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**Kenya's Foreign Policy:
From dependency to dynamism**

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Abstract

The approach of this dissertation will be to stress the importance of sub-Saharan Africa and the development of relations that these countries hold in the international arena as part of the *Africa Rising* narrative (Mabera, 2016) using Kenya as an example of a tendency towards a growing dynamism of its partners.

Kenya, a colony not so long ago, is now one of the main powers in the East African region and in the whole of sub-Saharan Africa. Due to the change in the international arena at the end of the 20th century, great powers such as the United States, Russia or the European Union modified their interests and objectives, which ultimately led to other not so developed countries to do the same. Kenya has now a foreign policy strategy that intends to follow in order to reach its goals, which involve bilateral and multilateral relations with different actors.

This dissertation will aim at analysing the diversification of partners that Kenya has been experiencing in the last few years, focusing especially on Russia (Pham, 2014) and China (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016) with the purpose of highlighting South-South cooperation rather than the more traditional donor-recipient relations that Kenya has with other powers such as the United Kingdom or the United States. Furthermore, it aims at studying its influence in East Africa, where it positions itself as a the leading economy (Mabera, 2016).

Keywords: Kenya, foreign policy, South-South cooperation, Africa Rising, traditional partners, China, Russia

Resumen

El enfoque de este trabajo será recalcar la importancia de África subsahariana y el desarrollo de las relaciones que estos países mantienen en el ámbito internacional como parte de la narrativa de *Africa Rising* (Mabera, 2016) utilizando a Kenia como ejemplo de una tendencia hacia un creciente dinamismo de sus socios.

Kenia, que era una colonia hace no mucho tiempo, es ahora una de las principales potencias de la región de África oriental y de toda el África subsahariana. Debido al cambio en el ámbito internacional a finales del siglo XX, grandes potencias como Estados Unidos, Rusia o la Unión Europea modificaron sus intereses y objetivos, lo que en última instancia llevó a otros países no tan desarrollados a hacer lo mismo. Kenia ha desarrollado una estrategia de política exterior que pretende seguir para alcanzar sus objetivos, que implican relaciones bilaterales y multilaterales con diferentes actores.

Este trabajo tendrá por objeto analizar la diversificación de socios que Kenia ha experimentado en los últimos años, centrándose especialmente en Rusia (Pham, 2014) y China (Mlambo, Kushamba y Simawu, 2016) con el fin de poner de manifiesto la cooperación Sur-Sur en lugar de las relaciones más tradicionales entre donantes y receptores que Kenia mantiene con otras potencias como el Reino Unido o Estados Unidos. Además, tiene por objeto estudiar la influencia de Kenia en África oriental, donde se posiciona como la economía más desarrollada (Mabera, 2016).

Palabras clave: Kenia, política exterior, cooperación Sur-Sur, Africa Rising, socios tradicionales, China, Rusia

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List of acronyms

ACP Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific

AfCFTA African Continental Free Trade Area

ATA Anti-Terrorism Assistance

AU African Union

BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

CDC Commonwealth Development Corporation

CORD Coalition for Reforms and Democracy

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

EAC East African Community

EU European Union

FDI Foreign Direct Investment

FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation

GDP Gross Domestic Product

HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus

ICC International Criminal Court

IEBC Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

IMF International Monetary Fund

IR International Relations

KADU Kenya African Democratic Union

KANU Kenyan African National Union

KAU Kenyan African Union

KPU Kenyan People's Union

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

NAM Non-Aligned Movement

NARC (National Rainbow Coalition)

NGO Non-governmental organization

NRM National Resistance Movement

OAU Organization of African Unity

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

ODM Orange Democratic Movement

ODM-K Orange Democratic Movement–Kenya

PM Prime Minister

PNU Party of National Unity

R2P Right to Protect

SSC South-South Cooperation

UN United Nations

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UK United Kingdom

USA United States of America

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WHO World Health Organization

WTO World Trade Organisation

1. Introduction

The growing importance of the African continent in International Relations both economically and politically is a new reality. In this context, although Kenya has had a turbulent history, the truth is that it is one of the great powers in growth. Kenya is a country that is scarred from its colonial history and most of its foreign policy throughout the years has consisted in relations with its colonial metropole, the United Kingdom, as well as with other traditional Western powers, such as the United States and the European Union. Thus, this work aims at presenting the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy partners: from its dependence on traditional partners to the new dynamism and its variety of relations with different states.

In this context, it is important to highlight the presence of China in the African continent, including its presence in Kenya. China is one of the main emerging powers interested in challenging the international order. China has seen in the African continent an opportunity to expand its influence at the same time it establishes economic relations with many African countries with a different approach than the one traditional donors used to have. Another interesting example is the case of Russia. After the dismantling of the USSR, the country was not in a position to maintain its presence in the continent but, through the last decades, with a similar aim as China consisting on becoming more present in the international sphere, it has found its way into the continent trying to cover those areas that were not already covered by other states and also spreading its influence in a mutually beneficial way for African states.

This dissertation will analyse the evolution of Kenya's foreign policy strategy following the post-colonial approach of International Relations to analyse how Kenya's relations have changed in recent years and to answer to the question of the reasons why Kenya has decided to diversify its partners. After analysing if Kenya has effectively diversified its partners, the aim will be to identify these new partners and to analyse Kenya's international agency through these relations. Contrary from what we usually assume, these partnerships are not solely a consequence of what those states are seeking in the continent, but also a result of African political projects.

2. Purpose and motivation

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Kenya's foreign policy in recent decades and what strategies have different governments followed in order to position Kenya as a regional power. It is clear that Kenya has broadened its partners since its independence with the aim of obtaining benefits from these new relations. Therefore, these new relations with partners such as China and Russia will be analysed to determine which of the parts is the most benefited one.

The reasons why this topic of investigation was chosen are varied. Firstly, a general interest in regional studies of Africa was what guided my choice of this topic. Ever since I started my degree, Africa has been my main priority area-wise. Understanding where sub-Saharan countries stand nowadays after the struggle of a difficult and controversial colonial past has been a priority for my studies, as well as framing their reality as understood in their historical context. Kenya, out of all sub-Saharan African countries, has been important for me for personal reasons as I had the opportunity to visit the country as part of a Diploma based on International Relations, Emergent Economies and Development Cooperation that I participated in and which took place in Nairobi. Therefore, I had the chance to see Kenya through my own eyes, apply what I had learned in my Regional Studies of Africa module, and create real bonds with people from there.

My interest in Kenya's diversification of partners came out of cooperation studies that I discovered with my International Development Cooperation class at university, in which South-South cooperation caught my attention. The fact that less developed countries have decided to reach progress in their own terms and without the need of traditional Western donors made me think of how the international context might change in the not so far future.

The aim of this paper will be to analyse whether Kenya has gone through a diversification of its partners in terms of foreign policy since the end of the 20th century, after the first decades of its independence. Kenya's foreign policy is directly linked to its domestic policy, so there is a need to examine how the domestic policies implemented by the government affect the foreign policy strategy.

From the beginning of its independence and up until now Kenya has had key relations with the United Kingdom (Kenya High Commission, n.d.) and other traditional

donors such as the USA, so it will be interesting to analyse the influence of other powers such as China, an interesting example, as well as others states such as Russia.

I believe this is a relevant topic because nowadays, the growth of several African countries is unquestionable, which is the case with Kenya. Moreover, I consider that there is too much focus on Asian countries as they have also experienced an important growth in recent years, but that there are far fewer studies focused on Africa. Africa is the continent of the future for several reasons. Firstly, because governance transformation has encouraged economic growth, in the sense that the quality of the traditional factors of growth, human capital, physical and capital aid and foreign direct investment have increased (Fayissa & Nsiah, 2013). Secondly, Africa is experimenting a significant demographic growth and it is estimated that Africa will represent 54 % of the global demographic growth in the next decades (Mckenna, 2017). For those reasons, I believe more importance should be given to the the behaviour of these countries, especially concerning their foreign policy and how they develop their relations with other countries.

3. State of play

3.1 AFRICA RISING

3.1.1 The Continental Rise

Even though authoritarian governments, corruption or conflict are still a reality in several African states, we have witnessed in the last years the appearance of the *Africa Rising*¹ narrative. During the decade of 2010s, “six of the world's ten fastest-growing countries were African” (Leaders, 2011) showing that Africa has been growing even faster than Asian countries. The reasons for African growth vary among the existence of natural resources, the positive demographic situation due to high fertility rates or the manufacturing and service economies that have begun to develop in these countries.

These developments can be seen through Africa's interest in technology which is also fostering its growth. This has been done because, as roads in these countries are normally appalling, advances in communications, including mobile banking and online agricultural information started being necessary for communication (ibid.). Moreover, health services have also improved for the African population due to increased concerns in scientific research to fight HIV or malaria. Furthermore, thanks to the population trends that indicate that there is an increasing percentage of high-skilled young people getting access to the labour market, economic growth could further increase in the next years.

In addition, a factor that has been key for African growth has been the change in perceptions of Africa by the international investor community. Even when facts are indubitable and based on indicators, such as GDP growth, firmly fixed stereotypes about a specific region are almost impossible to alter. However, the *Africa Rising* narrative exemplifies that the continent is experimenting substantial changes (Hofmeyr, 2013).

Sub-Saharan Africa has undergone through twenty years of continuous growth since the mid-1990s which has also been accompanied by larger political and macro-economic stability (Frankema & Van Waijenburg, 2018). One of the regions that has been making the most progress in terms of the improvement of its institutions, infrastructure and integration is East Africa, which makes it the region that has experienced the most growth (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). For instance, the Kenyan president Kenyatta has

¹ Italics are used for the Africa Rising concept in this dissertation when its narrative element is emphasised

participated, along with the governments of other states, in the construction of a rail project that will link specific cities of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and South Sudan to boost communication and exchanges among the countries. These East African states (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi) have also accomplished political and economic growth in comparison to their not so far past.

The African Union *Agenda 2063: The Africa we want* in the year 2015 shows the general interest of African countries to transform the continent and make it become an important actor in the international sphere. This agenda is the continent's tactical outline that intends to "deliver on its goal for inclusive and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the pan-African drive for unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-Africanism and African Renaissance" (African Union, 2015). This was created under the idea by African leaders that

there was a need to refocus and reprioritise Africa's agenda from the struggle against apartheid and the attainment of political independence for the continent which had been the focus of The Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the precursor of the African Union; and instead to prioritise inclusive social and economic development, continental and regional integration, democratic governance and peace and security amongst other issues aimed at repositioning Africa to becoming a dominant player in the global arena" (ibid.).

The need to envision a long-term development trajectory for Africa is important as Africa needs time to adapt its development agenda due to continued underlying changes. Firstly, there is a need for more peace processes as well as a decrease in the number of conflicts. Also, for economic expansion and social development to be possible, it is required for development to be based on the people, gender equality and youth empowerment. Africa likewise needs to adapt to the changing international situation which includes bigger globalization and the technological revolution. Furthermore, developing growth and investment prospects should be highlighted in sectors such as agriculture, infrastructure development, health and education. For that reason, there must be a focus on African unity which makes of the continent a global power capable of gathering support around its own agenda (ibid.).

Because of African growth, other powers are not only increasingly interested in partnerships within the continent but are also playing an important role in shaping the

African economy as trading partners, sources of finance and models of development. These actors include strong economies such as China, Japan or India as well as smaller economies like Turkey or Indonesia. These countries are funding new infrastructure, investing in African markets and bringing new technologies into the continent. The contribution of other developing economies in Africa is what is known as South-South cooperation, which has defied the traditional Western partnerships based on development aid and therefore created a new context of trade opportunities and even promoted geopolitical competition.

The interests of emerging powers in Africa vary from its material wealth in resources to its expanding market for goods and services. Moreover, when during the 1980s and 1990s Western powers decided to abandon the continent after decades of being involved as donors and multilateral aid agencies, this gave new chances to emerging countries to seek for opportunities in Africa. Although China's first interest in Africa relied on the resource sector and was eased by the great financial resources accessible by China, these opportunities in Africa stimulated the opening of business there by Chinese entrepreneurs. Moreover, strategic investments by Chinese firms were carried out in the textile and shoe industries and they also opened light industrial and automotive assembly factories in Ethiopia, South Africa, Morocco, Nigeria and Kenya (Alden, 2019).

The involvement of these emerging countries in Africa has a double meaning. On one hand, for these powers, a role in Africa is directly correlated to their diplomatic importance in international issues. On the other hand, it serves as a source of transcendent power for ambitious states seeking international recognition as global powers. Basically, "obtaining African votes in multilateral forums can be critical to the passage of resolutions of direct interest to an emerging power while claimants to status as global power understand that to realise this claim requires a position and presence on the continent" (Alden, 2019, p. 5).

