



Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales
Grado en Relaciones Internacionales

Trabajo Fin de Grado

**The Securitisation of the
European Neighbourhood
Policy towards the
Mediterranean**

An Analysis of the Evolution of the ENP towards
the Southern Neighbourhood

Estudiante: **Laura Romero Marín**

Director: Alice Martini

Madrid. Mayo, 2021

Resumen:

En 2004, la Política Europea de Vecindad (PEV) se creó con el objetivo de regir las relaciones de la UE con sus países más cercanos y alcanzar una mayor estabilidad, seguridad y prosperidad en la región. Desde su origen, las condiciones en los territorios que conforman la “vecindad” han cambiado de manera significativa. La PEV se ha visto continuamente desafiada por estos cambios y ha tenido que adaptarse y transformarse para dar respuesta a la nueva situación.

La región del Mediterráneo ha sido particularmente afectada por la inestabilidad en la última década con la Primavera Árabe en 2011, la guerra civil en Siria o la consecuente crisis de refugiados. Estos cambios han conllevado la redefinición de la región y de las prioridades de la UE y de su seguridad en estos territorios. El objetivo de este TFG es analizar cómo ha evolucionado la PEV en el Mediterráneo, y cómo se pueden explicar los cambios en esta política. Con este fin, se realiza un análisis del discurso y del contenido de los principales documentos de la PEV para identificar los nuevos intereses de la UE, las principales áreas de la PEV y los cambios en la representación de la Dimensión Sur.

Palabras Clave: PEV, EU, Mediterráneo, geopolítica, seguridad.

Abstract:

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 as a framework to govern the relations of the European Union with its nearby countries and aimed at accomplishing better stability, security and prosperity in the region. Since its creation, the situation in the territories that form the so-called neighbourhood has changed significantly. The ENP has been challenged by the continuous changes and has adapted and transformed to find a more accurate response to the new conditions.

In particular, the Southern Neighbourhood has undergone several transformations during the last decade -from the Arab Spring in 2011 to the collapse of Libya, the civil war in Syria and the consequential refugee crisis- that prompted the redefinition of actors in the neighbourhood as well as the alteration of the EU main priorities and security concerns in the region. The aim of this project is to analyse how the ENP has evolved in the region and what have been the main trends. For that, a discourse and content analysis of the main ENP documents is carried out in order to identify the new interests and issues of the ENP, and the changes in the portrayal of the neighbourhood.

Key Words: ENP, EU, Mediterranean, geopolitics, security.

INDEX:

1) INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1) Purpose and motivations.....	2
2) HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND.....	4
2.1) Origins of the ENP	4
2.2) Institutions and decision-making processes.....	5
2.3) Aims of the ENP	6
2.4) Implementation of the ENP	6
2.4) Main Principles: joint ownership, differentiation and conditionality	7
3) STATE OF ARTS	8
3.1) Rational theories.....	8
3.1.1) Neorealism	8
3.1.2) Liberalism and neoliberalism.....	9
3.2) Constructivist Theories.....	10
3.2.1) Normative Power Europe	10
3.2.2) Europeanisation Approach.....	11
3.2.3) Beyond External Governance	11
3.2.4) Critical Approaches.....	12
3.3) Rationalism vs. Constructivism: mutually exclusive?	13
4) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	14
4.1) Analysing the ENP agenda.	14
5) RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY.....	17
6) ANALYSIS.....	19
6.1) Prior to the Arab Spring.....	19
6.1.1) 2003 Wider Europe and 2004 Strategy	19
6.1.2) 2007 Communication. A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy.....	21
6.1.3) Conclusions of the first stage: the ENP prior to the Arab Springs	22
6.2) 2011: A new Response to a Changing Neighbourhood	23
6.3) From 2015 to today.....	27
6.3.1) 2015: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy	27
6.3.2) 2021: Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood.....	33

7) DISCUSSION.....	36
8) CONCLUSION.....	39
9) BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	42

List of Abbreviations:

AAs	Association Agreements
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EMP	European Mediterranean Partnership
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
EP	Enlargement Policy
EU	European Union
HR	High Representative
MS	Member States
NPE	Normative Power Europe
UfM	Union for the Mediterranean

1) INTRODUCTION

The creation of the European Union in 1957 brought peace to the old continent. This project evolved from its purely economic origins to encompass a large number of fields, norms and institutions, including external relations and foreign affairs. In 2004, the EU gained ten new Member States (MS) because of the enlargement process. This readjustment of EU's borders entailed new challenges and opportunities for the European Union. As a result, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was launched in 2004 as a key element of EU foreign policy with the aim of managing relations between the EU and the nearby countries of East Europe and the Southern Mediterranean (European Commission, 2004). This policy stems both from the need to stabilise the neighbourhood in order to ensure prosperity in the Union and from the wish to promote key values professed by the EU as good governance or democracy. Furthermore, unlike the well-known Enlargement Policies (EP), the ENP provided a new framework for developing bilateral relations with countries which, in the medium-term, does not include the promise of membership nor the commitment to a role in the Union's institutions (European Commission, 2004). Over the years, the ENP gained importance in the context of the management of the external relations and greater differentiation by region was adopted with the creation of supporting regional cooperation strategies as the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in 2007 and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in 2008.

Nowadays, the European Neighbour policy in the Mediterranean governs the relations of the EU with the following territories: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine¹, Syria² and Tunisia (EEAS, 2016). However, due to the increasing geostrategic importance of North Africa for Europe, the countries belonging to this region have gained more relevance inside the ENP strategy. Since the creation of the ENP, the situation of the neighbouring countries has changed substantially. The Arab Springs in 2011, the death of Gaddafi in Libya and the subsequent civil war, the outbreak of the war in Syria as well as the rise of terrorism not only in these countries but in their region have transformed the Mediterranean Neighbourhood. These new conditions do not only affect the Mediterranean countries, but it also impacts the relationship of these states with the

¹ It is not a recognised State for the EU and its inclusion in the ENP does not entail its recognition

² No Association Agreement (AA) has been signed replacing the expired agreement due to the growing instability

EU and have consequences for the stability of the EU because of the rise of immigration or the increase of non-democratic unstable regimes on the doorstep of the Union. Hence, the European Union's approach towards these territories did not remain the same, as in order to improve effectiveness it needs to evolve and adapt to the new challenging conditions of the area.

This dissertation will discuss how the changes in the security of the neighbourhood have affected the ENP, how this is reflected in the evolution of the policy through the study of its most relevant documents and how the portrayal of the Mediterranean has changed due to these events. Moreover, by assessing these aspects, it is important to note the changes in EU's interests in the region to identify whereas these concerns are now more security-related matters or if EU's guiding interests in the region have remained untouched. This document will argue that the increase of the instability led to a security-based narrative. This resulted in a change of the policy, that can be clearly seen through the study of its evolution since its origin to nowadays. In this sense, this work seeks to prove that this transformation is visible not only in specific measures or leading guidelines of the policy but also in the changing perception of the Mediterranean, which may have been a determining aspect for this transformation.

1.1) Purpose and motivations

The purpose of this Final Dissertation is to address the changes in the way the European Union frames the Mediterranean Neighbourhood after the aforementioned transformations of the region. In this regard, the conception of the neighbourhood defines the approach and principles that guide the ENP and therefore it would show how the EU has adapted to the changing environment of the South, its new direction and the changes in priorities. It should be noted that the aim is not to evaluate if this adaptation and changes have been efficient or if the policy has increased its efficacy over the years. The key objective of this paper is to analyse if new issues and opportunities have arisen and how these have been incorporated and framed as part of the current bilateral relations of the EU with its southern neighbours.

