uncertainty often deteriorate public sentiment, with the Brexit and the COVID-19 pandemic leading to spikes in anti-migrant discourse (Michael, 2021; Hase and Engelke, 2022), with the fluctuations aligning with Banulescu-Bogdan's (2022) observation of ASR representations oscillating between heroism and threat. Political developments, like the Rwanda Policy, further influenced the frames in media portrayals, with Barber (2022, 2023) identifying ideological divides in newspaper framing that reflect and reinforce governmental policies, normalising dehumanising language and institutional exclusion.

This, in conjunction Said's (1978) concept of "Othering," whereby groups are portrayed as fundamentally different and threatening, demonstrates identifiable links between negative ASR frames and perceived violence (Rettberg and Gajjala, 2016). For example, Arcimaviciene (2019), who identifies narrating migrants as economic or cultural threats suppresses empathy, can aid the understanding of how specific language and linguistic devices have a powerful impact in positioning migration discussions in media (Cooper et al., 2021), it has been identified that dehumanising rhetoric against ASRs, through animalistic metaphors or denying human traits, erodes empathy and moral inhibitions against violence (Haslam, 2006; Livingstone Smith, 2011). Moreover, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), which highlights how in-group identification can lead to negative biases towards out-groups, can help to understand how specific sentiment that separates ASRs from British nationals and can foster fear, suspicion, and influence public responses to ASRs.

X and Shifting Actors

Since 2015 ASR information dissemination has transformed with the rise of digital platforms, introducing new dynamics (Cooper et al., 2021) and facilitating networked publics that impact discourse (Papacharissi, 2015). Studies including Siapera et al. (2018), analysed X conversations in 2015, exposing key actors and how emotions, political figures, and networked

framing on X amplified both supportive and xenophobic rhetoric. Contemporarily, non-political 'influencers' (Riedl, Lukito & Woolley, 2023) have gained prominence, shifting political discourse from sole reliance on politicians. Understanding how these influencers frame asylum and migration and their potential for divisive discourse is therefore necessary.

Existing Analysis of the 2024 Riots

Due to their contemporary nature, limited in-depth scholarly analyses of the 2024 riots exist. However, emerging reports, such as ISD's (2024) study on Telegram's role in fostering extremist mobilisation, provide preliminary insights. Building on Boukari and Devakumar (2024), considering economic precarity, social inequalities, and political discontent is crucial for a nuanced interpretation of the social media dynamics under investigation.

Gaps in the Literature and Information Goals

Two notable gaps exist due to the study's contemporary nature. First, there is a lack of focused analysis on the dynamic interplay of language, framing, and influence on X during the 2024 riots in the UK. Second, the evolving influence of non-traditional political actors, or 'influencers,' in shaping online narratives during social unrest warrants more specific attention. While the link between online misinformation and real-world consequences is widely acknowledged (Horwood, 2024), a more granular exploration of the specific linguistic mechanisms and framing strategies within this specific timeframe, and their contribution to anti-refugee narratives online with potential real world consequences of physical violence, demands urgent scholarly attention. By synthesising X data, the study seeks to understand how this platform contributed to public discourse surrounding this vulnerable population during the lead-up to and aftermath of the 2024 riots.

This research addresses the deficit by focusing on the 2024 riots through two primary information goals:

1. During the lead up to, duration of and aftermath of the Summer Riots, what were the frames present of ASRs on X and what impact did this have on the scope and scale of the violence?
2. Who were the key actors involved in this discourse? How were their voices present in the position of othering?

Methodology

This research employs a multi-dimensional approach, combining a content analysis of X data with an analysis of secondary sources to cross compare the findings. The content analysis focuses on a sample of posts published between 1st July 2024 and 1st September 2024, approximately one month before and one month after the Southport attacks on the 29th of July 2024 (see Appendix A). The carefully selected sample of 47 posts, from a range of actors and a range of different levels of exposure, provides an insight into prevailing narratives circulating online in close proximity to the riots, in doing so aiming to address the identified gaps. In order to understand the full linguistic scope of the sample, both an in-depth qualitative discursive and linguistic analysis of five of the top-performing posts (Depth) and a framing analysis of prominent themes (Breadth) was undertaken to illuminate the specific linguistic techniques employed by different online actors.

Breadth: Framing Analysis of X Data

The sample of 47 posts involved a keyword search strategy using terms "Asylum Seeker", "Migrants", "Refugee" "Racists" and "Islam" aiming to capture a breadth of narratives in relation to ASRs in the UK in this time frame. The identified words were primarily driven by their established prominence and interconnectedness within the X and academic discourse on forced migration, social integration, and identity. These terms are frequently used in both scholarly literature and public discourse to define distinct yet overlapping populations and the societal responses they encounter. The sample size of 47 posts allowed for a manageable yet representative initial exploration of the diverse narratives circulating within the constraints of this research. Posts were extracted from various actors including the Government, Influencers, Influencer/Journalists, Journalists, News outlets NGOs, Political Commentator, Politicians and Think Tanks representing mainstream perspectives. The data set was then categorised through two forms of analysis; firstly, a sentiment scoring system (from -1 to 1) to understand the initial positive or negative nature of the content (Taboada, 2016), secondly, a framing analysis (Entman, 1993), focusing on identifying the dominant frames used to portray ASRs, considering how these frames may contribute to dehumanisation (Haslam, 2006; Livingstone Smith, 2011). This was then cross compared with Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) by identifying frames that emphasise in-group/out-group dynamics and in turn the construction of in-person violence.

Depth: Quantitate Analysis of Top posts

A quantitate analysis of discursive techniques was undertaken on five of the top-performing posts within the sample. These posts were identified based on the high number of total engagements (sum of likes, reposts, and replies) to pinpoint messages that garnered high levels of public attention and, consequently, potentially exerted the greatest influence on public perception. The in-depth analysis employs the discursive techniques mentioned and examine the specific linguistic strategies employed, such as metaphor, simile, metonymy, synecdoche (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), narratives of crisis and threat (Van Dijk, 1991) to understand how these influential messages construct meaning and potentially persuade audiences. The analysis of these are integrated into their categorising frames.

Actor Analysis and Secondary Analysis

Essential to the study was the exploration of these posts in relation to their author, particularly the role of political influencers, to greater understand key voices in the sentiment. Existing analysis, reports and online articles regarding the framing of ASRs were monitored to enable a contextualisation of the content.

Acknowledgements and Limitations

This research acknowledges several limitations inherent in the study of online communication:

Technical:

- The dynamic nature of online content means that deleted posts and removed content could not be included in the analysis, which is likely to have occurred. The statistics of views, likes, reshares and replies of posts is conducive of the scraping in March 2025, and may increase over time.
- Due to the scope of the project only a linguistic analysis was undertaken, and it is recognised that an analysis of photo and video content, emoticons and AI content would be highly beneficial for a further analysis.
- At attempt was made to primarily seek out UK-based content, except for exceptional circumstances such as content from Elon Musk, however, it is acknowledged that the insight into where the content is absorbed, is not available to the research.

- The sample size of 47 posts, while providing an initial overview, represents a snapshot of a much larger and constantly evolving online discourse. Future research with a more extensive dataset could offer further insights.
- While a new account on X was created to undertake the scraping of data, algorithmic recommendations on X, both for the researcher during data collection and for general users consuming content, inevitably influence the visibility and spread of information.

Human:

- Researcher bias, stemming from the interpretation of qualitative data, is duly acknowledged.
- The keyword search strategy, while designed to be comprehensive and derived from the, may not capture all relevant content.
- The ten identified frames encompass the different ranges of sentiment expressed in the dataset and I believe the content is appropriately sorted into said frames, however, it is acknowledged that there are crossovers in some content, where further nuance could be extrapolated.

Discussion

Framing Analysis

Frame A: Cultural and National Identity Threat




Figure a: Frame Timeline: Cultural and National Identity Threat Frame

Frame A is the perception that ASRs pose a risk to the established cultural norms, values, and national identity of the host nation (Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2000). This manifests as anxieties around the perceived erosion of a dominant cultural identity. This framing is significant as it taps into deep-rooted notions of belonging, heritage, and national cohesion (Molina, and Preddie 2020). The data from this study, reveals that while the frame had a lower frequency in the overall sample (3 occurrences) (figure a), the posts employing this frame achieved exceptionally high levels of visibility and engagement, with an average view count of 25,000,000 (Appendix B), exemplified by Elon Musk's post garnering 68.5 million views, implying that this narrative holds considerable sway in shaping online discourse when it appears.



Figure b: Post Number 37: Elon Musk (@ElonMusk)

The post referenced an incident in Birmingham, where a group identified as "Muslim patrol" members allegedly engaged in violent acts targeting a pub and journalists while seeking "white right-wingers". Musk's query, directly invokes a perceived disparity in protection, implicitly suggesting a preferential treatment of minority communities over native British populations.

