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Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallel Between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

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Come as you are, as you were
As I want you to be
As a friend, as a friend
As a known enemy

Take your time, hurry up
The choice is yours, don't be late
Take a rest as a friend
As an old

Mem-or-iiii-a… Mem-or-iiii-a…

(Kurt Cobain, Lead lyricist and singer for Nirvana, "Come as You Are", 1991)

Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal González
Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallels between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

Acknowledgements

Agradecimientos

Contents

Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal González
Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallels between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal González
Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallels between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

Summary

In June 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) self-declared its Caliphate, and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as Caliph. Since then, priorities with regard to security in the West have focused on prevention of Islamist radicalization and its progression into violent extremism (otherwise known as Islamist terrorism or jihadism). At least 7,700 Western foreign fighters plus another 35,000 extremists from over 120 countries answered ISIS' call for hijra (migration) (Ranstorp, in Vidino et. al, 2017). On the other hand, in December 2017, The Iraqi government announced that the war against ISIS was over. In the meantime, approximately 30% of foreign fighters have returned to their countries of origin; in countries like Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, this percentage increases to up to 50% (RAN, 2017).

After defeating ISIS, the West now faces the conundrum of what measures need to be implemented to deal with those returning home. However, all those efforts have overlooked the existing analogies between the radicalization processes and their progression into violence, and another phenomenon that has also been a source of concern for security bodies across different countries in the last years: human trafficking. This doctoral dissertation explains the similarities between recruitment mechanisms employed by human trafficking networks and those utilized by jihadist networks. The results of this research show that the manner in which the rehabilitation and reintegration programs employed with human trafficking survivors can be tailored to address the issues posed by returning foreign fighters.

Using ISIS as a case study, the hypothesis of this doctoral dissertation holds that pull factors and mechanisms associated to recruitment on behalf of human trafficking networks are analogous to those employed by jihadists This hypothesis is derived from the international definition of human trafficking included in the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (otherwise known as the Palermo Protocol) from the year 2000, as well as the concepts of *vulnerability* and *exploitation* as key elements to identifying the aforementioned similarities.

One of the main internal problems that the fight against Islamist terrorism faces is the lack of consensus with regard to what *terrorism* entails. As this work documents, behind the legal definition of human trafficking and the elements which constitute the crime is a diachronic which culminated in the elaboration, signing and ratification of the Palermo Protocol. The existence of an agreed upon definition has enabled the elaboration and implementation of evidence-based practices and policies. Such consensus does not exist in the field of terrorism. Admittedly, terrorism always implies violence triggered by some political ideology. However, States differ when it comes to specifying the nature of the actions encompassed by the term terrorism. This,

coupled with the existing debate around whether a State can be accused of terrorism, has been one of the main deterrents when cooperating and forming international partnerships against jihadism.

Moreover, the study of radicalization and its progression into violence faces two problems. The first is that elaborating a profile that determines who is more susceptible to the jihadist message has rendered impossible. The second is that data shows that only a very low percentage of individuals exposed to the message actually go on to commit violence. Islamist radicalization and its progression into jihadism is a complex phenomenon in which several variables, none of them independent, and conditions, none of them sufficient, interact. Therefore, the study of the phenomenon requires a more holistic approach that allows for all its aspects to be taken into consideration, including its causality.

Based on an ample and complete literature review, this doctoral dissertation established that the 4P paradigm used in to combat human trafficking (prevention, protection, prosecution, partnerships) can be replicated to advance in the War on Terror. With regard to combating jihadism, however, this work calls for a 4R paradigm: radicalization, recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration. Prevention directly involves the radicalization process. Prevention policies implemented in the realm of human trafficking are focused on mitigating push factors and irregular migration as a consequence. In the same way, the field of extremism has seen the implementation of mechanisms to prevent ideological adherence and other high-risk activities.

These measures are linked to a proactive protection of individuals. In the case of jihadism, protection is focused on avoiding recruitment. Nonetheless, recent policies indicate that security bodies have added a new dimension to the realm of protection. This is particularly relevant with regard to returning foreign fighters. Human trafficking survivors have a 'reflection period' which varies in duration depending on national legislations. During this time, not only do survivors have access to medical, legal and social services, but they also determine whether they cooperate with authorities in the criminal investigations. This approach is becoming more popular among individuals who were at some point involved in jihadist networks, the only difference being that prison time is often a necessary procedure. Regarding jihadism, persecution and protection are more intertwined than in cases of human trafficking, where there is a clearer distinction at a legal level between trafficker/exploiter and victims.

These protection and assistance policies applied to jihadists willing to cooperate with intelligence and security agencies walk hand in hand with the rehabilitation (ideological, psychological, socioeconomic and educational) of these individuals, as well as their reintegration into society after serving the corresponding sentence. Countries like Saudi Arabia have

implemented initiatives to deradicalize individuals through programs that touch upon theological and educational aspects and include family members in the process. These initiatives are still at an incipient phase in the West. However, there are some examples of similar initiatives, such as the program developed in the Danish city of Aarhus. Nonetheless, rehabilitation and reintegration are framed within a preventative approach and target teens and young adults in radicalization phases prior to jihadism (participation in violence). In both cases, the curriculum is very similar to the rehabilitation (psychological, educational, socioeconomic and even medical) and reintegration programs developed for human trafficking survivors.

Human trafficking rehabilitation and reintegration programs reflect the need for partnerships. These include cooperation at a national and local level, between security bodies, governments and civil society. This is equally true in the realm of jihadism. The Belgian city of Mechelen is a clear success story. There exist preventative programs where local police, the town hall, local mosques and civil organizations work hand in hand. As a result, Mechelen is the only Flemish city which hasn't produced any foreign fighters, despite Belgium being one of the most prolific countries with regard to foreign fighters.

This paradigm readjustment (4P's – 4R's) is based on the comparison and contrast of the recruitment methods employed by human trafficking networks and those utilized by jihadists. Similarities between both networks are established at an organizational level (modus operandi, hierarchical structure, goals, international networks and reach) and at an individual one (the members of those groups). As far as goals are concerned, both terrorist groups and human trafficking networks intend to establish control over a certain (physical) territory in order to establish sovereignty. They both commit actions deemed illegal, whether it implies changing the status quo at a political level (terrorism) or at an economic one, understood as the commission of crimes with lucrative intentions and with the goal of obtaining the monopoly of illegal market sectors. However, both terrorism and organized crime require political and economic pillars. In the same way organized crimes exercises political influence through social violence and the corruption of officials, the economic gains are a necessary condition for terrorists to be able to obtain their political goals through symbolic violent attacks that have grave socio-psychological consequences.

Terrorist groups and organized crime represent dark networks that ignore borders, customs and (inter)national legislations. They establish underground governments in origin, transit and destination countries, thereby nullifying nation states by damaging legal structures, economic development and political culture. However, the success of both groups is largely dependent on a network of participants. Each member of the organization has obligations,

assigned tasks and rights. This division of tasks is a consequence of specific task allocation and coordination through internal codes. The literature review performed for this research also established the similarities between the mechanisms of isolation and exploitation. In the same way as human trafficking networks do, jihadist networks abuse individual vulnerabilities to attract new members. Once embedded within the network, both traffickers and jihadists exercise psychological and physical control over an individual, hence ultimately coercing them into performing tasks in an exploitative regime.

Control coerces individuals into performing risky tasks (from a strictly physical - injury or death - or psychological standpoint - e.g. PTSD- and also from a more symbolic perspective, such as incarceration) for the benefit of third parties, without compensation, and with little or no possibility of free-willingly abandoning their position for fear of repercussions. As far as human trafficking goes, the most complicated issue is determining the purpose of exploitation. Despite the popular conception that human trafficking involves women and girls being kidnapped and forced into the sex industry, most cases actually involve fraud. In a broad sense, this means that pre-established contractual conditions are not met, and therefore the labor agreement does not correspond with initial promises. However, victims of fraud cannot unilaterally annul the contract: they may fear retaliation from traffickers, they may not trust the security forces of the country they are in, and they even risk socioeconomic consequences, including re-trafficking, if they are deported back to their areas of origin.

As it occurs with human trafficking, determining the abuse of vulnerabilities and /or coercion as well as exploitation in the case of jihadism (more specifically ISIS) is no easy task. The most clarifying example is probably embodied in those individuals who migrated to Caliphate-controlled territory and, upon arrival, found that the initial 'contractual conditions' were not fulfilled. It is then that individuals are faced with the impossibility of changing their circumstances. They fear retaliation from ISIS, and they fear legal prosecution on their countries of origin. Just like victims of human trafficking, recruits are coerced into staying within the network and performing tasks that involve physical and psychological risk against their will.

In this regard, this work gives special importance to the role ideology plays in the recruitment process. In the case of jihadism, the ideological component is clear. As has been previously specified, the nature of terrorism derives from violence associated to political ideology. However, it is worth highlighting that ideology is, all in all, merely a mechanism through which to channel socioeconomic, cultural and political grievances. It is also the element from which the progression from radicalization into violence derives its "emotional pull" (Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010). This emotional motivation is highly context-dependent and is affected

by socioeconomic and political grievances (integration disparities between different social groups within a State). Along these lines, ISIS' Caliphate represents the utopia through which material and spiritual needs can be fulfilled. In the same way, the idealized vision of the West presented by human trafficking networks is a tool to channel underlying grievances.

Radicalization is a learning process that can trigger the individual need to take another course of action based on certain grievances. This process of cognitive and behavioral changes (transitioning from holding radical beliefs to effectively participating in violence) finds an analogy in the recruitment processes on behalf of human trafficking networks. Individual cognitive alterations (considering migration as an option to resolve grievances) are sparked by an ideology based on the improvement of livelihoods. Behavioral changes (making the migration process effective) occur when perspectives of improved livelihoods overcome the risks associated to irregular migration and recruitment by trafficking networks. Both processes (participation in violence and initiating migratory procedures) are a result of an individual rational decision-making process.

However, these processes develop also as a result of intra-group flows. Regarding violent extremism, individual vulnerability triggers a self-reinforcing dynamics in which a horizontal progression (progressive radicalization) facilitates a vertical top-down recruitment process. The group embodies significance, relevance and empowerment; it also represents being part of a campaign which combines specific objectives with the satisfaction of personal needs. In similar fashion, eventual victims of human trafficking insert themselves in an apparently innocuous network or group, thereby satisfying a quest for personal significance and the satisfaction of very specific goals, mainly improving livelihoods. Becoming part of the group or network, however, requires a process: contacting the group, expressing interest for a given job offer, and taking the decision to migrate. Once embedded in the group, individuals are isolated hence rendering the process of pulling individuals out of such networks an extremely complicated one.

The nature of the underlying ideologies in both processes is different (one being political, the other one economic). However, in both cases it plays a key role in the individual rational decision-making process of resolving grievances. In addition, the ideological component is crucial when it comes to exploitation. In the case of jihadism, the influence is clear. There are cases of human trafficking where the influence of ideology is equally patent. The clearest cases are found within Nigerian human trafficking networks, mainly dedicated to the purpose of sexual exploitation. Before initiating the migratory process, women and girls participate in an ancestral ritual associated to witchcraft, known as juju, as a way to seal contracts and ensure conformity. In this way, a contractual and spiritual bond is created between the new recruits and the network.

This accounts for many cases of progressive involvement of women within the groups, who often go on to become *madames*.

Individual motivations to join ISIS are multiple. They include, but are not limited to, socioeconomic, cultural and political motivations, and even humanitarian reasons and support of Syrian Sunnis. With respect to recruitment methods, there are clear indications to confirm that there exist parallels between the mechanisms used by the group and those employed by human trafficking networks. As an organization, ISIS uses individual grievances as a recruitment tool and to reinforce individual commitment. ISIS recruits supporters by referencing a series of intangible elements (identity, belonging and participation in a cause with significance) framed within a political and religious context. A large number of individuals migrated on a voluntary basis to Caliphate-controlled territory and to fight on behalf of al-Baghdadi. The reality of the conflict and life under ISIS disillusioned many of them. However, fleeing the Caliphate did not appear as a plausible option. They either feared retaliation from ISIS or legal prosecution in their countries of origin. Therefore, continuing to be a part of ISIS' ranks becomes a physical and psychological obligation, which matches the definition of exploitation provided in this doctoral dissertation.

In spite of the apparent similarities between human trafficking groups and jihadist networks, no study to date has set them forth. There are neither evidences to suggest that policymakers, academics or media have acknowledged such parallels. In order to establish the reasons that explain this lack of awareness, this research includes a discourse analysis carried out using LexisNexis. A diachronic analysis (from the establishment of the so-called Caliphate on June 29th, 2014 until the fall of Mosul on September 29th, 2017, divided into six-month periods) allows for the examination of the context within which the discourse surrounding ISIS has been constructed, as well as the social reality in which is develops. More specifically, the discourse analysis examines the construction of the ISIS phenomenon in relation to human trafficking.

The section dedicated to the discourse analysis includes a study of the nature of the texts and the main actors (those who elaborate the discourse), as well as the number of texts produced for the selected periods. The core values, or key words, used for the analysis are: *Islamic State*, *ISIS*, *DAESH*, *Trafficking* and *Recruitment*. With regard to trafficking, the number of observations concerning ISIS and human trafficking increases if both phenomena are examined jointly. Trafficking appears as one of the main sources of income for ISIS, but it includes drug trafficking and illegal oil trade. Human trafficking also appears as a source of income. However, as defined by the Palermo Protocol, human trafficking is only linked to ISIS when depicting the purchase and sale of Yazidi women as sex slaves.

Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallels between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

Analytical results show that media (press) are the main actors with regard to the construction of discourse around ISIS. Given the need for immediate information, there is very little chance that media is able to provide in-depth analysis of the phenomenon at stake. The fact that in the 'post 9/11' era the threat has to emphasized and prioritized has to be highlighted, since it affects the lack of focus on underlying issues. On the other hand, academic input is significantly smaller, and therefore less influential. Pre-publishing criteria imposed by peer-reviewed journals causes issues to lose its relevance, given the speed at which events on the ground take place. Moreover, the lack of funding can prevent the development of research projects and can even bias them in favor of the interest of funders.

Despite the relevance of these results, the analytical section of this doctoral dissertation could be improved for further research. This analysis is limited to English language sources. Adding other languages, such as Arabic, could better help depict the way in which the discourse (or social reality) concerning ISIS is constructed. In the same manner, including different geographical areas could assist in examining whether different issues or key themes are more prevalent depending on the actors' location. Indeed, these improvements should be taken into consideration for future research. For instance, a joint analysis of the discourse constructed by Western media and jihadist propaganda (in Arabic) could help overcome the dichotomic "us vs. them" views. This would allow for the observation of how two opposed social constructions are created and maintained, in order to better comprehend the complex dynamics underlying voluntary enrolment in ISIS.

The short-term focus of the War on Terror has long-term consequences. This is especially pertinent as ISIS loses (physical) territory and many foreign *mujahideen* (fighters) return to their countries of origin. Although it is highly likely that those most dedicated to the cause will remain in Syria and Iraq, or migrate to other lands of jihad (Yemen or Afghanistan), the West will have to face the potential risk for national security associated to these returned fighters.

The results of this doctoral dissertation are promising at a social and national security level. On the one hand, this research contributes to a more in-depth analysis of the complex dynamics underlying recruitment and voluntary enrolment in ISIS. On the other, as the terrorist organization loses physical territory and re-establishes itself as a 'virtual Caliphate,' this work has shown the benefits of tailoring programs and measures implemented for survivors of human trafficking to tackle the issue of jihadism, especially with regard to the rehabilitation and reintegration of former extremists. As in cases of human trafficking, each case should be analyzed in a case-by-case individual basis. This will allow for a proper determination of the motivations

behind abandoning jihad, the degree of culpability and exploitation, and even assess the threat they may pose to national security.

The conclusions for this doctoral dissertation can be summarized as follows:

- Human trafficking and violent (jihadist) extremism share underlying causes. Although the manner in which grievances are addressed is different, as is the ideological adherence, both types of networks abuse individual vulnerabilities of new members in order to recruit them.

- Based on the elements of the crime of human trafficking included in the Palermo Protocol, and having defined exploitation from a socioeconomic standpoint, it can be confirmed that ISIS exploits many of its recruits in the same way human traffickers do.

- In spite of criminal prosecution being necessary in most (if not all) cases of jihadist extremism, it is necessary to encourage measures that promote rehabilitation and reintegration. These will be especially effective if they are developed alongside tools that allow for the assessment of the threat posed by a given individual to national security.

- To guarantee that measures against jihadism are sustainable, partnerships between governments (national and local), security bodies and agents, and civil society must become the go-to option. These types of alliances can create self-reinforcing dynamics that allow for an improved measurement and assessment of best practices in the field. States have called for the collaboration between security forces and law enforcement, social workers, psychologists, mental health specialists, expert theologians and victims.

Also, as a result of this research and its conclusions, this doctoral dissertation sets forth a series of recommendations that will facilitate combating jihadism. They are based on two of the 4P's: prosecution and partnerships. It is recommended to:

- Reach an agreed-upon definition regarding the nature of the acts that are to be included under the term terrorism in order to facilitate international partnerships and the implementation of evidence-based practices that allow for measurable outcomes.

- Create bridges between different areas of expertise to allow for a holistic approach of radicalization and its progression into violence. A multidisciplinary approach allows for the radicalization 'syndrome' to be addressed: personality traits, contextual causes, grievances, ideological components...

- Recognize the importance of the role played by Western foreign policy in the radicalization process, and the effects this has with regard to propaganda. This becomes

a particularly salient issue as ISIS loses (physical) territory and reverts to a 'virtual Caliphate,' especially if the ideological component of jihadism can have in areas of protracted conflict, such as Afghanistan.

- Consider the importance of the sociological component of radicalization and its progression into violence. Regarding Western policies, it is necessary to implement effective integration measures that will make U.S. General David Petraeus' "battle for hearts and minds" a success.

- Re-assess the threat posed by the online sphere. Internet has shown to be an efficient recruitment and mobilization tool that facilitates the scattering of networks and members. Further research in this area is encouraged in order to map the networks, identify prominent individuals and key ideas, as well as key nodes within the network which will allow for the perpetuation of the ideology and the networks, even when jihadists seem to be undergoing a period of crisis. However, policies and practices implemented online are mainly dedicated to eliminating context. This has encouraged migration to encrypted platforms, thereby complicating the identification process.

- Avoid the victimization of female jihadis and pay special attention to re-assessing the roles played by women within jihadist networks. Prison sentences for females are markedly lower than their male counterparts since they are considered passive elements. This could be nothing further from the truth. Women may be behind-the-scenes actors, but they play key roles as propagandists and fundraisers. Their theological knowledge and their capacity to influence propaganda and discourse can become a true asset in counter-narrative campaigns elaborated within the realm of countering violent extremism (CVE). Their journeys in and out of radicalization can provide useful information and insight, in the same way that human trafficking survivors are considered key elements when developing prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration programs.

- Actively engage with 'formers' through programs and practices that prevent recidivism. In the same way that there exists a concern for recidivism among human trafficking survivors (re-trafficking or re-engagement and eventual progression within the hierarchy of the organization), former extremists and those serving jail time for terror-related are also prone to 'relapse.' It is therefore necessary to develop and implement programs similar to those existing for human trafficking survivors, which can improve personal and professional abilities of those once involved in extremist networks and reduce risk of recidivism. Were these programs to be initiated within the prison system, they could become a powerful tool to address disengagement (behavioral changes) and deradicalization (cognitive alterations), while becoming an additional 'reflection period' during which individuals can decide whether to cooperate with law enforcement.

- Imitate ISIS' models of subsidiary branches. Prevention campaigns should follow this model of different affiliates working under one same branch. Experts in the field of extremism, activists and other members of the community need to come together in a similar way, under one logo, slogan, motto, etc. All this in order to be able to present ideological axioms and sociopolitical constructions that can revert the learning course undergone during the radicalization process. The success of these efforts is dependent on the synthesis and intersection of community-led programs and online initiatives that are able to construct a parallel network that rivals in scope and size with that of extremists and presents a pluralistic and democratic worldview.

Human trafficking is considered a violation of human rights, and exploited individuals are considered victims. Jihadists, on the other hand, are perceived as perpetrators. However, the solution to both issues requires similar solutions and initiatives. In first instance, preventative policies ought to include governments and civil society, in an attempt to mitigate underlying motivations regarding both irregular migration and participation in violent extremism. Secondly, in order to prevent recidivism, effective rehabilitation and reintegration programs should be implemented. Top-down initiatives should be avoided, and civil engagement must be considered as an option when aiming at addressing underlying causes. Most importantly, we must remember that a holistic approach to CVE doesn't require re-inventing the wheel. Experts in the field of extremism, the counter-terrorism community and active anti-violent extremism voices should take into consideration all similar initiatives that are being developed in other fields. More specifically, this doctoral dissertation has shown all the knowledge that can be extracted from the field War on Trafficking. It is hoped that this study, its conclusions and recommendations generate a valuable contribution to the War on Terror going forward.

Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal González
Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallels between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

Resumen

En junio de 2014, el Estado Islámico de Iraq y Siria (ISIS por sus siglas en inglés) declaró su califato, y a Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi como califa. Desde entonces, las prioridades a nivel de seguridad en Occidente han girado en torno a la prevención de la radicalización islamista y su progresión hacia el extremismo violento (terrorismo islámico, también llamado yihadismo). Al menos 7.700 combatientes extranjeros en Occidente y otros 35.000 extremistas de más de 120 países respondieron a la llamada de ISIS para emigrar (*hijra*) al territorio controlado por el califato (Ranstorp, en Vidino, Mareno, & Entenmann, 2017). Por otro lado, en diciembre de 2017, el gobierno iraquí declaro que la guerra contra ISIS había finalizado. Entretanto, aproximadamente un 30% de los combatientes extranjeros han retornado a sus países de origen; en países como Dinamarca, Suecia y el Reino Unido, esta cifra se incrementa hasta casi un 50% (RAN , 2017).

Tras derrotar a ISIS, Occidente se enfrenta ahora a la problemática de qué medidas han de ser aplicadas con los retornados. No obstante, todos estos esfuerzos han pasado por alto las analogías existentes entre el proceso de radicalización y su progresión hacia la violencia y otro fenómeno que también ha preocupado a los cuerpos de seguridad de los distintos países en los últimos años: la trata de personas. Esta tesis doctoral explora las similitudes entre el reclutamiento para las redes de trata de personas y el reclutamiento para las redes yihadistas. Los resultados de esta investigación demuestran que la manera en la que se ha abordado la rehabilitación y la reintegración social de los y las supervivientes de trata, puede equipararse con la problemática encarnada en los combatientes extranjeros retornados.

Utilizando el ISIS como estudio de caso, la hipótesis de esta tesis doctoral sostiene que los factores de atracción (*pull factors*) y los mecanismos asociados al reclutamiento con respecto a la trata de personas, son análogos a aquellos empleados por los yihadistas. La elaboración de la hipótesis parte de la definición internacional de trata de seres humanos, recogida en el Protocolo para Prevenir, Reprimir y Sancionar la Trata de Personas (también llamado Protocolo de Palermo) del año 2000, y los conceptos de *vulnerabilidad* y *explotación* como elementos clave para determinar dichas similitudes.

Uno de los principales problemas internos a los que se enfrenta la lucha contra el yihadismo es la falta de consenso en lo que respecta a lo que constituye el *terrorismo*. Tal y como se documenta en este trabajo, tras la definición legislativa del fenómeno de la trata de personas existe un proceso diacrónico que culminó con la elaboración, firma y ratificación del Protocolo de Palermo. La existencia de consenso a nivel legislativo ha permitido la elaboración e implementación de políticas y prácticas empíricas. En el ámbito del terrorismo no existe tal

acuerdo. Si bien se reconoce que el terrorismo implica violencia impulsada por una ideología de carácter político, los distintos estados difieren a la hora de especificar la naturaleza de las acciones englobadas bajo el término terrorismo. Este hecho, sumado al debate existente sobre si un estado puede ser acusado de terrorismo, ha sido uno de los principales impedimentos a la hora de formar partenariados internacionales en la lucha contra la violencia yihadista.

El estudio del fenómeno de la radicalización y su progresión hacia la violencia yihadista se enfrenta a dos problemáticas. La primera es que ha sido imposible elaborar un perfil que permita determinar quiénes son más susceptibles al mensaje yihadista. La segunda es que los datos demuestran que únicamente un porcentaje muy bajo de aquellos individuos expuestos a este mensaje terminan participando en algún tipo de acto violento. La radicalización islamista y su progresión hacia el yihadismo es un fenómeno complejo en el cual interactúan distintas variables, ninguna de ellas independiente, y diferentes condiciones, ninguna de ellas suficiente. Es por ello por lo que el estudio del fenómeno requiere un enfoque más holístico, que permita abordar todos los aspectos de la problemática, incluyendo su causalidad.

A raíz de la amplia y completa revisión bibliográfica realizada para esta tesis doctoral, se establece que el paradigma de las 4P's utilizado en la lucha contra la trata de personas (prevención, protección, persecución y partenariados) puede ser replicado para avanzar en la Guerra contra el Terror. Para esta tesis doctoral, no obstante, la lucha contra el yihadismo se ha estructurado en base 'paradigma de las 4R's': radicalización, reclutamiento, rehabilitación y reintegración. Prevención y radicalización van de la mano. De la misma manera que las políticas preventivas en el ámbito de la trata de personas se centran en poner en marcha mecanismos que mitiguen los factores de empuje y, como consecuencia, las migraciones irregulares, en el ámbito del extremismo se han impulsado mecanismos para evitar adherencias ideológicas y otras actividades de riesgo.

Estas medidas están directamente relacionadas con una actitud proactiva en la protección de los individuos. En el caso del yihadismo, dicha protección se centra en evitar el reclutamiento. No obstante, políticas recientes indican que los cuerpos de seguridad de los estados están añadiendo una nueva dimensión al ámbito de la protección, algo que cobra especial importancia a la hora de abordar el fenómeno de los combatientes extranjeros retornados. Quienes han sobrevivido a las redes de trata de personas tienen un 'periodo de reflexión', de duración variable según las distintas legislaciones nacionales. Durante este tiempo, no solo tienen acceso a servicios médicos, legales y sociales; también han de decidir si colaboran con las autoridades en la investigación criminal. Este enfoque se está utilizando también con individuos que han estado involucrados en redes yihadistas, con la diferencia de que en la mayoría de los casos las penas de

cárcel son inevitables. En lo que respecta al yihadismo, persecución y protección están más entrelazados que en los casos de trata, donde hay una clara distinción a nivel legal entre tratante/explotador y víctima.

Estas políticas de protección y asistencia aplicadas con aquellos yihadistas dispuestos a colaborar con las unidades de inteligencia nacionales están ligados a la rehabilitación (ideológica, psicológica y socioeconómica y educativa) de estos individuos, así como a su reintegración social una vez cumplida la condena impuesta. Países como Arabia Saudí han puesto en marcha iniciativas para 'des-radicalizar' individuos, a través de programas que tratan aspectos teológicos y educacionales, y que incluyen a las familias de los participantes en el proceso. Estas iniciativas están aún en una fase incipiente en Occidente, aunque existen ejemplos de iniciativas similares, como el programa desarrollado en la ciudad danesa de Aarhus. Sin embargo, rehabilitación y reinserción están enfocados desde un punto de vista preventivo y están destinados a jóvenes en las etapas de radicalización previas al yihadismo (participar en actos violentos). En ambos casos, los programas son muy similares a los programas de rehabilitación (psicológica, educativa, socioeconómica e incluso médica) y reinserción utilizados con supervivientes de trata.

Los programas implementados en el ámbito de la trata de personas demuestran la necesidad de establecer partenariados también a nivel nacional y local, entre gobiernos, fuerzas de seguridad y la sociedad civil. Esto es también aplicable al yihadismo. Un claro ejemplo de éxito es la ciudad belga de Malinas, donde existen programas preventivos en los que policía local, ayuntamientos, mezquitas y asociaciones vecinales trabajan de forma conjunta. A pesar de que Bélgica es la fuente de una inmensa mayoría de combatientes extranjeros que migraron hacia el califato, Malinas es la única ciudad flamenca de la que no ha salido ninguno.

Este reajuste paradigmático (4P's - 4R's) se basa en la comparativa y el contraste de los mecanismos de reclutamiento de las redes de trata de personas y las redes yihadistas. Las similitudes entre ambas redes se establecen a nivel organizacional (modus operandi, composición jerárquica, objetivos, y entramados y redes internacionales) e individual (los miembros que las componen). En cuanto a sus objetivos, tanto los grupos terroristas como las redes de trata pretenden ejercer control sobre un espacio (físico) determinado con el fin de establecer su soberanía. Ambos se dedican a actividades consideradas ilegales, bien sea cambiar el status quo establecido a nivel político (terrorismo) o a nivel económico, entendiéndose este último como la comisión de delitos con fines lucrativos para obtener el monopolio de sectores de mercado ilegales. Sin embargo, tanto el terrorismo como el crimen organizado requieren pilares políticos y económicos. El crimen organizado ejerce influencia política a través de la violencia social y la corrupción de oficiales. Igualmente, las ganancias económicas son una condición necesaria para

que los terroristas puedan conseguir sus objetivos políticos, a través de ataques simbólicos con graves consecuencias socio-psicológicas.

Los grupos terroristas y las redes de crimen organizado representan redes (oscuras) que traspasan e ignoran fronteras, aduanas y legislaciones (inter)nacionales. Consiguen establecer gobiernos clandestinos y alternativos en países de origen, tránsito y destino. Al dañar los sistemas legislativos, el desarrollo económico y la cultura política, consiguen anular la soberanía de los estados. No obstante, el éxito de ambos grupos requiere de una red de participantes. Cada miembro del grupo tiene unas obligaciones, tareas y derechos dentro de la organización. La asignación de tareas específicas y la coordinación de actividades a través de códigos internos permiten esta división. La revisión bibliográfica realizada para este trabajo permite también establecer similitudes entre los mecanismos de aislamiento y explotación. Igual que sucede en casos de trata de personas, las redes yihadistas abusan las vulnerabilidades individuales para captar nuevos miembros. Una vez inmersos en la red, tanto tratantes como yihadistas ejercen un control físico y psicológico sobre los reclutas, de manera que los individuos terminan realizando tareas en régimen de explotación.

El control ejercido coacciona a los individuos para realizar tareas de riesgo (bien desde el punto de vista estrictamente físico - lesiones o incluso muerte- y psicológico -síndrome de estrés post-traumático-, o desde el punto de vista más simbólico, como lo es el encarcelamiento) en favor de terceros, sin ningún tipo de remuneración, y con pocas o nulas posibilidades de abandonar la red por miedo a las consecuencias. A la hora de determinar los casos que clasifican como trata de seres personas, lo más complicado es probar la finalidad de explotación. A pesar de que la concepción popular respecto a la trata es que mujeres y niñas son secuestradas con el fin de ser productos en el mercado de la prostitución, lo cierto es que la inmensa mayoría de los casos de trata y explotación derivan de engaños. A muy grandes rasgos, se puede decir que las condiciones contractuales establecidas en un principio no se cumplen, y por tanto el acuerdo laboral no se corresponde con lo prometido. Sin embargo, las víctimas del engaño no pueden romper dicho contrato de forma unilateral: temen las represalias por parte de la red de tratantes, no confían en los cuerpos de seguridad del país en el que se encuentran, e incluso pueden sufrir consecuencias socioeconómicas, incluyendo la re-trata, si son devueltos a sus lugares de origen.

Igual que sucede en los casos de trata de personas, determinar el abuso de vulnerabilidad y/o la coerción, así como la explotación, en lo que respecta al yihadismo no es tarea fácil. Quizá el ejemplo más claro sea el de aquellos individuos que han migrado a zonas controladas por el ISIS y, una vez en destino, estiman que las condiciones 'contractuales' iniciales no se corresponden con la realidad. Estos individuos han de enfrentarse entonces a la imposibilidad de

cambiar sus circunstancias. Por un lado, temen la violencia ejercida por los miembros de ISIS contra quienes abandonan la causa; por otro, temen las represalias legales en sus países de origen. Al igual que las víctimas de trata, los reclutas se ven obligados a permanecer dentro de la red, realizando tareas en contra de su voluntad que suponen un riesgo físico y mental.

Esta tesis doctoral ha prestado especial atención al componente ideológico del reclutamiento. En el caso del yihadismo, la influencia ideológica es clara. Como se ha especificado anteriormente, la naturaleza del terrorismo deriva de violencia asociada a una ideología (política) determinada. No obstante, la ideología es, en realidad, un mecanismo de canalización de agravios de tipo socioeconómico, cultural y político. También es el elemento que proporciona el "empujón emocional" (Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010) que permite la progresión de la radicalización a la violencia. Esta motivación emocional es altamente dependiente del entorno, y se ve afectada por agravios socioeconómicos y políticos (disparidades de integración entre distintos grupos sociales dentro de un estado). Así, el califato establecido por ISIS se presenta como la utopía a través de la cual satisfacer necesidades materiales y espirituales. Del mismo modo, la visión idealizada del mundo occidental que presentan las redes de trata es también un medio a través del cual canalizar agravios subyacentes.

La radicalización es un proceso de aprendizaje que puede desencadenar la necesidad individual de cambiar la manera de encarar ciertos agravios. Este proceso de cambios cognitivos y conductuales (la transición de una radicalización ideológica a la participación en actos violentos) es análogo a los procesos de reclutamiento para las redes de trata de personas. Las alteraciones cognitivas individuales (barajar la migración como opción para enfrentar agravios) se desencadenan por una ideología basada en la mejora de la calidad de vida. Los cambios conductuales (hacer efectivo el proceso migratorio) ocurren cuando las perspectivas de un incremento en la calidad de vida superan los riegos asociados al proceso de migración irregular y al posible reclutamiento por parte de tratantes. Ambos procesos (participación en actos violentos e inicio de procesos migratorios) son el resultado de un proceso de decisión racional individual.

No obstante, los procesos individuales también son el resultado de dinámicas intra-grupales. En el caso del yihadismo, la vulnerabilidad individual detona una dinámica auto-reafirmante en el que un proceso horizontal (la radicalización progresiva) facilita un proceso vertical de reclutamiento. El grupo encarna significado, relevancia y empoderamiento; representa también el formar parte de una campaña que combina objetivos específicos, al tiempo que se satisfacen necesidades personales. De forma similar, las víctimas de las redes de trata se comprometen con algo aparentemente inocuo, satisfaciendo así una búsqueda de significancia personal y el cumplimiento de objetivos muy específicos, principalmente la mejora de la calidad

de vida. Para pasar a formar parte de la red, previamente han de ponerse en marcha ciertas dinámicas: contactar con la red, expresar interés por una oferta de trabajo concreta, y tomar la decisión de migrar. Una vez dentro de la red, los individuos se aíslan. Esto hace que el proceso de sacarlos de dicha red algo extremadamente complicado.

La naturaleza de las ideologías subyacentes en ambos procesos es distinta (una es político-religiosa, la otra económica). No obstante, tanto en los casos de trata de personas como en los casos de yihadismo, la ideología juega un papel clave en los procesos racionales de decisión individual a la hora de hacer frente a agravios. Así mismo, el componente ideológico es vital en lo que respecta a la explotación. En el caso de las redes yihadistas, dicha influencia es clara. Hay casos de trata de personas en los que la influencia ideológica queda igualmente patente. Quizás el paralelismo más conciso se encuentre en las redes nigerianas de trata de personas. Antes de iniciar el proceso migratorio, mujeres y chicas jóvenes participan en el ritual conocido como *juju*, una práctica ancestral de brujería que sirve para sellar contratos y garantizar conformidad. De esta manera, se crea un vínculo espiritual entre las mujeres y la red. Esto explica muchos casos de implicación progresiva de mujeres dentro de la red, hasta convertirse en *madames*.

Las razones individuales para unirse al ISIS son múltiples. Incluyen, pero no se limitan a, motivaciones socioeconómicas, culturales y políticas, e incluso razones humanitarias y de apoyo a los sirios suníes. En relación con los métodos de reclutamiento, hay indicaciones claras para afirmar que existen paralelos entre dichos mecanismos y aquellos empleados por las redes de trata de personas. Como organización, el ISIS usa agravios personales como método de reclutamiento y para afianzar el compromiso individual. El grupo recluta apoyos haciendo referencia a una serie de elementos intangibles (identidad, pertenencia y participación en una causa con trascendencia), que enmarca dentro de un contexto político y religioso. Un gran número de individuos migró de forma voluntaria a Siria e Iraq para luchar en favor de Al-Baghdadi. Aunque la realidad del conflicto y la vida en el califato desilusionaron a muchos de ellos, la huida no parecía una opción viable. Continuar en los rangos de ISIS se convierte en una obligación física y psicológica, bien por miedo a las represalias de ISIS, bien por miedo al enjuiciamiento criminal en sus países de origen. Esto concuerda con la definición de explotación recogida en esta tesis.

A pesar de las aparentes similitudes entre las redes de trata de personas y las redes yihadistas, ningún estudio hasta ahora ha hecho hincapié en ellas. Tampoco existen evidencias que sugieran que legisladores, académicos y medios de comunicación reconozcan dichos paralelismos. Con el fin de establecer los motivos que causan esta falta de concienciación, se ha realizado un análisis discursivo utilizando LexisNexis. Un análisis discursivo diacrónico (desde

la creación del Califato el 29 de junio de 2014 hasta la caída de Mosul el 29 de septiembre de 2017, en periodos de seis meses) permite examinar el contexto en el cual se ha construido el discurso en torno a ISIS, así como la realidad social en la que se desarrolla dicho discurso. Concretamente, se examina la construcción del fenómeno de ISIS en relación a la trata de personas.

El apartado dedicado al análisis incluye un estudio de la naturaleza de los textos y de los emisores del discurso, así como del número de escritos emitidos para los periodos seleccionados. Los valores principales o palabras clave utilizadas de cara al análisis son: *Islamic State* (Estado Islámico), *ISIS*, *DAESH*, *Trafficking* (trata) and *Recruitment* (reclutamiento). En lo referente a la trata, el número de observaciones con respecto a ISIS y el fenómeno de la trata son mayores si se examinan de forma conjunta. Cabe destacar que en lengua inglesa, el termino *trafficking* engloba no solo la trata de personas, sino el trafico objetos y sustancias.[1] El análisis en lengua inglesa pone de manifiesto que el tráfico de drogas y/o el tráfico ilegal de petróleo son actividades ilegales a través de las cuales se financia el grupo. La trata de personas también se presenta como una de las actividades ilegales que sirven para financiar la organización. Sin embargo, tal y como queda definido en el Protocolo de Palermo, la trata de personas con respecto a ISIS solo se asocia a la compraventa de mujeres yazidíes como esclavas sexuales.

Los resultados del análisis demuestran que los medios de comunicación son los principales emisores del discurso, siendo por tanto los principales arquitectos de la realidad de ISIS. La necesidad imperiosa de información impide que los medios de comunicación proporcionen un análisis en profundidad sobre el fenómeno. La era 'post 11 de septiembre' ha propiciado que se enfatice y priorice la amenaza antes que las problemáticas subyacentes. Las aportaciones académicas, por otra parte, son mucho menores, y por tanto menos influyentes. La velocidad a la que se desencadenan los acontecimientos sobre el terreno, en contraposición con los criterios impuestos por revistas indexadas y los largos procesos de pre-publicación, hace que muchos temas pierdan relevancia. Adicionalmente, la falta de financiación puede imposibilitar el desarrollo de proyectos de investigación, e incluso puede condicionarlos en función de los intereses de los financiadores.

A pesar de la relevancia de estos resultados, el estudio podría beneficiarse de ciertas mejoras de cara a investigaciones futuras. Los resultados han sido limitados a fuentes anglófonas. Añadir otros idiomas, como el árabe, podría delinear mejor la manera en la que se construye el discurso (o la realidad social) en torno a ISIS. También podría observarse la prevalencia de ciertas temáticas en función del área geográfica en la que se encuentren los emisores. Estas mejoras han

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[1]Para referirse al tráfico de migrantes, la lengua inglesa utiliza el termino *migrant smuggling*

de tenerse en cuenta de cara al futuro. Por ejemplo, un análisis conjunto de los mensajes de medios de comunicación occidentales y de propaganda yihadista (en árabe), podría ayudar a superar el enfoque dicotómico ('ellos vs. nosotros'). Con ello se conseguiría observar la creación y el mantenimiento de dos construcciones sociales opuestas, y comprender mejor las complejas dinámicas subyacentes en el reclutamiento voluntario en ISIS.

El enfoque cortoplacista en lo que respecta a la Guerra contra el Terror tiene consecuencias a largo plazo. Esta afirmación resulta especialmente pertinente a medida que ISIS pierde territorio (físico) y muchos muyahidines (combatientes en la yihad) extranjeros retornan a sus países de origen. Si bien es muy probable que aquellos más dedicados a la causa yihadista permanezcan en Siria e Irak, o migren hacia otras tierras de yihad (Yemen o Afganistán), los países occidentales van a tener que enfrentarse al riesgo potencial que suponen estos combatientes retornados para la seguridad nacional.

Los resultados de esta investigación resultan prometedores a nivel sociológico y a nivel de seguridad nacional. Por un lado, este trabajo contribuye a hacer un análisis profundo de las complejas dinámicas que hay detrás del enrolamiento voluntario en ISIS. Por otro, a medida que la organización terrorista pierde territorio físico y se reestablece como 'califato virtual,' queda demostrada la utilidad de adaptar programas y medidas ya implementadas en el ámbito de la trata de personas para atajar el problema del yihadismo, sobre todo en lo que respecta a la rehabilitación y la reintegración de aquellos que formaron parte de redes extremistas. Como ocurre con la trata de personas, cada caso ha de ser analizado de forma individual, con el fin de determinar los motivos para abandonar la yihad, el grado de culpabilidad y explotación, e incluso evaluar el riesgo que presentan para la seguridad nacional.

Las conclusiones de este trabajo pueden resumirse así:

- La trata de personas y el extremismo (yihadista) violento comparten causas subyacentes. Aunque la forma de encarar agravios individuales difiere, de la misma manera que lo hace el componente ideológico, se puede decir que tanto las redes de trata como los yihadistas (ISIS) abusan vulnerabilidades individuales para reclutar nuevos miembros.

- En función de los elementos recogidos en el Protocolo de Palermo para calificar la trata de personas, y tras definir el termino explotación desde un punto de vista socioeconómico, se confirma que el ISIS explota a muchos de sus miembros de la misma forma que lo hacen las redes de trata de personas.

- A pesar de que las medidas legales sean necesarias en muchos de los casos (si no en todos) de extremismo, es necesario impulsar medidas que promuevan la rehabilitación y la reintegración social. Estas serán especialmente efectivas si se desarrollan conjuntamente

con herramientas que permitan evaluar el riesgo que un individuo puede presentar para la seguridad nacional.

- Para garantizar la sostenibilidad de las medidas en contra del yihadismo, han de crearse partenariados entre gobiernos (nacionales y locales) y los cuerpos de seguridad del estado y la sociedad civil. Este tipo de alianzas pueden establecer dinámicas auto-reafirmantes que permitan medir y evaluar las mejores prácticas a este respecto. Los Estados han llamado a la colaboración entre las fuerzas del orden y la seguridad, trabajadores sociales, psicólogos, especialistas en salud mental, teólogos expertos y víctimas.

Así mismo, en base a esta tesis doctoral y sus conclusiones, se han elaborado una serie de recomendaciones que permiten hacer más eficaz la lucha contra el yihadismo. Estas indicaciones están basadas en dos de los cuatro pilares fundamentales de la lucha contra la trata de personas: persecución y partenariados.

- Se aconseja llegar a una definición consensuada respecto a la naturaleza de los actos que engloba el término *terrorismo*, con el fin de facilitar los partneriados a nivel internacional y la implementación de prácticas empíricas con resultados medibles.

- Es necesario crear puentes entre distintas ramas de conocimiento que permitan el estudio holístico de la radicalización y su progresión hacia la violencia. Un enfoque multidisciplinar permitirá abordar el llamado 'síndrome' de la radicalización: rasgos de la personalidad, causas contextuales, agravios, componentes ideológicos…

- Se debe reconocer la importancia que tiene la política exterior occidental en los procesos de radicalización y los efectos que esto tiene a nivel propagandístico. Este hecho cobra especial relevancia ahora que ISIS ha perdido territorio físico y revierte hacia un califato virtual, especialmente si se tiene en cuenta la influencia que la ideología yihadista puede tener en zonas de conflictos extendidos, como Afganistán.

- Se ha de tener en cuenta la importancia del componente sociológico subyacente en los procesos de radicalización y participación en actos de violencia. En cuanto a las políticas occidentales, es necesario plantear medidas de integración efectivas que permitan ganar lo que el General estadounidense David Petraeus denomino "la batalla por los corazones y las mentes".

- Hay que prestar especial atención a la amenaza que representa la realidad online. Internet ha demostrado ser una herramienta de captación y movilización efectiva, que permite la dispersión de redes y miembros. Se recomienda investigar más este área para trazar redes e identificar individuos e ideas clave, así como nodos centrales que permitirán la continuación de la ideología y la perpetuación de las redes yihadistas, incluso en tiempos en los que los terroristas parecen estar en crisis. Por el contrario, las políticas y prácticas

puestas en marcha online están dedicadas principalmente a la eliminación de contenido. Esto ha promovido la migración a plataformas encriptadas, dificultando así el proceso de identificación.

- Se recomienda prestar especial atención al rol de las mujeres en las redes yihadistas, evitando su victimización. Aunque las mujeres estén en un segundo plano, juegan papeles fundamentales como propagandistas y captadoras de fondos. Hay que tener en cuenta que sus periodos carcelarios son sensiblemente más breves que las de los hombres, ya que ellas son consideradas elementos pasivos dentro de estas redes. Sus conocimientos teológicos y su poder para influenciar la propaganda y el discurso pueden resultar fundamentales en las campañas de contra-propaganda elaboradas dentro del ámbito de la lucha contra el yihadismo. Su trayectoria de radicalización y des-radicalización también puede proporcionar información valiosa en este sentido, de la misma forma que las supervivientes de trata son consideradas elementos fundamentales a la hora de desarrollar programas de prevención, reintegración y rehabilitación.

- Es necesario involucrar a antiguos extremistas en programas y prácticas que prevengan la reincidencia. De la misma forma que existe una preocupación por la reincidencia de los supervivientes de trata de personas (re-trata o la progresión dentro de la jerarquía de dichos grupos con el paso del tiempo), los antiguos extremistas y aquellos que están cumpliendo sentencia por casos relacionados con el yihadismo también son propensos a la 'recaída'. Por tanto, es necesario desarrollar e implementar programas similares a los empleados con supervivientes de trata. Estos programas mejorarán las habilidades personales y profesionales de aquellos que estuvieron involucrados en redes extremistas y reducirán las probabilidades de reincidencia. Si dichos programas comenzaran dentro del sistema penitenciario, podrían servir para iniciar el proceso de desconexión del extremismo (componente conductual) y la des-radicalización (componente ideológico), al tiempo que se incluirían como un periodo de reflexión adicional durante el cual los individuos podrían decidir colaborar con las autoridades.

- Las campañas de prevención deben imitar la estrategia de ISIS, basada en filiales y afiliados que operan bajo una misma marca. Expertos en el ámbito del extremismo, activistas y otros miembros de la comunidad han de unirse de forma similar, bajo un mismo logo, eslóganes, lemas… Así podrán presentar axiomas ideológicos y construcciones sociopolíticas que puedan revertir el proceso de aprendizaje llevado a cabo durante el proceso de radicalización. El éxito de estos esfuerzos dependerá de la síntesis e intersección de programas comunitarios e iniciativas online para construir una red paralela que vaya más allá de rivalizar en tamaño y alcance con las redes yihadistas, presentando una visión pluralista y democrática del mundo.

La trata de personas se considera una violación de los derechos humanos, por lo que los individuos explotados son considerados víctimas. Los terroristas, en cambio, son considerados perpetradores. No obstante, el remedio a ambas problemáticas pasa por soluciones e iniciativas similares. En primer lugar, las políticas preventivas han de incluir a los gobiernos y a la sociedad civil, con el fin de paliar las motivaciones subyacentes, tanto de la migración irregular como de la participación en actos de extremismo violento. En segundo lugar, con el fin de evitar la reincidencia, se han de implementar programas de rehabilitación y reintegración efectivos. Ha de evitarse que sean verticales, optando por la participación social. Lo más importante es tener en cuenta que un enfoque holístico en la lucha contra el extremismo violento no requiere reinventar la rueda. Los expertos en el ámbito del extremismo violento, la comunidad anti-terrorista y las voces activas anti-extremismo han de considerar iniciativas que se estén llevando a cabo en otras áreas. Más concretamente, esta tesis doctoral ha demostrado todo lo que se puede extraer de lo aprendido en la guerra global contra la trata. La intención de este estudio, sus conclusiones y sus recomendaciones es generar, de cara al futuro, una contribución efectiva en la Guerra contra el Terror.

Chapter 1. Introduction

Human trafficking and terrorism are both among the most important security aspects threatening Western countries. They contribute to the instability of the international order and endanger national socioeconomic and political structures. National governments, as well as supra- and international bodies, have expressed their worries regarding the relationship between human trafficking and terrorism. Although this concern may seem new, it could be said that the link between fighting terrorism and combating human trafficking first started out in 2001.

In her book "*From Trafficking to Terror: Constructing a Global Social Problem*" (2014), Pardis Mahdavi highlights the link between the War on Terror[i] and the War on Trafficking. The framework for this interconnection between each phenomenon is based on the perpetuation of the myths concerning the feminization of sex and the masculinization of terrorism. The invasion of Afghanistan turned the War on Terror into more than fighting Al-Qaeda: it was also a fight for the liberation of women whose oppression was symbolized by the burqa. The United States' intervention in Afghanistan showed the world "the figure of the Muslim or brown-skinned woman who needs to be saved from the brown/Muslim men by white men (…) the villainous Muslim man who needs to be attacked/ punished/ detained" (Mahdavi, 2014).

This overlap between trafficking and terror also has a legislative background. The 9/11 attacks revealed that the fight against terrorism now required cooperation with law enforcement in other countries. In an attempt to maintain sustained relationships with counterparts abroad, the U.S. government realized that the fight against terrorism was insufficient, and that legal and intelligence efforts had to be directed to other types of investigations, particularly human trafficking (DeStefano, 2007). Little less than a year earlier, in October 2000, U.S. Senate and Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA). This law enabled U.S law enforcement to "codify the offense of trafficking and related crimes" and increase "the penalties for those convicted" (*ibid*).

While human trafficking and terrorism are typically considered as independent of one another, recent developments, such as the so-called Syrian refugee crisis, document that human trafficking and terrorism are often interrelated. The human trafficking trade human trafficking trade generates between $255 million and $323 million each year, a value that has particularly strengthened groups with a terrorist agenda, including the Islamic State" (Smith S. , 2015). This oftentimes intertwined association has been primarily recognized around concern with migration.

In this dissertation, I go one step beyond the migratory relationship. I attempt to document that terrorism and human trafficking share in other components and draw these connections

through an analysis of underlying causes with an emphasis on the role ideology plays in recruitment for both phenomena. These underlying similarities warrant closer examination. Finding parallels between the terrorist threat and other security concerns, such as human trafficking, can empower the international community and add valuable new tools and insight to the counterterrorism toolbox. This work examines the ways in which mechanisms of countering human trafficking could potentially also be applicable to combating terrorism.

ISIS (also known as the Islamic State, ISIL,[ii] or DAESH[iii]) is currently the name most associated with international terrorism. ISIS offers a case study through which I try to illustrate the existing parallels between human trafficking networks and terrorist organizations. The processes associated with ISIS' radicalization and recruitment has been the subject of numerous studies, in an attempt to understand why individuals join the Caliphate and what leads them to sympathize with and, or support it. Moreover, there exists proof that ISIS has financed itself through illicit activities, such as illegal oil trade and selling antiques in the black market.[iv] The transnational non-state actor has also been accused of perpetrating human trafficking, embodied in the enslavement of Yazidi girls and women. [v] Although this does indeed count as by-the-book trafficking in human beings, this work is not directly concerned with these specific cases, but rather with examining the general parallels between human trafficking networks and the behavior of terrorist organizations. The main similarities are found with regard to recruitment processes, as well as the overriding purpose of exploitation.

A brief overview of the security threats in the EU and the U.S.A.

The link between human trafficking networks and terrorist organizations has been acknowledged by the European Union and the United States, amongst others. The European Union's peaceful consolidation does not prevent it from being vulnerable to external threats. The European Commission has pointed out how an increasing globalization and interconnectivity walks hand-in-hand with an increasing sophistication of threats to European countries. In its 2015 and 2016 annual reports, Frontex identified three major threats to the EU's external borders: an increasing number of regular travelers, increasing migratory pressure from irregular migrants, and a mounting terrorist threat. These reports also relate cross-border crimes performed by organized criminal groups and the threat imposed by terrorism. While reports state that there is no known evidence of terrorists travelling along with irregular immigrants, they do reflect a territorial overlap between the areas of operation and influence of organized criminal groups and terrorist organizations. These findings suggest the possibility that there exists cooperation between the two: criminal organizations involved in smuggling are protected by terrorist organizations operating in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) area, in exchange for economic benefits (Frontex, 2015; 2016).

Both human trafficking and terrorism have been deemed as two of the main security concerns for the European Union (European Commission, 2016).[vi] The latest available data provided by Eurostat shows that, despite human trafficking having decreased during the 2010-2011 period by 1.02%, by 2012 human trafficking figures increased by 14.21% with respect to 2011 (Eurostat, 2015). However, the report does not specify whether human trafficking offenses are in fact on the rise, or whether the increase of identified cases responds to the efficient work of law enforcement. The same is true with regards to terrorism. Reports published by Europol show that from 2011 to 2015, terrorist attacks have increased by 17.54% (Europol, 2014; 2015; 2016). However, that statistic does not include a number of attacks that authorities and law enforcement thwarted, nor can it measure the number of potential operatives that were (or are) planning and plotting. Hence, the true magnitude of the threat may be minimized.

The United States' 2016 Intelligence Report also mentions both terrorism and human trafficking as menaces. Although human trafficking is classified as a specific form that transnational organized crime can take up, they are both classified as global threats - that is, they affect different countries at once and transcend national borders. By ignoring borders, customs and legislations, both phenomena ignore the national sovereignty of States, including their legal systems, their economic development and their political cultures (Reinares & Resa, 1999). States can lose control over their territory, having as a result the emergence of "underground governments" (Naylor, 1995) or "sub-politicization" (Beck, 1996); in other words, rule of law is implemented by third parties other than the sovereign state.[vii]

The 2016 Intelligence Report raises a point crucial to the elaboration of this work where it states that, "trafficking in persons has become a lucrative source of revenue for transnational organized crime groups and terrorist organizations (…)" (Clapper, 2016). The link between organized crime and terrorism is also a concern for European security authorities. Europol's reports (2014, 2015, 2016) specifically mention how terrorist organizations are increasingly utilizing organized-crime-like methods to finance their activities.