This dissertation analyses a contemporary debate in the field of the foreign policy dimension of the EU. Given that the analysis carried out in this paper covers the evolution of the ENP including the last years of the policy, this paper is timely in terms of its topicality. Moreover, the topic of the ENP and especially of the factors behind the EU's

foreign policy decisions are at the moment at the centre of the media debate and attract a great deal of attention and controversy. The changes in the Southern Neighbourhood, the rise of migration and the political instability of the region have affected the politics at the European national level as well as at the EU level. For that reason, it is of great relevance to reflect on the changes of the EU's policy that have resulted from the new scenario in the Mediterranean and the rationale behind these policy shifts. Furthermore, this document is academically relevant as it adds on the current literature that is traditionally based exclusively either on values or on interests, building on both, bridging these academics debates.

The author's motivation for writing about the external relations of the European Union and especially towards the Mediterranean stems from different causes. First, the interest that the author has developed in this complex international organisation during her years at the university and, in particular, thanks to the fieldtrip to Brussels where she witnessed first-hand the functioning of the EU and had the opportunity to exchange viewpoints with people working for the EU in different fields. Since then, her passion for the EU has led her to deepen her knowledge of the organisation. Secondly, this acquired enthusiasm for institutions is complementary to the author's long-time interest in international security. She has specialised in foreign affairs and international security during her undergraduate studies, with special dedication to those areas that affect Europe's security both directly and indirectly. Furthermore, during her internship at the Spanish Institute of Strategic Studies she was able to broaden her knowledge of the political implications of the Mediterranean for Spain and Europe, focusing her research on how the rising instability of the Sahel affects the North African countries that conform the border of the European Union. For these reasons, the author has chosen the ENP as the object of the analysis because it combines her interest in European integration -the ENP is a project carried out by the Commission- and her passion for international security, the Mediterranean and its changes that affect both the stability of the region and Europe.

In order to shed some light on the aforementioned issues the paper will be structured as followed. First, a brief historical and political background of the policy that will help gain insight on the topic and the state of art and literature review that will revise the main debates around the policy. This will be followed by the theoretical framework that will explain the lenses selected to evaluate the changes of the ENP and will grant the tools

that will guide the analysis. Then, after defining the research question and methodology, the author will move to analyse the main changes in the ENP and in its construction of the Mediterranean through content and discourse analysis of the most relevant documents. Finally, the results will be assessed and discussed and a last conclusion on the document will be given.

2) HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter aims to explain the policy in more detail, to situate this policy politically and historically in order to identify the main characteristics of the object of analysis of this paper. This background is relevant as it helps understand the importance of the ENP and its presence in the Mediterranean as well as to gain further knowledge on how it works, which is essential to follow the subsequent analysis.

2.1) Origins of the ENP

Although the ENP was established in 2004, it builds upon previous agreements with the neighbourhoods. The origins of the ENP towards the Mediterranean can be traced back to the Barcelona Process in 1995, a joint declaration of the EU and twelve countries in which they committed to more cooperation in terms of political cooperation, economic and financial partnership and social affairs, establishing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (Barcelona Declaration, 1995). However, even though it is based on this partnership, not all the aspects of the earlier policies have been maintained. For example, the EMP focused on regionalism whereas the ENP opts for bilateral differentiation and the ENP is dominated by positive conditionality instead of negative conditionality (Bicchi, 2010; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Smith K. , 2005). In other words, the EU sought to move from “passive engagement” in the EMP to “active engagement” with the ENP. By negative conditionality the Mediterranean partner did not receive any additional funding if reforms and progress were implemented but the agreement could be suspended if there was a violation of rights by the partner (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). In contrast, with the principle of positive conditionality, which will be further explained in a following section, those neighbours that engage in reforms will enjoy from greater benefits as incentive for their commitment (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005).

Furthermore, the ENP was created as an alternative to the EP and the enlargement of 2004 was a determinant force behind the launch of the ENP (Commission 2004). EP was the previous mechanism for the EU to spread its norms values and regulation in exchange of offering membership. Several authors have acknowledged the success of the EU acting as a normative actor through the EP and recognised the ENP as the successor of the policy (Haukkala, 2011; Schimmelfenning, 2012; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Kelley, 2006). Moreover, some EP principles appear in the documents of the ENP: (1) the promotion of liberal values and norms, (2) political conditionality, one of the main mechanisms of Europeanisation, and (3) similar planning, assistance procedures and reports to the ones applied to accession countries (Schimmelfenning, 2012). These similarities between the EP and the ENP demonstrate the normative character of the policy, at least in its origin.

2.2) Institutions and decision-making processes

The ENP, like any instrument of the EU foreign policy, is governed by the intergovernmental method, in which Member States retain their power of decision. The decisions are taken by the “European Council and the Council acting unanimously” (Treaty of the European Union, 1992). This, in practice, gives member states veto power over foreign policy decisions. The Council is chaired by the High Representative (HR), a figure that serves as a bridge between the Commission and the European Council and who is, since the Lisbon Treaty, the main responsible for the ENP (Balfour, 2015). Nonetheless, other EU actors, like the Commission may convey their wishes concerning the policy through communications to the Council, which may respond with conclusions. Moreover, the Commission is in charge of the day-to-day management of the policy and enjoys some independence from the MS in some matters like the negotiation of AAs. Concerning the role of the European Parliament in the making of the ENP, it plays a minor role in the decision-making process, it serves as a consultative institution (Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014). However, the approval of the European Parliament is required for budgetary issues and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), which gives the European Parliament power to pressure the MS or the Council to adopt certain measures (Balfour, 2015).

2.3) Aims of the ENP

The launch of the Commission's strategy paper on the ENP of May 2004 marks the start of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This document states the purpose of the ENP which is the creation of a "ring of friends, sharing the EU's fundamental values and objectives" (Commission, 2004) like democracy and respect for human rights. The purpose is that by sharing common values, "stability, security and well-being for all concerned" (Commission, 2004) will be enhanced. Moreover, as it is expressed in the document, the creation of the ENP aims "to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours and to offer them the chance to participate in various EU activities, through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation" (Commission, 2004). However, some scholars have questioned this last aim. Zaiotti (2007) argues that the ENP reproduces the existing frontiers and create new barriers between the countries of the ENP and the enlarged EU and describe the EU through his metaphoric "gated community syndrome". Regarding the guiding interests of the EU, there is a dominant debate in ENP literature on whether the EU follows a rationalistic approach based on interest-based policies or a constructivist vision whose aim is to spread EU values and norms. This dual aim and debate in the literature will be latter detailly explained in the following chapters.

2.4) Implementation of the ENP

The point of departure of the bilateral relations between the EU and its partners in the framework of the ENP are the Association Agreements and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. These are the legal documents on which the relations are based (Smith 2005). Right after the launch of the policy, the Commission created annual progress reports in order to assess the levels of development of the partners. These reports serve as guidelines for the creation of Action Plans (APs), which are bilaterally negotiated agendas for political and economic reforms (EEAS, 2015). The APs outline the principles to be followed specified into objectives and also highlight some key priorities in fields such as political dialogue and reforms, economic and social development, trade-related issues, justice and home affairs (Zaiotti, 2007). The diversity of fields covered by the ENP shows the complexity of the cross-pillar nature of this policy. The APs have raised some criticism as expressed by different scholars. Smith (2005) questions the aforementioned diversity and argues that most of the priorities are political and regard democracy promotion and human rights. Some other scholars emphasise the vaguely and

the lack of clarity of the APs, as there is no prioritization of certain objectives, there are no exact benchmark expressed and the rewards are not explicitly expressed (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Smith K. , 2005)

Since its creation, the policy has been revised twice in order to improve its effectiveness and build stronger relations with its partners. In 2011, as a result of the Arab Spring, the ENP issued its first review. It introduced the “more for more” principle, by which additional reform efforts are rewarded with larger financial and other support (EEAS, 2016). In 2015, another revision of the ENP was carried out, in which the radical changes and new challenges of the neighbourhoods were acknowledged (EEAS,2016).