This assertion strengthens an 'us vs. them' narrative, implying that established national protections are being unevenly applied, thus fuelling anxieties about the erosion of traditional British identity. Within Social Identity Theory, perceived threats to cultural and national identity can strengthen in-group identification and lead to negative biases against out-groups, who are seen as challenging the in-group's values and way of life (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Here, positioning specific minority groups as a threat to the state and its citizens, establishes a crucial link between negative stereotypes, perceived violence, and the potential for real-world conflict. Posted on 6th of August, during the riots, the post highlights how influential figures, amplified narratives that contribute to the perception of a cultural and national identity threat. Such amplification, particularly during periods of social unrest, lends credence to fringe ideologies and exacerbates existing tensions by reinforcing the notion that national identity is under siege.

Frame B: Economic/Welfare Burden Frame

To succinctly analyse this frame within the context of the riots, it is essential to postulate the broader socio-political and economic tensions, exacerbated by austerity, systemic neglect, the 2024 election, worsening cost-of-living crisis, pandemic-related shocks, and inflation which have provided fertile ground for the amplification of unrest and has deepened collective grievances in the UK (Lacroix, 2024; Richards et al., 2025). These factors frame the riots not just as extremist acts but as symptoms of deeper societal fractures, enabling negative media narratives to take hold (Boukari and Devakumar, 2024).

Importantly socio-economic deprivation emerged as a common thread among the individuals involved in the riots with over 50% of prosecuted defendants originating from neighbourhoods ranked in the lowest 20% for deprivation, while 29% lived in neighbourhoods with the lowest educational attainment (Duncan et al., 2024). Historically, socio-economic marginalisation can amplify perceptions of competition over limited resources, thereby fuelling resentment and social volatility.

While the overall fiscal impact of migration is relatively small (Vargas-Silva, 2024) the perception that ASRs are a strain on the UK economy is not new and is widely promoted in national media (Połońska-Kimunguyi, 2022). This is encompassed in Frame B, which is the understanding that ASRs place a significant economic burden on the UK's resources and social welfare system, rather than contribute to the economy (Høstmark, 2020). Averaging at 1,770,000 views (Appendix B), the 6 identified examples suggest a considerable level of public exposure with two posts in the dataset also included in the in depth language analysis due to their high performance (Appendix C).




Figure c: Frame Timeline: Economic/Welfare Burden Frame



Figure d: Post Number 7: Isabel Oakeshott (@IsabelOakeshott)

Post 7 presents a stark contrast between the "exodus" of "risk takers and wealth creators" and the arrival of a "mass of low and no skill migrants." This narrative employs metaphors such as "exodus" and "mass" and utilises crisis rhetoric to invoke a sense of fear and urgency. The language dehumanises migrants by reducing them to a faceless collective and strips them of individual agency (Haslam, 2006). Furthermore, it reestablishes the "us versus them"

dichotomy (Tajfel and Turner, 1979), framing the native wealthy as productive contributors and the incoming migrants as economic burdens, compounding frustrations about the perceived fairness of the welfare system, vitalising a key driver of British anti-immigrant attitudes (Lee, 2023). By suggesting that migrants will replace wealth creators, the post scapegoats them for anticipated economic decline, tapping into broader anxieties about societal change and the belief that foreign-born residents are unfairly benefiting from social supports without contributing adequately (Lessard-Phillips et al., 2020). The use of generalisations and alarmist language serves to magnify these fears and primes audiences to associate migration with decline and loss.



Tommy Robinson  
@TRobinsonNewEra



As migrants, who bleed the taxes of the British for their "benefits", bleed the housing system for their numerous offspring, bleed the NHS for their own ends, now rip up the pavements laid by the British, to throw at the British emergency services.

Figure e: Post Number 8: Tommy Robinson (@TRobinsonNewEra):

Similarly, Post 8 amplifies the frame through the repeated metaphor of migrants "bleeding" the states services, using language to constructs migrants as parasitic figures depleting national resources for their own ends. The imagery escalates with descriptions of migrants "ripping up pavements laid by the British" and using them as weapons against emergency services, directly linking migrants to violence and societal breakdown. This post further entrenches dehumanisation by presenting migrants as active threats to public safety and social order. The consistent use of "the British" versus "their" benefits and "their" offspring reinforces an "us versus them" mentality, framing migrants as alien and adversarial.

By portraying ASRs primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of their perceived economic cost, it can erode public support for aiding and foster a hostile environment for these individuals (Betts, 2021), underscoring the influence of this type of content in legitimising online and offline violence, instrumentalising the justification of exclusionary policies and by eroding public empathy (Livingstone Smith, 2011). Throughout the dataset, this can be identified through sub-themes including, the cost of providing housing and services, the claim that migrants take jobs away from native citizens, and the allegation that the asylum system is being abused by

economic migrants (Appendix A). The persistent invocation of the narrative in the lead-up to the riots, in combination of an average sentiment score of -0.7 (Appendix B) demonstrate how Frame B does not merely concern fiscal debates, instead, the deliberate use of inflammatory language constructs ASRs not only as undeserving of support, but as existential threats to the nation's well-being, actively cultivating fear, resentment, and moral panic for the reader, fuelling intergroup conflict (Haslam, 2006).

Frame C: Illegitimacy and System Abuse

With a sentiment score of -0.8 (Appendix B), Frame C portrays ASRs as not genuinely in need of protection or as actively exploiting the asylum and immigration systems for personal gain (Eberl et al., 2018). Coinciding with Economic Burden, this narrative involves questioning the validity of asylum claims, alleging fraudulent applications, and depicting migrants as "illegal" or as taking advantage of welfare provisions. This framing can erode public sympathy and support for asylum processes, fostering a perception that migrants are dishonest and a burden on the system (Lessard-Phillips et al., 2020). This frame also interact with the understanding that in-groups may perceive out-groups as unfairly gaining access to resources or status.




Figure f: Frame Timeline: Illegitimacy and System Abuse

The Data from this study indicates that the frame appeared 4 times in the dataset (figure f), with an average view count of 220,425 (Appendix B). These occurrences were noted in early July and then reappeared briefly in early, suggesting that concerns around the legitimacy of asylum claims, and potential system abuse were present in the online discourse leading up to

the period of heightened tension and resurfaced shortly thereafter. Influencers such as Steve Laws shared factually incorrect information in his post regarding the legality statistics (Appendix A). Whether intentional or unintentional, the spreading of misinformation is intrinsically harmful as a narrative tool, and due to the widespread nature, with 818,400 views, can have detrimental implications on the cauldron of anti ASR sentiment (Jones, 2024).

Frame D: Political Scapegoating




Figure g: Frame Timeline: Political Scapegoating

As defined in the glossary, Frame D is used to comment on the identification of this phenomenon and its occurrences in British politics surrounding the conversation of ASRs in the UK. The posts are positive in their sentiment with an average score of 0.3, identified 3 times in the dataset (figure g), with a notable average view count of 1,268,233 (Appendix B) with Zarah Sultana (Post 36, Appendix A) explicitly redirecting blame for the struggles of the working class away from asylum seekers and towards more powerful economic actors. Another, Femi Oluwole (Post 38, Appendix A) accuses a political entity (the reform party) of exploiting anti-immigrant sentiment for partisan purposes, highlighting the use of migration as a tool to create division and fear. While the frequency of this frame was relatively low in the overall dataset, its potential for high visibility suggests its capacity to provide higher performing alternative viewpoints, in addition to challenging negative frames narratives observed in other frames.

Frame E: Threat to Security / Riots

Frame E is the portrayal of ASR as a direct threat to social order and public safety, executed through associating ASR with violence, crime, and civil unrest (Rettberg and Gajjala, 2015). The frame garnered significant attention within the online discourse, with two of the three posts under this frame being included within the five top qualitative analysis.

Figure h: Post 47 Tommy Robinson (@TRobinsonNewEra),



Here, specifically phrases such as "As migrants riot" immediately scapegoats a broad group, attributing blame for unrest without nuance or context (Sager, 2017), followed by the specific mention of "Bangladeshis are also rioting," creating a direct link between a particular ethnic group and violent activity, attributing the actions of a few to broader groups of "migrants" and "Bangladeshis", deflecting attention from any potential contextual factors or alternative explanations for the events.

The racial and religious dimensions of the 2024 riots cannot be overlooked (Godshaw and Singleton, 2025). In the aftermath of the Southport incident, far-right groups attempted to legitimise the violence by framing it as a justified response to perceived threats posed by multiculturalism and immigration. Collectively, Anti-Muslim content alone garnered 80.3 million impressions, and anti-immigrant content 31.1 million, dwarfing the reach of neutral content (50.2 million) and factual corrections (31.7 million) (Jones, 2024). Organisations such as Hope not Hate reported that, deep motivation lay in long-standing hostility toward Muslims and migrants, sentiments which had been fomented through years of far-right rhetoric (Lowles, 2025). The data in the study revealed a disturbing trend of racially motivated and Islamophobic content across digital platforms. Negative posts often expressed xenophobia, antisemitism,

anti-Black racism, and Islamophobia (Jones, 2024). This rhetoric was reflected in real-world violence directed not only at asylum seeker accommodation but also at religious spaces such as mosques (Ahmed, 2024). Notably, misinformation spread online falsely claimed that the alleged perpetrator of the Southport incident was both a Muslim and an asylum seeker, further intensifying public hostility and legitimising acts of violence.

