THE USE OF LANGUAGE IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CASE STUDY OF TWO FIFA TOURNAMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA

End-of-degree Project

Cristina Marzal Ruano

Supervisor: PhD. Clare Elizabeth Nimmo

2015/2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Introduction

Ever since the Internet started its rapid expansion during the 1990s, companies have experienced a growing exposure to public opinion. Both social and traditional mass media have proven by far their ability to destroy somebody's reputation in the blink of an eye, leaving companies in a vulnerable position not only from society's criticism of their practices, but also from defamation campaigns led openly or covertly by competitors or by other actors in society.

This has forced companies to care about their reputation and the effects of their practices, specially in the case of those who engage in ethically questionable activities. As the possibility of carrying out unethical activities without attracting attention diminishes, companies develop strategies to counter the negative externalities of such activities in terms of reputation, giving rise to two booming areas of corporate culture. Firstly, and most obviously, to the growth of reputation management as a discipline. Secondly, to the development a concept called "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR), which aims to develop a socially and environmentally accountable nature within companies. Despite the relatively recent appearance of CSR in the 1970s, it is becoming increasingly important worldwide, even making its way into corporate legislation.

Although the companies whose actions breed most criticism may be the most interested in mitigating the effects of their bad reputation through CSR, most medium and large multinational companies are rapidly catching up with this trend, regardless of their field of activity. This creates three main challenges for companies: firstly, they have to come up with a strategy that is feasible and that can give positive return in the form of better reputation for the company. Secondly, they need to adapt this strategy to the many areas of the world they operate in, assessing the needs of each community and "localising" the strategy so it works equally in every region. Thirdly, such localisation process needs to be reflected in translation to the language of the region or country where that CSR strategy will be implemented, which is the focus of this dissertation.

This whole process has been developing and growing fast, and sometimes even simultaneously with the very creation of CSR as a field of study. In this regard, this project will analyse if CSR is indeed being localised, or if the same projects are just being translated without further concern about cultural differences with the "source country".

This will be achieved through a case study covering the latest CSR strategies deployed by FIFA in Latin American tournaments, more specifically the latest U20 World Cup in Colombia in 2012 and the latest Men's World Cup that took place in Brazil in 2014.

2. Theoretical framework

2.1. History of CSR

It would be incorrect to assume that CSR is the first organised attempt to put together business and a philosophy of ethics or social service. As noted by Carroll, (Carroll, 1999) such initiatives and ideas have appeared and flourished in many countries, cultural contexts and at various moments in history. In this regard, we could say that CSR is the modern mainstream term to address concerns regarding the social accountability of companies.

Despite the fact that societies have questioned the role of companies in the world order, particularly regarding human rights and environmental issues, corporate social responsibility as such is only a few decades old. The birth of CSR as a concept has been traced by the main CSR historians to the 1950s (Abe & Ruanglikhitkul, 2013). The disastrous effects of the Great Depression, as well as the influence of the Labour Movement, are said to have ignited the debate about the social meaning of business, gradually leading to a common idea that would be referred to as "social responsibility".

During the 60s and particularly in the 70s, the rise of corporate business organisation led to the addition of the "corporate" word to the name of CSR (Carroll,

2008). Although the term "corporate" is used differently in American (in which it often refers to a large business, regardless of its legal status) and British English, it could be defined a business model in which the business is a separate legal entity, having five core attributes defined and given by the law: limited liability for investors, centralised management under a board, transferrable shares, shared ownership by contributors of capital and, most importantly, legal personality (Armour, Hansmann, & Kraakman, 2009).

This means that, as more and more companies started acquiring this legal status, they also gained nearly all the rights and responsibilities of any other legal person. Firstly, they gained human rights, being able to denounce any violation of the aforesaid directed at them but also the obligation to respect the human rights of all fellow legal persons and accountability for any possible violation. Secondly, given that the ownership of the corporation is shared among many contributors of capital, the incorporation of the company meant that the accountability for that corporation's activities spread to the many shareholders that owned it and subsequently decided its course of action. Therefore, the establishment of corporations as legal entities led to both the establishment of legal accountability for human right offences and its spread among to a large group of stakeholders who could be held accountable the potential damage the corporation could cause in society or on the environment.

During the 80s and 90s there was further research on the topic of CSR, as well as theoretical debates that presented alternative approaches to the idea of a corporation's social accountability. As societies grew aware of the importance of environmental and political developments in the world, they also started to pay more attention to the effects the activities of big corporations could have in their lives. This increasing awareness of the fact that a corporation's activities affect more groups than just the management board and the owners, but also other stakeholders such as employees, suppliers, and society as a whole, led to a broadening of the definition of CSR that was adopted by some authors and named Corporate Social Performance (CSP) (de Quevedo-Puente, de la Fuente-Sabaté, & Bautista, 2007) (Clarkson, 1995).

Another interesting alternative approach developed during this time was stakeholder theory, introduced by R. Edward Freeman in his book *Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach* (Freeman, 1984). This alternative theory could be understood as departing from the grassroots reasoning behind CSP (mainly the acknowledgement of a wider group of stakeholders than the traditional capital owners) but adding a component of business ethics that aims to question the very purpose of corporations in the system. Hence, the main goal of Stakeholder Theory, as defined by Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, is "the assumption that values are necessarily and explicitly a part of doing business", as well as "to ask managers to articulate the shared sense of the value they create, as well as of what brings its stakeholders together" (Freeman, Wicks, & Parmar, 2004).

The convergence of CSR and business ethics is understandable as, at least in theory, both aim to define business practices that should be followed in order to avoid engaging in unethical behaviour. In this regard, Stakeholder Theory could be understood as the link between CSR as a more company-specific approach (not only moved by ethical reasons, but also by a strong reputation management will) and a more general and entirely ethics-based group of Business Ethics theories (Phillips, Freeman, & Wicks, 2003).

CSR as a discipline, enriched by the theoretical advances experienced during the 80s and the 90s, consolidated from 2000 onwards, starting to become common practice in an increasingly number of big corporations. Whereas CSR at first was mostly seen as a reactive measure aimed at mitigating the damage caused in the company's image by an ethically questionable practice, this approach seems to be evolving towards a long-term, comprehensive implementation in business planning. Neville Isdell, former CEO of Coca Cola, stated in an interview that companies are now moving towards a more strategic vision of CSR, abandoning a reactive and damage-mitigating approach to align CSR strategies with their business sectors and models so that their welfare and environmental commitment appears more genuine (Runde, 2011). Some companies are taking this a step further, creating CSR strategies through specific areas of investment within the corporations, known as social enterprises (Abe & Ruanglikhitkul, 2013).

The growth of CSR has also reached public administration, as the legislative bodies of several countries have started to include clauses related to CSR in their company law (as seen in clause 135 of the New Companies Act, 2013, in the case of Britain). This is set to evolve towards a redefinition of business models, in which the effect of such business in the widest definition of stakeholders (as seen in CSP theory) is increasingly considered as a direct responsibility of the company and its management board.

2.2 Multinational CSR and reputation management strategies

Multinational companies are some of the most important international actors in today's economic and political system. Many of them own assets that exceed the GDP of small and medium sized countries, employing thousands of people from very different backgrounds and thus affecting the lives of millions of people around the world.

The rise of multinational companies during the eighties and the nineties was accompanied by a series of power abuses regarding child labour, sweatshops, environmental disasters and exploitation of country's resources, with no benefit from the multinational companies reaching the local population. Whereas at first it was much harder for the consumers and the general public to be aware of such practices, the development of the Internet made all these pieces of information increasingly available.

This led to intense criticism towards these companies, particularly focused at irresponsible business models whereby companies externalised services and production to other countries where labour and environmental laws were not respected or non-existent, or where they could get away using the corruption in these countries to their benefit. The exposure of these practices even led to organised boycotts of some companies' products, strengthening the need to implement reputation management strategies through strategies such as CSR.

Given that the unpopular activities carried out by multinationals tend to take place in a country far away from where they sell their products, CSR strategies in multinational companies have traditionally had a strong international component, particularly when the sole goal of deploying a CSR strategy was to cover or mitigate criticism about a bad decision regarding activities in other countries.

During the last decades, due to this "damage-mitigating approach", the biggest CSR campaigns have been deployed by companies with questionable labour and environmental practices.

A good example of a CSR campaign motivated by a labour scandal is the case of Nike. This company was widely exposed and criticised during the 90s due to sweatshop and near-slave labour practices used to cut manufacturing costs in Asia, which led to a worldwide CSR and reputation campaign aimed at stopping the boycotts and the subsequent fall in its sales. In 1991, after Nike moved its manufacturing plants to Indonesia, China and Vietnam so as to cut costs, a human rights activist called Jeff Ballinger published a report documenting poor working conditions in Indonesia, including several interviews with factory workers. This attracted growing media attention, causing protests during the 1992 Barcelona Olympics and creating a big reputation problem for Nike (Nisen, 2013). The company started to respond in 1996, when it created a department dedicated to labour conditions and published a report on its factories abroad. This, however, had little effect and only contributed to making criticism more intense and widespread. It was not until the late 90s that Nike started to revert this trend, as it created the Fair Labour Association, working with human rights activists to establish a benchmark for workers' rights, as well as routine factory audits whose results were published in the shape of lengthy and detailed reports (DeTienne & Lewis, 2005).

This set of CSR strategies have also been accompanied by local projects, such as micro-loan financing and generous donations to various poverty alleviation projects in Southeast Asia. One of the most famous examples of these strategies is the "Nike Village

Development Project", a set of financing, education and professional empowerment programmes carried out in northern villages of Thailand (Contreras, 2004).

Human rights groups continue to point out some pending issues regarding Nike's "redemption", arguing that the company can still do much more regarding the rights of the workers it employs in Southeast Asia (Chan, 2015). However, the effectiveness of Nike's CSR campaign is beyond doubt, as it has managed to revert a strong trend of boycotting and bad reputation (Newell, 2015).

Even though labour abuse scandals have been present in the latest CSR strategies, environmental and humanitarian issues also play an important role. This is the case, for example, of Royal Dutch Shell in the biggest oil reserves known in Africa, the Niger Delta.