2.4) Main Principles: joint ownership, differentiation and conditionality

Three main aspects govern the ENP: joint ownership, differentiated bilateralism and conditionality. According to the principle of joint ownership, the priorities and objective stated in the APs should always be based on mutual consent and common interest between the third party and the EU. Therefore, the EU cannot impose its own priorities and conditions (European Commission, 2004). Nevertheless, as it would be later explained in the state of arts, many authors argue that the “common values” are, in fact, EU values and the ENP is just a tool for the transference of norms (Bicchi, 2006; Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005; Kelley, 2006; Manners, 2002; Smith K. , 2005; Zaiotti, 2007).

The following principle is differentiated bilateralism, by which the objectives and implementation process must be adapted based on the economic and political conditions of each partner, its current relation with the EU and each partner’s capacities, needs and interests (European Commission, 2004). Thus, this proves that the ENP does not follow the “one-size-fits-all” model, a dominant criticism of the EMP (Bicchi, 2006).

Finally, conditionality is one of the main mechanisms of the ENP. This principle was rescued from the EP, in which membership was the main incentive. In the context of the ENP, conditionality means “the possibility for the ENP partner states to benefit from *privileged relations* [...] depending on the progress on sharing the European values and on the effective implementation of the economic and institutional reforms in these states” (Mocanu, 2010). This definition shows that the EU will deepen its relationship with those countries who embrace EU values the most, which is described as “positive conditionality” (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). Moreover, this proves the normative

nature of the policy, whose origin is based on “common values” and the international spread of these values.

3) STATE OF ARTS

After having politically and historically situated the policy, the following section will look into the literature on the ENP and the international role of the EU. As it any research, it is essential to acknowledge and understand the existing literature in order to draw on it for the subsequent analysis. The dominant academic debate on this topic focuses on the aforementioned “principles” of the ENP.

Many scholars have sought to explain the role of the European Union beyond its borders and explain its interaction with its neighbourhoods. In this regard, there is a debate that has dominated the theorisation of EU foreign policy and, particularly, the European Neighbourhood Policy: does the EU acts as a normative power or it acts strategically according to its interests? Rationalist theories as liberalism and rationalism suggest that state interests are dominant in EU foreign policy, whereas constructivism defends that the construction of EU identity and its social interaction with the neighbourhood guide this policy.

3.1) Rational theories

Rational theories are difficult to define as they do not always consider themselves as rational, but they tend to identify themselves as neorealist or neoliberal theories. Kratochvíl and Tumels (2010) define these theories as to the one that fulfils one of the following requisites: (1) they stress the rationality of actors (driven by interests) (2) have a preference for material over ideational factors and/or (3) their point of departure is the assumption that actors are rational. Therefore, in this cluster, we may identify neoliberal and neorealist theories that try to explain the international role of the European Union and its *modus operandi*.

3.1.1) Neorealism

Neorealist approaches to International Relations focus mainly on power as an essential variable in explaining international politics (Hyde-Price, 2007). Therefore, this applied to the study of the European Neighbourhood policy means that neorealism seeks to explain how power relations shape interaction among the EU and the nearby countries

and their pursuit of strategies to achieve their goals (Hyde-Price, 2017). These theories have gained relevance over the last few years in the context of the ENP due to the growing threats to EU security that arise from the new challenges in the neighbourhoods like state failures, the rise of regional conflicts and terrorism across the African Continent.

The foreign policy of the European Union, as regarded by the neorealist school of thought, is just another tool for the Member States to pursue their common interests and concerns. This is allowed due to the functioning of policies such as the ENP. On the one hand, the Commission does enjoy of some independence from Member States in some matters as in the negotiation of Association Agreements. On the other hand, the EU Council, where the interests of the states are at the core, still set the priorities of the policy. After all, it should be reminded that the Union for the Mediterranean was born after a French initiative and the Eastern Partnership was a Polish and Swedish project (Hyde-Price, 2017). Nevertheless, the greatest successes of neorealist theories are attributed to their explanation of the ENP problems and limitations. In this concern, the neorealist explanation is of great relevance to understand the new dynamics of the world politics, especially, in the EaP, where the ENP has consequently led to a greater rivalry with Russia. The case of Ukraine illustrates the importance of realpolitik today, as the annexation of Crimea was in part triggered by the sign of the AAs by Ukraine with the EU (Mearsheimer, 2014).

3.1.2) Liberalism and neoliberalism

Second, liberal and neoliberal theories focus on cooperation and relation-building, being economic interdependence one of the main features of these relationships, portrayed as mutually beneficial interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2012). Neoliberal theories usually seek to explain integration in the European Union rather than its international role. Beach (2015) identifies two main branches of neoliberalism regarding the study of the EU: Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Neofunctionalism. The former contests the autonomy of the European Union's foreign policy and considers it a tool for the Member States to pursue their own agenda (Wagner, 2003). The latter expresses cooperation in foreign policy as a spill-over process in which interaction in the framework of the EU will lead to greater cooperation (Beach, 2015).

Among the greatest successes of the foreign policy of the European Union, neoliberalist scholars underline the importance of the Enlargement Policies, partly thanks

to the conditionality principle and the material incentives (Beach, 2015; Smith M. , 2011). These same principles were then adopted in the ENP. Regarding this policy and its implication in the Mediterranean, the argument that the European Union pursues a neoliberal agenda in the region is supported by several authors (Hollis, 2012; İşleyen, 2015; Wood, 2009). Their studies have demonstrated the primacy of economy in EU relations with these countries in fields such as trade relations and energy exports.

3.2) Constructivist Theories

Constructivism can be defined by its two main assumptions: “(1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt, 1999). Therefore, the constructivist theories applied to the ENP define the relation of the ENP countries and the EU as socially constructed. According to these approaches, the EU is usually portrayed as an active actor of its foreign policy whereas the conception of neighbourhoods, which are constructions, are the object shaped by EU’s policies. In this sense, the depiction of the neighbourhoods is a way to justify the policies carried out by the EU. Some of its criticism to the ENP has already been mentioned in the previous section. In the constructivist EU foreign policy literature there are three main approaches: Europeanisation, normative power Europe and those that go beyond external governance and EU identity. Moreover, there are critical approaches that are also applied to this field.

3.2.1) Normative Power Europe

The concept of NPE was coined by Manners who argues that the European Union is not only constructed on a normative basis but, that this normative construction predisposes the EU to act in a normative way in the international scene (Manners, 2002). Thus, the most important element for the role of the EU “is not what it *does* or what it *says*, but what it *is*” - i.e., how the EU is constructed (Manners, 2002). Kratochvíl and Tumels classify this definition as thick constructivism, as it assumes both the EU and the neighbouring countries have rule-following logic and their behaviour is directly linked to their identities (Kratochvíl & Tulmets, 2017). Since Manners’ conceptualisation of the EU as a normative power, many scholars have supported and developed this theory. Bicchi (2006) describes EU foreign policy as a “civilising power” and criticises its lack of inclusiveness and its promotion of “institutional isomorphism”. Haukkala (2011)

builds on how the EU *acts* instead of how it *is* and uses a regional focus instead of a global vision of the foreign policy. Moreover, as other constructivist authors, she questions the legitimacy of the ENP due to the asymmetric relation of the EU and the third parties and consider the EU in its neighbourhoods as a dominant power (Haukkala, 2011).

3.2.2) *Europeanisation Approach*

The Europeanisation approach was born as a framework to study European integration and governance and was later applied to explaining the EP and the harmonisation by the candidate states of EU values and the *acquis communautaire*. Schimmelfenning (2012) analyses Europeanisation beyond EU borders and particularly in the ENP and highlights the importance of the conditionality principle and socialisation as mechanisms for Europeanisation. The spread of EU standards and polity models is an instrument for the EU to shape the relations with the neighbourhood (Schneider, 2010). In this regard, the EMP was not effective as there was no expected goal nor any regional integration mechanism. The positive conditionality principle and the bottom-up socialisation of the ENP, although with limits, is an effective way to promote Europeanisation (Schneider, 2010). However, Schneider (2010) also argues that the prospect of membership was the most effective tool of Europeanisation.