Moreover, the highly charged and stigmatising label of “Muslim ghettos”, within post 47 employs metonymy and synecdoche by using a spatial concentration to evoke stereotypes and associate a religious group with social problems (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980), significantly contributing to an "Othering" effect that clearly delineates between a perceived "native" population and a migrant "them" associated with disorder. The concluding statement, "Let that f*cking sink in," is a forceful and aggressive appeal to fear and emotion, intended to leave a lasting negative impression and solidify the association between migrants, specific ethnic and religious groups, and violent unrest. Furthermore, by highlighting a seemingly unrelated event (a police shooting in Bangladesh) as the reason for the alleged rioting in the UK, the post attempts to delegitimise any potential grievances and solely frame the actions as irrational and unwarranted aggression by migrants within the UK. This narrative ultimately works to legitimise exclusion and discrimination by portraying these groups as inherently problematic and a threat to British social order.




Figure i: Frame Timeline: Threat to Security / Riots

The high visibility of Post 47 being among the top-performing posts, coinciding with the sentiment score of -0.9, coincides with the historic media portrayals of male migrants framed as dangerous or threatening (Rettberg and Gajjala's, 2015), underscores the power of such

inflammatory language to capture attention and potentially shape public perception, in turn contributing to a climate of hostility, underscores the positioning of language and content as a means of normalising the concept of ASRs as a legitimate target for anger and potentially violence (Weninger, 2023).

Figure j: Post 39: Rishi Sunak (@RishiSunak)



Post 39, presents a video, released shortly following Sunak’s electoral defeat, depicting a red carpet being unrolled upon a beach alongside the word 'welcome' written directly into the sand. This visual element is juxtaposed with the accompanying text, 'Illegal migrants are waiting for Labour,'. contributes heavily to curation of a security concern, especially when amplified by a politician. The post harnesses on UK public concern surrounding perceived irregular migration crisis through small boats on the Southern coastline (Dobbernack, 2025). Essentially a marketing ploy, the post attempts to tap into this essence of fear for the consumer, linking migration to issues of illegality and potential threats upon our shores.

The data strongly indicates that the frame, with an average sentiment score of -0.83 (Appendix B) played a critical role in cultivating tensions online. With the second-highest average views across the sample at 3,966,667, (Appendix B), linking narratives of migrants to security threats gained significant traction in the online discourse. Despite there being consistently more occurrences of “Economic Burden” before late July in the dataset, Frame E carries a powerful emotional charge capable of inciting fear and contributing to a pre-existing cauldron of hostility

and unrest, further amplified by influential voices, with substantial audience exposure to harmful narratives linking ASRs to public disorder and security threats. This illustrating a dangerous connection between online discursive strategies and the potential for real-world prejudice and anti-ASR sentiment (Weninger, 2023).

Frame F: Policy and Governance




Figure k: Frame Timeline: Policy and Governance

Frame F accounts for the most occurrences in the dataset (10 posts), indicating the central role of policy and governance discussions regarding ASRs in the online discourse, with a robust average view count of 745,387 (Appendix B). This frame encompasses the entire spectrum of governmental actions, from immigration laws and border control to support for asylum seekers and integration strategies (Jaidka, et al., 2019). Narratives within this frame involve evaluations of policy effectiveness, debates over legal and ethical considerations, and the constant push and pull between calls for stricter enforcement and demands for more humane approaches (Jaidka, et al., 2019). This frame is distinguished by the highest diversity of actor types (6 overall), highlighting the dynamic interplay among various stakeholders in shaping policy narratives. Political figures and governmental bodies, for instance, frequently leverage this space, underscoring the inherent political salience of immigration and asylum issues in UK public debate (Richards et al., 2025).

Sentimentally, the frame has sentiment score of 0.17, with a highly diverse expressed sentiment, at the highest at 0.8 and the lowest -0.8 reflecting the multifaceted and often polarised nature of the policy debate in the online sphere (Appendix B). The frame contains

positive sentiment (4 posts), aligning with calls for more compassionate or rights-based approaches, including the @ukhomeoffice detailing enforcement actions and @Keir_Starmer articulating a strong stance against criminal activity related to migration. NGOs and international bodies also contribute significantly, injecting human rights perspectives and advocating for alternative approaches, as exemplified by @UNGeneva welcoming the cessation of controversial partnerships. Conversely, the frame contains negative sentiment (2 posts), with former Home Secretary @SuellaBraverman employing highly critical rhetoric, advocating for radical policy shifts like leaving the ECHR. Neutral contributions (4 posts), such as those from @DAaronovitch, provide contextual explanations for societal issues related to ASR policies. The consistent presence of Frame F throughout the dataset underscores its central role in shaping online understanding and debate regarding ASR management.

Frame G: Riots Identified as Anti-Refugee Backlash

Frame G encapsulates posts in the dataset that go beyond simply acknowledging the occurrence of the riots, and actively positions anti-immigrant sentiment, racism, and xenophobia as key driving forces behind the violence and targeting of migrant communities or symbols associated with them (Ahmed, 2024). Frame G highlights an alternative narrative about how the riots are perceived. The language employed within these posts, while varying in specific articulation, consistently pointed towards racism and anti-migrant hostility as the impetus for the unrest. Terms like "racists," "hateful figures," "Islamophobic," and direct references to racist graffiti were used to characterise the perpetrators and motivations behind the violence (Appendix A). Furthermore, several posts explicitly expressed solidarity with refugees and asylum seekers who were identified as being directly affected by these "acts of violence," often highlighting their pre-existing vulnerability as individuals who had already fled conflict and sought safety.




Figure 1: Frame Timeline: Riots Identified as Anti-Refugee Backlash

The narrative constructed within this frame directly links the observed unrest to targeted aggression against migrant communities, framing it not as general social disorder but as a manifestation of anti-ASR prejudice coming to the fore in a violent manner. In do so, this attempts to humanise ASRs in the public eye. The frame appeared 7 times in the dataset (figure 1), with an average Sentiment of 0.6, and all observed after the 29th of July, although not reaching as high traction on social platforms as Frames with a more negative sentiment score, with a low average view count of 310,976.

Frame H: State Crackdown and Response

Frame H focuses on discussions related to government policies and actions concerning the riots, and importantly in this case, the broader social order. Appearing only once in the dataset, the sole post from at time Prime Minister Keir Starmer coined an exceptionally high average view count of 8,400,000.



This is not protest, it is pure violence.

We will have a standing army of public duty officers.

We will ramp up criminal justice.

We will apply criminal law online as well as offline.

We will not tolerate attacks on mosques or on Muslim communities.

Figure m: Post 45: Keir Starmer (@Keir_Starmer)

While not mentioning ASRs directly, the post directly articulates a state response to social unrest and potential violence, including religiously motivated attacks. The language used is decisive and assertive, emphasising law enforcement and criminal justice. The high view count of this post, coupled with its positive sentiment score of 0.8 suggests that the extent of the violence meant that directly addressing the riots and the repercussions was necessary. The sentiment underscores the potential for state actors to shape public discourse around these issue.




Figure n: Frame Timeline: State Crackdown and Response

Frame I: Humanitarian Crisis and Moral Obligation

Frame I positions ASRs as individuals compelled to leave their homelands due to persecution, violence, or other life-endangering circumstances, asserting a strong moral imperative for the receiving nation to offer safety and assistance (Ibrahim and Howarth, 2018). This perspective appeared 7 times (figure o), consistently throughout the timeframe, with an average view count of 381,291 and positive sentiment peaks around July 7th and 31st, 2024. The narrative (sustained throughout the timeline) indicates a persistent counter-narrative within the online discourse, actively working against more negative framings, with an average sentiment score of 0.4, reinforcing the empathetic tone.





Figure o: Frame Timeline: Humanitarian Crisis and Moral Obligation

5 out of the 7 posts originating from NGOs underscores their significant role in this discourse. These actors employ distinct rhetorical strategies to humanise ASRs and highlight their vulnerability. Post 14, (Appendix C, Appendix D) with 6.7 million views, and the sole post in the language analysis with a positive sentiment, exemplifies this approach:

Figure p: Post 14: Bushra Shaikh:



This post actively counters "Us vs. Them" divisions by extending a "Welcome to the Great Britain I know," aiming to foster inclusivity within a positive vision of national identity. With sentiment score of 0.7 and significant engagement, indicating the resonance of this message. Similarly, @UNmigration emphasises shared humanity, stating, "Migrants are no different than you and me". The narratives within Frame I frequently leverage tragic events to reinforce the moral imperative for protection and assistance. Posts 12 (@chooselove), exemplify this by stating, "No one should be forced to take dangerous routes in search of safety." This direct appeal to emotion underscores the inherent dangers and the desperate circumstances compelling individuals to seek refuge. The posts within Frame I provide a crucial counter-

narrative, foregrounding human dignity, systemic accountability, with post 15 (The Guardian) challenging the "demonisation and dehumanisation of male refugees," advocating for their recognition as victims and the urgent need for compassionate and rights-based responses to the global humanitarian crisis involving ASRs.