Shell's actions in the region have been controversial ever since its arrival, as the Nigerian government forcefully displaced the ethnic groups living in the region so that the oil companies could operate (Human Rights Watch, 1999). This has led to various revolts among these ethnic groups, as well as to the establishment of irregular armed militias (such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta or MEND) (Duffield, 2010) and to a widespread increase in violence due to competition between different groups for oil revenues. Confronted by strong accusations from human rights groups, Shell adopted a strategy of denying its involvement, as well as a negative effect of their activities in the region. (Human Rights Watch, 1999)

This situation is still present today, when the problems linked to violence and social unrest in the region are worsened by another consequence of Shell's activity. Oil spills that seem like uncontrolled have deeply polluted the Delta area, where many families depend on fishing revenues and catches to survive. This, together with the general unrest caused by the presence of foreign oil companies in the region, attracted the UN's attention, who in 2011 published a report denouncing Shell's activities and asking that it help fix the environmental and humanitarian damages caused in the Delta.

Due to the large media attention attracted by this UN statement, Shell declared that it would do as asked and clean its oil spills so as to ensure a future for local fishermen and not endanger the health of the population and the ecosystem. However, a recent report by Amnesty International denounces "blatant lies, again" by Shell regarding the situation in the Delta, arguing that the company has lied and has in fact not cleaned any of the waste it said it had cleaned after the UN request (Amnesty International, 2015).

Contrastive analysis of both cases leads to some conclusions regarding CSR and multinational companies:

CSR strategies make it possible for companies with a bad reputation to alter their image and regain consumer trust. This is achieved even if human rights abuse allegations still persist, but in a weaker manner, as in the case of Nike. Even if the CSR campaign has not implied a radical change in the company's activities, it helps achieve a better image and divert attention from potentially questionable decisions.

However, the assumption that growing exposure pressures all multinationals to deploy CSR strategies can sometimes be wrong. As seen in the case of Shell, companies that have a less sensitive consumer base and a less volatile demand can be less prone to acknowledging unethical behaviour, even if it is just to cover it while doing little or nothing to change to their current policies. Shell's response to accusations was just to deny or ignore them, it only responded when confronted by the UN and the fishermen's lawyers, and even though Amnesty and Human Rights Watch denounce regularly its unethical behaviour it is unlikely that this will have a strong effect in its sales, as oil is a necessary commodity and consumers will still need to buy it despite knowing about the company's misbehaviour.

The cases of these two companies serve as an introduction for the context in which multinationals such as FIFA operate in terms of CSR. As will be explained further on, FIFA's revenue comes directly from its organisation of football tournaments and

events. This should make it very vulnerable to potential blowback from unethical practices, but this is not always the case.

2.3. Localisation vs. Globalisation in CSR

When a company plans the sale of a product in more than one country it needs to develop a marketing and fabrication strategy that ensures it can be sold and used correctly in all the target markets (Wach, 2011). This strategy has been defined as comprising two steps: internationalisation and localisation. The internationalisation step gathers all design and technical aspects, product design and fabrication, whereas localisation implies the cultural and linguistic adaptation of such product so as to eliminate any cultural or linguistic barriers.

Even if the ultimate goal of this process is to obtain a product suitable for sale and use in the target region, there are two approaches to obtaining this result. The internationalisation and localisation process requires a decision about whether the product will undergo a process of localisation for each region or will be created following a globalisation approach, aimed at minimising the costs and the work needed to expand that product to other regions.

On the one hand, language localisation (also known as diversification or adaptation) (Wach, 2011) is the process by which content is not only translated to a specific target language, but also adapted for a specific region or cultural audience. This requires, along with the translation process, a thorough research process to ensure correct adaptation and promote the objectives for which localisation is used. The main motivation for a localisation approach is the wish to create a product that can overcome cultural and social barriers, adapting to the characteristic of a consumer base so as to maximise revenue. A well-known example of a highly localised product is the case of Coca-Cola. This company adapts its products not only regarding translation, marketing campaigns or labelling, but has even created a specific recipe for each country and different names for special markets, such as China (Vrontis & Sharp, 2003).

On the other hand, a globalisation (also referred to as standardisation) approach aims to create a product that can be sold and accepted in any target market, requiring only minor linguistic changes if needed. The main benefit of this approach is found in the consequent reduction of costs, comprising translation, localisation, product design and marketing among others. However, it can also bring disadvantages, as its homogeneity can lead to a loss of popularity, a lack of understanding from audiences who are not familiar with the topic, conflicts with national regulation over marketing or fabrication standards or even ridicule situations, such as what would happen if, for example, a common drink like Nordic Mist were sold in Germany, where the word "mist" is a slang term for "manure" (Rivkin & Sutherland, 2004).

As for current examples of extreme globalisation strategies, Inditex and most specifically the Zara shops show a clear tendency towards product standardisation. Zara shops tend to be almost identically set up across the world, and the clothes sold are so interchangeable among regions that they are already labelled with price tags in several languages and currencies (Jackson & Shaw, 2009).

Although extreme examples exist of mostly localised or globalised approaches, as seen above, it is most common to see brands and companies referring partially to both and thus finding themselves in a grey middle ground. One of the most frequent situations is the combination of both approaches: one applied to the product in itself and the other to the brand. As exemplified by professor Krzysztof Wach (Wach, 2011), this can result in scenarios of product and brand standardization (such as Sony), product and brand diversification (like Nestle), product standardization and brand diversification (like Algida) or product diversification and brand standardization (as in the case of Danone).

In the case of CSR, given that it is not in itself a product but a business strategy, it is essential to discover whether the same approach can be used. Specialist Vidhi A. Chaudhri argues that it is very rare to see CSR strategies that fall entirely within a localisation or a globalisation strategy. As seen also in the case of commercial products,

global CSR strategies are generally planned in some point of a continuum between totally localised content and a globalised approach (Chaudhri, 2006).

Following the thinking of Professor Wach, who distinguishes between brand and product internationalisation (Wach, 2011), a significant difference that arises in the case of CSR internationalisation is the inalterability of the brand. When a company sells consumer goods its main goal is to maximise consumption, and thus changing the brand name is not seen as a problem if it will bring a larger number of consumers towards the product. However, in the case of CSR it would not make much sense to alter the brand name, as the main goal of CSR is to seek a better image for that very brand or company.

We could assume, seeing that the brand by which the campaign goes needs to be the same that is already used in that region, that the most important aspect in the localisation vs. globalisation dilemma is the product in itself, that is, the content of the CSR campaign. The two options in this case would be either defining a global CSR strategy so as to be able to employ the same route map in different situations or else do plan a specific strategy for each country or region, making use of different language translations and research about specific cultural aspects that could be of use.

In this regard, the main benefits of localising CSR could be true engagement with the local population, ensuring that the company has full knowledge about their linguistic and cultural characteristics. This, however, would also require a large budget, as it requires solid research and translation efforts from qualified and specialised teams.

When a company chooses to globalise a CSR strategy, on the contrary, the costs are much lower, as specific research and localisation does not take place for every area of interest. Nevertheless, this expenditure cut can cause severe blowback, giving a disengaged image, leading to cultural conflicts or clashes with local population, or even ending up largely unnoticed due to lack of contact with the local culture. Whereas, as described by Wach, a well-planned globalisation strategy should be one that does not lead to cultural conflicts (Wach, 2011), the fact that it does not include the research needed for localisation makes it easier for this strategy to be culturally conflictive.

Figure 1 FRAMEWORKS AVAILABLE FOR STRUCTURING GLOBAL CSR

Source: (Chaudhri, 2006)

As mentioned before, CSR is still growing and developing as an academic research discipline and as a professional field. This is why the debate on how CSR should adapt to internationalisation scenarios is still open. Among the main theoretical proposals linking CSR with the localisation vs. globalisation dilemma we can find the framework developed by Chaudhri, in which four approaches are defined using two variables (global vs. local) from two points of view (implementation vs. initiative). Therefore, as per this framework, companies can deploy a globally integrated strategy (through global implementation and a global initiative), a programme extension (a local initiative being implemented globally), a hybrid or "glocal" strategy (departing from a global initiative and being implemented only locally) and, finally, a locally responsive strategy (both thought out and implemented at a local scale) (Chaudhri, 2006).

3. State of play

Corporate Social Responsibility is currently a fast-growing field of study, due to its prominence in key business areas such as compliance, auditing or public relations. As seen in previous sections, CSR is a relatively young discipline, and its origins in its modern form can be traced back to the 1950s. However, research about the modern concept of CSR, even in its conceptualization debate, is even more recent and continues to evolve.

As explained by Rosamaria Moura-Leite, research efforts in the field of CSR have been evolving and shifting focus according to the developments of CSR itself (Moura-Leite, 2011). Therefore, CSR research has to some extent transitioned from a more general "business ethics" point of view to a more results-oriented approach. This shift can be observed in the work of some of the most prominent scholars in CSR, such as Carroll or Davis.

Amongst the main points of debate is the very definition of CSR, as well as the determination of the role of companies regarding social responsibility, the definition and role of stakeholders and the validity of alternative approaches to this new imperative. As much as these debates are essential to conceptualise and define what is CSR and which should be its goals, it is also necessary to bear in mind research efforts that have analysed CSR in combination with other fields of study. Unsurprisingly, the most common field that appears in this type of study along with CSR is economics and business management. However, and to a lesser degree, one can find studies from the point of view of NGOs and cooperating entities, studies from the point of view of ethics, analyses from a social justice perspective and, most importantly for the aim of this dissertation, from the point of view of translators and localisation specialists. The latter are still scarce and, to date, there have been no comprehensive research efforts dedicated to analysing CSR from the translation and localisation point of view (Chaudhri, 2006).

4. Research question

CSR is emerging as one key business area, capable of shortening the long-denounced distance between company profits and revenue for stakeholders, including local populations at production sites and all those affected in one or either way by their activities. In this regard, and considering that multinational companies are key actors in today's world, from the view of a translation professional it is essential to analyse how the growing localisation specialty affects CSR.