3.2.3) *Beyond External Governance*

Lucarelli and Manners (2010) analyse the values and principles behind the EU foreign policy and conclude there are two differentiating characteristics of it: its stabilising effect and how the relations are inspired by “ethics and responsibility” towards other actors. According to their vision, the EU challenged traditional rationalist visions of foreign policy and achieve to spread civilian and democratic standards. Moreover, EU foreign policy is regarded as “structural” as it seeks to influence in an “enduring and sustainable way” the framework in which states interact with each other, with the people and other actors (Lucarelli & Manners, 2010).

Other authors go beyond the aforementioned normative and Europeanisation theories and argue that although the EU encourages its partners to harmonise their policies with the EU’s, the process is, in fact, a policy *convergence* process rather than a transference, which is one of the main constructivist criticisms (Barbé, Costa, Herranz, & Natorski, 2009). The ENP is vastly dominated by international standards that are

encouraged by the EU to be adopted by the neighbourhoods and tailor-made norms by the EU and the partner (Barbé & et al., 2009). Therefore, she opposes to the previous theories that do not take into consideration EU exposure to international influence and standards and to those that dismiss the bargaining power of third parties when designing the rules or when determining which rules, they choose to adopt (Barbé & et al., 2009). The result of these convergence processes is reflected in the Actions Plans, in which international standards are encouraged and the role of third parties is present (Barbé & et al., 2009).

3.2.4) Critical Approaches

Traditional critical approaches also apply to the ENP, in addition to many of the constructivist theories that also contested some of the aspects of the EU foreign policy like its eurocentrism, lack of inclusivity or legitimacy issues. The critical theories draw on the inconsistencies of the policy, especially regarding identity construction and border blurriness. These theories criticise the blurring boundaries of the EU and its external governance, the creation of otherness by the ENP, the promotion of a “European-Self” and controversial topics like the securitisation of migration (Aarstad, 2017; Zaiotti, 2007). In this regard, feminists and post-colonial scholars highlight the role of the EU in the neighbourhoods, its gender-biased portrayal of women in those countries -as victims- and how the EU does not live up to its expected role in the region (Maisenbacher & Kunz, 2015). Thus, these approaches denounce EU neo-orientalist sense of superiority to the neighbouring countries.

In conclusion, rationalist theories portray the EU as a rational actor that follows interest-based policies whereas constructivist debates revolve around the social construction of the neighbourhoods, EU values and self-ness and the capacity of the EU to spread its values and norms in the international system. Constructivism tends to focus on the logic of appropriateness of the EU ENP (legitimacy, constructions, values...) and minimise the logic of consequences (interests, outcomes) that were vital for the rationalist theorists (Tumels, 2017). Rationalist approaches often focus on the power of MS when designing the foreign policy and put common interests, particularly, at the basis of cooperation whereas constructivists often centre their approaches around identity, legitimacy and norm transference. These approaches are criticized by rationalist theorists that conceive constructivist visions as biased and recall that there cannot be an EU's

separated actorness to MS and question the “normative ethical foundation” of the European Union (Whitman, Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations, 2011). Nevertheless, are these theories mutually exclusive or can they be reconciled somehow?

3.3) Rationalism vs. Constructivism: mutually exclusive?

Rationalist and constructivist approaches have traditionally been conceived as contradictory and opposite theories. However, due to the increasing complexity of the neighbourhoods, some scholars have recognized that the fact that the EU is based on representations and values is not contradictory to the EU selection of the norms to be spread or promoted depending on how they best benefit its own interests on that moment. In fact, some scholars had underlined EU inconsistencies in foreign policies due to the different rules that are based on both behaviours and interests (Diez, 2013). In particular, security interests have gained attention in the EU literature after the sudden transformation of the Mediterranean Neighbourhood (Bicchi, 2010; Del Sarto, 2016; Whitman & Wolff, 2010). Therefore, there has been a gradual replacement of thick constructivism that defends purely normatively oriented rhetoric with the rationalist arguments based on self-interest and utility maximisation. This innovative approach analyses the balance of both approaches depending on the context.

Del Sarto and Schumacher (2005) analyse the changes from the EMP to the ENP and how EU’s self-perception and perspective have shaped the policies. They conclude that ENP is “unmistakably” framed in terms of interests, although it also recognises the EU’s ambitions to act as a “normative power” (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). The EU new self-confidence and assertiveness perception of itself as well as the construction of neighbourhoods as regions that affect EU security translate into greater willingness to use its power for pursuing its own foreign policy interests (Del Sarto & Schumacher, 2005). Barbé (2009) also underlines the importance of the EU interests in the selection of rules to be exported to the neighbourhood. She identifies three main aspects that influence EU’s foreign policy decisions: (1) legitimacy, (2) structure of incentives, which analyses the cost-benefits of the policy convergence and (3) intra-EU coherence. Furthermore, the Mediterranean Neighbourhood and the Arab Spring were used by Del Sarto (2016) to illustrate how there is a lack of contradiction between the EU being a normative power and the interest-based policies of the ENP. He coined the term “Normative Empire” to describe EU twofold purpose as he considers that the reproduction of EU’s identity

beyond its borders could be regarded as a tool that serves the empire's interests (Del Sarto, 2016).

Nonetheless, this is an emerging literature, which is why there is still little academic references that support this position. In this regard, the present dissertation will build on this new perspective and, by applying this innovative framework, it will also contribute to this strand of literature.

4) THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The above-mentioned theories are instruments, lenses, to simplify the abstract reality of the European Neighbourhood Policy. No theory has been able to fully explain all the aspects of this complex and multi-dimensional policy. The EU council is based on MS priorities and interests whereas the Commission focuses on the spread of values and norms, and this dual functioning is reflected in the ENP. For that reason, my analysis will follow the argument of some innovative and recent scholars that defend that rationalism and constructivism are not mutually exclusive and, therefore, the ENP is an instrument for the transference of EU norms and values depending on how the Mediterranean Neighbourhood is framed but it also has a utilitarian vision that pursues to fulfil EU interests.

4.1) Analysing the ENP agenda.

In order to know what to look for in the analysis, it is important to frame what are the main interests of the EU through the two main lenses that have been described. The identification of the interests of the EU through the ENP is essential for explaining the results of the further analysis of the changes of the ENP in the Mediterranean. According to Bicchi (2010), regionalism has become less important in EU's foreign policy and uses bilateralism to pursue its goals. Tumels (2017) argues that interest-based policies prevail in times of instability whereas constructivist interests dominate in times of political and economic stability. These assumptions must be taken into account when assessing the final discussion because it suggests that the rise of insecurity in the Mediterranean violence would have affected the evolution of the ENP and it could be expected a rise in security-concerned interests and bilateralism and a change in how the Mediterranean is framed as a result.

The increasing concern for security was also highlighted by other scholars, both constructivists and rationalists (Bicchi, 2010; Hyde-Price, 2017; Del Sarto, 2015; Tumels, 2017; Whitman & Wolff, 2010). Del Sarto (2016) identify three main imperial interest arisen from the Arab Spring: security, stability and economic advantage. Smith (2011) argues that the European Union follows a “liberal grand strategy” based on three main interests: (1) physical security, (2) economic prosperity and (3) value protection. And, according to Hyde-Price (2017), the ENP has three main roles: (1) maximise security of MS, (2) milieu-shaping, and (3) second-order normative project concerns that follow national interests. Thus, the incorporation of realist interests in the constructivist literature suggests that there could be an increase of interest-based policies in the foreign policy of the European Union. These renovated concern for security could mean that there has been a *securitisation* of the EU’s foreign policy in light of the events in the Mediterranean, i.e., the expansion of the security agenda to threats or fields that may not be intrinsically connected to security (Verdes-Montenegro Escáñez, 2015). Moreover, the securitisation of foreign policy could also have led to the extra-territorialisation of some issues that are now related to security, e.g., the externalisation of EU border as a consequence of the rise of migration and its new perception as a threat to the EU and the EU’s values. Hence, before moving to the analysis, it is essential to briefly define these two processes that are related to a higher incorporation of security interests in the traditional rationale of the policy.