Frame J: Integration and Contribution to Society

Frame J directly counters negative portrayals of ASRs by highlighting their potential and actual positive contributions to the UK, thereby challenging stereotypes of migrants as burdens or threats. This frame appeared 3 times in the dataset (figure q), with a notably low average view count of 1,919 (Appendix B). All three posts in Frame J are from NGOs and employ varied rhetorical strategies to demonstrate the tangible benefits of migration, such as using counterfactuals to illustrate cultural enrichment, for instance, the post 22 (@RESCUE_UK) depiction of an Afghan refugee's inspiring journey, also serve to humanise ASRs and showcase community resilience. These occurrences were scattered throughout the analysis period, suggesting that this positive framing, while present, did not achieve significant visibility or traction compared to other frames, particularly those with negative connotations, aligning with observations regarding the prevalence of negative news in online discourse (Papacharissi, 2015). However infrequent, the content underscores its critical role as an essential counter-narrative, offering a more balanced and nuanced understanding of ASRs' societal contributions.




Figure q: Frame Timeline: Integration and Contribution to Society

Online Landscape

Shifting Media Landscape

A comprehensive understanding of media representations of ASRs preceding the 2024 riots requires situating them within broader online socio-political tensions, in addition to understanding the quintessential positioning of the internet in radicalising and mobilising individuals (Cadwalladr, 2024). The majority of the British public do not have direct contact with ASRs meaning media can play a significant role in shaping ideas of ASRs (Jhoti, 2021). Online news (used by 71%) has overtaken television news (70%) for the first time (Ofcom, 2024), with individuals increasingly turning to the internet and social media for immediate information and opinions (Ashar, 2024), driven by the convenience and mobile accessibility of platforms like X (Van Dijck et al., 2018). While young people are less interested in weightier topics such as ‘serious things going on in the UK’ or ‘politics and current affairs’ on social media platforms (Ofcom, 2024), X makes an exception making it unique as a platform for news consumption.

Unique Characteristics

X presents a distinctive context for analysing media language due to its inherent characteristics (Guberman et al., 2016). The platform has a unique combination of speed, reach, low barriers to entry, perceived authenticity, algorithmic amplification, and potential for direct coordination makes it a particularly potent force in the curation and spread of violent ideologies in the contemporary world (Khosravinik, 2017). Anyone with an internet connection can create and disseminate content on X and the relative anonymity afforded by the platform (even with verified accounts) the sense of direct, unfiltered communication can prevail, lower inhibitions, and encourage the spread of extreme views and hate speech surrounding ASRs. The brevity of posts necessitates concise and impactful language, often relying on hashtags to frame discussions and reach specific audiences (Jaidka et al., 2019). Moreover, the constant exposure to violent or hateful content on X can contribute to desensitisation, making extreme views seem more normal or acceptable over time. When high-reach actors with negative sentiment utilise language that dehumanises ASRs, through metaphors like "swarms" or "invasions," as highlighted by Richards (2022), they contribute to an environment where prejudice and violence against this group become more acceptable. Furthermore, such online depictions of ASRs in dehumanising terms can create psychological distance, facilitating the justification of

harmful actions, a process amplified by online anonymity and echo chambers and the spread of the production of misinformation (Weninger, 2023).

Emotional Appeals and Echo Chambers

The potential for rapid dissemination of specific terms and phrases can quickly shape online conversations and contribute to the formation of dominant narratives (Nerghes and Lee, 2019). Emotional appeals can be particularly effective here where content competes for attention (Jones, 2024). The coined “affective publics” by Papacharissi (2015), are emotionally charged responses, which are often spurred by negativity, drive interaction, particularly in the form of replies, and as a result, communication has evidenced a swift and widespread adoption of particular frames and the reinforcement of in-group/out-group biases (Levi et al., 2025). This coincides with the existence of echo chambers, whereby X's algorithms expose users primarily to information that confirms their existing beliefs about ASRs, this in conjunction audience engagement reinforces pre-existing biases (Khosravinik, 2017). Accounts following dozens of X handles pushing hate speech were subjected to an algorithmic echo chamber, in which X fed additional hateful and racist content to users (Siddiqui and Merrill, 2023). This in conjunction with the pushing of more negative content, creates a wreath of increased likelihood of exposure to extremist views and make individuals less likely to encounter or engage with opposing perspectives creating a fertile environment for the spread of extremist ideologies and the process of radicalisation (Marwick et al., 2022).

X and Connectedness

The platform allows for direct interaction with and amplification of hateful messages through retweets, likes, and replies. This can create a sense of community and validation for individuals espousing violent ideologies and therefor allowing individuals with extremist views to connect, access propaganda, and become entrenched in radical beliefs (Awan, Sutch and Carter, 2019). X encourages this formation of networked publics, where a sense of connectedness can impact solidarity movements and also contribute to fragmented discourse (Papacharissi, 2015), in turn amplifying the existence of othering, fostering strong in-group identities (Berg, 2025).

Misinformation

The proliferation of misinformation and "fake news" related to migration on social media platforms is a significant concern, with clear links to real-world violence (Horwood, 2024).

Misinformation, often intertwined with socio-economic grievances, political discontent, and social divisions, can contribute to the environment in which anti-migrant sentiment and physical violence can escalate (Venkataramakrishnan, 2024). Online platforms allow individuals with extremist views to connect, access propaganda, and become entrenched in radical beliefs with narratives framing ASRs as threats can be potent in this process, leading to normalised extreme views and potential violence (Banulescu-Bogdan, 2022). This dynamic was starkly illustrated by the Southport incident, a process meticulously documented by Jones (2024). The timeline of information being spread, both by the police (Appendix F, Appendix G) and from online sources is essential in understanding the impact of different actors in the case of Southport riots, and the speed in which misinformation can spread. Hours after the attack on 29th of July 2024, an X account, 'Europe Invasion', (@Europeinvasionn) falsely posted that the suspect was 'a Muslim immigrant', reaching close to 4 million users (Burnell, 2024).



Figure r: Post by @artemisfornow (Now Deleted)

Later, @artemisfornow (Bernadette Spofforth) posted false claims naming the attacker as ‘Ali-Al-Shakati’, alleging he was an asylum seeker on an MI6 watchlist (figure f), gaining 1.5 million views and quickly accumulating over 6 million impressions by 10 pm that day, amplified by fraudulent news operations like Channel3NowNews (2 million views) and influencer Andrew Tate (15 million views) (Jones, 2024). Collectively, posts falsely alleging the assailant was Muslim, a migrant, refugee, or foreigner garnered at least 27 million impressions (Burnell, 2024), with disinformation about the assailant's identity reaching 155 million impressions on X alone between 29th July and 9th August (Jones, 2024) demonstrating the rapid and widespread dissemination of these baseless speculations. Crucially, Merseyside Police could not publish the suspect’s identity at this point due to his being under 18 (Home Affairs Committee, 2025).

Simultaneously, there are platform mechanics that likely facilitated the negative information flow. X's paid verification system, which algorithmically boosts subscriber content regardless of accuracy, coupled with diminished content moderation, creates an environment where harmful content proliferates unchecked (Jones, 2024). The platform's engagement-driven monetisation model further incentivised the spread of inflammatory and divisive content, as it rewards engagement irrespective of veracity (Jones, 2024). Collectively, these algorithmic amplifications likely prioritised sensationalist and polarising rhetoric over factual corrections, with anonymous accounts and bots further muddying the information landscape (Jones, 2024).

Disinformation and Physical Disorder

Within hours of the initial incident and the spread of this false narrative, far-right groups attacked the Southport mosque, explicitly referencing the online claims as justification (Jones, 2024). Online activity tragically translated into widespread public disorder, with violence erupting in at least ten towns and cities across England within a single week (Downs, 2024). Over the following weeks, the unrest involved 246 recorded events, 88 of which were serious disorder, resulting in 1,804 arrests (Downs, 2024). Historically, emotionally charged content spreads faster than factual information during crises (Evan & Hsu, 2024), with misinformation around Southport led to much higher engagement on posts linking the incident with ‘Muslim’, ‘Islam’, and ‘Asylum’ (Thomas, 2024). During the riots (post-29th July), Jones' study found that false or hateful information about Muslims and immigrants accounted for 65% of total impressions related to the events on X, while factual corrections and defences of targeted communities achieved only 13% (Jones, 2024).

In contrast, my sample, collected after 29th July, identified 63% positive, 14% neutral, and 23% negative posts. This more positive sentiment may reflect the prominence of content from NGOs and advocacy groups within the dataset, known for producing solidarity-driven and corrective messaging (Zogata-Kusz, 2022). Rather than undermining the findings, this suggests that the sample offers insight into a specific, active counter-discourse that emerged in response to the dominant narratives observed by Jones, highlighting how civil society actors engaged in shaping online conversations. As such, while not representative of the entire information ecosystem, the data highlights how civil society actors engaged in shaping online conversations during this period.