Regarding China, the country's diplomacy in Africa responds to the support received by African countries to not recognise Taiwan and to provide the backing for its position as a global power. In addition, when the global financial crisis took place, China decided to launch a foreign policy strategy based on policies that looked East in order to gain more prominence amongst African countries. The aim of these policies was to achieve new economic resources and associated opportunities available through bilateral

and multilateral arrangements like it is the case of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (ibid.).

Due to all this, any country that is interested in gaining certain significance and achieve a global position needs to be capable of designing foreign policies concerning the African continent. In fact, since the year 2000, “the Global Partnerships Office of the African Union (AU) has been inundated with requests by emerging powers to establish regional summits such as the Turkey-Africa Forum and the Africa-South America Summit [...]” (ibid. p. 6)

The traditional Western world order which is dominated by its institutions, values and financial structures and which entails important legacies of the colonial era, is now being challenged by a new multilateral system with new actors that differentiate themselves from the West that are decided in engaging Africa through the developing process and that share the same emerging status in the international order as well as their experiences of being victims of Western colonialism and imperialism, and therefore they share the principles of non-interference in state sovereignty and international solidarity. Thus, emerging powers are assuming a position of increased influence in all spheres of Africa, especially China. Thanks to the new discourses of transformation, unity and historical empathy, the ideological foundation for developing states to exercise power in the continent has been delivered, progressively replacing Western policies in its condescending methods towards Africa (ibid.).

3.1.2 Kenya’s contribution to Africa Rising

In this Africa Rising context, the role of Kenya in East Africa² is paramount. Kenya’s economy is the largest in the region, it is much more dynamic than those of other states and it is projected to grow even faster over the next decade for different motives, such as a recently passed policy of governmental devolution, potential oil reserves, and increased regional trade cooperation (Shetret, Durner, Cotter, & Tobin, 2015).

² In this dissertation, East Africa makes reference to the African Union regional subdivision of East Africa which includes the countries of Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Seychelles, Rwanda, Mauritius, Madagascar, Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti and Comoros.

The country's economy is distinguished for its investment flows and trade. This is due to its advanced human capital, its diversified economy, and its important position in the field of information and communication in the region (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). For these reasons, Kenya's economy is expected to remain strong. Moreover, Kenya enjoys a market-based economy and the most liberal economic system in East Africa (ibid.). The advantages of a market-based system include that it fosters economic efficiency and competition and promotes foreign investment. Regarding GDP, Kenya also has the largest economy amongst East African nations. Kenya's economic supremacy in the region is founded on a strong private sector that has developed policies that are relatively compatible with the market situation (ibid.). Furthermore, Kenya has steadily received high levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) which have mainly been addressed at transformative industries such as high technology (ibid.).

In addition, Kenya's position has been enhanced as a result of its relative political stability and its absence of intense ideological shifts, which differentiates it from other countries in the region. Moreover, thanks to institutional reforms that have ended in the adoption of a new constitution, the forecasts for a solid economy are enhanced. Following the 2007 elections that generated severe violence during 2007 and 2008, Kenya held a constitutional referendum in 2010 that led to the approval of a new constitution with significant reforms. For example, the new constitution promotes popular initiatives by the organisation of referendums. This democratic environment is not enjoyed in other sub-Saharan African countries.

As it was previously mentioned, Kenya stands out for its human capital. It is one of the leaders of sub-Saharan Africa in terms of adult literacy rates and it has the highest public expenditure in education among East African states, which plays an important role in improving productivity and economic growth and lowering poverty and inequality (Kimenyi & Kibe, 2014). Kenya Vision 2030, which will be further addressed, is a project that aims at making Kenya a newly industrialized, middle-income country by 2030. It is based on the economic pillar, which pursues to uphold and sustain the economic growth of 10 % every year; the social pillar, which seeks to invest in education, health and housing for the benefit of the Kenyan population; and the political pillar, which emphasises national unity and foresees a democratic system that concentrates on people, transparency and liberty (ibid.).

The different aspects that contribute to this favourable situation of development include (1) a strong monetary policy supported by the Central Bank of Kenya that aids to maintain inflation prospects steady in spite of rising fuel and food prices; (2) the decentralization of governmental duties; (3) the new industry of exportation of oil in the country, in fact, it was in 2019 the first time crude oil was exported since its discovery in the north-western county of Turkana (Deutsche Welle, 2019); and (4) the growth of East African cooperation and common markets (Shetret, Durner, Cotter, & Tobin, 2015).

3.2 KENYAN FOREIGN POLICY

3.2.1 Historical Context

According to Mabera, different contexts have influenced the development of the country's foreign policy since its independence. The first concept and a very relevant one is the *Africa Rising* narrative. This idea aims at challenging the old stereotypes about Africa being a poor hopeless continent and to emphasise the different achievements in terms of human development indices, FDI, life expectancy or GDP growth that Kenya has seen through the years. This *Africa Rising* idea goes hand in hand with Kenya's Vision 2030, which is

the long-term development blueprint for the country [...] motivated by a collective aspiration for a better society by the year 2030 with the aim of [...] creating a globally competitive and prosperous country with a high quality of life by 2030 and transforming [...] Kenya into a newly-industrialising, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens in a clean and secure environment (Kenya Vision 2030, n.d.).

Kenya has certainly moved towards its goal by consolidating itself as a strong economy in the East African region, “mostly owing to the diversification of its economy, a dynamic private sector, an advanced human capital base and its emergence as a regional trendsetter in the information and communications technology sector” (Mabera, 2016, p. 366).

Another context that has influenced Kenya's foreign policy is its geographical position in the area of the Horn of Africa, which is one of the most troubled areas in the whole of Africa with disputes such as the one in Somalia, the DRC, South Sudan or Yemen, among others. These conflicts have led to refugee and humanitarian crises, violence, fights over borders, etc. Given this specific context, Kenya has had an important

role in regional and sub-regional peace-building and peace-making based on a multilateralist, soft power approach to peace diplomacy (Mabera, 2016).

Furthermore, the global War on Terror has also shaped Kenya's profile as it has been both a strategic ally to the West and a main power regarding counter-terrorism in Eastern Africa, as well as a victim of terrorism itself. Because it has been the target of terrorist attacks for holding tight relations with the West to counter terrorism, the ATA (US Anti-Terrorism Assistance) has donated millions of dollars to assist the country. Attacks towards Kenya are performed by the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab mainly because in 2011 Kenya installed troops in the Somali territory to prove Kenya's keenness to use hard power when defending the national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Another interesting factor that influenced Kenya's foreign policy is Kenya's relations with the ICC. As it was previously mentioned, after the violent episode post-2007 elections, six influential people were appointed responsible for such violence, including Kenyatta and Ruto. During the campaign for the next 2013 elections, the Jubilee Coalition criticised the ICC under the allegation that it was a threatening puppet of the West. Because of Kenya's influence and power to isolate the ICC across the continent, with the help from other governments, they adopted a resolution advocating the UNSC to contemplate a one-year deferral of the cases against Kenyatta and Ruto. Kenya claimed that court proceedings would hinder their duties in national and regional security affairs. The media played an active role in portraying Kenyatta and Ruto as victims of an imperialist agenda in order to despise the ICC. African states then adopted the Malabo Protocol, an amendment to merge the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights with the African Court of Justice and therefore granting the court jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide as well as conceding heads of state or government and senior government officials immunity from prosecution under the extended jurisdiction of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (African Union, 2008).

3.2.2 Main aspects of Kenyan Foreign Policy

Once having analysed the contexts that have influenced the shaping of Kenya's foreign policy, the author Howell helps to establish certain themes that can be identified. Howell's hypothesis on Kenya's foreign policy is that "in global terms, the external policy has been markedly radical in nature and characterised by a strong sense of morality and

idealism [...] [but] in East African affairs [it has shown a] more conservative and legitimist thinking” (Howell, 1968, p. 29). Therefore, what this author expresses is that when foreign policy is directed at Kenya’s more direct interests it is not as radical or liberal as when it is focused on international issues. The main aspects of Kenyan foreign policy identified by this author are the continuation of its domestic policies, anticolonialism, Kenyan nationalism, African unity, non-alignment, multilateralism and economic cooperation, which will now be further explained.

Regarding international affairs, Kenya’s foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policies. Normally, new states or newly independent states are eager to participate in international politics and by pursuing a decisive and forceful foreign policy, it strengthens the national position of the government (Howell, 1968). Moreover, after Kenya’s independence, there was still a high reliance on foreign aid, so the external image of Kenya was important. For that reason, foreign policy was intended to achieve domestic objectives to be able to form a strong post-colonial Kenyan state, especially when it was finally able to participate and have a voice in world issues, and more specifically, African issues. Also, in the new states, there is a clear correlation between the growing assertiveness of a government's policy abroad and the consolidation of support for the group that has the national power (ibid.). In Kenya that was easy to observe as, not even someone as charismatic as Odinga, was able to challenge and present an alternative to Kenyatta. This did not only hurt Odinga as an opposition leader but also prevented Kenyan citizens from focusing on the harder to deal with domestic problems such as unemployment, land policy or Kikuyu domination, as the government was making emphasis on foreign policy (ibid.). For example, when Odinga tried to accuse Kenyatta’s foreign policy to not be sufficient non-aligned and too close to the west, it ended up portraying him as an ally of the communist states.

Anticolonialism is also an important feature of both domestic and foreign policy. Postcolonial Kenya was characterised by a huge “manipulation of ethnic nationalism by the political elite for the appropriation of state privileges as well as by the clash between two ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and Luo, and the constellation of other minority ethnic groups around the political cleavages exploited by the larger groups” (Mabera, 2016, p. 375). For this reason, the current Kenyatta government emphasises national unity for the wealth and development of Kenya. This anticolonialism idea is linked to Kenyan nationalism, which has its origin in the struggle for independence from the British Empire.

Cooperation and solidarity between all peoples across Kenya were key and resulted in the creation of KANU in 1942 which led to the rise of Jomo Kenyatta and made him the greatest icon of Kenyan nationalism (ibid.). Nowadays, the cultural diplomacy aspect of foreign policy intends to boost the cultural diversity of Kenya for the progress of the country through the “promotion of global intercultural dialogue, cultural exchanges and partnerships, and the promotion of Kiswahili as a continental and global language” (Mabera, 2016, p. 376).

However, even if anticolonialist sentiments are a key element of the ideology of Kenyan foreign policy, it is not the only approach of the country’s policy. All in all, it could be stated that after Kenya’s independence and its first participation in global affairs, Kenya’s external policy was based on the support of African unity or Pan-Africanism. This can be translated in the promotion of regional and continental integration boosted by a strong belief in African solidarity. This is explained by Kenya’s diminishing relations with the West. However, despite Kenyatta’s “Look East” economic policy which could be understood as an end of relations with the west, the reality is that relations persist with those states that have been its traditional partners on many levels. In fact, “EU remains the largest market for Kenyan exports and America tops the list in the provision of development and security assistance to Kenya” (Mabera, 2016, p.3 73).

Furthermore, most of the newer states see the UN as an organisation for the promotion of international ethics in relation to the rights of oppressed peoples and weaker nations. Likewise, Kenya’s position of non-alignment, support for the idea of African unity or disapprovals of colonialism, are the proof of its desire of designing an international sphere in which there is a recognition of mutual respect, genuine cooperation, and a recognition of the equality of all states. Thus, in the year 1966, Kenyatta stated that:

We are convinced that international recognition and acceptance of our principles would lead to a much happier and more peaceful world. Let every country go on its own way, but we in Kenya believe that our traditions of mutual responsibility and respect for other people are fundamental to human happiness, within each nation as well as among nations (ibid p. 35).

Among the less developed nations and the non-alignment movement, Kenya aims at playing an autonomous and powerful part in international relations, but independent not in the sense of acting on its own, but in the sense of being noticeable for the rest. And the

stress of African unity comes back from the Second World War and African nationalism at the time and can now be understood as a sign of independence and a declaration of the sole role to be played in the international sphere by African states.

Moreover, Kenya belongs to several regional and international organisations such as the AU, the UN, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) or the ICC, as well as to several multilateral fora such as the African and Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, the Group of 77, etc. One of Kenya's main goals is to promote international cooperation and multilateralism as an essential start for the accomplishment of its national interests. Kenya claims that it is still devoted to promoting the principles of the UN Charter while remaining a promoter of peace and security in the region and fostering regional and global cooperation for faster economic and social development for all. Regarding global governance, Kenya is supportive of both the transformation of the UN system and the promotion of South-South cooperation towards the recognition of a “transformed, representative and equitable global governance” (Mabera, 2016, p. 376).