On the one hand, *securitisation* theory was first developed by the Copenhagen School. It is defined as the plea of security to legitimise the use of measures, legislation or policies that would have been considered illegitimate otherwise (Neal, 2009). The consequence of securitisation is the expansion of the security agenda to many different types of threats that may not seem intrinsically related to security (Verdes-Montenegro Escáñez, 2015). In this sense, security is a construction, a subjective notion, which has been identified as a “speech act” by some authors and it may not be studied as an objective condition but as an outcome of a social process (Waeber, 1995). Emmers (2011) identifies two parts of the securitisation process, the security speech act (framing the issue in security terms) and the political act (political decisions).

According to the Copenhagen School, securitised matters result from previous politicised issues, that is, a topic that is already part of public policy (Does, 2013). Following that logic, de-securitisation implies the reverse process, which moves issues

from the emergency level into the normal political scene (Does, 2013). These securitised issues may be dramatized or presented as “urgent” or of “supreme priority” in order to deal with them before other issues (Does, 2013). This concept of security surpasses the classical understanding of security as a military threat and a state-centred conception and underlines the broadening of the security agenda (Verdes-Montenegro Escáñez, 2015)

On the other hand, introduced by Rijpma and Cremona, *extra-territorialisation* is defined as the attempt to push back external borders or to police them at distance in order to control migration flows (Bruns & Happ, 2016). This phenomenon is usually associated to border management and migration control. It can be also described as the externalisation of border controls beyond the physical border (Pérez Caramés, 2012) or push back measures to ensure that irregular migrants do not enter destination countries (Nicholson, 2011). Mark Duffield (2008) coined the notion of *containment* to describe the migration-security nexus and conceptualise the extra-territorial measures. He defines it as those actions that “seek to restrict or manage the circulation of incomplete and hence potentially threatening life or return it from whence it came”. In this sense, containment is a consequence of the securitisation of migration. Measures such as increasingly stricter visa and immigration control, offshoring visa control, restrictions and returns are ways in which extra-territorialisation is applied (Duffield, 2008; Nicholson, 2011). Moreover, another important factor of extra-territorialisation is the transformation of the countries of origins into “buffer zones” that halt the irregular migration before it reaches its destination (Pérez Caramés, 2012). Other ways in which extra-territorialisation or the securitisation of migration is evinced are the increase of maritime control, anti-smuggling operations or the strengthening of diplomatic relations (Nicholson, 2011).

Nevertheless, although extra-territorialisation is to a large extent linked to migration, the term encompasses other security issues. Wichmann (2007) enlarged the concept of extra-territorialisation and recalled that it should not be restricted to one policy area but to the external dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, which includes terrorism, drugs and crime, irregular migration and border control. In this regard, many authors have defended that the ENP seeks to extra-territorialise the management of security threats to the neighbourhoods by the export of rules and policy instruments to their legislation and enhancing cooperation in related policies (Balzacq, 2008; Bruns & Happ, 2016; Wichmann, 2007).

In conclusion, these two processes are intrinsically connected e.g., the securitisation of migration legitimise the externalisation of border and migration control, a measure of extra-territorialisation. For that reason, in the analysis it is of great relevance to identify which topics are being dramatized and how these issues are managed. This will be done in order to assess if the changes in the policies can be explained through the increase of security interests in the EU's ENP; the securitisation of certain topics now presented as "urgent"; and the extra-territorialisation of these concerns now conceived as security threats through the suggestion of stricter immigration control measures; or the enhancement of cooperation in those topics.

All these ideas and scholars' logics presented in this chapter need to be taken into account when analysing the evolution of the Mediterranean Neighbourhood. Some of the questions have arisen from this theoretical framework and that serve as guidance for the analysis are the following. Has the EU increased bilateralism as a result of the increasing instability or has regionalist values arose? Is the neighbourhood depicted in the same way? Is the neighbourhood framed in terms of security? Have new issues and interest-related topics arisen from the instability of the neighbourhood? Do the changes relate to the aforementioned interests of the EU or to the spread of norms? Are values at the core of the policy or has there been changes in the normative role of the EU? Can the changes be explained by the securitisation of foreign policy and extra-territorialisation of EU borders? These are some questions that the analysis will attempt to answer through the study of the evolution of the policy.

5) RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

As explained from the previous theoretical framework and the purposes stated above, the research question of this dissertation is the following:

Exploring the main changes in the ENP towards the Mediterranean neighbourhood from its creation to today, is the Southern neighbourhood portrayed differently? Is the EU following the same principles? Do new issues arise?

As aforementioned, it is expected that some changes have taken place in the policy during the last decade. For that reason, it is important to define the following sub-questions that support the general questions and help understand these changes and complete the analysis.

Are the new issues connected to security? Could these changes be understood through the securitisation of the policy and the extra-territorialisation of new EU's concerned issues?

In order to answer these questions, qualitative research based on content analysis and complemented by discourse analysis of the main Communications from the Commission documents on the ENP, and reviews of the European Neighbourhood Policy will be carried out. An essential part of the content analysis of these papers will consist of a word frequency count analysis to assess if new issues have arisen or any changes in the frequency a particular matter is addressed as this could indicate the relevance of each topic in each paper.

The papers that have been selected for the analysis are the following:

- a) 2003 *Wider Europe* Communication. This Communication marks the beginning of the policy.
- b) 2004 *Strategy Paper*. Following the introduction of the ENP, a strategy paper was launched in order to further explain the aims and the main guidelines of the new policy.
- c) 2007 *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*. This document was launched before the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean and explains the principle of “more for more” that has guided the first stage of the ENP.
- d) 2011 *A new Response to a changing Neighbourhood*. Communication launched after the Arab Spring in response to the changes in the Southern Neighbourhood.
- e) 2015 *Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy*. This review was launched after the sudden changes in both neighbourhoods and proposes a new framework and approach for the ENP.
- f) 2021 *Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood*. In light of the COVID pandemic, this communication was launched to address the new challenges faced by the Mediterranean neighbourhoods.

Therefore, the sample does not only collect the main documents of the ENP but also those that are of particular relevance to the Mediterranean neighbourhood such as the 2011 review or the 2021 communication on the neighbourhood. The analysis will be structured in three different stages. The first will analyse the documents launched since its creation until the Arab Spring. The second will address the communication launched

in the aftermath of these revolts. And lastly, the third stage will focus on those documents from 2015 forwards.

6) ANALYSIS

6.1) Prior to the Arab Spring

6.1.1) 2003 Wider Europe and 2004 Strategy

The first document of the ENP sets the main objectives of the policy described as “promote stability and prosperity beyond the new borders of the Union” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 4). An interesting aspect to note is how the sections are distributed in this first communication paper, as this shows the priorities of the EU and the main areas of interest. “Wider Europe” is divided into the following parts. First, a general introduction of the need for the launch of this new policy. Secondly, the main opportunities and threats in the areas of proximity, prosperity and poverty. Third, the presentation of incentives. And lastly, the final sections refer to the starting point and next steps for implementing the cooperation. A remarkable part of the document is that the EU decides to highlight proximity, prosperity and poverty in the opening pages of the document. In this context, it is interesting that in terms of proximity, the issue of migration is pushed into the background and other issues such as trade are prioritized. In this sense, migration is not a securitised issue nor a priority of this policy, at least at the origin of the policy. Security threats are also mentioned in this dimension, such as nuclear waste, disease, organized crime, and terrorism. In terms of prosperity and poverty, the Mediterranean region is repeatedly mentioned for its economic weakness and high relative poverty rates, thus revealing that security is not at the core of the policy and that economic interests may have prevailed in the beginning. Moreover, compared to other regions, it notes that political reforms are limited in these territories, which can be regarded by the EU as an opportunity to promote its own reforms in accordance to EU’s values and standards.