Thus far companies have been using CSR with more short term aims, showing in many cases no real interest on creating better conditions for stakeholders through their CSR projects. Some others, regardless of their intentions, have been unsuccessful at deploying and communicating a successful multinational CSR campaign

The aim of this dissertation is therefore to analyse this issue from a translation point of view, based on the question: when it comes to deploying a multinational CSR strategy, is it enough to translate the same material into different languages or does it also require a localisation process?

As a guide when analysing this research question, the dissertation also raises several secondary questions. These are the difference between CSR and conventional consumer goods regarding during the internationalisation process, how companies have deployed multinational CSR strategies to date, which are the main academic proposals regarding the expansion of this field and which aspects that would have been otherwise "lost in translation" can be recovered after a localisation process.

The final goal of this dissertation, as well as presenting pertinent information for the analytical efforts in this field, is to bear in mind the ethical role of the translator as a CSR localisation professional. This will be aimed by raising some decisions that translators have to make when translating and adapting such strategies.

5. Methodology

Given the nature of this dissertation, the analysis will follow a purely qualitative methodological strategy. The variables analysed will be evaluated in terms of perceived success from an analytical point of view and contrasting factors such as popularity, reactions of the populations and media coverage.

Firstly, a thorough literature review will be conducted so as to provide a strong theoretical basis, summarised in the theoretical framework and the state of play sections. The main focuses of this literature review will be on general CSR theory and practice, general localisation and globalisation theory and publications discussing localisation and translation strategies in CSR.

Secondly, analysis will be performed in order to evaluate a specific case in the field of CSR, namely, the actions of FIFA during the last two football World Cups. This analysis will include a brief introduction to and contextualisation of the situation in which the CSR campaigns took place, followed by a description and assessment of both campaigns. Given that the corporate languages of FIFA are English and French, and that most CSR strategies are originally written in English, this analysis will include a description of how translation was conducted, if there were any localisation efforts from the part of FIFA and, if so, how these were planned and deployed. It will also compare and contrast the language, with a parallel analysis of language used in the English, Spanish and Portuguese versions.

Lastly, the dissertation will make use of a well-known success-evaluation system, namely the metrics developed by the London Benchmarking Group given their acclaimed status among CSR scholars. The LBG is a network of community investment professionals created in 1994 to cooperate and improve their programmes. Their framework, based on a three-step process (Inputs: What's contributed, Outputs: What happens and Impacts: what changes) is now used by over 180 companies worldwide (LBG España, 2016). However, given that the LBG methodology is not public and access

to it requires ordering a costly consultancy job, this dissertation will only make use of the three categories that it defines in order to guide the assessment of FIFA's initiatives.

6. Case study: FIFA's CSR strategies in Latin America

Given the importance of CSR in the current corporate environment, as well as the continuously growing role and impact of multinational corporations on the global landscape, it is interesting to analyse in depth the case of a specific company. For the purpose of this dissertation, FIFA has been chosen as a subject of study due to its nearly global reach and common criticism from the civil society about the manner in which it conducts its business.

6.1. What is FIFA?

FIFA, the French acronym for International Federation of Association Football, is the international governing body for association football[1], futsal and beach football, created in 1904.

---

[1] The term association football is used to refer formally to the sport known as football in the UK and as soccer in the US and Canada. The reason why it is called "association" dates back to its origins in England, where it was used to tell it apart from other types of football, namely rugby football.

Being the international governing body for football federations across the globe, it is composed of 206 member national associations, and recognises six separate confederations that oversee football tournaments in their areas, one for each continent as seen in the image. These are CONACAF (Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football), CONMEBOL (South American Football Confederation), UEFA (Union of European Football Associations), AFC (Asian Football Confederation), CAF (Confederation of African Football) AND OFC (Oceania Football Confederation).

Among its main duties we could highlight the organisation of several football tournaments, which include the men's and U20 world cups. FIFA also holds 50% of the International Football Association Board, who guards the Laws of the Game for association football. Considering the size of the football business worldwide, which gathers revenue from match tickets, merchandising, sponsorship, advertisement and many others, one can imagine the ability to influence that is enjoyed by FIFA. This has led to many cases in which even the legislation of some countries have adapted so as to comply with conditions established by FIFA to organise a tournament in their territory. Such was the case during the last Men's World Cup in Brazil, which will be discussed in the case study.

The recurrence of scandals regarding corruption, bribery, money laundering and several criminal activities directly from FIFA executives both as an integral part of FIFA (meaning that these have taken place while on duty and aimed at achieving specific goals of FIFA) and in their separate activities has given this body a reputation of being a mafia-like, abusive and corrupt institution. This reputation has grown recently as two situations unfolded. Firstly, FIFA chose two countries for the following World Cup tournaments (Russia in 2018 and Qatar in 2022) after a process that was widely denounced for following a corrupt and bribe-based selection process, particularly in the case of Qatar, where the organisation changed the tournament to December once it realised it could not be held in the summer due to the high temperatures and largely disregarded the use of slave labour made by Qatar in order to build the required buildings. Secondly, ever since mid-2015 many of the top FIFA executives, including

former director and now suspended on corruption charges Step Blatter, were accused of corruption and prosecuted internationally.

As for FIFA's reputation in South America, where the confederation in charge is CONMEBOL, public opinion largely reflects the worldwide criticism aimed at FIFA during the last few years for the reasons mentioned above. In the case of Brazil this was exacerbated by the wave of anti-government demonstrations that took place the months before the tournament, where Brazilians took the streets to protest against the massive government infrastructure investments carried out to prepare for the World Cup. These included the construction from scratch of many football stadiums, bearing a cost of millions directly assumed by the Government with no FIFA funding. This was seen as excessive by part of the Brazilian public, who believed such funding should be used to attend more urgent needs, namely more useful infrastructure or the maintenance of welfare programmes. The situation even led to the creation of a slogan, "*não vai ter copa*" (there will be no World Cup) and to the development of violent clashes between police and "black block" protesters that put to risk the event and led to the search of a plan B location in the United States, were the Brazilian public to pose a significant threat to the success of the tournament.

Overall, it could be stated that FIFA's worldwide reputation as an institution is generally negative, even though football tends to be highly regarded and spark passionate feelings from its followers. This comes to light during and before World Cup tournaments, where FIFA is criticised for its deterministic bending of domestic laws, for being a propeller for the country's corruption and money laundering networks and for sharing none of the revenue it obtains from ticket sales, merchandising and other lucrative products offered within the tournament's framework.

6.2. FIFA's approach to international CSR and reputation management: localisation or globalisation?

Following Chaudhri's reasoning, in order to begin the analysis of FIFA's approach to CSR it is interesting to define the strategies it uses in terms of brand and product. FIFA's brand, that is, the institution in itself and its status as the highest football authority, could be interpreted as being so internationalised that not even its English acronym is used at all. However, it is essential to bear in mind that this internationalisation also hides a more localised outlook, as FIFA is largely represented locally by regional football confederations.

As for the product, which in this case can be considered to comprise the entire World Cup tournaments and all the activities that they entail, it is hard to determine whether FIFA has followed a more localised or internationalised strategy. On the one hand, World Cups follow quite strict organisation patterns, which tend to undergo minimal adaptation to cope with specific aspects of the country (such as weather conditions, safety, etc.) In fact, what could be regarded as the most localised part of the tournaments (that is, the broadcasting music, the initial ceremonies and the themes used in merchandising) happens to be created based on local cultural features (and often, stereotypes) and enhanced so as to attract the largest tourist attention as possible. In the case of CSR, FIFA does deploy a CSR team locally for each country, but it is unclear if this represents a merely practical decision or if it is aimed towards a localisation approach. Therefore, it is hard to determine if this process, which could initially be understood as localisation, is planned to increase acceptance within the host country or to create an attractive product to be sold internationally.

This raises a question regarding what can FIFA's approach to CSR be: does it create local CSR projects and sell them globally? If so, where does this take us in terms of conceptualising its strategy? Although this point is highly debatable, one solution could be interpreting FIFA's approach to CSR as exactly that: carrying out certain CSR projects in the region, and aiming to sell that "image" globally and also towards the local population. This changes when it comes to discussing FIFA'S CSR strategies as a whole.

In this case, where the product would be rather the general guidelines and CSR plans, the translation and localisation process will generally depart from a source document in English, as discussed in the following section.

Lastly, it is interesting to bear in mind that the 2006 Men's World Cup held in Germany was the first one which officially included CSR events as part of the tournament (FIFA, 2012). This means that the 2011 and 2014 events analysed in this dissertation are only one and three tournaments away from what could be considered as the "departure" of official CSR projects in FIFA events. This aspect is interesting, to bear it in mind and analyse CSR as a new area in this company but also to observe the evolution it undergoes from one tournament in 2011 to another, and much larger, in 2015 in terms of development.

6.2.1. Translation strategy

Given that localisation is considered as a competence of the professional translator, as long as he or she has the necessary knowledge about a specific region or society, localisation and translation will be addressed jointly in this section. As explained by FIFA translator Gabriela Straube in an interview, FIFA has four official languages (English, Spanish, French and German), managed by a team 13 in-house translators who translate into their mother tongue only. They are in charge of the institutional and company-related FIFA documents, such as the Statutes, legal and corporate documents, magazines, financial reports, press releases and so on (Dunn, 2008). In this regard, it could be understood that the main translations of CSR-related documents (at least for corporate use within Europe and the relations with the confederations) are carried out by this in-house translation team.

As for translations into other languages or for specific purposes (such as a World Cup), FIFA seeks freelance translators or agencies to complete such tasks. Whereas in the case of the Colombian U20 World Cup Spanish language translation appear to be covered by the in-house Spanish team, Portuguese translations for the Brazilian Men's Cup had to be externalised to freelance translators. At this point, both cases (the Spanish

and Portuguese translations) offer some insights about the strategy followed by FIFA when it comes to translation.