Moreover, the perceived authenticity of influencers, who cultivate direct emotional connections (Abidin, 2015), allowed their unverified speculations to gain rapid quickly. These high-reach actors, including influencers and politicians, amplify these unverified claims, they directly contribute to the building of tension and the justification of hostile actions against marginalised communities. Jones (2024) revealed a stark imbalance in the online information ecosystem during the riots. Platform leadership, particularly Elon Musk's amplified engagement with controversial content and disinformation, played a demonstrable role. His interactions with accounts known for spreading divisive content and his own inflammatory pronouncements, such as suggesting "civil war is inevitable," in response to posts originating from far-right channels, significantly boosted the visibility and spread of harmful narratives (Jones, 2024; Freedland, 2024). Musk's reduction of content moderation and the reinstatement of figures like Tommy Robinson further exacerbated the issue (Jones, 2024). Controversial influencer Andrew Tate, who has 9.8 million followers on X, also contributed to the false narrative:



Subscribe



Absolute zero protests in the UK after today.

An illegal migrant arrived on a boat one month ago.

Then he decided to stab children.

TWO CHILDREN DEAD.

NINE CHILDREN STABBED, SIX NOW IN A CRITICAL CONDITION.

TWO ADULTS ALSO IN A CRITICAL CONDITION.

These children were attending a Taylor Swift dance event in Southport.

The adults were trying to save the children.

Figure s: Post 46: Andrew Tate (@Cobratate)

The post from the 29th of July, garnering 1.5 million views, directly and causally linked the attacker's alleged "illegal migrant" status to the violent crime. Tate's deliberately emotive language, employing capitalisation and stark descriptions of casualties, provoked outrage, amplifying the tragedy and implying societal apathy towards migrant crime. Online platforms can be leveraged by far-right extremists to build online networks, promote hateful ideologies, and even organise real-world activities, as evidenced in the wake of the Southport attack.

Telegram

Research by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) (2024) on UK riot-related far-right identified Telegram as a platform emerging as a channel for extremist organisation and the dissemination of violent ideologies (The Conversation, 2024), and that platform spawned a proliferation of misinformation in online extremist mobilisation.

Telegram's platform affordances differ significantly from public microblogging platforms like X. While X facilitates broad dissemination, Telegram's emphasis on larger group chats and channels, often with less stringent moderation, appears to serve direct organisation and mobilisation for physical activity. ISD's analysis of nearly 45,000 messages across 55 channels demonstrated a dramatic 327% surge in activity, peaking on 4th of August, coinciding with significant far-right rioting. This study compellingly evidenced Telegram's role in coordinating offline action, with riot locations mentioned before events. The rapid growth of the 'SOUTHPORT WAKE UP' channel from 44 to over 15,000 members underscores Telegram's capacity for swift mobilisation around anti-immigrant sentiment (ISD, 2024). This aligns with the negative frames identified in the dataset on X, suggesting a shared underlying animosity towards migrant communities, although potentially expressed with greater intensity and less nuance on Telegram due to its comparatively relaxed moderation (ISD, 2024).

The interconnectedness of the online ecosystem is further evident in the ISD study's finding of over 3,000 links shared to mainstream platforms, including X, suggesting a flow of radicalising content from less moderated spaces like Telegram to more public platforms. Examination of key figures mentioned in both studies, such as Tommy Robinson, indicates overlaps within these online communities. Content originating or amplified within far-right Telegram

networks, characterised by anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim hate, may thus find its way onto X, contributing to the negative sentiment and framing observed in this thesis's analysis.

Findings:

Actors

Siapera et al.'s (2018) data analysis of nearly 7.5 million Twitter conversations during the 2015 refugee crisis identified key elites (NGOs, individuals, far-right groups) and dominant narratives (security/safety, humanitarianism). Their study highlighted Twitter's equivocal role in amplifying supportive and xenophobic rhetoric in the refugee debate, often politically driven and influenced by emotions and networked framing linked to prominent figures and anti-immigration sentiments. Providing a valuable comparative frame for understanding online refugee discussions in a key UK political period (pre-Brexit). However, the dissemination and consumption of information regarding ASRs within the online sphere has significantly transformed (Cooper et al., 2021). Of crucial exploration to the study is the marked rise in the influence of non-political figures, or 'influencers', within this sphere (Riedl, et al., 2024). Their increased social presence signifies a critical shift away from a reliance solely on politicians for political discourse with politicians now sharing the digital stage with a multitude of other voices, including political and non-political influencers, journalists, and online communities. Their messages must compete within a crowded information environment, and their influence is contingent on their ability to adapt to the dynamics of online communication (Riedl et al., 2023).

Influencers are not subjected to stringent posting guidelines in the same way a journalistic publication would be (Riedl et al., 2023). Moreover, unlike traditional media with editorial oversight, X has fewer gatekeepers to prevent the spread of harmful content. While platforms have content moderation policies, their enforcement can be inconsistent and often reactive rather than preventative (Jones, 2024). Furthermore, the perception of posts as "unedited thoughts," especially from influencers, can lend a sense of immediacy and authenticity that might be lacking in more curated forms of communication (Riedl et al., 2023), making the message perceivably more genuine and impactful. According to Marcus North of Hope not Hate, the contemporary British far-right is fragmented and decentralised, no longer dominated by singular entities like the BNP or the EDL. Instead, it functions through loosely connected online networks and charismatic personalities (Lowles, 2025). This may be why influencers

within this sphere such as Robinson have the scope to hold such power. While some rioters were ideologically motivated, others were opportunists or individuals with more diffuse grievances, further complicating the narrative of a purely extremist uprising.

In order to greater understand this, the dataset can be analysed. NGOs had average sentiment is positive (0.6), with Influencers (-0.57) exhibiting a significantly more negative average sentiment score than Politicians (0, although widely varied) and the Government (-0.1). Influencer/Journalists (0.6) and News Outlets (0.5) show positive average sentiment, often offering more balanced or empathetic perspectives, though their reach may not always match that of the more negatively inclined actors (Appendix E)

The actors propagating the "Humanitarian Crisis and Moral Obligation" frame reveals the significant role played by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who accounted for a notable portion of the posts employing this frame (5 out of 7). These organisations consistently utilised language to emphasise migrant vulnerability and appealing to ethical responsibility. However, the impactful reach of the top post from a Political Commentator suggests that the humanitarian narrative also finds amplification through individual commentators and media organisations, potentially reaching a broader audience. The consistent presence of this frame, coupled with its generally positive sentiment and the engagement achieved by key actors, underscores its crucial role as a counter-narrative within the often negative online discourse surrounding ASRs.

The sentiment expressed by influencers, largely unregulated in their content dissemination, was significantly more negative and inflammatory sentiment than other actors on X during the timeframe. Further numerical data reveals the significant reach and engagement of actors contribute to negative framing in the context of the 2024 UK riots. Influencers, with an average of 5,368,025 views and 31,394 likes, and Politicians, commanding 3,541,100 views and a striking 70,028 average replies, emerge as key players with significant potential to shape public narratives. NGOs, despite a larger number of actors (14), exhibit significantly lower average engagement (3,271 views, 41 likes) (Appendix E).

Collectively, the data indicates that inflammatory content from Influencers and Politicians, consistently outperforms more factual reporting from NGOs (Appendix E). Research shows that content evoking strong emotional reactions, particularly outrage, fear, or moral condemnation, is more likely to be shared and amplified online (Brady et al., 2017). The

significant engagement with influencers and politicians' posts (high replies) is indicative of the aforementioned "affective publics" described by Papacharissi (2015), with strong emotional responses, often fuelled by negative framing, drive interaction. Moreover, the pronounced disparity in reach between actors promoting negative sentiment and those advocating more balanced or positive narratives (such as NGOs) exacerbates what Jones (2024) terms the "spiral of silence," in which dissenting or less sensational voices are systematically marginalised, underscoring the challenge of amplifying inclusive messages against more sensational or divisive content propagated by higher-reach actors.

While the compositional and narrative choices, the format of the media, and the reach of the media are essential factors in the difference in how refugee is depicted in the UK during the timeframe, the data has shown that the author of such commentary is a core component in the construction of online narratives of ASRs and in producing harmful narratives, that have real world consequence. Ultimately, the entire of the sample of will have had an effect on a consumer, but the disproportionately negative and high performing post curated by the identified politicians and influencers on X, intentionally or unintentionally, employed framing techniques and language that contributes to the othering of ASRs, and expeditiously exacerbated existing social tensions and contributing to the climate surrounding the 2024 riots.

Frames

As of 10th of September 2024, 38 individuals had been charged for online activity related to the riots, illustrating the tangible link between digital incitement and physical violence (Duncan et al., 2024). The data indicates that key themes and patterns are present in narratives surrounding ASRs on X during this timeframe. While it is impossible to trace the exact influence of specific digital content and its incitement to cause individuals to perpetrate violent behaviour, the specific frames present are not only an example of a broader trend of online incitement but in relation to the summer riots, clearly evidence that the content perpetrating the identified themes played a serious role in facilitating collective action and violence. There are three ways in which this manifested.