One of the main results of the analysis regarding the first Communications is the use of the term “shared” or “common” values, which as the document note is used in reference to “*democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law, as set out within the EU in the Charter of Fundamental Rights*” (Commission of the European

Communities, 2003, p. 4). The repetition of the term “shared values” may indicate that during the first stage of the policy, the EU could have acted mainly as a normative power as previously defined. Furthermore, the documents repeatedly mention the need for a “regulatory approximation” and the “alignment with the *acquis*”. The use of these two expressions has the same purpose as the term “shared values”, which is to present the EU *acquis* as of the standard and to expand EU regulation beyond its own borders. In fact, in “Wider Europe” the term “pan-European” is used to describe this convergence in the field of economic integration. This reinforces the idea that at the beginning, the ENP was a tool for the EU to become a normative power and to spread its own legislations.

Although there is little differentiation between neighbourhoods in this first stage of the ENP, it is possible to affirm that the Mediterranean Region is primarily linked to economic issues. As a matter of fact, the first documents focus more on the economic outcome of the implementation of the policy rather than on other concerns such as security, democracy or the promotion of human rights. As aforementioned, the relative poverty and the economic fragility of the area are highlighted in the first document. The creation of a larger Mediterranean market and regional integration in the Mediterranean is repeatedly mentioned when specifically referring to this region. Therefore, in this first document there is a predominance of regionalism rather than a more differentiated or bilateral approach. Moreover, the lack of reforms in the region is attributed to the “conflict and political division in the Mediterranean” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 9).

Regarding security issues, conflict in the region is the most mentioned security concern, in particular, the Western Saharan and Palestinian conflicts. This security concern is followed by others such as terrorism, organized crime and trafficking. Furthermore, in the field of organized crime in the Mediterranean, the language used in the document suggests that the European Union is further interest-driven in this issue with expressions such as “*the EU should capitalise on [...] to introduce reforms [...]*” (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, p. 12). This also shows how the EU considers itself as a norm exporter or as an actor whose duty is to spread its standards beyond its borders.

In conclusion, this study of this first document is of great relevance as it reveals EU’s original interests in the Mediterranean and in the policy and the original ENP approach. In this matter, it is demonstrated that, when the ENP was launched, normative

power of the EU was at the core of the policy and building economic relations with the neighbourhood was the main priority. Although security is part of the ENP, this issue, in this first communication, is not one of the main relevant topics, which shows that it was not considered one of the main concerns of the policy in its creation. Moreover, there is still little differentiation between countries and neighbourhoods, which proves that there is a generalist regionalist approach in the conception of the ENP.

6.1.2) 2007 Communication. A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy

Regarding the structure of this document, it is of great relevance the third point of the Communication that outlines the most substantive issues. In this concern, economic integration, as in the first years, is still the primary concern. However, what is interesting about this section is that mobility is for the first time mentioned as such in a document. In this field, although it focuses on visas and travel facilitation, its security dimension is also recognized. Moreover, the Communication underlines the existence of regional conflicts as the previous documents but what is interesting is that it mentions that it could affect the EU's security due to the disruption of energy supply, terrorism, regional escalation and migratory flows. This is the first time that migratory flows are portrayed as a threat rather than just illegal immigration. In addition to this, the Mediterranean is the main region mentioned in the section that concerns energy cooperation and emphasizes the economic benefits of this collaboration.

Furthermore, another point of departure from the previous ENP papers is the lack of references to "values" in the document. This could indicate that the EU had moved away from its normative mission and may prioritize other objectives as security. In this regard, neither does the EU use the terms "regulatory approximation" or "alignment", which were central aspects of the above-analysed communications. Instead, the term regulatory "convergence" is used twice in the 2007 document. The change from "approximation" to "convergence" may be a sign that the EU could be willing to negotiate with the neighbouring parties in order to reach some middle-ground agreement instead of imposing EU *acquis* and the harmonization of regulations.


Another detail worthy of mention is the fact that in this document there is a direct reference to a Member State concerning its efforts to reinforce ENP collaboration with the Mediterranean. The 2007 Communication acknowledges France proposals, whereas in the previous documents, the EU was always portrayed as a unified institution and none

of the MS was mentioned. This evinces that the EU does not have a single interest, but the MS may also use the ENP to pursue their own agenda.

6.1.3) *Conclusions of the first stage: the ENP prior to the Arab Springs*


First, there is little differentiation between neighbourhoods and almost inexistent among countries in the neighbourhoods. The Mediterranean Neighbourhood is mainly linked to economic concerns such as trade and energy. Moreover, the conflicts of the region are also portrayed as the reason for hindering economic development and reforms in the Mediterranean. There is a slight change in this conception from 2003 to 2007, as in the latest document, conflict is also regarded as a source of threat to EU’s security. Hence, this could portend that the EU has started to securitise certain issues that were before primary linked to economic hindrance, although to a limited extent yet.

As figure 1 illustrate, the dominant concern of the ENP seems to be economic issues, followed by security and human rights. Democracy promotion ranks in fourth place in this first stage of the ENP. However, there is a noticeable trend from 2003 to 2007, as mobility and migration issues gained importance while the economic concerns were not as prominent. This is a trend to beware in the analysis of the following documents.



Regarding security issues, as illustration 2 shows, organised crime, terrorism and conflicts are the main concerns of the ENP in this first stage. However, there have been

similar changes to the previously mentioned as migration, not only irregular immigration, but also as migratory flows gained importance regarding its security dimension in 2007 Communication. The increasing importance and dramatization of migration, specially of those flows that are not necessarily irregular, could hint that this matter is being slowly securitised. It is important to note this new tendency as it would be further consolidated in later communications.



Lastly, there has been a decrease in the role of Europe as a normative power through the implementation of the ENP. Although the references of “shared values” and “regulatory approximation” were a central aspect of the 2003 and the 2004 documents, these terms are not mentioned in the latest Communication. This shows how the EU may have moved from values and the purely constructivist approach perception of its foreign policy to a more interest-based vision. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the role of a Member State was explicitly acknowledged in 2007, as it could support a more rational explanation of the ENP as described in the theoretical framework.

6.2) 2011: A new Response to a Changing Neighbourhood


This Communication was launched in May 2011, after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty that allowed the European Union to strengthen its foreign policy tools and right after the start of the Arab Spring in the Mediterranean Neighbourhood. In this

document, it is noticeable that the EU commitment to the policy has increased, which may be the result of these two events. The higher devotion to the ENP is seen throughout the paper, with stronger statements like the threat to sanctions regimes that do not comply with the Declaration of Human Rights. Moreover, the active approach of the EU is also reflected in the references to short-term expected results and measures, which is a novelty in EU's ENP main documents as the prior Communications focused only on the medium- and long-term. The document also underlines the need for greater efficiency in the policy as well as the importance of coherence, urging the Member States to align their foreign policy with the ENP interests and support the decisions made by the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon is regarded as a unique opportunity to increase effectiveness, but the document also emphasised on the individual role of the MS in supporting the policy. As stated on page 5, "business as usual" is no longer considered an option in order to make the neighbourhood a "safer place" and "protect our interests". The link between safety in the neighbourhood and the EU's interests indicates there is a new security-interest variable in the ENP. These visible changes support the idea that the EU evolved from a more idealistic and value-based vision to include more interest-based guidelines. Although the European Union still regards itself as a guardian of international values, the presence of short-term measures and the acknowledgement of further interests represent a shift from the previous primarily "values-driven" narrative.