Firstly, the fact that the Spanish language translations appear to have been carried out within the Spanish language team leave little room for a localisation process. Even if one or some of the Spanish translators in the team translated into Latin American Spanish (abbreviated as SPA-LA), this still would not be sufficient to fully adapt the discourse for a Colombian public. However, it is interesting to bear in mind that Brightlines, a UK-based translation agency, presents itself as a regular "marketing and advertising" translator for FIFA (Brightlines UK, 2016). The fact that this agency offers translation and transcreation services, which in the domain of advertising translation can be understood as an adapted form of localisation, as one pack, can possibly mean that at least in the cases of the languages they manage (French, German and Spanish), the final content could be localised for specific target audiences.

In the case of translations to Brazilian Portuguese, as per the testimony of Luciano Monteiro, the freelance translator who was in charge of managing this task, (Dunn, 2008) it is unclear whether he was also given the responsibility to translate CSR initiatives. If this was the case, and given that he does not mention localisation at any time during the interview or in his personal website, that only translation was performed and no further efforts in terms of localisation were applied.

Even though translation agencies and even freelance translators are unlikely to provide further information on these matters as part of their professional confidentiality agreements or ethics, the case studies should be able to detect whether the content has been localised or not.

6.3. Case study

In order to gain further insight about the translation of CSR within FIFA two specific cases will be analysed: the under 20 World Cup that took place in Colombia in 2012 and the 2014 Men's World Cup in Brazil.

Both analyses will begin with a definition of the context in which the tournament was organised, including the main actors involved (FIFA, the football confederation, the government and the football federation), the socio-political environment, the economic situation and other relevant aspects that affected positively or negatively the organisation of these events. This is highly relevant, as CSR initiatives will be likely to be aimed at those sectors in which there is more perceived danger or need to act.

Secondly, the CSR strategy employed by FIFA and the national federations will be researched, including all the projects (both announced and actually carried out) that gave shape to the practical side of CSR during the tournaments. Each program will be assessed taking into account its target, its aim and the results it achieved, given that, as expressed before, the entire benchmarking system of the London Benchmarking Group is not accessible for the purposes of this dissertation.

Finally, a source texts in English and its target language correspondent will be contrasted so as to detect the translation strategy that was followed in terms of localisation. This analysis will bear in mind translation decisions regarding vocabulary, grammar and style, giving a specific emphasis to whether these translation decisions are motivated by a purposeful adaptation to the local culture. In this regard, special attention will be given to the type of equivalences used in each text, ranging from literal equivalence to adaptation.

6.3.1. Colombia 2011 U20 World Cup

The U20 tournament is the equivalent to the Men's World Cup for the under-20 national football teams. Colombia became a host for this tournament for the first time

in 2011, hoping to attract attention to its national football potential and to its tourist attractions. Unlike the Brazilian case, the U-20 World Cup in Colombia was generally seen as a good opportunity to generate extra revenue for the tourism industry, and therefore was met with an overall good spirit.

This, however, does not mean that the country did not suffer from severe problems that could be addressed through CSR projects and strategies. Firstly, a significant part of Colombia's population suffered from poverty and malnutrition, a situation that was even more acute regarding unprivileged children, young girls, women and indigenous communities (UNDP, 2011).

Secondly, in 2011 Colombia was at a high point of its armed conflict with several guerrillas, amongst which were FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) or the ENL (National Liberation Army). This caused a poor security situation in which the militias controlled around one third of the entire territory of Colombia and were responsible for the deaths of both civilians and government officials. (Elespectador.com, 2011) The conflict with Farc has been one of the main factors that has dragged Colombia's economic development, as it contributed to eroding rule of law in the country, scared off investors and tourists and created a reputation of Colombia as one of the most dangerous countries in the world.

Although neither of these two issues did significantly affect the tournament, as Colombia deployed a strong security strategy to ensure the safety of the participants and the attendees (Xinhua, 2011), they still represented a side of Colombia that could not be ignored by FIFA and its CSR teams. Given that a problem such as a guerrilla insurgency is significantly beyond the capacities of FIFA in terms of Corporate Social Responsibility, in order to develop its CSR strategy for this tournament FIFA focused on two other aspects: child poverty and the environmental impact of the event. In both cases, it decided to adopt a strategy of cooperation with local entities rather than to come up with an entire strategy by itself. As will be seen in the case of Brazil later on, this is a common practice in FIFA's CSR that makes it easier to respond rapidly to some of the country's challenges. Regarding the focus of this dissertation, this strategy could

also be interpreted as part of a localisation approach, as FIFA also used its partnerships with local NGOs to achieve a closer image to the Colombian population and ease potential uneasiness or distrust towards its goals in the country.

Regarding child poverty and exclusion, FIFA developed a joint project with Coca Cola and the Inter-American Development Bank to fund and empower two local NGOs: *Colombianitos* and the SIDOC Foundation. These organisations, which use football to empower unprivileged children, received 1.1 million U.S. dollars in investment from FIFA as part of the tournament's CSR strategy. This was carried out as part of a joint anti-violence programme called "Goals for a better life", and also included the expansion of *Colombianitos* coverage to the city of Cartagena and its most impoverished neighbourhoods (FIFA, 2012).

As for the environment-related side of FIFA's strategy, it decided to help fund a reforestation project carried out by the government so as to "revert" the extra carbon emissions created by the event. This project, carried out within the own "Green Goal" environmental initiative already existing in FIFA, led to the planting of 35,000 endangered trees all over Colombia (Anchique, 2011).

Following the CSR assessment categories developed by the LBG, this dissertation can elaborate a summarised and superficial assessment of FIFA's strategy in this tournament:

It is important to bear in mind that, as seen previously, the target of this strategy regarding the direct effects of the CSR campaign is divided between unprivileged children and the environment. However, given the purpose of this dissertation, the impact assessment will focus in this strategy from the point of view of corporate communication rather than from a cooperation development approach.

Therefore, regarding the target of the CSR campaign, one may consider two main targets: national and international. The national target would then be Colombia's population as a whole, including the Government and the companies. The second target

would be the international public, including organisations that may be prone to denouncing FIFA's practices as immoral. In this category, the main goal is to discover whether FIFA has achieved to transmit its intentions to the wider public. Although more refined methodologies such as polling are not feasible given the limitations of this project, media monitoring can provide a fair overall idea of how much was the project image exploited. The conclusion after this research is that, unless the public went directly to consult in FIFA's website what was being done in terms of sustainability, the diffusion of such information has been nearly inexistent in online media.

In this regard, it is interesting to consider the main aim of this strategy, in order to be able to assess its results. It could be said, as per the main ideas contained in FIFA's CSR material in Colombia, that the main aim is to transmit the idea that football is a sport that makes society better, and that therefore FIFA as its highest representative represents a benevolent sport so powerful that it can end conflicts, send children back into education and promote a more stable and happy society.

Bearing all this in mind, the results of the CSR campaign in terms of corporate communication can be summed up as not too successful. This appears to be due by a lack of informative effort from FIFA and its associates in both initiatives, as well as to a lack of interest towards the projects shown by local media. However, given the generally friendly atmosphere that preceded the tournament in Colombia this still would leave the organisation with a successful CSR campaign, as at least it can show the world that it did carry out a sustainability strategy during the event.

Analysis of source and target CSR documents

After having analysed the CSR strategy in itself, and due to the lack of analytical documentation in nearly all aspects covered by this case study, it is interesting to discover FIFA's translation strategy through a contrastive analysis of two official corporate texts. In this case, the source text will be an article published in FIFA's website, titled "The IDB, FIFA and Coca-Cola launch anti-violence initiative Football for Hope" (FIFA, 2012).

The first aspect that comes to mind when contrasting both documents is the equivalence strategy used in the title. Whereas the title in English explains clearly that the initiative consists of an anti-violence project, the Spanish translation omits this explanation and merely offers a translation of the project name (*Fútbol para la Esperanza*).

This tendency continues towards the opening of the article, where the strategy continues to be near-literal translation combined with what could be considered as signs of regional adaptation. In this regard, the translator chose to omit "the neighbourhoods of" (FIFA, 2012, 1) when speaking about the areas where the programme will be implemented, as such information could come out as redundant for a Colombian public and provide a lesser "local" image of the text. This first paragraph also offers examples of another strategy that will be followed along the text, and which entails choosing a more direct equivalent in Spanish. Given that the source text employs many vague, business English-like verbs and expressions, the translator has substituted them by equivalents such as "benefit" (for "provide support" in the source text) or "in a situation of social risk" for "unprivileged" (FIFA, 2012, 1).

The translator's efforts to adapt the translation for a Colombian audience can also be observed in the second paragraph, where the elimination of the adjective "local" when talking about the children that will benefit from the programme is a clear indicator of the omission strategy mentioned above. It is also interesting to bear in mind the translation decision made for the sentence "with the assistance of the SIDOC foundation", when speaking about how FIFA has developed the strategy in collaboration with local NGOs. In this case, the translation has slightly altered the meaning of the sentence and translated it as "through the SIDOC foundation" (*a través de la fundación SIDOC*) (FIFA, 2012, 1). This may show a strategy of enhancing the role played by local NGOs, who enjoy a higher degree of confidence from the Colombian public than FIFA as an institution.

One last aspect that needs to be highlighted about the translation strategy in the second paragraph is a clear case of explicitation, which as seen before accompanies

implicitation where a piece of information may become redundant for a specific audience. Specifically, to translate "start their life projects" (referring to the children benefited by the programme) the translator wrote "starting a process of planning their life projects" (*comenzar el proceso de planeación de proyectos de vida*) (FIFA, 2012, 1). Considering the general route map that the translator has followed up to this point, it seems that explicitation in this case is used to make information more concise, probably linked to accountability for the projects (i.e. facing claims that FIFA promised to "start" these children's life projects when the programme only includes the planning stage). It is also interesting to note the use of *planeación* for "planning", given that it is the verb form preferred in Latin America and specially Colombia, whereas Mexican Spanish would prefer *planeamiento* and European Spanish would most likely use *planificación*(FIFA, 2012, 1).