On the other hand, regarding the East African region, Kenya's notable conservatism position is due to the weakness of the political system and the constraints of the underdeveloped economy within the neighbouring countries (Howell, 1968). When the OAU was created, it was considered by its members as a valuable method for defending national and territorial sovereignties from other African governments or domestic resistance movements. Kenyatta specifically positioned himself among the conservative strand regarding African unity because:

[It is essential to] preserve the territorial status quo. The proposed charter would become binding upon its signatories, restraining them from pursuing expansionist designs aimed against their neighbouring states and making it impossible to effect any frontier realignment except by mutual consent (ibid p. 37)

Kenya's conservatism has been key when dealing with Somalia's nationalism. The Somalis claimed that all Somali individuals that lived outside the state had the right to self-determination, and consequently the right to become part of Somalia if they wanted to. Somalis complained that the division of their people was originated by the random boundaries that colonial states established which do not correspond to the ethnic logic. For that reason, throughout the years, there have been problems with the management of

this ethnonationalism. Somalia finally recognised that no independent African state could support irredentist claims against another because, as a member of the OAU, the territorial integrity of African states must be maintained, as to permit “one national or ethnic group to secede would lead to secessionist, or more likely separationist, aspirations elsewhere”(ibid p. 41). Therefore, if Kenya’s government had been regarded as able to put on jeopardy such a basic notion as national sovereignty and ready to negotiate the nationality of a noteworthy part of its residents such as the Somalis, it would have importantly damaged the confidence of both the political party and the people. However, even if Kenya’s territory is protected under the nationalist ideology of the country, the depth of ethnic feelings in Kenya indicates that the mission of nation-building would always be more challenging.

Kenya’s interests have always been around the advocacy for economic cooperation rather than political integration (ibid.), so its aim has been to promote a successful interregional trade, especially with Uganda and Tanzania, and to preserve the monetary and banking system inherited after independence. On the other hand, Uganda and Tanzania have been keener on a political integration within East Africa in order to achieve a fruitful integrated economy. And, in order to preserve cooperation withing East African nations, Kenya has had to make concessions to its neighbouring countries, which only proves Kenya's commitment to these relations. For example, with the Treaty for East African Cooperation of 1967, Kenya had to accept the relocation of the institutions of cooperation which was meant for the limitation of the dominant situation of Nairobi and also agree that the Development Bank prioritised the demands of Uganda and Tanzania (Howell, 1968). As economic integration seemed a lot easier and realist than political integration, even if Kenya used to advocate for federalism, it is now more interested in the economic aspects of these relations. Furthermore, Kenya has had to reflect since its independence on its capability of receiving investment capital from outside, hence its interest in attracting FDI, mostly against the competition of other new states. Therefore, this situation puts pressure on the government “to try to present to the world an image of stable, pragmatic government not prone to any dramatic or 'irresponsible' flights in the field of foreign policy” (ibid p. 44) to achieve industrial progress. It is true that Kenya has always been seen as one of the fittest investment options in independent Africa, which shows the positive image that Kenya has succeeded in creating. It is important to note that still, for both trade and aid, Kenya is very dependent on western traditional donor

countries. Thus, Kenya would not develop a foreign policy that injured relations with those countries that have sent aid to Kenya throughout the years, nor it would hurt relations with states that obtain large imports from Kenya.

In African diplomatic terms, Kenyan status and significance rely on the importance of the city of Nairobi which offers excellent diplomatic facilities and therefore is the chosen place to organise a lot of the inter-African diplomatic activity. Moreover, Kenya's governmental stability and strength have led to other nations having confidence in the country, which is not as evident for other states with more fragile regimes. Nevertheless, the most important feature of Kenya's development as a respected neutral state in African affairs has been defending a position of commitment to those causes linked to African nationalism without allowing such commitment to oppose the interests of other African states.

According to the Kenyan Foreign Policy strategy published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in 2014, there are five interlinked pillars of diplomacy: the economic diplomacy, the peace diplomacy, the environmental diplomacy, the cultural diplomacy and the diaspora diplomacy (2014). Economic diplomacy aims to achieve a strong economic transformation in order to secure Kenya's social-economic development and success consistent with the objectives of the Kenya Vision 2030. Peace diplomacy pursues to establish Kenya's legacy in the promotion of peace and stability by its participation in mediation and peacekeeping missions for development in countries within the region. Environmental diplomacy is aware of Kenya's significant role in the sustainable administration of its natural resources to deal with current environmental issues. Cultural diplomacy focuses on employing culture as a crucial instrument in international relations especially through cultural interactions and the foster of the Kiswahili language in the international sphere. Finally, the diaspora diplomacy acknowledges the significance of exploiting the various skills, knowledge and potential of Kenyans living in foreign countries and aiding with their integration into the national development agenda. These pillars notify about the key priorities and strategies for Kenya to successfully improve relationships, boost social-cultural cooperation and promote its domestic goals (ibid.).

4. Theoretical framework

4.1 AFRICA IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

There is a common critique in the field of International Relations that claims that these are not actually “international” because they have always been written from a North American/European perspective, i.e. a Western approach. Evidence of that is the book *Griffiths’ Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations* (Griffiths, Roach, & Solomon) published in 1999, which did not include a single African, Latin American or Asian author. The same way the world went through a decolonisation period, there needs to be a decolonisation of International Relations in order to allow new voices.

Another common mistake when analysing Africa in International Relations is the commonality of encompassing the whole of Africa in the same boat. However, when examining Africa, one cannot compare Morocco with Somalia or Democratic Republic of Congo with Namibia; the same way Moldova, Italy and Norway are never referred to as a whole when speaking about Europe in International Relations publications.

According to Odoom and Andrews, the first problem in International Relations that has contributed to the marginalisation of Africa in the field has been the concept of state (2017). The state-centric model, which was the dominant one until the 20th century, affirmed that each political entity with a limited territory and a centralised organization were the core actors in the international sphere. This model could be perfectly applied to Europe. However, away from the West, for instance in the African region, this model did not work and created more conflict than brought cooperation and understanding. Traditional International Relations theories and authors have been concentrated on the behaviour and interaction of states. Therefore, other interesting insights into IR, which were developed at the sub-state level, are mostly disregarded (Odoom & Andrews, 2017). Thus, many scholars do not reflect or consider the appropriate concepts when approaching complex phenomena in global politics. For example, the conflicts that take place in the African context.

The Westphalian model enforced on less-developed countries a particular form of political organisation as well as forcing them to implement it in a short time (ibid.). African reinterpretations of International Relations theories ought to challenge the state-centric approach in order to establish a more inclusive method and concept which is relevant for the whole international reality. An example of how poorly the state-centric

approach has worked in Africa is the analysis of the conflicts in Sudan and Uganda, as they were viewed solely as states dealing with tensions within their territory. However, if other factors had been taken into account, such as the history, the context or the motivations of the rebel groups, the conflicts would have been easier and quickly understood. Hence, other methods that include studying non-state actors such as nations, cultures, etc. offer new instruments to analyse and understand the reality of, not only African states, but also states all over the world.

An additional factor that marginalises Africa in the field of international Relations is the liberalism theory. Liberalism is a theory that is based on the concepts of liberal democracy, international peace and economic prosperity. And as a theory that was born in Europe, most of it, as well as all its examples, are based on European or other western regions (Nkiwane, 2001). Besides, this theory pictures Africa as a factor of destabilisation. Moreover, Africa is a region which has not been exhaustively studied and that could provide a lot of knowledge regarding “the functioning of states and markets, as well as potential for state and market failure” (ibid. p. 104).

Some African scholars have established the need to reinterpret the concept of democracy because “liberal democracy in the African context has tended to be very illiberal” (ibid. p. 107), and it is clear that democracy cannot be solely based on electoral politics. Furthermore, democracy in Africa has proved not only that it is not an effective factor in preventing war but to be an element of promotion of war on some occasions. Therefore, forcing post-conflict African states to practice democracy through elections instead of promoting peace causes divisions in society based on ethnicity, religion, race or other identity elements (Odoom & Andrews, 2017).

Lastly, the African reality is normally better understood through collectivism rather than individualism, which is the preferred approach of traditional International Relations theory (ibid.). For this reason, the collectivism in African societies has not been taken into account because of the dominance of the individualistic approach when analysing global politics. Collectivism focuses on societies and groups rather than states or individuals. Consequently, collectivism is driven by solidarity and the accomplishment of the common good is prioritized over personal individual objectives. At the national level, collectivism promotes solidarity and strong family, ethnic and religious ties. And at the international level, the collectivist approach encourages consensual decision-

making and group thinking based on “Pan-African solidarity norm” (Tieku, 2012). This idea is key to understand Africa’s behaviours in International Relations.

4.2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY: POSTCOLONIALISM

Therefore, after having analysed the absence of African perspectives in International Relations, the theoretical framework of this paper will be based on the theory of postcolonialism. From my perspective, this is the most relevant theory to examine this region these days being aware of how theory has always been developed from a Western approach, as well as with the intention to conduct further analyses from the African perspective, taking into account its main ideas, concepts and interests, contrary to what has been done throughout history.

The basis of postcolonialism theory is the recognition that most of IR theory and interpretations have been done from a Westernised approach. It has been seen in recent decades, since the early 1980s, that postcolonialism emerged in order to study international politics from a new approach: the Third World or the global South, and it has made relevant contributions. Thus, postcolonial theory promotes a new interpretation of International Relations from afar the traditional concepts of states or militaries towards people and identities (Abrahamsen, 2007). Postcolonialism is about suppressing the idea that the non-western is just a reflection of the western and providing the right to all people to the same material and cultural possibilities. However, the world is currently unequal, and much of these inequalities are connected to the differences between the West and the Third World.

During the European overseas expansion from the 15th century until the 19th century, European empires controlled the rest of the world and their colonised territories and people were portrayed as in need of those powers as well as “requiring the paternal rule of the west for their own best interests” (Young, 2003) which is nowadays referred to as development aid. Such power relations were created on the basis of the concept of race: whites versus non-whites. Throughout the period of colonial rule, colonised people contested this domination through many forms of active and passive resistance. In this sense, postcolonialism originated with the struggle against those ideas in which the nations of the non-western continents (Africa, Asia and Latin America) are in a position of subservience to Europe and North America and in a condition of economic inequality.

International Relations theory provides a universalist view that is, in reality, a European and US view, which fails to represent the interests and reality of less developed countries. This is the main reason for the origin of the postcolonial theory that has a focus on the geographical areas that have been marginalised since the start of IR studies. Postcolonialism is also focused on diversity regarding identities and cultures, in contrast with traditionalist theories.

Non-western intellectuals during the independence struggle would reflect on the violence that came from colonial oppression and how it impacted cultures, identities, and forms of resistance as those “practices of colonial oppression undermined the very values of liberty, equality, and respect that Europe claimed to uphold and represent” (Césaire, 1972) and that is why postcolonialism theory aimed at rewriting an alternative history focused on the colonised.

However, not everyone agrees with this postcolonial view as some of their intellectuals are regarded as having a privileged status in these poorer countries and aiming at pursuing their own interests within the Western reality, and therefore still marginalising the reality of the majority and the poor (Abrahamsen, 2007). This critic essentially argues that postcolonial writers seem to continue with the Eurocentric mindset while the emergent regions are portrayed as “people without history” (Wolf, 1982)

The colonial rule did not only change the ways of imposing and maintaining rule in the southern territories but also transformed the discourses within which colonised people could respond to domination. Western imperial power also introduced these new territories under its domain into the capitalist economic system and obliged them to remain within this system even after they reached the independent status (Abrahamsen, 2007).

According to Abrahamsen (2007), and given that there is a lot of diversity among postcolonial theories, there are some common characteristics shared by the main authors. Firstly, the centrality of power has been widely analysed in relation to the formation of identity. According to them, power is not only material but instead associated with subjectivity and knowledge and, therefore, aimed at understanding why some representations of power became dominant undermining others. In the case of Kenya, the fact that power is not material but immaterial is seen in the capacity of the United Kingdom to influence Kenya's post-independence foreign policy.