Firstly, Narratives that frame ASRs as threats to national identity, security, or cultural values can be particularly potent in the othering and us and them rhetoric (Lee, 2023), reinforcing in-group solidarity and contribute to a hostile climate (Oksanen et al., 2014). The consistency and strength of this frame in the dataset, with a combined total of 91,531,000 views (Frames A, B,

E, Appendix B) is core in the curation of ASRs as a perceived direct safety threat to British people and Britishness. In doing so, this can lead to normalised extreme views (RAN Centre of Excellence, 2023), and in turn, standardising violence as an apparent means of protection. Moreover, when frames are coupled with calls to action, even implicitly, they can contribute to a climate where violence is seen as a necessary or justifiable response to the perceived threat (Połowska-Kimunguyi, 2022). Importantly, the frames do not exist as silos in and of themselves, the content frequently overlaps, for example "Economic and Welfare Burden" frame frequently interacts with the "Threat to Security/Riots" frame, creating a potent and damaging cumulative narrative that portrays ASRs as both a danger to society and a drain on valuable resources, further exacerbating negative sentiment and prejudice.

Secondly, as social media platforms prioritise engagement, their algorithms tend to boost posts that provoke rather than inform (Soroka and McAdams, 2015), meaning that balanced or affirming narratives often go unnoticed (Bakshy et al., 2015). The combined total views of the frames with a sentiment score of above 0 is 11,107,850 in comparison to the combined total views of the frames with a sentiment score of below 0 being 29,958,925 (Appendix B) indicating that positive portrayals of ASRs, such as those emphasising integration and contributions to society, struggle to achieve visibility compared to more negative narratives. The positive framing, especially around integration, lacks the conflict-driven appeal or perceived urgency that fuels virality. As a result, the positive frames in the dataset are overshadowed by frames that emphasise economic burden, cultural threat, or violence.

A significant body of research highlights the role of dehumanisation in facilitating violence (Haslam, 2006; Livingstone Smith, 2011). Dehumanising rhetoric, in portraying individuals or groups as less than fully human as seen in the data set in posts 46 and 47 (Appendix D), can erode empathy and moral inhibitions against violence. When ASRs are consistently depicted in dehumanising terms online, it can create a psychological distance that makes it easier for individuals to justify or even perpetrate harmful actions against them, amplified by the anonymity and echo chambers found online, further normalise extreme language and desensitise individuals to its violent implications (Weninger, 2023). Exposure to such narratives, can lead to the normalisation of increasingly extreme views and, in some cases, incite individuals to violence (RAN Centre of Excellence, 2023). This is evidenced in the aftermath of the riots, whereby Anti-racism charity the Anthony Walker Foundation received referrals for support from more than 300 people affected by race and religious hate in the two

weeks after the riots, up from a normal level of 50 referrals a week (Newman, 2024). Moreover, this frame can have a significant impact on policy debates by framing the issue of asylum and immigration predominantly in economic terms, often overshadowing humanitarian considerations and paving the way for policies that prioritise cost-cutting over the protection of fundamental human rights.

Conclusion:

The August 2024 riots did not emerge in isolation. They were the result of a volatile convergence of factors: enduring economic deprivation, weakened institutional trust, and a rise in right wing extremism. However, quintessential to the formation of the August 2024 riots was the positioning of social media, especially X, whereby a digital crucible of public sentiment was both reflected and amplified, a core factor in the curation of on and offline violence.

Most important, this study has demonstrated how specific actors and specific sentiment has been core to the amplification of violent narratives, and thus in person violence. In relation to the sentiment, external factors including the confluence of the unregulated digital environment, the speed, virality and validity in which misinformation and incitement is allowed to spread (Cooper et al., 2021) curated a perfect home for violence to thrive towards specific minority groups. We can directly postulate a contributor of the physical violence that ensued at the summer 2024 riots squarely on the overtly inflammatory and negative frames formed by dehumanising, othering, and us-and-them rhetoric leading to an environment of hostility and a culture of fear. The riots serve as a stark reminder of the destructive role misinformation and hate speech plays online, particularly leading up to, during, and after triggering events.

However, most important, this study has demonstrated how the shift in actors, specific actors and specific sentiment of inflammatory media narratives is an undeniably catalyst in the amplification of violent narratives, and thus in person violence. The data has shown that Influencers have increasingly more power in their voices in the highly emotive field of refugees and asylum seekers in the UK. It is hope that this study has shone the light on the detrimental effect of unregulated negative inflammatory sentiment, in doing so highlighting the urgent need for effective platform regulation and intervention strategies. The rise of influencers in this digital sphere, underscore the critical need for media literacy, platform accountability, and a conscious effort to foster a more informed and empathetic online environment to mitigate the potential for digital spaces to fuel real-world division and violence.

The amplified dissemination of overtly popular negative frames, intertwined with a hostile online platform and promotion from unbridled, highly influential figures. played a crucial role in curating tensions. The data unequivocally demonstrates how platform mechanics, the amplification by influential figures, and the spread of targeted disinformation can rapidly

cultivate a climate of hostility and directly contribute to real-world violence against marginalised communities. These developments underscore the increasingly blurred boundaries between online and offline spheres of radicalisation. The identified direct link between online disinformation and offline violence underscores the urgent need for effective platform regulation and intervention strategies. Here, the positioning of X and media sentiment, underscore how social media platforms, particularly X and the rise in social influencers, became critical conduits for xenophobic disinformation that directly preceded attacks on ASRs.

The ethical implications of this evolving online landscape are profound. The ease with which misinformation can spread, the potential for algorithmic amplification of biased content, and the lack of traditional editorial oversight on many online platforms raise serious concerns about informed democratic participation and the potential for manipulation. The power of influencers, often lacking journalistic training, to shape opinions, particularly among younger audiences, necessitates a critical examination of their role and the potential impact on the integrity of the online information ecosystem. There is an urgent need for stronger regulatory frameworks, platform accountability, and proactive measures to combat the spread of harmful falsehoods online is paramount to prevent future tragedies fuelled by digital disinformation.

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Appendices:

Appendix A: Full Dataset of Sampled Posts

Word Searched	Post Num	Post Content	Username	Date	Views	Replies	Retweets	Likes	Category	Frame Number	Before/After 29th of July	Sentiment Score
Islam	1	This pathetic government has waged war on its own people. To protect the feelings of the invaders. Islam needs to be removed from Britain. Completely and entirely. We are a Christian nation. If you don't like it. Leave.	@LozzaFox	Aug 4, 2024	1,000,000	1500	7500	38000	Influencer	A	After	-0.9
migrants	2	Oh look—take a hard look. Thousands of people turned out in Southport for a vigil after yesterday's slaughter of three innocent children. But do you notice anything? Where is the Islamic migrant community, who swarm the streets every week to demand respect, halal foods, political training. Islam in schools, closures for Islamic holidays, and seize control of public spaces for their "prayers" (show of power) on every Islamic holiday!? They dominate every aspect of British public life, yet now, when there's a vigil for British children, they are nowhere to be found. Why is that?	@AmyMek	Jul 30, 2024	5,600,000	3100	25000	99000	Influencer	A	After	-0.8
migrants	3	Too many people move to Britain unable to speak English - costing the taxpayer over £1bn. This makes integration impossible and it's hardworking Brits who are having to pick up the tab.	@migrationCtrl	Jul 26, 2024	19,100	20	116	523	Think Tank	B	Before	-0.7
asylum seekers	4	Did you know that if your asylum claim is successful, you are given money and somewhere to live, but if your asylum is rejected, you are still given money and somewhere to live. Insane	@WayneGb88	Jul 22, 2024	41,000	66	789	3700	Influencer	B	Before	-0.7
migrants	5	Since 1997 over 12million immigrants have entered Britain. 80% remain dependent on Welfare. Total cost is £50k per person pa. This is a staggering amount of money. Close to £500billion. It's destroying our economy. Labour started mass immigration in 1997 & want more #VOTEREFORM	@GarethDavies007	Jul 1, 2024	106,500	282	2100	4600	Influencer	B	Before	-0.6
migrants	6	As the people of the UK face a housing crisis because of mass immigration. Berkshire council have created beautiful new housing. Exclusively for migrants!	@TRobinsonNewEra	Jul 23, 2024	764,400	2100	4800	14000	Influencer	B	Before	-0.7
migrants	7	How are the rich preparing for a Labour government? They're leaving. Many have gone already. There's an exodus of risk takers and wealth creators. In their place? A mass of low and no skill migrants. How's that going to look in five years?	@IsabelOakeshott	Jul 3, 2024	1,100,000	4100	2200	7600	Political Commentator	B	Before	-0.7
migrants	8	As migrants, who bleed the taxes of the British for their "benefits", bleed the housing system for their numerous offspring, bleed the NHS for their own ends, now rip up the pavements laid by the British, to throw at the British emergency services. Migrants are no different than you and me.	@TRobinsonNewEra	Jul 18, 2024	2,600,000	2800	11000	38000	Influencer	B	Before	-0.9
asylum seekers	9	They deserve to be treated with the same respect and dignity like anyone else.	@UNmigration	Jul 31, 2024	2,969	1	31	65	NGO	I	After	0.8
asylum seekers	10	It is clear that the long years of racist, anti-refugee rhetoric has spawned the horrific violent attacks we are witnessing and our communities are experiencing. People who have fled war and persecution are now facing hatred and violence, and are in fear for their lives.	@safepassageuk	Aug 5, 2024	655	1	5	12	NGO	I	After	0.6
asylum seekers	11	Investigation by @LInvestigates Seven asylum seekers are thought to have died in a spate of suicides in quick succession in Home Office housing over a 15-week period last year.	@refugee4justice	Jul 1, 2024	1,213	0	8	5	NGO	I	Before	0
Refugee	12	In a devastating incident today, 86 refugees were rescued off the coast of Calais while attempting to cross the English Channel. Tragically, one person lost their life. Our hearts ache for the family of the deceased and all those affected by this tragedy.	@Care4Calais	19/07/2024	3,836	33	8	15	NGO	I	Before	0.1
Refugee	13	We're heartbroken that four people have lost their lives in the channel trying to reach the UK. No one should be forced to take dangerous routes in search of safety.	@chooselove	Jul 12, 2024	8,062	1	27	70	NGO	I	Before	0.1
migrants	14	Wonderful to see the first Border force boat bringing in migrants trying to cross the channel safely into Dover, since Labour winning. Welcome to the Great Britain I know	@Bushra1Shaikh	Jul 8, 2024	2,300,000	1800	656	4000	Political Commentator	I	Before	0.7
Refugee	15	We have allowed the demonisation and dehumanisation of male refugees. They are victims too Zoe Williams	@guardian	Jul 31, 2024	352,300	900	216	94	News outlet	I	After	0.5
asylum seekers	16	Another who came here on a student visa goes on to claim asylum. The Home Office have refused to answer my Freedom of Information request asking how many people in the asylum system got into the country on a visa. The last data in 2022 showed that 45% of the people in the asylum system were dinghy illegals. The remaining 55% will be made up of a majority who got here on a visa.	@Steve_Laws_	Aug 2, 2024	13,600	16	179	514	Influencer	C	After	-0.8
migrants	17	They clearly lied on their visa applications so should face immediate deportation. ILLEGAL MIGRANTS - UK border force is simply a fee ferry service. Another 64 illegal migrants transferred to the UK today, now that the weather is better. To be funded by hard working British tax payers. It will never stop! It's part of the plan!!	@Artemisfornow	Jul 8, 2024	23,700	70	469	1100	Influencer	C	Before	-0.9