Unlike the preceding two, the third paragraph of the article poses lesser localisation challenges, and it is only possible to find one relevant omission. The original English version mentions "problems afflicting these communities", and the Spanish translation omits the verb and expresses "*los problemas de esas comunidades*" (these communities' problems) (FIFA, 2012, 1). In this case, we could recall the implicitation strategy mentioned above and its will to cut out "obvious" bits of information from the text to make it more local and less institutional.

Passing on to the fourth paragraph of the document, it is possible to detect more hints suggesting that either the translator of the document was Colombian or that an original translation into standard Spanish had been later on reviewed by a Colombian editor, something which in the end shows a clear localisation intention from FIFA's CSR and corporate communication teams. To translate the phrasal verb "to be introduced to a programme", the equivalence in Spanish has undergone two steps. Firstly, it has slightly altered the meaning of the sentence by translating this expression as "to take part on the programme". Secondly, it has chosen a Spanish translation for this verb that is not accepted by the Academy of Spanish Language and that is widely attributed to the Colombian variant of standard Latin American Spanish (*hacer parte* instead of *formar parte*) (FIFA, 2012, 1).

Given that European and Latin American Spanish become significantly more difficult to tell apart when in written and formal form, it is sometimes only in these small aspects that the country-specific Spanish variant used can be discovered. Regarding the rest of the paragraph, one can find both examples for implicitation and explicitation techniques, all for a localisation purpose. On the one hand, the translator has given a more explicative translation of "to offer an alternative" (FIFA, 2012, 1), explaining that the project will take the children away from dangerous lifestyles (*los alejará*). On the other hand, the translator has chosen to omit the word "routinely" when translating "routinely exposed children", assuming that a Colombian public is familiar enough with the situation of unprivileged children in their country and know that the dangers they are exposed to are present on a daily basis.

The fifth paragraph brings the hardest part of this translation regarding the task of discovering why the translator made each equivalence decision. In this paragraph, which describes the declarations of the IBD's head for Institutional Capacity and Finance Sector regarding the project, the translator cuts out half of the first sentence and then re attaches it at the end of the paragraph, altering significantly the overall meaning that it acquires in each version. More specifically, the problematic bit is the expression "rigorously assessed" (FIFA, 2012, 1). Whereas the original declaration (or at least the declaration as it appears in the original English source text) mentioned the rigorous assessment specifying the following: "expressed the organisation's satisfaction at supporting an initiative that will be rigorously assessed", the Spanish version cuts it out and attaches it to the second part of the representative's declaration, which speaks about how the project bears the responsibility to demonstrate the utility of football as a social tool.

In this case, the translator presents this information as important regarding the fact that it undergoes a thorough assessment process, which leaves this sentence far from its original meaning. This situation poses a bigger challenge, as it is not possible to see clearly why was this decision taken, as a translation error seems unlikely regarding the overall quality of the document.

In the sixth and last paragraph of the document, the translator adopts a near-literal strategy, possibly because it is quoting FIFA's head of CSR and in this case it is possible that FIFA prefers not to localise this sort of information. This may also be so because the chief of CSR uses very precise words that are always present in CSR corporate communication, such as "responsibility" or "pledge", most of which already count with a well defined Spanish equivalent.

This analysis shows how a short document such as the article that was chosen can provide many insights on how a company has planned its CSR strategy, even if more direct and close sources about the topic are unavailable. Although this dissertation is focusing on the use this process may have from the point of view of a translator, the strategy of contrastive translation analysis could also be of use if the focus was on mere CSR strategy, as it is possible to see through language what the campaign is trying to achieve and how it plans to do so.

To conclude, it can be stated that contrastive analysis of the two texts shows how FIFA has translated the article following a localisation approach. Among the features of localisation that can be observed there are both strategies of equivalence and dialectal factors that can be brought to light. These refer respectively to cutting out information bits that may be considered as redundant for a local audience (therefore providing a lesser "local" image of the text) and further explaining others so that they match what the audience knows about a specific topic. In the case of explicitation, the texts even show the strengthening of some verbs that are acceptable in standard business English because of their vagueness, but which require a more specific and stronger equivalent in order to be fully accepted by the Colombian public. This is applied, even if sometimes it slightly alters the meaning of what is said in the English version.

Secondly, regarding the characteristics of the Spanish language used in the text, it can be observed that it was clearly written in Latin American Spanish, providing even hints of a purely Colombian variant due to some specific verb choices. This strengthens the possibility that FIFA purposely localised the Spanish translation, and that the

translation choices mentioned above are part of a wider strategy aiming to reach the Colombian public.

Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that this comparison has been performed assuming that the English version is the source text, but that it could be otherwise. As per the hour and date displayed in the website, both documents appear to have been released simultaneously, making it harder to determine which one is the original and which one is the translation. In this regard, and following the information on FIFA's translation workflow that was discussed in previous chapters, it can be assumed that indeed the English version was the source text, as has been during the analysis. However, several pieces (such as quotes from Spanish-speaking government officials and businesspeople) are subject to have gone through a process of back translation. This doubt can only be fully solved by directly contacting those in charge of that specific translation, so this dissertation can only point it out as an open question regarding this contrastive analysis.

6.3.2. Brazil men's World Cup 2014

Ever since Brazil was announced as the host for the 2014 World Cup, preparations began in the country to cope with the high expectations both locally and internationally. After all, the Men's World Cup is one of the largest world events and attracts continued mass media attention before, during and after it is held, and Brazil had created high hopes for football fans, given its status as "the country of football".

However, when the cost of the infrastructure projects and the conditions imposed by FIFA were known to the public, they led to increasing refusal from the population towards the tournament. This escalated into widespread protests against FIFA and the World Cup, urging the government to stop using taxpayer's money to build stadiums and direct it to poverty alleviation and necessary infrastructure instead (Baake, 2014). According to a survey conducted by Pew Global months before the World Cup, 61% of Brazilians believed the event affected the country negatively, as it took away

money from social services. This contrasts with the 34% share that answered the poll stating that it was good because it created jobs (Pew Research Center, 2014). As well as public expenditure, Brazilians became increasingly concerned about the possible side effects of mass tourism in their cities, as criminal activity was expected to rise. This specifically referred to armed robberies from Brazilian criminals, attracted by the affluence of tourists, but also foreign tourists seeking prostitution, specially child prostitution, a problem that touches the sensitivity of the Brazilian public and that threatened to come back strongly during the World Cup.

The last aspect that enraged Brazilians about the World Cup preparations was what was known as "pacification" of communities. For months before the tournament took off, the Brazilian security forces carried out a series of operations against drug cartels in the shanty town areas that bordered strategic venues, such as the stadiums or the international airport. This was criticised for the means used (such as entering these towns riding military tanks), as well as by the increase in violence that it caused, both during the "pacification" and after, as organised crime groups moved elsewhere to continue their operations and had to violently earn a spot in their new headquarters, with all the consequent violence suffered by those who lived in these regions.

This made animosity towards the World Cup grow more and more, aligned with discontent towards the worsening economic situation of the country and widespread corruption in the political class, led to more populous and violent clashes between protesters and police. The gravest example of these clashes can be found in the case of the so-called "black blocks", protesters that covered their faces in black and attacked police with Molotov cocktails, set fire to police cars and buses and created barricades in the streets. This situation nearly scared off FIFA, who indeed did not welcome the new motto of the demonstrations: "*Não vai ter copa*" (there will be no World Cup). This even led the organisation committee to allegedly plan a plan B location in case Brazil turned out to be impossible, probably in the United States.

Provided that this event already departed from a very hostile situation regarding the local population, the need to plan CSR so as to reach the Brazilian public appears as

even more pressing for FIFA. In this regard, the organisation carried out a comprehensive CSR strategy based on eight areas of focus: environment, waste management, volunteer training, community-building support, global warming, renewable energies, empowerment and transparency. As seen in the case of Colombia, the event developed yet another phase of "Football for Hope" to cover the areas of community building and empowerment. In this case, and given the size of the event, FIFA decided to establish small cooperative projects with local NGOs, similar to the case of *Colombianitos* in Colombia, in nearly all host cities.

In this case, the choice to channel projects through a local NGO was even more crucial, both due to the bad reputation FIFA had obtained during the protests in recent months and to the fact that host cities were significantly different and thus required very specialised knowledge to implement programmes successfully.

One aspect that marked the difference between this edition of Football for Hope and previous ones was the organisation of a medium-scale children's football tournament, the Football for Hope Festival 2014 (FIFA, 2014). In this tournament, FIFA gathered 32 teams from all over the world in a tournament which aimed to promote team working and good relationships among the children, rather than a fierce competition for the title as seen in the real World Cup. Among these teams there were 8 Brazilian, another 14 from the Americas, 4 European, 8 African, and 6 Asian, including a joint Israeli-Palestinian team called "The Peace Team".

Because the aim of the programme was to enhance and promote good relations, it included many workshops on cultural and educational topics, as well as sport activities other than football and purely Brazilian, such as capoeira. This was all done through mixed groups, so as to encourage communication and exchange between teams. To finish off, there was a three-day football tournament without referees, where any dispute had to be solved through dialogue and that counted with the attendance of some major football players as guests. The children were also able to attend the World Cup quarter finals in the Maracana Stadium, in Rio de Janeiro. All this was achieved in the favela of Caju, in Rio de Janeiro, with the assistance of a local NGO, IBBEA.

Secondly, and also following the line of the Colombian tournament, FIFA developed many environmental initiatives through its "Green Goal" project (2014 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee Brazil, 2014). This project, which in its origin aimed to set a series of environmental goals for the tournament, was applied specially regarding the event's carbon footprint. This did not only include the carbon footprint generated by the event in itself, but also all other preparatory activities carried out before the event. This was highlighted as a success, as every World Cup implies an arduous preparation process that stretches during as much as two or three years before it actually takes place. Although the technical part of this initiative is not relevant for the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to bear in mind how, lacking its own methodology to measure such footprint, FIFA used the GHG Protocol, an accounting standard for greenhouse gas measuring developed by the World Resources Institute and the World Business Council for Sustainable Development. (2014 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee Brazil, 2014).