Given the relationship with social legitimization, finances of terrorist organization and organized crime networks are a major concern for authorities. Money deriving from illegal activities may be re-invested in the construction of housing or may take the form of public grants. Through these actions, members of organized crime groups manage to further launder their illicit earnings, and also partly substitute the State in its functions (Finckenauer, 2005), especially in territories where quasi-governmental roles also imply providing protection for the population (El-Aboudy, 2002). As such, the normal social order is disrupted by the legitimization of illegal income, and loyalty being transferred to criminals who now benefit from social impunity. On the

other hand, the pain and fear inflicted upon the population by terrorist groups can turn into political demands by the population, whether it's in the shape of popular support for the actions of terrorists, or in the form of actions being demanded to make certain concessions to terrorists. [viii]

The 2015, Europol's Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) points out how, on top of activities such as the trafficking of firearms and fraud, terrorist groups were also suspected of facilitating irregular immigration. Such is the case of the attacks that occurred in Paris in November 2015,[ix] in which terrorists entered the EU along with immigration flows (Europol, 2016). Migration flows towards Europe have exarcerbated since the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. For instance, figures provided by Frontex and UNHCR from 2013 to 2015 show a dramatic increase in the number of irregular maritime arrivals to European territory. By 2015, one million people had reached Europe by sea (Andersson, 2016). Later figures account for an additional 362,376 arrivals by sea in 2016, and 44,791 by May 4, 2017 (UNCHR, 2017). The Syrian refugee crisis has also raised security concerns in the United States. Figure 1 depicts how the number of accepted refugees decreased drastically after the 9/11 attacks, but then reached a peak in 2009. The 2015 fiscal year accounted for a 1% increase with regards to 2014. The majority of these refugees came either from Near South Asia (Burma) and Africa (Dem. Rep. Congo, Somalia) (U.S. Department of State, 2015).

Figure 1 - Number of refugees accepted in the U.S. since 9/11 (Source: U.S. Department of State, 2015)

Although existing evidence confirms that the chances of an American being murdered by a foreign-born terrorist was lower than 0,001% a year, and the chances of an American being killed in an attack perpetrated by a refugee was 1 in 3.64 *billion* (Nowrasteh, 2016), there have been attempts to implement more restrictive immigration policies, especially with regards to the

acceptance of refugees. The most recent and controversial example for such a policy is Executive Order 13769 ("Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States"), issued by President Donald J. Trump and popularly known as 'the Muslim ban'. Among other measures, the Executive Order argued for "additional procedures" only for "nationals of countries for which the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence have jointly determined that such additional procedures are adequate to ensure the security and welfare of the United States" (Trump, 2017). These include Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, all Muslim-majority countries.

The link between migration flows (whether regular or irregular) and terrorism seems apparent, at least when it comes to national security. As has been pointed out, however, it is a rather novel issue, at least partially exaggerated as a result of the increased human mobility associated with the Syrian civil war and coincident to the rise in concern for ISIS. Yet, this is but one of the reasons why ISIS has been chosen as the case study for this dissertation. Apart from the apparent link between international terrorism and organized crime, this research is mainly concerned with ISIS's capacity for recruitment and how it is related to human trafficking. The organization has been able to recruit a large number of foreign fighters (especially in comparison to Al-Qaeda) while also inspiring attacks in countries outside its controlled territory. It is this capacity for recruitment that sets the grounds for establishing parallels between the terrorist group and human trafficking networks.

A Brookings Doha Centre Analysis paper published by Charles Lister in 2014 argued that the best manner to fight ISIS was to address the organization´s (apparent) long-term sustainability, translated into its territorial expansion and its desire to govern over millions of people. The long process of countering the terrorist group should focus on undermining, among others, its financial strength, its military mobility and its capacity for recruitment using social media, while also addressing the socio-political issues which both Syria and Iraq face today. Several other strategic documents call for a similar multidimensional strategic angle.[x]

However, as much as Lister's paper portrays finances, military and recruitment as independent spheres to be addressed, this work argues that they are not so independent of one another but are in fact mutually reinforcing. ISIS has turned into a "bureaucratic organization" (Lister, 2014), which uses techniques very similar to those used by any other hierarchical entity. As such, ISIS's financial capacity and military strength are dependent on the effectiveness of its recruitment efforts. After all, it is recruits who plan military missions and advances. Military conquest increases the organization's financial assets. Its propaganda maintains morale and drives foreign recruitment while promoting radicalization among indigenous populations. The

importance of propaganda is highlighted by the fact that propagandists or media producers earn a substantially higher pay grade than the organization's foot soldiers.[xi] The increase in foreign fighters joining ISIS, while not necessarily and exclusively related to the existent structural inefficiencies and political chaos in Iraq and Syria today, includes an intersection of financial, military and religious incentives (Mink, 2015). Similarly, variables related to human trafficking are equally complex and interrelated. This work will analyze, compare and contrast these dynamics.

Such a comparison will help address another of the key issues associated with the ISIS phenomenon. ISIS's call for *hijra* (migration) was answered by 7,700 Western foreign fighters and another 35,000 extremists from over 120 countries (Ranstorp, in Vidino et. al, 2017). Attacks from the international coalition started in 2014, and by December 2017, the Iraqi government declared that the war against ISIS was over (Usher, 2017). The threat that Western governments now face is what treatment to give to those nationals who departed to the Caliphate but are now returning to their countries of origin. In this work I posit that existing underlying similarities, reintegration and rehabilitation programs implemented in the realm of human trafficking can be tailored to address the needs of the threat posed by returning foreign fighters. However, the approach to the War on Terror and the War on Trafficking, largely based on social constructions, morality and preconceptions, has prevented a more holistic understanding of the intertwined nature of both phenomena.

Hypothesis and research questions

The predominant approach with regard to combating violent extremism in the West is focused on jihadist extremist. The current War on Terror revolves around two main axes: debilitating the group by targeting their economic assets and their structure and focusing on preventing individuals from adhering to the group. The second pillar of the War on Terror, however, is mostly based on a sociopsychological approach that tries to understand the individual motivations that lead to engagement in violent extremism. This approach, however, fails to recognize the intertwined dynamics existing between individuals and the group.

Recent works fail to acknowledge that engagement in violent extremism and the methods used by recruiters are not that different from those used by recruiters in the human trafficking networks. When they do, they highlight the recruitment of women as a form of human trafficking, hence reinforcing the victimhood discourse surrounding human trafficking and the feminization of the crime. The main hypothesis of this work goes a step beyond the myths surrounding both the War on Terror and the War on Trafficking and posits that procedures of recruitment for violent

political extremism (terrorism) resemble strategies deployed by human trafficking networks. No previous studies have highlighted these similarities.

This thesis examines the ways in which human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism (terrorism) are similar. Exploring the topic will permit an answer to my underlying hypothesis, namely that: *Procedures of recruitment for violent political extremism (terrorism) resemble strategies deployed by human trafficking networks.*

To illustrate the utility of already existent conceptual, legal and social tools with regards to human trafficking, I use ISIS as a study case to compare and contrast recruitment strategies applied by traffickers and recruiters of terrorists.

Prior to debating the possibility of reintegrating and rehabilitating returned foreign fighters and the manner to do so, the hypothesis for this work needs to be proved or disproved. If sufficient evidence exists to claim that recruitment techniques used by violent jihadi groups such as ISIS are similar to those used by human trafficking networks, then already existent programs implemented with human trafficking survivors appear as a possible tool, appropriate for replication and capable of preventing re-engagement or new cases of violent extremism. Contrary to the approach promoted among survivors of human trafficking, criminalization among former jihadists is not futile.

Nonetheless, in the same manner that not all cases of exploitation can be deemed as trafficking, neither do all foreign fighters go back to their countries of origin for the same reasons. Rather than making prisons "radicalization hubs" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), rehabilitation and reintegration programs should be implemented so as in to avoid recidivism into violent extremism. Answering the following research questions will confirm or disconfirm the overriding hypothesis:

a) *Do violent extremist groups, such as ISIS, abuse individual vulnerabilities to attract recruits?* The Palermo Protocol considers that abusing vulnerabilities or a position of power helps traffickers recruit potential victims. This research will explore whether a vulnerable position also permits ideological influences to affect individuals, pulling them further into engagement. For human trafficking victims, the decision to migrate often involves the search for a better livelihood, or to live in a Western country that seems utopic. For foreign jihadist fighters, the ideological shift also entails migration and expectations of both worldly benefits and heavenly rewards. The caliphate is its utopia.

b) *Are recruits of groups such as ISIS being exploited?* The Palermo Protocol establishes that one of the conditions to determine a situation of human trafficking is whether exploitation

(defined based on force, fraud and coercion) has in fact taken place. In the case of human trafficking networks, the economic benefits for traffickers are clear. In the case of violent jihadis, the issue is not so simple. Benefits are not solely economic; most fighters believe that sacrifice for the cause is religious and political. However, in the same way that not all cases of exploitation are considered trafficking, it is necessary to consider cases of individuals whose expectations in migrating to the Islamic State were not met, though they were forced to remain in ISIS-held territory because they either feared for their lives or feared prosecution back in their countries of origin.

The answer to these two questions will prove or disprove the notion that recruitment for human trafficking and radicalization and recruitment of violent jihadists are similar. If that is true, then the secondary proposition that tools utilized to combat human trafficking can help provide insight into to how to address the security threat posed by returning ISIS foreign fighters will be elaborated upon by answering the following:

c) *Should former jihadists be prosecuted or should countries aim for rehabilitation and reintegration?* Survivors of human trafficking are often referred for alternatives to incarceration or deportation, programs that address the underlying issues and causes and facilitate a more holistic way of addressing the problem. The potential threat of foreign fighters is a cause of controversy. The stigmatization associated with violent jihadist extremism tends to stimulate a knee-jerk reliance on prosecution and criminalization. However, criminal and justice systems will be left with two options: either prosecute and imprison foreign fighters or address return holistically as well and incorporate reintegration and rehabilitation alternatives.

d) *How can partnerships help the rehabilitation and reintegration of former jihadis?* If the complexity of human trafficking and its effects requires a multi-faceted response and recruitment processes are similar concerning jihadists, then it makes sense to incorporate platforms that have worked well in rehabilitating and reintegrating survivors of human trafficking. Partnerships and collaboration networks have been established to approach the causes and consequences of human trafficking in a comprehensive and effective manner. Engagement in violent extremism and sustainable disengagement are no less intricate. Might partnerships help to create a network parallel to that of the jihadi universe? Similar partnerships may offer an instrument that helps effectively address the security threat embodied in returning foreign fighters.

A revision of the literature has helped set the scaffold to identify common characteristics which will allow for a more in-depth analysis of similarities between the fields of human

trafficking and countering violent extremism. Nonetheless, a priori, to this day there is no research that draws parallels between the two.

I hypothesis that this is a result of the way in which the discourse regarding ISIS has been constructed since the Caliphate was established on June 29th, 2014. Constructing the discourse means to check "how particular ideas, concepts and perspectives come into being and are sustained" (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). It is only by examining the production, dissemination and reception of ideas, concepts and perspectives, as well as their historical context, that we can understand how they become a reality. Discourse does not only influence public opinion, but also policy making, academic research and media focus. The aim is to be able to gather sufficient data that will indicate what actors provide most input on ISIS, and what other actors follow that lead and provide input for the interdiscourse that has ultimately constructed the discourse on ISIS and recruitment.

Justification

The problem of Islamist terrorism

Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the Tamil Tigers are names that sounds familiar. However, only some, if not few, might remember the IRA Omagh bombings of 1998. The same would happen were I to ask about ETA's 1987 Hipercor bombing, the Kattankudy mosque massacres perpetrated by the Tamil Tigers in 1990, Shining Path's bombing of the Miraflores district in Lima on that same year, or even Al-Qaeda's 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Were I to ask about 9/11, the Madrid train bombings of 2004 or London's 7/7 bombings, the answers would probably be very different.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, were the cornerstone of 'international terrorism,' a new "wave of terrorism" (Rapoport, 2004) that also benefited from the advancements of globalization and that was no longer relegated to a region or a country. There were no longer borders for terrorism; it could now happen anywhere, at any time. Terrorism became global. It also became deadlier. New York (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2007) account for 3,243 casualties. Since then, the number of attacks has increased: from 2014 to 2017 there were 65 attacks in the European territory with a total of 351 victims. In United States soil alone, 11 terrorist attacks have taken place since 9/11, and produced a total of 100 victims. All these attacks had one thing in common: they were perpetrated in the name of Islam. Terrorism has turned into a global reminiscence of Huntington's 'clash of civilizations.' The symbolism behind the attacks to the Twin Towers, the most representative signs of Western capitalism, set the stage for a global 'East vs. West' divide. As former U.S. President George W. Bush put it, "you are either with us, or with

the terrorists" (Voice of America, 2007).

The internationalization of terrorism presented a new challenge for academics, law enforcement and the counter-terrorism community not just because of its global outreach and religious nature. It evidenced an inability to identify who would go on to commit attacks. Could it be an Arab-Muslim like lead hijacker of the 9/11 bombings, Mohammed Atta? Or could it be a female, like white converts Colleen LaRose (popularly known as 'Jihad Jane') and ISIS-propagandist Sally Jones? [xii] Profiling has become even more complicated since ISIS self-declared its so-called Caliphate in 2014. It has become the most attractive terror group in history, luring 7,700 Western foreign fighters plus another 35,000 extremists from over 120 countries (Ranstorp, in Vidino, Mareno, & Entenmann, 2017). The large number of recruits renders the elaboration of a single profile a more than complicated endeavor.

This is particularly relevant in the current context. Some may think that now that ISIS has lost its territory, the threat is no longer relevant. Reality, however, could not be further from the truth. Data retrieved from the New America Foundation relevant to terrorism in America after 9/11 unto today reveals that jihad is not a temporary phenomenon. Rather, individuals have flocked to different 'lands of jihad' over time, such as Bosnia, Afghanistan, Somalia and, more recently, Iraq and Syria. The shifts in focus regarding 'lands of jihad' suggest that a new battlefront may emerge in the future. This is due to the holistic worldview of jihadist Islam, an intersection of socioeconomic, political and religious spheres that seeks to establish a global *khilafa* (caliphate) as fulfillment of the Qur'anic End of Times prophecy. In the meantime, a retrospective analysis of the emergence of ISIS' propaganda structures suggests that ISIS might be following the steps of Al-Qaeda and retreating to their own "virtual Waziristan" (Morton & Silber, 2018). Takedown policies online are further pushing ISIS and its acolytes into the dark web, making identifications of hubs, networks and at-risk individuals even more difficult.

Moreover, those who left to join ISIS and returned, as well as those convicted for terror-related offenses in their home countries pose an additional diatribe to society in general concerning the potential security threat they represent. For instance, in the United States alone, there have been over 160 cases of individuals charged for ISIS-related offenses since March, 2014, while from 2011-2016, an additional 79 non-ISIS terror related cases were also prosecuted (George Washington University - Program on Extremism, 2015-2018). Most of these individuals will one day return to society. U.S. Congressional Research Service data shows that at least 61 individuals will be released between 2018 and 2024 (Bjelopera, 2015).

The fact that the jihadist phenomenon may be far from over poses a series of questions with regard to how to address prevention in a preemptive manner. Additional questions arise when considering what will be the future of those convicted with terror-related offenses upon their

reentry into society. My dissertation does not seek to find *the* solution to global jihad. Rather, it is an exploratory attempt to provide potentially alternative solutions that encompass all the above mentioned spheres, from preventing engagement to rehabilitating and reintegrating those that once espoused jihadist violence.

Why human trafficking?

The problem of preventing violent extremism and how to reintegrate and rehabilitate those returning home after serving time for terror-related crimes has been touched upon from different angles. The most successful one is probably equating jihadist terrorism to gang activity (see, for example, Nacos, 2015; Basra & Neuman, 2016; Valasik & Phillips, 2017). Indeed, gang activity feels appropriate when taking into consideration the "drivers of radicalization" (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Skillicron, Leuprecht & Winn, 2012; Rahimi & Graumans, 2015), especially social discontent and lack of integration as potential push factors. However, the gang approach fails to take into consideration one of the primary grievances expressed by jihadists, international politics.

Addressing jihadism requires an approach that is able to understand the intersection of the macro-, the mezzo- and the micro-level. In other words, solving this major security threat requires grasping the convergence of international, national and individual factors. Most importantly, the solution should acknowledge that all paths to radicalization are unique, let alone each path to engagement. In this regard, I believe the field of human trafficking represents an opportunity worth exploring. Human trafficking has been an international concern since the early 19th century. Since 2000, the global war against human trafficking has taken a holistic approach through what is known as the '4P paradigm:' prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships.

Regarding human trafficking, prevention deals with the intersection of national and international dynamics. It acknowledges that human trafficking is a form of transnational organized crime, and it should therefore be addresses transnationally, taking into consideration how globalization may affect the crime. At their roots, human trafficking and jihadist terrorism share the fact that they are both phenomena which are largely context-dependent and are a result of combined socioeconomic, political and cultural factors. How these elements intersect are a result of globalization dynamics and how they shape the interplay of international and national. Globalization effects at a national and international level are subjectively interpreted by individuals through their interaction with their environment. It is the individual reaction to those subjective interpretations that makes a person vulnerable to an ideology. A horizontal ideological progression (political radicalization or an increasing disposition to be part of 'the American way of life') facilitates top-down recruitment. Grievances are exploited in the form of job placements, or even political propaganda that plays off the peripheral role Muslim countries have been relegated to in the international arena as a result of a modern wave of Western expansionism.

Human trafficking also allows for the one-on-one approach that dealing with the diverse (former) jihadist profiles requires. National security and law enforcement agencies now face an unprecedented domestic threat, mainly due to the fact that returned fighters are not a homogenous group (Clarke & Amarasingam, 2017). In the words of Europol chief, Rob Wainwright: "There is some part of the returning population who genuinely regret traveling out there and are making genuine attempts to reintegrate into society, but there are also a good number that are coming back in a frenzied mental state bent on revenge" (Taylor, 2017). This statement reflects the need to advance case-by-case mechanisms and programs to assess and address the potential security threats embodied in returning foreign fighters.

Part of the protection branch of human trafficking entails acknowledging the individual profiles of survivors. This includes addressing psychological and medical well-being, legal support, and other socioeconomic variables, such as employment. Survivors of human trafficking are granted a 'reflection period' during which they can consider cooperating with law enforcement against their exploiters. Because there is no single path to radicalization, the counter-terrorism community, law enforcement and academia could benefit from a similar reflection period for those facing terror-related charges. Understanding individual trajectories could shed further light into the phenomenon of radicalization and engagement in violence. This process would not redeem those guilty from incarceration. However, addressing individual psychological, socioeconomic and cultural issues is key to disengaging and potentially de-radicalizing 'terrorists.' This reverts back directly to potentially successful reintegration and rehabilitation processes. As the United States Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) puts it, "release preparation begins the first day of incarceration."

Partnerships, the fourth and last pillar of the War on Trafficking, also prove an essential tool in the War on Terror. The transnationality of terror and the complexity of its causes call for cooperation at a macro- and mezzo-level. For example, the threat of terrorism in the European Union is not the same as in the United States, Russia or China. This, however, should not prevent all countries from engaging in common pathways to address a global issue. Counter-terrorism bodies and agents, as well as CVE experts, would benefit from pulling from developments in the field of human trafficking. A common international definition of what human trafficking entails is provided by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (2000). This has allowed for the elaboration and implementation of best practices that can produce measurable outcomes. A common international consensus to effectively end the War on Terror would allow for similar procedures and results that would consequently make national anti-terrorism policies more efficient.

The reluctance to apply the approach of human trafficking to ending the War on Terror is

understandable from the standpoint that those trafficked are victims and terrorists are perpetrators. The War on Trafficking relies largely on a human rights based approach (HRBA) to combat address prevention and efficient rehabilitation of reintegration of victims. However, the War on Terror would certainly benefit from a HRBA to address grievances both at preventative and reintegrative stages of the (de-) radicalization process. Under a HRBA "plans, policies and processes" are based on rights and obligations established under international law (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rghts, 2006). Laws and administrative processes are meant to respond to rights and needs, including an economic approach that seeks to transform resources into rights and thereby reducing poverty, understood as the lack of physical and social goods, that is, discrimination and lack of political and civil rights. This broader approach will help address the complexities behind engagement in violence.

Filling a gap

The idea of potentially approaching CVE from a human trafficking perspective is a very novel one. Other than two recent works (see Benetti, 2015; CSIS, 2016), there is no academic literature that touches upon both issues simultaneously. No study has yet thoroughly analyzed these similarities nor highlighted the benefits of approaching recruitment for terrorism through the same lens and methodologies used to study and combat human trafficking.

This raises a series of questions regarding the rationale behind the lack of an empirical or theoretical framework linking both phenomena. The first is why has this approach never been taken or explored? The answer that comes to mind is the fact that academic research is pushed forward by public discourse. Hence the question becomes, is there no public awareness of the parallels between human trafficking and engagement in violence? If so, why is it? One possible answer to this last question is the way in which human trafficking and terrorism are portrayed.

Between 2010 and 2012, 30,146 victims of trafficking were identified between in the 28 EU Member States (Eurostat, 2015). A closer examination of the data reveals a feminization of human trafficking: 80% of the identified victims were female. Out of the total number of victims, 69% had been recruited for the purpose of sexual exploitation, and 95% of these sex trafficking victims were women. In the United States, 25,696 victims have been identified since 2007 (Polaris, 2015).

According to the Office of Trafficking in Persons, January and February 2016, accounted for a historical high of human trafficking cases being reported at the National Human Trafficking Resource Center Hotline (U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 2016). Data collected for 2015 shows a great gap between the number and type of trafficking cases communicated: 4,136 cases of human trafficking vs. 721 cases of labor exploitation (ibid). Again, the majority of victims identified (75% according to data gathered by Polaris' National Human Trafficking

Resource Center Hotline for 2015) were female. Gretchen Soderlund (2011) is very accurate when she describes the effects this feminization of data has with respect to the social construction of human trafficking:

> *"[s]uch revelatory discourse functions to legitimize stories about sex trafficking in two ways. First, it creates an origin story in which particular assertions about the nature of sex work (typically that all prostitution is trafficking and that all prostitutes are victims) are true (...)".*

Language used in the TVPA reflects the feminization of the sex industry, and how vulnerable women are prey to lurking men. The document states that most victims of trafficking are women and children, and that most of them are "trafficked into the international sex trade, often by force, fraud, or coercion". It goes on to explain that traffickers "primarily target women and girls, who are disproportionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to education, chronic unemployment, discrimination, and the lack of economic opportunities in countries of origin" (United States Department of State, 2000).

Terrorism, on the other hand, is masculinized. A report published by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague (ICCT) in 2016 shows that 83% of foreign fighters are male. A study conducted by Elcano Royal Institute (Real Instituto Elcano) in 2017 seems to confirm that data. During the 2013-2016 periods, 120 men were arrested in Spain for activities related to ISIS, whilst the number of women was 23. Regarding motivations to be involved in activities related to ISIS, there also exists a feminization of emotions. Among the detainees, 68.9% of men claimed to have made their choice based on ideological premises; this was only the case for 15.4% of women. On the other hand, 61.5% of women mentioned emotional reasons to take place in ISIS-related activities (the promise of marriage and familial stability), whilst this was only true for 11.1% of men.

In the same way that sex trafficking is largely a cultural construction based on "language and institutional discourses" (Soderlund, 2011), so is engagement in violent political extremism (terrorism). Weitzer (2007) refers to the ideological and institutionalized "crusades" behind sex trafficking. The author speaks about the "moral crusades" (applying ethical criteria to the nature and essence of sex trafficking and hence explaining why it is bad) and "symbolic" ones, in other words, the objective of providing relief to victims and eradicating the problem. This dichotomy between morals and symbolism is also applicable to terrorism. Human trafficking is morally unacceptable. The activities it entails are ethically reprobable, especially if identified with sexuality. International terrorism, on its end, is morally wrong because of its effects. However, the moral spectrum is largely two-sided. Not all cases of prostitution can be deemed to be trafficking, not all cases of forced labor fall under human trafficking, and not all cases of

radicalization will automatically imply engagement in violent political extremism.

The seemingly strong correlation between culture and the construction of social phenomena raises questions concerning why only certain discourses or aspects of it are deemed worthy of public discussion. The first criterion is obviously that the content of that discourse must be a reality. Circling back to the issue at stake, my dissertation seeks to answer, primarily, exactly that: do parallels between human trafficking networks and ISIS actually *exist*? In doing so, I attempt to alter the discourse around ISIS and potentially pushing a more holistic approach to counter it going forward.

As mentioned, I do not intend to find the overall solution to the problem of jihadism. Rather, I will attempt to tease out a theoretical framework that might allow future works to test my hypothesis further and to do so empirically. All in all the original hypothesis can be justified for further research and also draw hypothesis for further testing in the field of practice. In other words, potentially proving my hypothesis could lead the way into further examining whether interventions in the realm of human trafficking based on rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors can be tailored to the needs of the CVE sphere. The implications, as I stated above, will be a more holistic approach to prevention, rehabilitation, reintegration and preventing recidivism.

Why recruitment specifically?

Pulling from human trafficking as a framework, I suggest that the best way to approach engagement in jihadism is to study its recruitment mechanisms. Recruitment is key, because it encompasses the pre-recruitment stages, and it assists in enhancing prevention through its relationship to grievance and vulnerability. Focusing on recruitment also implies acknowledging there are national and international dynamics that need addressed to effectively combat jihadist extremism going forward, given they are important drivers of radicalization.

Concentrating on recruitment has broader social consequences. It helps understand the reverse integral procedures that need to take place to obtain effective rehabilitation and reintegration, and preventing recidivism. Tailoring already existing programs for human trafficking survivors, CVE can open up to more integral approaches that combine online and real-life initiatives and try and implement them. This approach could help address the issues of reintegration and rehabilitation preemptively, and could also become a powerful tool in preventing waves of migration to the next land of jihad. Even if it initially requires a process of trial and error, practice makes perfect. Eventually, the CVE and the counter-terrorism community will have developed mechanisms that allow for measurable outcomes and the determination of best practices.

In the same way that we tend to over regulate in times of crisis and under-regulate once the emergency is over, CVE emerged and evolved largely as a result of ISIS' self-declaration of

its so called Caliphate. However, given that the threat is far from over, we should aim for policies and practices that allow for sustainable improvement and resilience against the fluidity of terror networks. My aim is to explore whether the field of human trafficking and what it has taught us so far should deserve consideration as a plausible approach.

The dissertation

To prove the existing parallels between recruitment methods used by jihadist networks, more specifically ISIS, and human trafficking groups, this work is structured into different chapters.

Firstly, the following chapter (Chapter 2) deals with basic definitional issues. Defining both human trafficking and terrorism according to the elements that constitute both crimes is essential to draw existing parallels between them. By providing insight into how both phenomena are defined at an international, regional and national level, this dissertation raises a fundamental issue regarding the War on Terror: reaching an agreed-upon definition of what constitutes terrorism is a necessary first step towards being able to establish long-lasting an efficient partnerships and strategies necessary to safeguard national security. The Palermo Protocol (2000), the main tool used to define human trafficking, has enabled the international community to efficiently conduct the War on Trafficking. A similar tool should be elaborated to combat violent extremism.

Because no previous work has been elaborated on the existing operational similarities between human trafficking and violent extremism, it is also necessary to review existing knowledge concerning both phenomena. Chapter 3 sets forth the main findings of academic literature regarding human trafficking and violent extremism. It focuses not solely on the main elements that constitute the crimes, but also their underlying causes and the different approaches used to study them. The chapter also details strategies used to combat human trafficking and to combat violent extremism.

A preliminary literature review will show that there exists no theoretical or empirical framework thank links recruitment mechanisms employed by human trafficking networks to those employed by jihadist groups, more specifically ISIS. Nonetheless, chapter 4 goes one step beyond simply laying out what two different theoretical frameworks say about to phenomena which have remained independent from one another in the eyes of academia and practitioners. As such, chapter 4 will tease out overlapping aspects of both human trafficking and political violence. Overlaps are extracted from an organizational perspective (how both networks behave and operate in order to achieve their goals) and an individual one (what drives individual engagement based on how the groups function).

Human trafficking is almost solely associated to women and girls being forced into the sex industry. However, this chapter will show how most cases of trafficking take place because of a rational decision-making process: being presented with a series of options, individuals decide to migrate. It is the conditions under which they initiate this migratory process that renders them vulnerable to traffickers. In the same manner, there is also rationality when it comes to engaging in violent extremism. Joining a violent group and exercising violence appears as the only viable option to fill existing voids. Both human traffickers and members of already existing violent extremist groups exploit individual grievances as a recruitment mechanism. By proving that procedures of recruitment for violent political extremism (terrorism) resemble strategies deployed by human trafficking networks, I argue that rehabilitation and reintegration techniques used with survivors of human trafficking could be tailored to meet the needs of former jihadists and returning foreign fighters.

Chapters 3 and 4 of my dissertation reflect the need to further explore the overlaps between human trafficking networks and terror groups, such as ISIS. As a result, chapter 5 of this dissertation will set forth the methodology employed to answer both the hypothesis and the research questions. In order to account for this lack of academic focus on the subject, I will conduct a discourse analysis to explain how the discourse surrounding ISIS is socially constructed and by whom. The results of the discourse analysis are presented in the subsequent chapter (chapter 6). Results show that the need for immediate information on the War on Terror prevents in-depth analysis from being provided concerning underlying problematics and dynamics.

However, the quantitative results provided by the discourse analysis require further nuance. Chapter 7 is a single case study analysis, ISIS. The origins and evolution of the terror group, its ideological background and its operational techniques will serve to further illustrate whether or not ISIS' recruitment mechanisms fall under the international definition of human trafficking included in the Palermo Protocol. It narrows into comparing recruitment tactics used by human trafficking networks and ISIS. The comparison focuses on the organizational structures and techniques, as well as the role that individuals play regarding involvement. I pay special attention to individual agency, mainly to debunk existing myths in the realm of human trafficking and violent extremism.

The theological appeal behind the Caliphate appears as the answer to individual grievances, which recruiters exploit to entice individuals into the organization. Once embedded in the network, as it occurs in cases of human trafficking, individuals become isolated and those who wish to leave the organization are incapable of doing so. Fear of retaliation from ISIS and/or prosecution in their countries of origin renders individuals vulnerable to exploitation on behalf of

the terrorist group. As ISIS loses territory however, 'those who wish to return' appear as a major security concern for Western countries. States are faced with the conundrum of whether to take a hard or a soft approach regarding returning foreign fighters. I posit that, as it happens with survivors of human trafficking, a case-by-case study is required to assess the risk posed by each individual. Rehabilitation and reintegration programs use with survivors of human trafficking appear as a solution to prevent recidivism. Such programs are aimed mainly at disengaging individuals and driving them away from any violent ideology. Programs should be implemented within the prison systems and should continue once individuals are released.

The overall conclusions of this work are presented in Chapter 8. I also use this chapter to put forward a series of recommendations for future lines of research that I believe can add valuable tools to the counter-terrorism toolbox. All recommendations are based on approaches and strategies used in the War on Trafficking.

Chapter 2. Definitions

In recent years, concern has grown with regards to the link between migrant flows and terrorism. However, much less has been said about how human trafficking and terrorism intersect beyond a migration concern, or human trafficking as a way of financing terror.. The terms *human trafficking* and *terrorism* will be defined according to their principal characteristics. Parallels between human trafficking and terrorism can be correctly drawn only by first identifying their corresponding elements. Defining both terms will document these overlaps. The definitory issue grows a bit contestable regarding specific meaning and detail however. It is crucial to grasp these contentious matters for several of them impinge upon the scope of this research.

Defining human trafficking

Human trafficking is generally defined according to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons (UNODC, 2004). Also known as the Palermo Protocol, it provides an internationally agreed-upon definition of what constitutes human trafficking. It defines the crime according to three main elements: the actions (what is done), the method (how it is done) and the purpose (or end goal). The adopted definition for trafficking is:

> *the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs* (UNHCR, 2000).

Human trafficking is considered a form of transnational organized crime. As organized crime, it is performed by a structured group of at least three people which exists over a period of time during which they aim at obtaining economic benefit by performing "at least one crime punishable by at least four years' incarceration" (UNODC, 2004). Human trafficking is considered a violation of human rights and an attack against the national sovereignty of states. However, human trafficking is on many occasions conflated with other migratory movements that violate existing immigration laws, such as migrant smuggling. This has become even more frequent since the onset of the Syrian refugee crisis.

Human trafficking vs. Migrant smuggling

According to official estimates, in 2010 there were at least 50 million individuals who were involved in clandestine migration movements (IOM, 2015). The underground, dynamic nature of these migratory engagements prevents obtaining more concrete figures.[xiii] Both the migrant and those who assist them are involved in what is known as *migrant smuggling*. Migrant smuggling is defined internationally as the "procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident" (UNODC, 2004). What the definition is referring to is not the migratory status of those crossing borders, but rather the act of accessing a given national territory without the permits required by authorities, and through the provision of economic benefits to those enabling the incursion. This serves to distinguish human trafficking and migrant smuggling.

Migrant smuggling is a crime against national migration legislations. Therefore, it is easy to conflate human trafficking with migration wherever it implies the crossing of borders. On many occasions, trafficked individuals are initially smuggled into a given national territory. Whether they enter that territory in a clandestine manner or use forged documents, their migratory status renders them vulnerable to trafficking. Nevertheless, it is the economic benefit that actually distinguishes trafficking from smuggling. The financial or material benefits obtained through migrant smuggling are a one-time business transaction. Human trafficking is also characterized by the obtainment of a third party's benefits, but only when the benefits of exploitation extend over a period of time. Chapter 6 will discuss the concept of exploitation more in depth, but it is worth noting how the difficulty of proving the purpose of exploitation, or the intention thereof, aggravates the difficulty in distinguishing between smuggling and trafficking.

Human trafficking: a historical perspective

The historical antecedents for the consensus arrived at with the Palermo Protocol are also relevant. The concept of human trafficking emerged in the context of minors being used for sexual purposes by elites during the Victorian era (1837-1901) (Spencer & Broad, 2011). Resembling the *traite des noirs* from the colonial era, the term *traite des blanches* was coined. It referred to the sexual enslavement of white females. The subsequent fight against trafficking was focused on the "the procuring of women or girls for immoral purposes abroad" (International Agreement for the Suppression of the "White Slave Traffic" , 1904). It incorporated the fraudulent or abusive recruitment of women and girls for prostitution within national borders (1910) as well as the trafficking in boys (1921) (Gozdziak & Collet, 2005). Colonialism and the increase in international migrations called for a readjustment of the territorial scope under which the procurement, enticement or leading of "a woman or girl of full age for immoral purposes" should

be punished (League of Nations' Traffic in Women and Children Committee, 1933). The international scope of the slave trade helped broaden territorial concern to include "the colonies and protectorates of the High Contracting Party concerned, as well as territories under his suzerainty and territories for which a mandate has been entrusted to him" (*ibid*).

In 1949 the discourse regarding human trafficking shifted from morals to profits. International legislation changed from emphasizing the "gratification of passions" (*ibid*) to acknowledging the exploitation inherent to trafficking. The Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others punishes any person who, to gratify passions, "exploits the prostitution of another person, even with the consent of that person" (Art. 1.2); "keeps or manages, or knowingly finances or takes part in the financing of a brothel" (Art. 2.1); or "knowingly lets or rents a building or other place or any part thereof for the purpose of the prostitution of others" (United Nations General Assembly, 1949). By 1966, this Convention had been ratified by 70 countries. Support for this international tool to combat human trafficking was further encouraged by the awareness of AIDS, feminist movements, and the acknowledgement of child trafficking and sex tourism (Gozdziak & Collet, 2005).

The Palermo Protocols, agreed to at the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, represent the most recent international instrument against human trafficking, a culmination of this lengthy history. Signed in the Italian city in 2000, the protocols included a definition of trafficking that went beyond the sexual enslavement of women, and formally acknowledged two realities: that human trafficking also affects men and that human trafficking includes but is not limited to sexual exploitation. The implementation of an international legislation with regards to trafficking implied joint efforts from all countries to counter it. Since then, international utensils have developed around combating human trafficking, and have further enhanced cooperation among countries.

In 2014, the International Labor Organization (ILO) adopted the Protocol of to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930. In it, the international community agreed to implement measures to prevent "all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily" (ILO, 1932). These developments led to the involvement of other international bodies. For instance, the International Organization for Migrations (IOM), the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF, UN Women, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have joined the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to combat human trafficking. Holistic measures have been developed to deal with trafficking, ranging from prevention to coping with its effects at an international, national and individual level.

Regional definitions of human trafficking

The Palermo Protocol was enforced on December 25, 2003. With 117 signatories, it is one of the most ratified international tools and induced a wide-ranging consensus and legal framework for human trafficking throughout the international community. However, it is important to also consider how local legislative evolutions at the regional level both influenced and were influenced by the definition adopted at Palermo. This section will cover that evolution and discuss legalese in Africa, Asia, the Americas, Europe and the MENA region.

Africa

The African Union (AU) was not created until 2001. While still the Organization of African Unity (OAU), it elaborated upon the African Charter on Human and People's Rights. The Charter condemned and prohibited slavery as a form of exploitation (African Union, 1981). It did not, however, refer specifically to human trafficking or any of its forms. In 1999, the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child included irregular adoptions as a potential form of trafficking. It recommended taking appropriate measures to guarantee that inter-country adoption of children did not result in "trafficking or improper financial gain for those who try to adopt a child" (African Union, 1999). UNICEF and ILO contributed to the regional sensitization of the risks of children in trafficking. In 2002, Libreville (Congo) hosted a regional meeting where officials from Western and Central African countries advocated for a common action plan that would propose "a legal framework to protect child workers; an improvement in the custodial system of child victims of trafficking; the strengthening of cooperation among governments; and the establishment of transit and reception centers for returned children" (UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 2010).

Since 2000, the definition of human trafficking used by African regional institutions has abided by the Palermo Protocol. In 2005, preventing trafficking in women was made compulsory through the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, or Maputo Protocol. As a result, African regional organizations started enforcing the initiative. ECOWAS and ECCAS elaborated a joint regional two-year (2006-2008) Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, as well as a Multilateral Cooperation Agreement to Combat Trafficking in Persons (especially Women and Children) in West and Central Africa (*ibid*). Thereafter, the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) Regional Plan of Action on Trafficking in Persons put forth a ten-year plan (2009-2019) that focused on gender and children.

The Palermo Protocol also permitted inter-regional cooperation to prevent human trafficking (European Union and African States, 2006). In 2014, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR) approved the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of

the ACHJHR. Under its international criminal law section, 'enslavement' is defined as "the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children" (African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 2014).

Americas

The Organization of American States (OAS) declared trafficking as a form of violence against women in 1994. However, only the Inter-American Convention on International Traffic in Minors provided insight into what were considered the constitutive elements of trafficking. International trafficking in minors was defined as the "abduction, removal or retention, or attempted abduction, removal or retention, of a minor for unlawful purposes or by unlawful means." It included the "kidnapping, fraudulent or coerced consent, the giving or receipt of unlawful payments or benefits to achieve the consent of the parents, persons or institution having care of the child" for the purpose of "prostitution, sexual exploitation, servitude or any other purpose unlawful in either the State of the minor's habitual residence or the State Party where the minor is located" (OAS, 1994).

Since 2000, OAS efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking have been based on the United Nations' definition of human trafficking. The Second Work Plan against Trafficking in Persons in the Western Hemisphere, "takes its definition of 'trafficking in persons' from the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime" (Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, 2014). MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) signed the Montevideo Declaration against the Trafficking in Persons in 2004. During the Sixth South American Conference on Migration, MERCOSUR countries signed the Asuncion Declaration. The document reinforced the importance of the Palermo Protocol and adopted its guidelines to combat human trafficking (MERCOSUR, 2006). In 2016, the CELAC (Community of Latin America and Caribbean States) signed the Political Declaration of Quito, in which human trafficking was framed as a security issue, along with terrorism (CELAC, 2016).

Asia

The Asian continent has developed different sub-regional tools to combat human trafficking and to enhance international cooperation for this purpose. The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) established its first joint program in 2006, based on the definition of human trafficking provided by the Palermo Protocol. The Program of Cooperation of the CIS member states set forth a three-year initiative (2007-2010) to prevent and fight trafficking in human beings (Mukomel, 2013). The plan focused on sexual exploitation (including forced marriages), slave labor, trafficking in children (including international adoptions), trafficking of

disabled persons for forced begging, trafficking in persons for forced commercial surrogacy, and human trafficking for use in armed forced (including the use of soldiers and prisoners for forced labor).

The Association of Southeast Nations' (ASEAN) work on preventing human trafficking dates to 1997. No definition of human trafficking is provided by the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime; however, human trafficking is already pointed out as a form of transnational organized crime. In 2004, following the agreed-upon definition of trafficking included in the Palermo Protocol, ASEAN signed its Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (ACTIP). ASEAN's joint efforts to counter human trafficking have developed through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) and the operations of the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime (SOMTC) (UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 2010). In 2007, the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) combined efforts to combat trafficking under the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Human Trafficking (COMMIT-Mekong). The COMMIT-Mekong Declaration focused on sexual exploitation (including forced marriages) and forced labor of both adults and children (COMMIT-Mekong, 2007). Including men and boys has been a priority for the COMMIT-Mekong Initiative (UN Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 2010).

Europe

The European Union's work complements the work of international organizations, particularly the United Nations (Council of the European Union, 2002). The Framework Decision of 19 July 2002 on combating trafficking in human beings emphasizes the need to address human trafficking in a comprehensive manner, common to all member states. To address the issue, the Council of the European Union follows the same definition of human trafficking provided by the Palermo Protocol. The definition is also structured according to actions, methods and purpose. The EU definition includes as trafficking activities, "forced or compulsory labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery or servitude, or for the purpose of the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, including in pornography" (*ibid*). The same definition applies to the Council of Europe's Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005).

As of 2011, the EU includes additional forms of exploitation as human trafficking. Directive 2011/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council added forced begging as a form of forced labor. Forced begging is defined by the EU according to the 1930 ILO Convention No 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour. The directive also includes exploitation of criminal activities (including, "inter alia, pick-pocketing, shop-lifting, drug trafficking and other similar

activities which are subject to penalties and imply financial gain") and trafficking in human beings for the removal of organs (European Parliament and Council of Europe, 2011).

Middle-East and North Africa Region (MENA)

The MENA region's predominant legal instruments to combat human trafficking are two: the Arab Charter of Human Rights (ACHR) and the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights in Islam (CDHRI). By 1990, the CDHRI had already recognized that all men are born free, and that, "no one has the right to enslave, humiliate, oppress or exploit them" (Nineteenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, 1990). Article 10 of the ACHR states all forms of trafficking are "prohibited and punishable by law" (League of Arab States, 2004). Nevertheless, the document provides no technical definition of human trafficking. It does list all activities that fall under the Arab interpretation of human trafficking: forced labor (instead of labor exploitation), sexual exploitation, "the exploitation of the prostitution of others or any other form of exploitation or the exploitation of children in armed conflict are prohibited" and "medical or scientific experimentation or to the use of organs".

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has set up several initiatives for cooperation against human trafficking. For instance, in 2007 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hosted workshops to enhance collaboration. At an individual level, member states have undertaken individual efforts to counter trafficking. The governments of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have taken steps to combat both sexual exploitation and labor exploitation. In this regard, Saudi Arabia is concerned with the exploitation of domestic workers; the government of Qatar has taken special measures to prevent exploitation of workers during the works conducted for the 2022 FIFA World Cup (Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrein, 2014).

The League of Arab States elaborated the Arab Framework Act on Combating Trafficking in Persons (2008). It also started out the Arab Initiative to Build National Capacities to Combat Human Trafficking in the Arab Countries in March 2010 (Giammarinaro, 2014). The definition provided by the Palermo Protocol was used to elaborate the Comprehensive Arab Strategy for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (Council of Arab Ministers of Justice , 2012).

National definitions of human trafficking

At a national level, definitions of human trafficking tend to emphasize aspects of the phenomenon most relevant to the State. While including a cross-sectional analysis of this reality would be too lengthy, it is important to recognize the same situation proves true when we look at definitions of human trafficking specific to different countries within the international order, that they are driven by particular political and cultural interests.

For example, the definition adopted by the United States' Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) of 2000 and the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2003, 2005, 2008 and 2013include sex trafficking and labor trafficking as severe forms of human trafficking (One Hundred Sixth Congress of the United States, 2000). Sex and labor trafficking are defined according to the 22 U.S. Code § 7102. The age of legal sexual consent is 18 years of age, and any sexual act performed with a person under that age is considered trafficking under U.S. law (U.S. Congress, 2000). Human trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation is also a concern in countries where prostitution is legal. The Dutch legislation on human trafficking criminalizes sexual exploitation. However, the major concern in the Netherlands relates to trafficking with the purpose of organ removal (Nederlandse Openbaar Ministerie, 2013).

In conclusion, the historical antecedents and distinctions evident in regional and national concerns document an evolution in international legislation that produced consensus. Bearing this in mind, the definition for human trafficking used in this work is the same as that provided by the Palermo Protocol. A similar analysis is pertinent to the search for a consensus definition for terrorism as well, for it highlights a similar series of complications.

Defining terrorism

Modern history has witnessed "four waves of terrorism" (Rapoport, 2004): the Anarchist Wave (1880–1920); the Anti-Colonial Wave (1920–1960); the New Left Terrorism (the 1960s until the Iranian revolution in 1979); and finally the Religious Wave, which began in 1979 and continues until today. More recent occurrences complicate the definitional discussion more so. For example, the emergence of "terrorist semi-states" is an inherent contradiction on whether states can commit terrorism or whether terrorism moves beyond violence against civilians (Honig & Yahel, 2017). The definitory paradox is largely a result of divergent perspectives that vary from time to time and place to place.

Attempting to define terrorism

To this day, there exists no agreed-upon definition, and the term has been categorized as an, "essentially contested concept" (Connolly, 1993). At least 109 definitions have circulated (Schmitt, 1988), and those that do exist are often inherently contradictory – for example stating that states can or cannot commit terrorism or that terrorism is only, or not only, violence against civilians (Stampnitzky, 2013). As a result, there exists no international legal instrument to define terrorism.

Hoffman (1999) describes terrorism as any action which has exclusively political motivations and objectives; is violent or represents a violent threat; is designed to have psychological effects beyond the direct victims; is undertaken by organizations with an

identifiable chain of command, or the structure of a conspiracy cell whose members do not wear a uniform nor a distinctive identification; and is perpetrated by a national sub-group or a non-state entity.[xiv] Wardlaw (1989) defines *political terrorism* as:

> "*the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such an action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.*"

Definitional inconsistencies have led to broad and ill-defined definitional adoptions which seek to placate disagreement around these contradictions.

Resolution 51/210 of the UN General Assembly considers unjustifiable, "all criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes (…) whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them" (United Nations General Assembly, 1996). Like other definitions proposed by international institutions, this one makes the clear identification of a terrorist act or terrorist actor mostly subjective, akin to a 'I know it when I see it,' conceptualization. The International Organization for Migrations (IOM) has defined terrorism as,

> "*the international and systematic use of actions designed to provoke terror in the public as a means to certain ends. Terrorism can be the act of an individual or a group of individuals acting in their individual capacity or with the support of a State. It may also be the act of a State, whether against the population (human rights violations such as forced labor, deportation, genocide, etc.) or in the context of an international armed conflict against the civil population of the enemy State*" (IOM, 2011).

Attempts have been made to determine what activities are considered terroristic. The sixteenth session of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the General Assembly in its of 17 December 1996 elaborated the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism:

> "*Any person commits an offence within the meaning of the present Convention if that person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes: (a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or (b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or (c) Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of the present article resulting or likely to result*

> *in major economic loss, when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act*" (UN General Assembly, 2013).

These characteristics of what is defined as (international) terrorism are compatible with other international tools elaborated to forbid, condemn and prosecute violent actions against civilians and government structures, including the hijacking of airplanes, hostage-taking, nuclear terrorism or terrorism financing.[xv] Recent UN resolutions include implicit and explicit reference to more recent manifestations of terrorism, such as the mounting number of kidnappings and hostage-taking and the increasing number of foreign fighters, "individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or providing or receiving terrorist training" (UN General Assembly, 2016). Instead, United Nations documents and reports continue to call for efforts to work towards a consensus definition. UN member states managed to reach an agreement in 2006 to elaborate a common Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (*ibid*). Based on the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism presented by the UN Secretary General to the General Assembly, that strategy calls for global consensus on definition in order to address the underlying causes that lead individuals to radicalize and join violent extremist groups (UN CTITF, 2016).

Terrorism is not only considered a human rights issue but also a matter of security. Other UN bodies are also involved in combating terrorism. For instance, the UN Security Council has approved resolutions to combat terrorism and other violent actions considered to be a threat to states. As such, it "condemns the violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, sectarian violence, and the commission of terrorist acts by foreign terrorist fighters and demands that all foreign terrorist fighters disarm and cease all terrorist acts and participation in armed conflict" (United Nations Security Council, 2014). While these definitions indicate modest agreement, their broad nature documents the difficulty of arriving at a lucid definition necessary for uniform utility in international legislation and enforcement. Not unlike human trafficking before the Palermo Convention, the search for consensus in defining terrorism has proven fleeting and convoluted in issues revolving around state interests and cultural subjectivity and relativism.

Terrorism: A historical perspective

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon, but its conceptualization has changed throughout history (Perry, 2004; LaFree & Dugan, 2009). The term was first applied in a political context during the French Revolution. The period known as "*la Terreur*" was characterized by an arbitrary rule of law and mass violence. It accounted for 500,000 arrests and around 100,000 deaths (Arasse, 1987; de Baecque, 2002). State-perpetrated (illegitimate use of) violence transitioned into *terrorism* understood as the use of violence by non-state actors.

In the 1870's, violent criminal behavior, more specifically bomb throwing, had been gaining strength in Russia and Italy. Anarchist movements were an act of defiance, both to society and morality. The ideological motivations were made tangible and concrete through the actions of an individual: "propaganda by the deed" (Iviansky, 1977).[xvi] The deed aimed to prove the vulnerability of the social order, the economic establishment, and the rule of law; the objective was to show that, in the words of Russian anarchist activist Peter Kropotkin, "the established order does not have the strength often supposed" (Garrison, 2004). Assassination was framed as part and parcel of a revolutionary sociopolitical struggle, and individual acts of violence were directed at specific persons. "Individual terror" was an expression of deeper social, governmental, technological, and ideological changes which shaped revolutionary activity. It was a conscious crime to protest hypocritical values of society, a politically-motivated, known perpetrator lashing out against an individual victim. Offensives evolved to anonymous perpetrators with more complex motivations and aims (both strategic and ideological) who could resort to more modern technological devices. It was a new phenomenon compared to that of political assassination; attacks were no longer isolated incidents, but non-stop incidents of "individual", revolutionary, violence (Iviansky, 1977).

After World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, anarchist terrorists would portray themselves like Robin Hood. Supporters conceived their actions as crime against crime – an invisible enemy who afflicts people's lives (for instance, the bourgeoisie). Political warfare by means of terrorism represented a more abstract and impersonal approach regarding its objective. The aim remained to undermine what was considered an absolutist State, but also to give history a push by destroying the myth of absolute power and legitimacy of the State with monopoly of force. As a result, victims were no longer political or military figures, but rather public spaces, such as theatres or restaurants. Technological advancements gave terrorist warfare this broader spectrum when intimidating a large audience by using extreme violence. Developments in communication grant a means to convey the grievance, to argue in a marketplace of ideas for sympathy and support.

The most contemporary wave of terrorism initiated in the 1960's. This decade introduced a type of terrorism that crossed state boundaries (Reid, 1997); it was transnational and aimed not only to undermine an international capitalist order but to alter global social norms and status quo. Terrorist activity taking place in "semiperipheral states" (*ibid*) (mostly in the Middle East) was now exported into Europe. The phenomenon was coined "spillover terrorism" (Pluchinsky, 1987 in Bergesen & Lizardo, 2005). Soon the phenomenon spread as a tactic portrayed as resistance: one man's terrorist another's freedom fighter (Ganor, 2002).

Regional definitions of terrorism

Africa

The African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (OAU Convention) was the first unified attempt to combat terrorism in the African continent (Williamson, 2016). The OUA Convention addresses terrorism from a human rights perspective and considers the multiple dimensions of security. It defines terrorism as:

> "*any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to: (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or (iii) create general insurrection in a State*" (OAU, 1999)

The document was elaborated according to the Charters of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. It also considers the special vulnerability of women and children regarding terrorist violence (*ibid*).

Asia

In 1999, the CIS signed the Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism. The document defines terrorism as

> "*an illegal act punishable under criminal law committed for the purpose of undermining public safety, influencing decision-making by the authorities or terrorizing the population, and taking the form of: Violence or the threat of violence against natural or juridical persons; Destroying (damaging) or threatening to destroy (damage) property and other material objects so as to endanger people's lives; Causing substantial harm to property or the occurrence of other consequences dangerous to society; Threatening the life of a statesman or public figure for the purpose of putting an end to his State or other public activity or in revenge for such activity; Attacking a representative of a foreign State or an internationally protected staff member of an international organization, as well as the business premises or vehicles of internationally protected persons; Other acts*

classified as terrorist under the national legislation of the Parties or under universally recognized international legal instruments aimed at combating terrorism" (CIS, 1999).

The cooperation treaty also highlights the threats posed by "technological terrorism" (the use of chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear weapons) and the functioning of facilities "whose inoperability may lead to loss of human life, the impairment of human health, pollution of the environment or destabilization of the situation in a given region or a given State as a whole" (*ibid*).

In its Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, ASEAN provided no definition of what constitutes a terrorist action. The Declaration does, however, state that addressing (international) terrorism is a manner of combating transnational crime (ASEAN, 2001). ASEAN's Convention to Counter-Terrorism goes a step beyond with regard to listing what activities are classified as terror offences. To do so, the document refers to the existing list of international legislative tools and instruments (see end note [xvii]). The last country to ratify the Convention was Malaysia (ASEAN, 2013).

America

Based on the Charter of Organization of American States and the Charter of the United Nations, the OAS General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. The document does not provide any definition of terrorism. It does, however, list the international agreements upon which it bases what is considered a terrorist offense (see end note [xviii]) (OAS, 2002). The Convention was elaborated to complement the resolution RC.23/RES. 1/01 "Strengthening Hemispheric Cooperation to Prevent, Combat, and Eliminate Terrorism" (2001).

Cooperative actions are primarily focused on the economic aspect of preventing and combating terrorism. The implementation of the Convention made banks and other financial institutions abide by legal and regulatory measures aimed at preventing illegitimate capital movements for the funding of terrorism. Moreover, each signatory agreed to set up a national financial intelligence unit "for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of pertinent money laundering and terrorist financing information" (*ibid*). The goal is to prevent money laundering and confiscate funds and assets that would otherwise finance terrorist activities. Other than the financial aspect, the Inter-American Convention also suggests measures be taken with regards to border cooperation, as well as collaboration between law enforcement agencies, legal assistance and extradition treaties.