Discourse is another characteristic theme of the postcolonial theory. Western discourse, not only during colonial times but throughout history, established what were universal truths and an international reality that marginalised and silent other ideas. A contemporary example of this is the discourse used for development which can be interpreted a neocolonialism as it creates new ideas about the ‘rich’, the ‘poor’ or the ‘needed’. The use of these discourses impacts the identities of people and countries and makes it acceptable for Western countries to intervene in poorer countries to modify their lifestyle as they wish with the justification of helping them reach development standards and, thus, not letting people make choices on their own countries. All in all, development discourses legitimise a western intervention in third world countries to reshape their ideas according to the Eurocentric correct perceptions of progress. Hence, this idea emphasizes the identity of the West as “democratic, rational, and morally superior” (Abrahamsen, 2007, p. 116). As it will be further analysed, China’s and Russia’s discourses of being different than traditional powers and applying different principles and conditions have helped establish fruitful relations with Kenya and other African states

Identities were profoundly affected by the colonial experience, and the psychological and cultural impacts of colonialism on local cultures makes postcolonialism supporters believe that there is no return to a pure position of cultural authenticity. The concept of hybridity reflects the fact that the identities of the coloniser and the colonised are built-in relationship with each other: “the white man’s self-perception as moral, rational, and civilized required the image of the Negro as barbaric and uncivilized” (ibid p. 117). Moreover, this hybridity indicates the failure of colonial power to completely dominate as the colonised were never exactly as the colonisers. This shows that the peoples of the poorer countries are not simply submissive victims facing the powerful Western domination. This has been one of the main elements of the *Africa Rising* narrative and how African nations are no longer instruments for colonial powers, but instead have set their own objectives and develop their own voice in the international sphere.

Another theme in postcolonial theory is the idea of resistance defined as creativity and adaptability of the subordinate when facing a dominating power (ibid.). The postcolonial authors aim at recapturing the positions of the marginalised peoples and retelling the story from their perspective. This process of reinterpretation and recovery of formerly marginalised discourses is contemplated as an act of resistance, a way of ending

with the hegemony of prevailing discourses. It is clear that to be able to change the economic and political forms of domination and inequality it is firstly necessary a change in the psychological foundations. Certain criticism around postcolonial theory argues that focusing too much on discourse and representations leads to interference with the important issues of inequality or poverty that the real marginalised people have to face in contrast with what seem to be the struggles of the academic sector (ibid.). Nevertheless, emerging economies such as the BRICS have shown resistance to the supremacy of the US and the EU by creating their own values, establishing their own regional institutions and forming partnerships without their collaboration, as it is the case of South-South cooperation.

Thanks to the development of postcolonial ideas, the countries and peoples of the South have become more visible in the field of International Relations, pointing out the lack of these areas in traditional Western analyses. The focus on culture, identity and complex patterns of power and resistance that this theory presents challenges to a discipline that has been long dominated by the figure of the state, as well as by material power.

5. Objective and research questions

The main research question that this paper aims at answering is the following:

Why has Kenya diversified its partners?

The hypothesis prior to the realisation of the research work is the following:

Kenya's diversification in partners is due to the willingness of the country to overcome colonial ties with the former metropolis and the United States, the wish to become a more relevant actor in the international sphere and the disposition to build ties with those countries that seem to be in a similar situation of growth and development and whom with it has more in common.

Therefore, this dissertation aims to achieve the following objectives:

General objective:

Analyse Kenya's foreign policy and its dynamic partnership with other emerging economies since its independence until the present time.

Specific objectives:

- Identify Kenya's new emergent partners.
- Understand how domestic policy and foreign policy are related.
- Kenya's relations with traditional partners such as the UK and the USA. Is this a relationship based on dependency?
- The importance of Kenya as a regional leader: how are Kenya's relations with other East African states?
- The emergence of the South-South cooperation phenomenon and Kenya's partnership with states such as China and Russia. Who are the real beneficiaries? Is it always a win-win situation?

6. Methodology

In order to prove the hypotheses, a literature review was carried out between May 2019 and April 2020 using a variety of scholarly and newspaper articles, as well as information and diverse opinions obtained from different books and websites, mostly in English and Spanish, from the university's repository and databases such as Dialnet, EBSCO, JSTOR, Research Gate or Google Academic, among others. All of the sources used are reliable and their authors have been properly cited. The selection criterion was the suitability of the content of the publications with the objectives of the work, based on the reading of the abstracts of each of these.

The structure of the paper is based on a first descriptive and then analytical approach, aimed at providing the reader with the historical background upon which the analysis is later carried out. The analysis of Kenya's relations with traditional partners allows us to compare and study further relations with the new partners and, therefore, to support the dissertation's main hypothesis.

Firstly, the purpose and motives of this dissertation are exposed to prove personal interest as well as to express the relevance of this topic. Moreover, the state of play provides a brief introduction to the transformation of the African continent in the international context, Kenya's role in those and the development of partnerships with China and Russia. By showing recent literature on these issues, the relevance of the topic in the current international will be proved. This would be followed by the theoretical framework which would present the appropriate international relations theories to support the theses and the overall analyses of the matter. The hypotheses, objectives and following research questions have been presented and would be a guide through the analysis of Kenya's foreign policy and would give this work the focus that is pursued.

After the present methodology section, a contextualisation of the issue will be given in order to have some facts that will help with the understanding of the further analysis. The historical background, the current domestic political situation and the main strategy of the Kenyan government in terms of foreign policy will be the topics on this contextualisation. Subsequently, the research questions will be answered throughout this paper in the main body, the analysis. This is divided into two sections: traditional partners and new partners concerning Kenya's foreign policy. Finally, a conclusion will be written outlining the main ideas of this work and presenting some future perspectives.

7. Analysis

7.1 HISTORY OF KENYA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE PRESENT

7.1.1 Mau Mau and independence

With the beginning of the Second World War, the people of Kenya were already demanding change and, even if in 1944 Kenya became the first East African territory to include an African individual on its Legislative Council (Ingham, Hongo Ominde, & Ntarangwi, 2020), it did not feel like enough. For that reason, in the year 1928, Jomo Kenyatta created the Kikuyu Central Association, an organization of which he was the leader, that aimed for a peaceful transition to African majority rule. Later on, he became the leader of the Kenyan African Union (KAU) that aimed at encouraging Africans in Kenya to join this movement. However, the actions of the several organizations were not seen as useful for many Africans as they were not achieving the expected results, so the Mau Mau group was born. This group had a more aggressive attitude and started getting involved in violent actions around the country against the British rule and against those Kenyans who did not support their cause.

Between 1952 and 1960 the state of emergency was proclaimed by the government due to the actions executed by the Mau Mau and Kenyatta and other Africans were imprisoned and charged as responsible for the chaos in the country. As a result of this revolt, certain economic and social changes took place in favour of Africans, mainly linked to agricultural benefits. In 1953, after KAU showed no moderation even after the imprisonment of Kenyatta, it was banned, and the formation of new African associations was also not permitted. However, in 1960, the Kenyan African National Union (KANU) was founded and, soon after, some KANU members created KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) that was concerned with Kikuyu domination and intended to protect ethnic interests through a decentralised government (ibid.). In 1961, elections were organised in Kenya giving more representation to the KANU association, but both parties required the liberation of Kenyatta. Subsequently, in 1963, after the coalition of the two parties in 1962, Kenyatta officially became the Prime Minister of Kenya, which made the country acquire its independence from the British rule.

7.1.2 Kenyatta's era

With Kenyatta as the new Prime Minister, numerous changes were introduced in the country. However, the preference of Kenyatta towards his own Kikuyu people was evident as they were offered the best posts in the army. In addition, some ideological differences started to arise between Kenyatta and the vice president of his government, Odinga (from the Luo ethnic group), as he considered that, by implementing a capitalist economic policy that resembled the Western ones, the poorer people were not being represented. For this reason, Odinga left the political party of KANU and created his own opposition party, the KPU (Kenya People's Union). On the other hand, Kenyatta obtained more presidential power and decided to redistribute landholdings to Africans to satisfy Odinga's claims about the poor after settling a reasonable agreement with those European farmers that wanted to leave the country. (Ingham, Hongo Ominde, & Ntarangwi, 2020). In 1969, tensions between the Luo group and the government grew when a KANU member from the Luo group was killed, which subsequently increased when Odinga and other members of his political party were imprisoned and KPU was forbidden. In 1971, there was an attempt of reconciliation and national unity, but the numerous actions that the government implemented to favour the Kikuyu population only gave more reasons to the opposition to complain about ethnic differentiation. Kenyatta was then succeeded by Moi upon his death in 1978, a member of the minority Kalenjin ethnic group.

7.1.3 Moi's rule

After such a strong leader as Kenyatta, there were doubts about the new presidency. Initially, Moi's policies resembled those of Kenyatta and he started distributing posts among the different ethnic groups. However, soon after, members of his Kalenjin group acquired a lopsided number of positions. Odinga was still critical of this practice and he started receiving support from university students. Even though Kenya had been a one-party state since 1969 (when the KPU was outlawed), KANU's power was strengthened in 1982 when the KANU-dominated National Assembly modified the constitution of the country formally naming KANU the only legal political party (Ingham, Hongo Ominde, & Ntarangwi, 2020).

Western financial aid since the independence of the country had been an important factor in maintaining the Kenyan economy and, for that reason, Moi followed Kenyatta's

example by orientating the country's policies towards the West (ibid.). Nevertheless, towards the 1990s, Western powers established certain political and economic conditions to the country in exchange for their financial support. Therefore, in 1991 Moi agreed to introduce a further amendment to the constitution that permitted multiparty elections. But, in the 1991 elections, Moi was re-elected because the opposition was divided. In the 1997 elections, the Kenyan population had hoped that the different opposition parties would cooperate to overthrow Moi, but there were more than eight different ones, so he won again and continued to ignore the opposition's demands. In 2002, Moi announced that he would not present himself again for Kenya's presidency.

7.1.4 Current Domestic Politics Situation

Uhuru Kenyatta, the son of Jomo Kenyatta, became the president of the KANU party and Kibaki became the leader of a coalition of opposition groups, the NARC (National Rainbow Coalition). In the 2002 elections, Kibaki defeated Kenyatta, which was the first time that a different party from KANU had the presidency. After long having condemned KANU's corrupted government, Kibaki's party was involved in a corruption scandal in 2005 which created a new wave of opposition to the government. A new coalition of political parties emerged, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which included KANU, which was later fractionated and created the Orange Democratic Movement–Kenya (ODM-K). For the 2007 elections, Kibaki formed a new coalition, the Party of National Unity (PNU), which included some of the political parties that used to be in his NARC coalition and, more unexpectedly, KANU, in spite of its previous situation as an opposition party. The 2002 election had the highest turnout in Kenya's history and the provisional results designated Odinga (from the ODM party) as the most voted candidate. However, when the final election results were released, Kibaki was proclaimed the winner. Odinga immediately disputed the outcome and accused Kibaki of fraud, and even international observers doubted the legitimacy of the final election results.

Protests and revolts started to arise throughout the country which ended in horrible acts of violence and confrontation among Kenya's main ethnic groups: the Kikuyu (Kibaki's group), the Kalenjin, and the Luo (Odinga's group). Over a thousand people were assassinated as well as over six thousand were displaced in the brutal aftermath of the election, and even UN mediation attempts were not successful (ibid.). In 2008, Kibaki

and Odinga agreed to a power-sharing plan supported by the president of Tanzania and the chairman of the African Union, which aimed at establishing a coalition government between PNU and ODM and the creation of new positions. In that sense, Kibaki remained the president of the country and Odinga became the new prime minister.

In 2010 a referendum was celebrated on the adoption of a new constitution and was passed with a majority vote. This new constitution had the objective of ending the country's persistent patterns of political tension and corruption, reducing the power of the presidency and giving more control to the country's local governments. It also introduced a bill of rights and a land reform (The Constitution of Kenya, 2010). Later that year, the International Criminal Court (ICC) published the names of those who were suspected to be accountable for prompting violence after the 2007 elections, including Kenyatta and Ruto, and some had to face trial and were charged with committing crimes against humanity. There was a feeling of terror among the population when the country was preparing for the 2013 elections after what happened in the previous ones. The ICC trials did not stop Kenyatta and Ruto to campaign together as leaders of the newly formed Jubilee Coalition, a multiparty alliance. Odinga stood for the presidency as the candidate from the Coalition for Reforms and Democracy (CORD). Despite concerns of violence, the election was peaceful and technically free and transparent, so Kenyatta officially became president of the country.

When Kenyatta's presidency started, he had to deal with an important issue: Kenyan troops had intervened in Somalia to fight the Islamic terrorist group al-Shabaab in 2011. As revenge, al-Shabaab responded with numerous terrorist attacks on Kenyan territory. In 2016 there was a general sensation of fear about the 2017 election and protests arose against Kenya's Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), alleging it was corrupt and biased in favour of Kenyatta's Jubilee Coalition. The Jubilee Coalition disappeared forming then one single party, the Jubilee Party, with Kenyatta and Ruto as aspirants for the presidency. Also, ODM and other parties that were part of the CORD coalition joined other parties to form the National Super Alliance (NASA) with Odinga as its president (Ingham, Hongo Ominde, & Ntarangwi, 2020). The election was celebrated with eight possible candidates to win but, once again, the real duel was between Kenyatta and Odinga. When the IEBC announced that Kenyatta had been chosen with more than 54 % of the vote, Odinga and NASA maintained that the election had been arranged.