Following the CSR assessment benchmark developed by the LBG, this dissertation can elaborate a summarised and superficial assessment of FIFA's strategy in this tournament, based on its target, its aim and its results. As discussed previously, this case represents a larger challenge for FIFA in terms of reputation than in the case of the Colombian U20 World Cup because of its scope and the hostile environment that surrounded it.

Regarding the target of this campaign, it could be stated that the main group FIFA was aiming at with this campaign was the Brazilian people, especially those who were completely against Brazil hosting the tournament. This can be divided among those who lived somehow comfortably and protested out of empathy with the rest of society and those who felt directly the consequences of this event (for example those who suffered the decrease on social spending in their allowances, those who were evicted to make room for new stadiums or whose communities were affected by the increase in drug violence due to "pacification" operations. In this regard, and considering how the protests carried on throughout the tournament (Bowater, 2014)

despite all of FIFA's efforts to communicate its CSR projects, FIFA proved that its strategy did not effectively manage to reach its target.

Research performed in the coverage of this event on Brazilian media shows very little attention to what could be considered as the most successful aspect of FIFA's CSR campaign in this tournament, the Football for Hope Festival. This, bearing in mind the aim of the project, shows that even if providing good results for the local community it did not manage to overturn the heavy accusations that the Brazilian public were directing towards FIFA and its involvement with the Government. As for the results of Green Goal regarding reputation management, the goals of this ambitious environmental plan, which had even led some to name the event the "Green Cup", were not achieved, something that unlike the positive results of Football for Hope did receive larger attention both in Brazil and abroad (Spanne, 2014).

Analysis of sample source and target CSR documents

Given the importance of CSR in this tournament, and also that Football for Hope documents were already compared in the previous case study, this analysis will contrast the first ten pages of the concept reports for the sustainability strategy in the Brazil World Cup. These, unlike the publications analysed in the Colombian case, are corporate documents also planned to be released for the public. This is interesting in order to consider their aim, as well as the possible transformations the target document may have undergone before being released.

Before analysing the linguistic side of the reports, it is interesting to note that the theme colours differ in the original English version and the Portuguese translation. Whereas the original is presented in a blue theme (which is understandable, as blue is the institutional colour of FIFA), the Portuguese version has been released in a green theme. Although this project has mainly focused on the linguistic aspect of localisation, aspects such as colour are also considered part of the localisation process, as a specific colour cannot be "exportable" to different audiences around the globe. In Brazil, for

example, the colours blue and red are nearly monopolised by the two main political groups, PSDB and PT respectively (Valle & Fisher, 2016). On the other hand, green is the colour that represents the rainforest (De Bortoli & Maroto, 2001), thus being a common choice to present environmental and sustainability messages. Regarding the overall report translation, it is also interesting that, given the strong differences between Brazilian and European Portuguese variants in terms of grammar and lexicon, it is much simpler to determine that indeed the Portuguese translation is expressed in the Brazilian variant.

Having stressed these general aspects of localisation, it is possible to begin analysing the translation strategy followed in this document. The report begins with a foreword by FIFA's Secretary General, Jérôme Valcke. Considering what was observed in the previous case study, it comes as little surprise to see that near-literal translation has been chosen to express the words of a senior figure within FIFA to the Portuguese language, as was the case of the officials' testimonies in the Colombian news piece.

This statement is followed by another made by Ronaldo Nazario, a former footballer and well-known celebrity in Brazil, who was part of the Local Organisation Committee Board. Given that Nazario's native language is Portuguese, this part of the foreword brings back a dilemma that appeared in the first case study, as it is not possible to know whether the original was written in English or in Portuguese. The analysis has assumed that the original was written in English to follow the logic of the entire report, but bearing in mind that there are other valid possibilities. This statement shows a higher degree of adaptation than the previous, as it speaks mostly of the relationship of Brazilians with the World Cup tournament. To be precise, there are two key points that have been adapted to bear in mind the sensitivities of a Brazilian audience. Firstly, the translator has altered two adjectives that spoke about the CSR initiative. Where the original spoke about a "strong" team, the Portuguese version translates this as "dedicated" (FIFA, 2012,.3). However, when one line after the original speaks about a "dedicated" team, the translator chooses "committed" (FIFA, 2012, 3). This shows at least some degree of intentional altering of the sentence, apparently to add a stronger sense of commitment.

Whereas the introduction of the report has been translated following a near-literal although correct approach, the paragraphs explaining the concept of the CSR campaign show a more localised focus. The most interesting aspect of the translation in this part is how key concepts, such as stakeholders or accountability, have been translated but are accompanied by the English equivalent between parenthesis in the Portuguese version. This aspect clearly shows that, regarding the nature of the report as both corporate and public that was discussed in the beginning, its focus appears to be mostly on the corporate audience rather than on the Brazilian public. This can be seen in the fact that the localisation technique that is used (adding further explanation by adding the English term) can only be seen as localisation if the text is meant to be well understood by a corporate Brazilian audience. If the main focus had been the public as a whole, there would have been no need to add the English equivalents, as the translations would have been enough to understand what the report was speaking about.

As for all the following sections of the document, it can be seen that the translation strategy continues to follow the literal approach, with a slight addition when speaking about all the administrative levels at which the collaboration will take place in terms of CSR. Whereas the English original speaks about federal and municipal levels, the Brazilian translation adds the State (*estadual*) level, following the country's administrative structure.

Regarding the last pages that have been analysed, a more localised approach can be observed when FIFA speaks about alignment with presidential directives regarding CSR. Whereas the original speaks about "guaranteeing access to education", the Portuguese translation eliminates "access" and translates as "guaranteeing education" (*garantir educação*) (FIFA, 2012, 7). However, the last sentence of these pages shows the most relevant aspect of omission in this contrastive analysis. When speaking about the positive aspects that the World Cup implies for Brazil, the report states that host cities have invested much more money on public transportation infrastructure than they

would have done if they had not been World Cup hosts. This statement, which may come up as pretentious and be received critically by the Brazilian public, was totally omitted in the translation, which says "the host cities are investing a great quantity of resources in public transportation" (*as sedes estão investindo uma quantidade significativa de recursos em transporte público*) (FIFA, 2012, 7).

As a whole, this translation has shown a much smaller degree of localisation than in the case of the Colombian news piece. The main localisation features that had been observed are the alterations in terms of colours and layout, as well as the use of the Brazilian Portuguese language variant and occasional amendments to adapt the discourse to the Brazilian political structure. This does not mean that no localisation has been performed, as there are indeed some aspects that have been slightly altered to be better understood by a Brazilian public. There was even a full sentence that was omitted, possibly due to the adverse social reaction that it could cause.

7. Conclusion

After having thoroughly contrasted texts from two CSR campaigns rolled out by FIFA, it can be concluded that the organisation has indeed included localisation to some degree in its corporate communication strategy. In both case studies the language variant used has been, rather than the international standard, the local dialect, specifically Colombian Spanish and Brazilian Portuguese. As well as some aspects regarding layout, many adaptations have been noticed. Whereas this was significantly more common in the case of the Colombian documents, which were short news pieces published on FIFA's website, it has also been present to some degree in the corporate documents of the Brazilian World Cup. The differences regarding localisation in the Colombian and Brazilian case show that FIFA adopts different strategies and localises documents according to specific principles depending on the target audiences it wants to reach within the same country. For example, corporate documents show localisation in terms of basic cultural and political terms, but maintain a corporate mix of Portuguese and English that would not be suitable for the wide Brazilian public.

Regarding the relationship between CSR and translation observed in this dissertation, the literature review made prior to the case studies has showed a tendency in literature and also within companies to take more into account cultural and linguistic differences when planning a multinational CSR strategy, or at least a CSR strategy planned in one country but to be implemented in another. The current literature has developed some models that are of use in order to classify each company's CSR strategy using marketing terms, such as Chaudhri's (2001). As per this model, which spoke about two aspects that presented the internationalisation vs. localisation dilemma, FIFA's strategy can be understood as using brand internationalisation and product localisation. This can be observed in the fact that it has developed a series of sustainability and social programmes (such as Football for Hope, or Green Goal) which are later on adapted through collaboration with local NGOs to cover the needs of a specific community or environmental issue. Therefore, the international brand (FIFA Football for Hope) acquires a localised version that is then sold as the final product for each country (FIFA Football for Hope Brazil). This means that the same strategy can be used around the world and just be adapted through collaboration with local entities to ensure the creation of a product that is easy to assimilate by that country's population.

However, and regarding the research question of this dissertation, this brand internationalisation-product localisation approach does not appear to be convincing enough to offset the bad press and reputation that is attributed to FIFA. As seen in the case studies, only in the Colombian case did the projects cause a significant impact in the population. This, given that the Colombian public were not hostile to FIFA, is of little importance in comparison with the weak effect of such programmes in Brazil. This raises many questions about the true usefulness of CSR as planned by FIFA, that is, through specific social projects rather than by reverting the practices that have caused the criticism to start in the first place, as was done by Nike. As was observed in the overview of the socio-political context prior to the World Cup, the security concerns expressed by FIFA regarding Rio de Janeiro led to a series of police operations in unprivileged neighbourhoods which were largely accused of worsening violence and crime in the

area. It may then appear as easier to understand why then FIFA's efforts to enhance its image in a similar favela did not have the results it expected.

Returning to the initial question "Is translation enough?", it could be concluded that translation indeed is not enough to transmit a specific feeling or meaning to a foreign population. As seen in the contrastive analyses, there are many cases in which the decision to alter the meaning of a sentence is nearly an imperative for the localisation specialist, whose main task is to polish the text so that it gives an entirely local impression. In this regard, the perfect localisation process could be seen as being achieved once a local reader does not stumble upon anything "foreign" or strange as he or she reads on. However, the fact that translation is not enough does not automatically indicate that localisation is, indeed, sufficient to guarantee good results in a CSR strategy. Contrarily to the assumption that was made at the beginning of this dissertation, (that is, "either translation is enough to convey a CSR message or localisation will be the necessary add-on to make the process successful") this analysis has shown that FIFA's CSR strategy is still lacking several attributes, making its reputation management efforts unsuccessful despite the evident localisation approach followed in its corporate communication.