Europe

The EU has found itself with the same problem. Rather than providing a definition of (international) terrorism the Council of Europe's Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism

(CETS No 196), adopted in 2005, lists "public provocation to commit a terrorist offence and recruitment and training for terrorism" as criminal acts (European Parliament, 2015). In May 2015, the Committee of Ministers adopted the Additional Protocol to the Convention. This document failed to define (international) terrorism, but did indicate a series of activities which are criminalized: "being recruited for terrorism, receiving training for terrorism, travelling to another state for purposes related to terrorism, and providing or collecting funds for such travel" (Council of Europe, 2005).

The list of activities the EU considers terrorism has expanded. The Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism includes activities such as participation in an association or group to commit terrorism; participation in an association or group to commit terrorism; travelling abroad to commit terrorism; funding, organizing or facilitating international travels aimed at committing terrorism; and exchanging information which may facilitate the commission of terrorist actions (Council of Europe, 2015). The European Commission's policies have focused on preventing these activities. [xix]

Middle-East and North Africa Region (MENA)

In 1999, the Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) signed the Convention on Combating International Terrorism. The document was elaborated according to the Charter of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, principles of International Law and the United Nations Charter, UN resolutions (see endnote xv) and Islamic Sharia Law. Article 1 of the Convention defines terrorism as:

> *"any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States"* (OIC, 1999).

The OIC Convention distinguishes between terrorism and other legitimate political struggles (Williamson, 2016). Article 2 states that "peoples struggle including armed struggle against foreign occupation, aggression, colonialism, and hegemony, aimed at liberation and self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law shall not be considered a terrorist crime" (OIC, 1999). However, terrorist crimes are not, in fact, considered political. Art 2.2. reads, "none of the terrorist crimes mentioned in the previous article shall be considered political crimes." The document goes on to list an array of activities that are clearly political; for

example, "aggression against kings and heads of state of Contracting States or against their spouses, their ascendants or descendants" or "aggression against crown princes or vice-presidents or deputy heads of government or ministers in any of the Contracting States". Yet, the offences are removed from political context and considered crimes against society at large. This expanded definition thereby includes "all forms of international crimes, including illegal trafficking in narcotics and human beings (…)."

Terrorism at a national level

There is no clear line between terrorism and other politically oriented, violent movements. In 1983, a study with 109 different definitions of terrorism was published (Schmid, 2005).[xx] The delimitation of the elements of the crime differs based on national interpretations of what is a *violent act*. Actions can range from "sectarian strife" (such as in Iraqi law) down to the "violation of honor" contemplated by Saudi Arabia, including "subverting the constitutional order" (Peru), "harming public order" (Egypt) or any other conducts that "complicate international relation, infringe upon sovereignty and territorial integrity, undermine the security of the state, provoke war (or) armed conflict (and) destabilize sociopolitical situations" (Uzbekistan).

The United States Code is a good example on how approaches to terrorism are determined in accord with the interests of the state. The US Code (18 U.S.C. § 2331) defines *domestic terrorism* as violent acts which meet three characteristics (Unites States Federal Government, 2009): 1) violate federal or state law and which are dangerous to human life; 2) are intended to a) intimidate or coerce civilians; b) influence government policy by intimidation or coercion; c) affect government conduct by mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and 3) occur primarily in the territorial jurisdiction of the US. Title 22 of the U.S. Code gives a more concise definition of *terrorism* which includes not only motivations and objectives, but also actors. As such, it is defined as a "politically motivated violence perpetrated by subnational groups in a clandestine manner against noncombatants" (*ibid*).[xxi]

To bypass the difficulties encountered when dealing with *terrorism*, I opt for the use of the term *violent extremism*. This term encompasses the nature of the crime (divergent political views on either side of the spectrum) and the manifestation of it through explicitly violent actions. By nature, violent extremism has a political connotation. Although ideology varies between different groups, recent events have caused violent extremism to be associated almost exclusively to militant jihadism and Islam. Radical Islam intertwines politics and religion and seeks to implement *sharia* law according to the Salafi reform movement.

In summary...

The Palermo Protocol has become the legal international tool that frames the approach to combating human trafficking. Establishing global consensus around the elements that constitute the offence has enhanced holistic efforts to eradicate the phenomenon, regardless of its form or where and when it occurs. Unlike the resultant consensus of Palermo, debate around a definition for terrorism continues. This lack of agreement has prevented a similar cohesion necessary for addressing the phenomenon of terrorism. It is hopeful that one day debates will coalesce and produce a similar outcome to that of Palermo. Given the current void, however, it seems more appropriate to identify alternative ways of approaching terrorism. The following chapter suggests that there exist sufficient parallels between recruitment for terrorist groups and what we know of human trafficking networks to glean important lessons. Those lessons might help reshape the means and mechanisms for preventing and countering terrorism as well.

Chapter 3. Preliminary research

The aim of this PhD dissertation is to provide new insight to the field of countering violent extremism and counter-terrorism studies. To do so, it intends to draw the parallels between recruitment procedures between human trafficking networks and terrorist groups. As per the previous chapter, this may prove a difficult endeavor. Legal definitions prove that authorities deal with both issues in a very different manner. To make matters worse, an agreed-upon definition for terrorism does not exist, hence complicating the task even further. However, a literature review is useful for this very respect. Although there exists no literature that explicitly draws parallels between human trafficking networks and terrorist organizations, new publications point out the intersection between organized crime and terrorism, including how terrorist organizations finance themselves through illicit means, including human trafficking. A revision of the major contributions to both fields helps determine the main approaches used to study both phenomena, draw their main characteristics and identify the internal dynamics of both networks.

Literature review

As addressed in the introduction, the invasion of Afghanistan turned the War on Terror into more than fighting Al-Qaeda: it was also a fight for the liberation of women whose oppression was symbolized by burqa's. To further reinforce this statement, the Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report, issued by the United States government, classifies six out of the seven countries included in Executive Order 13769 (also known as the 'travel ban') under Tier 3 (Syria, Iran, Sudan) or as "special cases" (Libya, Yemen, Somalia). The only exception is Iran, rated as Tier 2.

More recent works, such as that of Loretta Napoleoni (2016), reflect how jihadist armed organizations, such as Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, now work hand-in-hand with smugglers and traffickers. Selling Western hostages to jihadist groups or smuggling and trafficking refugees into Europe have become new business opportunities for what Napoleoni calls "merchants of men". ISIS' recruitment methods have only recently been equated to those used by human trafficking networks. According to Sara Khan, director of the anti-trafficking NGO Inspire:

> "… [*the girls are] befriended online, told they're loved, [and] showered with praise and flattery. These girls, like victims of child sexual exploitation, don't see themselves as victims. They see themselves as girls going to be with men who genuinely love them*" (in Malin et. al, 2017).

Although true, this statement perpetuates the feminization of trafficking. It obviates the fact that 21% of victims of trafficking in 2014 are male, a percentage which has increased from 13% in 2004 (UNODC, 2016). Male foreign fighters are also fraudulently lured to join ISIS consensually,

but the Caliphate might not meet their expectations. Fear of retaliation prevents them from abandoning their situation; they are hence forced and coerced to continue under ISIS rule. In order to prove that recruitment methods used by ISIS are similar to those used by human trafficking networks, the first step is to review and interrelate the most recent scholarly contributions in both the field of human trafficking and countering violent extremism.

What we know about human trafficking

Human trafficking as a focus of scientific inquiry is a relatively new phenomenon. While studies of human trafficking have proliferated over the past few decades, they often suffer from a lack of scientific rigor and empiricism. The Institute for the Study of Migration at Georgetown University, for example, reviewed data and research on human trafficking in 2008 and found 218 research-based articles; of them, a mere 39 were based on empirical research (Gozdziak & Bump, 2008).While the research on human trafficking remains empirically lacking, the dynamics behind human trafficking are presumed as an interrelation of push and pull factors.

The two traditional approaches to human trafficking are economic (human trafficking as a business) and legalistic (human trafficking as a crime) (Salt, 2000). More recent voices have framed human trafficking under a human rights framework (Jordan, 2002; Chang & Kim, 2007; Rijken, 2009; Chung, 2009; Brysk & Choi-Fitzpatrick, 2012), a security approach (Nadig, 2002; Koser, 2005; Rizer & Glaser, 2011; Pati, 2014) and a matter of gender discrimination (Truong, 2000, 2017; Desyllas, 2007; Lobasz, 2009; Limoncelli, 2009; Shelley, 2010; Kempadoo, Sanghera, & Pattanaik, 2016). Studying human trafficking from a single perspective oversimplifies the phenomenon's complexity. These different perspectives do, however, contribute to establishing the four main pillars of trafficking, which Cho (2015) delineates as migration, vulnerability, crime, and policy and institutional efforts.

These four main axes also serve to elaborate on the international framework and strategies used to combat human trafficking worldwide, otherwise known as the 4P paradigm: prevention (migration), prosecution (crime), protection (policy) and partnerships (institutional efforts). This holistic approach aims to tackle the attributes of what has been deemed 'modern day slavery': "invisibility, mobility and the international criminal organizations" (Petrovic, 2002, in Stanojoska, 2015).

Migration

Human trafficking is a migration-related phenomenon (Haynes, 2008) caused by the increased migration flows in a globalized context. I define *globalization* as a world-wide process which enables political, economic, commercial, labor, social and cultural exchanges between nation and the individuals that comprise them. The elimination of physical borders, technological

and communicative processes and the improvement in means of transportation has created a transnational space where these exchanges are possible. In such a context, information is increasingly exchanged, tangible goods are more easily transacted, and a growing number of individuals participate in the different forms of labor cooperation.

Data shows that there are approximately 244 million international migrants around the world (United Nations, 2016), most of whom are urban migrants. Nearly two thirds of all international migrants live in Europe or Asia, while North America hosted nearly a quarter of them (United Nations, 2015). The number of urban migrants worldwide is expected to rise to 6.4 billon individuals by 2050 (IOM, 2015). These figures, however, correspond to migrants who arrive in destination countries through normalized ways of entry, with corresponding work and, or residence permits. Irregular migrant flows are more difficult to measure, and estimates vary widely (United Nations, 2013). However, most individuals who end up trafficked were initially engaged in what seemed to be a course of regular or irregular migration.

People migrate for different reasons. Common factors include, "poverty, oppression, lack of human rights, lack of social or economic opportunity, dangers from conflict or instability and similar conditions (UNODC, 2008). Economic globalization has been pointed out as one of the main motivations for migration (Stanojoska, 2015); economic factors are also addressed in the Palermo Protocol. Stanojoska (2015) points out how a lack of opportunities and unemployment in countries of origin, along with other forms social exclusion (i.e. marginalization in education, medical services and social protection) set the stage for negative consequences of economic globalization. Relative poverty between countries determines the push-and-pull factors.[xxii]

In countries of origin, escaping poverty is the main push factor, and migration the only available strategy to overcome it (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009). In destination countries, the pull factor derives from the need to incorporate immigrants into domestic services, the agricultural sector, the textile, fashion and construction industries, and also the sex industry (Taylor & Jamieson, 1999; Bruckert & Parent, 2002). In order for the recruitment of immigrants in the labor force to be profitable, most immigrants hired are not in a regular working situation (Bruckert & Parent, 2002), and it is these irregular working conditions that increase the chances of human trafficking. Statistical analysis by Mahmoud & Trebesch (2009) revealed that, among households in Eastern Europe with a family member who migrated irregularly, the probability of trafficking increased significantly. The authors conducted random surveys in 5,513 households in Eastern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Ukraine and Poland). Statistical analysis revealed that chances of having a trafficked family member increased by 0.056 points per every 1 percent point increase

in the share of migrant households. This translates into "a five *percent* increase in the predicted probability of human trafficking on the household level."

On many occasions, cultural factors also intertwine with economic and social marginalization, especially with regard to gender and, or certain minorities. Shifting population dynamics and a change in gender roles has resulted in an augmented incorporation of women to the labor market. Conflict is also an influencing factor with respect to the increased feminization of the labor market. In war-torn countries, women tend to become the main source of income for the household when their husbands are involved in fighting or are killed (Stanojoska, 2015). In circumstances where poverty is feminized, housekeeping, babysitting and even prostitution become (illegal) money making mechanisms (Ebbe & Das, 2007). In the European Union alone, 80% of human trafficking survivors were female, and 69% of identified survivors had been trafficked for the purpose of sexual exploitation; thirty-five percent of them were from a non-EU country, mainly Nigeria, Brazil, China, Vietnam and Russia (Eurostat, 2015).

Although very few studies identify the consent behind trafficking practices (Doezema, 2002; Jones, 2012), most victims of trafficking initiate migration processes on a voluntary basis (Tyuryukanova, 2005; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009). Behind initiatives to migrate there is both a rational decision-making process and individual agency, that is, the capacity to take personal decisions and the ability to retain that aptitude (Wheaton, Schauer, & Galli, 2010). All in all, individuals may be aware that they will have to perform certain tasks but are unaware of the magnitude of degradation it will entail (Hughes, 2000). While migration certainly plays a role in human trafficking, the question remains: why do some fall prey to the exploitative practices while others do not? Why are some more vulnerable?

Vulnerability

Vulnerability is often assessed in order to determine the likelihood of an individual being trafficked. However, it is the elements of vulnerability, rather than vulnerability as an abstract term, which should be evaluated (Akee et. al, 2012). Vulnerability is a multi-faceted and multi-dimensional phenomenon that combines endogenous factors (capabilities) and exogenous ones (available resources) (Triulzi & Tommasolo, 2003; Lindley, 2009).[xxiii]

Migrations represent the link between the lack of opportunities and the expectations for better livelihoods, between rich and poor countries. Individuals are "active subjects" (Tickner, 2009) and will choose the life they consider more satisfying among a series of options (Suhdir & Sen, 1994). However, migrating can also entail certain threats. The impossibility of being able to develop adaptive capabilities during travel is what makes migrants vulnerable to trafficking. Based on an organizational model developed by Salt & Stein (1997), Salt (2000) has divided the

process of human trafficking in three stages: mobilization, requirements *en route* and insertion and integration of migrants in destination countries. Regarding mobilization, both personal and contextual or environmental factors make individuals vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation.

In first instance, individual characteristics of migrants can increase the probability of trafficking. Authors mention lack of livelihoods, age, gender, belonging to a certain minority and the level of education as conditions of vulnerability (Kempadoo et. al, 2005; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009). For instance, poverty or lack of livelihoods can cause migrants to incur in debt with smugglers, hence increasing the chances of trafficking due to debt bondage. Kempadoo, Sanghera and Pattanaik (2005) also mention contextual conditions that increase the likelihood of trafficking, including lack of State structures and corruption among public officials. The UNODC has also reported how political instability, war and conflict can create a favorable environment for human trafficking to thrive, especially in cases when individuals migrate without a protective framework (UNODC, 2009).

A combination of these factors sets the grounds for irregular migration networks to develop. These networks reflect the symbiotic and co-dependent relationship established between traffickers and trafficked individuals. Traffickers embody the "specialized networks" (van Impe, 2000) that migrants require to ultimately reach their destination. Networks provide access to the necessary know-how (contacts, knowledge of the grounds, finances, logistics); likewise, migrants "provide a market for traffickers' 'services' and facilitates their ability to engage in slavery-like abuses with virtual impunity" (Dinan, 2008). It is dependency that ultimately makes an individual vulnerable to trafficking.

The IOM reported that 76% of migrants who travelled the Centre Mediterranean route alone suffered some sort of exploitative situation during their journey. Seventy-six percent of these individuals were travelling independently (IOM, 2017). Another report published in September 2016, reflects how irregular migration flows and human trafficking can intersect. Surveys conducted in Sicily (Italy) show that 42% of 2,336 migrants and refugees from 37 different countries of origin were forced to work during their journey; 47% of them performed jobs for which they received no compensation. Exploitative practices majorly took place during their transit through Northern Africa (IOM, 2016). The same report conveys further information on migrants and refugees who were identified in the Central Mediterranean route. Forty-seven percent of respondents were employed at the time of departure, mainly in construction or electricity and retail services. When asked the reasons for departing their countries of origin, 62% argued war or political reasons, while economic reasons came in as second (22%).

Policies developed by transit and destination countries also increase the vulnerability of individuals (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009). Increasing control and externalization of borders increases vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation, based on migrants' ability to develop resilience strategies to break those policies (Schuster, 2004). Institutional efforts to contain migration have caused "crime industries" that "concentrate geographically" (Freeman et. al,; Zenou, 2003). Van Impe's research (2000) shows how irregular Africans trying to enter the EU were exposed to the risk of trafficking exploitation because of being contained in "enclaves of mobility". The Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla, and the Moroccan Mount Gurugu, are more examples of migration enclaves at the doorstep of Europe. To protect themselves from migrant influx, the Spanish cities set up a border fence, 8km and 12km long, respectively. Mount Gurugu is the place where migrants await to make the leap into the EU. It is in these high-emigration areas in which migrants are more vulnerable to being deceived by traffickers (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009).

Irregular migration processes increase migrants' vulnerability to trafficking and exploitation (Dinan, 2008). Despite the dilemma irregular migration poses to States, it exposes migrants to insecurity and vulnerability (Koser, 2005). Violence and coercion mostly take place after arrival in destination countries: life "in the shadows and a new environment" makes migrants vulnerable to seemingly attractive job offers made by traffickers (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009). Human trafficking networks rely heavily on "false [job offer] advertisements" (IOM, 2002). Traditionally, fraudulent recruitment was hidden behind "vague advertisements" (Siron & Van Baeveghem, 1999). These advertisements could be found in local newspapers or on notice boards (IOM, 2002). Posting on these advertisements usually offer lucrative jobs abroad for low skilled positions, such as waitresses or nannies; good salaries are also offered to attractive women who are looking for jobs as dancers, hostesses or models (*ibid*). Some women also end up in trafficking networks because of bride catalogues or "marriage agencies" (Hughes D. M., 2000).

In 1996, Hughes already pointed out how the IOM had acknowledged the fact that mail-order-bride agencies who recruited women originally from former USSR countries were under control of organized crime networks. In a study carried out in the Russian Federation in 2002, the IOM detailed examples of how bridal agencies work. Russian women were brought into Norway under a tourist visa and were then introduced to their 'husbands'. Before their visa expired, the Russian brides married their Norwegian spouse and were able to regulate their migratory situation. Were the women to file for divorce before their third-year wedding anniversary, they would be deported back to Russia. On many occasions, the vulnerable situation of these women paved the way for more abusive and exploitative situations to take place. According to van Impe (2000):

> "*women are also directly approached in bars and discos by friends, acquaintances or strangers telling them beautiful stories about living and working conditions in the West. (…) Sometimes young women are dazzled by the possibility of marrying a rich foreigner and escaping their poverty in a romantic way. Other girls are offered a free holiday or an opportunity to study in the West.*"

Accepting "3D jobs" (difficult, dirty, dangerous) (Wheaton et. al, 2010) appears as the option to escape poverty in transit and destination countries. Lack of education, language ignorance and mistrust of law enforcement deter victims of trafficking from reporting their situation.

Crime

There are several spheres of criminalization when it comes to human trafficking. The first one refers to the link between human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Migrant smuggling is an attack "against national immigration legislations and a country's sovereignty; when human trafficking, when transnational, can also violate immigration laws as migrants arrive to destination countries in an irregular fashion" (UNODC, 2004). The overlap between smuggling and trafficking also incurs into illicit activities of different nature but related to the nature of smuggling and trafficking as forms of TOC. Migrant smuggling

> "*[…] has provided unscrupulous entrepreneurs with a potential for profit. The number of persons attempting to enter a country clandestinely has given rise to a market for services such as the provision of fraudulent travel documents, transportation, guided border crossings, accommodation and job brokering*" (Escaler, 1998, in Aronowitz, 2001).

Legislation in the Palermo Protocol clearly distinguishes between human trafficking and migrant smuggling. However, empirical evidence suggests that there exists a deep interrelation between both phenomena (Lee M. , 2007). The demand for cheap labor and people's desire to work has enabled smuggling networks and other criminal organizations to profit from the reduced options of legal employment (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009). Although human trafficking as an economic phenomenon requires further empirical research (Gozdziak & Collet, 2005; Tyldum & Brunovskis, 2005; Piper, 2005; Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009), the interconnection between migrant smuggling and human trafficking has been framed within the economic models of supply and demand.

Smuggling and trafficking have been deemed as "one of the most profitable and lowest risk activities" in comparison to other forms of trafficking (i.e. drug trafficking) (Europol, 1998). The demand and supply within labor economic markets allows traffickers to connect employers (demand) to workers (supply); through trafficking, human beings become differentiated products (Wheaton et. al, 2010). According to Tamura's model (2005), smugglers are hired by migrants as

assistance to cross borders and find work abroad; it will depend on the smuggler and the profitability of exploitation whether migrants end up being trafficked. Friebel and Guriev's model (2006) correctly points out the role played by debt/labor contracts in the illegal migration market. Smugglers and intermediaries offer loans to migrants who cannot pay for travelling and arrangement costs; the debt will have to be paid back upon arrival in destination countries (Agbu, 2003).

Individuals who are trafficked are many times mistaken for smuggled migrants. Criminalization of trafficked individuals also occurs because of the difficulties linked to proving exploitation. Migrant smuggling and human trafficking often overlap, and it is complicated for authorities and law enforcement to determine whether individuals are perpetrators or victims (Morehouse, 2009). If individuals are intercepted at a national border, proving the intent of exploitation becomes a complicated issue. In such cases, trafficked individuals will be given the same non-citizen status as illegal migrants and will hence be criminalized (Lee, 2016). In the United States, the federal framework prevents victims of trafficking from accessing T-visa benefits if they originally consented to migration or employment; survivors may even be subject to deportation, mostly when they exercise their right not to cooperate with law enforcement (Chang & Kim, 2007).

In order to facilitate border crossings, smuggling networks make use of violence and other illicit means, such as the corruption of public officials and institutions. According to analytical regressions carried out by Cho (2015), vulnerability is robustly explained by crime in both origin and destination countries. Corruption among politicians and law enforcement officers also contributes to lack of precise information regarding human trafficking as well as the ease with which trafficker's transport and exploit victims (Wheaton et. al, 2010). Fieldwork carried out by Içduygu & Toktas (2003) in Turkey reveals how migrants crossing irregularly from Middle Eastern countries, such as Iran, often pay police for protection. Smugglers interviewed for their research also revealed that visas from European countries were often obtained using bribes.

Zones where human trafficking networks thrive are also affected by criminal activities, including money laundering (FATF-GAFI, 2011) and drug trafficking. Drugs and alcohol are not only used as a recruitment mechanism among individuals already suffering from addiction, but they are also used as control tools among exploited individuals, or even as palliatives for pain endured. In other cases, individuals exploited by human trafficking networks are also used to purchase and sell drugs (Catague & Veloria, 2014).

Policy and institutional efforts

Because of this equitation between (irregular) migration flows and trafficking, the War on Trafficking is largely focused on migration and asylum regulations (border controls, punitive sanctions) (Lee, 2016). Media plays a critical role in constructing a general discourse regarding human trafficking (the sex industry), more specifically regarding non-specialized public (Soderlund, 2011). Since the first public accounts of women being exploited for sexual purposes, human trafficking has received attention from academics, governmental institutions and law enforcement. The aim has been to create joint efforts to combat trafficking, by addressing the root causes, prosecuting criminals and protecting victims. Academia has largely focused on discussing legal matters as well as their implications with regards to the War on Trafficking. Another highlight of discussions has been the underlying causes of human trafficking, as well as the implications of other illicit activities related to trafficking on national sovereignty (Cho, 2015).

The academy has walked hand-in-hand with policy making. National governments and law enforcement communities have joined forces under umbrella organizations to counter trafficking. For instance, nation states operate under supranational organizations, such as the UNODC, and commit to raise awareness on human trafficking, strengthen prevention and fund projects to end trafficking (UNODC, 2008). With regards to prevention, emphasis has revolved around the importance of socioeconomic development as a tool for prevention (UNODC, 2016). The transnational nature of human trafficking has required joint efforts from law enforcement. Coordination and liaison mechanisms such as Europol have been set up to assist in the coordination of policing activities of countries. Through different services, agencies like Europol enhance information exchange and promote effective organization and governance (Europol, 2017).

In theory, a human-rights-based approach has framed public strategies to protect trafficked persons, migrant workers, and women (Chang & Kim, 2007). However, policy and institutional efforts have also been accused of increasing the vulnerability of migrants to trafficking and exploitation, and of being ideologically biased. Skeldon (2000) explains how bureaucratization and the corruption of governments, as well as an increased securitization of borders, increment illegal migration. It has been detailed above how politically motivated restrictions on migration fluxes creates an "opportunistic response" (Chuang J. , 2006) for traffickers, who profit from the need to migrate (Mahmoud & Trebesch, 2009). It has also been pointed out how ideologically driven policies have contributed to equating sex trafficking to prostitution, therefore eliminating individual agency of sex workers, criminalizing both activities and hence contradicting the human-rights-based approach; moreover, the focus on trafficking for

the purpose of sexual exploitation has marginalized the attention given to other forms of trafficking, such as labor exploitation and domestic servitude (Chang & Kim, 2007).

Combating human trafficking: the 4P paradigm

Traditionally, the War on Trafficking was constructed upon three main pillars: prevention, protection (of victims) and prosecution (of offenders). This strategy was commonly known as the 3P paradigm. This paradigm addresses both the underlying causes of trafficking (prevention) and it consequences: survivors need to be assisted (protection) and offenders must be punished (prosecution). The complexity of the human trafficking phenomenon, however, led former Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, to add a new "P" to the paradigm: partnerships. Mrs. Clinton highlighted collaboration as the only possible way of accomplishing the first 3P's:

"*In recent years, we've pursued a comprehensive approach reflected by the three Ps: prosecution, protection, and prevention. Well, it's time to add a fourth: partnership. The criminal network that enslaves millions of people crosses borders and spans continents. So, our response must do the same. So, we're committed to building new partnerships with governments and NGOs around the world, because the repercussions of trafficking affect us all.*" (U.S. Department of State, 2013).

All the mechanisms undertaken to combat human trafficking are related to the four main pillars of trafficking in human beings pointed out by Cho (2015): migration, vulnerability, crime, and policy and institutional efforts.

Prevention

Prevention is focused on tackling the root causes of trafficking. Mechanisms implemented respond to push-and-pull approach to international migration, that is, dealing both with the causes that push people to migrate, and what factors pull or attract migrants. For human trafficking specifically, the push-and-pull approach has taken a more economic turn, and the terms 'supply and demand' are used (Jandl, 1994; Feingold, 2005; Danailova-Trainor & Belser, 2006; Wheaton et. al, 2010). The international community is aware of the driving factors behind human trafficking. Migration alone is not a sufficient condition for trafficking, rather vulnerability is also necessary. Vulnerability represents the main push factor in countries of origin, and hence supply. Through an analytical regression of 76 variables, Bales (2007) concluded that "corruption, poverty and conflict" were all "significant predictors of trafficking." Employment opportunities and better livelihoods represent the main pull factors and contribute as a push factor.

Prevention strategies in supply countries are focused on three key and intertwined areas: poverty alleviation, awareness raising and migratory control (Marshall & Thatun, 2016).

Awareness raising campaigns warn about the risks of migrating; poverty alleviation programs seek to prevent migration by increasing income through educational curricula. Marshall and Thatun (2016) correctly point out that awareness raising campaigns and poverty alleviation programs are often detached from local contexts. Reducing relative poverty at a national level (*ibid*) would prevent individuals from responding to current globalization trends and accepting "dangerous migration assignments" (Chuang, 2006). The deep socioeconomic roots of vulnerable migration do not prevent individuals in search of better livelihoods from migrating. In response, migratory controls are becoming stricter and borders are being externalized. Numbers of smuggling cases have not necessarily declined. For instance, according to Europol, 90% of arrivals in Europe are still facilitated by smugglers (IOM, 2016).

Protection

Protection is aimed at rescuing victims of human trafficking and assisting survivors. The protection of victims is understood as a process which goes from the identification and referral of victims to law enforcement, to their rescue and their ultimate reintegration and rehabilitation in society (UNODC, 2017). Awareness campaigns and national hotlines have been set up in several countries in an attempt to get citizens involved in the fight against trafficking. Once authorities are alerted, intervention operations are launched: victims are rescued, and offenders are arrested. Nonetheless, several voices have risen against this approach, arguing that the War on Trafficking has focused more on the prosecution of the crime than on the assistance to survivors (Chuang, 2006; Marshall & Thatun, 2016).

The argument behind this criticism is not only that it overlooks the importance of the migratory aspect behind human trafficking, but also that even protection mechanisms for victims are designed to make criminal prosecution of offenders more efficient. As mandated by the Palermo Protocol, survivors of human trafficking are granted a reflection time, a period during which the survivors have of the possibility of recovering "and of making an informed decision about whether to assist and cooperate in criminal proceedings" (UNODC, 2008). The duration of the reflection period will vary depending on the country, but certain international tools, such as the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (2005) mandate that it be no shorter than 30 days. During this time, survivors are granted residence permits, access to job markets, housing, psychological and legal assistance, and medical and other social services. The residence permit, however, is temporary. A definitive permit will depend not only on a survivor's will to cooperate with the authorities in any criminal investigations and proceedings (Gallagher & Holmes, 2008; Brunovskis, 2012).

Early recommendations already pointed out the need to grant residence permit to trafficking survivors "regardless of whether they are willing and/or able to give evidence as a

witness" to enhance confidence in national authorities and facilitate investigations (European Commission, 2004). Concerns have also been raised with regards to whether programs and processes undergone by survivors of trafficking prepare them for their return to their countries of origin (Schloenhardt & Loong, 2011).

Prosecution

The third pillar of human trafficking studies is crime. In response, criminal prosecution of offenders is another tool to combat human trafficking. Resources and efforts have resulted in an increasing number of convictions. In the United States, human trafficking prosecutions by the Department of Justice (DOJ) increased from 208 to 241 during the 2014-2016 period (fiscal years), reaching a peak of 257 prosecutions in 2015; during this same period, the number of convicted defendants rose from 355 (2014) to 531 (2016); in 2014, 184 traffickers were convicted, a cipher which increased to 439 by 2016 (United States Department of State, 2016; 2017). In Europe, there have been 4,079 prosecutions and 3,129 convictions for trafficking in human beings between 2013-2014, according to the latest figures (European Commission, 2016). According to the European Commission (2016), however, "the level of prosecutions and convictions remains worryingly low, especially when compared to the number of victims identified."

The feminization of human trafficking has also led to the implementation of measures which also criminalize the demand. Some countries, such as Sweden or the United States,[xxiv] have opted for a total abolition of prostitution, thereby criminalizing clients (Ekberg, 2004). The argument behind a zero-tolerance policy is that the risk of punishment will decrease demand for prostitution services. Markets will therefore become less lucrative, and traffickers will re-direct their operations to more profitable destinations. Those opposing abolition make their argument referring to the "pop-down, pop-up" problem (Marshall & Thatun, 2016): by pushing prostitution further into illegality, those involved in the industry become even more vulnerable, and problems associated to human trafficking will only increase.

Partnerships

The Palermo Protocol instigates States parties to enhance and promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation among them to achieve the objectives highlighted in the document. It also recommends signatories to partner with organizations, including non-governmental ones, and civil society to provide the necessary protection for survivors. Agencies which include fighting human trafficking in their lines of action also highlight the importance of exchanging knowledge and information to improve practices (Interpol, 2017). UNODC has developed tools and manuals to help countries respond to issues derived from trafficking in human beings.

Nonetheless, a "dynamic relationship among diverse actors, based on mutually agreed objectives, pursued through a shared understanding of the most rational division of labor based on the respective comparative advantages of each partner" (Brinkerhoff, 2002) does not always imply mutual influence, equal input and mutual accountability (Fukushima & Lliou, 2012). Partnerships are meant to be multilateral. They should include criminal and justice systems, law enforcement, health experts (including mental health) and social service providers (including translators and cultural mediators). Many of the impediments to efficient partnerships stem from the fact that, on the eyes of the public, successful anti-trafficking operations are equated with criminal arrests (Srikantiah, 2007). This causes an overrepresentation of the criminal and justice systems and contributes to the perpetuation of the victimization discourse. Moreover, it causes a detachment between programs implemented by government agencies and non-governmental organizations (Kaufman & Crawford, 2011). For partnerships to be effective, they should combine theoretical, academic knowledge and hands-on experience and practice (Fukushima & Lliou, 2012).

What we know about engagement in violent extremism

Following Weitzer (2007), one can argue that the West has initiated both a moral and a symbolic crusade against violent extremism. Its morally incorrect consequences have lead scholars, law enforcement and policy makers, among others, to attempt to eliminate the problem and provide relief to particular populations, in particular those considered susceptible or at-risk. The study of the motivations which lead individuals to become violent extremists are part of the symbolic crusade against terrorism. Different approaches have aimed at providing explanations for what seems to be an irrational behavior. In line with the Rousseauian argument that man is by nature good and virtuous, different theories have sought to understand the elements which corrupt individuals and make them justify the killing of innocents.

The psychological approach to terrorism

Biological theories (Bakker, 2006), as well as psychological ones, aim to explain engagement in violent extremism. Experts often resort to major clinical illnesses (schizophrenia or depression) or personality disorders (anti-social personalities) to explain engagement in violent actions, especially in cases of self-immolation. Theories related to identity, narcissism or other forms of psychopathy have attempted to explain the feelings of hate, revulsion and revenge that underlie behind terrorist attacks (Reich, 1990; Post, 1990; Victoroff, 2005; Borum, 2010). However, Islamic terrorist organizations will never recruit a depressed person, neither any other individual who would end up committing suicide because of some other mental disorder. In fact, the Qur'an strictly prohibits suicide:

Juncal Fernández-Garayzábal González
Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallels between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

"And do not kill yourselves. Surely, God is Most Merciful to you." (Quran 4:29)

"And do not throw yourselves in destruction." (Quran 2:195)

Shaheed (martyrs) believe that whatever they are not enjoying in this life will be compensated for in the afterlife (Moghadam, 2011). They would be accused of blasphemy and crime were they to act out of desperation or hopelessness; rather, they are individuals full of hope (Atran, 2003).The possibility of suicide is automatically annulled by the fact that *shaheed* embrace what they believe is a justified cause for a greater good. Terrorist organizations carefully select their members and will never recruit a depressed person nor any other individual with mental disorder. As Moghadam's (2011) work on the Second Intifada shows, they usually reject volunteers and will rather pick individuals they have known for some time. In this way, extremists can count on these individuals' secrecy, their motivations and devotions, and, most importantly, their mental capacity to perform the assigned tasks. Earlier works have shown that "no psychological attribute or personality distinctive of terrorists" has been found (Hudson, 1999; Bakker, 2006).

Reich (1990) correctly points out how psychological theories tend to over-generalize when elaborating a terrorist profile and miss out on the societal and economic rewards found in terrorism. Individual grievances that could lead to voluntary enrolment deserve more than the psychological approach traditionally associated to engagement in violent extremism.

The socioeconomic & cultural component of violent extremism

There is a large social component involved in the individual "emotional pull" of radicalization (Bartlett, Birdwell, & King, 2010). Former United States' President, George W. Bush (2002), claimed the U.S. was fighting poverty because "hope is an answer to terror". However, contrary to the common idea that terrorists are poor and uneducated, poverty is not an influential factor at an individual level. Krueger & Maleckova (2002) point out that a meticulous review of research provides no evidence that neither poverty reduction nor an increase in education rates would reduce violent extremism. Researchers found that most Palestinian suicide bombers have a college education, and fewer than 15% of them come from poor families (Saleh, 2004).

Poverty does, however, have a marked influence at a national level, because it walks hand in hand with other cultural and social differences (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002). In Western countries, for instance, economic disparities and cultural differences between immigrants and local population account for an increase in "ghettoization" (Balanche, 2016) and the Islamization of society. French sociology, however, points out that it is not only outcasts (individuals with a

lower level of education and no job prospects) who are attracted to radical Islamic thinking, but also individuals who are seemingly in a better socioeconomic position and are more integrated (Kepel, 2004; Roy, 2005; Khosrokhavar, 2005). Roy (2005) argues that a change of relationships between migrants and their culture of origin has caused the "deculturation of Islam" in a context where secularized culture has forgotten about the overall importance of religion and religiosity. This leaves (European) Muslims with a "double sense of non-belonging" (Kepel, 2004; Khosrokhavar, 2005): whilst they have been Westernized to a point that they don't feel fully part of their parents' community, they feel they are being socioeconomically discriminated against because of their roots.

All in all, the socioeconomic approach to engagement in violent extremism suggests that "receptiveness toward the radical worldview of militant Islamism" is a result of a "search for identity, dignity, meaning, and community combined with perceived discrimination and pressure on Islam" (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010). Work by Alan Krueger and Jitka Maleckova (2002) finds that, rather than being correlated to a nation's per capita income, violent extremism is linked to a lack of civil liberties. The *ummah* or community is seen as a refuge from the perceived structural inefficiencies. However, socioeconomic and cultural factors alone fail to explain engagement in violent extremism, given that only a small percentage of individuals exposed to certain socioeconomic and cultural conditions go on to commit violence (Horgan, 2012).

Political (ideological) standpoint

Terrorism typically implies revenge against an established system. Global dynamics influence socioeconomic and cultural realities at national and local levels and produce social inequalities (Barner et. al, 2014). Socioeconomic and cultural are "contributing" contextual "root causes" (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009) and their influence can be partially explained by relative deprivation theory (RDT). RDT is usually used to explain the underlying causes of social movements and revolutions (Krahn & Harrison, 1992; de La Sabblonière et. al, 2013): feeling deprived from money, power or status can account for a progressive inclination towards violent attitudes as a solution for social change (Pedahzur et. al, 2003; Victoroff, 2005; Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009).

However, these variables alone cannot explain engagement. Globalization and other processes (historical, social, or political) explain the structural inequalities existing at national levels. Inequalities between countries, and how positive and negative characteristics are attributed to them, are promoted by "hierarchy-legitimizing myths" (Pratto et. al, 1994). International relations are described by dependence theory. Antagonisms when it comes to actors and power distribution, determines the beneficiaries, positions (central, hegemonic positions, versus

periphery, subordinate ones) and international labor distribution in a globalized environment (Kay, 1998).

Violent extremism or terrorism holds political connotations. Although ideology varies between different groups, recent events have caused violent extremism to be associated almost exclusively to militant jihadism and Islam. Radical Islam intertwines politics and religion and seeks to implement *sharia* law according to the Salafi reform movement. This *Sharia* (path) is based on the practices, sayings and teachings of Prophet Mohammed, and it defines the guidelines and principles that lead all aspects in Muslim life: family life, religious obligations, financial dealings, rule of law and government. This merging between religion and politics explains why religious views alone are neither a sufficient condition for engagement in violent Islamic groups.

Research carried out in Palestine shows individuals tended not to be very religious at the time they joined terrorist organizations and only became religious afterwards (Atran, 2003). In reality, foreign policy and globalization account for grievances expressed by jihadists. These grievances include insults to Islam (such as the Prophet Mohammed cartoons in 2005, the issuing of the film *Submission* in 2004, or the making of the short film *Fitna* in 2008), Western compliance with Muslim suffering (in places such as Gaza and the West Bank) and what are considered direct attacks on Muslims (two Gulf Wars, the invasion of Afghanistan, or the intervention in Somalia) (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). Islamic terrorism embraces an Islamic World vs. the West dichotomy that represents a means of contesting existing hierarchical international positions and the perceived insults towards Islam and Muslims.

Individually, however, none of the above theories serve to provide an integrative understanding of engagement in violent extremism. Psychological and socioeconomic factors, along with perceived religious and political harassment, are contributing factors to radicalization. However, no empirical data shows whether there are factors which are more contributing than others in the radicalization process. Moreover, the reasons an individual transitions from holding radical beliefs to actual support for or engagement in violence remain unclear.

Combating violent extremism: the 4R paradigm

On September 11, 2001, then President George W. Bush declared 'War on Terror.' Through Executive Order 13224, the United States government sought to deter terrorist actions by cutting any funds to terrorist organizations and regimes. Terrorism was not embodied only in Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but it also included Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran and North Korea. The efforts to combat terrorism were based on a 4D strategy: Defeat, Deny, Diminish and Defend (CIA, 2003). These four pillars were centered on three main objectives: ensuring homeland

security, dismantling Al-Qaeda and preventing the creation of new terrorists by tackling socioeconomic and cultural roots of terrorism (CIA, 2003; de La Corte, 2007).

The increase in insurgency violence in Iraq called for reforms in the military-centered approach against 'terror.' General David Petraeus took a population-centered focus that emphasized the importance of providing civilians with a sense of protection and security. His COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy was based on a "battle for hearts and minds" (Petraeus & Amos, 2006; Metz, 2007). Petraeus' holistic approach also enabled a more integrative perspective to the process of radicalization and engagement in violent extremism. It has been determined that radicalization is an extremely complicated phenomenon, even moreso the progression from belief into action. A multidimensional perspective has shown that both processes require three levels of analysis: individual, group and organizational (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009). An integrative approach is also required to achieve effective rehabilitation and reintegration processes for those who disengage from violent extremism.

Pulling from the War on Trafficking, I set forth a '4R paradigm' upon which to base the War on Terror and its consequences: radicalization, recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration.

Radicalization

In the same way that human trafficking needed to be distinguished from migrant smuggling, violent extremism needs to be distinguished from radicalization. Defining radicalization remains a major concern for academics, policymakers and the counter-terrorism community at large (Borum, 2011). Recent terror attacks have caused, on the one hand, radicalization to be associated almost exclusively with jihadi terrorism; on the other hand, the terms 'radicalization' and 'violent extremism' are often exchanged and used as if they were one same phenomenon.

The process of radicalization is political in nature and can apply to any kind of extreme thinking, independent of the nature of the ideology. It has been defined as a "process of political mobilization as an increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of intergroup conflict" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008). This shift is a response to a feeling of "moral outrage" (Sageman M. , 2008) caused by "individual marginalization" (Taarnby, 2005). However, a radicalized individual does not always engage in political violence (Borum, 2011). For instance, the Flower Power movement from the '60s and '70s was considered extreme (in the sense that it embodied a counterculture of social permissiveness), was political in nature (it opposed the Vietnam War), but maintained an ideology of pacific resistance and non-violence.

Radicalization requires a process of "transformative learning" (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). In its initial phases, it is a cognitive process usually triggered by "contributing factors"

(Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009) which explain conflict with the environment. A sentiment of disorientation initiates a process of change, where meaning schemes and perspectives are deconstructed and re-constructed as the individual critically reflects on his or her reality and acquires the necessary knowledge for establishing a "new course of action" (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2010). The outcome of this process is usually reflected in behavioral changes in one's life, produce of integrating newly acquired perspectives (*ibid*). Cognitive and behavioral changes are a translation of a quest for personal significance (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Kruglanski et. al, 2009; Kruglanski et. al, 2014). As personal dilemmas arise, and self-examination occurs, a personal goal for significance also arises. Violent extremism can be identified as a means to reach that significance as incentives are constructed to gain meaning (Kruglanski et. al, 2014).

Preventing radicalization has primarily focused on addressing the socioeconomic and cultural contributing factors. However, prevention efforts fail to consider that it is political identities which serve to predict engagement in collective action (recruitment) (van Zomeren et. al, 2008). As individuals radicalize, chances of social interactions with like-minded individuals increase; social constructions of realities of groups further increase radicalization and chances of engagement in violence. Nonetheless, the study of the "processes by which people come to adopt beliefs that not only justify violence but compel it, and how they progress (…) from thinking to action" (Schmid, 2005) show that there is a "low base rate of involvement" (Horgan, 2012).

Recruitment

Radicalization is different to "action pathways" (Borum, 2011). Engagement in politically violent groups is known as *recruitment*. Different theoretical models have attempted to explain the process by which an individual goes on from manifesting ideological alignment with radical political views, to partaking in group violence.

In 2007, the New York Police Department (NYPD) conceptualized a four-stage process. According to this model, identification with an ideology leads to indoctrination, then giving way to *jihadization* (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). The model is designed in a linear manner, with designated stages. However, it obviates the fact that some phases are co-occurring, and some stages can go back and forth. For instance, identification with a cause usually walks hand in hand with indoctrination, and further indoctrination requires deeper identification. This increasing commitment has already been identified by Moghaddam's (2005) five-stage "staircase to terrorism"[xxv] and Moskalenko and McCauley's "conveyor belt metaphor" (2008).[xxvi] Nonetheless, being actively engaged in politically violent groups does not imply committing violent actions. Participation can include material and economic assistance, helping disseminate ideology (propaganda), and/or recruiting new members for the organization.

Others suggest that violent extremism, due to its political nature and objectives, is best considered as a social movement (Benjamin & Simon, 2006). Social movements are "networks of informal interaction between a plurality of individuals, groups and/or organizations, engaged in a political and/or cultural conflict, based on a shared collective identity" (Diani, 1992). From an organizational approach (Crenshaw, 1987), adherence to groups facilitates resolving the "quest for significance" (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009) and the need for empowerment (Kruglanski et. al, 2014) by becoming part of a larger campaign to achieve specific (political) goals (Pape, 2003). Terrorism is different to other movements because of three elements: existing grievances, blame of a culprit, and identification of a method to address grievances (Thomas et. al, 2014; Kruglanski et. al, 2014). "Collective rationality" (Crenshaw, 2009) suggests that individual motivations build up to give birth to a collective ideology or identity (Thomas et. al, 2014). The ideological criterion is paramount, since it is the umbrella under which individuals create a shared reality. Social dominance orientation (SDO) argues that decision to join a certain social group is related to the subjective perception of social reality and grievances, and the consequent desire to perpetuate certain differences or promote equality. Individuals with a higher SDO, or desire to keep themselves up in the social hierarchy, will join institutions and groups that will promote intergroup differences; individuals with a lower SDO will join groups or institutions which will promote social equality.

Active engagement in terrorist organizations requires an intersection of individual and group processes (Merari & Friedland, 2009). Group dynamics and sociological processes also contribute to further radicalization and political engagement. Research carried out by Thomas et. al, (2014) reveal that extreme forms of social action can arise from interaction with the likeminded. According to social network theory, as "intragroup dynamics" (Thomas et. al, 2014) promote polarized attitudes, the "dialectical process" (Borum, 2011) increases the will to change an established status-quo. A clear cut between "me/us" (individual and his or her group) and "them" (outsiders) (Yuval-Davis, 2010) establishes violence as the only solution to perceived group grievances, as exclusion and negation of group outsiders becomes more apparent. As polarization increases, so does the reduced fear of death and readiness for self-sacrifice on behalf of a group. Social network analysis has remarked that the improvement of technologies enables a physical detachment between individuals who compose a group (Ressler, 2006). Recent attacks performed by ISIS' 'lone wolves' show that technological advances have permitted individual acts of violence to be in line with or pledge allegiance to any active terrorist group, even if the perpetrator has received no direct support from it. This has increased and broadened violent extremist networks, therefore annulling the idea that individuals involved in political warfare are part of groups composed exclusively of the elite of intelligence militia.

There remains a research gap concerning the motivations that spark engagement in violent extremism. It is often assumed that violent extremism is a necessary consequence derived from radicalization, but the low base rate of those radicalized that go on to engage in actual violence suggests otherwise.

Rehabilitation

The intervention of the international coalition has caused ISIS' Caliphate to progressively lose territory. On June 10, 2017, international troops took Mosul, one of ISIS' last bastions in Iraq. Security concerns took a new turn: where would former ISIS fighters go? There have been several foreign fighters who have attempted to return to their countries of origin in the last years. Attacks like the ones which took place in a Brussels on May 2014, when an ISIS returned fighter opened fire in a Jewish Museum, reinforced the idea of the potential threat posed by returning foreign fighters being evaluated. Concerns revolve around the possibility of returned foreign fighters keeping in touch with the terrorist network. After all, among one of the reasons why foreign fighters had already been welcomed by Al-Qaeda is because their passports were a gateway to return and operate in countries of origin (Aydinli, 2016). Therefore, the debate becomes whether returned foreign fighters can be rehabilitated.

Anti-terrorism measures policies lack strategic measures that effectively disrupt the environments which enable violent extremism. The common approach, and the most popular among public opinion, is the "hard approach" to the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters (Reed & Johanna, 2017). In an attempt to prevent their citizens from fleeing to ISIS-held territory, Western countries contemplated revoking the nationality of anybody who would travel to Iraq and Syria to support the group (Sands, 2016).[xxvii] The criminalization approach was used for those who returned from the Caliphate. However, studies like that of Silber & Arvin (2007) show that long sentences may backfire, given that prisons are "radicalization hubs". As pointed out earlier, contact and bonding with like-minded individuals can further increase the sense of empowerment and push individuals further along the radicalization continuum.

Focusing on military interventionism in the Middle East and the "hard approach" to foreign fighters in the West has only resulted in an increased number of radicalized individuals; in the meantime, despite reducing the operational capabilities of violent extremist groups, their ideology and goals remain unaltered (Gunaratna & Rubin, 2011). Eliminating the instrumental approach to terrorism (terrorism being a means to obtain a goal) fails to address the "syndrome": personality traits, background environment, ideological component, etc, which explain engagement in violent extremism (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009; Sukabdi, 2015).

The inability to discover a terrorist profile prevents a high degree of certainty when it comes to predicting who will engage in or recidivate back into violent extremism-related behavior. There is no reason to believe that "hardcore fighters," those closest to Al-Baghdadi and in the highest ranks of ISIS (Clarke & Amarasingam, 2017), will return from Iraq and Syria. It is more likely that these individuals will remain in Iraq and Syria and join the insurgency. The threat presented by "mercenaries and free agents" (*ibid*) should neither worry authorities. It seems these individuals will neither return to their countries of origin but will rather become part of a "leaderless jihad" (Sageman, 2009). Their ideological support of ISIS will take them to territories where jihad is being waged to protect or reestablish the *khilafa*, such as Yemen, Libya, or Afghanistan.

Only those who actually attempt to return to their countries of origin in Europe pose a threat to national security forces and law enforcement agencies. Nonetheless, the motivations for returning are vary from individual to individual. Apart from those who returned with the intention of perpetuating jihad back home, there are those who returned because of disengagement and/or disillusionment. Some could have abandoned the armed struggle because of operational or physical impediments; others might reconsider a hands-on approach to jihad because the idea of the Caliphate may have not met their expectations. Abandoning violence, however, does not necessarily imply an ideological detachment from jihadism. As Horgan (2014) correctly points out, *disengagement* does not imply *de-radicalization*. In the same manner, that radicalization into engagement in violent extremism requires both a cognitive and behavioral transformation, behavioral changes do not imply a cognitive change when it comes to disengagement. Disengagement does not necessarily imply an abandonment of the ideology, but rather requires a "shift in social relationships and personal circumstances" (Holmer & Shtuni, 2017)

It has been pointed out that returned foreign fighters also benefit from theological rehabilitation (Gunaratna, 2011). The transformative learning process individuals underwent prior to engagement in violence requires a reverse process to deconstruct their adherence to violent ideologies. Several countries have tried to implement disengagement programs (Rabasa et. al, 2009; Stern, 2010; Sukabdi, 2015). Six critical dimensions have been identified for rehabilitation processes to be successful contextual insights, vocational skills, spiritual maturity, personal skills, social skills, and domestic skills (Sukabdi, 2015).

Reintegration

Reintegration strategies fall under the 'soft approach' to terrorism. It is based on a multidimensional verge onto radicalization and engagement in violence; it is aimed at addressing contributing factors, reversing violent ideology, and preventing new cases of radicalization and mobilization or engagement. However, the lack of empirically-derived indicators allows for no proof of what are effective tools to achieve short and long-term effects (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012; Veldhuis, 2015). Even when aiming for reintegration, programs differ on whether

individuals convicted for terror-related offenses and, or foreign fighters should be prosecuted and criminalized.

Veldhuis (2015) points out that the first issue with regards to reintegration concerns individuals imprisoned for terrorism-related charges. The risk of these individuals becoming potential radicalizers of other inmates and, or going on to commit acts of violence once their sentence is complete raises the question of whether disengaged individuals should be placed with the general inmate population. Countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and France have experimented with placing these individuals in isolated modules in high-security prisons; the United Kingdom, however, approached the issue by dispersing small groups of risky individuals among several high-security facilities (Veldhuis, 2015). Countries have implemented programs in prisons which aim at reintegrating terror offenders back into society and reducing the probability of recidivism (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012). There exists an overall agreement that reintegration programs in the penitentiary system should respect the rights of inmates, and adapt to national differences in history, culture and legal procedures, while bridging the possible differences between international and national laws.

According to the Rome Memorandum (2012) there are several practices which should be implemented in order to make these programs successful. Firstly, new inmates should be taken in, assessed and classified based on an effectively developed system. This should be done on a case-by-case study, since not all terrorism offenders may be apt for reintegration (de Kerchove et. al, 2015); plus, returning foreign fighters disengage for different reasons, therefore complicating the implementation of one-size-fits-all measures. Secondly, partnerships have been pointed out as essential for the effective accomplishment of reintegration programs. States call for the collaboration between law enforcement, social workers, psychologists and mental health specialists, theological scholars, victims, and even former extremists. Professionals who are apt for working with these high-profile individuals and respond appropriately will be able to make sure that all the crucial areas of reintegration are appropriately applied in each individual case. Programs are elaborated to provide terror offenders (when necessary) with cognitive skill programs, vocational training courses, basic education trainings, the possibility of continuation with the program after the sentence has been completed, and protection for individuals who are threatened for disengagement and de-radicalization. Reintegration programs are also aimed at including families and communities.

A rationalist approach points out that the lack of data to prove the efficacy of best practices should lead to programs being elaborated on more than just theoretical knowledge and expertise. The difference in profiles, individual radicalization trajectories and reasons for

disengagement and de-radicalization also make it impossible to relay on single case studies (Veldhuis, 2012). The fact that there are existing success stories of reintegration has lead supranational bodies to suggest cooperation between law enforcement and former radicals (Reed & Johanna, 2017).

In summary...

Human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism are mostly treated as independent phenomena. However, identifying convergences between these seemingly distinct arenas may prove to be extremely beneficial.

Human trafficking and violent extremism have both been deemed primary concerns for international security. At their roots, they share the fact that they are phenomena that are largely context-dependent and are a combined result of socioeconomic, political and cultural factors. Assessing individual agency is also essential when analyzing both phenomena. Because of their complexity, human trafficking and violent extremism need to be approached in a holistic manner. Despite solutions not being straightforward, it is clear that the international community has identified the need of collaborating in order to address both issues.

The main characteristics of human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism identified in this section will be analyzed in detail in the next chapter. The objective is to draw the parallels between both networks, both from an organizational perspective and taking into account the role recruited individuals play within them.