NASA officially contested the results taking the case to the Supreme Court stating that the presidential election should be declared void and his claims were satisfied when the elections were finally annulled. In the meantime, two amendments were passed in the National Assembly, in which Kenyatta's Jubilee Party held a majority. These amendments comprised controversial measures: "removing the need for dual transmissions to verify the results, allowing a candidate to automatically be declared the winner of the contested post if the other candidate withdrew from an election, and limiting the court's ability to void an election" (Ingham, Hongo Ominde, & Ntarangwi, 2020). The amendments were denounced by NASA and, even if Kenyatta did not finally sign it, the bill automatically became law.

Because of his disappointment with the lack of electoral reform, Odinga announced his retreat from the upcoming election. He asserted that, according to law, the IEBC would need to cancel the election and call for a new one, but Kenyatta insisted that the election should take place. However, when one of the IEBC members resigned from the commission uncovering that there were certain uproars within the IEBC that were stopping electoral change from happening, it was doubtful that the elections would finally take place (ibid.). The president of the IEBC additionally acknowledged that he could not ensure a free, fair, or credible election in October. Finally, the election was celebrated, but it was blighted by low turnout because NASA worked on convincing voters to boycott the poll. The IEBC reported that Kenyatta had won the election, but the veracity of his mandate was not seen very official as the turnout was very low.

NASA and Odinga did not accept the legitimacy of the elections and continued to ask for the celebration of another one. Moreover, Odinga revealed the formation of a People's Assembly, comprised of representatives from several groups within society that would examine the concerns faced by Kenyans. Besides, he suggested the creation of the NRM (National Resistance Movement), a group for the organisation of nonviolent protests and economic boycotts. Kenyatta was appointed president again on the 28th of November 2017 and, on the 30th of January 2018, Odinga organised another ceremony in which he was proclaimed the "people's president" of Kenya justifying it with what NASA stated were the real results from the elections in which he had received more votes than Kenyatta (ibid.). The government was obviously incensed with Odinga's defy to his presidency and it initiated an investigation into the event and stated that radio and television stations would stay shut down until the investigations were concluded.

7.2 TRADITIONAL PARTNERS

7.2.1 Kenya-UK Relations

Britain has not particularly maintained intense political, security, and economic ties in its former African colonies, something that strikes in contrast with France's relations with its former colonies. Even after the end of apartheid in South Africa in 1994, Africa remained to be of little interest for British foreign policy. However, British activities in the continent's natural resources and energy sector are obvious in the oil-producing countries of Nigeria, Angola, and Equatorial Guinea (Daniel & Nagar, 2016). Britain is also a key source of remittances to Africa. In fact, Nigeria is the second-largest recipient of such remittances (ibid.). Even if the United Kingdom did not maintain strong ties with its former colonies, the Commonwealth was formed in the 19th century to unite the nations that used to belong to the British Empire.

Regarding Kenya's relations with the UK, Kibaki's election as president in 2003 and the corruption scandals during his presidency, as well as the violence that Kenya faced after the 2007 elections, were important challenges to diplomatic relations with the UK and other traditional donors. However, the UK continued to support the Kibaki administration and retained its diplomatic relations with Kenya, which proves that Britain was interested in maintaining diplomatic relations in order to protect its economic interests in the country (Mubea Kamau, 2018).

After the post-election violence in 2007, the ICC pressed charges against Uhuru Kenyatta and Ruto of murder and human rights violations and this situation gave Kenya a very bad reputation in the international sphere (ibid.). The UK was among the countries that supported the ICC decision and decided to establish a certain policy that made diplomatic relations between Kenya and Britain become very tense. And when Uhuru Kenyatta won the presidential elections in 2013, he made the choice of continuing to follow Kibaki's "Look-East" policy.

In most recent years, Britain has found itself increasingly losing the power it used to have on Kenya's domestic policy which had always been eased due to the colony status of Kenya towards the UK. In fact, the role Britain played in Kenya as the motherland is gradually concluding because Kenya proclaims that the current foreign policy focus is led by trade (ibid.). When former President Kibaki decided to favour China over the West as Kenya's development partner and then President Uhuru Kenyatta continued with that

approach, the relation between the two states was destabilised. When President Uhuru Kenyatta was elected as president, he stated that Kenya would pursue a radically new foreign policy regarding its traditional partners, that it would strengthen the focus on regional and continental cooperation, and that it would not be responding to historical connections and traditions(ibid.).

Some consequences of Kenya's current foreign policy concerning the UK are that Kenya has warned the UK that it must make sure that Kenyan inhabitants are not damaged by the presence of its troops in the country. In addition, Kenya has realised the presence of certain neocolonialism indicators and the fact that it keeps being exploited by the UK. Also, Kenya has developed the country's national security interests by establishing military relations with Britain (ibid.).

More recently, the fact that the UK is disengaging from the EU after Brexit has made it obvious that the country is interested in diversifying its international partners. In fact, the importance of the Commonwealth as a major trading partner is being emphasised now that the UK is no longer part of the European Union's single market. Consequently, in 2020, UK's PM Boris Johnson hosted African presidents for the UK-Africa Investment Summit 2020. The main goal of this summit was to show that the UK is a favourable partner for Africa, stressing financial services, technological innovation, security cooperation and the UK's higher education sector (Fraser, 2020) now that the UK has to rethink its partnerships as a non-EU member. The Summit described the UK's aspiration to take advantage of leaving the EU to secure trade and investment chances in Africa and even become the largest source of FDI for Africa, although currently, only about 2 % of current UK trade is with Africa (ibid.). Nonetheless, an important reversal of the policy framework would be required for the UK as that plan has governed the EU and the UK's approach to aid, trade, and investment for over 40 years.

Regarding aid and investment, the UK government representatives have established that the UK's purpose is to become the G7's largest investor in Africa by the year 2022, even if they are able to recognise that African countries have a number of other interested investors (ibid.). Since the 1970s economic crisis, Western states have not proved active and powerful enough to build industrial capacity in Africa and, therefore, the countries in the continent have been looking to a much broader array of partnerships, particularly focusing on China, which has a more powerful economy and also has a big interest in African primary resources.

Africa's main problem is the amount of money leaving the continent as a consequence of the debts generated by long relations with the US, the EU, and the UK. Since the colonial era, most African countries have been tied into dependent and unequal trading relations with European states (ibid.). Therefore, the conditions in which the investments come are more important than the actual sum of money in investments. These debts are a consequence of profits made in Africa by foreign investors usually being returned to shareholders in the West rather than being reinvested in the continent (ibid.).

The UK's purpose is that, even if it does not become Africa's biggest investor, to at least be the best alternative. For instance, the UK's PM stated that thanks to the British investment in Mombasa Port, Kenya did not have to engage in an unequal relationship with China (ibid.). One strategy that is being considered is that instead of UK aid being used by African administrations or NGOs so that they spend it on the development of the continent's education or health systems, to actually invest it in private businesses via the CDC, which is the Commonwealth Development Corporation.

Ever since the 1980s, the UK has been one of the most engaged advocates of the neoliberal dogma that pursues control over complex elements of African economic and political life. Thus, it needs to prove how it is going to separate itself from the European mindset and actually reduce their control over African policy and permit the continent's governments and people to exert their sovereign rights to shape policy for their own benefit. Notwithstanding, it is possible that this strategy turns into African leaders being bribed to lessen tariff and non-tariff barriers in return for investment instead of being able to set their own tax, trade and industrial protection policies, as it has been the situation for a long time now (ibid.).

Concerning this UK-Africa Summit, it is notable that on October 2019 Russia hosted 43 African leaders in the same month that France presented its annual "Ambition Africa" business conference. In addition, in 2018, China welcomed 51 of the continent's 54 leaders (Blomfield, 2020). Thus, it is clear that there is interest from many different actors in developing relations with the African continent in order to not be left behind in the current international order.

7.2.2 Kenya-USA Relations

Ever since Kenya's independence, the United States and Kenya have mostly agreed on security matters and differed on issues concerning democracy and human rights. The US sees Kenya as a strategic partner in East Africa and as an important ally to counter terrorism in the region as Kenya's military plays a crucial role in regional operations against Al-Shabaab in Somalia.

Historically, the US has been a stable ally and a key development partner to many African countries, particularly to Kenya. It supports many projects that target development and democratic improvement, that contribute to healthcare, that assist in technology transfer as well as supporting infrastructure development activities (Mubea Kamau, 2018). US objectives focus on improving the living standards of Kenyans who, to a large extent, live under the WHO's poverty line of less than a dollar a day. Apart from this, Kenya and the US have had a fruitful relation, marked by its cooperation in different issues.

In the decade of the 1970s, Kenya's foreign relations totally focused on a pro-Western strategy given the international order at the time. Along with the UK, the US became an important partner for Kenya at the time and Kenya's biggest supplier of development and security assistance. Particularly during the Cold War, Kenya-US relations topped when American military facilities were established in the Kenyan city of Mombasa in 1980 which caused the USA to recognise Kenya as the key American strategic ally in Eastern Africa (Mabera, 2016). However, Kenya's foreign policy in relation to the US in the 1980s was also focused on its own national security concerns in the region.

The interests of the United States in Africa during the Cold War focused mainly on resisting the spread of communism in the continent and, as Kenya was the only anti-communist state in Eastern Africa, it became an important US ally. The US often disregarded fundamental democratic principles and development, and instead supported autocratic client regimes (Daniel & Nagar, 2016). Once the Cold War was over, the US was more and more concerned about political and human rights abuses by the Moi government. The US Africa policy then meant to reflect the country's status as an international leader and to establish its fundamental values of peace, democracy, human rights, development and market economy (Rehák, 2018) and, throughout that period, US

aid to Kenya dropped. However, after September 11 (2001), security, economic development and political interests of the US were introduced in Africa into the wider agenda of the War on Terror (ibid.).

Kenya's violent 2007 elections were observed with disappointment by the US, which thought the country's democratic progress as almost destroyed (Ploch Blanchard, 2013). And, even if the US recognises the important security position of Kenya, it still raises concerns about state corruption and human rights abuses. On the other hand, the US supports growth, as it was the case with the approval of the 2010 constitution. In 2013, the creation of the Power Africa Initiative was revealed with the purpose of mobilising private financing for investment in energy and electricity production (Rehák, 2018).

Nevertheless, the 2013 election and the previously noted situation with Uhuru Kenyatta and Ruto complicated the solid relationship between Kenya and the United States. As is has been seen, Kenyatta and Ruto faced charges before the ICC for their suspected responsibility in crimes against humanity after the 2007 elections. Kenya's main traditional partners, including the US, have been supporters of the ICC process because they believe that exemption for corruption and political violence represents a challenge that menaces Kenya's stability (Ploch Blanchard, 2013). However, the relation with the US concerning this matter continues to be uncertain as the US is not a member country of the ICC.

Nowadays, Kenya is positioned among the highest US foreign aid recipients in the world as it receives substantial development, humanitarian, and security assistance (Ploch Blanchard, 2013). Furthermore, because of their commitment to counter terrorism, the US established its largest diplomatic mission of Africa in Kenya, as well as four major United Nations offices worldwide, which are in Nairobi. The United States has appreciated Kenya's position as a peacemaker in Eastern Africa and its role as a recipient of refugees in the region (ibid.). However, governance and human rights challenges complicate the yearly discussions about aid to Kenya. These problems might hamper the relationship between the two states if they are balanced against US security concerns in the area.

US aid to Kenya is normally addressed to health, education, economic growth, and improving political reforms (ibid.). Recently, aid has progressively been focused on improving Kenya's capabilities to control its land and sea borders and to counter

terrorism. The Kenyatta government has proved to be a different type of administration that has emphasised its commitment to market reforms and its intent to leverage public-private partnerships to create employment, increase access to education, health care, and technology (ibid.). While many of these objectives fit with US foreign aid priorities, Kenya's capacity to finance them is unclear, and continuing security dangers could hinder investments.

7.3 NEW PARTNERS

7.3.1 South-South cooperation

According to the United Nations, South-South cooperation is the

“technical cooperation among developing countries in the Global South. It is a tool used by the states, international organizations, academics, civil society and the private sector to collaborate and share knowledge, skills and successful initiatives in specific areas such as agricultural development, human rights, urbanization, health, climate change etc” (UN DESA, 2019).