Therefore, this dissertation has observed that despite FIFA's efforts to localise its CSR strategy and develop ambitious social and environmental programmes, the overall result in at least one of the analysed tournaments is still negative in terms of reputation. This can show that, even if localisation is applied to enhance a "connection" with the public and aim to ease the sense of being an "external agent", there are many more factors that can make a CSR campaign unsuccessful.

8. Appendices

8.1. Appendix 1: Spanish version of Colombia Football for Hope Media Release

Media Release

Fédération Internationale de Football Association
FIFA-Strasse 20 - P.O. Box - 8044 Zurich - Switzerland
Tel: +41-(0)43-222 7777 - Fax: +41-(0)43.222 7878

COLOMBIA 2011

El BID, FIFA y Coca Coca lanzan Fútbol para la Esperanza
(FIFA.com) 16 ago. 2011

El Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, mediante la cooperación del gobierno de nacional de Colombia, la FIFA y Coca-Cola realizaron la presentación oficial de Fútbol para la Esperanza (Football for Hope), un programa que beneficiará a 1.400 niños entre 5 y 18 años que viven en situación de riesgo en Ciudad Bolívar en Bogotá y la Comuna 20 en Cali.

Con el apoyo local de la Alcaldía de Bogotá, la Alcaldía de Cali,el Gobierno Nacional, y a través de la Fundación Colombianitos en Bogotá y la Fundación SIDOC en Cali, los niños tendrán acceso no sólo a la práctica delfútbol en su tiempo libre, sino que además iniciarán un proceso de planeación de sus proyectos de vida, desarrollo de habilidades sociales, generación de hábitos de vida saludable y adquisición de valores.

Psicólogos, trabajadores sociales y profesores de educación físicapodrán identificar y tratar problemas sociales en estas comunidadescomo consumo de drogas, delincuencia juvenil y violencia doméstica y de esta forma beneficiar indirectamente a más de 5.000 personas incluyendo padres, familiares y vecinos.

En Ciudad Bolívar harán parte del programa 700 niños que encontrarán en el deporte un nuevo estilo de vida que los alejará de las calles y sus peligros y por tanto de la violencia a la que están expuestos. En la Comuna 20, serán beneficiariosotros 700 niños,que mediante la práctica del fútbol desarrollarán habilidades para la convivencia y el tratamiento no violento de los conflictos.

A propósito del proyecto, la gerente del sector de Capacidad Institucional y Finanzas, Ana María Rodríguez, expresó la satisfacción del BID de apoyar esta intervención que emplea el fútbol como herramienta eficaz para desarrollar habilidades y valores que mejoran los niveles de convivencia entre los jóvenes. La gerente destacó también que ésta intervención, en concreto, además sirve un propósito adicional: el de permitir a la región conocer mejor por qué y cómo el fútbol es una herramienta de primer nivel para la promoción de la convivencia y prevención de comportamientos violentos, dado que el proyecto cuenta con rigurosos estándares de evaluación.

"Debido a su función y sus valores, a su popularidad y su naturaleza universal, el fútbol tiene una importante responsabilidad ante la sociedad como conjunto. Es un placer para la FIFA aunar esfuerzos con organizaciones comprometidas y apoyar a programas en pro de la convivencia, la integración social y el acceso a servicios de educación y salud para niños y jóvenes en zonas desfavorecidas en Colombia," comentó Federico Addiechi, Gerente de Responsabilidad Social de la FIFA.

"Ciudad Bolívar y la Comuna 20 son sectores marginales en los que se han identificado problemas sociales que inciden en los índices de violencia y criminalidad. Los niños que habitan estas zonas no cuentan con espacios deportivos, ni acceso a programas recreativos que generen en ellos hábitos saludables. Mediante FÚTBOL PARA LA ESPERANZA queremos marcar la diferencia y es nuestro compromiso el aportar al desarrollo de estas comunidades vulnerables mediante la generación de estilos de vida activa, que hacen parte de nuestra plataforma mundial *Viviendo Positivamente*", explicó Ricardo Cortés, Gerente para la Región Andina de Coca-Cola.

8.2. Appendix 2: English version of Colombia Football for Hope Media Release

Media Release

FIFA U-20 WORLD CUP

The IDB, FIFA and Coca-Cola launch anti-violence initiative Football for Hope

(FIFA.com) 16 Aug 2011

In collaboration with Bogota City Council, Cali City Council and the Colombian government, the Inter-American Development Bank (BID), FIFA and Coca-Cola have joined forces to donate approximately $1.1m USD to 1,400 children in both cities. The donation will be channelled through the Colombianitos Foundation in Bogota and the SIDOC Foundation in Cali.

Bogota, 16 August 2011. With the cooperation of the Colombian government, FIFA and Coca-Cola, the Inter-American Development Bank today unveiled the Football for Hope programme, which will provide support to 1,400 underprivileged children aged between five and 18 and living in the neighbourhoods of Ciudad Bolivar in Bogota and Comuna 20 in Cali.

Drawing on the support on the ground of Bogota City Council, Cali City Council and the Colombian government, and with the assistance of the Colombianitos Foundation in Bogota and the SIDOC Foundation in Cali, local children will have the opportunity to play football in their free-time and start their life projects, develop social skills, lead a healthy lifestyle and acquire social values.

A team of psychologists, social workers and physical education instructors will be on hand to identify and tackle the problems afflicting these communities such as drugs, juvenile delinquency and domestic violence. The work they carry out will indirectly benefit over 5,000 people, including parents, other family members and neighbours.

Through the programme and the sport of football, some 700 children in Ciudad Bolivar will be introduced to a new lifestyle that offers an alternative to the dangers of the street and the violence to which they are routinely exposed. By also playing football another 700 youngsters in Comuna 20 will develop the skills they need to live together and resolve conflict by peaceful means.

In speaking on behalf of the IDB, Ana Maria Rodriguez, the head of its Institutional Capacity and Finance Sector, expressed the organisation's satisfaction at supporting an initiative that will be rigorously assessed and which harnesses the ability of football to nurture the skills and values youngsters need to get along better. She also pointed to FOOTBALL FOR HOPE's additional objective of raising awareness throughout the region as to the reasons why and how the sport is an excellent tool for helping youngsters to live together and for preventing violent behaviour.

"Thanks to the role it performs, its values, popularity and its universal appeal, football has a major responsibility to society as a whole," said Federico Addiechi, FIFA's Head of Corporate Social Responsibility. "It is a pleasure for FIFA to join forces with committed organisations and to support programmes that promote togetherness, social integration and access to health and education services for children and youngsters in disadvantaged areas of Colombia."

"Ciudad Bolivar and Comuna 20 are deprived neighbourhoods where social problems have been identified and which impact on violence and crime rates," commented Ricardo Cortes, Coca-Cola's Director for the Andean Region. "The children who live in these areas have no sports facilities they can use or access to recreational programmes encouraging them to adopt a healthy way of life. Through FOOTBALL FOR HOPE we aim to make a difference and it is our pledge to develop these vulnerable communities by promoting active lifestyles, which are an essential component of our global platform Live Positively."

8.3. Appendix 3: Portuguese and English versions of the Brazil World Cup CSR Media Kit

PREFÁCIO

A Copa do Mundo da FIFA™ é a maior competição esportiva de uma única modalidade do planeta e o impacto dela na sociedade e no meio ambiente é indiscutível. Na realização de um evento internacional como esse, devem ser levados em conta todos os aspectos necessários para garantir que sua abordagem seja equilibrada e os resultados sustentáveis. A FIFA e o Comitê Organizador Local (COL) consideram esses fatores com seriedade e se comprometem em realizar uma competição sustentável no Brasil em 2014.

Graças ao seu alcance global, a Copa do Mundo da FIFA™ é capaz de oferecer, mundialmente, uma plataforma exclusiva para atrair atenção e conscientizar o público em relação a certas questões sociais e ambientais. Considerando o interesse e as expectativas despertadas por um evento desse tipo

nas diversas entidades envolvidas, gostaríamos de aproveitar ao máximo essas oportunidades e otimizar os resultados positivos da Copa do Mundo. Portanto, é essencial que a FIFA e o COL definam objetivos claros, ambiciosos e, ao mesmo tempo, realistas para seu trabalho.

A Estratégia de Sustentabilidade da Copa do Mundo da FIFA 2014™ irá guiar nossos esforços na realização de um evento sustentável, nos auxiliando a alcançar um dos elementos centrais da missão da FIFA: a construção de um futuro melhor.

Jérôme Valcke
Secretário-geral da FIFA

FOREWORD

The FIFA World Cup™ is the biggest single-event sporting competition in the world and its impact on society and the environment is indisputable. Staging such a world-class event requires careful consideration of all aspects to ensure a balanced approach and sustainable outcome. FIFA and the Local Organising Committee (LOC) take this responsibility very seriously and are committed to delivering a sustainable event in Brazil in 2014.

Through its worldwide reach, the FIFA World Cup also offers a unique platform to raise awareness and highlight selected social and environmental concerns on a global scale. Considering the interest and expectations that such an occasion arouses among a whole host of stakeholders, we want to make the most of these opportunities and maximise the positive impact of the FIFA World Cup™. Therefore, it is essential for FIFA and the LOC to define a clear, ambitious and yet realistic focus for their approach.

The 2014 FIFA World Cup™ Sustainability Strategy will guide our efforts towards staging a sustainable event and, ultimately, help FIFA achieve one of the key elements of its mission – that of building a better future.