The War on Terror and the War on Trafficking have been the focus of institutional and policy efforts for years. Programs have been elaborated mainly to address root causes of both human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism; measures have been implemented to protect those who are directly or indirectly affected by both phenomena. However, the complexity of both phenomena has been reduced to a dichotomist discourse. The two categories are criminalization (traffickers, trafficked individuals mistaken for smuggled migrants, mujahedeen) and victimization (human trafficking survivors, jihadi brides). Focusing on the similarities between human trafficking networks and terrorist organizations established in this chapter could help broaden this reductionist approach, while providing the field of CVE with new insights on how to address radicalization and engagement in violence. The 4P paradigm used to combat human trafficking could prove extremely useful if applied to the 4R's of terrorism (radicalization, recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration). The case by case approach implemented with human trafficking survivors could serve as best practices when handling cases of returned foreign fighters.

Chapter 4. Recruitment for human trafficking networks and violent political extremism: An analysis of the parallels.

Despite promising works, there is still no clear evidence that human trafficking is merely more than a financing mechanism for terror groups like ISIS. The literature review in the previous chapter, however, has enabled me to tease out categories that would further support a justification for my dissertation. In this fourth chapter, I will establish a comparison between human trafficking and violent political extremism (terrorism). This comparison is based on the independent theoretical frameworks used to approach human trafficking on the one hand, and terrorism on the other. However, a closer examination reveals that both networks present not only operational similarities, but also a common *modus operandi* when it comes to luring people into the network. In this regard, ideology plays a key role. Extracting these similarities is another step forward into determining whether indeed the parallels between human trafficking and terror groups such as ISIS should be further explored, and how bridging the gap between seemingly unrelated fields can help add new tools to the counter-terrorism tool-box.

Organizational comparison

Organizations and groups only become operational if individuals adhere to them and work towards the consecution of a series of group goals. In human trafficking cases, it is assumed that individuals are forced into slavery; regarding terrorism, the process whereby an individual decides to engage in violence has been subject of multiple studies. Agency is usually excluded as the reason why an individual may decide to initiate a migratory process or join a violent extremist group. However, while victimization dominates the discourse around human trafficking, individuals who joined a terrorist organization and then regretted their decision based on ideological inconsistencies or a mismatch of expectations are criminalized by authorities and the general public.

Nonetheless, traffickers or high commanders (in cases such as ISIS) benefit from those who are in search in better livelihoods. At an organizational and operational level, human trafficking networks and terrorist groups act in the same manner in pursuit of their objectives. Regarding objectives, it is irrelevant whether these are ultimately economic or political. They both are co-dependent: political control cannot occur without economic means, and economic management of a territory cannot take place without any political support.

Structure

Human trafficking networks, like any other criminal organization, may adopt different operational structures: hierarchies, clans, networks, cells and others (National Security Council,

2009). These groups are usually set up according to traditions and social structures (Bossard, 1990) as a rational response to the demand of illegal goods and services (Demletier, 1994).[xxviii]

For organized crime to reach its goals and objectives, let alone for being able to perpetuate its activities over time, it requires skills and planning, but also, a more extensive network of participants (Kirby & Penna, 2010). There are internal (direct members) and external participants (collaborators or contributors). Internal participants are bonded to the group by not only discipline, but also a loyalty provided by the fact that all members have a common background and are able to identify with the group (Bossard, 1990; Finckenauer, 2005). Each of the members of the group has his or her obligations, duties and rights specified within the organization (Cressey, 1969); the division of labor is a result of task allocation and of coordination of activities through internal codes (Conklin, 2010). External collaborators are part of the established structures which organized crime benefits from. They contribute to organized crime being able to achieve and exercise influence at a political, commercial and social level. Collaboration can be direct (active participation in illegal and/or violent activities) or indirect (passive accepters of the situation). Acceptance can come because of fear of repercussion (whom I deem 'fearsome collaborators') or because collaborators seek profit derived from collaborating in illicit activities (whom I deem 'profit-seeking collaborators'). The latter ensure the immunity of organized crime (in the case of corrupt officials), and facilitate the financing of the organization through, for instance, blackmail.

There is a collective identity and subdivision of work among members of any organized criminal group (Paoli, 2002). Human trafficking networks coordinate the different activities their members perform. Recruiters identify the victims and lure them to the network;[xxix] "Trolleys" are in charge of transporting recruits safely from origin to destination; individuals in charge of resource acquisition will take the necessary steps to make travel effective, such as obtaining fake documents or tickets for transport; individuals in management are in charge of giving orders (Campana, 2016).

The same applies to international violent extremist groups. 'Active collaboration' refers to recruits who engage in violent actions. Engagement of new recruits fulfills the objective of enabling the terrorist organization to further advance in the achievement of their goals. The greater the number of recruits, the greater the possibilities for terrorist organizations to diversify the tasks assigned to its members. Just like in human trafficking networks, there are recruiters, "trolleys", individuals dedicated to resource acquisition, and individuals dedicated to management.

There is, however, an aspect with regards to both human trafficking and terrorism which is often overlooked: the importance of familial ties. Research conducted among children and

youth trafficked into the U.S. reveals that none of them were forcefully abducted by traffickers. In fact, for the large majority of the 140 individuals observed, families played a crucial role in the travelling procedures. In cases in which it wasn't parents who brought their children across the U.S. border, smugglers were paid by families to accompany minors during the border-crossing (Gozdziak, 2016). Among the many complexities Gozdziak's research reveals about human trafficking, social rewards are one of them. All the subjects of her study conveyed that, without exception, they travelled to the U.S. with the goal of finding employment, or even educational opportunities.

In the case of violent extremism, increased social status or admiration by family and friends are a primary preference among those enroled in terrorist organizations (McCauley & Segal, 1987). Research carried out by Sageman (2004) provides interesting insight into how relationships of friends and familiy with Islamic extremism can influence *jihadization* of individuals. Out of 400 interviewees, 88% of them accounted for friendship or family bonds to jihad: 68% of them account for friendships, 20% had close family members involved in jihad.

Use of violence

The main characteristic of violent extremism is the (unexpected) use of violence. Terrorism can be defined as any violent, politically oriented action perpetrated against civilians (primary target) with the higher objective of obtaining political influence.[xxx] Not only is violence legitimized, but it is seen as the ultimate goal of an individual's mission inside the organization. Woodhouse, Ramsbotham and Cottey (2003) described the reasons why violence is seen by terrorists as the only way to address individual grievances.

> "*There seems to be general agreement that a common factor in most cases of terrorism is a sense of injustice, frustration and humiliation, and the idea that there are no nonviolent channels of redress.*"

Given that organized terrorist groups have bigger resources to perform what are considered harmful and 'symbolic' attacks, they contribute to the socio-psychological consequences derived from these attacks. The main socio-psychological consequence is fear, factor which is accounted for by the timing (and unexpectedness) of terrorist attacks. Whether performed by an organized non-state group or by an individual according to external ideologies, the political motivation behind these actions also reflects on the targets of attacks. Terrorist attacks distinguish between direct and indirect targets.

Direct targets are civilians or off-duty military personnel; this accounts for the consequent inducement of overall fear. Indirect targets, on the other hand, are what Hoffman (1999) calls "national infrastructures", which he sets as targets of the politically motivated attacks. National

infrastructures do not solely refer to physical infrastructures, such as buildings. It also refers to the more abstract conceptualization of a government, and ultimately, a country. Although violent actions are committed in order to create a fearful state of mind in an audience broader than the direct victims (Jones & Fong, 1994), and despite the State (understood as a given political organization) and public order (Sorel, 2003) being the ultimate objectives of terrorist attacks, it is unarmed civilians, and/or military objectives in times of peace, who are directly affected by the attacks (Ahmed et. al, 2005). These attacks are solely political and do not include any other personal or criminal goals (Ruby, 2002).[xxxi]

Organized criminal groups, including human trafficking networks, also use violence to obtain their goals. The use of violence enables organized criminal groups to earn a reputation through effective physical harm (the result of physical violence), and psychological harm derived from fear (Ianni & Ruess-Ianni, 1976). This reputation, and the fear it causes, implies that immunity of actions is not only granted by violence and enforcement (Hagan, 2010), but also because of social acceptance (Ianni & Ruess-Ianni, 1976). This acceptance refers to the external participants which compose the network that organized crime relies on. Legitimation of organized crime does not only occur through political presence. Corruption and other illegitimate means are also used to obtain influence at a social level. For instance, between 2006 and 2011, murder rates in Mexico reached 50,000 (Molzahn et. al, 2012).

According to research, drug cartels have expanded their targeting to women and children. This suggests that there are also direct and indirect victims of organized crime and its different forms. Direct victims are those who are attacked and murdered, or those who develop addictions due to drug trafficking. In the case of human trafficking networks, direct victims are those who are exploited. Communities affected by violence and families of those who are deprived from freedom when they become victims of human trafficking networks. Moreover, illegal activities derived from human trafficking, such as money laundering and drug trafficking also affect the socioeconomic and political structures of origin, transit and destination countries.

Scope of action & transnationalism

Motivations of groups can also determine their scope of action. Lizardo & Bergesen (2003) classified violent extremist groups into three categories, based on their ideological background and their scope of action:

- **Type 1**: ethno-nationalist groups: the groups usually embrace ideologies at either end of the political spectrum (left - right). Their goal is to be able to obtain the necessary popular support to cause a change in government. Actions usually take place in a determined territory, against a central government.

- **Type 2**: separatists and revolutionary: their political ideas, whether left or right in the political spectrum, stand against colonial powers. These types of groups usually emerge in the periphery of multi-ethnical empires and aim at attacking the core.

- **Type 3**: anarchic-nihilist and religious/ethnical: Groups located in peripheral areas perpetrate attacks against core targets, such as outposts (military bases, embassies), citizens living in their peripheral areas, or civilian and/or government structures in core states.

Type 3 corresponds to what is known today as "international terrorism". It is the ethnocentric and revolutionary causes that largely explain the advancement of terrorist ideologies at a transnational level. Terrorist organizations are now better organized and have easier access to resources. This, along with overall technological improvements and a growing interconnection between countries, has enabled terrorism to have spill-over effects.

Effects derived from control of organized crime over certain spheres of society are no longer delimited to one single country where criminals may operate. In the same manner that legal businesses have profited from a growing interconnection between countries and economic systems, so too has organized crime This has given way to organized crime developing transnational characteristics. Human trafficking networks can be allocated in a similar manner, based on the range of action of the organization:

- **Type 1**: local: human trafficking does not imply the crossing of international borders. Examples of local human trafficking can be found in countries where economic poverty encourages rural-urban migration. Children who are left behind by migrant parents are vulnerable to traffickers; women who migrate to large cities and are unable to become economically successful add to the demand of prostitution (Shelley, 2010).

- **Type 2**: regional: human trafficking behaves in the same way that terrorist groups which emerge in the peripheries of empires and target their cores. For instance, recent figures indicate that 65% of victims of human trafficking identified in the EU came from an EU Member State (Eurostat, 2015). This data reveals how there are human trafficking networks which originate in the periphery of certain geographical areas ultimately operate (find profit) in the more centric areas.

- **Type 3**: transnational: trafficking networks which originate at a local level expand their operations to a broader international scale. Of the total number of trafficking survivors identified at a global level, 58% are trafficked internationally (UNODC,

2015); the routes they follow from origin to destination countries often overlap with regular migration flows.

Goals

The aim of both terrorist organizations and human trafficking networks is to remain associated in order to perpetuate their benefits and obtain their goals. Terrorism aims at or challenging or changing the established political scene without making use of the traditional, democratic means. Organized crime, including human trafficking networks, seeks to obtain economic and power benefits.

Both organized crime (human trafficking) and violent extremism perform activities which are considered illegal, whether it is the desire for changing the established political status quo, or the purpose of committing crimes which will render them not only money (economic benefits) but will also enable them to achieve power through the monopoly of illegal market sectors (Schelling, 1971; Maltz, 1976; Woodiwiss, 2001). The group structure of organized criminal groups enables them to obtain certain continuity over time and across crimes in the performance of illegal activities (although they can penetrate legitimate businesses), thanks to the use of social violence and the corruption of public officials (Finckenauer, 2005). Therefore, organized criminal groups also exercise a political influence, also through illicit means (such as bribery and blackmail). Both groups seek to exercise a desired control over a determined space and to establish sovereignty (Picarelly, 2006), in other words, having absolute authority over a given territory to obtain success.

International terrorist groups may have a clear desire for political change; however, economic gains are a condition *sine qua non* their political goals cannot be achieved. As any organization, they need economic resources to obtain certain infrastructures and tools. In his study of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Moghadam (2011) shows how terrorist organizations require recruitment and training of individuals who will perform tasks depending on the hierarchical rank they occupy (decision making and target selection, weapon procurement, execution of attacks) to fulfill the organization's goals.

All in all, like it occurs with business planning, terrorist organizations like PFLP and Al-Qaeda are involved in a tactical learning process over time. This process enables them to establish the effectiveness of their actions, and see which ones provide them with more concessions (Pape, 2003). As (politically) strategic entities (Crenshaw, 2009; Pape, 2003), terrorist organizations look to reach their goals while minimizing risks involved. Terrorist strategies include distinguishing between "official goals" (more general ideologies to which people can adhere to)

and "operative goals" that "focus attention on the issues that require effort on the part of specific units and particular employees" (Hatch, 1997; Moghadam, 2011).

Social influence

To be able to perpetuate activities over time, both terrorist groups and human trafficking networks need to exercise certain (if not full) control of the areas in which they operate in. Although not all activities involved in obtaining control are violent, violence is an important asset to achieve territorial control, and for the exploitation of local and national administrative and political channels (Finckenauer, 2005). Fear from violence grants certain actions with immunity through social acceptance (Ianni & Ruess-Ianni, 1976). 'Legitimation' of organized crime does not only occur through political presence, but also through other illegitimate means. Political influence can take up many forms, such as corruption of officials (in the form of bribery, violence, blackmailing or other threats), the existence of political entities akin to the group's interests, or even members of the criminal group occupying positions of power (United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, 2008).

Exploitative purposes

The main difference between smuggling and trafficking is the goal of exploitation. Exploitation refers to the profit obtained from making use of natural resources. For instance, one can exploit agrarian resources to obtain income. It can also imply gaining profit from the performance of activities by a third person, usually using fraudulent means.[xxxii] With regards to human trafficking, it refers to people victimized through the performance of economic activities under conditions which do not ensure neither their physical and mental well-being, nor their security and protection. The Palermo Protocol (2000) includes the following activities as purpose of exploitation: "at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs" (OHCHR, 2000).

Determining the purpose of exploitation is complicated. Analyzing the juridical elements of the purpose of exploitation is beyond the scope of this work. However, it is necessary to highlight the fact that there are certain activities through with the exploiter can obtain benefits from the victim (Diamond City Case, Eindhoven, 2007). There are three components to exploitation: social, labor and economic exploitation. The social component derives from the fact that it is a control exercised from individual to individual. This control has the purpose of obliging the exploited individual to unwillingly perform a series of tasks (labor), so as in to obtain economic benefit. But because social exploitation is performed through a forced labor regime, the lines between both phenomena are blurry.

Social exploitation

The concept of *social exploitation* was developed by Karl Marx. It refers to the use one individual makes of another with the aim of purposefully harming him or her (Buchanan, 1984). Existing differences between social classes allowed powerful individuals to take advantage of more vulnerable ones,[xxxiii] something which can translate into physical and/or psychological harm. Although this idea needs to be considered within the industrial context in which it was developed, it is a concept that applies to human trafficking. The existence of socioeconomic, cultural and political hierarchies contributes to the creation of situations in which individuals in a more unfavorable position can be vulnerable to abuse from other individuals. In fact, the definition provided by the Palermo Protocol (2000) states "abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability" as one of the means used by traffickers to recruit individuals.

For it to be considered exploitation, there needs to be economic benefit derived from labor performed forcefully by the exploited individual. This includes abusing the power that the trafficker has over the victim to obtain benefits. Abusing power implies control, whether it is peoples' movements or physical environment, psychological control, measures implemented to prevent escaping, sexuality and/or labor (Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010). This, in turn, renders the individual incapable of freely changing a status by which s/he is performing determined tasks for another person, whether rewarded or not (UN, 1956).

Economic exploitation

The intentionality behind social exploitation is related to the economic aspect of exploitation. It derives from the concept of economic abuse, in other words the lack of access to economic means, or the inappropriate use of properties or other tangible good to obtain economic benefit.[xxxiv] By maintaining control over all economic resources and by making all the final economic decisions, the victim is obliged to completely depend on the exploiter for all financial needs (Adams, et. al, 2008; Fawole, 2008; Postmus et.al, 2011). Victims have no access to economic and financial resources, which results in a situation of dependency.[xxxv]

Economic exploitation is different to labor exploitation. In the cases of labor exploitation, the victim is performing the tasks for a third party, tasks which should be salaried according to national labor legislation. The person performing the task is either performing it against his or her will (because of some physical, psychological, economic or some other kind of threat) or finds that he or she cannot voluntarily quit the workplace (ILO, 1932). Economic exploitation walks hand in hand with labor exploitation, and the tasks compulsorily performed for economic profit of the exploiter through labor. Labor exploitation basically refers to forced labor. Human trafficking is determined based on labor exploitation. Victims perceive inexistent retribution for tasks performed unwillingly, because of fear of violence or any other retaliation. A distinction

exists, however, between activities which are unwillingly performed and for which the victims receives no compensation but occur only once, and another set of activities which allow exploitation over an extended period of time.[xxxvi] Determining the purpose of exploitation is difficult because of its subjectivity (Villacampa Estiarte, 2011). It is not only a matter of proving that an individual is purposefully exercising control over another one. It also has to be shown that control is exercised through fear or coercion and for the purpose of obtaining economic benefit.

Human trafficking situations are also based on *consent*. The Palermo Protocol specifies that consent will be annulled if the victims have been recruited forcibly or through fraudulent means (ONU, 2000). Voluntarily accepting to perform tasks does not imply acknowledging the conditions under which these tasks will be performed. There are cases in which trafficked individuals free-willingly accepted an employment offer which turned out to be fraudulent. Contract fraud or switching occurs when the labor recruit is not legally nor ethically bound to the contract, independent of whether the contract was verbal or written (United States Department of State, 2015). The conditions of the contract can change, or the worker can be transferred to a new recruiter who offer different or inexistent job offers. Upon arrival in the new territory, migrants find they must pay a high sum for expenses generated during their transport. Promises of a well remunerated job fade away, and rather the acquired debt needs to be repaid through services "not respectively limited and defined" (*ibid*). As such, an individual is being held as "security for a debt" whilst the value of the services performed are not applied "towards the liquidation of the debt" (*ibid*).

Bondage is a key element of exploitation. Debt bondage can comprise other forms of exploitation; it is also a good example of how migrant smuggling can be linked to human trafficking. Bondage is the element which annuls consent and free-will; the individual is coerced into performing activities because of threats or violence (Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010).The 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery includes debt bondage as a practice similar to slavery.[xxxvii] This power is a result of a situation of bondage and a consequent relationship of ownership. Ownership is exercised through control, obtained through isolation and abuse of coerced obedience. The trafficker can control a trafficked individual's movements or physical environment, their psychology, or can implement other measures to prevent escape. This, in turn, renders the individual incapable of freely changing a status by which s/he is performing determined tasks for another person, whether rewarded or not (UN, 1956). Activities carried out by exploited individuals do not only violate national labor legislations, but they also cause damage at a physical and psychological level.

With regards to violent extremism, bondage reflects as obedience. Obedience is obtained through the abuse of individual vulnerabilities or grievances. Terrorist groups take advantage of individual identification with a cause, which appears as an answer to grievances. The social aspect of the exploitation carried out by terrorist groups is derived from the hierarchical structure of the group and the ideological component attached to them. Ideological identification can transform a cause into a moral obligation, hence justifying and enabling the control higher ranks in the organization exercise over new recruits, who lose their autonomy and freedom. Isolation is made possible through an initial commitment to the cause, which is gradually transformed into a complete detachment from the individual's environments. This isolation is not only physical, but also psychological. The latter is especially important, given that it enables the individual to effectively violently confront the cause of his or her grievances.

Moreover, a cutback in sponsorship has lead terrorist organizations to find new ways of providing their activities with economic security, and they have now developed their "criminal capabilities" (Hutchinson & O'Malley, 2007). Recruited fighters perform tasks which are not strictly military but that allow the organization to be financially stable. Territorial control is the basis of ISIS's economic model, and it provides the organization with varied resources: natural resources, oil, gas, kidnapping and even antique trafficking (Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016). The maximum expression of exploitation in terrorism cases is found is *Shaheed*, or martyrs. Suicide bombings were first used during the Palestinian Intifadas; Al-Qaeda and ISIS have more recently adopted the technique of using martyrs to fulfill the objectives of their cause. Despite *Shaheed* being heroes for the cause, they are actually involved in an exploitative situation. Individual grievances are exploited to create group identification and detachment from the environment. As an ultimate from of exploitation, suicide bombers abide by instructions given to them by terrorists higher up in the group hierarchy. The fear provoked by suicide attacks helps terrorist groups fulfill their objectives.

Effects

Politics and commerce, as well as other spheres related to any society, are closely linked. Violent extremist organizations and human trafficking networks ignore borders, customs and legislations. This causes the "nullifying" of states (Finckenauer, 2005) by damaging their legal systems, their economic development and their political cultures (Reinares & Resa, 1999; Voronin, 2000). As a result, economic, political and social systems around the world are undermined, also a result of connections existing between organized crime in all its forms and militant, ethnic, and religious movements *(ibid)*.

The illegal nature of activities executed by human trafficking networks and the violence that is sometimes comprised cause societal harm (Ianni & Ruess-Ianni, 1976), but also damage

the political structures of a nation through the exploitation of local and national administrative and political channels (Finckenauer, 2005). This threatens national territorial integrity. Illicit activities (aimed at profiting from political, economic and social influence) affect territorial integrity, political and social stability, economic security, and even physical security, when the actions undertaken by these groups imply resorting to violence, or even promoting it, as in the case of conflicts. Organized crime manages to set up its own rule of law through the establishment of underground governments. Nonetheless, rather than a "monopoly of power" (Lupsha, 1996), it is "sub-politicization" (Beck, 1996), or establishing a network that can substitute existing governments.

This sub-politicization can also be exercised by terrorist groups. In areas where terrorist groups have *de facto* influence quasi-governmental roles also imply providing protection for the population (El-Aboudy, 2002). As such, the normal social order is disrupted, and loyalty transferred to terrorists, who now benefit from social impunity. Despite the pain and terror inflicted on the population, this pain and fear can turn into political demands on behalf of the population, whether it's in the shape of popular support for the actions of terrorists, or in the form of actions being demanded to make certain concessions to terrorists. The impact of public opinion should not be underestimated. It can be so substantial, especially with respect to salient issues (Burstein, 2003), which are often a direct cause of policy change (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

Individual level comparison: Rational choice, agency and the importance of ideology

The study of human trafficking and terrorism has focused on the understanding of processes and motivations. However, the approaches to the reasoning behind both phenomena are different. The victimhood discourse surrounding human trafficking calls for the study of underlying causes and motivations of people who commit the crime; the apparent irrationality behind engagement in violent extremist groups overemphasizes psychological procedures.

These approaches fail to highlight that, more often than not, there is a rational decision-making process behind both processes. According to rational choice theory, individuals make elections among a series of options based on their preferences, available information, and probability of events. This means that individuals have enough "agency" (Mahdavi, 2014) to assume "calculated, strategic behavior" (Simmons & Lloyd, 2010).

It is often assumed that the ideological component is exclusive to radicalization and engagement in violent extremism. Nonetheless, human trafficking is often a result of migration processes which were initially voluntary. Both engagement in extremism and migratory processes are produce of deliberate decision-making processes, and a desire to achieve better livelihoods.

Traffickers

In the realm of human trafficking, rational choice theory is solely applied to traffickers. Legal, established structures are used by organized criminal groups dedicated to obtaining profit from the delivery of illicit goods and services upon demand, while avoiding, through different methods, the regulations imposed on the profitability of their activities (Dammer & Albanese, 2013).

As Reinares and Resa (1999) put it, criminal organizations have managed to establish a "symbiotic" relationship between the traditional knowledge of contraband, new business opportunities, and the structural realities which difficult, or prevent, State prosecution. The profitability of human trafficking comes from the control that "monopolistically competitive sellers" have over the price at which they sell differentiated products (Wheaton et. al, 2010). Trafficked individuals will have different attributes which will make them useful for certain tasks. Human trafficking can perpetuate its activities over time because of the "social universe" (von Lampe, 2003) around it. It brings together criminals and those involved in the social system (politicians, law enforcers, entrepreneurs and other citizens) (Block A. , 1983). Human trafficking is, all in all, "'an opportunistic response' to the tensions between the economic necessity to migrate, on the one hand, and the politically motivated restrictions on migration, on the other." (Chuang J. , 2006). However, the discourse around human trafficking leaves trafficked individuals as "helpless victims" (Spencer & Broad, 2011).

Migration as a personal option

Contrary to common perceptions, human trafficking is, on many accounts, a result of a conscious decision to migrate. Human trafficking networks rely heavily on "false [job offer] advertisements" (IOM, 2002). For those who migrate, personal and economic efforts behind the migration process are compensated by the expectations of the positive outcome of re-establishing livelihoods in a new context. Human capabilities (knowledge, attitudes and conducts) enable the individual to increase his or her election probabilities to transform goods and services into achievements (Sen & Nussbaum, 1996). The possibility of adequately satisfying basic human needs determines the quality of life people may have (Max-Neef, 1991). Individual needs are satisfied by freely using available resources.

Personal well-being, understood as the satisfaction of needs, can be negatively affected by vulnerability if individuals lose capacity to face changes in the environment. Vulnerability is an *ex-ante* factor in cases of trafficking, given it is a combination of endogenous factors (capabilities) and exogenous ones (available resources, or capitals) (Triulzi & Tommasoli, 2003). A multifactorial and multidimensional process of losing adaptation capacities increases vulnerability, making individuals more prone to suffer the negative aspects of changes in the environment. Vulnerability has been largely identified as a key factor regarding human

trafficking. Many studies, both at a policy and at an academic level, suggest that it is lack of integration that causes individuals to make the conscious decision to migrate. The ecological model proposed by Bronfenbrenner serves us to explain the reason why vulnerability is a continuum. Bronfenbrenner's model links economic, social and psychological factors in the interaction between individuals and their context (Vargas Trujillo, Flórez, & Mendoza Simonds, 2011).

Individuals undergo an internal process prior to taking the decision to migrate. As s/he engages further in the idea of finding new ways to improve livelihoods, the higher the chances that s/he will accept job offers which are, at first glance, a solution to existing grievances. The decision to migrate derives from the impossibility to mobilize sufficient individual resources to survive inside a wider structure (of policies, institutions and processes) (Lindley, 2010). The individual's security is centered in fulfilling basic needs, as well as his or her integration in the community.[xxxviii] The lack of security in the economic and social aspects can affect the psychological factors, thus turning migration into a resource to be able to fulfill needs. The conditions under which s/he engages in the migratory process is what renders him or her vulnerable to exploitation.[xxxix] Desperation caused by the non-satisfaction of basic needs creates the gap through which traffickers can use deceit and fraud to recruit victims.

The same decision-making process applies to individuals who take the leap from radicalization into violent extremism. Personal grievances may be expressed in the form of radical opinions. However, the jump to actual violence is a result of an evaluation process. Participating in violence maximizes a utility or goal which compensates the results in case of failure (legal prosecution) (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002).

The rationality in terrorism

Radicalization implies a personal change, "product of cognitive and emotional processes of transformation" (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011). According to Wilner & Dubouloz (2011), the process of personal transformation can either be caused by a "transformative trigger" (a sudden shock in the environment, such as the sudden death of a loved one) or a less immediate, "cumulative process". Both result from vulnerabilities, or the incapacity to adapt to (new) circumstances. An individual adopts new perspectives (ideas), as well as new roles, relationships and behaviors under those circumstances. More specifically, "individual radicalization takes place during the changing phase in which a combination of reflection, knowledge acquisition, and identity reassessment occurs" (*ibid*).

The identification of grievances is what sets an individual on the quest to solve them and makes him or her more prone to external and new influences (indoctrination). As the individual

advances in his or her quest, and the quest turns into a moral obligation to solve existing grievances, the more prone an individual will be to external ideological input. As s/he engages further with like-minded individuals, the greater the chances of reinforcing those ideas and hence further isolating him or herself, thereby reinforcing new acquired beliefs and thoughts. Terrorist organizations encompass the material rewards of membership with the security of interpersonal bonds and the opportunities of a corporation, in combination with an ideology of a perceived deprivation (McCauley & Segal, 1987). There is an existing relationship between individual, horizontal, radicalization (ideologically distancing oneself from the established status quo) and the influence of the top-down ideological process of radicalization. Transitioning into violence, or "jihadization" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), is a two-fold process, which requires both internal changes and external influences.

Both internal and external factors influence radicalization and trafficking in human beings. In the same way individuals who migrates sees in migration a solution to existing grievances, those engaging in violent extremism are also in searching for personal improvement. Triggers for migration can be classified like those of Islamic "seekers" (Quantum Communications, 2015): political, economic, social and/or cultural. In cases of radicalization, vulnerabilities help trigger a self-reinforcing dynamic in which a horizontal, individual process of change (progressive radicalization) makes a top-down recruitment process easier for violent extremist groups.

Contrary to what a bottom-up approach suggests, radicalization and engagement in violent extremism are a reaction of discontent to certain dynamics. Vulnerabilities are indeed individual and subjective but vary depending on the individual recruit. Resorting to violence to address grievances also depends on the available resources and structures. Although there are authors who have suggested a bottom-up approach to studying organized crime (see Madsen, 2009), it is believed that participating in any of the existing forms of organized crime is a reaction to an establshed order, hence the importance of the broader contex.[xl] In the same way, terrorist groups respond to the urge of political change. They interact with established social structures and seek to change the status quo, or at least defend privileges that seem to be under threat (Crenshaw, 2009).

The role of ideology
Engagement in terror groups and human trafficking networks share the fact that they are both ideologically driven. Although the nature of the ideology differs, recruits in both situations make rational decisions based on a worldview presented to them by recruiters.

The ideological component behind engagement in political violence is clear. International dynamics have allowed for a landscape where certain countries to play a more prominent role than others in the international arena. Examples of this are abundant. One clear example that reflects this and which is very pertinent to this dissertation is the 'tug of war'-like direction the United Nations Security Council took in preparation to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In 2002, then-U.S. President George W. Bush formally started making his case for invading Iraq and to forcefully overthrow Sadaam Hussein's regime. Whilst U.S. NATO allies such as the United Kingdom and Spain agreed with the approach taken by the United States, key players such as Germany, Russia and France (the two latter ones having a veto right within the U.N. Security Council) opted for continued negotiations and diplomacy. After deliberation, United Nations' Security Council Resolution 1441 was adopted, which required compliance from the Iraqi government to a weapons inspection. Despite international diplomatic efforts, the U.S. Congress passed the 'Iraq Resolution' (formally, 'Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002,' or Public Law No. 107-243) in October 2002 and in early 2003 and its allies proceeded to invade Iraq and overthrow the regime.

The invasion of the country and the eventual withdrawal of international and U.S. troops left a political vacuum in Iraq that will be further discussed in Chapter 7. However, it is necessary to mention how those who benefitted from this political vacuum were the children of the 1991 Gulf War and the subsequent sanctions on Iraq, such as the Oil-for-Food program imposed by the United Nations in 1995. These sanctions reflect the interplay between international and international dynamics. Whilst the United Nations controlled "all revenues from Iraq's oil sales and contracts (…), procedures are slow, monies are withheld for war reparations, and Iraq's oil industry cannot obtain either investments or adequate spare parts," thereby creating one of the worst humanitarian crises in the country (Global Policy Forum, 2005). In the meantime, Sadaam Hussein's regime was able to pocket $1.8 billion (Otterman, 2005).

Jihadist groups, from Al-Qaeda to ISIS, have been able to weave in the national effects of international dynamics with a theological interpretation of events. As chapter 7 will detail further, aiding the Muslim brother worldwide is God's duty for the *ummah*. Plus, the reestablishment of the Caliphate is not just a fulfillment of the Muslim End of Times prophecy, but it is also the way of establishing God's rule on earth. Contributing to the implementation of God's way is seen as a means to improve one's livelihoods (and the life in the hereafter) from a theopolitical and social perspective. All in all, the ideology behind engagement in political violence (terrorism) is an answer to hopes and expectations within a given social reality.

According to Doezema (2002) the ideology behind human trafficking is very similar. More specifically, the author argues that, "The ideology of 'trafficking', and the political myths that are associated with it, are powerful not because they make lies seems believable, but because they express something of our social reality, because they are able to embody both our fears and our hopes." Although this statement refers to the social construction behind anti-trafficking policies, it also applies to the rationale behind initiating risky migratory processes that may result in human trafficking situations. An idea that rests on a 'from rags to riches' discourse is presented by traffickers to those who lack sufficient socioeconomic and, or political integration to be resilient in their current environment. This has been widely observed mainly in cases of human trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation, where women are attracted to the idea of becoming models or actresses (Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010). However, there are also less extreme cases where the decision to migrate or accept a given job offer is a result of an individual will to economically support oneself or other family members. As this chapter has illustrated, poverty and the incapacity to meet individual needs make migration a plausible option to improve livelihoods.

It is true that the ideology behind human trafficking does not emphasize the 'us vs. them' dichotomy espoused by terror groups. Therefore, the idea of creating a social movement based on identifying a common enemy is inexistent in cases of human trafficking. However, there is a common underlying ideological adherence in both situations, an ideology of non-compliance with the current status-quo and a determination to improve one's livelihoods or relationship with the environment. Whether it is an economic upgrade or a theological one, the truth is that recruiters are able to present a worldview which is attractive enough for individuals to free-willingly adhere to a network.

In summary…

Human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism are each multi-causal phenomenon. They are both sparked by a response to contextual and environmental vulnerabilities, as individuals strive to search for better livelihoods. Decisions are rational, based on individual agency, and ideologically driven. Whether the ideological component is economic (in the case of migration) or political/religious (in the case of engagement in terrorist organizations), imaginaries of an improved life are exploited by third parties who need labor to accomplish certain pre-established goals. Labor can take up the form of workers, as it occurs in human trafficking networks, or foot soldiers, in the case of politically violent groups.

Based on the definition of human trafficking in the Palermo Protocol, I conclude that human trafficking networks and terrorist groups have structural and operational similarities. This

includes recruitment processes and purpose of exploitation, given that both human trafficking networks and terrorist groups abuse vulnerabilities using fraudulent means. When expectations are not met, individuals are stripped from the agency which they initially used to initiate a migration process by accepting a (fraudulent) job offer or by considering that the Caliphate and living under *sharia* law would provide better livelihoods.

This chapter has helped further tease out the seemingly existing similarities between engagement in political violence and recruitment for human trafficking networks. Both processes are mainly a result of a rational-decision making process sparked by a need to answer individual needs within a given socioeconomic and political reality. Seeing that correlations and overlaps exist, it is necessary to further outline these similarities in order to explore whether the approach taken to human trafficking can be tailored to meet the needs of the CVE realm.

In order to do so, the following chapter sets forth the methodological approach taken not only to answer my overriding hypothesis, but also to answer the research questions. The main points raised in this chapter will be further illustrated by using ISIS as a case study.

Chapter 5. Methodology

In order to confirm or disconfirm the overriding hypothesis of this dissertation, I aim at answering how the elements of the crime of human trafficking (abuse of vulnerability and exploitation) apply to ISIS' recruitment methods (see section *Hypothesis and research questions*). Answering these questions leads into a second set of research questions, regarding whether rehabilitation and reintegration mechanisms employed with human trafficking survivors would be applicable to former jihadist extremists, including foreign fighters.

When correlating human trafficking and jihadism, he first thing that comes to mind is the buying and selling of Yazidi women (Callimachi, 2015; Otten, 2017a; 2017b; Callimachi, 2017). Academia has further reinforced this discourse, by highlighting how human trafficking is an illegal activity through which terror groups, such as ISIS, finance themselves (Shelley, 2010; Mahdavi, 2014; Napoleoni, 2016). However, deeper correlations between both phenomena, like the one I posit with regard to recruitment mechanisms have not yet been explored.

In order to further explore this, I will utilize discourse analysis. Discourse analysis has been defined as the consideration of "the larger discourse context in order to understand how it affects the meaning of the sentence" (Tannen, 2012). In other words, it is the analysis of the language in use and what the language is used for, taking into account its transactional (content, or the communication of information) and interactional functions (social relations - does not always require information giving, but also contributing statements to advance a conversation) (Brown & Yule, 1983). Social constructivism claims language constitutes social reality and plays a key role in shaping our perceptions of it (Alvesson & Karreman, 2000; Butcher & Atkison, 2001). Paraphrasing Berger and Luckmann (1967), language constructs social reality. For the purpose of this dissertation, I will examine what is said with regard to how ISIS relates to human trafficking (transactional function) and who contributes to the advancement of that discourse (interactional function).

This dissertation takes a linear approach to studying ISIS' recruitment methods and how they resemble those employed by human trafficking networks. The discourse analysis is an intermediary step between the literature review and an in-depth case study. Rather than determining cause and effect, case studies seek to provide a detailed narrative description, qualitative in nature, of a phenomenon. Case studies have been recognized as a useful technique to examine community-based problems (Johnson M. , 2006).

In this case, the goal of this case study is to understand whether reintegration and rehabilitation approaches utilized with human trafficking survivors would be applicable to (former) extremists, including returning foreign fighters. While no generalized prescription can

be derived from a single study, case studies can provide the particularization necessary to both generate and validate conceptual and theoretical frameworks (Stake, 1978; Flyvbjerg, 2016).

Why Discourse Analysis?

An initial literature review has proven that there is a dearth of empirical research in the field of human trafficking (see, for instance, Tyldum & Brunovskis, 2005; Brunovskis & Surtees, 2010: Gozdziak & Bump, 2008; Gozdziak et. al, 2014) and in the field of CVE (see, for instance, Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010; Pisiou, 2013). No study has yet thoroughly analyzed similarities between human trafficking and ISIS nor highlighted the benefits of approaching recruitment for terrorism through the same lens and methodologies used to study and combat human trafficking. A preliminary academic literature review shows no framework that links both phenomena. In fact, the first attempts to correlate the two are very recent.

In 2015, Ashley Binetti pointed out that some of ISIS' recruits could fall under national or international definitions of human trafficking (Binetti, 2017). She explains how including the recruitment (of females) into ISIS under the legal definitions of trafficking in persons would influence the legal interpretation of the actions performed by trafficked individuals, and how the international community should design counter-terrorism policies and research agenda. In late 2016, the Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) published a report that recommended the approach utilized by the U.S. Government in its Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Reports as being a useful tool to establish international principles to combat extremism. Nonetheless, the TIP has been criticized for being a unilateral mechanism established by the United States government (Gallagher A. T., 2011), and for relying on prosecution rather than on prevention strategies (Horning et. al, 2014). The U.S.'s TIP has also been criticized because, "some figures for trafficked victims refer to all migrants who sell sex, while others require proof that the victims knew nothing about what was happening" (Agustin, 2008).

Although Binetti's and CSIS' contributions are a step forward, they raise a series of questions. Why is the correlation between ISIS and human trafficking networks made mainly in the context of prosecution, and regarding female 'victims'? Is this interpretation of correlations part of a broader discourse? In other words, are these correlations part of "macro-discourse" (context, or the overall portrayal of the subject), or are they an isolated "micro-discourse" (in-group) (Talib & Fitzgerald, 2016)? If they are not part of a broader discourse, is it because no correlation between human trafficking and recruitment on behalf of ISIS actually exists? Or is it a result of the way in which 'human trafficking' is understood? The first, second and fourth questions are answered by discourse analysis. Discourse analysis helps account for the text and the context. That is, what is said (how are ISIS and human trafficking networks similar?) and where, when and by whom.

Language is driven by discourse (Alvesson & Karreman, 2016), defined as the social reality in which texts develop and evolve. Texts are not solely the reflection of "discoursive mycrodynamics of individual decisions" (Phillips & Hardy, 2002), but they also reflect the social reality in which these decisions are taken, as well as the discursive structures of that context. According to Foucault (1972; 1991), precursor of discourse analysis, discourse is merely a representation of reality which is culturally constructed. For instance, anthropologist Laura Agustin has claimed that data gathered to elaborate the annual TIP is based on "guesstimates" (Agustin, 2008) driven from a lack of cross-cultural and cross-class understanding. She illustrates this further by recalling how her AIDS prevention work in the Caribbean led her to engage with families who were actually proud that their daughters were able to support them by selling sex abroad. The apparent socio-cultural differences between 'being a prostitute' and 'being the breadwinner' remind one of the old adagio, 'one man's terrorist, is another man's freedom fighter.' Both examples serve to explain how concepts and their meaning are shaped by context.

Moreover, discourse helps explain how a determined concept emerges and the reasons why it is given a determined meaning in a given historical context (Balzacq, 2011). Because discourses are a product of the interaction between text and context (Phillips & Hardy, 2002) and can therefore vary across time and space. In 2015, the Evolving Concepts of Security (EvoCs) project was launched as an attempt to advise European security stakeholders (including the European Commission) on security concepts across four different areas (North-Western EU; West-Mediterranean EU; Eastern EU border; South-Eastern Europe). The assessment was aimed at defining different European security concepts, as well as "the salience of their respective core values, actors, levels, security challenges (threats, hazards, risks), and ethical and human rights issues" (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015). Different political actors across the different geographical areas give priority to different core values and perceive risks differently, and hence address them differently at different points in time. These results explain how the conceptualization of a given term (security) is influenced by the interaction between different discourses (texts within and as a result of different contexts).

Kerr (1995; in Phillips & Hardy, 2002; Balzacq,2011) points out how producing complex social meanings (discourse) is indeed a combination of "both the histories of both the participants in the production of the text and the institutions which are "invoked" or brought into play," as a result of existing relations of power between the two. Foucault (1972; 1991a) would argue that it is not just a matter of power dynamics, but that discourse (re-)produces both knowledge and power simultaneously. That is, the predominant discourse and its social system are a produce of selection, exclusion and domination (Young, 1981). Foucault (1981b; 1981c) explains this as a result of "external systems of exclusion," namely the "taboos, rituals and

privileges of the speaking subject."

Weitzer's work (2007) on human trafficking serves to illustrate Foucault's point. Weitzer (2007) refers to the ideological and institutionalized "crusades" behind sex trafficking. The author speaks about the "moral crusades" (applying ethical criteria to the nature and essence of sex trafficking and hence explaining why it is bad) and "symbolic" ones, in other words, the objective of providing relief to victims and eradicating the problem. This distinction taps directly into Soderlund's findings (2011) stemming from her analysis of the public discourse surrounding human trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation.

Soderlund revealed the critical role the press played in constructing the narrative around sex trafficking, and it also contributed to the establishment of a methodology for gathering facts and reaching conclusions regarding prostitution and sex slavery. The overall takeaway from Soderlund's publication is that sex trafficking is largely a cultural construction based on "language and institutional discourses". The sociological reality of forced prostitution is known through second-hand accounts represented by institutions, human rights organizations, media and entertainment, as well as religious and feminist groups. All these groups shape each other's discourse and perceptions as far as sex trafficking goes.

The aim of utilizing discourse analysis to explore the construction of public debates around ISIS is not to apply discourse analysis in strictly Foucauldian terms. In other words, the aim of utilizing discourse analysis is not to examine the potential privileged "subject-positions" (Foucault M. , 1977) that could result from producing the discourse around ISIS and its recruitment mechanisms, but rather study the power dynamics between the different participants in the discourse (Fairclough, 1995). For the purpose of this dissertation and this discourse analysis, I understand 'power' relations as the amount of discourse produced by different discourse communities, or social groups that share collective symbols and that allow for specialized discourse (Balzacq, 2011). That is, through discourse analysis, I intend to identify 'who' dominates the discourse with regard to ISIS and human trafficking. As a result, I can answer whether an awareness gap in the general public actually exists.

By identifying the dominant discourse community, discourse analysis also serves to understand 'what' is being presented as truth (Foucault, 1972; 1991a). In other words, the language utilized by a given discourse community might be understood as the norm, especially discourse produced by a dominant discourse community. For instance, ISIS has been known to buy and sell Yazidi women (Callimachi, 2015), something which would be considered textbook case of human trafficking. Is human trafficking associated to ISIS solely regarding this kind of practices? Discourse analysis also helps determine which issues are raised as primordial and how they come together to construct a given social reality. Moreover, it can be used to determine why

a given discourse may prevent an empirical approach to a given issue.

LexisNexis: the database and the methods

By conducting a discourse analysis, I aim to clarify whether or not there exists an awareness of the relationship between ISIS and human trafficking, as well as the nature of this potential association. The objective is to clarify whether these hypothetical correlations are part of a broader public discourse, and the reasons for the presence or the absence of such stream of discourse. In order to do so, and following the definitions of discourse analysis presented above, it is necessary for me to examine not only the discourse and its nature (what is said) but also the frequency with which it occurs and who (what actors) push the discourse forwards.

In order to try and answer these questions, I used LexisNexis (LN), an academic database that provides access to open source documents of different nature. Texts analyzed have been chosen because of their political nature. This is not to say that they are in all cases elaborated at a political level, but rather that they contribute to political decision-making. Policymaking is ultimately the arena that requires influenced if alternative measures to deal with former ISIS members, including returning foreign fighters, are to become part of any national structure. As mentioned above, media and academia influence the broader discourse, and ultimately influence the political sphere. Given the existing difficulty in legally determining the existence of human trafficking cases, results obtained in the text analysis would require triangulation through interviews with experts on the matter. However, the fact that there is no established theoretical framework in academia that links human trafficking to recruitment for jihad, any answers would be skewed by specialization bias (see section *Analyzing secondary data*).

I selected LN because it allows for a more detailed and specific search that other academic datasets, such as Google Scholar (GS). There are two main reasons why I disregarded GS as a tool for this discourse analysis: not only is it a search engine rather than a database, but also the results it provides are exclusively related to academia and therefore does not allow me to account for the different actors involved in the discourse of ISIS and human trafficking. LN allows me to paint a broader picture of who (if anybody) is pushing the 'ISIS-human trafficking' discourse forward. In addition, it also employs Boolean terms in a manner that allows for more complex and specific searches than GS.

Boolean terms allow users to combine keywords and operators (modifiers) to obtain more pertinent results. Examples of modifiers are AND (all terms included in the search must be included in the results), AND NOT (to exclude specific terms), and OR (if at least one of the terms included in the search must appear in the results). LN also allows for semantical searches, given it includes wildcards. For instance, traffick! will return "trafficking", trafficked" and "trafficker". To tailor findings even further, the search option enables for proximity searches

(determining how far apart two search terms are within a given number of words on a sentence or paragraph) and determining the minimum number of times a search term must appear in the text for it to be considered relevant (ATLEAST function). Further refinements are available by date, geographical area and type of document required.

LexisNexis database was accessed through the Georgetown University Library. The home page of the database enables searching for the desired terms; for the purpose of this research, the Advanced Options were considered more appropriate. The table below (Table 1) shows the search terms or core values I selected to perform the search with LN. Core care values refer to the different aspects (what) that make up the discourse around ISIS recruitment and its relation to human trafficking (how). Forty-two different searches were conducted and are detailed in Annex 1.

Table 1 - Core values inserted in LexisNexis

Core Value	Justification
Islamic State, ISIS, DAESH	The terrorist group is referred to in different ways. Although the acronym DAESH has not been used throughout this study, it is important to check how it is used and appropriated by certain speakers. Seeing that the construction of the Caliphate and joining it has a theological connotation, using the acronym DAESH may hurt certain religious sensibilities. The acronym IS will not be used, to avoid compromising the reliability of results, since it can be confused with the third person singular of the verb "to be".
Trafficking	It is included in a generic manner, and not specifically as human trafficking. The goal of this is to see what forms of trafficking (such as drugs and arms trafficking) are mentioned with the acknowledged reality of and may help construct the discourse of ISIS being involved in other forms of organized crime, and how these might be used as a form of financing the organization.
Exploitation	Because human trafficking takes up different forms, it is necessary to understand what exactly is understood by *trafficking* and if different forms of exploitation are more prevalent than others in the public discourse.

In order to fully examine the context of the discourse around human trafficking and ISIS, I need to account for actors (who), the time-frame within which the discourse occurs (when) and the geographical locations where the discourse takes place. The Venn diagram below shows that the intersection of ISIS, trafficking and exploitation (centre) is dependent on actors, time and

location.

Diagram 1 - The ISIS discourse and who it is constructed

The table below (Table 2) shows the different contextual elements that interact to construct the discourse around ISIS and its reality. These elements comprise the actors or speakers (who is the source and disseminator of the discourse), the time frame (when is the discourse produced) and the geographical location where the discourse is produced by the speakers during different periods of time.

Table 2 - The ISIS discourse: elements

Element of discourse	Justification
Actor (speaker)	This work does not identify actors prior to the analysis of discourse. Rather, by inserting determined search term, it is expected that the academic databases will provide the map of actors involved in the construction of the discourse around ISIS and recruitment, and how it is associated to human trafficking. I check whether texts come from academia, the media, policy makers or the private sector. The higher the number of texts issued by a determined speaker, the higher the contribution to the construction of the discourse.
Time	For the construction of the discourse to appropriately examined,

	it is necessary to take the context into account, as well as how the discourse has evolved over time. This reflects how the treatment of an issue may vary across time, and even how different speakers may have become more or less relevant over time. The evolution of the discourse over time has been broken up into different time periods. In all cases, the starting point is June 29th, 2014, date when the Caliphate was first established, and Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was proclaimed Caliph. The construction of the discourse is divided into six months periods in order to check for any fluctuations in the production of discourse, and to account for the context. For instance, it is expected that the publications regarding ISIS and recruitment will increase in periods where salient events took place, such as the Bataclan attacks in November 2015.
Location	Geographical location account for the areas of the world in which the speakers focus when touching upon a phenomenon. It would also be necessary to examine the geographical areas that the texts focus on. Unfortunately, LexisNexis does not account for the geographical areas. Although it does show locations, a closer look at results reveals that locations are either repeated or misplaced, therefore compromising the results.

There is no a priori sample selection. Rather, search terms are inserted into LN's Advanced Options and the database provides the number of results. These were sorted out according to the nature of the source, and entered to a spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel) that enables data manipulation and can answer statistical needs. To quantitatively show results, and because the total number of observations varies depending on the search terms, the comparison between observations is done in terms of percentages. In order to examine what kind of source (media, newspapers, journals...) accounts for what percentage of total observations, I calculate percentages according to the total number of observations. This procedure enables to check what type of source is predominant in the discourse depending on the search terms. Comparison is possible because percentages of observations according to search terms are measured in absolute terms. Results are transformed into graphs using Excel; graphs serve to compare the total number of texts produced by type of source, in order to verify what kind of sources most contribute to ISIS discourse building.

Despite the results of this analysis being relevant, there are limitations to the study. In first instance, results have been limited to English-language sources. Including other languages, especially Arabic, would provide a broader insight into how the discourse of ISIS is constructed worldwide, and whether certain issues are more salient depending on the area. Nonetheless, these

flaws can also be opportunities for further research. A joint assessment of Western and jihadist media and propaganda (the latter in Arabic) can enable going beyond the 'us vs. them,' given that it would allow for comparing two different social constructs and would be seemingly useful for better understanding the complex dynamic behind voluntary enrolment in ISIS. This seems to be even more crucial as ISIS loses territory and seems to be reverting to a virtual caliphate (Morton & Silber, 2018). The web facilitates the promotion of ideas and the exploitation of grievances, as well as the creation of hubs and "echo chambers" (ibid) where they can be further reinforced, hence increasing the threat of engagement.

It is true that discourse analysis may not necessarily help to empirically prove or disprove the overriding hypothesis of this dissertation. It does, however, set the precedent to understanding how the discourse around ISIS and human trafficking is constructed. Discourse analysis is also the lead way into altering the general discourse and into new developments. The literature review has proven that there is a lack of academic awareness as far as establishing parallels between human trafficking and engagement in terror networks. The academy is the intermediary between policy makers and the public as much as policy makers and politicians are dependent on public discourse. A change in discourse could thereby impact public consciousness.

The question then becomes: is altering the discourse necessary? Do the hypothetical parallels between human trafficking and terror groups actually exist? In order to answer those questions, a simple discourse analysis proves insufficient.

Why a case study?

A discourse analysis may not necessarily help prove or disprove my hypothesis empirically, but it creates a pathway into observations that do document those similarities. If the discourse analysis proves negative (that is, there is no public awareness of the parallels between recruitment methods employed by ISIS and those utilized by human trafficking networks), it would still be necessary to employ a technique that would provide sufficient evidence to become a control mechanism of sorts, and could account for any overlooked dynamics and intersections. If, on the other hand, the discourse analysis proves positive (public awareness does exist) it would be necessary to try and understand why academia is not approaching the issue empirically. In relation to this, further exploring the potential similarities between human trafficking and recruitment for ISIS would provide additional evidence to push the issue within the realm of academia and, consequently, in the policy-making ambit.

The best way to obtain in-depth comprehension of the underlying dynamics of ISIS' recruitment methods and whether or not they actually resemble those employed by human trafficking networks is to conduct a case study. The case study research method is defined by Yin (1984) as "an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life

context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used" (Yin, 1984). In essence, case studies explore real-life issues or phenomenon using a detailed analysis of the context of a limited number of events and how they interrelate. Following Yin (1994), a single case study allows for a diachronic, longitudinal approach to collect data through micro-level observations, analyze that information and report results. This approach has been successfully employed in the field of education (Bowen et. al, 1992; Gulsecen & Kubat, 1997; McDonough & McDonough, 1997; Merriam, 1998), healthcare (Sculpher, et al., 2004; Taylor & Berridge, 2006), logistics (Ellram, 1996), and business (Lowi, 1964; Lazega & Pattison, 1999; Welch et. al, 2010; Alavi & Gallupe, 2017), among others.

Yin (1984) himself acknowledges the shortcomings of using case studies as a research methodology. There are two main criticisms two this approach, mainly that case studies lack scientific rigor and fail to address issues related to generalization (Tellis, 1997; Noor, 2008). The lack of scientific rigour can be safeguarded by providing outcomes based on a detailed account of a phenomenon, including its history (origins and evolution), its activities and how it relates to any other phenomenon or issue (Yin, 1994). While authors like Campell (1975) argue that a multiple-case design is better suited to replication through pattern-matching and thereby arriving at some theoretical proposition, and while it is true that no generalized prescription can be derived from a single study, case studies can provide the particularization necessary to both generate and validate conceptual and theoretical frameworks (Stake, 1978; Flyvbjerg, 2016). Because the resulting theory is usually "novel, testable, and empirically valid," (Eisenhart, 1989) a single case study is an appropriate research approach when addressing new issues or topic areas.