Furthermore, one of the main changes that can be highlighted in this Communication is the increase in the differentiation, not only among neighbourhoods but also a further distinction among countries is done. The document emphasises the creation of bilateral relations, following a bilateral approach, which is a point of departure from the first ENP communications that insisted on the creation of regional links and regional integration above bilateralism. This approach transformation is not only evident through the structure and references to the regions but also through the choices of terms such as "adapting" and "tailoring" when referring to reforms. In addition to this change, this document follows the 2007 trend of not mentioning EU values and "shared values" as a core part of the policy. Instead, the 2011 Communication uses expressions as "bilateral efforts" or "shared commitment" which indicates negotiation and integration of the neighbourhoods' perspective. Moreover, when referring to values, the EU remarks that it "does not seek to impose a model" and in a majority of cases, it refers to universal values as articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Regarding the Mediterranean, the document identifies three main directions: (1) democratic transformation and institution-building, (2) partnership with people and (3) sustainable economic development. Although security is not mentioned as a direction per se, it is a central aspect for the three main objectives as stated in the document. The first goal seeks democratisation in the neighbourhood in a broad sense, which means not only through the call of elections but through the empowerment of the civil society, promoting key rights and freedoms and calls for a security sector reform as part of the process. Security cooperation is regarded as a key point to support progress towards “deep democracy” (European Commission, 2011, p.3). The second goal concerns partnership with people and in this aspect, the Communication underlines the need to launch a dialogue on migration, mobility and security. This dialogue is only mentioned in regard to the Mediterranean region, which proves that the EU is more concerned about migration coming from this region which is considered to have more “instability” than the Eastern Neighbourhood. Moreover, this dialogue is regarded as the first step towards the Mobility partnership. One of the requisites of this partnership, as described in the document, is *cooperation on fighting irregular migration* and other specific measures regarding border control. Hence, the provision of visas and the partnership itself is conditioned by security developments. These changes reaffirm the trends regarded in the 2007 document, with a further securitisation of some issues, in this case migration. The association of migration with instability, and in particular those migrations from a specific region as the Mediterranean and not from the EaP, proves that the EU has constructed migration from the Southern Neighbourhood as a threat to its own stability. Moreover, the fact that cooperation in border control is presented as a requisite to increase partnership can be regarded as a measure and a sign of extra-territorialisation as described in the theoretical framework (Wichmann, 2007). Furthermore, in line accordance to this rationale, economic aspects that were a primary issue when framing the Mediterranean neighbourhood are now pushed into the background, relegated at the third direction of the ENP towards the Mediterranean. A remarkable aspect in this field is the references to short-term measures that reaffirm the EU ambition to increase its efficacy in the region and try to prevent another source of instability and radical changes in the territory. This sense of urgency and emergency is linked to the securitisation process (Does, 2013). In this sense, even the economic development has started to be securitised even if other issues are now predominant.


As illustrated in figure 3, the main issues addressed at the 2011 Communication, three main topics dominate the new approach as stated on the first page: building and consolidating democracies, sustainable economic growth and cross-border management. In this aspect, it is noteworthy that cross-border issues are ranked at a general priority, at the same level as economy and democracy building. Moreover, economic concerns that were the main purpose of the previous Communication has been displaced in order of importance, revealing that the EU considers other topics as more pressing. This new tendency is clearly seen in the world frequency count analysis as the term democracy alone almost surpasses the mentions to the economy, which in previous documents was a dominant matter. In addition to this, the increase of references to political reforms in comparison to economic reforms or economic integration is also an aspect to be highlighted. This renovated approach to political changes may be linked to the new concern over democracy and its predominance over sustainable economic growth. Furthermore, the increase in the use of migration and mobility is also remarkable, as the sum of these two very similar concepts would exceed the mentions of economy and democracy. This reaffirms the worry of the EU over the security concerns derived from the migration from these newly unstable territories towards the European region.



Lastly, as represented in figure 4, the word frequency count analysis result regarding the security issues mentioned in the 2011 Communication shows that as in

previous documents, the resolution of protracted conflicts and the mentions of conflicts, in general, is still a primary concern for the EU. However, what is noteworthy in this aspect is that the topic of migration is an increasingly important issue when compared to previous papers. Mentions to migration account for over one-quarter of the mentions of any security issue in the document, followed by other related issues such as trafficking, terrorism and organised crime. Organised crime, which was a priority in the first stage has been replaced by migration and conflicts. This shift can be attributed to the changes in the Mediterranean region due to the Arab Spring and the violent crackdown in Syria and the increase of migratory fluxes to Europe that may have led the EU to reconsider its strategic priorities in the region.

Figure 4: Word Frequency Count- Security issues 2011



6.3) From 2015 to today

6.3.1) 2015: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy

The 2015 Communication shows a clear shift in the ENP narrative. Security-based rhetoric is predominant throughout the document, and indeed the reasons cited as root causes for this revision are all inherently security-based: the refugee crisis, energy security and the rise of terrorism and attacks in Europe. Moreover, the 2015 Review proposes a new approach and a re-prioritisation of the ENP, whose focus is more based on increasing the stability in the neighbourhoods and extra-territorialising security rather

than promoting democracy as the last document insistingly mentioned. The EU uses a humbler tone to address the objective of the policy and acknowledges its limitations and that it “cannot alone solve the many challenges of the region”. For that reason, a major effort by the Member States to back and support the decisions and ambitions of the ENP is requested.

Regarding the new approach adopted by this document, the traditional incentive-based “more for more” approach which granted neighbours further integration into the EU as long as the countries committed to reform is replaced. In this regard, the EU follows a more realist perspective, understanding that partners “do not currently wish to pursue such [EU] a model”. This new perspective is also noticeable in the discourse used in the document and in the choice of new terms to describe Europe’s relationship with its neighbouring countries. New words such as “ownership” and “proactive engagement” are used for this purpose, as well as derivatives of this term such as “co-ownership” or “mutual ownership”. This shows greater commitment from the EU to adapt to the neighbour’s interests and a greater will to negotiate with the partners and not only impose its own agenda based on the EU’s standards. The new ENP reflects in a better way the wishes of the neighbouring country in regard to the nature and priorities of their partnership with the European Union. In addition to these new terms, others such as “mutual interests” or “mutual priorities” are also used to assess the new incentives for cooperation when integration into the EU model is no longer attractive. In this regard, this change is adopted to pursue a more “effective” cooperation, a term that is mentioned sixteen times in the document. The need for effectiveness was also evoked in the previous 2011 Communication, and in 2015 the focus on “short-term” measures and “pressing” or “urgent” issues is still present. The use of these expressions consolidates the securitisation of those topics. Furthermore, the 2015 Review follows the trend of referring to “fundamental” or “universal” values, instead of “shared values” that is only used 25% of the times. This preference for universal values can be also attributed to this new approach that seeks greater ownership of the partners and minimises the importance of the EU’s standards when applying the policy. Therefore, the role of the EU as a normative power keeps decreasing in this stage.


Another aspect of this new approach is that further differentiation is made. In this matter, the EU commits to launching individual progress reports for each partner and not a general review of the ENP that encompasses all the region in one single document. The

2015 Review increases the differentiation efforts that were already noticeable in 2011 and continues using a similar language when talking about the partnership and reforms like “adapting” or “tailoring”. In this sense, mutual ownership and differentiation are regarded as the “hallmark” of the new ENP. Remarkably, this differentiated and asymmetric approach is to be particularly useful in the case of the Mediterranean neighbourhood. An example of that can be seen through the lack of will for achieving integration in the EU’s free-market among the Mediterranean partners, which was a key instrument in promoting prosperity in the ENP. By 2015, only Morocco reached a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) agreement while the rest of the neighbourhood did not have the same interest in this incentive. Hence, the fact that this new asymmetric approach is based on mutual priorities mostly benefits the Southern partners that were more reluctant to those previous agreements and did not wish to aspire to EU’s standards. Again, in this new approach the minimisation of EU’s ambition to spread its values in favour of the maximisation effectiveness and the pursuit of certain interests is visible.

The 2015 Communication also evinces a reconsideration of the ENP’s priorities, and therefore of the EU’s main interests. In this concern, it is interesting that “stability” becomes a central aspect of the document, whereas in the last previous papers “stability” had fallen behind in favour of other priorities such as democracy promotion. Nevertheless, in this new ENP, stabilisation is reconsolidated as a main political priority. This is clearly linked to the increasing security-based rhetoric. As represented in *Figure 5*, security surpassed any other issue in 2015, including the economy, which was an essential part of the ENP cooperation even when related to security or energy issues. It is also worth mentioning that the economic proposals are depicted as “economic development for *stabilisation*”, which supports the aforementioned revival of the notion of stability at the core of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, it is noteworthy that democracy, which was one of the pillars of the previous review is now pushed into the background.