The less developed countries in the South have contributed to more than half of the global growth in the past years and, currently, south-south trade is at its highest, accounting for over a quarter of all total trade (ibid.). Hence, along with political dialogue and economic cooperation, South-South cooperation has fostered substantial knowledge and expertise interaction through programs or projects that have facilitated the resolving of particular difficulties in the states of the South. SSC has been a vital concept in the pursuit to modify the established world order and create a vision of mutual benefit and solidarity among the more underprivileged states. SSC's main argument is that development can be accomplished by the less-developed themselves through their mutual assistance to one another.

The Asian-African Conference that took place in Bandung in 1955 aimed at emphasizing the desire of the newly decolonised countries of the global South of collaboration for economic and cultural reasons, human rights and the promotion of world peace (Gray & Gills, 2016). This emergent movement of solidarity among the less-developed intended to challenge the vertical relations between colonies and metropolises that impeded relations between countries of the global South. The Bandung Conference

emphasized policies of non-interference and non-alignment, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) further developed this unity to challenge the expanding global inequality while minimizing the South's economic and political reliance on the North (ibid.).

There is debate on the effects that SSC might have. There are those who believe that SSC would mean the development of the South and, therefore, the emancipation from the supremacy of the North. On the other hand, there are those critics who see the success of the South as being part of the existing global capitalist development paradigm. Moreover, there is also debate on whether the elites of the rising powers in the South sincerely aim at challenging the dominant structures of global capitalist development, or whether they intend to support and reproduce these structures while altering their global position in the system and enhancing their influence within the existing structures (ibid.). Perhaps, the increasing economic growth, industrialisation and financial capability of numerous countries across the South is a move towards the restructuring of the global power relations and the restructuring of international governance institutions and the norms of the global economy. For example, BRICS have demanded the reform of IMF governance to increase the quota allocated to developing countries and to end the arrangement whereby the leadership positions of the IMF and World Bank are restricted to Europeans and Americans, respectively.

Beyond clear attempts at amending the institutions of global governance, the developing powers have also become important bilateral donors and have even formed South-South regional trade agreements (ibid.). Even if these developing countries continue to receive aid themselves and still struggle to successfully tackle certain issues such as “domestic poverty, underdevelopment, environmental degradation, deprivation, inequalities and socio-political injustices” (ibid. p. 562), the aid they are able to deliver is sufficient so that it is now impossible to understand the international aid structure only in terms of vertical relations of North-South donations. However, it is still not clear if SSC can be understood as a mutually beneficial accord or is it again purely an indicator of the pursuit of emerging donors' interests. Some praise the aid programmes of emerging donors for their deviation from the OECD Development Assistance Committee's neoliberal norms and for being a mutually beneficial method of development assistance as an alternative to the dominant aid paradigm. On the other hand, others criticise the role of emerging powers such as China for having a dubious intention and actually using aid

to acquire rights for the extraction of resources (ibid). Even if emerging powers have been able to establish SSC, it is still unknown if they will be able to challenge the dominant aid structure and establish a new aid paradigm that goes beyond the protection of the domestic interests and puts attention on the needs of the developing states. For that reason, the role of emerging powers and their procedures in regards to SSC should not be seen as a simple unitary force but instead as composed by complicated and conflicting national interests.

So, as it has been claimed, the main critics of the new emerging powers rely on the practices that show a re-subordination of both the people and the natural resources of the South to the continued supremacy of the North and at the same time to the increasing influence of new powers from the South itself (ibid.), developing new forms of colonialism. Nevertheless, such a statement disregards African agency and fails to analyse how that agency can convert emerging bilateral relationships into mutually beneficial ones (ibid.). This has been the case for instance in Ethiopia where there has been a fruitful combination of relations with emerging donors, such as China and India, and the development of its own domestic policy. And even if Ethiopia still has a sizeable trade deficit with China, it has benefitted from this because of extensive Chinese investment in the country that has not been centred solely on the purchase of land and extraction of resources, but instead on manufacturing, construction and real estate (ibid.).

Moreover, the establishment of the many South-South initiatives has incited new proposals to foster the traditional North-South cooperation, as it has been the case in some African states, through the US and EU summits with certain countries in the continent that followed the precedent successful Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The growth of numerous regional and global economic shifts, especially those that took place after the beginning of the global financial crisis, may, therefore, indicate a modification of the international political economy, and the start of upcoming profound structural changes.

7.3.2 Kenya's Partners in the Continent: East Africa

Regionally, Kenya has maintained decent relations with other African countries since its independence in 1963 and since it joined the Organization of African Unity (OAU) that same year. The OAU was established to boost political and economic

integration among its members and to eliminate colonialism and neo-colonialism from Africa (Mubea Kamau, 2018). In addition, Kenya has kept working with the African Union (the successor of the OAU), in fields like the management of conflict in Africa.

Moreover, Kenya, along with Tanzania and Uganda, established the East African Community (EAC) in 1967 to promote regional integration. Nevertheless, by 1977 the EAC was out of action and in 1983 it was officially suspended. By the decade of the 1990s, though, a new interest on regional integration fostered the reestablishment of the community in 1993, when the leaders of Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya agreed on a permanent trilateral commission (African Studies Center, n.d.) that received the same previous name, EAC, and which was finally installed in 1996. This newly established institution was more moderate in its cooperative aspirations and it highlighted principally collaboration in transport, energy, the administration of Lake Victoria and cross-border trade (ibid.). The members of EAC nowadays continue to cooperate in regional integration with the purposes of developing a customs union, common market, monetary union and political federation (Mubea Kamau, 2018). Uganda and Tanzania are currently the prominent export markets, with Kenyan manufacturers being the main recipients (African Studies Center, n.d.). The currencies of the EAC members are adaptable and agreements on tariffs and negotiations on monetary policy are being overseen by the different central banks. However, nowadays, Kenya still faces some foreign policy issues with its neighbours related to border issues or population movements.

Regarding regional integration and trade, Kenya has declared over the years that it favours regional integration. Apart from being a founding member of the EAC in 2018, Kenya was among the first countries to sign the AfCFTA. AfCFTA intends to establish a single continental market for goods and services and a customs union with free movement of capital and business travellers (Signé, 2018). One of its main objectives is to improve the economies in Africa with the liberalisation of trade among the continent's subregions. This trade promotion will also serve to promote a more competitive industrial sector while fostering the diversification of the economy (ibid.). Furthermore, the elimination of tariffs will establish a market that will benefit economies of scale and, consecutively, states will be capable of accelerating their industrial development.

Even if the EAC grants the free flow of goods manufactured among the members without excessive taxes, Kenya still protects local manufacturers, so enlarging regional integration could be a challenge for the country. For that reason, Kenya aims at looking for

opportunities outside Africa, like it was demonstrated when attending the UK-Africa Investment Summit (Mutambo, 2020).

Currently, there is competition between different states to dominate Eastern Africa. For instance, last year, Kenya intended to establish warehouses in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo as part of its strategy to strengthen its control on regional trade. This strategy of establishing warehouses in certain cities of these countries was aimed at attracting more exports and avoid competition from the neighbouring states that threaten Kenya's supremacy of the main markets (Muchira, 2019). On the other hand, both Rwanda and Tanzania have signed two impressive infrastructure agreements that will certainly restructure the region of East Africa both in the political and in the economic spheres, with Kenya being the most affected country in this new situation. Tanzania signed an agreement to connect its new railway line to Burundi and the DRC, and the same kind of deal is being reviewed in Rwanda. These agreements give Tanzania an upgraded status in East Africa, as its railway project will make its commercial capital the principal route to the sea for the non-coastal countries in the area, which puts Kenya's dominance in danger (Kiruga, 2019). This also shows the important consequences of the failure of the collaborative plan that Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda had set in 2013 to build mega-infrastructure deals together (ibid.). From all this, the main beneficiary has been Tanzania, as it shares a frontier with Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, and Uganda.

7.3.3 Kenya-China relations

China is an increasingly influential actor in world politics and has, since the 1960s, expanded its interests in the African continent. China is now the largest trading partner for the African continent. The *Africa Rising* narrative has contributed to China's involvement on the continent, particularly through mechanisms such as the FOCAC, which has become a common approach for multilateral cooperation with African countries (Daniel & Nagar, 2016). FOCAC was established in 2000 to improve consultation and dialogue and it represents an important mechanism for Chinese-African cooperation. Through FOCAC, China has implemented measures in several areas such as "medical care, human resource development, education, credit and financing among others" (Onyango, 2020).

However, as it could be guessed, China has been criticised by the other actors that have seen their influence in Africa undermined due to the large Chinese power in the continent. Some of the most common criticisms are that China employs Chinese workers in Africa instead of employing local population, that China is solely interested in Africa's resources or that its actions in the continent do not foster environmental degradation or the consolidation of authoritarian regimes in the continent. For instance, the USA, a traditional African partner, has had to face this new reality and acknowledge China's strength in the continent and design new strategies. The USA, however, tries to demonstrate that, even if China's financing is quicker to obtain, they do not count with the experience and knowledge of many years as the US does and that it is not focused on long term sustainable development but it is instead untenable (Tiboris, 2019). The US also argues that China's interest in Africa relies on the exploitation of resources.

Furthermore, for nations such as the USA, China's ability to directly finance projects shows a clear expression of China's aim to portray its foreign policy goals and it raises concerns among certain states because of the exploitation of natural resources, continuity of environmental degradation, labour shift, unbalanced debt burdens, or land grabs in Africa (ibid.). China describes its economic engagement in Africa as following the principles of mutual benefit and non-intervention. However, for the US, what China does is to invest mainly in individual projects that interest the foreign government and that stimulate its economic and foreign policy purposes and not really follow the mutual benefit principle.

Moreover, African demands for development assistance is growing and, again according to traditional African partners, those requirements are much broader than those that can be assumed by China. However, African governments tend to see certain advantages in loans from China as they often have fewer conditions than Western loans. From a Western perspective, "the complexity of Western arrangements is intended to ensure that they are beneficial for the parties involved, are less vulnerable to corruption, and encourage shared global goals for environmental security, human welfare, and sustainable economic development" (Tiboris, 2019, p. 5) while China focuses on infrastructure projects and ignores the enduring effects of their construction. The reason for this is that following the principle of non-intervention, the consequences of the projects, good or bad, are the responsibility of the recipient country. In addition, the USA is preoccupied that, because of China's non-intervention principle, it supports

authoritarian governments and promotes corruption while the US has worked to boost democracy in Africa over the years. Hence, without renewed US commitment, there is a risk of retrogression of democracy on the continent (ibid.).

Nevertheless, all these typical critics that Western countries spread about China are not always true. In fact, the belief that the Chinese arrived in Africa just recently for their need for oil is false. As it was mentioned before, China has been engaged in Africa since the 1970s, when the countries were obtaining their independence and started being abandoned by their metropolis.

Moreover, as it has been seen, the West accuses China of damaging their attempts to consolidate democracy in Africa as Western aid is sent in exchange of governance transformation, while the Chinese come without conditions. In fact, China does have one crucial political condition to their aid: the One-China policy (Brautigam, 2011), i.e. not to recognise Taiwan. This means that “only those countries that recognise Beijing as China are eligible for aid” (ibid p.3). However, the point is not that China’s aid comes without conditions, is that sometimes Western countries also leave conditionality behind depending on the type of engagement they are establishing in a region. For example, Western donors did not offer any financing for reconstruction in Angola after the conflict unless they made governance improvements, but, on the other hand, Western banks did offer loans of billions of dollars to Angola without imposing governance conditions. And what is more, the biggest recipient of US aid in Africa used to be Egypt, when it was governed by President Mubarak, who refused to hold free and fair elections (ibid.).

To the extensive acceptance that China’s aid is motivated by the need for natural resources, the response is that China’s aid is actually more driven by politics, as it has been shown with the One-China policy and the desire to maintain partnerships with the different countries. For this reason, China is cautious in providing aid to all the countries with whom they have diplomatic relations, including those that do not have any resources, like is the case of Senegal, or Rwanda. Another false statement is that China sends Chinese farmers to settle in Africa, which leads to land grabbing and therefore is giving rise to a new era land colonisation in Africa (ibid.). It is true that an important number of Chinese workers have moved to Africa, but it is also essential not to forget that there are over 6.5 million white Europeans who live on the continent. Moreover, most Chinese immigrants that come live in Africa do not do so to be farmers but to be traders.

Related to land grabbing by the Chinese in Africa is the statement that Chinese companies that settle in Africa import their own workers instead of employing local people. Again, the truth is that Chinese companies hire many Africans and only bring Chinese workers for construction projects. Additionally, the amount of Africans working on most projects is higher than the Chinese, and Chinese individuals tend to be hired for technical or managerial positions where speaking Chinese is required while less skilled jobs are occupied by Africans.