Using a single case study as methodological approach allows to inductively document existing similarities between recruitment methods employed by ISIS and those utilized by human trafficking networks. If I document that the general academic and journalistic discourse has not made the connection between human trafficking and jihadist terrorism but I am able to document these similarities in an inductive manner, I can tease out the theoretical framework that might allow future works to test my hypothesis further and to do so empirically. The whole methodological approach is therefore a step towards empiricism.

Method: ISIS and human trafficking

The real-life issue this dissertation talks about could not be timelier or more pertinent. At least 7,700 Western foreign fighters plus another 35,000 extremists from over 120 countries answered ISIS' call for *hijra* (migration) (Ranstorp, en Vidino, Mareno, & Entenmann, 2017), making it the most 'popular' terrorist group in history. About one fifth (6,000) of Syrian foreign fighters came from the West, mainly Europe (Kroet, 2016). North America is

underrepresented. 130 came from Canada (Neumann P. , 2015) and between 100 and 300 traveled from the United States (Karadsheh et. al, 2014). The process by which individuals became radicalized to the extent that they would engage in violence (either travel to ISIS-held territory or committing lone wolf attacks) has occupied the mind of researchers since ISIS declared its so-called Caliphate on June 29th, 2014. The risk of attacks made ISIS the biggest security threat to Western nations in recent years.

In December 2017, The Iraqi government announced that the war against ISIS was over. As ISIS lost territory, 30% of foreign fighters returned to their countries of origin; in countries like Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom, this percentage reached 50% (RAN, 2017). More concrete figures estimate that at least 5,600 extremist travelers from 33 countries have returned (The Soufan Center, 2017), while even more have been captured and now sit in prison or refugee camps in Iraq and Syria. After defeating ISIS, the West now faces the conundrum of what measures need to be implemented to deal with those returning home. The fact that that European Muslims are nearly 16 times overrepresented among foreign fighters when compared to figures for Muslims traveling from other regions of the world (Reinares, 2017), makes the issue of returning foreign fighters all the more complicated from a social and policy standpoint.

Academic research has shown that there is no one-size-fits-all radicalization and engagement process. Hence, it cannot be assumed that all the potential returnees were equally involved in ISIS' ranks, and that they will present the same type and degree of threat to their communities of origin. However, the large numbers of potential returnees makes it impossible to tailor programs to every individual, mainly due to difficulties in allocating resources. It is therefore necessary to try and come up with an alternative that would allow for a case by case approach while also taking into consideration the structural factors that were involved in the individual radicalization and how they can be reversed to address the issue of rehabilitation and reintegration.

The case-by-case approach taken with human trafficking survivors seems like a promising path. It not only takes into account individual needs, but it also provides a framework in which contextual factors (communities and state agents and bodies) are involved. Seeing that radicalization and engagement in violent extremism is the result of an interaction between individual and contextual variables, a lot could be learned from what has already been done in the field of human trafficking. In order to explore that possibility, the hypothetical correlations between ISIS and human trafficking networks concerning recruitment have to be further examined.

Moreover, there have been ongoing conversations about ISIS' transition into a 'virtual caliphate' (see, for example, Morton & Silber, 2018). By operating in the virtual realm, chances

are that online grooming and recruitment increase exponentially. Online recruitment is a technique that is not unfamiliar to human traffickers (Belser, 2005). In addition, as takedown strategies govern the online approach to the terrorist group, it is likely that identification of at-risk individuals becomes more complicated, and that ISIS will benefit from being pushed away into the dark web.

The above mentioned issues justify a preliminary exploration of if and how ISIS' recruitment techniques resemble those employed by human trafficking networks. Pulling from the holistic approach to human trafficking, I suggest that the most integral way to approach engagement in terrorism is to study its recruitment mechanisms. Recruitment is key because it encompasses the pre-recruitment stages, and it assists in enhancing prevention through its relationship to grievance and vulnerability. On the other hand, it also helps understand the reverse procedures that need to take place to obtain effective rehabilitation and reintegration, and therefore prevent recidivism. Were similarities between ISIS and human trafficking networks to exist, then there is room for exploration of how what is already being implemented with regard to human trafficking survivors may prevent the CVE space from trying to reinvent the wheel when dealing with these issues.

Unfortunately, though understandably so, satisfying Yin's (1984) criteria of studying the phenomenon 'in context' has been impossible due to security concerns and risks. ISIS-held territory is essentially a war zone, something that also accounts for the fact that no prior field work or first-hand data collection took place before initiating this research. In addition, it would have been impossible for me to examine the process of grooming, radicalization and potential engagement as it unfolds. Posing online as a potential recruit, or even not reporting an ongoing process of recruitment, would almost certainly bring about legal consequences. In order to account for the context, and accounting for the fact that my data gathering has been restricted to secondary sources, I will cover the historical evolution of ISIS, its ideological basis, and how these two elements interact with the macro and micro structural variables that make recruitment effective.

Analyzing secondary sources

The case study has been conducted through the exhaustive analysis of secondary sources. Secondary sources were selected based on relevance to the hypothesis I aim to test. These include reports (n = 15) and interviews (n = 5) conducted among survivors of human trafficking, as well as reports (n = 15) and interviews (n = 5) with former ISIS extremists. Reports and interviews contain pertinent information to the topic at stake, mainly the pre-recruitment, recruitment and period of engagement. Although my sample could be criticized for selection bias, the reader should consider the fact that both areas of expertise (human trafficking and radicalization studies) are plagued with the same issue. For instance, I was unable to find any studies that were conducted

among radicals who did not go on to commit violence. All in all, there are no existing control groups.

The reason why these secondary sources were selected is because it is a first interpretation of the resemblance of recruitment methods employed by ISIS and those utilized by human trafficking networks. By elaborating on this monograph and providing an accurate interpretation of these similarities, I intend to account for the existing academic deficit on the issue, in order to promote a potentially alternative integral approach to the field of (de-) radicalization studies. This, of course, is dependent on the outcomes or observations, that is, on whether the hypothesis is ultimately proven. Basically, I am at answering the question of whether altering the discourse on ISIS and trafficking is ultimately necessary.

Reports and interviews were then coded for themes. The table below (Table 3) shows the three elements of the crime of trafficking that make up the crime of human trafficking. Interviews and reports conducted among human trafficking survivors are bound to contain those elements, otherwise interviewees would not have been included in the first place (Tyldum & Brunovskis, 2005; Brunovskis & Surtees, 2010). The aim is to show whether these categories are also present in the discourse of former ISIS members.

Table 3 - Human Trafficking: the elements to analyze

Category	Question to be answered	Explanation
Vulnerability	Did individuals have grievances prior to being recruited? Did recruiters appeal to those grievances?	"Trafficking in persons" is defined as "the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or **use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception**, of the **abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability** or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.
Recruitment	Did the individual voluntarily engage in the group?	
Exploitation	Were individuals performing tasks on behalf of third parties? What kind of tasks? Were they able to free-willingly abandon their positions? Why or why not?	The Palermo Protocol states that "Exploitation shall include, **at a minimum**, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of **sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs**"

Despite the above-mentioned criticisms to case studies as a research method, the issue at stake leaves little room for alternative approaches. Firstly, as I have already discussed in the justification for this dissertation, the ISIS phenomenon is far from over. Even if we were to disregard the possible emergence of new jihadist groups, or the re-emergence of old ones, we are still in the midst of uncovering the full extent of ISIS' effects. Documents are still being recovered (Callimachi, 2018), and individuals are still returning. Therefore, the data available is far from complete.

I have also discussed the impossibility of obtaining first-hand data due to security concerns. In a hypothetical situation where I would have had access to former ISIS recruits, my dissertation would have had to overcome the lack of relevance of results obtained from a small sample size, selection bias and lack of reliability. The number of those incarcerated and waiting for trial for involvement in a foreign terrorist group is not high, therefore limiting my access to a sample size that would be significant. In his work "*Understanding Terror Networks*", Marc Sageman (2004) correctly points out that given that most data is provided by journalists, "results are somewhat biased towards leaders and unusual cases, and tends to ignore those who cannot be investigated and downplay the rank and file." In other words, the appropriateness of my sample would have been tainted by my awareness of the most relevant cases.

Individuals who purposefully downplayed their participation within the organization would have probably gone unnoticed. In addition, I would have had to consider that those who would be part of my sample may be under extenuating circumstances (awaiting trial or cooperating with authorities) and may not provide reliable accounts. Moreover, I would have had to consider other issues which are way beyond my expertise, such as the fact that they may not have yet recovered from any traumatic experiences in the battlefield and the fact that their accounts might be "subject to the biases of self-report and flawed memory" (Sageman, 2008). The same bias would apply to experts and practitioners in both fields. The lack of a common theoretical or empirical framework between human trafficking and radicalization and terrorism studies would make any commentary provided by experts and practitioners biased because of their specialization and clustering of expertise and knowledge.

Through this single case study of ISIS I intend to document how recruitment methods employed by the group resemble those employed by human trafficking networks. The goal is to be able to add further nuance to any results provided by the discourse analysis. If the analysis shows no interaction but observations from the study case do document that those similarities exist, the original hypothesis can be justified for further research and also draw hypothesis for further testing in the field of practice. That is, this contrast between data provided by discourse analysis and observations produced by ISIS' case study could potentially prove that we should

experiment in applying techniques addressed to deal with human trafficking survivors to former jihadist extremists, including returning foreign fighters.

In summary...

There is a dearth of academic literature that links ISIS (or any terror group) to human trafficking beyond implying that human trafficking is solely a financing mechanism. The only two attempts to correlate both fields of study are gender-biased and more focused on the prosecution aspect of the crime rather than on firmly establishing where this hypothetical correlation stems from. This limited view on the overall phenomenon led me to wonder whether this narrow approach was part of a broader "macro-discourse," and whether it was a result of the generalized but limited understanding of the crime of human trafficking.

These questions are easily answered by utilizing discourse analysis as a means of analyzing not only what is said and how both phenomena intersect in the eyes of the public, academia and policymakers, but also who are the main speakers or actors pushing this type of discourse forward. Whether or not there exists a public awareness of how human trafficking and ISIS intersect, and how recruitment mechanisms utilized by traffickers and terrorist recruiters are parallel sets the precedent to understanding how the discourse around ISIS and human trafficking is constructed. Discourse analysis is also the leadway into altering the general discourse and into new developments. The academy is the intermediary between policy makers and the public as much as policy makers and politicians are dependent on public discourse. A change in discourse could thereby impact public consciousness.

In order to examine whether a change of discourse is actually necessary, I add nuance to the data extracted from the discourse analysis and go on to conduct a case study on ISIS. Using a single case study as methodological approach allows to inductively document existing similarities between recruitment methods employed by ISIS and those utilized by human trafficking networks. If I document that the general academic and journalistic discourse has not made the connection between human trafficking and jihadist terrorism but I am able to document these similarities in an inductive manner, I can tease out the theoretical framework that might allow future works to test my hypothesis further and to do so empirically. All in all the original hypothesis can be justified for further research and also draw hypothesis for further testing in the field of practice. The whole methodological approach is therefore a step towards empiricism.

Chapter 6. The discourse analysis

The previous chapter outlined the existing similarities between human trafficking networks and violent extremist (terrorist) groups. Similarities exist at an organizational level and at an individual level, including the behavior of both members and recruits. Despite these similarities, it was not until the end of 2016 that a document published by Centre for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS) recommended that the approach utilized by the U.S. Government in its Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Reports would be a useful tool to establish international principles to combat extremism. No study has yet thoroughly analyzed these similitudes nor highlighted the benefits of approaching recruitment for terrorism through the same lens and methodologies used to study and combat human trafficking.

Results

A preliminary approach to the construction of the discourse regarding ISIS, recruitment and human trafficking depicts a first explanation regarding salient issues, as well as the evolution of the discourse. Regarding salient issues or topics, the overall results from June 29th, 2014, until March 29th, 2017, several conclusions are drawn from the observations and the analysis of aggregated results. Data processing reveals that the main concern regarding the terrorist organization is recruitment, since the frequency with which these two search terms appear together is even larger than the number of observations resulting from inserting *ISIS/DAESH* as an individual term, as shown on Figure 2 below.


Figure 2 - The ISIS Discourse: text input

This is also corroborated by data shown in Figure 3, which shows how results or number of observation for *ISIS/DAESH* and *ISIS/DAESH+recruit!* walk hand in hand for the period of analysis. Results hit a peak in the period from June 30th, 2015, to December 30th, 2015.

Despite the total number of terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIS in 2016 is higher than the total number of attacks for 2015 (23 vs. 37), the difference in numbers is explained because of the study of observations in 6-month periods. There were 13 ISIS attacks in the second half of 2015, 7 less than in the first half of the following year. However, 2015 accounted for the biggest terrorist attack perpetrated by ISIS affiliated individuals in European soil: 130 people were killed and another 360 injured in an attack which included hostage taking and shooting in a concert hall in Paria, as well as a suicide attack in the surrounding area of a soccer stadium.

Although 2016 is the bloodiest year with regards to ISIS attacks, the first half of 2015 was, until then, the deadliest period since the establishment of the Caliphate. In contrast to the 481 casualties in the first half of 2016,the period from July to December 2015 (both included) resulted in 788 casualties. Not surprisingly, this unexpected increase in attacks in 2015 probably also accounts for the fact that it is the only period when the number of observations for *ISIS/DAESH* is higher than when the search terms also include *recruitment* (Figure 3).


Figure 3 - ISIS and Recruitment: the discourse

The same period (June 30th, 2015 - December 30th, 2015) also accounts for the maximum number of observations with regards to input related to ISIS/DAESH and trafficking, as well as a discourse which related ISIS/DAESH and trafficking to recruitment (see Figure 4).

In order to determine what sources consider recruitment to be trafficking, the number of observations accounted for with regards to the search terms *ISIS/DAESH+traffick!* were reviewed. It is important to note that although LexisNexis Academic compiles documents, not all of them are representative for the analysis. Of all the observations recovered with the above search terms, almost 40% were coded under "other". This category was used for those documents that did mention both ISIS/DAESH and different form of trafficking but did not relate both phenomena. This occurred with documents such as transcripts of congressional hearings, where different topics are touched upon, but are not necessarily related.

Figure 4 - The evolution on the discourse of ISIS over time

The majority of observations actually refer to illicit activities which ISIS undertakes to finance itself. These activities are mainly related to organized crime activities, such as drug and arms trafficking, money laundering and illicit oil trade. However, not all the results mention the transnational nature of those activities: only 23% of the texts retrieved specifically refer to these crimes as being trans-border, and therefore, transnational.

It is important to note that the crime of migrant smuggling is also a crime commonly associated to ISIS and its finances, as explained in the introductory chapter. However, in over 70% of the cases it is mentioned as human trafficking. In order to fully understand the nature of ISIS's illicit activities it is paramount for these activities to be clearly defined. The second chapter of this dissertation already spoke about the differences in nature and legal implications (at both a national and international level) between migrant smuggling and human trafficking. The fact that ISIS would be either operating in areas traditionally known to be harbors for migrant smugglers does not involve the terrorist group in crimes of human trafficking, neither in the cases when it is

mentioned that ISIS smuggles its recruits into EU territory. Only if exploitation occurs can references be made to human trafficking. Those retrieved observations which do specifically refer to human trafficking, mostly simply mention the crime without mentioning the form of human trafficking at stake (47%). The cases in which further details are provided, human trafficking is related to the kidnapping, enslavement and sales of Yazidi women (56%) and child trafficking (16%) or both (28%).

Revision of the observations also reveals a noteworthy activity related to ISIS and human trafficking: the purpose of trafficking in organs. The crime of human trafficking with the purpose of organ removal is probably one of the most complicated forms of this crime to determine. Proving the elements of fraud and/or coercion is the most complicated issue when trying to determine the crime of human trafficking with the purpose of organ removal, especially when trying to distinguish it from what would simply be trafficking in organs (Table 1).

Table 4 - Human trafficking and organ removal (Source: United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking, 2017)

Typology of crime	Description
Illegal organ trade	The "donors" agree to get an organ extracted in exchange for economic benefits. The organ is later sold in the black market.
Exploitation derived from illegal organ extraction - trafficking in organs	The "donors" formally or informally agree to sell an organ, and this activity turns, but are not paid for the transaction or are paid less than promised.
Human trafficking to the purpose of organ removal	Includes the cases where victims have been tricked into giving up an organ, as well as those cases in which organs are removed without the victim knowing.

The above differentiation is a good representation of what occurs in the broader realm of studies regarding both human trafficking and CVE. The lack of terminological precision entails both cognitive and legal consequences: not only does it prevent a true, in-depth understanding of the phenomenon at stake, but it also hinders the elaboration of appropriate legal approaches and policies to deal with the issue. The increase was, most likely, not solely due to the increase in deaths caused in ISIS-related attacks. February 2015 witnessed the voluntary enrolment of three British Muslim teenagers, who fled their home in London to join the Caliphate. The large moral connotation associated to joining what is considered a terrorist organization, was probably one of the causes that provoked an increase in the attention given to the causes behind recruitment.

However, in order to also account for the increase in the number of observations, it is worth noting the source of those observations and who is the principal elaborator of discourse. For the period at stake (06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015), most of the texts are produced by newspapers (see Figure 5 below). This implies that the input for the discourse is dynamic and focuses more on the immediacy of the events. In this sense, with regards to terrorist attacks, newspapers report on information provided by authorities (documents not gathered by LexisNexis), and will not necessarily focus on the in-depth analysis of the attacks. This applies also to recruitment. Reports from research institutions and think-tanks, such as The Soufian Group (TSG) and the International Centre for Counter Terrorism (ICCT) published reports, eventually cited by newspapers, in which they highlighted the increase in numbers of foreign fighters departing to Syria and Iraq.

Figure 5 - The ISIS discourse (06/30/2015 - 12/29/2015): sources

The number of observations which account for magazine, journals and law reviews is also particularly relevant. After all, academia in general is supposed to provide in-depth analysis on a series of specialized scholarly disciplines. Periodic publications are supposed to encourage the exchange of knowledge, through research on innovative topics. However, one of the main downturns of academic publications is the amount of time that it takes to undergo the process that enables publications in prestigious and relevant magazines and journals. These long procedures account for the results shown on Figure 6 below. The highest number of observations for both *magazines and journals* and *law reviews and journals* are produced on the 12/30/2015 – 06/29/2016 period. This reflects that the majority of academic pieces were submitted in the prior period, 06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015, but were not published until later.

Networking Nirvana: Analyzing and Assessing the Parallels between Jihadist and Human Trafficking Recruitment

Figure 6 - The discourse on ISIS: magazines, law reviews and journals

As the number of publications in the news regarding ISIS, its recruitment methods and its relationship with illegal activities (such as trafficking) increased, so did the number of academic publications related to these topics (see Table 5).

Table 5 - Newspapers and Academia: comparative observations

Date	Total Newspaper Publications	Total Magazine, Law Review and Journals
06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014	1968	17
12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015	2084	45
06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015	2244	41
12/30/2015 – 06/29/2016	2248	76
06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016	1834	80
12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017	1929	42

The above table (Table 5) shows that the number of newspaper and academic observations both increased steadily, except for a period of slight decrease in numbers. In the case of newspapers, it was a -8% decrease in the 06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016 period with regards to the

previous six months; for magazines, law reviews and journals, the 06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015 accounted for -9% less observations than the previous six-month period. Although there appears to exist a relationship between the number of observations for newspapers and magazines, law reviews and journals, there seems to be no correlation between the decreases in number of observations for both types of sources, since they occur at different, non-subsequent, periods of time.

This seemingly unrelated decrease in number of observations is worth mentioning because of the nature of academic publications. Academic publications are a result, not only of interaction with other academic sources, but also of observations of the real world. Newspapers and media are among the best sources of general, up-to-date information about what phenomena take place in the world.

As the number of observations for newspapers increases, so does the interest in the academic field regarding security (terrorism) and radicalization studies. For instance, the last three months of the selected period of study (12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017) produced slightly over 50% of the total number of observations produced in the previous six months (06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016). Figure 7 shows how law reviews and journals, as well as magazines and journals increase the percentage of discourse input in the 06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016 period. Moreover, it shows how issues related to ISIS, recruitment and trafficking are increasingly being approached from a legal perspective.

Figure 7 - ISIS discourse (06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016): sources

With regards to the entire period selected for study (06/29/2014 - 03/29/2017) the role played by academia in the construction of discourse surrounding ISIS is not significant. It is only with regards to trafficking and recruitment that law reviews & journals account for 7% of the overall discourse. Under those search terms and for the same period of time, newspapers account for 58% of the total discourse input.

Overall, newspapers dominate the discourse on ISIS, by a large percentage (Figure 8). Data reveals how newspapers focus, not only on ISIS/DAESH, but on recruitment on behalf of the organization. In fact, were percentages to be added, numbers would reveal that the majority of the discourse on ISIS is elaborated by newspapers, online publications, news, and newswires & press releases. Seeing that we are currently in the era of communications, these results are not surprising. It has already been mentioned how the need for immediate newsfeed prevents in-depth analysis of issues surrounding ISIS.

Figure 8 - ISIS discourse (6/29/2014 - 03/2972017): sources

Discussion

The aim of this dissertation is to prove whether or not recruitment mechanisms employed by ISIS are akin to those employed by human trafficking networks. In order to account for these similarities, the first step I took was to use a discourse analysis to extract data concerning the construction of the reality surrounding ISIS, and how it is perceived to correlate with human trafficking. Despite there being an awareness that ISI engages in human trafficking (though often confused with migrant smuggling), human trafficking is portrayed as being merely a financing mechanism for the terror group. However, actual operational parallels seem to go unnoticed when it comes to media, academia and policy making.

Overall results of the analysis reflect how the lowest number of observations accounts for the search *ISIS/DAESH+recruit!+traffick!*, whilst the biggest number of results is a result of inserting the terms *ISIS/DAESH+recruit!*. These results echo the fact that with regards to ISIS, there is a question which seems to be key to combating the group: what causes people to join ISIS? It is thanks to manpower that ISIS can expand territory, perpetrate attacks and continue posing a threat for the West. Concern for recruitment on behalf of ISIS started growing from 2014; coincidentally, in 2014 the now famous beheading videos were first issued. One of the most prominent videos featured 'Jihadi John', a British citizen who had joined the Caliphate, beheading

U.S. journalist Steven Scotloff. Focus on ISIS' recruitment accounts for the largest number of observations until the last analyzed period, the last half of 2016. After this period, the international coalition started advancing and taking back on Caliphate-held territory. The salience of the recruitment discourse stems from an "us vs. them" rhetoric, more focused on the threat posed by ISIS propaganda and its influence among Westerners than on recruitment mechanisms themselves.

Regarding trafficking, the number of observations concerning ISIS and trafficking is higher than when recruitment and trafficking are examined together. Trafficking is presented as the illegal activities aimed at financing ISIS, such as drug trafficking and/or illegal oil trade; on occasions, human trafficking is confused with migrant smuggling. In cases in which human trafficking as defined by the Palermo Protocol is attributed to ISIS, it refers to the buying and selling of Yazidi women as sex slaves. Nonetheless, this is not necessarily useful when it comes to analyzing recruitment for ISIS from a human trafficking lens. Since the fall of Mosul, an increasing number of female jihadis are arriving in refugee camps asserting that they were forced into the terrorist group. Again, the victimization card surrounding trafficking of females is useful when it comes to disregarding the agency behind joining a given network. The hypothetical lack of agency can result in benefits when it comes to legal prosecution of adherence to a terrorist organization. This reflects the need to analysis each individual story on a case-by-case basis. There is, however, enough proof to determine that there are similarities between human trafficking networks and recruitment for terrorist organizations. Even if proving the elements of fraud and coercion to determine human trafficking is complicated, the accounts of individuals who defected ISIS and speak about their disillusionment and how they feared retaliation should be regarded as evidence that exploitative situations are taking place.

The "threat image" (Balzacq, 2011) of ISIS is limited: were the similitudes between the group's recruitment techniques and human trafficking not to be obviated, recruitment could be understood as a socioeconomic and political phenomenon, rather than just as a military security problem. Studies like the EvoCS project (2015) reflects how different political actors prioritize certain security aspects and deal with them in different manners across time. Relegating the relationship between ISIS' recruitment techniques and human trafficking to Yazidi women who are kidnapped and then sold as commodities prevents a holistic and multidisciplinary understanding of the push and pull dynamics behind Westerns joining the Islamic State.

This failure to provide a holistic approach derives from the social contexts under which the discourse around ISIS is constructed. The construction of discourse around ISIS is mainly a political one where the "power tectonics" (Balzacq, 2011) are focused on an 'us vs. them' rhetoric

that justifies the "moral crusade" (Weitzer, 2007) against ISIS. Soderlund's work (2011) on the role of media plays in the construction of the discourse around human trafficking explains the dynamics behind the social construction of discourse when it comes to ISIS and its recruitment. Humans learn the world through others (Verhagen, 2005) and results presented in this section reveal how the news outlets (mainly newspapers) are the main actors when it comes to constructing ISIS' reality. Given the need for immediate information, it is highly unlikely that any in-depth analysis is provided. It should also be considered that the post 9/11 era and the ongoing War on Terror consequently cause an emphasis and focus on the threat rather than on the underlying problematic.

Academics are the actors in charge in providing policy makers with expertise through a more insightful analysis. Nevertheless, their input on the overall discourse is considerably smaller and hence so is their influence. The problems faced by experts and academics are internal and external. Internally, this work has shown how academics are still concerned with definitional issues and causal relationships of radicalization, despite there being proof of the "low-base rate of involvement" (Horgan, 2012). Moreover, the requirements of peer-reviewed journals make contributions to the discourse more complicated. One of the characteristics of academic journals is that publications are peer-reviewed, that is, revised, selected and approved by a panel of experts in the matter. On many occasions, the review board will suggest improvements to the submitting authors, and the author of the article will get a chance to respond. Depending on the acceptance rate and the impact factor of the journal, response time can vary between two weeks and a full year. As far as external problematics are concerned, the main issue affecting academia is funding. The lack of funding can make research an impossibility; however, funding can reflect the interest and approaches of funders to a given issue, especially in the case of national governments.

To further illustrate the results of the discourse analysis, ISIS was used as a case study. As predicted, there is no social awareness of the operational similarities between ISIS and human trafficking networks, and how they both recruit individuals (labor). The questions, therefore, now becomes one of analyzing whether those similarities actually exist, and whether it is necessary to possibly alter the approach given to recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration of former jihadists. The description of ISIS' origins, ideology, organizational management and recruitment processes helped answer the research questions proposed for this dissertation.

Chapter 7. ISIS' as a human trafficking network? A case study

Chapter 4 of this dissertation provided further insight into the seemingly existing correlations between human trafficking groups and terror networks, including recruitment tactics and the ideological rationale behind them. However, as the results of the discourse analysis show, there is no public awareness of such correlations. Although it is true that the fact that media is the main speaker pushing the ISIS discourse forward, it is still necessary to further try and understand whether these parallels actually exist. This will not only help prove or disprove my hypothesis, but also answer the research questions and possibly make the approach taken by CVE experts and the counter-terrorism community more holistic and integral.

All in all, by using ISIS as a case study I not only intend to add further nuance to the results of the discourse analysis. I also intend to add further objectivity to my own analysis presented in chapter 4, and check whether these similarities actually exist or whether they are merely a result of my own confirmation biases.

ISIS as a case study

ISIS originated in Jordan as Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (JTJ) (Warrick, 2016). After the U.S.-led Iraqi occupation in 2003, JTJ participated in the Iraqi insurgency. After its leader Abu Musab Al-Zaraqawi pledged allegiance to Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda in 2004 (McCants, 2016), JTJ then became known as Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (TQJBR), or Al-Qaeda in the Mesopotamia (AQM). However, when Al-Zarqawi started carrying out attacks against Shiite civilians,[xli] he was reprimanded by Ayman al-Zawahiri, then Bin Laden's deputy. Al-Zawahiri was concerned with TQJBR's image, to the extent that he said:

> "*We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of our global Muslim community* (ummah). *However far our capabilities reach, they will never be equal to one thousandth of the capabilities of the kingdom of Satan that is waging war on us*." (al-Zawahiri, 2005, in Richardson, 2007).[xlii]

Meanwhile, debates between Al-Zarqawi and his original teacher, Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi,[xliii] continued to widen a gap between AQM and the Al-Qaeda-core. In 2006, after Al-Zarqawi's death, TQJBR reconstituted itself as the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Documents made available after the Abbottabad raid that killed Bin Laden highlight a tumultuous relationship going back to that period despite popular portrayals of the split occurring after ISIS announced its Caliphate.[xliv] ISIS came into being on June 29, 2014. On the first Friday of Rammadan, Ibn 'Awwād Ibn Ibrāhīm Ibn 'Alī Ibn Muhammad al-Badrī al-Hāshimī al-Husaynī al-Qurashī

(otherwise known as Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi) declared himself as the Caliph, leading the prayer at Mosul's al-Nusri Mosque. Self-anointed Caliph Ibrahim announced himself as the leader of the Islamic State and called for *jihad* in the name of Allah.

The goal of the *salafi*[xlv] militant group is to establish a *shariah*-based worldwide Caliphate.[xlvi] In June 2014 ISIS proclaimed that the Caliphate had actually been reestablished and explained that it was to be a "*khilafah ala manhaj al-nabawiyya*" ('a Caliphate on the Prophetic method'), a clear reference for Islamists to End of Times prophecy. It represented a dramatic turnaround for an organization that had once been thought defeated and that was deemed, only months beforehand, as Al-Qaeda's "jayvee team" by President Barack Obama (Remnick, 2014). However, ISIS became the biggest threat to Western countries, as far as terrorist organizations are concerned, ISIS Despite the fall of the Caliphate's capital, Mosul, on June 10, 2017, ISIS still holds major cities (i.e. Raqqa); the Shiite-Sunni tensions still exist in Iraq; and extremist ideologies like the one embraced by ISIS is taking profit of the power vacuum in countries such as Libya, Yemen and Syria. In the meantime, Al-Qaeda has taken the focus on ISIS as an opportunity to re-brand itself, even grooming the next leader of their Caliphate, Hamza Bin Laden (Morton, 2017).

This suggests that the War on Terror is far from over (Bergen, 2017). Hence, strategies to combat violent extremism need reformulated (Jenkins, 2016). I suggest that a holistic approach to radicalization, engagement in violent extremism and potential disengagement can be based on approaches taken in the War on Trafficking. To do so, this section will study the origins and evolution of the concept of *Islamic State*, and how it came into being with the declaration of as the caliph. It will also focus on the radicalization techniques and recruitment processes used by ISIS, and how they correlate to human trafficking networks. It serves to confirm whether ISIS attracts recruits by abusing their vulnerabilities, and whether recruits are being exploited under the Caliphate.

The territorial fall of ISIS implies the return of a high number of foreign fighters to their countries of origin, a previously unknown security threat because of the potential risk of recidivism. Were ISIS' mechanisms of recruitment to resemble those used by human trafficking networks, similar approaches as those used with survivors of human trafficking could be employed to disengage and de-radicalize returning foreign fighters. Rehabilitation and reintegration techniques used with human trafficking survivors are the suggested approach to deal with the threat of returned foreign fighters.

The origins and evolution of the Caliphate

The name "Islamic State" is hardly a random choice. Its adoption is part strategic, part theological. As a concept, the *Islamic State* encompasses the main ideological and political motivations behind the establishment of the Caliphate. The ideological component is important for three reasons.

First, it explains the justification for the existence of a Caliphate. Although there are eschatological (religious) motivations behind it, a Caliphate cannot exist in the abstract alone. Rather, it requires control of substantial territory and the ability to implement Islamic law. Secondly, as this work will flesh out, ideology is crucial to the process of engagement in violent political extremism (terrorism) or the process associated with the process of radicalization into violent political extremism; ideology plays a similar part in recruitment for human trafficking networks. Lastly, the combination of politics and eschatology is derived into a juxtaposition of 'us vs. them' which helps justify intergroup violence against outsiders and enhances polarization. Because ISIS originated as the Iraqi branch of Al-Qaeda, it is paramount to also dig into Al-Qaeda's strategies and goals. On July 29th, 2014, ISIS spokesman Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani declared in an audio recording:

> "*The legality of all emirates, groups, states and organisations becomes null by the expansion of the caliph's authority and the arrival of its troops to their areas* (…) *Listen to your caliph and obey him. Support your state, which grows every day.* (…) *The* Shura [*council*] *of the Islamic State met and discussed this issue [of the caliphate] (…) the Islamic State decided to establish an Islamic caliphate and to designate a caliph for the state of the Muslims*" (Al-Adnani, 2014).

Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was to lead the first Caliphate established since the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate after World War I (WWI). ISIS' leadership council (*shura)* considered him as just, claimed that he held a PhD in Qur'anic science, was in good health and lacked any physical defect. He had experience leading ISIS since 2009 (McCants, 2015), and therefore possessed courage and bravery. But, perhaps most importantly, Al Baghdadi's lineage traced back to the tribe of the Prophet. In fact, Al-Baghdadi claimed to be a direct descendant of the family of the Prophet Muhammad himself.

Yet, most Muslims rejected the proclamation. In the same way Muslim masses failed to react to Osama Bin Laden's call to *jihad* after 9/11, Islamic scholars issued condemnations of the group's barbaric attacks. They explained why the criteria for the establishment of a Caliphate had not actually been met; any man's claim to be caliph must be substantiated by scholars and others of influence.[xlvii] Al-Zawahari, now leader of Al-Qaeda, ordered ISIS to retain control in Iraq but

to leave Syria to Al-Qaeda's offshoot Jabat Al-Nusra. ISIS refused and soon dropped any distinction between the two lands, changing its name to The (as in 'the only') Islamic State. To make Al-Adnani's announcement all the more powerful, he utilized the phrase "*ala manhaj al-nabawiyya*", thus framing the event as a glorious fulfillment of prophecy. The phrase was taken from a recorded in Abu Daood's Sunan in *kitab al-Malhama* (Islamic book of the Apocalypse):

> "*There will be Prophethood for as long as Allah wills it to be, then He will remove it when He wills, then there will be Khilafah on the Prophetic method and it will be for as long as Allah wills, then He will remove it when He wills, then there will be biting Kingship for as long as Allah Wills, then He will remove it when He wills, then there will be oppressive kingship for as long as Allah wills, then he will remove it when He wills, and then there will be Khilafah upon the Prophetic method» and then he remained silent*" (The Khilafah, 2014).[xlviii]

For Salafi jihadists, this narration attributed to the Prophet Mohamed covers all of history, from the Prophets' time to the Day of Resurrection. Al-Adnani's declaration of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as caliph was a crucial one. From the time of the Prophet, into the Islamic expansion, under 30 years of commemorated rule, then onto the great dynasties and through to the fall of the last Ottoman Caliphate just after WWI. Near its end, the *hadith* outlines a historical trajectory that includes an era of oppressive kingship, lasting until a re-establishment of a global caliphate upon the Prophetic method. It was this final phase that ISIS claimed to fulfill. This pronouncement of the Caliphate's reestablishment seemed to mark a transition for the fulfillment of both a sacred sociopolitical duty and religious prophecy, an ushering in a promised End of Times victory.

The first Islamic State was established in 623 A.D. with the development of the Constitution of Medina, one year after the *hijra* (migration) of Prophet Mohamed to the city. The first foundation for a State ruled by Islamic law, served as a base for the 'conquest' of Mecca in 630 A.D.[xlix] By the time of his death in 632 A.D., he had established a unified polity in the Arabian Peninsula. His death, however, put an end to the period of Prophethood. Within eight years, the small State built by Prophet Mohamed came to dominate the whole of Arabia.

The initial period of rule following Prophet Mohamed's death is known as *the rightly guided khilafah*. This era coincides to the reign of four of the Prophet's closest companions (Sahaba). The first caliph after Mohamed's death was Abu Bakr. His main duty was the political implementation of the *sharia*,[1] and preservation of the territorial rule the Prophet had established in his lifetime.[li] What ultimately made the caliphate possible was *jihad*, which at the time was a persistent dedication to armed struggle.

The aim of *jihad* was not to establish a rule by a determined person or family, but to preserve the religion's dominance. The idea of rewards provided by God in another world, or even rewards in this world for those who survived battle, served as key motivations (Blankinship, 1994). Abu Bakr appointed Umar Ibn Al-Khattab as the second caliph. Under his mandate, Islam extended over many different territories. Of particular import was the Muslim army's defeat of the Arab tribes in what is today Yemen and Iraq, the defeat of Persia to the East, and Roman controlled territory in what today are Palestine, Israel and the Transjordan. The rate of expansion decreased under Uzman Ibn Affwan (as-Sallabi & al-Khattab, 2007; as-Sallabi, 2010), the last two rightly guided caliphs of the era. This lack of sustained expansion was largely due to internal disputations and civil war (Lapidus, 2002; Hallaq, 2005)..

Civil war during the reign Ali Ibn Abu Talib ushered in an era of Kingship. The reasons for the transition from Caliphate to Kingship basically derived from the expansion of Islam into different territories (Gardner, 2011). Between the years 632 A.D. (after Prophet Mohammad's death) and 750 A.D., the Rashidun and the Umayyad caliphs consolidated an Empire which had extended from the Arabian Peninsula to include Persia, Transoxania, Sindh, the Caucasus, Mesopotamia, part of the Byzantine area, the MENA region, and the Iberian Peninsula (Al-Andalus). This territorial expansion implied a change in power dynamics, as there was now an official separation between the government (embodied in Kings) and the spiritual, moral and intellectual spheres, which depended on theologians and jurists. Territorial expansion also implied an increase in the number of converts. The limited number of imams speaking in the divergent tongues of the State's new subjects prevented them from acquiring proper knowledge of the religion, and it was believed that it precipitated converts into moral weakness. This exacerbated racial, tribal and ethnic differences, as well as tensions related to jurisprudential disagreement.

The collapse of the Ummayad Empire in 740 A.D. implied the death of a universal jihad and a universal single Muslim State. Early Abbasid rule, often referred to as the Golden Age of Islam, moved the Caliphate center to Baghdad (Bobrick, 2013). Baghdad's House of Wisdom (Lyons, 2010) generated the inclusion of alternative ideological references, including, but not limited to Greek philosophy, logic, and Christian theology (Esposito, 2009). Gradually, however, many territories under Abbasid dominion (for instance parts of Algeria, Spain, and Portugal) were lost, but still remained as Muslim-majority territories. Territorial dismemberment brought about a change in the implementation of *sharia:* in fragmented territories, the focus was placed more on how to implement Islam inwards, towards their own societies, therefore emphasizing the spiritual side of the Jihad (Blankinship, 1994). As Abbasid dominion and influence diminished, so too did the idea of the Caliphate's necessity in Muslim minds. The Abbasid caliph became a mere

figurehead, and the Muslim *ummah* fragmented into a multitude of state-like entities and inter-Muslim warfare (Arnold, 2011). The last bastion of the Caliphate now gradually receded and culminated in the eventual collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate,[lii] a collapse Islamists see as the result of Western meddling and conspiracy against Islam and Muslims.

Territorial disintegration paved the way for Western domination. A previously unimagined period of Muslim populations being ruled by aliens conjured up conspiracy theories and initiated the first wave of Islamist thought in the Modern Era. Western Empires were now portrayed against the Muslim masses with nefarious plots against an imagined unity preserved by the Caliphate's token existence. Colonialism marked the initiation of the phase of Oppressive Kinship from the hadith. The colonial powers were oppressing the people through education and values (The Khilafah, 2014). The notion and utopian vision of the Caliphate's reestablishment remains prevalent amongst Islamists and is perhaps best described in a fabricated quote attributed to British statesman Lord Curzon:

> "*The situation now is that the Islamic Caliphate in Turkey is dead and will never rise again, because we have destroyed its moral strength, the Caliphate and Islam. We must put an end to anything which brings about Islamic unity between the sons of the Muslims. As we have already succeeded in finishing off the Caliphate, so we must ensure that there will never arise again unity for the Muslims, whether it be intellectual or cultural unity.*" (Lappin, 2010)

With the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate,

> "*the response in key Muslim countries has been divided between those who have sought the new state-based, ecumenical international order as significant members – adhering to deeply felt religious beliefs but separating them from questions of foreign policy- and those who see themselves as engaged in a battle over succession to universal authority within a stringent interpretation of the traditional Islamic concept of world order*" (Kissinger, 2015).

It is the latter perspective that has driven the contemporary ideology and strategic thinking from the extensively non-violent methodologies of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir to Al-Qaeda and ISIS' infuriation and violence. These notions are fixated via a mix of religion and politics expressed most prominently via acts of terrorism, both in the West and within the abodes managed by the Oppressive Kingships.

Strategic thinking and differences between ISIS and Al-Qaeda

In early 2004, a lengthy strategic document entitled "*The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Ummah Will Pass*" was posted on jihadist Internet forums. Inspired by questions raised within the *jihadi* community after the attacks of September 11th, 2001 (Shaykh Yusuf al 'Uyayree, 2006), the document outlined a three-stage plan for exploiting the chaos induced by the War on Terror (Naji, 2006). It was an agenda to ultimately culminate in the establishment of an international Islamic order. The phases included:

- *Disruption and exhaustion*: terrorist attacks are aimed at disrupting the economy of enemy powers and to demoralize their populations.
- *Management of Savagery:* a phase of violent resistance which emphasizes the commitment of highly violent acts, with the intention of sending a message to both allies and enemies. This stage is considered the most critical one, because it will give way to the Islamic State "which has been awaited since the fall of the caliphate" (Naji, 2006).
- *Empowerment*: establishing regions controlled by jihadists which can subsequently grow and unite into an expanding Islamic State (Stern & Berger, 2015).

Disruption and exhaustion

Economic disruption usually walks hand-in-hand with terrorism.[liii] Although stock movements and markets have proven more resilient to terrorist attacks over time, the uncertainty derived from such attacks still causes economic disruptions (Chen & Siems, 2004). In a global context where the interconnectedness of markets is increasing, the economic effects of terrorist attacks reverberate and can induce drastic external consequences. These effects are not limited to stock markets, however. A study carried out by Ito & Lee (2003) assessed the impact of the 9/11 attacks on U.S. airline demand. An analysis of the 1980-2003 timeframe revealed that September 11th, "resulted in both a negative transitory shock of over 30% and a persistent negative demand shock amounting to roughly 7-8% of pre-September 11th demand."

Bin Laden himself understood these effects. Elaborating in an interview after 9/11, he explained, "We are continuing this policy in bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy (…) We, alongside the mujahedeen, bled Russia for 10 years until it went bankrupt and was forced to withdraw in defeat" (Osama Bin Laden, in CNN, 2004). Under "bleed-until-bankruptcy plan," Al-Qaeda had spent about $500,000 in the Twin Towers attacks, an amount which "paled in comparison to the costs incurred by the United States" (CNN, 2004).

The Management of Savagery

Until the Islamic State is firmly reestablished, the ummah finds itself undergoing a multidimensional struggle or *jihad*. Despite that *jihad* can also refer to a spiritual struggle and the strife of becoming a better person (commonly known as 'greater *jihad'*) (Taymiyya, 2009), the final victory of Islam (empowerment) in its modern Salafist interpretation refers to the lesser *jihad* or armed struggle. Referred to as the forgotten obligation or sixth pillar of Islam (Jansen & 'Abd al-Salām Faraj, 1986), violence is portrayed by some Islamic scholars, such as Sayyid Qutb, as a revolutionary need to change the system from the inside (Qutb, 1964). More radical views, such as the ones shared by Faraj, depict military jihad as being one with Islam (Lahoud, 2010). The ultimate goal of jihadists is to unify a global *ummah* under *sharia*.[liv]

The 9/11 attacks were the first concrete modern expression of the desire for a global jihad in pursuit of a global Caliphate. Moreover, it is more than just the commission of sending a message through extremely violent acts. As Management of Savagery made the rounds and influenced jihadist strategy, it became ever more apparent that Al-Qaeda could no longer function as a vertically aligned organization. A 1,600 page manifesto from al-Qaeda's chief strategist, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri entitled, "*A Call to Global Islamic Resistance"* (*Dawat al-Muqawamah al-Islamayyah al-Alamiyyah)* argued for a decentralized system, rather than top-down, hierarchical structure (*nizam; la tanzim*). This would require a shift from command-cadre terrorism to leaderless resistance:

> "*The call for resistance is based on decentralized cells. Jihadist franchises would be based on individual activities and on the operation of small, completely independent cells, so that there would not be link between them, except for the mutual objective, a common name, the methodology of belief, and the way of education*" (Al-Suri, 2003).

While Al-Qaeda decentralized, their offshoot in Iraq grew more powerful and retained at least semblance of a top-down organization with control over territory in the Anbar province.

In his book "Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qaeda", Jordanian journalist Fouad Hussein detailed a seven-step plan to achieve the desired empowerment, in other words, a global caliphate (Musharbash, 2005). These seven phases include an "awakening", "opening eyes", "arising and standing up", followed by the fall of the so-called hated Arab regimes,[lv] a "total confrontation" between believers and non-believers, and a final victory of Islam over the world. The establishment of a global caliphate corresponds to the final phase of Empowerment (Atwan, 2013).

The Awakening Phase

Under Al-Qaeda's plan, the September 11th attacks initiated the 'awakening' of Muslims,[lvi] the first phase of Al-Qaeda's plan to establish a global Caliphate. After the invasion of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda's organizational structure was under threat. However, the organization documented an ability to adapt to the rapid changing environment. Using a strategy like that of outsourcing utilized by transnational companies, the terrorist group opted for "de-territorialization" and "disappearance" (Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005).

The lack of affiliation with a concrete territorial location and the lack of institutional presence, in favor of a more military presence, became Al-Qaeda's "organizational trademarks" (*ibid*) through a network of activities under the umbrella of insurgent groups often referred to *ansar al-Islam* ('helpers of Islam') Al-Qaeda was able to reduce the risks entailed in hierarchical structures. Bin Laden claimed that the overall goal was to weaken the United States and the West as a response and defence mechanism. Both the U.S. and the West had humiliated Islam and were preventing the achievement of a single Islamic state (Caliphate). Through the spreading of this message, Al Qaeda was seeking to legitimize their actions and gain supporters for the cause.

The Opening Eyes Phase (until 2006) and the emergence of ISIS

The occupation of Iraq drew the West into closer combat; "the battlefield was opened up, and Americans and their allies became a closer and easier target" (Musharbash, 2005; Rasheed, 2015). Small groups or branches of Al-Qaeda started appearing in different Muslim countries.[lvii] ISIS is but one example of this phenomenon. Experts differ on whether the origins of ISIS go back to Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda, or whether the group goes back to al-Zarqawi's alignment with *ansar al-Islam* and later pledging subordination to Bin Laden (Laub & Masters, 2014). What seems to be clear, however, is that the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq contributed to the eventual emergence of ISIS.[lviii] A report published by the Council of Foreign Relations in 2014 shows how what started out as contacts in Afghanistan and Pakistan turned into a network which extended into a diverse range of countries and regions. As Al-Qaeda degenerated into branches and loosely connected cells, related groups were adopted, and people who were not primarily acquainted with Al-Qaeda before were carrying out attacks under its brand name. Moreover, the division between foot soldiers in the organization and mere sympathizers became increasingly blurred (Rasheed, 2015).

The collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime and the recruitment of many 'Afghan graduates' to the anti-American forces in Iraq turned Abu-Musab al-Zarqawi into the chief coordinator of terrorist activities in Iraq. He claimed responsibility for most of the terrorist acts initiated against Western targets in Iraq. The acts themselves were strongly associated with Al Qaeda because they resembled some of its past activities: suicide bombing, car bombs, and direct hits at oil tankers

(Mishal & Rosenthal, 2005). The political collapse of the country enabled the fostering of ethnic conflicts triggered by the firing of all Ba'ath party officials from their civil servant positions, and partly encouraged by an empowered al-Zarqawi. According to the first issue of ISIS's Dabiq magazine (2014), the creation of chaos was based on the political and military strategy called for by 'shaykh' al-Zarqawi. In order to prevent his Islamic movement from being crushed, Zarqawi resorted to "injury (*nikayah*) operations" that would break the status-quo between intelligence and security agencies. Once instability was ensured, he could proceed with operations aimed at paving the way for claiming territory (*takim*, or consolidation operations).

Al-Zarqawi's approach to Salafi jihadism was most focused on Muslim countries. By ignoring Bin Laden's request that he prioritized targeting the West (Benjamin & Simon, 2006) he further deepened the divide between both leaders.[lix] The one-time violence against Shiite civilians angered many jihadists, fearing that such operations would destroy any chance for Al-Qaeda gaining further support in a time where the organization's base in Afghanistan had been depleted. This disagreement led to the formation of an independent ISI (Islamic State of Iraq) in October, 2006. The call for independence coincided with the death of al-Zarqawi. Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi was made *emir* (leader).[lx] As Stern and Berger (2015) point out, the joint U.S.-Iraq airstrike left the organization without steady leadership, hence making its authority and probability of success tumble; Al-Baghdadi appeared as the leader that combined both "religious authority and track of strategic success".[lxi]

Arising and Standing Up (2007 – 2010)

According to Hussein's book, the third phase of the seven-step plan would be very focused on Syria (Musharbash, 2005). Sham (Greater Syria) is considered by Islam as a blessed land. It has been recalled that Prophet Mohammed proclaimed "*Ya Tuba Li Al Sham!*" (Blessing to al Sham) "because the wings of the angels of the Merciful are lowered over it" (Al Rifai, 2016).[lxii] This saying is usually utilized alongside another *hadith* which states '*Al-Tuba lil' Ghurabaa* ('the blessing is for the strangers')'; when referenced together, with additional scriptures, it is implied that those willing to travel to Sham to sacrifice in jihad will be few, but that their sacrifice will earn them tremendous benefits.

After Al-Qaeda started expanding its influence into neighboring territories, Syria became a focus for experts concerned with the stakes of the country. Syria was becoming a focus for the *mujahedin*. From Syria, other territories, such as Turkey and Israel, or bordering territories such as Jordan, were expected to become targets of even more violence. However, data shows how Al-Qaeda's focus on Sham in this period generally failed. Apart from a few attacks in Baghdad, and the 2007 attacks on the Yazidi population, violence on behalf of Al-Qaeda took place mainly in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Fall of the Hated Arab Regimes (2010 – 2013)

By the beginning of this phase, ISI(S) nominated Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi as its leader. The organization was reasserting itself. Campaigns led by ISI(S) were a de facto attempt to destabilize an already feeble and incipient Iraqi democracy (Peritz, 2014). It has also been argued that ISI(S)'s retaliation was a response to the treatment that the Sunni Muslim population was receiving under Maliki's government, which increased sectarian tensions (Childress et. al, 2014).[lxiii] The aim of the fourth stage is to bring down the so-called "hated Arab regimes". Architects of jihadi Salafism, such as Sheikh Abu Muhamad al-Maqdisi, claims that all governments that do not rule according to a strict interpretation of *sharia* are to be considered infidels and should be violently opposed (Moghadam, 2008).[lxiv] This step is a necessary predecessor to the commencement of final victory, and the implementation of *sharia*.

The impurity of certain regimes had already been criticized since the late 18th century. For example, scholar Abd al-Wahhab[lxv] had expressed his disapproval of "the decorous, arty, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, drum pounding Egyptian and Ottoman nobility who travelled across Arabia to pray at Mecca" (Crooke, 2014).[lxvi] This disgust with modernity perpetuated. The 'hated Arab regimes' are now considered to be those who are not only failing to govern for Allah's sake, but also those who solely represent themselves, and whose "particular aspirations are remote from its popular bases (of support) or its community (the closest example of that are, in general, the regimes of the Arab region)" (Naji, 2006).

The aim of Al-Qaeda was to bring down these regimes, and in return obtain "a steady growth in strength within al-Qaida" (Musharbash, 2005). Hussein explained how the fall of the 'hated Arab regimes' was to be facilitated by attacks on the oil suppliers, as well as cyber-attacks directed against the United States of America (*ibid*). Nonetheless, there had been a change of primary actors in the scene, as it was ISIS and not Al-Qaeda who was inching closer to the overall objective. In May 2013, Jabat Al-Nusra, founded by Abu Mohammad Al-Jawlani,[lxvii] a member of ISIS sent to Syria to develop an offshoot, took control of the oil field in Syria and started trading in oil. Regarding cyber-attacks, it was not until October 2013 that ISIS opened its first official Twitter account; by April 2014, ISIS had developed a Twitter app capable of sending tens of thousands of tweets a day, therefore spreading its message and ideology to a number of users far greater than any of Al-Qaeda's videos. The use of Twitter enabled further constant newsfeed and a round-the-clock diffusion of propaganda.

Fifth phase (2013-2016) and "'total confrontation" (2016 - onwards)

The fifth phase of the seven-stage process corresponds to the declaration of the Caliphate. The aim of Al-Qaeda was to have reduced Western and Israeli influence in the Islamic World, so

that there would be no resistance to the establishment of "a new world order" (Musharbash, 2005; Rasheed, 2015). As the fifth phase unfolded, ISIS made even greater territorial advances and had already taken over predominance in the transnational jihadist arena. In January 2014, the group officially took over the city of Raqqa; by June, it took control of Mosul having crossed the Iraqi-Syrian border,[lxviii]and claiming the invalidation of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreements.[lxix] Moreover, during this phase, ISIS already started making efforts to expand its influence beyond the borders of the territories they had occupied. In February 2014, ISIS officially broke from Al-Qaeda Central, now led by al-Zawahiri. Fracture was based on claims that they were now carrying out the true mission and representing the spirits of Bin Laden. After Zawahiri ordered ISIS to retreat to Iraq and leave Syria to Al-Qaeda, Al-Baghdadi retorted, "The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant will remain, as long as we have a vein pumping or an eye blinking. It remains and we will not compromise nor give it up." (Al-Jazeera & Agencies, 2013)

Now following Bin Laden's strategy of attacking the West, or 'far enemy', the first threats in European territory came in March 2014, when ISIS supporters were arrested in Switzerland, accused of plotting an attack; in May 2014, a returned ISIS fighter performed a shooting at the Jewish Museum in Brussels. By this time, ISIS leader, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, had already declared the self-proclaimed Caliphate. His Caliphate sought to exert its influence through violence but also emphasized the diffusion of the jihadist ideology. It engaged in a massive, global propaganda campaign over social media. As a result, different Salafi movements started emerging across Europe: Sharia4Belgium, Sharia4Holland, and three UK-based organizations, Islam4UK, Islamic Sharia Council and Sharia Patrols (Vidino, 2015).

ISIS' strategy was based on two distinct methods: one considered 'field work' (the actual conquering of territory for the sake of the Caliphate) and the second one related to propaganda of their deeds and actions using both social media and branch groups classified as *emirates*. The mission of the latter is mainly aimed at territories outside the Caliphate, to obtain ideological support and ultimately (and ideally) recruitment for their cause and spreading the organization's message of fear. Moreover, these methods used are part of a strategy discussed in detail within the work of Hussein and Rasheed (2015); it involved the creation of an "Islamic army" inducing a "total confrontation" (sixth phase) between "believers and non-believers" (Musharbash, 2005; Rasheed, 2015).