asylum seekers	18	Get into the country on a visa, then slap in an asylum claim. The system is wide open for abuse and it's done so deliberately.	@Steve_Laws_	Jul 9, 2024	26,000	34	266	1200	Influencer	C	Before	-0.7
Refugee	19	Some of the 491 "poor refugees" crossing the English Channel yesterday. All were picked up by "border forces", bussed off to hotels near you, all unvetted, all at your cost.	@TRobinsonNewEra	July 10 2024	818,400	1100	3100	9900	Influencer	C	Before	-0.8
Refugee	20	Here's what the England team would look like without migration. The team's #EURO2024 success so far shows the power of welcome. When we celebrate England's wins, we celebrate how diversity makes us stronger. Join us in cheering on the team in tonight's #SPAENG match.	@RESCUE_UK	Jul 14, 2024	2,417	0	9	10	NGO	J	Before	0.7
Refugee	21	A reminder for the new government: Being kind is the most straightforward solution. Just ask Paddington. #refugeeswelcome	@FreefromTorture	Jul 7, 2024	3,043	2	47	123	NGO	J	Before	0.8
Refugee	22	"I've never felt more welcome once I saw people standing up for people they don't know." Following recent violence at UK hotels, these words come from Afghan refugee Sam. Now a student, Sam's inspiring journey shows the power of a community welcome	@RESCUE_UK	Aug 20, 2024	297	0	0	2	NGO	J	After	0.9
asylum seekers	23	Nigel Farage fuelled race riots that have led to dozens of asylum seekers nearly being burned alive... ..and now he's worried about HIS safety?!	@Femi_Sorry	Aug 8, 2024	505,400	592	1100	2900	Political Commentator	F	After	0
Islam migrants	24	Nigel Farage was rehabilitated by ITV when it paid him £1.5m to appear on I'm A Celeb. He is also joint-second for most appearances on BBC Question Time. When I say the "entire" media class is complicit in the normalisation of Islamophobic & anti-migrant rhetoric, I mean it.	@zarahsultana	Aug 9, 2024	1,000,000	1300	14000	50000	Politician	D	After	0
	25	Enormous crowds of anti-racist demonstrators in Walthamstow.	@CharlottEngland	Aug 7, 2024	1,200,000	321	3000	17000	Journalist	G	After	0
Refugee	26	Depressed and/or horrified by events of the past week and want to work to reconnect communities? Then sign our HOLD ON TO HOPE pledge and together we will get to work in your community @hopenthate	@lowles_nick	Aug 4, 2024	385,600	694	191	386	Influencer	G	After	0.5
Refugee	27	The UK must work with European Governments to create humanitarian led solutions that support people seeking refuge. Our hearts and thoughts are with the families of those killed in this senseless tragedy.	@chooselove	Jul 13, 2024	1,182	0	1	5	NGO	F	Before	0.7
asylum seekers	28	Let's state what should be obvious about the resentment of asylum seekers living in hotels - that this is a product of past government's total failure to process claims and that successful applicants want nothing more than to work for their living.	@DAaronovitch	Aug 5, 2024	530,000	551	832	3700	Influencer/ Journalist	F	After	0.6
Refugee	29	Independent human rights experts welcome announcement to end #UK #Rwanda asylum partnership. "This is an important step to ensure the right to asylum and protection of the human rights of all migrants and refugees seeking protection in the UK, regardless of how they arrive."	@UNGeneva	July 10 2024	2,906	4	5	20	NGO	F	Before	0.8
migrants	30	46 criminals and immigration offenders have been returned to Vietnam and Timor-Leste. The rules need to be respected and enforced. We're ending the Migration Partnership with Rwanda, instead focusing on fast-tracking removals of people with no right to remain in the UK.	@ukhomeoffice	Jul 25, 2024	76,700	345	126	304	Government	F	Before	-0.1
migrants	31	Can someone please answer me this simple question: Where would Labour send all the illegal Channel migrants originating from unsafe countries, if not back to France nor to Rwanda ? Where will they send them?	@Rod__Mason	Jul 1, 2024	345,400	2800	948	3900	Influencer	F	Before	-0.3
Refugee	32	I said we will smash the criminal gangs. I meant it. Grown-up politics, in the service of working people, is back.	@Keir_Starmer	Jul 18, 2024	887,700	5000	1300	7200	Politician	F	Before	0
asylum seekers	33	More blah, blah, blah. I warned, but prepare to see the UK become an even bigger magnet for illegal arrivals & numbers soar as our borders disintegrate. We need to leave the ECHR, scrap the HRA & quickly remove people when they arrive illegally. Nothing else matters.	@SuellaBraverman	Jul 8, 2024	1,300,000	5100	3100	15000	Politician	F	Before	-0.8
Refugee	34	We must move beyond the use of hotels, and instead house people within communities where they can access essential support, build meaningful connections, and begin to rebuild their lives in safety. Read more: Today I have set out the first steps to establish the new UK Border Security	@Care4Calais	Aug 28, 2024	4,577	64	10	20	NGO	F	After	0.8
migrants	35	Command to go after criminal smuggler gangs and strengthen our borders.	@YvetteCooperMP	Jul 7, 2024	3,800,000	3100	1400	7800	Politician	F	Before	0