All in all, China is seeking legitimation of global leadership through delegitimization of the United States and the resocialization of other actors. Non-Western powers like China are challenging the liberal international order and establishing alternative multilateral institutions based on different principles in the process of asking for additional authority in global governance and shifts in global power distribution. China is aware of the fact that its military and economic capabilities are not enough to directly challenge the USA's global dominance. However, knowing that emerging powers traditionally expanded their influence abroad through conflict and colonisation, China is using its economic capabilities by making natural resource and trade deals (Hodzi, 2018).

The common point between China and Africa is that they do not agree with the "Western-centric order or Western norms of intervention, responsibility to protect (R2P), human rights, good governance and democracy" (ibid. p.298) and that both were compulsorily integrated into the liberal international order. The rise of China as a global power with increasing influence in the South has though challenged that liberal international order. In addition, the United States' failure to meet its global commitments have driven African states' interest in China. In fact, the President of Rwanda, Kagame, claimed that in opposition to the West, "China adhered to the values of equal treatment and mutual respect, no demarcation in ideology while developing relations with Africa" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 2017 in Hodzi, 2018, p. 302). Moreover, Trump's administration questioned the effectiveness of the US aid in Africa and decided to apply significant cuts on foreign assistance, which did not create any sympathy among African nations.

In addition to establishing no harsh conditions for aid as Western powers do, China is investing billions of dollars in projects while the West still prefers putting their money into humanitarian projects, when at this point it has been made more than clear that what Africa needs is infrastructure, trade and investment and not charity. Moreover,

as an alternative to imposing its own development model, China maintains that all states have the right to choose their own development process and that cooperation with foreign states ought to be mutually beneficial (ibid.). China is also challenging the acceptability of international norms such as the R2P depicting them as vulnerable to manipulation by Western nations to obtain their political goals (ibid.). China has instead supported the resolution of international issues “based on its foreign policy principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity”(ibid. p.304).

China has accomplished to create a group of states that diverge from certain international principles such as R2P and international justice thanks to describing itself as the leader of weaker countries against the abuse of Western countries. China also emphasises the idea of “African solutions to African problems” to express that solely Africans have the knowledge and right to solve their conflicts (ibid.). For China and other less-developed countries, the adoption of Western norms was simply driven by their need to survive in the international sphere and also to avoid punishment for disagreement, as sanctions were imposed to those states that opposed the Western principles, such as respect for human rights or democracy. This superiority is perceived by China and African states as an extension of the Western colonial control over their regions (ibid.).

At the same time that China grows in the international sphere, Africa has empowered the *Africa Rising* narrative and the rejection of African states to any form of Western intervention in its domestic matters. Hence, countries in Africa are becoming strong allies of China and therefore providing legitimacy to the leading role of China in international affairs by gradually assuming China’s norms and principles of non-interference, respect for other states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, meaningfully decreasing the power of the West in Africa.

Therefore, from a more optimistic perspective, it could be argued that the presence of China-African cooperation differentiates China from the neocolonialist aims of Western powers. Moreover, Chinese investments have been directed to areas neglected by capitalist centres and have appeared at a time when Africa, after being plundered, had been abandoned to its fate. It can also be said that there has been a strong link between Chinese growth and that of African countries, who needed aid and investment. Meanwhile, from a pessimistic approach and a Western discourse, it is argued that the Chinese are not only repeating the neocolonial model but are endowing it with even more

negative characteristics, by adding corruption as a habitual component in the negotiations of both parties and by not carrying out a trade-off between aid and democracy. It also warns about the danger of growing Chinese imperialism, claiming that China's immersion in Africa is contributing to deindustrialization and underdevelopment in this continent. Protests have erupted from some African countries over the destruction of local industries that have been unable to compete with imports from China (Lechini, 2013) as well as for Chinese immigrants taking over the jobs of Africans or environmental degradation.

Even if an introduction of China's policy in Africa has been exposed, the main objective is not to analyse China's interests in the continent but rather address Kenya's interests in developing relations with this international partner. Kenya started the most current relations with China in times of President Kibaki, but it was with the election of President Uhuru Kenyatta, that those relations started being more emphasised. As it was mentioned before, the election of this President caused rejection in the West because him and Ruto faced charges by the ICC of committing crimes against humanity after the violence that the 2007 elections generated. However, China agreed with the election of Kenyatta as the country's president and that meant the commencement of a new era of close cooperation under the officially announced "Look East" policy, which is a state policy that implied a shift in Kenya's diplomatic relations and which was established after the election of Kibaki as the country's president .

Because of Kenyan need of development and urbanisation, the state is keen on receiving contributions from OECD members but especially from new donors that engage in SSC, due to non-conditionality. As a result of Kenya's "Look East" policy strategy of openness towards Asian countries, these countries are welcome to contribute to Kenya's growth at a lower cost than Western donors (Bénazéraf, 2014). Thus, accords have been established with China, Japan or South Korea in the areas of infrastructure, mining prospection, agriculture, among others. China became the main Kenyan bilateral donor in 2011, and since 2013 it has been the principal source of FDI to the country (ibid.) and has been able to compete with Kenya's traditional partners and donors.

However, for China, Kenya is also an important economic partner as it has a strong role in the East African region. China's position as a donor for Kenya is unlike any other as it does not participate in coordination with other partners, it does it on its own. It also does not work in cooperation with other states when it comes to urban development projects because, in this field, Chinese involvement is focused in the dimension of

urbanisation and in other sectors that have no presence of other donors (ibid.). However the methods, it is undeniable that China is contributing to the urban development of Nairobi and other near cities. Even if Kenya's urban infrastructure still relies on the colonial or traditional powers, the operational dimension and the fast way in which Chinese road and housing projects are completed are making a change (ibid.). The main advantage of Chinese investments in comparison to other external partners is that they offer more instant solutions to the demands of the Kenyan people. Moreover, these projects are not intensively and previously planned and coordinated and do not take into account issues such as environmental and social factors or good governance (ibid.), so that is why they become attractive to both the authorities and the public opinion. It is true that, even if China defends that each nation should be in control of their own development methods, it does bring its experience and knowledge into the African continent and therefore influences the development of the region.

In terms of trade, the supremacy of the EU as Kenya's import partner has been diminishing in the last decade at the same time that China's role as a significant import partner has been progressively increasing. Kenya's exports to China remain to be minor but also steadily increasing with the main export products being tea, leather, sisal fibre, fish, and scrap metal (AERC, 2010). In general, the export trends of Kenya's main export products to China suggest that these relations have been advantageous to Kenya particularly in allowing the country to take place in the global market (ibid.). Regarding Kenya's role in FOCAC, Nairobi has continued to be the key beneficiary of FOCAC since the establishment of this forum. The reason for this is that, for China, Kenya is a considerable partner for its project of the Belt Road Initiative, as Africa's section of that initiative starts in Mombasa and then goes towards the west, to Uganda, and then the Great Lakes and the west coast of Africa (Onyango, 2020). In addition, as Kenya is aiming at boosting FDI from China for reasonable priced high technology for the sectors of manufacturing and housing, China has demonstrated to be a trustworthy partner for African states with development goals. Furthermore, the close ties between both countries are good to motivate the Chinese to visit Kenya and therefore foster tourism in Nairobi (ibid.). For itself, Kenya ought to make sure that it recognises the repercussions of a larger engagement with China, taking advantage of the opportunities as it protects the interests of the country.

Kenya and China have signed different agreements to cover different areas such as the economy, technology, energy, tourism, health, etc. China sees in Kenya a safe opportunity to gain more access to the rest of the Eastern Africa region and that is why it puts special efforts in developing its relations with this country. Accordingly, Kenya has proved to be a good candidate due to its situation of no internal conflict and having a stable political situation. The reality is that the trade, investment and aid figures between Kenya and China are not yet as significant as those with other trading partners of Kenya such as the EU and the rest of Africa (Onjala, 2008). However, recent patterns in these sectors show that there is increased proliferation of FDI by China through the manufacturing and service fields in Kenya as well as more interest in the mining sector, there is also still limited employment levels in joint companies for both Kenya and China (ibid.). China's involvement in numerous road construction projects in Kenya demonstrates the reality that China sees Kenya as its entrance to the whole Eastern region of the continent.

Lastly, the total impact of China's trade, FDI, and aid to Kenya comes with both gains and losses for the country. Kenya's population gains from cheap products, although not with the best quality, due to the low price of imports from China of both consumer and producer goods (ibid.). However, local producers become losers because of competitive pressure, even if they can get cheaper supply or producer goods (ibid.). Moreover, the consequences of Chinese-Kenyan economic relations can also be direct or indirect. Indirect effects include the loss of regional markets or of opportunity to take part in international trade (ibid.). On the other hand, Chinese FDI poses an opportunity for technology transfer and chance to improve local businesses which could make local firms competitive in international markets (ibid.).

Chinese imports do not necessarily replace domestic production, because they actually replace imports from other countries, and therefore lower the general cost of imports. In addition, those imports can also increase labour productivity within certain sectors and enhance employment in services (Sanghi & Johnson, 2016). However, it is important that Kenya seeks to improve its manufacturing sector to be able to compete with China's low-cost manufacturing. In relation to exports to China, especially those related to services, they may rise once China shifts to an economy based on consumption (ibid.). When focusing on trade, the improvement of export competitiveness should be emphasised as well as the general balance of trade, and not just to China, but to any other

partner state. Chinese companies also create many local jobs and, unlike in other places in Sub-Saharan Africa, China invests in more than natural resources in Kenya, such as in the communications sector or infrastructure (ibid.).

The relations between both states have can still be described as asymmetric as China has benefited considerably more from its growing relationship with Kenya than Kenya has (Rehák, 2016). In fact, though Kenya has been promised the highest degree of partnership, it has been ignored in different occasions. For that reason, Kenyan public opinion is vigilant about the advantages of close cooperation with China and sometimes even very critical of Chinese activities (ibid.), in spite of the formal Look-East policy established by Kenyan foreign policy.

7.3.4 Kenya-Russia Relations

Kenya-Russia relations differ from the Kenya-China relations because they do not represent the same kind of partners for the African state. In fact, Russia's comeback to the African continent is relatively recent and thus, there is not the same amount of information to explain its relationship with Kenya. This is rather a prospective analysis to understand the potential relations to come.

After the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the Soviet Union, Russia-Africa relations entered a period of important deterioration in political and economic terms due to Russia's incapability to keep up with its responsibilities in the country. Because of Russia's weak economic situation, it demanded African countries to repay their debts as soon as possible, but African countries, on the other hand, demanded Russia to eliminate the debts they owed. This damaged Russia's image in Africa as they went from being an important partner to completely abandon the continent. This ended up being a problem when eventually Russia recovered interest and pretended to re-establish relations with Africa.

During the decade of the 1990s, Russia's strategy consisted in focusing on the development of relations with the West while still ignoring Africa. At that moment, China already had a big advantage in Russia on the African continent and the influence of the country kept decreasing. However, more recently, the rise of the African continent following the *Africa Rising* narrative and its presence in the international sphere have created fresh prospects for Russia because "significant countries of the world that hold

political and economic powers currently aim to develop economic interests and political influence on the African continent and Russia uses every opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to acquire its former prestige among world states” (Fidan & Aras, 2010, p. 47). Russian aspirations in Africa include recovering the influence the Soviet Union used to have and also building new alliances.

During the decade of the 2000s, Russia’s interest in Africa resuscitated as the economy became more stable. Hence, Russia started seeking to be included in Africa’s sphere of influence. Russia also developed further relations with other regions as it was demonstrated with its entrance to the G7 club, the maintenance of close relations with China, the establishment of relations with Syria or Iran, and therefore showing interest in the Middle East, and also its friendship with Venezuela proved that Russia also considered relations with Latin America important (Fidan & Aras, 2010). This determination to return to Africa was prompted by its concern that states such as China, India, Brazil, and, in particular the US, were already strengthening their engagement in the region and it did not want to stay behind in gaining access to natural resources and energy reserves (Giles, 2013).

In 2007, Russia’s authorities claimed they would not accept the unipolar world system in the post-Soviet period and for that reason they needed to expand their efforts on the African continent. The strategy included the participation in the resolution of conflicts in the African continent, the alleviation of the debts of African states, the support for the development of trained human capital, and the continued humanitarian assistance to the continent (Fidan & Aras, 2010). Russia envisions a multipolar world in which it can resist US hegemony as one of several alternative powers. Russia's foreign policy often follows a zero-sum approach pursuing to promote its own agenda by attacking Western interests (Russell & Pichon, 2019).