Jérôme Valcke
FIFA Secretary General

F. Alinhamento com as diretrizes presidenciais

Devido ao foco nacional do evento, descrito na seção anterior, as diretrizes presidenciais fornecem linhas gerais e um contexto para a Estratégia de Sustentabilidade da Copa do Mundo da FIFA. As 13 diretrizes que caracterizam o programa de políticas do governo brasileiro estão resumidas abaixo.[2]

1. Expandir e fortalecer a democracia
2. Aumentar o crescimento econômico
3. Implementar um projeto de desenvolvimento econômico em larga escala e a longo prazo
4. Defender o meio ambiente e garantir o desenvolvimento sustentável
5. Erradicar a pobreza e reduzir a desigualdade
6. Melhorar as condições de trabalho e facilitar o acesso dos jovens ao emprego formal
7. Garantir educação de qualidade e à formação profissional
8. Transformar o Brasil em potência científica e tecnológica
9. Melhorar o acesso a serviços de saúde de qualidade
10. Suprir as necessidades básicas dos cidadãos, como moradia, saneamento e transporte
11. Promover a cultura brasileira e o diálogo com outras culturas
12. Garantir a segurança civil e combater o crime organizado
13. Defender a soberania nacional por meio de uma presença ativa e altiva do Brasil no mundo

A Copa do Mundo da FIFA™ e a Estratégia de Sustentabilidade da Copa do Mundo da FIFA irão contribuir para que muitas dessas diretrizes sejam cumpridas. Seguem alguns exemplos que ilustram isso:

- Diretiva 4: A meta da FIFA e do COL de reduzir o impacto negativo da Copa do Mundo da FIFA™ sobre o meio ambiente está de acordo com os esforços do governo para preservação do meio ambiente e apromoção da sustentabilidade.

- Diretiva 5: Por meio do programa Football for Hope, a FIFA irá apoiar projetos no Brasil que combinem futebol e desenvolvimento social, ajudando jovens de comunidades menos favorecidas na luta contra a pobreza e contra a falta de oportunidades.

- Diretivas 6 e 7: Por meio de programas de capacitação, desenvolvidos especialmente para certos grupos envolvidos na Copa do Mundo, a FIFA e o COL irão dar suporte na busca pelo emprego de longo prazo.

- Diretiva 6: Segundo estimativas dos Ministérios do Esporte e do Trabalho, a Copa do Mundo da FIFA™ irá gerar 710.000 empregos. Desses, avalia-se que 330.000 serão permanentes, enquanto 380.000 totatilizam os cargos temporários.

- Diretiva 10: As 12 Sedes estão investindo uma quantidade significativa de recursos em transporte público. Esses investimentos terão um impacto positivo sobre a qualidade de vida dos cidadãos, deixando assim um legado duradouro.

2   http://www2.planalto.gov.br/presidenta/diretrizes-de-governo

9

44

F.   Alignment with presidential directives

Given the national focus defined in the previous section, the Presidential directives provide an important framework and context for the FIFA World Cup Sustainability Strategy. The 13 directives that outline the Brazilian Government's policy agenda are summarised below[2].

1. Expand and strengthen democracy
2. Increase economic growth
3. Implement a large-scale and long-term economic development project
4. Defend the environment and guarantee sustainable development
5. Eradicate poverty and decrease inequality
6. Improve working conditions and facilitate access to formal employment for youth
7. Guarantee access to quality education and vocational training
8. Transform Brazil into a scientific and technological power
9. Improve access to quality health care
10. Provide citizens with basic necessities such as accommodation, sanitation and transportation
11. Promote Brazilian culture and dialogue with other cultures
12. Guarantee civil security and combat organised crime
13. Defend national sovereignty through an active and proud presence of Brazil in the world

The FIFA World Cup and the FIFA World Cup Sustainability Strategy will contribute to the achievement of many of these directives. A few examples to illustrate this are listed below:

- Directive 4: The aim of FIFA and the LOC to minimise and reduce the negative impact of the FIFA World Cup on the environment is in line with the Government's efforts to defend the environment and promote sustainability.

- Directive 5: Through Football for Hope, FIFA will support programmes in Brazil that combine football and social development, thereby empowering youth in underprivileged communities in their fight against poverty and unequal access to opportunities.

- Directives 6 & 7: Through specially designed capacity-building programmes for a number of groups involved in the World Cup, FIFA and the LOC will support their pursuance of long-term employment.

- Directive 6: The Ministry of Sports and the Ministry of Labour estimate that the FIFA World Cup will generate 710,000 jobs. Of these, it is expected that 330,000 will be permanent jobs, while 380,000 will be temporary positions.

- Directive 10: The 12 Host Cities are investing considerably more in public transportation than would be the case without the FIFA World Cup. These investments will positively impact on the quality of life of citizens, thereby leaving a lasting legacy.

9. Bibliography

2014 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee Brazil. (2014). *Summary of the 2014 FIFA World Cup Brazil Carbon Footprint.* Rio de Janeiro: FIFA.

Abe, M., & Ruanglikhitkul, W. (2013). *Developments in the concept of CSR.* Business and development. Bangkok: UNESCAP.

Amnesty International. (2015). *Niger Delta: Shell's manifestly false claims about oil pollution exposed, again.* Washington DC: Amnesty International.

Anchique, J. (2011, July 22). Sub20: Colombia aprovecha programa Green Goal (gol verde) de FIFA. *Terra Deportes*, pp. 1-2.

Armour, J., Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R. (2009). *The essential elements of corporate law: what is corporate law?* Harvard University. Cambridge: John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business.

Baake, A. (2014). *Corporate Social Responsibility in Brazil.* Universiteit Twente. Enschede: Universiteit Twente.

Bowater, D. (2014, July 10). Whatever happened to Brazil's World Cup protests? *Al Jazeera*, pp. 1-2.

Brightlines UK. (2016, January). *Brightlines UK.* Retrieved March 16, 2016, from Media & Entertainment: FIFA: http://www.brightlines.co.uk/en-gb/brands/media-entertainment/fifa/

Carroll, A. (1999). Corporate social responsibility. *Business and society, 38*(3), 1-268.

Carroll, A. (2008). A History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts and Practices. In A. Crane, D. Matten, & A. McWilliams, *The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility* (pp. 1-3). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Chan, A. (2015, november 30). United Students Against Sweatshops take on Nike. *The Daily*, 1-3.

Chaudhri, V. (2006). *Organising Global CSR: A Case Study of Hewlett-Packard's e-inclusion Initiative.* West Lafayette: Purdue University.

Clarkson, M. (1995). A stakeholder framework for analyzing and evaluating corporate social performance. *Academy of Management Review*, 92-117.

Contreras, M. (2004). *Corporate Social Responsibility in the Promotion of Social Development.* Washington D.C.: Inter American Development Bank.

De Bortoli, M., & Maroto, J. (2001). Translating colours in web site localisation. *European Languages and the Implementation of Communication and Information Technologies* (pp. 33-60). Paisley: University of Paisley.

de Quevedo-Puente, E., de la Fuente-Sabaté, F., & Bautista, J. (2007). Corporate Social Performance and Corporate Reputation: Two Interwoven Perspectives. *Corporate Reputation Review , 10*, 60-72.

DeTienne, K., & Lewis, L. (2005). The Pragmatic and Ethical Barriers to Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure: The Nike Case. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 359-376.

Duffield, C. (2010). Who are Nigeria's Mend oil militants? *BBC*, 1-2.

Dunn, C. (2008, May). *Luciano O. Monteiro, MITI.* Retrieved March 15, 2016, from The Language of Football: http://www.lucianomonteiro.com/iticover

Elespectador.com. (2011, April 28). Alertan que más de 330 municipios tienen fuerte presencia de las Farc. *El Espectador*, p. 1.

FIFA. (2012). *Kit de imprensa: Estratégia de Sustentabilidade na Copa do Mundo da FIFA Brasil 2014.* Rio de Janeiro: FIFA.

FIFA. (2012). *Make the world a better place.* FIFA Football for Hope. Geneva: FIFA.

FIFA. (2012). *The IDB, FIFA and Coca Cola launch anti-violence initiative Football for Hope.* Bogotá: FIFA.

FIFA. (2014). *Football for Hope Festival Report.* Caju: FIFA World Cup Brasil.

Freeman, E. (1984). *Strategic Management: A stakeholder approach.* Boston: Pitman.

Freeman, E., Wicks, A., & Parmar, B. (2004). Stakeholder Theory and "The Corporate Objective Revisited". *Organization Science*, 364–369.

Human Rights Watch. (1999). *The price of oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil Producing Communities.* Human Rights Watch. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Jackson, T., & Shaw, D. (2009). *Mastering Fashion Marketing.* London, UK: Palgrave&Macmillan.

LBG España. (2016, january 1). *LBG España.* Retrieved march 9, 2016, from Home: History: http://www.lbg.es/index_en.php

Moura-Leite, R. (2011). Historical background of corporate social responsibility. *Social Responsibility Journal*(4), 528-539.

Newell, A. (2015, June 19). How Nike Embraced CSR and Went From Villain to Hero. *Triple Pundit*, 1-2.

Nisen, M. (2013). How Nike solved its sweatshop problem. *Business Insider*, 2-3.

Pew Research Center. (2014). *Most say hosting World Cup is bad for Brazil.* New York: Pew Research Center.

Phillips, R., Freeman, E., & Wicks, A. (2003). What stakeholder theory is not. *Business Ethics Quarterly, 31*(4), 479-502.

Rivkin, S., & Sutherland, F. (2004). *The Making of a Name: The Inside Story of the Brands We Buy.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Runde, D. (2011, march 16). *Center for strategic and international studies.* Retrieved january 11, 2016, from The evolution of corporate social responsibility: http://csis.org/publication/evolution-corporate-social-responsibility

Spanne, A. (2014, June 19). Brazil World Cup Fails to Score Environmental Goals . *The Daily Climate*, pp. 1-2.

UNDP. (2011). *Football helps boost indigenous people's income in Colombia.* Bogotá: UNDP.

Valle, S., & Fisher, D. (2016, March 31). Brazil crisis: Choose your colours carefully or face public fury. *The Sydney Morning Herald*, pp. 1-3.

Vrontis, D., & Sharp, I. (2003). The strategic positioning of Coca-Cola in their Global Marketing Operation. (W. Publishers, Ed.) *The Marketing Review, 3*, 289-309.

Wach, K. (2011). *Global product as a result of globalization process.* Cracow University of Economics. Krakow: Cracow University of Economics.

Xinhua. (2011, July 16). Colombia to dispatch 55,000 police for FIFA U-20 World Cup security. *Xinhua news*, pp. 1-2.