asylum seekers	36	I've said it before and I'll say it again: The enemy of the working class travels by private jet, not migrant dinghy.	@zarahsultana	Aug 7, 2024	2,700,000	4000	18000	83000	Politician	D	After	0.6
Islam	37	Why aren't all communities protected in Britain? @Keir_Starmer	@elonmusk	Aug 6, 2024	68,400,000	17000	45000	209000	Influencer	A	After	-0.5
migrants	38	An overt racist created your party. You chose to use brown faces to scare people about European migration, despite the UK not being under EU asylum policy. You put YOURSELF into the category of racist. Not us.	@Femi_Sorry	Jul 6, 2024	104,700	196	390	3000	Political Commentator	D	Before	0.3
migrants	39	Illegal migrants are waiting for Labour.	@RishiSunak	Jul 1, 2024	6,700,000	4700	3100	16000	Politician	E	Before	-0.6
asylum seekers	40	Remember those words scrawled on the wall – "FUCK PAKIS" – whenever a pundit or a journalist tries to make out that this is all a misguided expression of legitimate concerns about immigration	@AyoCaesar	Aug 5, 2024	563,800	248	5000	15000	Influencer	G	After	0.8
asylum seekers	41	As far-right mobs set fire to the Rotherham hotel, children and asylum seekers with disabilities were told to remain inside. Two asylum seekers said they had to put out some of the fires themselves. Most staff, meanwhile, were evacuated.	@NicolaKelly	Aug 26, 2024	12,800	3	145	147	Influencer/ Journalist	G	After	0.6
migrants	42	Statement re #RaceRiots from @SBMSociety . We #StandwithRefugees The Syrian British Medical Society condemns the Islamophobic, anti-refugee, anti-migrant riots which have occurred across the UK. In particular, we #standwithrefugees, many of whom have fled conflict & suffered during their journeys to the UK where they seek safety. We ask the government & its institutions to take a hard line against those displaying such divisive actions.	@SBMSociety	Aug 9, 2024	307	1	2	6	NGO	G	After	0.8
migrants	43	This is what real community looks like. Hateful figures drummed up by racism and division caused the rioting that trashed a grieving community in Southport. But today, the community stepped up. While racists shout loudly, we'll NEVER stop fighting for kindness and compassion	@FreefromTorture	Jul 31, 2024	6,786	1	30	109	NGO	G	After	0.8
Refugee	44	Today we join over 240 orgs to stand in solidarity with those affected by the recent acts of violence, many of whom have already fled unimaginable horrors to try to find safety. This must be a turning point. Read the statement here: https://bit.ly/3AipP9y #TogetherWithRefugees	@refugeecouncil	Aug 7, 2024	7,538	6	54	118	NGO	G	After	0.7
Islam	45	This is not protest, it is pure violence. We will have a standing army of public duty officers. We will ramp up criminal justice. We will apply criminal law online as well as offline. We will not tolerate attacks on mosques or on Muslim communities.	@Keir_Starmer	Aug 5, 2024	8,400,000	26000	8500	39000	Politician	H	After	0.8
migrants	46	Absolute zero protests in the UK after today. An illegal migrant arrived on a boat one month ago. Then he decided to stab children. TWO CHILDREN DEAD. NINE CHILDREN STABBED, SIX NOW IN A CRITICAL CONDITION. TWO ADULTS ALSO IN A CRITICAL CONDITION. These children were attending a Taylor Swift dance event in Southport. The adults were trying to save the children.	@Cobratate	Jul 29, 2024	1,500,000	117	4300	23000	Influencer	E	After	-1
migrants	47	As migrants riot in Leeds. Bangladeshis are also rioting in one of the biggest Muslim ghettos in Whitechapel, London. Their reason? Police shot a Bangladeshi, in Bangladesh! Let that f*cking sink in.	@TRobinsonNewEra	July 18 2024	3,700,000	1600	9500	41000	Influencer	E	Before	-0.9

Frame Name	Frame Code	Quantity in Sample	Average View	Average Reply	Average Retweets	Average Likes	Sentiment Score
Cultural and National Identity Threat	A	3	25000000	7200	25833	115333	-0.73
Economic and Welfare Burden	B	6	771833	1561	3500	11403	-0.72
Illegitimacy and System Abuse	C	4	220425	305	1004	3179	-0.8
Political Scapegoating	D	3	1268233	1832	10796	45333	0.3
Threat to Security / Riots	E	3	3966667	2139	5633	26666	-0.83
Policy and Governance	F	10	745387	1756	4085	4217	0.17
Riots Identified as Anti-Refugee Backlash	G	7	310976	182	1203	4681	0.6
State Crackdown and Response	H	1	8400000	26000	8500	39000	0.8
Humanitarian Crisis and Moral Obligation	I	7	381290	391	136	607	0.4
Integration and Contribution to Society	J	3	1919	1	17	45	0.8
Total Average Per Frame			4106673	4137	6072	25046	
Average Per Tweet			2487721	1950	3799	16173	

Appendix B: Framing Statistics

Post Number	Post Content	Username	Date	Views	Replies	Retweets	Likes	Category	Frame	Sentiment Score	Before or After 29 July
7	How are the rich preparing for a Labour government? They're leaving. Many have gone already. There's an exodus of risk takers and wealth creators in their place? A mass of low and no skill migrants. How's that going to look in five years?	@IsabelCakeshott	03/07/2024	1,100,000	4100	2200	7600	Political Commentator	Economic and Welfare Burden	-0.7	Before
8	As migrants, who bleed the taxes of the British for their 'benefits', bleed the housing system for their numerous offspring, bleed the NHS for their own ends, now rip up the pavements laid by the British, to throw at the British emergency services.	@TRobinsonNewEra	18/07/2024	2,600,000	2800	11000	38000	Influencer	Economic and Welfare Burden	-0.9	Before
14	Wonderful to see the first Border force boat bringing in migrants trying to cross the channel safely into Dover, since Labour winning. Welcome to the Great Britain I know	@Bushra1Shaiikh	08/07/2024	2,300,000	1800	666	4000	Political Commentator	Humanitarian Crisis and Moral Obligation	0.7	Before
39	Illegal migrants are waiting for Labour.	@RishiSunak	01/07/2024	6,700,000	4700	3100	16000	Politician	Threat to Security and Riots	-0.6	Before
47	As migrants riot in Leeds. Bangladeshis are also rioting in one of the biggest Muslim ghettos in Whitechapel, London. Their reason? Police shot a Bangladeshi, in Bangladesh! Let that f*cking sink in.	@TRobinsonNewEra	18/07/2024	3,700,000	1600	9500	41000	Influencer	Threat to Security and Riots	-0.9	Before


Appendix C: In Depth Analysis: Statistics

Post Number	Content	Sentiment Score	Key Words / Phrases	Discursive Techniques	Discursive Mechanisms	Identified Frame
7	How are the rich preparing for a Labour government? They're leaving. Many have gone already. There's an exodus of risk takers and wealth creators. In their place? A mass of low and no skill migrants. How's that going to look in five years?	-0.7	"mass of" "exodus" "low and no skill migrants."	Metaphor Metonymy Narratives of Crisis and Threat Appeals to Fear and Emotion	Dehumanisation. Othering and "Us vs. Them" Mentality Scapegoating Inflammatory and Fear-Mongering Language Generalisations and Stereotypes -Statistical/Quantifying Language	Economic and Welfare Burden
8	As migrants, who bleed the taxes of the British for their "benefits", bleed the housing system for their numerous offspring, bleed the NHS for their own ends, now rip up the pavements laid by the British, to throw at the British emergency services.	-0.9	"bleed the taxes" "bleed the housing" system" "bleed the NHS" "rip up the pavements" "As migrants" "the British" "their 'benefits'" "their numerous offspring" "their own ends" "pavements laid by the British"	Metaphor and Simile Narratives of Crisis and Threat Appeals to Fear and Emotion	Dehumanisation Scapegoating Othering and "Us vs. Them" Mentality Inflammatory and Fear-Mongering Language Generalisations and Stereotypes Legitimising Exclusion and Discrimination	Economic and Welfare Burden
14	Wonderful to see the first Border force boat bringing in migrants trying to cross the channel safely into Dover, since Labour winning. Welcome to the Great Britain I know	0.7	"Wonderful to see... safely" "Welcome to the Great Britain I know"	Appeals to Fear and Emotion Attribution and Sourcing	(None explicitly present)	Humanitarian Crisis and Moral Obligation
39	Illegal migrants are waiting for Labour. (With video content of red-carpet being rolled out on a beach)	-0.6	"Illegal migrants"	Metaphor and Simile Narratives of Crisis and Threat Appeals to Fear and Emotion Attribution and Sourcing	Scapegoating Othering and "Us vs. Them" Mentality Generalisations and Stereotypes Legitimising Exclusion and Discrimination	Political Scapegoating
47	As migrants riot in Leeds. Bangladeshis are also rioting in one of the biggest Muslim ghettos in Whitechapel, London. Their reason? Police shot a Bangladeshi, in Bangladesh! Let that f*cking sink in.	-0.9	"As migrants riot" "Bangladeshis are also rioting" "Muslim ghettos" "Let that f*cking sink in"	Metonymy and Synecdoche Narratives of Crisis and Threat Appeals to Fear and Emotion Attribution and Sourcing	Scapegoating Othering and "Us vs. Them" Mentality Inflammatory and Fear-Mongering Language Generalisations and Stereotypes Legitimising Exclusion and Discrimination	Threat to Security and Riots


Appendix D: In Depth Analysis: Linguistic Analysis

Category	Number in Sample	#	Average View	Average Reply	Average Retweets	Average Likes	Average Sentiment Score
Influencers	16		5368025	2095	7509	31394	-0.57
Government	1		76700	345	126	304	-0.1
Influencer/ Journalist	2		271400	277	489	1924	0.6
Journalist	1		1200000	321	3000	17000	0
News Outlet	1		352300	900	216	94	0.5
NGO	14		3271	8	17	41	0.6
Policial Comentator	4		1002525	1672	1087	4375	0.07
Politician	7		3541100	70,028	7057	31,143	0
Think Tank	1		19100	20	116	523	-0.7
Total Average Number	5.75		1476915.125	9455.75	19501	86275	0.012

Appendix E: Actor Statistics




Appendix F: Timeline of information shared (Home Affairs Committee, 2025).



Appendix H: Sentiment Score and Actor Timeline

Sentiment Score Timeline



Appendix H: Sentiment Score And Framing Analysis Timeline