In order to legitimize its involvement in Africa, Russia has abandoned the ideological approach that it followed during the USSR era by supporting the independence of African countries, following the postcolonial theory of IR. This emphasis on the suppression of the ideological approach is also to oppose the US’s more ideological approach that highlights democracy and human rights. Russia’s advantage in this aspect is that it assisted in the decolonization processes and has continued to ensure no signs of neocolonial aspirations to appease African fears of Russian political intentions in the continent (Giles, 2013). Russia advocates for equality in relations with African

countries and to abstain from interfering in national issues, preserving mutual respect for independence and territorial integrity, and recognising the role of the UN in the continent (Fidan & Aras, 2010).

Russia's non-ideological approach does, however, have one principle which is the total opposition to what it sees as Western intervention in other countries' matters with the justification of advocating human rights and democracy. For that reason, many African countries prefer Russia's inclination to disregard human rights problems. In fact, Russia has used its UNSC veto to protect African countries from international human rights-related sanctions, and African countries have reciprocated for Russia's interests (Russell & Pichon, 2019). As African states compose nearly a quarter of the UN, they have supported Russian proposals for Russia not to seem isolated on the international arena. Russia has tried to use its veto power as a permanent member of the UNSC to persuade African countries and challenge Western supremacy while getting allies in the process. Even in 2014, after Russia invaded Crimea and was sanctioned by Western countries, it convinced more than half of the African countries to oppose a UN General Assembly resolution that denounced its actions (Standish, 2019). Moreover, in 2019, the first Russia-Africa Summit was held in order to maintain Russia's strategy to gain allies and be able to challenge the current USA and European dominated security mandate.

A crucial element of Russia-Africa relations is related to military equipment. These relations were already established when the USSR was a strong power and have always been a priority for the country. The forces of many African countries such as Algeria, Angola, and Ethiopia are 90 % armed with Soviet military instruments (Fidan & Aras, 2010). Now, since African forces are used to Soviet weapons, Russia is the only country that can meet their needs in this sector. Russia's main rival in the arms market in Africa ever since the dismantling of the USSR, apart from the USA, has been China. Russia's main customers include many African states like Algeria and Ethiopia. The majority of countries in Africa do not have a national weapons industry so they depend completely on imports from other states' industries. Russia saw the opportunity and asserted its purpose of restoring military cooperation and arms sales to the continent (Giles, 2013). Nevertheless, Russia has often been denounced by the international community because of the arms supply to states where domestic conflict and ethnic rivalry result in the infringement of human rights. Furthermore, Russian weapons are appealing to African chiefs because agreements with Russia do not involve human rights

clauses that do appear in accords with other states like France or the USA. Since 2015, Russia has signed military agreements with over 20 African countries which include “weapons sales, access to African seaports and air bases, training at Russian military academies for African officers, counter-terrorism, peace-keeping and the presence of Russian military advisers” (Russell & Pichon, 2019). Another relevant component of Russia’s relations with Africa relies on the policy of debt relief. To counter Russia’s small amount of donated to African counties in comparison to other actors such as the EU or the USA, Russia decided to forgive African countries the debts they accumulated during the USSR era.

In relation to economic and natural resources terms, Russia and Africa are dependent on each other as together they possess 60 % of all the natural resources. Interestingly, Russia needs Africa more concerning natural resources because even if Russia has substantial resource deposits, they are hard to access and expensive to develop (Giles, 2013). Hence, Russia is interested in getting access to minerals in regions where the exploitation is cheaper, which is especially in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In 2009 it was revealed that Russia became the world’s number one exporter of oil, even ahead of Saudi Arabia, and it is also the country with the earth's biggest natural gas reserves. In this context, gas, petroleum, and refined oil products represent more than half of Russian exports. Therefore, in order to successfully follow its energy policy, Russia needs to obtain further oil and gas reserves. Thus, African states represent an important focus for Russia’s energetic interests. In exchange, Russia offers African countries investment in the field, lack of political obligations and practical expertise in the extraction of energy resources as well as advanced nuclear knowledge (Giles, 2013). Russian exports of natural gas and oil are crucial to maintain the national economy and to increase the reliance of other countries on its reserves. Moreover, Russia-Africa cooperation expands Russia’s opportunities to become an energy leader because, in comparison to its rivals that are unwilling to invest in energy production in Africa, Russia is in a different situation. In fact, amongst the powerful actors in Africa, Russia is the only one exporting energy (Fidan & Aras, 2010). Furthermore, energy cooperation is not limited to fossil fuels and, although for the moment only South Africa has a functioning nuclear power plant, other African countries are contemplating nuclear energy as a fairly cheap way to meet the rising energy demand. Consequently, Russia has signed accords

to develop nuclear energy with several African nations which include Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, Rwanda, Nigeria, and Ethiopia (Adibe, 2019).

Concerning trade, Russia's partnership with Africa is not as strong as other countries after the decade of the 2000s, imports from African countries to Russia have been growing slower than Russian exports to the continent. However, it still represents only 3 % of Russia's total international trade, and 2 % of Africa's which proves to be fairly small, except in the strategic energy and mining sectors (Russell & Pichon, 2019). Russia's main export to Africa are weapons and Russia's main imports from Africa include mostly agricultural products

All in all, Africa's partnership with Russia benefits it in "bringing investment for the energy and mining sectors, helping to build military capacity, and enabling governments to diversify their foreign relations in a way that reduces dependence on other international partners" (Russell & Pichon, 2019). On the other hand, Russia is interested in cooperating with Africa because apart from the above-mentioned advantages, it is able to supervise the activities of other emerging powers in the continent and can reflect on the possible formation of a unified group of countries that are willing to counter US/Western influence in Africa (Giles, 2013).

It is true that among the different countries in Africa, Russia does not have the closest relation with Kenya, which could be related to the modest amount of natural resources present in the country or its insignificant demands for military equipment, which are the main strategies for China. Russia's closest relations in Africa are with states such as Sudan, Central African Republic, Libya, South Africa, among others. Nevertheless, it is a growing partner for Kenya and it is finding its way to build closer relations.

Kenya has had friendly relations with Russia since its independence in 1963. During the Cold War, Kenya was part of the NAM, so it maintained good relations with the USSR. When Kenya achieved its independence, not only did Russia offer scholarships to Kenyans to study in the USSR, but also participated in the development of Kenyan infrastructure (KIPPRA, n.d.).

Currently, it is essential to reflect on the first Russia-Africa Summit, which took place in Russia in October 2019, which allowed Russian and African heads of government to talk about strategic cooperation on topics of common interest including areas such as

trade, investment or energy. In accordance with the summit, the expansion of trade relations between both states is crucial. At this time, Kenya-Russian trade is fairly small compared to the overall trade between Kenya and other important economic powers such as China, India or the USA (ibid.).

Kenya is seen by Russia as the main power in the East African region, so President Kenyatta and Putin, have engaged in bilateral talks concerning “trade, investment, tourism, science and technology, training and education, security and defence, and tourism” (ibid.) that would be utterly necessary to upgrade the agenda of both countries. Moreover, both leaders agreed on the establishment of a Russian-Kenya Business Council that would be essential to supervise the completion of collaborative trade and investment programmes. Furthermore, Kenyatta invited Russian authorities to invest in Kenya's priority areas of manufacturing, affordable housing and universal health to enhance economic cooperation (Standard Digital, 2019). Regarding energy, Kenyatta stated that Kenya is interested in employing Russia's knowledge as a crucial power in the exploration of renewable energy and natural gas resources (ibid.).

Russia acknowledges Kenya's efforts in promoting regional security, peace and stability through political mediation, participation in peacekeeping operations and fight against global terrorism (KIPPRA, n.d.). Russia has collaborated through the training of Kenyan security workers, thus Kenya could benefit from Russia's experience and technology to tackle security threats from terrorist groups, particularly given the situation in Somalia. Kenya's commitment to this further cooperation ought to be driven by the nation's fundamental objectives which include economic growth and the social and technological transformation of the state, among others (ibid.).

8. Conclusions

To sum up, it is clear that Africa's relevance in the international arena has been changing through the last decades and can be no longer ignored nor disregarded. It is indeed clear that it has been seen how most actors in the international sphere, both strong powers such as the USA, other emerging powers like China or Russia, but many others that could not be regarded in this dissertation, are all interested in building alliances with African countries. Nevertheless, these new partnerships cannot be understood as in past eras. Africa is not a continent to be colonised, to take advantage of. At the present time, as the continent has been demonstrating during the past decades, Africa is now the one setting the rules for these new partnerships, deciding based on its national interests and not to forcibly obey the structures set by other actors.

In line with the postcolonial theory, this dissertation has intended to analyse the shift in Kenya's foreign policy strategy through a new interpretation of International Relations in which whatever the field, it is analysed in its own context and situation and forming their own understanding of IR and not the already established Western perspectives. Kenya's foreign policy and the diversification of its partners is observed as anticolonialist. As it has been studied, the country does not respond to colonial ties anymore, and even if it still has a relationship with its former metropole, the UK, and other traditional donors like the USA and the EU, it does not do it as a subordinate of its demands but as an important actor in those partnerships that also wants to impose its conditions. Moreover, the new relations that Kenya started building after its independence with more emerging donors, such as China and Russia, and others that could not be covered in this work like Japan, India or Turkey, prove that the international order is increasingly multilateral these days and that less-developed countries need to have a voice in international decisions. This reality could create a debate in certain areas such as the structures of some international organisations like it is the example of the UN with its permanent members in the UNSC.

Also conforming to the postcolonial theory, the question about if these new ties that Kenya is forming could be interpreted as neocolonialism arises in the sense that other states build these relationships based on their own interests and to pursue their own goals. This means that, de facto, these relations do not contribute to the emancipation of African states as the empowering of the African governments or Southern elites does not

necessarily mean the African population is going to be benefitted and able to cover its necessities and demands. This neocolonialism fear comes from how much African states have been affected by their colonialism experiences. However, in order for postcolonialism to become a more integrated theory in IR, there is a need for further research, because at the present time there is poor IR literature of non-global North states, as it was previously studied. In the case of Kenya, anticolonialism fed into postcolonial sentiments moving into ethnic nationalism, or Kenyan nationalism and conservatism which ended up affecting both domestic and foreign policies, including foreign policies focused on economic cooperation rather than political integration. Thus, partners seen as favourable by Kenyan/African leaders were those who bolstered these ideas.

According to the anticolonial perspective, it has been seen that Kenya moved towards a “Look East” policy. This was related to both Kenya's 2013 election and the complicated ICC situation with Kenyatta and Ruto which complicated the solid relationship between Kenya and the United States. In addition, the ICC was seen as another form of imperialism which steered Kenya away from Western partnerships. Nevertheless, as it has been analysed, the EU still remains the largest market for Kenyan exports and America is also still the main donor of development and security assistance to Kenya. Hence, Kenya is very dependent on western traditional donor countries.

Another important relevant matter in line with Kenya’s foreign policy and with other African countries is the component of African unity and that sentiment of solidarity that exists in the continent that has been demonstrated through the creation of their own successful institutions, like the AU or the EAC, in which countries work together to achieve their own objectives at their own path. Another example of this is Agenda 2063, *The Africa We Want*, in where African voices have established what they believe are their own goals for the near future. This same element is understood through the non-alignment approach in which Kenya wants to be powerful in International Relations, but in an autonomous way. A good example of this is Kenya Vision 2030 in which the country has established its own objectives and perspectives of growth.

Regarding the Chinese-African relations, it has been seen that China ticks all the right boxes of an African anticolonial sentiment which makes the partnership viewed more positively to African nations because both Africa and China see themselves as emerging markets, they have both been victims of Western colonialism and imperialism and both share the principles of non-interference in state sovereignty and international

solidarity. For the moment, both actors are interested in the development of these relations and China has importantly collaborated to Kenyan development by the participation in infrastructure projects, investing in industries, etc. However, it might be too soon to observe the effects of this relationship and how they will develop in the future. Will all this be positive for Kenya and Africa after all? Concerning Russia, it has been seen that the country's foreign policy during the Cold War was based on domination while nowadays is described more in terms of disruption/destabilization. With a possible weakening relationship of Kenya from the US (e.g. situations like ICC), Russia could be seen as an important ally for the country.

Africa's traditional partners were mostly colonial powers and the then global powers such as the United States and, ever since the colonial period, most of the African nations have been unfairly dragged into reliant and unequal relations with European countries. Nevertheless, with increased anti-colonial sentiments and the increased importance of independence as well as with the actual growth of African countries, such as in the case of Kenya, these states have been able to reflect on these partnerships and re-evaluate the type of relations they have and values those partners bring. The tragic history of colonialism has definitely painted some partners more negatively and others more positively. Even if Kenya has diversified its partners and included some new ones, the relations with the traditional partners have not disappeared, but they have indeed changed to be fairer and more balanced. As to whether these anti-colonial partners (China, Russia, etc) are better for Africa, and more specifically for Kenya is yet to be seen and needs further research.

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