The ideological component behind the Caliphate

The construction of the ummah

The concept of an Islamic State goes beyond a merely political one. As discussed earlier, it is derived from an interpreted theological mandate. *Tawhid* (unity) among the *ummah*

(community) is one of the four pillars of Islam. The only possible way of establishing a single, united, *ummah* is if the whole group falls under one unified political, social and ideological path (Zadeh Khurasani, 2009).

The ultimate goal is establishing a world *ummah*, where humanity and all the religions which follow the Holy Books (Judaism, Christendom and Islam) fall under the umbrella of a unified community. The path to overcome all the different religious interpretation (*madhhab*) is based on a practical and jurisprudential dimension which combines *akhlaq* (ethics) and '*irfan* (gnosis). A unified *ummah* is a stride and a duty for all Muslims (Zadeh Khurasani, 2009). The establishment of a worldwide sharia-based *ummah* is seen as victory for Islam; this duty cannot be fulfilled without the commitment of individuals to the cause. For these individuals engaged in jihad victory is shaped as martyrdom, and retribution in the afterlife. These rewards walk hand in hand with the earthly compensations for those committing to their duties as a Muslim and fighting for the implementation of *sharia*.[lxx]

Success was embodied in victory over the infidels (including the 'bad Muslims'), something for which *fatwas* has already been published. For instance, in the year of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979), Sheikh Abdullah Azzam published a religious ruling called "*Defence of the Muslims Lands: The First Obligation after Faith*". It was obligatory to wage jihad wherever and whenever Muslim countries were invaded. Nine years later "*Join the Caravan*" set forth sixteen reasons for which Muslims all around the world should join jihad. Even if this *fatwa* was issued in time of the Soviet-Afghan war, Azzam´s words were applicable to any context of 'War against Islam'. Azzam described the *ummah* as one body "so that whichever region of the Muslims' territory is exposed to danger, it is necessary that the whole body of the Islamic Ummah rally together to protect this organ which is exposed to the onslaught of the microbe" (de Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker, 2014). However, the establishment of a unified *ummah* requires a Caliphate real-world existent.

Unlike the Jewish Diaspora, the idea is for it to live under a unified territory. A Muslim's primary identity, wherever they may be found, requires primary allegiance to the religion and not his or her land of residence. Such a conceptualization leads to what has been termed the "de-territorialization" of Islam (Roy, 2005). There are ample End of Times prophecies that serve to empower individual Muslims with a notion of obligation to work for the utopic State's establishment.

The importance of territory

It was not until the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq that jihadists were able to truly expand in influence and start setting up the Caliphate's foundations. The importance of Iraqi

in *jihadist* ideology is a near-perfect representation of the blend between the political and the religious. During the second phase of the Management of Savagery, "Iraq should become the center for all global operations, with an 'army' set up there and bases established in other Arabic states" (Musharbash, 2005). Abu Mus'ab az-Zarqawi anticipated the initiation of *jihad* in Iraq and into Sham (Greater Syria- modern Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, part of Jordan, and Kurdistan) following a *hadith* from Sahih Muslim, by saying that "[t]he spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by Allah's permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq" (Dabiq, Issue 1, 2014). Also, the following words were attributed to Ali Ibn Abu Talib: "The *Mahdi* (redeemer of Islam) will not come until one third die, one third are killed, and one third remain" (Nu'aym Ibn Hammad, in Al-Rifai, 2015).

The 'first third to die' is interpreted to resemble the humanitarian crisis, which took place in Iraq from the First Gulf War until the U.S. invasion of the country.[lxxi] Syria (or Sham) is the place where the second coming of Jesus Christ is supposed to take place, more specifically on the southern minaret ('Jesus minaret', or *madhanat Isa*) of the Great Mosque in Damascus (Umayyad Mosque). During his second coming, Jesus ('Isa) will fight the *Masih al-Dajjal* (anti-Christ or false Messiah). Once the *Dajjal* is killed, peace will rule the earth and, according to medieval scholar of *hadith* Ibn Majah, "[t]he entire world shall recite and follow one and the same *Kalimah* (word) and none shall be worshipped except Allah". According to Islamic eschatology, there are further minor signs of *al-Malhama* (Armageddon) linked to Iraq. It is believed that Europe, in its will to colonize the Arab World, will seek gold or "treasure" in areas covered by the Euphrates River (Ibn Kathir Dimashqi, 2006). This will cause war between Arabs. Despite the specific area not being clear (it could refer to both an area of the Raqqa province or Iraq), the "cylinders of gold and silver" mentioned by Ibn Abbas are interpreted to be the oil reserves found in Iraq. This finding will apparently take place after sanctions are imposed both in Egypt and Syria (Al-Rifai, 2015).

Sham (Greater Syria) is a key spot in the Islamic tradition of Armageddon. It plays a prominent role in the stage that precedes the victory of Islam and the re-establishment of the Caliphate upon the Prophetic method. Inside this tradition, Syria symbolizes the ending of the era of tyrants, and will be a battlefield for the struggle (*jihad*) prior to the final victory and the beginning of era of the Caliphate (Al Rifai, 2016). Two *hadiths* (Imam Ahmad 4/110, Abu Dawud 2483) state Prophet Mohammed saying "Matters will run their course until you become three armies: an army in Sham, an army in Yemen, and an army in Iraq" (*ibid*). From their beginning in 2011, demonstrations against the Assad regime appeared as signs of the hour to jihadists, as indicators of the final battle between the Muslims and non-Muslims, including the impure

regimes. Mohammed prophesized "when you see Sham is a bounty for a man and his oligarchy family members, then at this time Constantinople will be opened" (Al Rifai, 2016).

In the Islamic tradition, Constantinople refers to Rome. Abū Mus'ab al-Zarqāwī specified that the goal of jihad was ultimately conquering Rome ("We fight here, while our goal is Rome with good expectations concerning Allah (…)"); his successor, Abū Hamzah al-Muhājir, elaborated this point further, by stating that "(…) we will not rest from our *jihād* until we are under the olive trees of Rome, after we destroy the filthy house called the White House" (Dabiq, Issue 4, 2014). It is believed that the taking of Rome is the sign of the coming of the *Dajjal* (anti-Christ), the final step prior to the establishment of the *Khilafa* (Al-Rifai, 2015). The Caliphate, as such, is depicted as both a political deed but also a way to salvation, since the taking of Rome precedes the coming Day of Judgment. All in all, the ideology embodied in ISIS is clearly based both in ideology (eschatology) and politics. This work explains that the intersection between the two, coupled by the role played by actors outside the Muslim world, have resulted in a process of self-reinforcing exclusion between "us and them".

Us vs. Them

The nationalist struggle in Afghanistan against the Soviets in the 1980's at once fathered the contemporary international order and the global jihad (Barber, 1996). Western powers, particularly the United States, viewed the struggle to liberate Afghanistan as a useful tool intended to embroil the USSR in a protracted conflict. To do so, the U.S., along with its Mid-Eastern allies, armed the conflict the Afghan mujahedeen.[lxxii] Muslims from all over the world travelled to Afghanistan to defend its people in what was framed as jihad.

This migration set the basis upon which Al-Qaeda's transnational network formulated. U.S. statesmen did not foresee the ultimate outcome. As Zbigniew Brzezinski put it: "What's a few riled-up Muslims?" (Hari, 2008). After years of civil war, the Taliban came to power,[lxxiii] implementing a strict form of *sharia*, while simultaneously providing a safe haven for the "Arab Afghan" migrant (Rashid, 2001). Among those, of course, was Osama Bin Laden. Afghanistan revived classical conceptions of jihad throughout the Muslim world, and generated the first indications, at least in the mind of Islamists, that the End Times were nigh. As the Prophet had explained:

> "*There will be many armies after me. You must join that army which will come from Khurasaan (interpreted as the whole of Afghanistan and part of Pakistan)* (…) *When* the black flags come from Khurasaan*, go to them, for among them is the khalifah of Allah, the* Mahdi (…) *Black standards will come from Khorasan, nothing shall turn them back until they are planted in Jerusalem*" (Ibn Kathir Dimashqi, 2006).

Since then, an active engagement in jihad was perceived as a defensive movement at a global level to which Muslims must answer to, even when the threat was only local (Hegghammer, 2010). September 11th was an attempt to make the West "aware of the Islamic community" (Musharbash, 2005). Terrorism was now equivocated with Al-Qaeda, an organization which had managed to strike at the core of Western (sociopolitical and economic) interests. The attacks were to warn the international community, to make 'it' realize that the rules of the game had changed. Internally, the dichotomy between 'us' (those supporting Al-Qaeda) and 'them' (those not), set up a juxtaposition which translated into the categories of 'believers and non-believers' or 'Muslims vs. *kufr'*. Osama Bin Laden emphasized,

> *"Our goal is for our nation to unite in the face of the Christian crusade. This is the fiercest battle. Muslims have never faced anything bigger than this. Bush said it in his own words: "crusade." When Bush says that, they try to cover up for him, then he said he didn't mean it. He said "crusade." Bush divided the world into two: "either with us or with terrorism." Bush is the leader; he carries the big cross and walks. I swear that everyone who follows Bush in his scheme has given up Islam and the word of the prophet"* (Bin Laden, 2001).

The 9/11 attacks appeared to threaten the global order and induced a paradigm shift in the international arena (Kuhn, 1996). The "War on Terror" (WoT) that followed triggered a war against terrorist organizations (predominantly, Al-Qaeda) and governments in empathy with their perceptions (Saddam Hussein's Iraq).[lxxiv] The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq offer a representation of how U.S. foreign policy has fostered a sentiment of nationalism among Arab countries, as well as anti-American sentiment. As the Soviet-Afghan War wound down, Abdullah Azzam, an associate of bin Laden, prepared Muslims worldwide for Western aggression. He explained in a video that has been clipped and included in Al-Qaeda propaganda many times since then, that the West expects Muslims to accept their domination and explained that "they not only want to slaughter us, but they want us to walk right to the slaughterhouse, lay down, and not so much as kick when they slit our throats" (Unkown, 2007). Many interpreted the invasion of Iraq as a symbol of neocolonialism that served to reinforce "hierarchy-legitimizing myths" (Pratto et. al, 1994). The West (more specifically the United States and its allies) still considered the Middle East its area of influence, to the extent that it could deploy its military power to 'free' the Iraqis from a dictator and 'bring democracy' to the country.[lxxv]

Where Bin Laden had branded America as the 'far enemy' prior to 9/11, an increased number of Muslims pinpointed the United States as the main *kufr* State. For example, in 2001, Sheikh Hamud bin Uqla al-Shuaybi issued a *fatwa* in which he declared all Americans legitimate targets of *jihad*: they had elected Congress, and they there therefore to be held accountable for the

invasion of Afghanistan by association. The whole Muslim community around the world should therefore "oppose unbelievers and hate them" (Warren, 2016). Likewise, Sheikh Nasir Al-Fahd, when questioned about the permissibility of fighting the Americas outside Iraq, said:

> "*For the Muslims, in their (*the Americans*) eyes, are nothing but a collection of insects (...) for they have corrupted the lands, and killed many of the servants, and fought the Muslims everywhere, so there is doubt that they are the leaders of disbelief in this era, without dispute*" (al-Fahd, 2003)

This retaliation is primarily seen as part of a process through which the Muslim community can regain some of the dignity they lost because of foreign invasion. Its secondary role is to recruit others to undertake the primary task (jihad) (Moghadam, 2008). The effective suffusion of these sentiments relies on the 'us vs. them' juxtaposition, more specifically between Muslims and disbelievers. The anti-neocolonialist discourse feeds a counter-paradigm that distinguishes 'group members' from 'outsiders', thereby concretizing the hegemonic identity discourse Al-Qaeda utilized this identity as bait for recruitment. The aim was two-fold: it tried to attract further ideological support for Al-Qaeda's long-term objective and to radicalize young men from all over the world to reject globalization and liberalism, and to thereby transform the organization from "vanguard" (*taifa*) (Qutb, 1964) into a mass movement.[lxxvi]

Identities built around a given social and/or political cause can formulate social movements. By generating a social movement, Al-Qaeda intended to contest the established (international) order. This movement was framed on an identity discourse grounded in these social dichotomies. Whether this unfavorable position was political, economic (such as the above mentioned example of the 2003 Iraqi invasion), or even social,[lxxvii] it had served to light the spark of individual and group grievances on behalf of some members of the Muslim community.[lxxviii] Under the general framework political Islam, the use of "intergroup conflict and violence" is justified, given that individuals undergo a "process of political mobilization as an increasing extremity of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of intergroup conflict" (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2008).

Attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda attempted to highlight the political, cultural and religious oppression of Muslims under the global system. It was "a blowback and backlash at the same time" (Johnson, 2004). Every fight was seen as a victory "because for so long Muslims didn't have any weapons at all" (Rasheed, 2015). The fact that they were deprived of any defense mechanisms shows how they were relegated to a secondary position regarding power equality, a condition resulting from globalization dynamics and a monopoly of force amongst Muslim authoritarian regimes in the Muslim majority world. Attacks combined both political and cultural

motivations. Including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in 2007, all attacks perpetrated by Al-Qaeda were directed against elements of what was considered a Western occupation of traditionally Islamic territories. For instance, in July 2008, a joined force of Taliban and Al-Qaeda, in Afghanistan's Nuristan province attacked NATO troops; two months later, the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad was bombed. Islamabad was not only the country's capital, but it was located in an area where embassies, government buildings and other important institutions had also been built.

Another example of 'anti-establishment, anti-colonialism attacks' is depicted by the December 2009 attack at Camp Chapman, where an Al-Qaeda agent posing as a double agent killed seven CIA Officers (Warrick, 2009; Baer, 2010). There are also examples of international terrorist attacks performed by Al-Qaeda which were more a cultural response. Such is the case for the bombings of the Danish embassy in Pakistan in June 2008 that followed the 2005 publication of Prophet Mohammed's cartoons (CNN, 2008; Haider, 2008). Whether politically or culturally oriented, the overarching ideology is religious. The goal is either to protect or defend Muslim-majority territories, or to guarantee the respect of Islam. French scholar Olivier Roy describes the core sentiment as not so much a question of "radicalization of Islam, but the Islamization of radicalism" (Roy, 2017). The reality seems somewhere in between.

ISIS has continued carrying the dynamic Al-Qaeda set forth. The alleged re-establishment of the Caliphate on Iraq and Syria was powerful and further reinforced the exclusionary discourse. ISIS' terrorism resulted in the creation of a U.S. led international coalition to confront them when President Obama outlined a plan to "degrade ultimately and destroy" (Obama, 2014) the organization.[lxxix] However, the plan was not limited to military intervention. It included different kinds of efforts (McInnis, 2016): supporting military operations, capacity building, and training; stopping the flow of foreign terrorist fighters; cutting off IS' access to financing and funding; addressing associated humanitarian relief and crises; and exposing ISIS' true nature. Despite Al-Qaeda having planned a definitive victory by 2020, at the latest, the efforts of the international coalition have not only deterred ISIS from advancing further into their desired territories, but they have also made ISIS pull back in territories such as Mosul.[lxxx] Nonetheless, the strides between the international coalition and ISIS are still ongoing. The fight will no doubt remain interpreted as ushering in the final struggle between Islam and its opponents prior to Armageddon.

In the meantime, concern has shifted to focus from recruits joining ISIS to those returning to their countries. There is a growing concern in European territories regarding the increasing number of foreign fighters on behalf of ISIS. Especially worrying is the fact that teenagers are reportedly fleeing their home countries in order to voluntarily enroll in combat.[lxxxi] In March 2016, a document was discovered with the names of 22,000 individuals who had been recruited by the

terrorist organization.[lxxxii] The alarm caused by this drastic increase in foreign fighters for ISIS has heightened concern for the underlying reasons seemingly normal individuals enroll in the group. It has also sparked greater interest for the techniques ISIS utilizes in recruitment. This research examines these recruitment techniques. It takes a less nuanced approach and establishes parallels between human trafficking networks and ISIS. Prior to establishing those parallels, both human trafficking and terrorism need defined.

ISIS and its parallels with human trafficking networks

ISIS has become the most prominent terrorist threat for the West. Aside from its territorial conquests in the Middle East, the group has attracted 7,700 Western foreign fighters and another 35,000 extremists from over 120 countries (Ranstorp, in Vidino, Mareno, & Entenmann, 2017). The organization has also served as an inspiration for Westerners who perpetrated attacks in their home countries, such as the ones occurred in Paris on November 13, 2015, in Brussels on March 22, 2016, London Bridge on June 3, 2017, and more recently, in Barcelona on August 17, 2017. The focus, therefore, is on the reasoning behind individuals joining the deadliest terrorist group in history and to fulfill their mission in jihad. Academic literature has focused on the motivations and grievances that push individuals along the ideological continuum of radicalization, although little has been discerned with regards to the factors which ultimately determine behavioral changes (engagement in violent extremism).

` What is clear is that the existence and perpetuity of terrorist groups is based on self-reinforcing individual-group dynamics: the violent addressing of grievances requires prior identification with a group which embraces those solutions as a group objective; the group is composed of members whose identity becomes reinforced by group dynamics. In a way, it also responds to the supply-and-demand model which are said to determine the functioning of organized criminal groups, including human trafficking networks. This subsection will highlight the existing parallels between ISIS and human trafficking networks.

At an organizational level

Around 10 million people were living under ISIS at the Caliphate's peak (BBC, 2017). ISIS established top-down structures (Wood, 2015) that enabled it to effectively maintain territorial control and hence call itself a State. Territory controlled by the organization was divided into provinces; territories were managed through bureaucratic ministries and military ministries (Glenn, 2015). Among its State-like hierarchical structures, ISIS also set up intelligence apparatus, the EMNI (Speckhard & Yayla, 2016). This intelligence body is committed to military intelligence, strategic analysis, spreading propaganda, recruiting and deploying spies and recruits, monitoring logistical support operations, and handling foreign relations, including the Turkish

government and the Assad regime. The EMNI was also useful with regards to establishing tribal connections that ensured ISIS' internal support within Iraq and Syria (Almohammad & Speckhard, 2017). Saddam Hussein's former intelligence operative, Haji Bakr, understood the benefits of recruiting acolytes from within Iraqi tribes in order to conquer territory from within. (*ibid*) and relied heavily on the support provided by former Baathists.

ISIS' territorial gains were not only produce of carefully planned government proceedings. The ideology and the active approach to jihad embraced by ISIS resulted in other Islamic militant groups pledging allegiance to al-Baghdadi, despite Al-Qaeda having disowned ISIS for its disobedience. Since the declaration of al-Baghdadi as Caliph of the Islamic State, different groups in the Middle East, Northern Africa and Central Asia attached their name to ISIS, even if they had no operational ties to the organization (Stanford University, 2010-2017). These groups included Egyptian *Sinai Province* (formerly Ansar Beit al-Maqdis), Nigerian *Boko Haram* (despite the group being active before Baghdadi's speech) and even factions of the Taliban in Afghanistan. In Western countries loyalty to ISIS was not expressed by formal militant jihadist groups; rather, endorsement of ISIS legitimacy has reflected as attacks and plots by cells. Jihadi cells in Europe can be traced back to the 70's and 80's, but it was not until after 9/11 that they received widespread attention (Pew Research Center, 2010).

Groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir were successful in spreading their idea of the Caliphate in Europe because of the exploitation of the sense of alienation felt by some second and third generation Muslims. ISIS, however, managed to expand its influence worldwide. By exploiting grievances and thanks to effective publicity and social media efforts (Jones, 2015), the Islamic State managed to draw ties between Iraq and Syria and Western countries thanks to an increasing number of acolytes. Those most drawn to Baghdadi's message ended up perpetrating attacks in ISIS' name, both in the United States and Europe. It has been revealed how plotters and attackers in Western countries had at some point travelled to Syria and Iraq, where they became further radicalized and received sufficient military training to prepare them to commit the attacks (Kaplan, 2015; BBC, 2016; Rubin & Gladstone, 2016; Dearden & Kentish, 2017). This sets forth the idea that ISIS has well established migration networks between their territory and other countries.

Human trafficking networks were described by Salt & Stein (1997) as a "system of institutionalized networks with complex profit and loss accounts, including a set of institutions, agents and individuals, each of which stands to make a commercial gain." More recently, the Council of Europe (2005) stated that "Organized crime generally consists of networks in which individuals or groups are involved in particular transactions in a given country, while linking up

with individuals and groups in other countries." Like ISIS, human trafficking networks organize themselves in a way that makes obtaining their goals plausible, and each individual inside the organization will have a clearly defined role. Research carried out in South Eastern Europe reveals that individuals who take part in human trafficking networks may work alone at the lowest levels of the organization, like "contractors" (Campana, 2016), small criminal groups (mid-level) or they can be part of well-organized criminal networks (high-level) (Surtees, 2008). Human trafficking networks also seek collaboration among individuals and authorities to establish themselves in a given territory in which they can operate.

Nigerian human trafficking networks structure themselves and coordinate activities according to internal hierarchy and external marketing (Campana, 2016). In other words, not only do they require a formal internal structure, but they also require external input, that is, individuals who will ultimately be exploited. Potential victims are, as stated above, lured to the organization both through personal and e-contact and by offering (fraudulent) job offers. Networks established by human trafficking organizations are similar to those established between ISIS and its Western acolytes; they account for recruitment processes, transportation methods and exploitation of individuals.

Migration & transnationalism

In his first speech as self-proclaimed Caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi reminded the *ummah* about their duty to do *hijra* (migration) to the Islamic State, like Prophet Mohammed did from Mecca to Medina. The ideology of the call to the *Khilafa* was effective with regard both to jihadis fighting in groups like Jabat al-Nusra, who swore commitment to al-Baghdadi (pivoting jihadis), and foreign fighters (*muhajireen*, emigrants). In order to make the crossings to ISIS-held territory, future *mujahideen* profited from the porous Turkish border and established smuggling routes (Walsh, 2013; Trofimov, 2015; Arango & Schmitt, 2015).

However, the totality of *muhajireen* did not stay and fight the local jihad, but rather became tools for the global jihad. NATO officers warned that approximately 25% of foreign fighters had returned to their countries of origin (Yuhas, 2016) and were part of sleeper cells who were awaiting to commit attacks (Schmid, 2016). It has been estimated that minimally one-third of the ISIS-related plots involved "returnees" (Homeland Security Committee, 2016).[lxxxiii] The Islamic State fighters engaged in circular migration, leaving their countries of origin to receive the necessary military training that would enable them to perpetuate attacks upon return to their homelands.

It has been pointed out how migration is one of the key elements of human trafficking. The operations undergone by trafficking groups will depend on their size, structure and available

resources. High-level human trafficking networks are those which are most similar to ISIS as far as networks and transnational reach go. They establish relationships and contracts with mid-level groups operating in the same geographical location, usually in borders between different territories, to which they command supply of services, transportation, forging of documents and bribing of officials. At a more local level, low-level groups oversee receiving victims and ensure border crossings through coordinated activities (Schloenhardt A., 1999; Andreani & Raviv, 2004; Surtees, 2008). Connections that extend from a local to a national and international level are established, and it is thanks to these connections that human trafficking networks can deliver services and obtain their goals at a transnational level. It can be therefore stated that supply and demand of *mujahedeen* for ISIS responds to the same model as that established by human trafficking networks.

These also establish sets of connections that extend from a local to a national and international level, and it is thanks to these connections that human trafficking networks can deliver services and obtain their goals at a transnational level.

Goals

The goal of ISIS goes beyond re-establishing the Muslim Caliphate at its furthest territorial expansion. Ultimately, the group seeks to establish the rule of Islam and *sharia* law worldwide. Countries around the world have been targeted by ISIS propagandist as being objectives to plant the Caliphate's black flag. Not surprisingly, the most specific threats have been issued against the two main leaders of the international coalition that invaded Iraq in 2003: the United States (ISIS, 2014) and the United Kingdom (Roberts, 2016). The global establishment of the Khilafa also has a nationalist background, and a subjective view regarding the secondary role Muslims worldwide had been pushed to. As stated in the 12th issue of Dabiq magazine:

"Soon, by Allah's permission, a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as a master, having honor, being revered, with his head raised high, and his dignity preserved. (...) The Muslims today have a loud, thundering statement, and possess heavy boots. They have a statement that will cause the world to hear and understand the meaning of terrorism, and boots that will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy, and uncover its deviant nature (...) Let the arrogant know that the skies and the lands are Allah's" (ISIS, 2015) The institution of the *Khilafa* requires territorial control. In order to achieve such control and to be able to establish itself as a State, ISIS had to be able to provide adequate and sustainable governance for the people under its control (Stephan, 2005). Like any other State, ISIS not only had its military (the *mujahedeen*), but also had a support network that included religious scholars and imams, engineers and laborers, bankers, drivers, online recruiters, service administrators, tax

collectors, bureaucrats, and media/communications practitioners (Lister, 2014). The goal for ISIS, therefore, was twofold. On the one hand, it had to develop a capacity for long-term reliable governance so as in to sustain a functioning State; on the other hand, in order to develop the infrastructure that would enable appropriate ruling, the group also required financial assets and manpower.

This work has already covered the way in which manpower, crucial to territorial advancements, was obtained by ISIS. As far as financing goes, the Islamic State organized itself as a "highly efficient company" (Gray, 2014) which uses extortion and taxation to produce over $1 million per day in revenue to back its activities (Almukhtar, 2015). Territorial control is the basis of ISIS's economic model, and it provides the organization with varied sources of income: natural resources, oil, gas, kidnapping and even antique trafficking (Center for the Analysis of Terrorism, 2016).[lxxxiv] The list of activities shows the existing link between the terrorist group and organized crime. Corruption, for instance, has been highlighted as one of the main factors that enabled ISIS' initial territorial expansion in Iraq, a country already void of any political leadership and control (Kossov, 2017).

Political vacuums also create space for criminals to operate, for trade in arms drugs and people to flourish, and for corrupt officials to act with impunity (Surtees, 2008). An exemplification of this statement is Yemen, where the breakdown of authority has allowed for human trafficking activity to boom (NYT Editorial Board, 2017): young migrants from Somalia and Ethiopia try and reach Saudi Arabia in search for job opportunities. However, the only way to get through Saudi Arabia from the Horn of Africa is Yemen, a country torn down by famine and a cholera epidemic; toughened controls in Saudi Arabia make getting legal working permits more complicated, and hence increasing the chances of human trafficking.

Human trafficking networks base their business plan on a supply and demand model. In order to be able to respond to (illicit) market demands (i.e. cheap labor force), they require both territorial operability and political control; political control is obtained via illicit means that enable corruption, such as blackmailing and bribery. According to the ILO, human trafficking generates yearly revenue of US$ 150 billion (ILO, 2014). Part of this amount is then reinvested in control mechanisms which enable human trafficking networks to be invisible, act with impunity, ensure the execution of illicit activities and increase the potential re-victimization of individuals who might escape the network. There have been reported cases of the link between human trafficking and corruption in countries like Nigeria (Agbu, 2003) and Bulgaria (Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2002). Corruption is particularly important in the process of transporting victims. As found in a report issued by the UNODC (UNODC, 2011):

> *"A woman trafficked from Southeast Asia to Western Europe mentioned, that she was instructed by the trafficker to stand in a particular queue at her home country's main airport. When she moved to a shorter one, she was moved back to the original queue and it was pointed out to her that the particular immigration official serving this queue was "one of them" and he will not ask any questions about her documents."*

Exploitation

The Palermo Protocol states exploitation as the goal of human trafficking. All in all, exploitation is a result of the abuse of an individual's vulnerabilities through fraud and/or coercion. There are several accounts of migrants who left their area of origin lured in by what seem a profitable job offer; upon arrival, either the activities the individual was supposed to perform or the working conditions (or both) did not correspond to what was initially agreed upon.

> *"Working with a recruiter in Venezuela, Sarah accepted a job in a nursing home in Trinidad and Tobago. She was thrilled by the chance to earn more money, yet nervous that she had to leave her home and did not have enough experience in elder care. When Maria arrived in Trinidad and Tobago, she realized she had been deceived. The recruiter informed her she owed a large debt, and instead of working at a nursing home, she was forced into prostitution at a local hotel bar. Her recruiter confiscated most of her earnings each night.*"

> *"Maya was 22 when she fled her home country of Syria due to conflict in the region. She was promised a job working in a factory in Lebanon, but when she arrived she was forced into commercial sex along with more than 70 other Syrian women.*"

Although it has been described how ISIS has used violence and threats as coercion mechanisms to ensure allegiance, the number of foreign fighters who joined ISIS ranks reveals that propaganda has proven an effective technique for voluntary enrolment. However, as experience in the battlefield failed to live up to fighter's expectations, the number of defectors began to increase (Stephan, 2005). Violence, corruption of ISIS officials and the fact that the Caliphate was in fact a police state (including prosecution and reprisals) are among the main motivations for individuals to leave ISIS-controlled territory (Neumann, 2015). According to interviews carried out by Speckhard & Yayla (2015), "[i]f someone is caught fleeing from IS, he is killed immediately." Fear and coercion are used as mechanisms to ensure permanence in ISIS ranks, and therefore safeguard, at least, the Caliphate's military capacity. Similar events take place in situations of human trafficking. Threats against exploited individuals and situations of abuse often cause sufficient psychological damage for victims not to be able to leave the network; fear

of being reported to authorities as irregular immigrants, and hence criminalization, also plays an important role. The 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report reflects such situations:

> "*Nicole left her impoverished family to work as a maid in Kuwait with the intention of sending her earnings back home. For nine months she worked constantly, suffered physical and verbal abuse, and received no pay. When her work visa expired, her employer took Nicole to the police and falsely accused her of a petty crime. Nicole tried to explain her innocence and reported that she had not been paid and had been abused over the past nine months. The police did not listen and instead jailed Nicole for six months. After her time in jail, Nicole was deported and returned home without any compensation*"

In contrast to enrolment of foreign fighters, which is voluntary, permanence of disillusioned individuals is forced. With regards to human trafficking, there have been cases where babies and infants are used as coercion mechanism to ensure compliance of female victims, more specifically in Spain (Lucas, 2015). Academic research carried out among individuals who managed to defect from ISIS-held territory reveals how the terrorist group's ultimate goal is to prevent individuals from defecting in order to ensure its continuation. An example of such account is Lila's story, who fled to the Caliphate with her husband and became pregnant:

> "*When he was killed and she tried to leave before being choiceless married off to someone else as most of the ISIS brides are, repeatedly, she fled. ISIS cadres sent her texts threatening her life and finally when they realized she was serious but not yet out of Syria, telling her she could leave but she needed to return first, bear and nurse her baby, and give up her child to ISIS because the baby was theirs.*" (Speckhard, 2016)

Use of violence

Popular support was not the sole reason behind ISIS' expansion. There are accounts that recall violence perpetrated by the group in areas where the population did not pledge allegiance to it. An interview conducted by London-based think-tank International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence (ICSR) among 58 ISIS defectors revealed that violence (against other Muslims) and hardship of life in the Caliphate were among the main reasons for leaving ISIS-controlled territory. More in-depth interviews (n = 13) conducted by Speckhard & Yayla (2015) provides further insight into the conditions under which population is subdued under the terrorist group. Beheadings, crucifixions and executions are a well-known occurrence (Al-Jazeera, 2015; Stakeleck, 2015; Clarion Project, 2016; CGTN, 2016; Rothwell & Ensor, 2016). However, violence in the Caliphate went beyond publicity purposes. According to interviewees,

intimidation techniques were used to coerce the population to enroll; more violent techniques were implemented to ensure law and order:

"*When they came to Raqqa they came to me and asked, 'Why you don't come with us? We work together to make an Islamic government. Why you don't you help us?' I answered, 'Inshallah* [God willing] *after some time,' but he won't hear no. I knew if I said no, they will kill me, so instead I said, 'Inshallah.' (…)*" (Abu Walid, in Speckhard & Yayla, 2015).

"*A man in a small village went to visit his neighbor. He knocked on the door of a woman whose husband was not there. He was caught waiting inside the front yard of the home [inside the outer gate of the yard] when the husband was absent, so he was arrested. He was lashed forty times.*" The lashing was so harsh that, "*he could not use the toilet and had to stay in bed for twenty days. Afterwards he was forced to take the Shariah course for three weeks. The woman inside the house was lashed forty times as well because she opened the door to the yard for him*" (*ibid*).

Violence is also a common means of treatment for individuals who are victims of human trafficking networks. Traffickers ensure acquiescence of victims through "regular beatings, sexual violence and psychological coercion, such as threats against the victim or her family" (Surtees, 2008); rape and beatings are "part of the process" (Hughes & Denisova, 2011). The 2017 TIP Report published by the United States government provides narratives from traffickers who acknowledge the efficiency of violence as a coercive mean. According to a South African trafficker, "[t]here are situations where you have to force girls by using rape, abuse or torture. When she begins to fear for her life, she stops resisting and starts working."

Research carried out in the South Eastern Mediterranean region reveals different forms of abuse are common practices among victims: 82.2% of Moldovan victims had endured some form of physical or psychological form of violence in 2004 (Surtees, 2005a); a Lithuanian survivor of human trafficking required reconstructive surgery on her face because of continuous beatings (Surtees, 2008). Abuse, however, is neither limited to human trafficking with the purpose of sexual exploitation, neither is it limited to female victims. For instance:

"*Tim lost his job in 2009 and was on the edge of destitution when a couple recruited him to work in their construction business, offering him housing and three meals a day. When he arrived at the couple's property, however, he found workers were living in a crowded and dirty trailer. The couple shaved his head, took his clothes, and confiscated his phone*

and identification. They held him captive, physically and verbally abused him, and forced him to work laying cement driveways." (United States DoS, 2017)

Effects

A political vacuum permitted ISIS' advancement. Territorial control, manpower and financial assets allowed for ISIS' will to obtain "monopoly of power" (Lupsha, 1996) lead to the emergence of a sub-political space, parallel to that of the Iraqi government. ISIS' alternative to a chaotic political situation characterized by corruption and sectarian violence was the fulfillment of the local population's needs. A report issued by Brooking Institution in 2014 examined the infrastructure and social services that were created under ISIS' rule. These included educational, health and transportation systems, among others. Propaganda elaborated by Abu Rumaysha al-Britani described how the Caliphate had "attracted some of the brightest talent to its land." ISIS' efforts to unite Muslim under its rule also include skilled professionals. It is these who played the role of engineers, tax collectors, civil servants and even small businessmen, all crucial to the correct functioning of the Caliphate (Lister, 2014).

Indeed, "ISIS didn't take over large swaths of Iraq and Syria without the active and passive support of many people" (Stephan, 2005). Frustration against of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Shi'a-dominated Iraqi security forces caused ISIS to be received as liberators in many areas (Lister, 2014), and the terrorist groups exploited anger towards the Iraqi government and the security forced to rally acolytes and fighters (Abdo, et al., 2014). By providing protection and services to the population, normal societal order was disrupted; loyalty was transferred to a terrorist group that now operated by legal and social impunity (El-Aboudy, 2002). Blackmail is also one of the preferred techniques by ISIS to gain support in areas where they may encounter resistance:

> "*According to documents captured at Haji Bakr's residence, IS' security division employed cadres sent out in advance of invasions to recruit local informants in order to collect and immediately apply intelligence to gain control the moment it decides to advance into new territory. This process includes: identifying the powerful families and individuals in a given area, finding their sources of income, identifying rebel brigades and their leaders by name, and learning about their Shariah violations so that on the basis of these they can be blackmailed if necessary.*" (Speckhard & Yayla, 2015)

Politics and commerce, as well as other spheres related to any society, are closely linked. Violent extremist organizations and human trafficking networks ignore borders, customs and legislations. This causes the "nullifying" of states (Finckenauer, 2005) by damaging their legal systems, their economic development and their political cultures (Reinares & Resa, 1999;

Voronin, 2000). As a result, economic, political and social systems around the world are undermined, also a result of connections existing between organized crime in all its forms and militant, ethnic, and religious movements *(ibid)*.

The illegal nature of activities executed by human trafficking networks and the violence that is sometimes comprised cause societal harm (Ianni & Ruess-Ianni, 1976), but also damage the political structures of a nation through the exploitation of local and national administrative and political channels (Finckenauer, 2005). This threatens national territorial integrity. Illicit activities (aimed at profiting from political, economic and social influence) affect territorial integrity, political and social stability, economic security, and even physical security, when the actions undertaken by these groups imply resorting to violence, or even promoting it, as in the case of conflicts. Organized crime manages to set up its own rule of law through the establishment of underground governments. Nonetheless, rather than a "monopoly of power" (Lupsha, 1996), it is "sub-politicization" (Beck, 1996), or establishing a network that can substitute existing governments.

This sub-politicization can also be exercised by terrorist groups. In areas where terrorist groups have *de facto* influence quasi-governmental roles also imply providing protection for the population (El-Aboudy, 2002). As such, the normal social order is disrupted, and loyalty transferred to terrorists, who now benefit from social impunity. Despite the pain and terror inflicted on the population, this pain and fear can turn into political demands on behalf of the population, whether it's in the shape of popular support for the actions of terrorists, or in the form of actions being demanded to make certain concessions to terrorists. The impact of public opinion should not be underestimated. It can be so substantial, especially with respect to salient issues (Burstein, 2003), which are often a direct cause of policy change (Page & Shapiro, 1983).

The nullifying of the Iraqi State allowed ISIS' to exercise violence against dissidents and to set up a financial system largely based on corruptive means. Both violence and corruption damage national political and economic structures. Human trafficking also damages national structures in countries where the networks operate. The exploitation of local and national administrative and political channels (Finckenauer, 2005) causes societal harm (Ianni & Ruess-Ianni, 1976), mainly due to the corruption of the legal systems. According to UNODC, the British Home Office carried out a study among convicted traffickers. The results revealed how bribery allowed for trafficking networks to operate across the border, and sometimes also led to long-term relationships between border services agents and traffickers:

> *"In some cases, the corruption was not as obvious as the payment of money for services rendered, but was more subtle – [it had] to do with longstanding relationships of mutual*

benefit, such as the exchange favors among people in 'useful positions'. (...) Interviewees also provided examples of bribery. (...) Some interviewees alleged that there was corruption within immigration and border services, both in Western Europe and outside the region." "There was a time in a Western European country where we paid the guards [400– 500 euros each]; there were 20 or 30 people to get through (...). At the Immigration Office [Passport Agency] you had people who worked very, very hard but... there were a few people who would help and break the law – for money, of course..." (UNODC, 2011)

At an individual level: Radicalization & recruitment

The Palermo Protocol defines the act (what is done) as one of the elements of human trafficking. The act includes recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons for the purpose of exploitation. The feminization of trafficking and a victimization discourse have contributed to eradicating the element of agency within individuals who ultimately end up trafficked. Lured in by (fraudulent) job offers that embody an upgrade in livelihoods, victims of trafficking generally free-willingly engage in migration processes. This rational decision-making process is similar to the one undergone by ISIS recruits. *Jihad* is not only a religious calling but living in the Caliphate is seen as an upgrade in livelihoods.

Motivations behind engagement: abusing vulnerabilities

The study of human trafficking and terrorism has focused on the understanding of processes and motivations. However, the approaches to the reasoning behind both phenomena are different. The victimhood discourse surrounding human trafficking calls for the study of underlying causes and motivations of perpetrators. In the realm of human trafficking, rational choice theory is solely applied to traffickers. Legal, established structures are used by organized criminal groups dedicated to obtaining profit from the delivery of illicit goods and services upon demand, while avoiding, through different methods, the regulations imposed on the profitability of their activities (Dammer & Albanese, 2013).

As Reinares and Resa (1999) put it, criminal organizations have managed to establish a "symbiotic" relationship between the traditional knowledge of contraband, new business opportunities, and the structural realities which difficult, or prevent, State prosecution. The profitability of human trafficking comes from the control that "monopolistically competitive sellers" have over the price at which they sell differentiated products (Wheaton, Schauer, & Galli, 2010). Trafficked individuals will have different attributes which will make them useful for certain tasks. Human trafficking can perpetuate its activities over time because of the "social universe" (von Lampe, 2003) around it. It brings together criminals and those involved in the social system (politicians, law enforcers, entrepreneurs and other citizens) (Block A. , 1983).

Human trafficking is, all in all, "'an opportunistic response' to the tensions between the economic necessity to migrate, on the one hand, and the politically motivated restrictions on migration, on the other." (Chuang J. , 2006). However, the discourse around human trafficking leaves trafficked individuals as "helpless victims" (Spencer & Broad, 2011).

Academia has largely attributed the process of radicalization to an array of biological theories (Bakker, 2006), socioeconomic and cultural explanations (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2010) and political motivations. These approaches fail to highlight that, more often than not, there is a rational decision-making process behind both processes. According to rational choice theory, individuals make elections among a series of options based on their preferences, available information, and probability of events. This means that individuals have enough "agency" (Mahdavi, 2014) to assume "calculated, strategic behavior" (Simmons & Lloyd, 2010).

It is often assumed that the ideological component is exclusive to radicalization and engagement in violent extremism. Nonetheless, human trafficking is often a result of migration processes that were initially voluntary. Both engagement in extremism and migratory processes are produce of deliberate decision-making processes, and a desire to achieve better livelihoods.

Contrary to common perceptions, human trafficking is, on many accounts, a result of a conscious decision to migrate. Human trafficking networks rely heavily on "false [job offer] advertisements" (IOM, 2002). For those who migrate, personal and economic efforts behind the migration process are compensated by the expectations of the positive outcome of re-establishing livelihoods in a new context. Human capabilities (knowledge, attitudes and conducts) enable the individual to increase his or her election probabilities to transform goods and services into achievements (Sen & Nussbaum, 1996). The possibility of adequately satisfying basic human needs determines the quality of life people may have (Max-Neef, 1991). Individual needs are satisfied by freely using available resources.

Personal well-being, understood as the satisfaction of needs, can be negatively affected by vulnerability if individuals lose capacity to face changes in the environment. Vulnerability is an *ex-ante* factor in cases of trafficking, given it is a combination of endogenous factors (capabilities) and exogenous ones (available resources, or capitals) (Triulzi & Tommasoli, 2003). A multifactorial and multidimensional process of losing adaptation capacities increases vulnerability, making individuals more prone to suffer the negative aspects of changes in the environment. Vulnerability has been largely identified as a key factor regarding human trafficking. Many studies, both at a policy and at an academic level, suggest that it is lack of integration that causes individuals to make the conscious decision to migrate. The ecological

model proposed by Bronfenbrenner serves us to explain the reason why vulnerability is a continuum. Bronfenbrenner's model links economic, social and psychological factors in the interaction between individuals and their context (Vargas Trujillo, Flórez, & Mendoza Simonds, 2011).

Individuals undergo an internal process prior to taking the decision to migrate. As s/he engages further in the idea of finding new ways to improve livelihoods, the higher the chances that s/he will accept job offers which are, at first glance, a solution to existing grievances. The decision to migrate derives from the impossibility to mobilize sufficient individual resources to survive inside a wider structure (of policies, institutions and processes) (Lindley, 2010). The individual's security is centered in fulfilling basic needs, as well as his or her integration in the community.[lxxxv] The lack of security in the economic and social aspects can affect the psychological factors, thus turning migration into a resource to be able to fulfill needs. The conditions under which s/he engages in the migratory process is what renders him or her vulnerable to exploitation.[lxxxvi] Desperation caused by the non-satisfaction of basic needs creates the gap through which traffickers can use deceit and fraud to recruit victims.

The same decision-making process applies to individuals who take the leap from radicalization into violent extremism. Personal grievances may be expressed in the form of radical opinions. However, the jump to actual violence is a result of an evaluation process. Participating in violence maximizes a utility or goal which compensates the results in case of failure (legal prosecution) (Krueger & Maleckova, 2002).

Radicalization implies a personal change, "product of cognitive and emotional processes of transformation" (Wilner & Dubouloz, 2011). According to Wilner & Dubouloz (2011), the process of personal transformation can either be caused by a "transformative trigger" (a sudden shock in the environment, such as the sudden death of a loved one) or a less immediate, "cumulative process". Both result from vulnerabilities, or the incapacity to adapt to (new) circumstances. An individual adopts new perspectives (ideas), as well as new roles, relationships and behaviors under those circumstances. More specifically, "individual radicalization takes place during the changing phase in which a combination of reflection, knowledge acquisition, and identity reassessment occurs" (*ibid*).

The identification of grievances is what sets an individual on the quest to solve them and makes him or her more prone to external and new influences (indoctrination). As the individual advances in his or her quest, and the quest turns into a moral obligation to solve existing grievances, the more prone an individual will be to external ideological input. As s/he engages further with like-minded individuals, the greater the chances of reinforcing those ideas and hence

further isolating him or herself, thereby reinforcing new acquired beliefs and thoughts. Terrorist organizations encompass the material rewards of membership with the security of interpersonal bonds and the opportunities of a corporation, in combination with an ideology of a perceived deprivation (McCauley & Segal, 1987). There is an existing relationship between individual, horizontal, radicalization (ideologically distancing oneself from the established status quo) and the influence of the top-down ideological process of radicalization. Transitioning into violence, or "jihadization" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), is a two-fold process, which requires both internal changes and external influences.

Both internal and external factors influence radicalization and trafficking in human beings. In the same way individuals who migrates sees in migration a solution to existing grievances, those engaging in violent extremism are also in searching for personal improvement. Triggers for migration can be classified like those of Islamic "seekers" (Quantum Communications, 2015): political, economic, social and/or cultural. In cases of radicalization, vulnerabilities help trigger a self-reinforcing dynamic in which a horizontal, individual process of change (progressive radicalization) makes a top-down recruitment process easier for violent extremist groups.

With regards to those who engage in ISIS' jihad, motivations seem to be no different. Between 2013 and 2015, Lebanese media group Quantum Communications interviewed 49 fighters who had joined different groups fighting in the Middle East: ISIS, al-Nusra front, Ahrar al-Sham and former FSA. Although the results allowed for nine different Islamic "seekers",[lxxxvii] the overarching motivations can be narrowed down to four: economic, social and/or cultural, and political/ideological.

Other studies suggest similar drivers for radicalization and engagement, as well as variations in motives between Muslim *mujahedeen* and foreign fighters. For instance, among Muslim fighters, the "humanitarian drive" (Neumann, 2015) behind support for Syrian Sunnis, and identification with a group who claimed to "unite Sunnis in the search for a just Islamic form of governance" (Almohammad & Speckhard, 2017) seems to be a widespread incentive. A study conducted by Speckhard & Yayla (2015) reveals that other stimulus to join ISIS included control of resources (e.g. housing), the need for cash money, fear of worse alternatives, and the feeling of having a better religious understanding thanks to ISIS' charismatic leaders.

This translates into a desire to implement *sharia* law and the positive view of martyrdom as a way of obtaining paradise. Al-Baghdadi's portrayal of the Caliphate as the State "which will return your [Muslim] dignity, might, rights, and leadership" (Jones, 2015) is an appealing "alternative geopolitical reality" (Stephan, 2005) for Arabs and Muslims who are unhappy with

the overall status-quo. By exploiting local grievances and through material gains, ISIS could convey the religious duty to support the Caliphate and manifest the personal gains obtained by doing so. Religious duty has also been exploited throughout ISIS propaganda aimed at recruiting foreign fighters. For instance, two videos released in 2014 as part of ISIS' campaign featuring two foreign fighters, a Canadian and a British citizen. Both videos specify how *jihad* is a deed by Allah, and how it is every Muslim's duty, out of brotherhood, to defend attacks against Muslims like the ones perpetrated in Palestine and Fallujah. Having lived in the West, both videos point out the emptiness of Western civilization, and portray jihad as a way to self-fulfillment.

Death for Allah and the Khilafa is the way to *jennah* (paradise), and martyrdom is also good for one's family (ISIS, 2014a; ISIS, 2014b), from both an economic and religious perspective. Several other videos and propaganda tools called for taking jihad beyond the Caliphate's territory. The message of 'duty by the deed' has been the motivation for the jihadist attacks perpetrated in the West. Even in those most controversial cases, like that of Omar Mateen,[lxxxviii] perpetrators pledged loyalty to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Khilafa and expressed their antipathy towards Western meddling in countries like Iraq and Syria (Mateen, 2016). The idealistic description of life in the Caliphate and the glorification of battles against the *kufr* is appealing even to those who join ISIS solely for the purpose of adventure (Stephan, 2005).

With regard to human trafficking, it has been established that exploitative situations are a consequence of, among other factors, individuals voluntarily engaging in migratory processes. These processes are mostly triggered by a quest for better livelihoods. Economically disadvantaged individuals can be tricked with promises of job offers that will grant them enough money to support their families (Surtees, 2008; Sossou & Yogtiba, 2009). On many occasions, fraudulent job offers are particularly appealing to individuals whose family or household situation is unstable (Surtees, 2008). There have been reported cases of runaway women who were offered luxuries and the emotional support they were not getting at home and ended up enslaved in the sex industry (Biehal & Wade, 2000; Boxhill & Richardson, 2007).

A study conducted by Surtees (2008) in Southern Europe reveals how marriage is a relatively common technique used by traffickers. From a survey conducted "among 854 persons from households with at least one unmarried daughter aged between 15 and 25 years and living with the family" (Alexandru & Lazaroiu, 2003), 48.3% of human trafficking victims in Albania were recruited with marriage and engagement purposes. Apart from the economic and personal motives behind migration, there are also individuals who are seeking adventures in other countries. Their willingness to break rules and take risks make these individuals particularly vulnerable to trafficking (*ibid*).

Agency is particularly relevant in both human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism, more specifically with regard to women. The Middle East has become the scenario where the War on Terror and the War on Trafficking overlap. As Mahdavi (2014) put it, it represents "the figure of the Muslim or brown-skinned woman who needs to be saved from the brown/Muslim men by white men (…) the villainous Muslim man who needs to be attacked/ punished/ detained." A victimization discourse has largely eliminated female agency from the discussion on human trafficking; the same has occurred with women voluntarily engaging in violence. However, research has found how women are not only "voiceless victims" (Chatterjee, 2016) but rather play an active role within the organization (Garcia-Calvo, 2017) as plotters, supporters and travelers (Alexander, 2016).

The role of ideology

Engagement in violent extremism, including ISIS, is always related to political ideology. The intertwining between religious and political ideology is largely overlooked with regards to Islam. A strict interpretation of *sharia* law is the merging of religion and politics, and its implementation in a given territory. Hence, it cannot be said that ISIS recruits are not politically influenced, neither that they acting solely based on religious ideas. When an individual undergoes a process of "jihadization" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007) and consciously pledges allegiance to ISIS, s/he is not solely seeking for religious identification: s/he believes that a form of government based on religion (in this case, the implementation of *sharia* in the Caliphate-held territories) is the answer to certain individual grievances. ISIS attracts adherents and fighters by referring to a series of intangible elements (sense of identity, belonging and participation in a meaningful enterprise) framed within a given political and religious background (Stephan, 2005; Brown, 2014). Excitement, adventure and the promise of glory in the afterlife are appealing drivers for those struggling at a political economic and social level (Stephan, 2005).

Ideology is also largely left out of the field of human trafficking. Despite ideology being mostly associated to sociopolitical movements, it is essentially a set of beliefs, opinions and thoughts that an individual identifies with. This means that the belief that engaging in a migratory process is the way to improve one's livelihoods can also be considered an ideology. It may not be a strict, conscious adherence to any sociopolitical beliefs (such as Marxism, Fascism, or Capitalism); however, it is the belief that a change in the environment (social, economic or political) will bring about positive outcome. A new job opportunity is seen by potential victims of trafficking as the solution to restore capitals, as well as the solution to support family and communities of origin. Traffickers will initially not be identified as criminals, but rather as the means through which a migrant's "expected utility" (Atran, 2003) will be accounted for. Moving to another city, province or country is made worthwhile through the offering of a job that will

enable to satisfy the basic needs that go uncovered in the area of origin. What makes it ideological is that the individual identifies with these thoughts to the extent that they will guide his actions in the decision-making process.

As it has been pointed out earlier, human trafficking tends to be erroneously identified with women and girls being kidnapped for the sex industry. However, victims of trafficking mostly end up in situations of exploitation as a result of a migratory process which s/he engaged in consciously, with the hope of fulfilling certain needs or grievances. In the same manner, the economic, social and cultural (spiritual) benefits offered by terrorist organizations appear as a lifejacket for a group of "unattached population" (Atran, 2003) who seeks to make up for a series of individual grievances.

There are specific cases, such as the Nigerian trafficking networks, where the ideology also has an escathological component. Nigerian juju is an example, and probably the best one, to depict how religion or beliefs can be transformed into a moral obligation. Just like foreign fighters are bonded to the Caliphate through a Salafi interpretation of the Qur'anic scriptures, *juju* is a religious ceremony which ties the individual to the network through the performance of rituals very similar to those of voodoo, which require personal items of the woman or girl who will travel, ranging from clothes down to nails and even pubic hair. *Juju* in Nigeria is a religion, and even has its own institutions and temples (Women's Link Worlwide, 2015). This ceremony is customary law in Nigeria and is even protected under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (*ibid*).

Juju enjoys social recognition and frees the girls from the stigma produced by exercising prostitution; it is also seen as a necessary cleansing to unblock the spiritual energy that initially prevented the female for travelling to the desired destination. Taking all of this into account, families are able to give away their female members and accept that they now belong to the madame. However, *juju* is also used as a coercion and control mechanism. Failing to fulfill the network's requests, including trying to escape, is seen as a lack of loyalty towards the network. Trafficked girls know that failing to fulfill their duties towards the network, in other words breaking the contract, implies putting their families at risk. Fear permits traffickers to grant freedom of movement to victims, knowing that they will not leave the network.

Engagement: online and offline interactions

The internet has increased the potential number of radicalized individuals worldwide. Not only does it allow for radicalization processes to take place without any physical contact, but it also allows for self-radicalization (von Behr et. al, 2013). It is common, especially when recruiting online, that individuals are persuaded into spending an increasing amount of time online therefore causing detachment from the outside world, friends, and family members (Shaikh, 2016). In cases

of radicalization, vulnerabilities help trigger a self-reinforcing dynamic in which a horizontal, individual process of change (progressive radicalization) makes a top-down recruitment process easier for terrorist groups.

However, the importance of physical enclaves or "hubs", such as mosques (Silber & Bhatt, 2007), in the radicalization and recruitment process cannot be overlooked. A recent study carried out in Spain shows the importance of both exposure to radicalizing agents and pre-existing ties to radicalized individuals contribute to radicalization and engagement in violence. Between 2013 and 2016, a total of 178 individuals have been arrested in Spain charged with ISIS-related activities (Reinares, Garcia-Calvo, & Vicente, 2017). Out of 119 cases, 40.3% of them had radicalized both online and offline; out of 107 available cases, 86.9% of them radicalized along with other people. The low percentage of people who self-radicalized reveals that probability of radicalization increases through contact of like-minded individuals. In this regard, it is worth noting how the same study shows that in cases of face-to-face radicalization processes activists and peers are the most influential figures; peers are also a prominent radicalization agent among cases of online radicalization, although foreign fighters also play an important role. Almost half (47.7%) of those arrested have sibling ties with a foreign fighter or an individual previously arrested for jihadi terrorism-related activities.

In cases of human trafficking, families and close friends, even sentimental partners, play a crucial role when approaching victims (IOM, 2002; Finckenauer, 2005).[lxxxix] There are accounts of employers visiting families of individuals (women and girls) they intend to traffic, "promising good employment abroad, easy jobs, high wages, and monthly support sent regularly to their families" (IOM, 2002). There exist several studies to prove this point, especially regarding children. A report focused on Moldova revealed that, especially in rural areas, there is a tradition for children being involved in income-generating activities; therefore, family members and relatives often consent to the recruitment of children, given that they see this s an additional source of income (IPEC, 2003). Another tradition in the country is for parents to look for suitable husbands for their daughters already at a young age. There are reported cases of traffickers who approach these parents under a fake identity, even presenting false parents, to arrange the marriage. Once an agreement has been reached, and in a similar manner to that of loverboys, the husband will suggest their in-laws for the spouses to move abroad.

The idea of extra income for the family persuades parents into agreeing to the couple's departure. (Renton, 2001). In many African countries, women are offered positions as a waitress, hotel maid, or similar. The offer implies changing geographical location; however, friends, families and colleagues not only agree, but encourage the acceptance of such an offer, hoping that

they will also benefit from those earnings (Thompson, 2004). There are other reported cases in developing country where the whole family is promised an income they will all benefit from, in case they opt for giving up a child (Roby, 2005).

Traditionally, fraudulent recruitment was hidden behind "vague advertisements" (Siron & Van Baeveghem, 1999). These advertisements could be found in local newspapers or on notice boards (IOM, 2002). However, the globalized use of the internet has also affected recruitment for human trafficking networks. Studies carried out in the field show evidence that online pages such as Craigslist also grant the anonymity required for the success of trafficking operations (Council of Europe, 2003). A report conducted by Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism (University of Southern California) provided U.S. federal human trafficking cases in which individuals (mainly minors) had been recruited for the purpose of sexual exploitation through social platforms such as MySpace. There were also reported cases of individuals being charged and convicted for selling persons (more specifically minors) and/or offering their services on Craigslist (Latonero, 2011).

So far, using ISIS as a single case study has provided enough evidence to suggest that enough correlations exist between the terror groups and human trafficking networks. Human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism are each multi-causal phenomenon. They are both sparked by a response to contextual and environmental vulnerabilities, as individuals strive to search for better livelihoods. Decisions are rational, based on individual agency, and ideologically driven. Whether the ideological component is economic (in the case of migration) or political/religious (in the case of engagement in terrorist organizations), imaginaries of an improved life are exploited by third parties who need labor to accomplish certain pre-established goals. Labor can take up the form of workers, as it occurs in human trafficking networks, or foot soldiers, in the case of politically violent groups.

Based on the definition of human trafficking in the Palermo Protocol, I conclude that human trafficking networks and ISIS have structural and operational similarities. This includes recruitment processes and purpose of exploitation, given that both human trafficking networks and terrorist groups abuse vulnerabilities using fraudulent means. When expectations are not met, individuals are stripped from the agency which they initially used to initiate a migration process by accepting a (fraudulent) job offer or by considering that the Caliphate and living under *sharia* law would provide better livelihoods. This serves to confirm the main hypothesis for this work, mainly that *Procedures of recruitment for violent political extremism (terrorism) resemble strategies deployed by human trafficking networks.*

In order to further elaborate on the research questions and to propose a potentially viable solution to the issues of preventing extremism, and rehabilitation and reintegration programs for returning foreign fighters and those convicted in their countries for terror-related offenses, the following subsections analyze the potential of approaches taken with human trafficking survivors.

Prosecution or rehabilitation: Debating returned foreign fighters and former jihadists

The War on Terror and the War on Trafficking have been the focus of institutional and policy efforts for years. Programs have been elaborated mainly to address root causes of both human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism; measures have been implemented to protect those who are directly or indirectly affected by both phenomena. However, the complexity of both phenomena has been reduced to a dichotomist discourse. The two categories are criminalization (traffickers, trafficked individuals mistaken for smuggled migrants, mujahedeen) and victimization (human trafficking survivors, jihadi brides). Focusing on the similarities between human trafficking networks and terrorist organizations established in this chapter could help broaden this reductionist approach, while providing the field of CVE with new insights on how to address radicalization and engagement in violence. The 4P paradigm used to combat human trafficking could prove extremely useful if applied to the 4R's of terrorism (radicalization, recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration). The case by case approach implemented with human trafficking survivors could serve as best practices when handling cases of returned foreign fighters.

As ISIS loses territory, the West is becoming increasingly concerned with having to adapt to the policy and strategic efforts this will entail. Despite current setback, ISIS' online propaganda still has great radicalization and engagement power over Westerners. The question then becomes how to prevent the expansion and influence of ISIS' virtual Caliphate, and how to deter radicalized fence-sitters from leaping into violent extremism. Plus, the territorial collapse of the Islamic State does not imply the ideological destruction of violent Salafi jihad (Jones & Dobbins, 2017). Rather, other groups such as Al-Qaeda are likely to profit from ISIS' territorial defeat and will continue to spread extremist ideas (Morton & Silber, 2018). Another major concern linked to ISIS' territorial relapse is the threat posed by returning foreign fighters. NATO officers warned that approximately 25% of foreign fighters had returned to their countries of origin (Yuhas, 2016). Clark & Amarasingam (2017) state not all Western fighters who joined the Caliphate are a threat to their countries of origin, given that not all of them are subject to returning. "Hardcore fighters" (those closest to Al-Baghdadi in the highest ranks of ISIS) are likely to remain in Iraq and Syria and will join insurgency movements. "Mercenaries and free agents" will most likely try and protect the establishment of the Khilafa by providing support in other areas where jihad is being

waged, such as Yemen, Libya or Afghanistan. Of those foreign fighters who will actually return to their countries of origin, only a small percentage intends to perpetrate attacks as part of a "leaderless jihad" (Sageman , 2009) movement. There are individuals who returned because of disengagement and/or disillusionment. Some could have abandoned the armed struggle because of operational or physical impediments; others might reconsider a hands-on approach to jihad because the idea of the Caliphate may have not met their expectations.

The same reality applies with regard to human trafficking networks. The commitment of those in the higher ranks of a human trafficking network will most likely prevent them from abandoning it; a cost-benefit analysis will most often prevent those in the upper and mid-levels from disengagement. However, as with ISIS' foreign fighters, survivors of human trafficking have become a large concern to authorities, mainly due to their risk of re-victimization or even the risk of adjusting roles and entering the higher ranks of an organization. Surtees (2005; 2008) revealed how recruitment into human trafficking networks by female recruiters was increasing in the South Eastern Mediterranean region. Between 2003 and 2004 the number of Moldovan victims recruited by women increased by 12.7%; in Bosnia and Herzegovina the percentage increase between 2003 and 2004 was 17.1%, whilst in Macedonia it increased by 30.5%.

Nigerian human trafficking networks account for victims working for *madams* to supervise newcomers, and eventually end up working as *madams* themselves. There are documented cases in Italy which reveal that Nigerian madams are usually between 25 and 35 years old; in the Netherlands, many Nigerian prostitutes arrive as minors, and are working as *madams* (Carling, 2005). According to these findings, it is fair to say that, despite initial fraud, disillusionment and abuse, survivors of trafficking are also prone to re-engagement. Work carried out by Denisova and Hughes (2001) in Ukraine reveals that victims who had formerly been subject to rape and physical violence showed little sympathy for new victims, arguing that violence was part of the process. Extended periods of exposure to abuse cause recruits to feel affinity towards their traffickers, even identification, because of desensitization (Long, 2002).

Violence and coercion is a tactic that prevents victims from seeking assistance, hence enhancing permanence and maximization of benefits. More recently it has been reported that traffickers are reducing the use of violence against trafficked individuals, therefore reducing the likelihood of victims identifying themselves as such (Brunovskis & Surtees, 2007), and even creating an "emotional reaction" (Surtees, 2008) similar to the Stockholm syndrome. Anti-trafficking efforts are largely aimed at preventing re-trafficking (re-engagement) of individuals after rescue. On the one hand, preventing re-victimization focuses on ensuring that the circumstances which initially triggered recruitment. For instance:

> *"Eighteen-year-old Anu grew up in a small village in an underdeveloped country, the oldest daughter in a very poor family.1 When Bellina, a family friend, offered her a job as a maid in Europe she took it to provide for her family. To her surprise, when she arrived in Europe her "employer" forced her to work as a prostitute to repay the cost of the trip and her living expenses. (...) After two years of servitude, the police raided her house and arrested her and other trafficking victims as prostitutes. She was held in an immigration detention center, since she did not have correct documentation. When the police interviewed Anu, she was very cautious and did not reveal much information because she feared the police and retribution to herself and to her family. The police suspected that she might be a victim of human trafficking, but because Anu was too afraid to help with an investigation or prosecution, especially testifying in trial, she was quickly deported back to her home country without any aid or counseling. When she returned home, Anu not only faced all the same problems that had placed her at risk before she was trafficked, but she also had new concerns. She returned with no money, and had not been able to send money home as she had promised. As a result, she faced mockery from the village and the anger and disappointment of her family. Soon after her return, (...) the town labeled her a "prostitute" and ostracized her and her family. Distraught, Anu realized that she had no way to pay off her debt (...) because of the stigma attached to her. After being at home for five months Anu became desperate and accepted another offer of overseas work, only to be trafficked yet again."* (Adams , 2011)

There are cases in which re-trafficking occurs without deportation of survivors. For instance, police officers in Barcelona (Spain) have reported Nigerian women disappearing after initial contact with authorities once a case is opened (Boyero, 2015). Despite initial disillusionment, re-trafficking can be a result of identification with the trafficker, normalization of violence, or a desire of permanence in the network with the objective of escaping physical and economic abuse by escalating ranks within the network and being able to repay debt (Europa Press, 2016). Preventing re-engagement or re-trafficking is not only a matter of addressing the economic drivers behind migration, but it also requires breaking the emotional empathy developed towards traffickers and the network. Sometimes, it even requires cultural mediation to palliate the effects of cultural and religious elements, such as in the case of Nigerian women bonded to trafficking networks by juju. Failing to consider all these issues may increase the likelihood of re-engagement. To avoid re-trafficking, individuals need to undergo a cognitive process by which their emotional and psychological attachment to the organization can also bring about behavioral changes.

The same is true with regard to the differentiation between de-radicalization and disengagement from violent extremism (Horgan, 2014). It has been pointed out that returned foreign fighters also require cognitive alterations, mainly theological rehabilitation (Gunaratna, 2011). Radicalization and engagement in violent extremism require both a cognitive and behavioral transformation; ideology is the tipping point for violent engagement, a motivation to act (Fishman, 2009). The transformative learning process individuals underwent prior to engagement in violence requires a reverse process to deconstruct violent ideology. Moreover, this disengagement process needs to account for the physical and psychological consequences of conflict, even more so in cases where foreign fighters had no other option but to stay in the Caliphate for fear of retaliation. This dissertation has already described the direct physical abuse that ISIS exercised over its 'citizens'. This harm not only affects physical health, but also has long-term cognitive and psychological effects (Grantham-McGregor, et al., 2007). Psychological matters, however, are more difficult to determine. Psychologically, damage is related to conduct problems. It refers to the ability to control emotions, feelings and personal monitorization (Mangrulkar, Whitman, & Posner, 2001). Bad mental health is reflected in low self-esteem, emotional stability, self-control, and high levels of anti-social behavior (Davis & Nichols, 2016)

Although criminalization of human trafficking survivors is rare, the opposite occurs among foreign fighters, or those supporting ISIS in their countries of origin. According to Europol (2017), the number of terrorism-related arrests has increased from 74 in 2014 to 1002 in 2016; in 2014, 51% of cases were related to jihadism, a percentage which has increased to 71.65% in 2016. Prisons, however, have been deemed to be "radicalization hubs" (Silber & Bhatt, 2007); therefore, it seems wise to suggest that prisons should be the first areas of intervention with regards to disengagement. Although countries like the Netherlands, Belgium and France have experimented with placing these individuals in isolated modules in high-security prisons, Veldhuis (2015) highlights the risk of incarcerated individuals becoming potential radicalizers, and the risk that incarcerated individuals may go on to commit violence once their sentence is complete. The risk of recidivism stems from "psychological maltreatment" (McGee & Wolfe, 1991; Hart, Binggeli, & Brassard, 1997; Bakker, 2006) that is, obviating the cognitive and emotional component behind hostile actions towards other individuals. Good psychological and cognitive health is fundamental to develop socio-emotional abilities: negotiating capabilities, trust, cooperation and empathy (Mangrulkar, Whitman, & Posner, 2001).

Several countries have tried to implement disengagement programs (Sukabdi, 2015; Boucek, 2009). Six critical dimensions have been identified for rehabilitation processes to be successful: contextual insights, vocational skills, spiritual maturity, personal, social and domestic skills (Sukabdi, 2015). As Holmer & Shtuni (2017) put it, "disengagement does not necessarily imply an abandonment of the

ideology, but rather requires a "shift in social relationships and personal circumstances". These same principles are being applied when it comes to the rehabilitation of human trafficking survivors. A study conducted by USAID (2017) sets forth the main areas of intervention for the rehabilitation of human trafficking survivors living in group residential facilities in foreign countries. Apart from assessing residential facilities for survivors, it evaluates the importance of education, economic opportunities and psychosocial support. A special subsection is dedicated exclusively to reintegration of survivors. According to the document, reintegration:

> "(…) *involves not only the victim but also the environment and culture within which the reintegration is to take place. (...) The process entails putting the pieces of the former victim's life together in a way that she can be re-united with a former life, a family, and a community, or helping the victim create a new life in another place in society*."

Are partnerships the solution to reintegration?

The last pillar of anti-trafficking efforts revolves around partnerships. The Palermo Protocol instigates States parties to enhance and promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation among them to achieve the objectives highlighted in the document. It also recommends signatories to partner with organizations, including non-governmental ones, and civil society to provide the necessary protection for survivors.

Bodies like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have successfully promoted cooperation to reintegrate survivors of human trafficking. Alongside ActionAid, they created the Reintegration Network in 2007; the network is composed of sixteen international and national entities that cooperate and coordinate efforts and resources to assist in the reintegration process of women and children in Vietnam. Among others, "providing life-skills training, health care, and psycho-social counseling and mental-health treatment" (IOM, 2007) is key inside the program. The IOM's efforts do not only include legal and social branches, but they also take into consideration broader aspects, such as healthcare. In 2009, the IOM, the UN Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT) and the Gender Violence and Health Centre of the London School for Hygiene and Tropical Medicine created the *Caring for Trafficked Persons: Guidance for Health Providers*. Expertise from international organizations, universities and civil society addresses clinical and non-clinical issues consequences of human trafficking.

The aim of such partnerships is to comply with identified "best practices" (Schloenhardt & Loong, 2011) including a holistic approach to health-related issues, the provision of vocational trainings, so that survivors can become economically independent and have a sense of ownership over their reintegration process, as well a sense of worth and capacity (psychological well-being) in order to avoid re-trafficking. Such programs emphasize the importance of reintegration through

contributions to the community, whether it is back in the country of origin or in destination countries if victims obtain temporary residence permits. With regards to conflict and violence, however, the question becomes whether communities also play a decisive role.

To answer this question, and to check for applicability with regards to returning foreign fighters, I resort to experiences and results derived from reintegration and rehabilitation programs aimed at children soldiers. Studies conducted among former child soldiers reflect how conflict and abuse can cause children to both externalize and internalize certain behaviors which are not conducive to the development of adaptive behaviors (Betancourt et. al, 2010a). Hostility among child soldiers was inversely proportional to rates of family acceptance (*ibid*). Having protective resources, social support, education and community acceptance (including familial acceptance) has proven to reduce depression, promote the development of pro-social attitudes and improve psychosocial readjustment among child soldiers (Betancourt et. al, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c). Most importantly, however, Betancourt et. al, (2010c) highlight the importance of overcoming stigma when undergoing psychosocial adjustments. In line with Anu's story presented above, lack of integration within a community of reference can be cause for recidivism. This is particularly important in the case of foreign fighters, given that discrimination is considered, in and of itself, a push factor of radicalization. Community-based, collective, and comprehensive support contributes to the development of human capacities and the communal sociocultural fabric (Derluyn et. al, 2013).

Rehabilitation and reintegration are currently being considered as options for ISIS' child soldiers, otherwise known as the "cubs of the Caliphate" (Karasapan, 2017; van der Heide & Geenen, 2017). Nonetheless, as far as adults go, the common approach, and the most popular among public opinion, is the "hard approach" to the phenomenon of returning foreign fighters (Reed & Johanna, 2017). This approach fails to understand that returning foreign fighters disengage for different reasons, therefore complicating the implementation of one-size-fits-all measures. Reintegration strategies are based on a multidimensional approach to radicalization and engagement in violence; they are aimed at addressing contributing factors, reversing violent ideology, and preventing new cases of radicalization and engagement. It is true that not all terrorism offenders may be apt for reintegration (de Kerchove, Bundsgaard, Stone, & Levitt, 2015); new inmates should be taken in, assessed and classified based on an effectively developed system. This should be based on a case-by-case study, in the same manner that cases of human trafficking are dealt with (Smith & Smith, 2010; Leclerc & Wortley, 2014).

Incarceration and isolation fail to take into consideration the accomplishments of reintegration programs. However, the lack of indicators allows for no proof of what effective tools

achieve short and long-term effects (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2012; Veldhuis, 2015). Even when aiming for reintegration, programs differ on whether individuals convicted for terror-related offenses and/or foreign fighters should be prosecuted and criminalized. According to the Rome Memorandum (2012) there are several practices which should be implemented to make programs successful.

Programs are elaborated to provide terror offenders (when necessary) with cognitive skill programs, vocational training courses, basic education trainings, the possibility of continuation with the program after the sentence has been completed, and protection for individuals who are threatened for disengagement and de-radicalization. Reintegration programs are also aimed at including families and communities. States call for the collaboration between law enforcement, social workers, psychologists and mental health specialists, theological scholars, victims, and even former extremists. Professionals who are apt to working with these high-profile individuals and respond appropriately will be able to make sure that all the crucial areas of reintegration are appropriately applied in each individual case.

In their book called "*Reintegrating Jihadist Extremist Detainees: Helping Extremist Offenders Back into Society*" Weggeman and de Graaf (2017) present a series of reintegration programs implemented in different countries. Saudi Arabia's "war of ideas" is a combination of religious teaching and rehabilitation. The program claims to account for a low rate of recidivism: after disengagement and de-radicalization, government stipends avoid detainees falling back into their old networks. The technique of 'dialogue of ideas' is also implemented by Yemen's Committee for Religious Dialogue. Before being released, detainees had to sign a document that they had rejected radical Islam and acknowledging that families could be held accountable for future actions. However, in 2005, after many Yemenis fled to Iraq to wage jihad, the program was ultimately disregarded. In Asia, reintegration programs are implemented in Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. The Singaporean and Malaysian approach is a top-down process which touches upon psychological, religious and social aspects; release is person- and context-specific, and it includes follow-ups after release. Indonesia, on the other hand, is more focused on the criminal aspect of the process, trying to figure out what actually goes on inside terrorist groups. As a result, authorities viewed as enemies because of lack of trust, hence tampering the effectiveness of the program.

As far as partnerships go, the Nigerian case is a good example. Its prison-based de-radicalization program is funded by EU and UK, and it is based on four main pillars: engagement, risk assessment, needs assessment and intervention. The program focuses on individually-held beliefs, values, attitudes and behavioral changes; as such, interventions include motivational

interviewing, vocational training and work experience, educational and cultural activities, art therapy, sports and games, religious intervention and psychological counseling. There are no direct rewards for participation, but participation does include incentives such as assistance with legal matters, medical care and welfare assistance.

The fact that there are existing success stories of reintegration has lead supranational bodies to suggest cooperation between law enforcement and former radicals (Reed & Johanna, 2017). This approach has also been used by law enforcement with regards to cases of trafficking in human beings; survivors cooperate with police and social services to identify victims, they participate in trainings for security forces, and they also assist in mentoring vulnerable individuals to prevent cases of human trafficking from increasing (McEvers, 2016; University of Dayton, 2017; Appleton, 2017). In the realm of CVE, experts have encouraged governments and activists to "recognize the value and credibility of defector narratives" (Neumann, 2015). When engaged in deradicalization programs, former radicals are a credible voice to counter the jihadi messaging, due to their religious knowledge and their personal trajectories (Rabasa et al., 2009).

An example of this is the Quilliam Foundation, the first think-tank to counter violent extremism. Quilliam was set up in London by Ed Husain, Maajid Nawaz and Rashad Zaman Ali, all of them former members of Hizb ut-Tahrir. Currently, Quilliam is engaged in assessing direct intervention programs with radicalizing youth, such as the Channel Programme, which allows the British government to conduct one-on-one interventions (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Moreover, Husain's "*The Islamist: Why I Joined Radical Islam in Britain, What I Saw Inside and Why I Left*" (2007) and Nawaz's "*Radical: My Journey Out of Islamist Extremism*" (2013) are used as references for engagement and disengagement trajectories, and the importance of altering one's belief system.

The UK's (controversial) Prevent Strategy utilizes former extremists and moderate imams to engage youth reported to the authorities (United Kingdom Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2011). Britain is not the only example. Once de-radicalized, former Al-Qaeda propagandist and recruiter, Jesse Morton, collaborated with U.S. authorities and law enforcement in preventing terrorist financing operations and to deter American youth from travelling to Syria (Zapotosky, 2016). Morton currently works to counter violent extremists' messaging by utilizing his personal experiences and knowledge of network science. In the European context, Danish citizen Morten Storm went from Al-Qaeda militant to working undercover for the FBI and the Danish Security and Intelligence Services (PET). His information gathering helped track Anwar Al-Awlaki and carry out the drone attacks that ultimately lead to his death.

In summary...

This chapter has illustrated the rise of ISIS, its ideology, its organizational schematics and its recruitment methods. The objective was to confirm (or disconfirm) the main hypothesis for this work, and in order to answer the research questions. All in all, it can be concluded that ISIS not only functions in ways identical to organized crime networks, but that its recruitment methods equate to those used by human trafficking groups. This serves to confirm the hypothesis presented in the introduction of this research:

Recruitment for ISIS is not solely a top-down process. Rather it requires proactive attitudes that facilitate individual progressions along a non-linear continuum between cognitive radicalization and violent extremist behavior. This agency is also a characteristic within human trafficking networks: susceptible victims are lured into the network through fraudulent job offers that represent an upgrade in livelihood. Vulnerabilities are abused by traffickers to coerce individuals into exploitative conditions. Oftentimes in the sex trafficking trade, a narrative of 'rags to riches' entices recruits, selling them the idea of a utopia in the country of destination. In that same manner, ISIS recruits are promised a life of practical opportunity and abundance, under the laws of Allah. In the early days of the Caliphate in particular, this included imagery of wealth, distribution of charity and increased yields in livestock and agriculture. Recruits progressively gravitate towards violent extremism and migration to the Caliphate as a result of idealistic notions of jihad as the means to fulfilling earthly and other-worldly objectives.

The main argument against equating ISIS recruitment to human trafficking is the fact that migration to and permanence in ISIS-held territory is voluntary. This approach, however, fails to take into consideration that ISIS propaganda targets individual vulnerabilities; vulnerabilities are answered through the religious element, therefore making the determination of exploitation through fraud and coercion all the more complicated. Accounts of the brutality and violence exercised within the Caliphate are proof of this coercion. There are reported cases of individuals who cannot depart areas under ISIS' control for fear of retaliation, both by ISIS and their countries of origin were they able to return. This conundrum is also applicable for cases of exploitation where the elements of fraud and coercion are not present and cannot be considered human trafficking. In cases where fraud and coercion do exist, victims are often scared to leave the network for fear of retaliation, either from the network itself or from authorities in destination countries.

Having identified these similarities, I posit that, although prosecution is needed for returned foreign fighters, criminalization must include programmatics that aim for reintegration and rehabilitation. In order to prevent recidivism, the holistic approach most often employed with

survivors of human trafficking should be tailored to fit returning foreign fighters, though it will not always prove applicable. The protection, reintegration and rehabilitation techniques utilized in the treatment of survivors of human trafficking have effectively encapsulated the need to intertwine physical, psychological and socioeconomic aspects for the correct recovery of survivors. In the same manner, physical, psychological and socioeconomic factors are required to achieve the behavioral and cognitive changes that can lead and individual from disengagement to de-radicalization, which suggest and complete and holistic personal transformation. Therefore, effective reintegration and rehabilitation programs could prove useful as a means of prevention, intervention and even interdiction as former extremists offer credible voices against radicalization and engagement in violence, oftentimes expertise in ideology and recruitment and first-hand knowledge of extremist networks.

Chapter 8. Conclusions & Recommendations

Both human trafficking and terrorism are two of the main security concerns the European Union (European Commission, 2016) and United States face currently. The U.S. 2016 Intelligence Report indicated their intersecting nature where it emphasized that "trafficking in persons has become a lucrative source of revenue for transnational organized crime groups and terrorist organizations (…)" (Clapper, 2016). To this date, the relationship between both phenomena has only been examined from that perspective, as if human trafficking was exclusively a financing mechanism for terror groups.

A preliminary literature review, however, reveals that human trafficking and terrorism may have more in common than initially suspected. They are both complex phenomena, dependent on a socioeconomic, political and cultural macro- and micro-context. Moreover, the War on Trafficking is based on a 4P model (prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships) that is very much in line with what I call the 4R model for the War on Terror (radicalization recruitment, rehabilitation and reintegration).

These seemingly existing similarities led me to ask why academia has not tapped further into this line of research. Independent of whether the threat of ISIS and jihadist terrorism going forward is acknowledged, the truth is that returning foreign fighters and those convicted for terror related offenses could potentially pose a security threat for their communities of origin. There are, however, no mechanisms in place that acknowledge the diversity in profiles of those who joined jihad, the need to reverse the ideological and contextual factors that led to their engagement in the first place, and how to effectively prevent recidivism through proper rehabilitation and reintegration initiatives. The holistic approach taken to combat human trafficking appears as a plausible alternative to achieve this.

A discourse analysis helped shed further light on the reasoning this lack of awareness concerning the issue at stake. The discourse analysis was conducted using LexisNexis, which served to account for how the discourse around ISIS has been socially constructed from the moment the terror group self-declared its so-called Caliphate until the taking of Mosul, one of its bastions, by the international coalition. Results show that media is the main voice pushing the 'ISIS discourse' forward. The rapid developments on the ground and the need for immediate information prevent a more in-depth analysis of the reality behind ISIS' operational strategies and rationale. Failing to highlight these aspects affects the way in which academia, law enforcement and the counter-terrorism community, including CVE experts, approach (preventing) engagement, rehabilitation and reintegration of former jihadists.

The fact that there is no public discourse linking recruitment mechanisms employed by ISIS to those utilized by human trafficking networks does not mean that the parallels do not exist. In order to qualify as parallel or being akin to human trafficking processes, ISIS would have to fall under the international definition of human trafficking provided by the Palermo Protocol, that is, abuse individual vulnerabilities to fraudulently or coercively recruit individuals for the purpose exploitation. For this purpose, I used ISIS to conduct a single case study. This would allow tease out a theoretical framework that might allow future works to test my hypothesis further and to do so empirically

Using ISIS as a single case study allowed me to, in first instance, answer the two first research questions:

- ISIS abuses individual vulnerabilities to attract recruits: I have documented that the group frames religious ideology in socioeconomic, cultural and political terms. Lack of integration causes vulnerabilities that help trigger a self-reinforcing dynamic in which a horizontal, individual process of change (progressive radicalization) makes the top-down recruitment process easier. The group represents significance and empowerment, as well as partaking in a larger campaign to achieve specific goals while fulfilling personal needs.

- ISIS is guilty of exploiting some of its recruits: attracts adherents by referring to a series of intangible elements (sense of identity, belonging and participation in a meaningful enterprise) framed within a given political and religious context to enhance commitment. A large number of engaged individuals journeyed to Syria and Iraq to fight for Al-Baghdadi free-willingly. Thereafter, many became disillusioned and attempted to flee. Fear of being killed by ISIS troops and prosecution in their countries of origin prevented them from escaping. Thus, the psychological and physical obligation to continue fighting on behalf of ISIS is in line with the definition of exploitation provided in this dissertation

Based on these two points, the overriding hypothesis of this work is confirmed: recruitment methods employed by ISIS resemble those utilized by human trafficking networks. These results hold important implications for both sociological and national security interests. They allow for a deeper understanding of the dynamics that back individual motivations to engage in violent extremism and how networks facilitate that engagement. In return, it can be concluded that:

- In some cases, rehabilitation and reintegration would be effective alternatives to incarceration. In cases where incarceration is mandatory given the nature of the offense, specifically tailored rehabilitation and reintegration programs should be included as part of the prison program, especially seeing that most individuals convicted for terror-related

offenses will one day return to society. In order to address the two tiers of the issue, disengagement and deradicalization, reintegration and rehabilitation programs should pull from best practices in the realm of human trafficking. A holistic approach to preventing recidivism through reintegration and rehabilitation should not only address the ideological component of "jihadization" but should also encourage the educational and socioeconomic recovery of individuals. As occurs with human trafficking, some cases may also require psycho-social counseling and mental-health treatment.

- Following the fourth 'P' of the War on Terror paradigm, partnerships are also key to address the threat of jihadism going forward. To guarantee that measures against jihadism are sustainable, partnerships between governments (national and local), security bodies and agents, and civil society must become the go-to option. States have called for the collaboration between security forces and law enforcement, social workers, psychologists, mental health specialists, expert theologians and victims. These types of alliances can create self-reinforcing dynamics that allow for an improved measurement and assessment of best practices in the field. In a similar fashion to survivors of human trafficking, the voice of former jihadis should be considered indispensable. Once they have undergone their own disengagement and deradicalization processes, they can become key advisors for law enforcement. Also, their journeys in and out of extremism could prove an invaluable asset in the realm of prevention, they can become trained interventionists that could play a crucial role in preventing engagement and recidivism, and they can turn into a support mechanism within the rehabilitation and reintegration programs

There are, however, limitations to this dissertation. In first instance, results of the discourse analysis are limited to English-language sources. Including other languages, especially Arabic, would provide a broader insight into how the discourse of ISIS is constructed worldwide, and whether certain issues are more salient depending on the area. Nonetheless, these flaws can also be opportunities for further research. A joint assessment of Western and jihadi media and propaganda (the latter in Arabic) can enable going beyond the 'us vs. them,' given that it would allow for comparing two different social constructs and would be seemingly useful for better understanding the complex dynamic behind voluntary enrolment in ISIS and curtail the threat going forward. Moreover, single case studies have been largely criticized as research methods. Although a multiple-case design may be better suited to replication through pattern-matching and thereby arriving at some theoretical proposition, and while it is true that no generalized prescription can be derived from a single study, case studies can provide the particularization necessary to both generate and validate conceptual and theoretical frameworks.

All in all the original hypothesis can be justified for further research and also draw hypothesis for further testing in the field of practice. In other words, proving my hypothesis has opened the door to further examining whether interventions in the realm of human trafficking based on rehabilitation and reintegration of survivors can be tailored to the needs of the CVE sphere. The whole methodological approach is, overall, a step towards empiricism.

Recommendations for future research

These existing comparisons permit elaboration into research recommendations for addressing the foreign fighter problematic going forward. As it occurs in cases of human trafficking, each individual case will require close examination, to determine the reasons behind an individual abandoning ISIS-held territory, the degree of culpability and exploitation and whether they are determined to pose a threat to national security. Research recommendations in this work are based on two of the four main pillars of human trafficking: prosecution and partnerships.

Definitional issues

As far as partnerships go in the field of violent extremism, the international community should aim to reach a consensus definition for terrorism. . Seeing that academic discourse drives policy-making, academia should aim at bridging sufficient knowledge to set forth a definition of *terrorism* that serves to influence the international community.

The internationally agreed-upon definition for human trafficking provided in the Palermo Protocol can be used as a reference. This consensus has been utilized effectively to work towards common practices that allow for evidence-based practices and measurable outcomes across borders. For instance, The United States' yearly Trafficking in Persons Report is a world-wide reference used to evaluate individual countries' efforts to prevent and combat human trafficking. Evidence-based practices have helped countries of origin to adopt prevention, protection and intervention programs that are attacking the phenomenon of human trafficking at its root.

Addressing root causes

It is largely acknowledged that root causes of human trafficking revolve around a lack of socioeconomic and political integration in countries of origin. However, as far as radicalization and engagement in violent extremism goes, academia has mostly ignored an instrumental and multidisciplinary approach. This fails to address what has been classified as 'the syndrome': personality traits, background environment, ideological components, grievances etc., to explain engagement. This would explain the inability in finding a 'profile' for terror-related offenders.

Before 9/11 the field of terrorism was more commonly known as political violence, a term that lends itself to the inclusion of the sociopolitical drivers that back pseudo-religious

justifications and that would force more impartial analyses that recognizes grievances, such as the impact of Western foreign policy in the Middle East and Muslim world generally. Combating the transnational jihadist movement will require a population-centric approach that gets to the root drivers. Integration and immigrations measures like the recent 'Muslim ban' enflame the problem and expand the appeal of violent extremism propaganda.

Western nations must reconsider their respective integration policies among migrant communities. A debate should be open for integration to go a step beyond assimilation and ensure economic mobility and sociopolitical representation at a longitudinal and cross-generational level. At the global level, the international community should consider the positive outcomes of initiatives like those put forward by General David Petreaus and his COIN strategy. It was this approach that originally defeated the Islamic State of Iraq, predecessor to ISIS. More than sixteen years into the War on Terror, it should be apparent that we cannot 'kill our way' out of the problem. The relatively nascent field of CVE is testimony to this realization.

Additionally, it should be clear that a holistic approach will prove essential to effectively contesting ISIS' (and other Islamist groups like them) advocacy for transforming the status-quo internationally. This approach is also applicable across zones of protracted conflict, for instance in Afghanistan, where popular support for the Taliban's desires for the United States and NATO to retreat remains a pertinent issue. A soft approach aimed at gaining sympathy from locals and eliminating the idea of the international system as perpetuating insensitive hegemony is crucial.

In this regard, academia should play a critical role in advancing an approach to terrorism that goes beyond the reductionist lens derived from specialization bias. A deeper understanding of the complex underlying dynamics of cognitive radicalization and behavioral engagement in violence can help better address prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration. Further empirical research can further advance theories and promote new perspectives, while providing a gateway into obtaining measureable and replicable outcomes. It is important to bear in mind that synergy between different fields of expertise presents an opportunity for knowledge borrowing and idea exchange that can surely contribute to winning the 'battle for hearts and minds.' This dissertation is a good example of how such synergy can work and the possible alternative approaches it can set forth.

The online threat

Human trafficking networks rely heavily on "false [job offer] advertisements" (IOM, 2002). In an age of interconnectivity and globalization, many of these advertisements can be found online. It is also online that child pornography is distributed, and where other fraudulent activities can take place, such as the purchase of illegal documentation that would grant migrants access to

a given country. The World Wide Web has also played a major role regarding violent extremism. Individuals embedded in an e-community of like-minded individuals will increase their chances of isolation and further polarize their "us vs. them" views.

It is advised not to disregard the importance of online networks, especially as ISIS loses territory. Although an organization may be dismantled, the ideas that hold a movement together perpetuate. This is as true for trafficking networks, gangs and smuggling operations as it is for transnational jihadists. A recent publication on American foreign fighters that traveled to Iraq and Syria since 2011 highlights the importance of diachronic approaches to the formation and continuation of online jihadi communities. The report documents how previously existing jihadi networks and 'radicalization hubs' established during previous periods of jihad in Bosnia, Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan played outsized roles in future migration (*hijra*) to ISIS' Caliphate (Meleagrou-Hitchens, Hughes, & Clifford, 2018).

Further research in this direction is encouraged, to be able to trace and track individuals, ideas and network nodes that allow for the continuation of ideas and the perpetuation of jihadist networks in times when threats seem to be receding. Such is the case now with ISIS' loss of territory, but it was also the case in 2004, when the Taliban and Sadaam Hussein regimes were removed from power and in 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed and the 'Arab Spring' seemed to indicate a new wave of Middle Eastern democracy.

The current threat is based on the intersection of cyberspace and reality offline. Hence, a greater focus on online prevention is required. Current efforts to combat jihadist recruitment online center around a take-down approach combined with a counter-narratives that seek to discredit Islamist extremists. For instance, YouTube launched its own Redirect Method, an initiative that redirects vulnerable users to an alternative video list that refutes the jihadist message. The Redirect project suggests it reached 320,906 people during an eight-week pilot, and that a total of 500,070 video minutes were watched (Redirect Method, 2017).

However, these strategies are pushing jihadist sympathizers to migrate to encrypted platforms and the dark web, a collection of networks and technologies which enable information exchange anonymously both in origin and destination. This increases the possibilities of exchanging ideas without any sort of censorship and prevents extensive law enforcement monitoring. Migration to encrypted platforms will only hinder the identification of ISIS supporters online (Fernández-Garayzábal, 2018). This will likely prove true for underground trafficking networks as well, particularly as access to the internet continues to increase, especially with initiatives like internet.org. Internet.org is a Facebook-led initiative set up with the goal of bringing internet access to the 4.9 billion users worldwide who are not connected (Internet.org,

2013) (Hempel, 2016). Enhanced connectivity to the World Wide Web in the developing world will not only reduce the spatial restrictions between recruiters and those susceptible to recruitment but will also provide greater access to idealized and enchanting narratives of life in the West.

The role of women

In the same manner that the field of human trafficking has acknowledged to increasing role of women as recruiters and madams, so too must the field of countering violent extremism reconsider the role women play as propagandists and recruiters. Except for extremely prominent cases such as that of Sally Jones, a woman's role in the Caliphate is typically assumed as limited to giving birth to future *mujahedeen* and being caretakers in the household. This assumption has proven true to the extent that prison sentences in the United States for women are an average of 5.6 years, in contrast to the 13.2 average sentencing for men. Similar discrepancies exist in Europe, despite research documenting women play active and influential roles as propagandist and recruiters (Alexander, 2016). Moreover, ISIS' recent territorial fallback also seems to be refuting conceptualizations of women as 'behind the scenes' actors. Recent propaganda depicts women of the Islamic State participating directly in battlefield conflict (The Baghdad Post, 2018).

Considering that women are not solely passive standbys and that their prison sentences are typically less than those of men, special focus should be given to female recruits. This applies to those who are still free, and those who have been incarcerated. Their theological knowledge and their power to influence propaganda and discourse can be essential in counter-propaganda campaigns elaborated within the CVE space. Their journeys in and out of radicalization can also provide essential input to the field, in the same way that accounts of human trafficking survivors have been considered key in developing prevention, rehabilitation and reintegration programs.

Incarceration, rehabilitation and reintegration

As ISIS loses physical territory, concern for returning foreign fighters and the potential threat they pose have becoming a growing concern in the West. Apart from those who returned with the intention of perpetuating jihad back home, there are those who returned because of disengagement and/or disillusionment. Unless, however, each returnee is assessed on a case-by-case basis, there will be no certainty as to their motivations, nor will it be possible to correctly determine the extent of the threat they may pose.

Because of the existing similarities between recruitment methods utilized by ISIS and those used by human trafficking networks, tools utilized to combat human trafficking can help provide insight into how to address the security threat posed by jihadist returnees. However, the stigmatization associated with violent jihadist extremism tends to stimulate a knee-jerk reliance on prosecution and criminalization. Criminal justice systems should combine prosecution and

imprisonment with reintegration and rehabilitative alternatives. Although the public demands absolute security, successful rehabilitation and reintegration stories, for example among the 'cubs of the Caliphate' can serve as some of the best preventative and counter-narrative mechanisms.

Despite the criticism that approaches to the War on Trafficking have received, there are still valuable lessons to be drawn from it. For instance, the Palermo Protocol acknowledges the need for human trafficking survivors to undergo a reflection period. During this period, survivors are granted a series of protections and benefits, while they ponder whether to collaborate with law enforcement. This reflection period could also be applied to individuals charged with terror-related offenses, independent of whether this time is spent in preventative prison.

In many cases, prison will be the ultimate destination for those convicted on terror-related charges. Nonetheless, however long prison sentences may be, most individuals will eventually come back into their communities. Once released, these individuals risk recidivism, especially if it considered that contact and bonding with like-minded individuals in prison can further increase the sense of empowerment and push individuals further along the radicalization continuum.

The same concern applies to survivors of human trafficking, mainly due to their risk of re-victimization or even the risk of becoming part of the higher ranks of a human trafficking organization. Despite initial fraud, disillusionment and abuse, survivors of trafficking are also prone to re-engagement. To prevent this, programs have been developed and implemented. Programs usually include vocational and personal skills, as well as legal and social assistance. Similar programs could and should be part of prison systems in the West for extremist inmates. Such programs have proven to reduce recidivism rates, as well as provide the necessary protection for survivors. The implementation of such programs in prison can serve both to disengage and deradicalize individuals, while also serving as an added reflection period during which individuals may ultimately decide to cooperate with law enforcement.

States call for the collaboration between law enforcement, social workers, psychologists and mental health specialists, theological scholars and victims. The fact that there are existing success stories of reintegration has lead supranational bodies to suggest cooperation between law enforcement and former radicals. Programs are elaborated to provide terror offenders (when necessary) with cognitive skill programs, vocational training courses, basic education trainings, the possibility of continuation with the program after the sentence has been completed, and protection for individuals who are threatened for disengagement and de-radicalization. Reintegration programs are also aimed at including families and communities.

The role academia can and ought to play in this realm is simple though straightforward. Combining different fields of expertise and diverse experiential knowledge, academics play a key role in initiating the trial-and-error phase of potential mechanisms used to address the issues posed by jihadism going forward. Academia is also positioned best to extract and analyze what works and what doesn't, and to further perfect an integral approach to this security issue.

Engaging civil society in combating extremism by creating a parallel network

Research in the field of human trafficking has called for a holistic approach in combating the phenomenon. The same approach should be considered when countering violent extremism. A holistic approach to jihadist extremism would incorporate intersecting initiatives at the prevention, intervention, de-radicalization, reintegration, rehabilitative and interdiction levels. Getting the private sector and civil society involved in these efforts will prove crucial, as has proven the case with regard to human trafficking.

Given the increase and multifaceted fashion of radicalization, preventing entry in any radical environment and avoiding adherence to radical beliefs should be primarily prioritized (Sedgwick, 2010). Effective prevention requires the proactive development of a holistic worldview based on principle antithetical to hate and which targets society at large. Nonetheless, current prevention strategies are based on an 'if you see something, say something' approach, rather that synthesizing on- and offline strategies that include a positive message and pathways to participate in alternative, non-violent networks.

As an alternative, prevention campaigns should mimic ISIS' strategy of offshoots and affiliates that operate under one banner. Anti-extremism experts, activists and other members of the community should merge under one same 'brand' which includes logos, mottos, etc., and that are able to present ideological axioms and sociopolitical constructions that can revert the learning process undergone during the radicalization stages. The success of these efforts will depend on the synthesis and intersection of community initiatives and online approaches that construct a parallel network that not only rivals in scope and size to that of jihadi extremists, but also present a pluralistic and democratic worldview (Fernández-Garayzábal, 2018).

Cooperation between government and civil institutions can also serve to improve intervention programs focused on rehabilitation and reintegration, as an alternative to incarceration in low-risk cases. Intervention can become an important pillar in the CVE sphere, especially if self-reinforcing cooperation mechanisms are put in place and permit the elaboration and implementation of both CVE-relevant and CVE-specific programs. Bridging the gaps between government agencies and civil society allow for better feedback and evaluation,

something that would increase the suitability of such initiatives and adapt them for increased success.

As programs evolve, they would construct "communities of practice" (Wenger, 2000), that is, a community of discourse that provides its members with a sense of belonging, through communal resources and shared interests. Interaction and dialogue create "metanarratives" (Klenke, 2004), a narrative interpretation which inculcates and includes historical, psychological and cultural perspectives. As a result, ideas, common values and memories are created. Working together will guarantee establishing trust among the members of these communities.

These ideas, however, are not altogether new, since they mimic the approach taken to combat human trafficking. Governments, law enforcement, NGO's and civil society have managed to unite efforts in a way that enables them to address root causes of trafficking, acknowledge the importance of strategic communication to engage society at large, and increase cooperation with civil society when it comes to preventing human trafficking and enabling prosecution.

In summary...

Countering violent extremism has become one of the most pressing security issues for the West. Resources have been allocated to find the perfect recipe to prevent new cases of engagement and future attacks and, ultimately, to protect citizens. The overall conclusion is that CVE should opt for an increasingly holistic approach that addresses current threats: radicalization, engagement in violent extremism, the perpetration of attacks, and recidivism among individuals already convicted for terror-related offenses.

The complexity of the phenomenon and the individual trajectory of offenders seems to suggest that no straightforward solution exists. However, this work has shown how initiatives and programs already implemented in other spheres relevant to national security could be tailored to meet the needs of the CVE community. More specifically, this dissertation has drawn from the existing parallels between human trafficking networks and violent extremist groups. Using ISIS as an example, I have concluded that the similarities in recruitment methods imply that similar approaches can be used when addressing the reintegration and rehabilitation of those involved in such networks.

Although human trafficking is considered a violation of human rights and exploited individuals are considered victims and terrorists are considered perpetrators, dealing with both problematics requires similar solutions. In first instance, preventative policies should include both governments and civil society, given the socioeconomic and political factors that allow for the

existence of human trafficking and engagement in violent extremism. Second, to prevent recidivism, effective reintegration and rehabilitation programs must be implemented. However, these approaches should avoid being top-down, but should rather include community-led initiatives that are able to address the root problematics.

The most important factor to take into consideration is that a holistic approach to CVE does not require reinventing the wheel. Rather, CVE experts, the counterterrorism community and CVE activists should ponder examining what is already being implemented in other fields. In particular, this dissertation has shown that they should turn to closely examine what we've come to recognize from the Global War on Trafficking.

End Notes

[i] The Bush administration spoke about the global fight against terrorism being both ideological and military. The term 'War on Terror' was coined based on the methods used by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups: although the battle in itself was against "violent extremism", but those extremists used terror as a tool (Schmitt & Shanker, 2005).

[ii] Islamic State is the name the terrorist organization prefers. The Obama administration chose to use ISIL (Islamic State in the Levant) as an alternative. The Levant territory much larger than Syria and Iraq, for instance Israel, Palestine, the Sinai, Lebanon and the Transjordan, where the organization did not control territory but had a large presence.

[iii] It is generally stated that using the terms Islamic State, ISIS or ISIL would legitimize the barbarity of the movement lead by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi. Contrary to that belief, this work will ultimately use ISIS or ISIL throughout the work, instead of the widely-spread DAESH. The reasoning behind this choice is that, to ISIS's supporters, the Caliphate is completely legitimate and justified from a religious and political point of view. Independent of whether the movement correctly interprets the Qur'anic scriptures upon which they base their actions, the truth is that not acknowledging the (alleged) legitimacy of the Caliphate can cause grievances, even if the support for ISIS is merely ideological. As this research will point out, grievances are a large contributing factor to radicalization and ultimate engagement in violent political extremism.

[iv] Illegal trade in oil has been pointed out as one of the main sources of income for ISIS. The organization controls a vast majority of oil field in Syria, enabling them to have a daily turnover of between $1 and $1.5 million, by selling crude to independent traders. The Russian authorities have accused Turkish elites (President Erdogan, his family and close circles) as being the main purchasers (and hence, financers) of ISIS crude. These sorts of statements have not helped alleviate tensions in the Middle East region, let alone the Syrian conflict. Overlooking the debate regarding these accusations, the fact is that illicit oil trade is enabling ISIS to gain financial stability and support to increase the number of recruits. For instance, they can use that income to pay salaries of technicians and engineers managing the oil fields, or they can invest it in expanding their media outreach and propaganda techniques, while enhancing the idea of economic independence and sustainability of the caliphate (Taub, 2015; Nakhle, 2015; Solomon, Kwong, & Bernard, 2015). There is also evidence that ISIS has been increasing their income through the looting of cultural heritage sites in Syria and Iraq and smuggling of antiquities (Taub, 2015). Looted and smuggled antiques (also known as 'blood antiques') are mainly jewelry, ceramics and sculptures coming mainly from historical areas in Iraq and Syria (such as Palmyra or Nineveh), but pieces coming from Turkey and even Egypt have also been intercepted. It is difficult to precisely determine what exactly is smuggled, the final destination of the items, or which routes they follow. However, several pieces of 'blood antiques' have been identified in the European black market, and also as parts of private collections. The exact value of 'blood antiques' is unknown; some of them have been valued at $12m. The illegal export of cultural property contradicts international legislation on the matter (see UNESCO's Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing

the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property of 1970), it is one of the activities that has made ISIS the richest existing terrorist organization (Watson, 2015; Shabi, 2015)

[v] The ninth issue of Dabiq magazine (2015) directly deals with the case of Yazidi women. Basing the arguments on religious knowledge and theological explanations, ISIS justifies the fact that women captured in war are taken by ISIS fighters as concubines. It is described as an act "containing many divine wisdoms and religious benefits, even if people are not aware of it". Throughout the article it is largely emphasized how, according to ISIS's interpretation *sharia* law, women who have been taken from their men during conflict and are now a property of warriors should be treated with respect and kindness. Despite prostitution being considered a sin, slaves are not considered as prostitutes; rather, they are seen as means of having more offspring (and hence increase the number of future *mujahedeen*) and a way of converting more individuals into Islam. Once these women embrace Islam, they will be accepted as wives rather than concubines. Polygamy is a practice accepted under Islam. The target of these practices are mostly Yazidi women (read, for instance, Rukmini Callimachi's article in the New York Times, "*ISIS enshrines a Theology of Rape")*, a religious ethnic minority originally from the Mesopotamia area. Because their religious beliefs merge elements from Zoroastrisnism, Islam, Christianity and Judaism, they are not considered to be *'Ahl al-Kitāb* ("people of the book"). On top of reported accounts of the treatment Yazidi girls and women receive, ISIS propaganda videos show *mujahedeen* openly objectifying women, by engaging in the purchasing and selling of these women. In a context that reminds one of a market, ISIS members tax women based on their physical attributes, and bargain to get a good deal out the exchange. Some are "bought for a pistol"; others as young as thirteen and fourteen years old are auctioned to the best bidder (see: "*Yazidi Girls as Young as Twelve Sold to ISIS Fighters*" and "*ISIS selling women into slavery*", both available in the video-sharing website YouTube). In 1993, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) classified rape as a form of crime against humanity when committed in armed conflict and directed against civilians In 1998, Jean-Paul Akayesu was the first person to be tried for using rape as a form of genocide (as a tool to exterminate the Tutsi race) (The Prosecutor of the Tribunal vs. Jean-Paul Akayesu, 1998). The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), in force since 2002, states that "committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, (…), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions."

[vi] The Post-Cold War scenario in which the clash between the two major powers had been substituted by a multipolar order in which a multiplicity of actors appeared, was once again challenged. There were two direct, though interrelated, consequences derived hereof. The first one was a re-conceptualization of the Operations Other Than War (OOTW), a term coined during the 90's to refer to all those interventions which did not require military troops. The post-Cold War scenario revealed that threats to peace and security now represented a complex set of intertwined elements that went beyond a mere military threat. Threats such as environmental or economic issues that need to be addressed through both engagement and cooperation between nations are now seen as a source of conflict in general. However, what exactly constitutes a security threat and its relative importance varies between countries and across time; how the different issues are perceived will determine how they are addressed (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies , 2015).

[vii] Sub-politicization is a result of the structured nature of human trafficking networks and terrorist groups, their economic and political goals, and the use they make of violence and corruption to perpetuate their multifaceted actions over time. Their fluidity, dynamism and capacity of adaptation pose a threat to national law enforcements and overall national security. The "monopoly of power" (Lupsha, 1996) that both types of organization seek ultimately "nullifies" the State (Finckenauer, 2005) at an economic, political and cultural level.

[viii] The 1988 Israeli elections are an example. Twenty-seven parties ran for elections, fifteen of which achieved the minimum number of votes to obtain 1% of representation. The difficulty to maintain (political) order did not come because of the existence of a multiparty system, but rather because of the ideological differences stemming from the First Intifada (December, 1987 – March, 1991). The Arab uprising came to reflect the need to deal with the territorial dilemma in a realistic manner; however, data obtained from surveys carried out between December, 1987, and January, 1988, revealed that 21% of the Israeli population actually supported the Intifada, and that 3% of the population disagreed or strongly disagreed with the emigration of Arabs (versus 69% who agreed or strongly agreed to this) (Arian, Shamir, & Ventura, 1992; Arian A. , 2003). These same surveys revealed that around 13% of the population thought that military action would only worsen the situation. In fact, only in 1995, 2001 and 2002 was military intervention the preferred course of action among respondents, coinciding with the end of the First Intifada, and the outbreak of the Second one. If actions undertaken by the Israeli government during these years are reviewed, they show that political approaches to the subject do bear in mind the opinion of voters.

[ix] On November 13th, 2016, a series of coordinated attacks resulted in 130 dead and 368 injured in Paris. The first suicide bombings (3) took place outside the Stade de France football stadium. They were followed by shootings and suicide bombings in the streets of Paris. The largest death toll (89 casualties) occurred in the Bataclan theatre: gunmen shot indiscriminately at individuals attending an Eagles of Death Metal concert, and then took hostages inside the theatre. Ultimately, as the police raided the venue, the attackers blew themselves up. Two of the perpetrators, Ahmad al-Mohammad and M. al-Mahmod, were said to have entered European territory from Syria using fake passports and posing as refugees. The two terrorists who survived the attacks, Salah Abdelsalam (though tot be the mastermind behind the operation) and Mohamed Abrini, were both Belgian-born. They both left Paris after the attacks and fled to Belgium, where they participated in the terrorist attacks which took place a few months later, in March 2016 (BBC News, 2016).

[x] A basic awareness that counter-terrorism strategy should be holistic has developed from the onset of the War on Terror. Donald Rumsfeld once described the reductionist approach given to the War on Terror, by saying: "*Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing, or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training, and deploying against us?*" (Secretary of Defense Donal Rumsfeld, in Singer, 2004). By the time President Bush increased US troop presence in the 2006/2007 period (known as "the surge"), the strategy in Iraq was much more in line with General David Petraeus' COIN (counter-insurgency) strategy. Influenced by the writings of French soldier and intellectual David Galula ("*Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*") as well as by the experiences and work of Iraqi War Veteran John Naql (author of "*Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*"), Gral. Petraeus changed the approach to a conflict that was reporting around 90 civilian deaths a day (Bergen, 2012). He realized that territorial conquest was less

important than the "battle for hearts and minds", that is, ensuring the population's needs and securing them, so that they would not have to side with insurgence. The approach to ISIS, however, is more a military approach than a battle for hearts and minds. Experts do, however, recommend taking up a more holistic approach to battling ISIS. Diplomacy is the ideal tool for the Middle East. Filling the "power vacuum" (Hussain, 2015) which enables ISIS to thrive should be more important than worrying about whether existing regimes in the area comply or not with the conceptualization of liberal democracy. As far as policies in the West go, more specifically Europe, they should focus more on their integration policies, while acknowledging that support against ISIS is not solely ideological, but also a consequence of a broader political context.

[xi] An article published on November 20, 2015 in The Washington Post depicts the privileged treatment given to media producers in the Caliphate: "In Syria, they were given a villa with a garden. Abu Hajer was issued a car, a Toyota Hilux with four-wheel drive to enable him to reach remote assignments. He was also paid a salary of $700 a month — seven times the sum paid to typical fighters — plus money for food, clothes and equipment. He said he was also excused from the taxes that the Islamic State imposes on most of its subjects" (Miller & Mekhennet, 2015).

[xii] British-born Sally Jones was a notorious propagandist and female recruiter for ISIS. She converted to Islam in 2013 and married Junaid Hussein, British computer hacker and recruiter also an ISIS recruiter. That same year, Hussein left to join ISIS in Syria; Jones and her 10-year old son followed soon after. Also known as "Umm Hussain al-Britani," Jones used her Twitter accounts not only to recruit females into the organization, but also to teach them how to use weaponry and how to carry out suicide attacks in the West. She also used social media to incite violence and even issue threats, such as publishing the information of 100 U.S. soldiers online under a "kill list" (Counter Extremism Project, 2015). Jones was allegedly killed in a drone strike in June 2017.

[xiii] What also contributes to this uncertainty in numbers is a definitional problem: because these migration movements violate the norms of sending, transit and destination countries, there currently exists a debate on whether they should be deemed *irregular immigration*, or rather *illegal immigration*. Irregular immigration refers to migratory statuses of individuals. These are a product of immigration policies, whose nature is aimed at regulating entries and settlements. Immigration control is at the top of every political agenda: it is perceived as a threat to public order (Broeders & Engbergsen, 2007) and it associated to other illicit activities, such as drugs and crime (Uehling, 2004). As a result, there are different types of "illegality" (Huysmans, 2000). Some immigrants will enter national territories in a clandestine manner, other will arrive at a given national territory using forged documents, some will claim to have lost their identification or regulatory papers, others may overstay the duration of their visa, or those applicants for international protection may find themselves in a limbo until their legal status is defined.

[xiv] A debate exists on whether violence perpetrated by a State should be included as terrorism. It is sometimes argued whether a State's use of violence can be proportional to the attack received (Cooper, 2001), and is rather "low intensity warfare" (Wardlaw, 1989). However, as Wardlaw himself argues, violent actions performed by States can be classified as terrorist: the basic principle of distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants is not respected by States performing these violent actions, and therefore they never meet any *jus in bellum* standards. State-

sponsored terrorism is, however, different to what is commonly conceived as *terrorism,* in the sense that it is violence imposed from above, rather than violence from below seeking to influence higher power instances (Laqueur, 1977; McCauley & Segal, 2009). There are two types of State terrorism: covert State terrorism and surrogate terrorism (Stohl, 1988; Wardlaw, 1989). Both, however, also have their sub-types or sub-divisions. *Covert State terrorism* can be divided into *clandestine State terrorism* (the State directly participates in violent actions) and *State sponsored terrorism*, that is, governments employing third groups to perform violent acts on its behalf. *Surrogate terrorism* involves certain complicity, and it seems to have a different level of moral responsibility to covert State terrorism. It can be divided into two subcategories. *State-supported terrorism* implies a State supporting a third party, which has committed an act of terrorism that can be deemed as interesting for the supporting State. *State acquiescence to terrorism* occurs when a State fails to condemn an act of terrorism performed by some third party. This classification also comes to show that State terrorism can also be used a tool of foreign policy (Wardlaw, 1989; Merari & Friedland, 2009).

[xv] Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 1973; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December 1979; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on 26 October 1979; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December 1997; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December 1999; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted in New York on 13 April 2005; Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 8 July 2005; Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October 2005; and Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October 2005.

[xvi]As what happens with terrorist movement, the 'propaganda by the deed' is not exclusive to the Narodnaya Volya movement in Russia. Already during 1st century A.D., Zealots, Sicarii and Assasins carried out their campaigns in the Middle East. The Shiite Assasins, for instance, murdered Muslim leaders who, in their view, had corrupted Islam. However, they did this publicly and in broad daylight, in order to attract attention to their cause and obtain their end goal: revitalized theological and social order (Mahan & Griset, 2013).

[xvii] Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971; Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 1973; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December 1979; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on 26 October 1979; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December 1997; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December 1999; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted in New York on 13 April 2005; Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 8 July 2005; Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October 2005; and Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October 2005.

[xviii] Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, concluded at Montreal on 23 September 1971; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, adopted in New York on 14 December 1973; International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted in New York on 17 December 1979; Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, adopted in Vienna on 26 October 1979; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, done at Montreal on 24 February 1988; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at Rome on 10 March 1988; International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted in New York on 15 December 1997; International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, adopted in New York on 9 December 1999; International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, adopted in New York on 13 April 2005; Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, done at Vienna on 8 July 2005; Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, done at London on 14 October 2005; and Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, done at London on 14 October 2005.

[xix]The EU has developed legal instruments to curtail terrorist actions and protect government infrastructures. At an economic level, the EU developed the Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive, along with the Cash Control Regulation and a Financial Action Task Force (FATF). To prevent bombings, the EU elaborated an Action Plan on Enhancing the Security of Explosives, followed by the 2014 Regulation No. 98/2013 on the marketing and use of explosives precursors. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks are regulated by the EU CBRN Action Plan

(2009). Government infrastructure is protected under the European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) from 2006, and tools such as the 2008 Directive on European Critical Infrastructures.

[xx] More definitions have probably been added since then. From the definitions included, the majority of them mentioned violence, political aims and fear. In numbers, 83.5% of definitions mentioned the violent aspect, 65% the political connotation, and 51% referred to violence. The least mentioned characteristic was their methods of action or tactics (30.5%).

[xxi]This definition sets forth the political orientation of terrorist groups and points out that perpetrators of such acts are not part of the government. The fact that their actions are classified as clandestine or underground intends to highlight their illegality. Lastly, by mentioning "noncombatants", Title 22 of the U.S. Code sets forth that violent, illegal actions fall under *terrorism* also because they are perpetrated against civilians. Terrorist actions are performed in times of peace, which implies that only one of the sides is engaged in armed violence. Under International Humanitarian Law, a non-international armed conflict implies the confrontation between government forces and non-governmental armed groups, or between two non-governmental armed groups (Sivakumaran, 2012). In cases of terrorism, it is the State who suffers unidirectional attacks in an unexpected manner (since open war has not been declared by two opposing factions). Moreover, the non-governmental group is composed of members who, despite maybe having announced the name of their group (Wallensteen & Sollenberg, 2001), do not wear neither a uniform nor any other distinctive symbol (therefore camouflaging among civilians) (Hoffman, 1999). However, based on this definition, violent, politically-oriented actions could be excluded from the definition of terrorism, were they to be directed to military personnel. That is why the term "non-combatant," referred to, but not defined, in 22 USC. 2656f (d), also includes *"military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting"* in addition to civilians.

[xxii] Beck (1996) speaks about a *transnational poverty*. The author also mentions an existing *relativity of poverty*, (distinguishing between *absolute poverty* - living under $1/day- from *relative poverty* - living with a quantity equal to $1-2/day). However, in the same manner that development is not solely economic, and security does not exclusively fall under military terms, poverty is also a multidimensional phenomenon, which should not just be expressed in economic terms, but also in social and political ones. Given that they include social and cultural systems (Tickner, 2009), differences in accessing resources cause an asymmetric impact in development.

[xxiii] Based on Sachs's (2005) classification of capitals, (define in text), capabilities can be classified into three different categories: physical-financial (everything a household has, and therefore includes natural, business and infrastructure capitals), human (related to the individual and his/her attributes, and which can translate into income and well-being), and social (intangible attributes and relational resources, or networks, which enable social well-being). If expressed in terms of vulnerability, poverty can be conceptualized as a multidimensional and multilayered phenomenon. Capitals are classified into six different categories of capitals: human, business, infrastructure, natural, and intellectual capital (Sachs, 2005).

[xxiv] The only state which allows any kind of legal prostitution is Nevada.

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xxv According to Moghaddam (2005), the process of radicalization an individual undergoes until s/he engages in violence is similar to climbing a staircase. Each 'step' taken is one higher step of commitment to the organization. As s/he climbs further, not only does commitment become stronger, but options on how to address grievances become narrower. Ultimately, violence is seen as the only possible course of action.

xxvi The 'conveyor belt' metaphor suggests activism results in radicalism, and that all cases of radicalism stem from activism. Terrorist address those who are isolated and aggravated and try to embrace extremist ideologies. Gradually, terrorists expect to gain sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, new recruits. However, Moskalenko and McCauley's research reveals that activism and radicalism are two different dimensions of political engagement. The transition between both depends on the subjective perception of injustice inflicted by security forces.

xxvii Given that the Islamic State is not an internationally recognized country, and claiming that one's nationality is "Muslim" has two major, interconnected, implications for ISIS recruits. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights states in Article 15 that everyone has a right to a nationality, and that no one "shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality". However, according to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, there are several instances under which a contracting State may deprive an individual of their nationality. The reasons cited include: (a) that, inconsistently with his duty of loyalty to the Contracting State, the person *(i) has, in disregard of an express prohibition by the Contracting State rendered or continued to render services to, or received or continued to receive emoluments from, another State, or (ii) has conducted himself in a manner seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the State; (b) that the person has taken an oath, or made a formal declaration, of allegiance to another State, or given definite evidence of his determination to repudiate his allegiance to the Contracting State*. The first element to consider is that the Caliphate is not considered a *de facto* State; secondly, it is not clear whether performing terrorist acts outside the national territory is considered an action that is prejudicial to State interests, since these actions usually encompass "*espionage, treason, or a violation of the duty of loyalty owed to one's state*". Moreover, going back to the definition of terrorism, what is considered an act of terrorism is subjective to the interpretation of the different States. However, were engagement in ISIS to be considered sufficient motive to revoke recruits of their nationality, the question of whether these individuals would become stateless under international law is raised (Sands, 2016; Jayaraman, 2016). After all, a "stateless person" is a person who is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law. The issue among countries regarding foreign fighters in ISIS has been whether to deprive nationals with dual citizenship of the nationality that compels them. Examples of legal actions of this sort are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada and Indonesia (Sands, 2016). Nonetheless, as Jayaraman (2016) correctly points out, if this measure is more widely implemented, it could lead to a race between countries to deprive nationals who joined ISIS of their citizenship. Were this to be the case and considering that ISIS is indeed not recognized as a State, it could throw ISIS recruits into statelessness.

xxviii The illegality of these activities be a product of the selling of good which are illegal as in of themselves (for example, narcotics), the illegal selling of legal goods (for instance alcohol sold in the black market to avoid taxes, or the selling of pieces of art in the black market), the illegal provision of services (migrant smuggling and human trafficking, both of which are independently

regulated under international law), and/or any financial activities derived hereof (money laundering or counterfeiting currency) (Weenink, Huisman, & van der Laan, 2004).

[xxix] In the case of networks dedicated to sexual exploitation, recruiters are usually former prostitutes turned traffickers. They are commonly known as *madams*. Paolo Campana's work (2016) offers detailed descriptions on the role madams play in Nigerian human trafficking networks. The paper also describes how *madams* interact with other members of the organization to recruit, transport and exploit girls in the sexual industry.

[xxx] Even the most current threats of violent Islamic radicals are included under the political aims and goals. Their aim is to make radical Islam an authority in the political scene. It should be acknowledged that not all of the political movements, ideological trends and policies fall under this fundamentalist approach. Islamists have different views regarding religious authority and knowledge, let alone concerning the use of violence to gain reach their goals.

[xxxi] There are authors who distinguish between political, religious and ideological motivations behind terrorism (see Enders & Sanders, 1999, 2002; Krueger & Maleckova, 2009). This work encompasses the three categories all under the same type of motivations. The dimensions of terrorism set forth by Victoroff (2009), does differentitate between political ideology (leftist/socialist; rightist/fascist; anarchist) and the relation of the different groups to authority (anti-state/anti-establishment/separatist; pro-state/pro-establishment). All in all, however, the relation with authority is mostly dependent on the ideology of the terrorist organization and the government they oppose or favour. Even the spiritual motivation of terrorist movements (secular; religious) currently also falls under political motivations: religious movements who engage in violent actions often seek to merge governance and religion speheres at a State-level.

[xxxii] The excessive exploitation of natural resources through illegal means and with the purpose of obtaining illicit income is known as *over-exploitation*.

[xxxiii] Exercising any kind of power by abusing a person's vulnerable situation is a key element in slavery-like situations. Although it is true that there exist power relations among individuals (for instance a boss has power and mandate over his or her employees), what is defined as abusing vulnerabilities is profiting from situations where there exist unequal conditions. For example, in cases of homicide, a judge will have the right and the obligation to do justice and punish the person accused guilty. There is indeed an imbalanced power position, since the defendant's destiny is in the hands of a jury and a judge. However, assuming that the accused has had a fair trial, it cannot be said that the defense is taking profit of power balances.

[xxxiv] "*Los abusos económicos son formas de abuso en dos maneras principalmente, en la pareja por el acceso a los recursos económicos, lo que disminuye la capacidad de la víctima de mantenerse a sí misma y la obliga a depender financieramente del perpetrador o bien en el ámbito financiero como el uso ilegal o no autorizado de propiedades, dinero u otros valores de una persona (incluyendo el cambio en la voluntad de una persona para nombrar al abusador como heredero)*" (Economic abuses are forms of abuse, mainly the partner accessing economic resources, which diminishes the capacity of the victim to self-sustain herself and obliges her to depend on the perpetrator, or in the financial sphere, such as the ilegal or unauthorized use of properties, money or other personal assets - including the change of the victim's will to make the

abuser the lawful heir) (Instituto Universitario de Integracion en la Comunidad. Universidad de Salamanca, 2012)

[xxxv]Though similar, exploitative situations should not be confused with abusive ones. Abusive situations refer to those involving "labor compensation" (Chan & Siu, 2010). However, the wages and material rewards obtained by workers do not match the demands of performed tasks. Low wages provide those abused limited with little economic self-sufficiency (Chan & Siu, 2010; Postmus et. al, 2011). Immigrants in an irregular legal situation may be susceptible to situations considered abusive. However, no matter how dimished the power of the employee is at the workplace, there is no link to the employer other than a working position. Companies in countries like the United States would rather hire irregular immigrants because of the lack of requirement to meet labor legislations, and the possibility of paying lower wages (see Bloomekatz, *Rethinking Immigration Status Discrimination and Exploitation in the Low-Wage Workplace*, 2007). This allows employees to apply for new positions in other companies. There is no further bondage between employer and employee.

[xxxvi]Because of the nature of the activity, human trafficking with the purpose of organ removal is a one-time phenomenon. According to international definitions, human trafficking with the purpose of organ removal would imply the recruitment and transportation of persons by forced, coercive or deceitful means for the purpose of obtaining benefits from transactions with their organs. However, illegal organ trade can take on plenty of forms. The table below shows that the lines distinguishing illegal organ trade from exploitation, and from human trafficking for the purpose of organ removal can be very thin. Irregular adoptions can also be considered a form of trafficking. It involves recruitment, transport and obtaining economic benefit from the selling of children. However, it cannot be classified as forced labor, despite the infant being treated as a commodity. Transactions for purchasing and selling a child will only take place once, and therefore those dedicated to this activity will only be able to obtain benefit from the same child once. There are, nonetheless, other activities which, by nature, can be carried out over a prolonged period of time. These activities have been classified as forced labor. The term 'labor' automatically distinguishes it from one-time activities which, in spite of also being performed unwillingly, do not allow for the same individual to be exploited successively. Tasks performed include services related to begging or sexual exploitation, forced marriage. Forced marraige, for instance, is a modality of servitude which often also entails domestic and/or sexual servitude (Castaño, 2014). The 1956 Slavery Convention includes it as a form of slavery because the woman "*without the right to refuse, is promised or given in marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group*", can be transferred "*to another person for value received or otherwise*" or "*is liable to be inherited by another person*" after her husband's death. Sexual exploitation must be forceful for it to be considered trafficking. As specified by the European Court of Justice, "[t]he activity of prostitution pursued in a self-employed capacity can be regarded as a service provided for remuneration" and can therefore be included as "economic activities as self-employed persons" and "activities as self-employed persons" (Aldona Malgorzata Jany and Others v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, 2001). As economic activities, they should be performed by a person "over a certain period of time (…) in return for remuneration paid to that person directly and in full (…) under that person's own responsibility (…) [and] outside any relationship of subordination concerning the choice of that activity, working conditions and conditions of remuneration". The Protocol to

Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons intentionally leaves the terms exploitation of the prostitution of others and sexual exploitation undefined. The Protocol does not criminalize prostitution, but only activities related to trafficking. Individual States preserve their right to lawfully regulate matters concerning prostitution. For instance, the Dutch government regards prostitution as a consented (sexual) act between two adults (Rijksoverheid Nederland, 2015). Other sectors have also developed according legislation to combat other forms of exploitation. For instance, the ILO reported on the efforts made by Brazil to tackle forced labor. These include: "*the creation of the National Commission to Eradicate Slave Labour (CONATRAE), responsible for the formulation and monitoring of the First and Second National Plans to prevent and eradicate forced labour; the creation of the Special Mobile Inspection Group under the Ministry of Labour, combining the efforts of specially trained and equipped labour inspectors and police officers; the establishment of labour courts in the areas most affected by forced labour; the government's 'dirty list', regularly updated, which names and shames those enterprises found to be employing forced labour; and the National Pact for the Eradication of Slave Labour, by which major companies not only commit to prevention and eradication of forced labour within their own organizations and their supply chains, but also agree to be monitored*" (Maranhão Costa, 2009). These measures serve to avoid labor exploitation. This is the last category of forced labor that this work identifies. Labor exploitation is different to the other categories because it encompasses activities that would normally be regulated and for which an appropriate legislation exists (for instance agriculture or fishing industry). This would distinguish labor exploitation from other exploitative situations derived from activities which are in themselves illegal, such as theft. There are cases in, such as it has been presented above, that the sex industry is also legislated by national governments. However, in cases of trafficking, it needs to be distinguished from labor exploitation since it violates an individual's sexual rights. Violent conflicts have also given way to cases of human trafficking. These cases do not only refer to the forced engagement of recruits or women to be sex slaves for combatants. More recently, there have reported cases of individuals being captured and sold as a means of economic subsistence for paramilitary groups or terrorist organizations. Such was the case of the 200 girls kidnapped by Boko Haram. Not long after the kidnapping, though, suicide attacks started taking place in Nigerian public spaces. These attacks claimed by Boko Haram were being perpetrated by very young girls, suspected to be some of the girls which had been kidnapped and forced to commit suicide.

[xxxvii]Slavery is based on the exercise of rights of ownership. It is defined as the "*status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised*" (OHCHR, 1926). Rights of ownership are defined in economic terms. They are a set of rules that regulate behaviors in relation to objects, as well as the right to enjoy them within limits established by law. Different regulations will determine whether the proprietor may or may not do with the object over which there exists this ownership right, and how other individuals should behave with respect to this object. In other words, what turns a person into a victim of trafficking is the fact that they are enslaved. Social exploitation allows for vulnerable individuals to be turned into "commodities" (Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010) that can be purchased and sold. Exploitation of man by man leads to alienation. This alienation leads to commercialization of human beings: they are commoditized through loss of autonomy and freedom. The European Court of Human Rights specifies that human trafficking, because of its nature, is based on the exercise of ownership powers over human beings, who are treated as commodities that can be bought and sold (Case of Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010). Commercializing human beings implies stripping them of their dignity. It also walks hand in hand with slavery: the slave belongs

to the master and cannot have access to things that belong to the individual, such as his/her body or his/her abilities. Detachment from things that are inherently human, reduces the individual to the category of a 'thing'.

xxxviii Integration for individuals can be either active or passive. When talking about active integration we refer to individuals benefitting from the existing social networks existing in the community; passive integration refers to the individual free electing his or her representatives and is included in the work market. For instance, was passive integration and inclusion in the work market to be lacking, citizens would be prevented from gaining the necessary physical-financial capital to satisfy a series of needs.

xxxix On the moment of departure, the individual migrant leaves behind all the physical-financial capital. Human capital, on the other hand, may have been forged in the country of origin. However, translating those attributes into income and well-being may be prevented because of the process of migration itself. Given that until the migrant reaches a destination, he or she is involved in an on-going process of movement, it is difficult to set the proper grounds for obtaining any significant income. Lastly, social capital suffers from the same problem as human capital, since establishing networks in the environment requires a prior settlement. It is in this sense that vulnerable migration processes turn out to be a problem of human security. It has been proved that vulnerability potentiates the probabilities of becoming a victim of human trafficking. Sometimes victims of human trafficking decide to migrate at an individual level, without a job opportunity in sight. There only aim is to reach the Northern countries, where they expect to be able to fulfill their needs. In these cases where journeys are long and difficult, vulnerability turns out to be a burden that is brought along by migrants from their town of origin, and it turns out to be a key element for the recruitment of victims. In the same way that it was personal insecurity that pushed migrants to take the decision to try and re-start their livelihood strategies somewhere else, personal insecurity is the enhancer that increases their possibilities of falling victims of human trafficking.

xl Criminal organizations take actions by efficiently using available resources to achieve their goals, but subject to a series of constraints (Sandler, Tschirhart, & Cauley, 1983). Classifying these groups as "strategic", implies assuming they are isolated from the outside world, and that their strictly enforced behavioral and moral standards follow a consistent logic which is independent of external factors (Edward & Levi, 2008). Organized criminal groups are usually set up according to traditions and social structures (Bossard, 1990; Arsovska & Kostakos, 2008) as a rational response to the demand of illegal goods and services (Demletier, 1994; Wheaton, Schauer, & Galli, 2010).

xli A study conducted by Pew Research Center's Forum on Religion & Public Life in 2012 asked 38,000 Muslim interviewees in +80 languages about their views on Islam. Regarding differences between Shi'a and Sunni Muslims, answers for Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, Palestinian territories and Morocco show that only in Iraq and Lebanon are Shi'a Muslims considered true Muslims by an overwhelming majority (82% in Iraq, 77% in Lebanon). Lowest scores correspond to Egypt (53% consider Shi'a to be Muslims, 42% do not), Palestinian territories (40% consider Shi'a to be Muslims, 38% do not) and Morocco (50% consider Shi'a to be Muslims, 37% do not).

xlii This concept of battling for "hearts and minds" was later also used by General David Petraeus in his counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy. It reveals that there was an overall awareness that, very much in line with a polarized scenario of external threats to nation states, the fight could not solely rely on military strength. Victory and a sustainable 'post-conflict' scenario (whether it entailed implementing democratic liberal values in the Middle East, or the proclamation of the Caliphate) would only be possible by obtaining civilian sympathy for the cause.

xliii Al-Maqdisi is an Al-Qaeda loyalist considered as a godfather of the salafi jihadi ideology. Al-Maqdisi met Al-Zaraqawi in a Jordanian prison and helped him dedicate his life to Islam. In the run up to the Iraq war, the presence of Al-Zaraqawi in Iraq was utilized as a evidence for an alleged link between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda (though this was later disconfirmed). Al-Zaraqawi left Jordan for Iraq with his teacher still incarcerated. Once Al-Zaraqwi justified deliberately attacking Shiite civilians, he and Al-Maqdasi corresponded. That correspondence was posted over online pro-Al-Qaeda communication boards and represented the first indications of a rift between the offshoot in Iraq and Al-Qaeda-core.

xliv After the Abbottabad raid, which killed Bin Laden, 17 documents were declassified and released to the Combating Terrorism Centre (CCT). The documents were internal communications between several Al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama Bin Laden `Atiyya `Abd al- Rahman, Abu Yahya al- Libi and convert American Adam Gadahn. The letters express concern with regards to Al-Zarqawi's strategy, "which he took in the name of alQa'ida". Attacks like the one perpetrated against a Catholic Church in Baghdad were criticized, given that ISIS was back then known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Leaders of Al-Qaeda were aware that such actions were not an efficient tool to "to gain people's sympathy". The treatment given to Christians (for instance, the fact that they had to pay the *jizya*, or non-believer tax) was heavily criticized, and was even compared to President George Bush's policy ("Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists", manifested during a Congressional session in 2009). Documents from the Abbottabad papers reveal that even before Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi proclaimed to Caliphate, the relationships between Al-Qaeda an ISI were poor, mainly due to the "repulsive issues -and certainly forbidden-" actions ISI was undertaking (such as the targeting of mosques) and because ISI had declared statehood without prior consultation with Al-Qaeda leadership (Lahoud, et al., 2012).

xlv The word *salafi* is in adjective form. Derived from the Arabic root *sa-la-fa*, it means *predecessors*. In the religious meaning, it entails 'those that follow the righteous predecessors'. The Prophet Mohamed reportedly said that **"The best people are those of my generation, then those who come after them, then those who come after them. Then, there will come people after them whose testimony precedes their oaths and their oaths precede their testimony"** (narrated in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 6065 and Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 2533). He repeated the term thrice. Modern *salafis* differ in means but are close in objective. They all seek the reestablishment of the Calpihate. Quietist *salafis* are apolitical and tend to be mostly aligned with the scholars of the Saudi State. Political *salafis*, such as Al-Noor party in Egypt, seek the gradual islamization of Islamic society. Participation in politics is seen as a necessary component of effective proselytization. Salafi jihadis consider quietist overly passive and political salafis as unrealistic. Only violent jihad will establish the Islamic State and thereby rid the Muslim world of Western influence and imperialism.

[xlvi]A caliphate implies governing all Muslims under one political system based on the *sharia* (or Islamic Law). According to Islamic terminology, *shariah* is the combination of the principles of human life established in the Book of God (the Qur'an) and the Prophet's establishment of the model of life according to Islam through the implementation of the law and the provision of further details where necessary, always according to the Divine Book (A'la Mawdudi, 1960).Contrary to kings or dictators, the *khaleefa* (caliph) is an elected position, based on a special ruling called *baya* (The Khilafah, 2014). Because of the electoral nature of the leadership, electing the *kahleefa* becomes the duty of all Muslims. The synthesis of political and religious establishment of the Islamic State or Caliphate, expressed in modernist terms, is *Islamism.*

[xlvii]Known as Ahul hawl wal aqd ("those that knot and bind" link to Ibn Tyamias siyasaal-shariah). These influential leaders are best suited to evaluate the caliph's religious education and must have insight (*baseerah)* and wisdom (*hikmah*). Baseerah in arabic is reference to a word emphasize in the Qur'an. It's meaning is "penetrating insight"; Hikmah comes from the root ha-ka-mah for legislation, thus requiring comprehensive knowledge of both current affairs and the religious law. "*In terms of the appointment of the caliph, Al-Mawardi outlined several requirements to both the electors (*ahl al-ikhtiyār*) and the potential caliphs (*ahl al-imāmah*). The criteria of electors are: The ability to be just; have good knowledge of the* sharī'ah *to evaluate the caliph's religious education; and lastly having "insight and wisdom" to choose a leader best suited to contemporary situation and the needs of the* ummah *(community). On the other hand, there are seven requirements to be a caliph: he must be just; must have knowledge of the* sharī'ah *for the purpose of* ijtihād *(independent interpretation); good overall health including hearing, sight and speech; physically sound and not disabled from normal movement; good administrative capabilities; courage and bravery to wage war against an enemy; and finally the (controversial) lineage requirement belonging to the family of Quraysh*" (Wan Naim Wan Mansor, 2015).

[xlviii]

تَكُونُالنُّبُوَّةُفِيكُمْمَاشَاءَاللَّهُأَنْتَكُونَثُمَّيَرْفَعُهَاإِذَاشَاءَأَنْيَرْفَعَهَاثُمَّتَكُونُخِلَافَةٌعَلَىمِنْهَاجِالنُّبُوَّةِفَتَكُونُمَاشَاءَاللَّهُأَنْتَكُونَثُمَّيَرْفَعُهَاإِذَاشَاءَاللَّهُأَنْيَرْفَعَهَا ثُمَّتَكُونُمُلْكًاعَاضًّافَيَكُونُمَاشَاءَاللَّهُأَنْيَكُونَثُمَّيَرْفَعُهَاإِذَاشَاءَأَنْيَرْفَعَهَاثُمَّتَكُونُمُلْكًاجَبْرِيَّةًفَتَكُونُمَاشَاءَاللَّهُأَنْتَكُونَثُمَّيَرْفَعُهَاإِذَاشَاءَأَنْيَرْفَعَهَاثُمَّتَكُونُ نُخِلَافَةًعَلَىمِنْهَاجِالنُّبُوَّةِثُمَّسَكَتَ

[xlix]The word translated as 'conquest', in Arabic *fath*, is from the root from 'opening'. Islamists typically reject its translation as 'conquest' and rather prefer 'a meaning that indicates liberation'.

[l]This implementation of *sharia* implied a change, not only in the political life of tribal communities, but also in morals and values which transformed the life of these societies. When the conquering period subsided, differences between conquerors and local populations faded. Religious diversity was one of the characteristics of the Caliphate, favored by an accepted equality between Arabs and non-Arabs. Many individuals ended up converting to Islam, given it was associated to economic and political advantages; however Muslim elites were not always happy with seeing their advantaged diluted (Lapidus, 2002; Hoyland, 2014). Political unity of Muslims and non-Muslims under the Caliphate was based on the idea of obtaining both spiritual and material goods, the latter serving as means to finance further advances.

[li]Shortly after the Prophet passed away, several of the Arabian tribes, while remaining Muslim, refused to pay Abu Bakr's Caliphate *zakat* (a tax imposed upon Muslims every year, and the third pillar of Islam). Additionally, a few others in the Arabian Peninsula arose and proclaimed

themselves as prophets. Because their proclamation conflicted with the fundamental teachings of Islam, Abu Bakr fought them in what were called the Wars of *Ridaa* (Apostasy). Expansion of the State did not occur during his two-year reign.

[lii]The Ottoman Empire was founded by the House of Usman and survived from roughly 1300 to WWI. At its peak, its territory stretched from the edge of Vienna to the Red Sea, from North Africa to the Balkans.

[liii] An empirical investigation of the determinants of terrorism at a country level can be found in Abadie's work "*Poverty, Political Freedom and the Roots of Terrorism*" (2004). Results show a correlation between the range of political freedom and the probability of terrorist attacks: democracies and fully authoritarian regimes are less prone to suffer terrorist attacks than those countries with a certain degree of political freedom. Another indicator increasing the probability of terrorist attacks are transition periods between authoritarian regimes and democracies.

[liv]The role of ideology in radicalization and recruitment is disputed and many describe the process differently. Former extremist J.M. explains them as: 1) *tawheed al-hakimiya*, the concept that one cannot believe in Islam's strict emphasis on monotheism until they believe in seek to implement sharia in tune with the era in which it was revealed; 2) *kufr bit taghout*, those that rule by 'other than what Allah has revealed' (i.e. the regimes in the Muslim World) are in actuality both false idols and apostates; 3) *al-walaa wa al-baraa*, loving and hating for the sake of Allah, a Manichean perspective derived from religious scripture that cements the "us vs. them" world view.

[lv]The final fall of the Arab regimes considered to be apostate and impure is considered as the final victory after the disruption and exhaustion phase.

[lvi] In statements related to the 9/11 attacks, Osama Bin Laden called for "all the people to wake up from their sleep" (Al-Jazeera, 2011) and see that "[i]t is the United States which is perpetrating every maltreatment on women, children, and common people of other faiths, particularly followers of Islam" (Bin Laden & Berner, 2007).

[lvii] The expansion of Al-Qaeda during the 90's has been compared to "a corporation" (Stern & Berger, 2015). However, this work believes that this expansion resembles more the expansion of transnational organized crime. Indeed, Al-Qaeda had a corporate-like structure, however, its operatives travelled around the world to "insert themselves in local conflicts" (*ibid*) , either to profit from them (such as when they used Bosnian relief charities to launder money) or to encourage violent extremisms (for instance, training the cells that attacked the World Trade Centre in 1993) (Berger, 2011).

[lviii] In an article published in The New Yorker in 2006, Lawrence Wright claims that Abu Musab Al-Suri declared that the American occupation of Iraq inaugurated a new historical period "that almost single-handedly rescued the jihadi movement just when many of its critics thought it was finished". Iraq did indeed appear as a "new front" for Al-Qaeda's struggle with the West, and helped Zarqawi build a network of supporters, and transformed him into a "charismatic leader" (Bakos, 2013).

[lix] In 2004, Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama Bin Laden. Through the declaration of *bayah* (allegiance), a "marriage of convenience" (Zelin, 2014) was established between both groups. This agreement came along with the announcement of the birth of a new jihadist movement: *Tanzim Qaedat al Jihad fi Bilad al Rafidayn* (Al Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers, in reference to the crossing between the Tigris and Euphrates in Iraq).

[lx] Abu Omar al-Baghdadi is not to be confused with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Formerly a police brigadier general during Saddam Hussein's regime, he joined Iraqi insurgence during the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. He was the first *emir* of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), and was succeeded by Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi when he was proclaimed caliph. In April 2010, Abu Omar Al Baghdadi was killed near Tikrit in a joint operation of American and Iraqi forces (Roggio, 2008).

[lxi] One of the main differences between Al-Baghdadi and Bin Laden, and later Zawahiri, was the fact that both Baghdadi And Zawahiri lacked military experience. As Stern and Berger (2015) correctly point out, Al-Qaeda was unsuited to gain control over a growingly militarized environment, which included military strikes, raids and the use of drones.

[lxii] For more details on the eschatological component around Syria and Iraq, see section *The importance of territory*

[lxiii] For instance, a popular Sunni finance minister was accused of terrorism (Human Rights Watch, 2014). In December, 2013, after protests against terrorism had resulted in a high number of civilian casualties (Human Rights Watch, 2013), Maliki deployed the army against a group of 350 Sunni protesters who were demonstrating against abusive terrorism laws, hence reactivating re-insurgence against the government (Human Rights Watch, 2014). It seems that sectarian tensions, along with corruption, would have played an important role in 'facilitating' the conquest of territories of behalf of ISIS: the Iraqi government had removed all senior Sunni from senior military positions, and put inexperienced (though well connected) Shi'a officers instead (Zucchino, 2014).

[lxiv] The Sunni Salafi movement believes that corruption of Islam is the result of the influence of preexisting religious traditions, cultural biases, political agendas and other self-interests (Stern & Berger, 2015). In return, Salafism calls for the return of a global caliphate under which early Islam is the rule of law, including all beliefs and practices; jihadi Salafism believes in the need to engage in violent actions in order to restore the purity of Islam. Such ideas find support in ideologues such as Mawdudi (1960). According to the Islamist philosopher, the purpose of an Islamic state is to establish Islam as a moral system in the territories the caliphate encompasses, independent of race, language, color, nationality… all those who live under the rule of the caliphate enjoy the same citizenship rights. Salafism was never an apolitical movement. Modern waves of Salafism were classified by Wiktorowicz (2006) in three different categories: quietist faction (the only faction not linked to politics), political faction, and jihadist faction. Political Salafism is influenced by a series of Egyptian thinkers, and it implies the engagement in political actions to overthrow corrupt regimes that undermine the purity of Islam, according to the interpretation of current events. Jihadi Salafism, however, is not solely politically oriented and worried about corruption of Islam, but also believes the need to engage in violent actions in order to relief these concerns.

[lxv]Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab was the founder of the Wahhabism, a strict interpretation of Qur'an which sees common Muslim practices of Muslims as either religious innovation (*bid'ha*) or as polytheism (*shirk*), both prohibited by Prophet Mohamed. In what today is Saudi Arabia, he reached a pact with the then ruler Muhammad bin Saud to bring the Arabs in the Peninsula back to what they considered to be the true principles of Islam. This pact also helped establish the Emirate of Diriyah, the first Saudi-ruled state, and predecessor of what today is Saudi Arabia. Since then, the descendants of al-Wahhab have been the leaders of the *uluma* (scholars) of the Saudi Kingdom (al-'Uthaymin, 2009; Crawford, 2014).

[lxvi]Puritanism gave way to the development of the doctrine of *takfir*, which considered any person who did not completely abide by the absolute Authority (ideally be a Caliph, otherwise a King) as sinful and infidel. Certain practices (prayers to saints, pilgrimages outside Mecca, the use of gravestones when burying the dead…) were seen as behavior that deviated the individual from the subservience to Allah. Shiites, Sufis and other Muslim groups were considered to be apostates, sometimes not even Muslim at all; the punishment for them was death, confiscation of their property, and the rape of their wives and daughters.

[lxvii] In earlier stages, al-Nusra positioned itself as a party independent of both Al-Qaeda an ISI (Stern & Berger, 2015). However, its leader, Abu Mohammed Al Jawlani had been sent to Syria by Al-Baghdadi after he had served as a regional leader for ISI in Mosul (Lister, 2014). Within a year of Jawlani's transferring, al-Nusra was already recognized as a leader among the rebel groups in Syria, largely thanks to their external financing, which allowed them to procure weapons, equipment and other resources (Zelin, 2013; Levitt, 2014).

[lxviii] Footage of how the ISIS' *mujahedeen* are literally dissolving borders can be found in Vice News' video "Bulldozing the Border Between Iraq and Syria: The Islamic State (Part 5)" (2014).

[lxix]In 1916 the Ottoman Empire broke down, and Paris and London engaged in meetings in order to determine the areas of influence and economic sectors that would correspond to each power. The aim was to ultimately also involve Italy and Russia in the plan, as a response to Ottoman support for the Germans after the break out of World War I. British advisors focused on the importance of the Mesopotamia region, including both Bagdad and Mosul. The importance of this region was related to the apparent existence of oil fields, a major British interest. This area, however, was initially under French control. In his article *"France's Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918"*, Fitzgerald (1994) debates on the actual reasons why France may have had other diplomatic interests when "giving away" these territories to the British. Operation *Iraqi Freedom* has been interpreted as a reminiscence of this Sykes-Picot Agreement, seeing that a foreign power is involved in territorial and democratic changes. The current situation in Syria is also a reminiscence of the Great Game period. Not only were France and Britain playing a role, but Russia also had a saying in the decision-making process. Britain established relationships in the Middle East in an attempt to stop bolshevism, which was also the reason why France and Britain did not focus on Turkey (Fromkin, 1980).

[lxx] Abu Bakr Al-Baghdai frequently discusses the need and deed of jihad. For example, in this lecture given after he announced himself caliph, he essentially argues that the whole world, Jews, Christians (whom he calls Crusaders), the Shiites and secularists and atheists everywhere are

collectively fighting the Muslims and that only unity under a caliphate and violent jihad can resolve the situation, see https://archive.org/details/Khalifa-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi.

[lxxi] Iraq had been subject to economic sanctions by the U.S. since the 1980's. The first economic sanctions occurred from 1980 to 1982, under the accusation that Iraq was supporting terrorism. During these two years, U.S. investments in Iraq dropped by 68%, and cost Iraq $22 million. After the First Gulf War (1990-1991), economic sanctions worsened an already deteriorated situation in the country, fostered by the 1980-1988 Iraq-Iran war, the militarization of the Iraqi economy and the invasion of Kuwait. Once Iraq was ousted from Kuwait, the UN Security Council did not lift the sanctions, under a pretext of leverage for Iraqi disarmament (Cordesman & Hashim, 1997; Cordesman, 1999; Alnasrawi, 2002). The economic sanctions resulted in a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. For instance, according to data provided by UNICEF, since 1991 until 2000, infant mortality rates increased by 113% (UNICEF, 1999). With the intention of providing the Iraqi population with some relief, the UN Security Council elaborated ad implemented an "Oil-for-Food Program", under which the UN controlled all revenues from Iraqi oil sales. However, contracts under the program were basically managed by the United States (93% of contracts, according to data from UN Office of the Iraq Program). This prevented the Iraqi oil industry from adequately developing; the situation worsened in 2001, when funds for the Program were further reduced after the U.S. and the U.K. exercised strict controls over contract prices. Economic recovery became, hence, all the more difficult in a context where economic sanctions had turned economic policy into a unidimensional task determined by how much oil is produced and where economic recovery was compromised by Iraq's foreign liabilities of debt and war reparations (United Nations Security Council, n.d.; Bosco, 2009; Lowe et. al, 2010).

[lxxii] On his Message on the Observance of Afghanistan Day, President Ronal Reagan called the mujahedeen "freedom fighters". More specifically: "*Yet, while we condemn what has happened in Afghanistan, we are not without hope. To watch the courageous Afghan freedom fighters battle modern arsenals with simple hand-held weapons is an inspiration to those who love freedom. Their courage teaches us a great lesson—that there are things in this world worth defending. To the Afghan people, I say on behalf of all Americans that we admire your heroism, your devotion to freedom, and your relentless struggle against your oppressors*" (Reagan, 1983).

[lxxiii] Although commonly mistaken for one another, the Taliban is not a branch of Al-Qaeda. During the U.S.-led occupation of Afghanistan, their area of operation did overlap; however, their scope and motivations were different. Taliban means disciples, or pupils, and it refers to their interpretation of Qur'an, based on *sharia* law. In their political views, however, the Taliban do not have the global perspective that Al-Qaeda did. For the most part, they were fighting against the foreign occupation of their country; their nationalism, however, also affected neighboring Pakistan. In 1948, the British withdrew from India and Southern Asia, leaving behind a legacy of territories for Afghanistan. The territory in question was Pashtunistan, located in the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and which had traditionally been occupied by the Pashtun tribe. The territory survived until 1893 under a contract similar to that established with Hong Kong; that year, the Durand Line was traced, creating what today is the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Neither Kabul nor Islamabad officially ratified their conformity with the Durand Line. With Britain being withdrawn, and once Pakistan was constituted by Muslim Indians, the

Pashtuns started their own nationalist revolts. They wanted an independent State, given they did not identify neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan as their legitimate countries (Hopkirk, 1992).

[lxxiv] U.S. government officials claimed that Saddam Hussein's government had ties to Al-Qaeda during a period of eleven years (1992-2003) (Hayes, 2003). President Bush accused Iraq of serving as a haven for the Abu Nidal group and the Abu Abbas groups, of offering "to bankroll Hamas and Islamic Jihad suicide bombers launching attacks in Israel", and of succoring Al-Qaeda members fleeing from Afghanistan (Garamone, 2002).

[lxxv] This perception was not exclusive to the Arab world. Surveys carried out through different European countries (including initial U.S. allies, such as Poland, Spain or the United Kingdom) revealed that public opinion, although believing that Saddam Hussein was hiding WOMD, differed on how to approach the issue (Everts & Isernia, 2005). Overall, there seemed to be an agreement concerning the (lack of) need to solve the Iraqi crisis through military intervention. The low approval rates of military intervention mainly stemmed not only from an unwillingness to send troops to Iraq, but also from the lack of support from the United Nations to the military intervention. Political support, however, was more popular, especially among Eastern European countries, who believed that Saddam Hussein and his regime were a threat to world peace (Springford, 2003; Everts & Isernia, 2005; Hummel, 2007).

[lxxvi] Vanguard (in Arabic *taifa*) is a reference to a hadith from the Prophet that uses the term *taifa-mansoora* ("the victorious group"). It is said in the narration that a group from the Muslims will always remain vicious fighting for the truth. Qutb utilized the term in his work "Milestones" and set the tone for a revolutionary understanding of this concept that resonated through to *jihadi* ideology until today.

[lxxvii] The end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st have witnessed the persecution and killings of Muslims in different areas around the world. The wars in Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Balkans (including the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and the Srebrenica massacre), the territorial disputes in Kashmir and between Israel and Palestine, and even the treatment of Muslim prisoners in Guantanamo have been used as examples to support the idea that the West has anti-Muslim and anti-Islam sentiments (and it is therefore legitimate to fight back). The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, efforts to stop Iran's nuclear program, hesitance to admitting Turkey in the EU and the ongoing debate on how to integrate Muslim population in Europe had created a feeling of distrust from Muslims to Westerners; this sentiment, although slightly stronger among Muslims, seems to be reciprocal according to a study published by Pew Centre in 2007. Despite this mistrust, a survey carried out in 2009 revealed how 58% of interviewees though that Muslims worldwide were facing discrimination (only the LGBT community was thought to be more discriminated, by 64% of those surveyed); 45% of respondents believed that Islam was not a religion that would encourage violence more than any other faith (Wike & Grim, 2007). Although responses depended on political views of interviewees, results on Muslim discrimination and the relationship between Islam and violence remained the same for 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2010). An ample majority of respondents (65%), however, admitted knowing "some" or "not very much" about Islam. After the attacks in Boston (2013), 45% of respondents admitted to believing that Muslims face "a lot of discrimination" (Pew Research Center, 2017). In 2014, surveys reflected that 62% of respondents were "very concerned" about the rise of Islamic Extremism. Moreover, the percentage of individuals who stated that Islam actually encourages violence

increased from 38% in February to 50% in September (Pew Research Center, 2014). In Europe, however, more specifically in France, attitudes towards Muslims were favorable (72%) or even very favorable (25%), even after the Charlie Hebdo attacks (Lipka, 2017). It should also be highlighted how surveys carried out in Bosnia, 20 years after the Srebrenica massacre, reflected that 59% of respondents agreed that Christianity and Islam have a lot in common (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies , 2015). As far as more recent date is concerned, the FBI has reported 91 anti-Muslim assaults in 2015, figure which is very close to those in 2001 after 9/11 (93 attacks) (Kishi, 2016).

[lxxviii] According to polls, the degree of support for Al-Qaeda has varied over time. Pew Research Centre carried out some surveys between 2013 and 2014. Suicide bombing was approved by 40% of Palestinians, 39% of Afghans, and 29% of Egyptians. Regarding opinions on Al-Qaeda in 2013, approval rates in the Palestinian territories mounted up to 35%, whilst the second and third countries where Al-Qaeda was popular were Indonesia (23%) and Egypt (20%). These figures changed in 2014. While Palestinian territories were the Muslim-majority country where Al-Qaeda was most popular (25%), popularity increased in Bangladesh (23%), Malaysia (18%) and Nigeria (18%). As far as ISIS goes, the organization is considered 'very positive' mostly in Mauritania (10% of the population), Sudan and Algeria (5% of the population in both countries) and Egypt and Morocco (3%) (Poushter, 2014; 2015). Support for Al-Qaeda was not only linked to population. Investigations and reports published after 9/11 showed evidence that national governments (more specifically, Saudi Arabia) had provided financial services to the terrorist group (Roth, Greenburg, & Wille, 2002).

[lxxix]"According to the U.S. State Department, there are currently 66 participants in the coalition, including Afghanistan, Albania, the Arab League, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, the European Union, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kosovo, Kuwait, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malaysia, Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States" (McInnis, 2016).

[lxxx] Analysts indicate that ISIS has lost almost a quarter of its held territory both in Syria and Iraq. According to the IHS Conflict Monitor, ISIS lost 14% of its territory in 2015 and shrunk by another 16% in 2016 (Engel, 2016). Since the beginning of 2017, ISIS has lost key cities. Ira, Russia and Lebanese Hezbollah helped Syrian pro-regime forces take the city of Palmyra; additionally, critical infrastructure was re-captured from northern Aleppo (Chulov, 2017). In May 2017, the territorial battle is mainly over the city of Mosul. According to the latest Iraqi news, ISIS-held Mosul is only 9% and the Iraqi forces have taken over one the organization's last bastions: Uraybi district (Mostafa, 2017).

[lxxxi] In Europe, one of the best-known cases are the three girls aged 15 and 16, who left their homes in London to join ISIS in February 2015. There have also been similar cases in the United States. For instance, in late 2014, three siblings aged 19, 16 and 15 were detained when they were trying to flee Chicago to join ISIS (Sullivan, 2014).

[lxxxii]German newspaper, Der Spiegel, has access to documents kept by ISIS. In those, ISIS bureaucrats detailed information about their recruits, ranging from their age, their *nom de guerre*, their tasks and deeds in the Caliphate, their marital status and even health-related issues. These kinds of documents could be used by authorities to identify the potential risks of returned foreign fighters (Diehl, Lehberger, & Schlesier, 2016).

[lxxxiii] Although here is no conclusive evidence to determine that increased migration flows increase terrorist activities (OHCHR, 2016), there have been cases that prove that ISIS trained personnel has used traditional migrations routes to enter European territory (Stern & Berger, 2015, Schmid, 2016).

[lxxxiv] Illegal trade in oil has been pointed out as one of the main sources of income for ISIS. The organization controls a vast majority of oil field in Syria, enabling them to have a daily turnover of between $1 and $1.5 million, by selling crude to independent traders. The Russian authorities have accused Turkish elites (President Erdogan, his family and close circles) as being the main purchasers (and hence, financers) of ISIS crude. These sorts of statements have not helped alleviate tensions in the Middle East region, let alone the Syrian conflict. Overlooking the debate regarding these accusations, the fact is that illicit oil trade is enabling ISIS to gain financial stability and support to increase the number of recruits. For instance, they can use that income to pay salaries of technicians and engineers managing the oil fields, or they can invest it in expanding their media outreach and propaganda techniques, while enhancing the idea of economic independence and sustainability of the caliphate (Taub, 2015; Nakhle, 2015; Solomon, Kwong, & Bernard, 2016). There is also evidence that ISIS has been increasing their income through the looting of cultural heritage sites in Syria and Iraq and smuggling of antiquities.

[lxxxv] Integration for individuals can be either active or passive. When talking about active integration we refer to individuals benefitting from the existing social networks existing in the community; passive integration refers to the individual free electing his or her representatives and is included in the work market. For instance, was passive integration and inclusion in the work market to be lacking, citizens would be prevented from gaining the necessary physical-financial capital to satisfy a series of needs.

[lxxxvi] On the moment of departure, the individual migrant leaves behind all the physical-financial capital. Human capital, on the other hand, may have been forged in the country of origin. However, translating those attributes into income and well-being may be prevented because of the process of migration itself. Given that until the migrant reaches a destination, he or she is involved in an on-going process of movement, it is difficult to set the proper grounds for obtaining any significant income. Lastly, social capital suffers from the same problem as human capital, since establishing networks in the environment requires a prior settlement. It is in this sense that vulnerable migration processes turn out to be a problem of human security. It has been proved that vulnerability potentiates the probabilities of becoming a victim of human trafficking. Sometimes victims of human trafficking decide to migrate at an individual level, without a job opportunity in sight. There only aim is to reach the Northern countries, where they expect to be able to fulfill their needs. In these cases where journeys are long and difficult, vulnerability turns out to be a burden that is brought along by migrants from their town of origin, and it turns out to be a key element for the recruitment of victims. In the same way that it was personal insecurity that pushed migrants to take the decision to try and re-start their livelihood strategies somewhere

else, personal insecurity is the enhancer that increases their possibilities of falling victims of human trafficking.

[lxxxvii]According to Quantum Communication (2015), there are nine different profiles for individuals who join ISIS and other battling groups on the Middle East. These are: *Status seeker,* who attempt to improve their social position through money and recognition; *Identity* seekers, or individuals who are in search of a group with whom they can identify with, and find a "transnational identity" within Islam;; *Revenge seekers*, who believe that their group of adherence/belonging is being repressed (mainly by the West) ; *Redemption seekers*, who seek to cleanse their prior sins by joining ISIS; *Responsibility* seekers, who joined to be able to financially provide for their families; *Thrill seekers*, who joined for adventure; *Ideology seekers,* who seek to impose Islam; *Justice seekers*, who feel they are responding to a perceived injustice; *Death seekers*, those whose trauma makes them consider martyrdom as the only way out of their grievance, without committing suicide.

[lxxxviii]On June 12th, 2016, Omar Mateen entered Pulse a gay nightclub in Orlando (Florida, United States) and opened fire, filling 49 people and injuring another 56. It was deemed to be the most fatal terrorist attack perpetrated in U.S. soil since 9/11.

[lxxxix] The Dutch Police has set up a whole section in their webpage providing information on what are known as "loverboys". Loverboys are young males who are on the lookout for emotionally unstable or insecure girls in order to lead them into sexual exploitation. The first step is to engage in a sentimental relationship with the girl, and provide the necessary attention, compliments and material gifts in order to ensure she will fall in love with him. As the relationship consolidates, he will slowly isolate her from her friends and family, hence building a relationship based on dependency. Once a total dependency is established, the loverboy will ask the girl to prove his love for him in different ways, including having sexual intercourse with his friends. The next step, and the ultimate step prior to actual prostitution, is to have the girl have sporadic intimate encounters with strangers in exchange for a small amount of money (Politie Nederland, n.d.).

Annex 1

Search Number	Search Terms	Time Frame
1	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State	06/29/2014 – 03/29/2017
2	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State	06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014
3	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State	12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015
4	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State	06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015
5	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State	06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016
6	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State	12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017
7	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick!	06/29/2014 – 03/29/2017
8	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick!	06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014
9	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick!	12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015
10	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick!	06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015
11	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick!	06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016
12	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick!	12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017
13	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND recruit!	06/29/2014 – 03/29/2017
14	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND recruit!	06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014
15	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND recruit!	12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015
16	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND recruit!	06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015
17	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND recruit!	06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016

18	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND recruit!	12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017
19	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl!	06/29/2014 – 03/29/2017
20	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl!	06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014
21	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl!	12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015
22	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl!	06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015
23	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl!	06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016
24	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl!	12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017
25	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND traffick!	06/29/2014 – 03/29/2017
26	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND traffick!	06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014
27	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND traffick!	12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015
28	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND traffick!	06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015
29	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND traffick!	06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016
30	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND traffick!	12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017
31	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND recruit!	06/29/2014 – 03/29/2017
32	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND recruit!	06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014
33	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND recruit!	12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015
34	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND recruit!	06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015

35	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND recruit!	06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016
36	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND smuggl! AND recruit!	12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017
37	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick! AND recruit!	06/29/2014 – 03/29/2017
38	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick! AND recruit!	06/29/2014 – 12/29/2014
39	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick! AND recruit!	12/30/2014 – 06/29/2015
40	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick! AND recruit!	06/30/2015 – 12/29/2015
41	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick! AND recruit!	06/30/2016 – 12/29/2016
42	ISIS OR DAESH OR Islamic State AND traffick! AND recruit!	12/30/2016 - 03/29/2017

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