Regarding the economy, it ranks at the second position in the word frequency count analysis results of general issues, being displaced for the first time by security. In this field, the document identifies the main spheres of cooperation: trade, employment, modernisation, transport and energy security and climate actions. New concepts and terms arise in the field of economics such as the digital economy, the climate policy aiming at meeting the Paris Climate Agreement and gender inequality. The issue of


gender inequality and women’s empowerment gains attention in this new Communication. The first time this concept was mentioned was one time in the 2011 Communication, whereas, in this 2015 Review, this issue is repeated six times throughout the document, revealing that new concerns may be arising as a consequence of global politics and the international agenda.



Nonetheless, the majority of the document (over 30%) is devoted to security issues. In this concern, migration has an independent section in the document to *The Security Dimension* as classified in the Communication. Security Sector Reform is described as the main priority of the cooperation between the EU and its partners. This reform seeks to improve the capacity of the neighbouring countries to deal with security-related matters as a way to foster stability in this region and prevent a spill-over effect that could affect the EU directly. It is noteworthy that the EU’s new approach to security emphasising on security capacity-building, training and the extension of EU’s security policies such as the “Policy Cycle” to the neighbourhoods. Another trend that reveals the process of extra-territorialisation is the increasing insistence on the importance of borders as demonstrated through the repetition of the use of terms as “border management”, “border security” or “border protection”.

However, as seen in the chart below, the main shift in security concerns regarding the word frequency count analysis is the rise of terrorism and radicalisation as central topics in the ENP. The sum of these two terms accounts for over 33% of all the security-

issue related threat of the analysis. Radicalisation and extremism are for the first time presented as a threat as important as terrorism itself, and its prevention is regarded as “crucial” for security. Moreover, it is of great relevance to note that for the first time, terrorist groups are named in a document, in this case, Da’esh/ISIL. Another novelty in this field is the references to refugees and the refugee crisis. In this field, the EU opts for supporting the neighbourhood by developing its capacity to support the displaced people. In addition to these new issues, cybercrime also appears for the first time. Therefore, it can be affirmed that security issues not only have become more important and prominent in the ENP, but they have also diversified. New security issues have arisen and are now presented as opportunities to cooperate and to promote a stronger engagement with the neighbourhoods. It could also be affirmed that new forms of security concerns like asymmetric warfare or migration have replaced the traditional security matters of the ENP. Protracted conflicts and conflict-resolution that had been a main issue for the ENP became a secondary source of instability for the European Union.



Another relevant and new aspect of the renovated approach of the ENP regarding security matters is the constant mentions to security-related EU institutions such as FRONTEX and Europol or the European Defence Agency. These are attributed a major role in the cooperation with the neighbouring countries, although in the previous documents none of them was mentioned. This could be attributed to the aforementioned insistence of the EU in working together to increase capacity-building and security training in the neighbourhoods. As some authors supported, enhancing cooperation in this

fields and the increasing mention to these bodies is a clear sign of extra-territorialisation (Balzacq, 2008; Bruns & Happ, 2016; Wichmann, 2007)

Regarding the section on migration, irregular migration is still a priority for the EU in addition to the new source of instability that comes with the rise in forced displacement. A remarkable aspect of the 2015 Review is that when addressing the issue of irregular migration, it insists repeatedly on the “return” of the migrants. Although this action may have been implicit in the other documents in the term “migration management”, the 2015 Communication explicitly and repeatedly emphasise this measure. This insistence on returns as well as the increasing restrictions on migration reaffirm the extra-territorialisation of EU’s migration control (Duffield, 2008; Nicholson, 2011).

The portrayal of the Mediterranean Neighbourhood in the 2015 Review of the ENP is also completely linked to the security issues. In fact, unlike the Eastern neighbourhood, the Southern region is since the introduction depicted as a region of “conflict, rising extremism and terrorism, human rights violations and other challenges [...] that have resulted in major refugee flows” (European Commission, 2015, p.2). There are also references to the aftermath of the Arab Spring and the rise of the specific terrorist groups of the region (ISIL and Da’esh). These topics are then explained in detail in the document, which means that despite the specific mentions of the Mediterranean in the security dimension section, most of the actions and proposals are designed to stabilise this specific region. Hence, this description of the Southern neighbourhood aligns with the new increasingly security-based vision of the ENP.

Lastly, the Communication proposes for the first time the creation of Thematic Frameworks with the neighbours of the EU’S neighbours in matters of security, energy and migration. The strengthening of the relations with these third parties is specifically mentioned in regard to the Southern neighbourhood, Sub-Saharan Africa and the Sahel as well as Syria and Iraq. These territories are a great source of instability, terrorism and organised crime as well as a point of departure of the migration towards the EU. This new project shows the EU commitment to expand its policies even beyond the neighbourhood in order to secure the stability of its nearest countries.


6.3.2) 2021: Renewed Partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood

The 2021 Communication focuses on the relations of the EU with its Southern Neighbourhood after the COVID-19 outbreak. The document can be regarded as an ambitious and optimistic renewed partnership with the Mediterranean countries. However, although it states that it seeks to renovate the partnership, the EU emphasises more on a “transition” of this partnership rather than a transformation of it.

Regarding the perspective and the role of the EU as described in the document, they resemble the ones stated in the 2015 review. Nevertheless, there is a return to a longer or medium-term vision in addition to the short-term and urging topics as it can be clearly seen with the goals for 2030 or the strategies for 2021-2027. There is also no doubt that the European Union maintains a higher involvement of the partners in the design of their relationship than in the first stages of the ENP. The terms “co-ownership” or “mutual interests” are still dominant terms to depict the relationship of the EU with the Southern countries. However, it is noticeable that after the COVID outbreak, there has been a slight change in the supremacy of the EU in the neighbourhood (Soler i Lecha, 2020). The aftermath of this crisis has put the Mediterranean countries in a position of weakness, and the EU has adopted a more present role, with the return of expressions as “shared values” (75% of the times the document referred to values), and the increasing insistence of the EU to promote the integration of the region into EU programs and especially through the use of the European Green Deal as a foremost framework in international policymaking in the field. Concerning the differentiation of regions, the 2021 Communication follows the steps of the predecessor and opts for bilateral differentiation, “tailoring” and the “no size fits all” model.


One of the main changes of the ENP in 2021 is the broadening of its agenda regarding the Southern Neighbourhood. In 2015, the document identified three main fields of cooperation (1) economic development, (2) “the security dimension” and (3) “migration and mobility”. In 2021, there has been a diversification of topics, with the inclusion of two more spheres: digital transition and green transition. Moreover, the economic development for stabilisation has been transformed into “human development”, reflecting a more socio-political dimension of economic development. The new agenda of the ENP in the region is clearly influenced by three frameworks: the Paris Agreement, the European Green Deal and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.

Concerning the main general issues of the document (see figure 7), there is a return of the economy as a primary concern of the ENP, although closely followed by security. This shift could be attributed to the exceptionalism of the COVID crisis and its damaging effect in economies worldwide, and particularly on weaker economies such as the economies of the MENA countries. Moreover, the focus on the economy is also mentioned to be essential to security and to halt migration to Europe as “[the economic reforms] contribute to reducing factors that lead to irregular migration” (European Commission, 2021, p.3). Therefore, there is still a link between economic stability promotion and security interest in the region. It is noteworthy that green transition, environment or green growth consolidates as a major priority in the EU’s ENP agenda in the Southern Neighbourhood. In this matter, the European Green Deal is used as a main framework of cooperation and as the main standards, which supports the aforementioned return to the previous EU’s role as an international policymaker and normative power. There is also another trend that consolidates in the 2021 Communication, that is the gender approach, which is also significantly repeated throughout the document as well as the promotion of women’s right. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that democracy and democratic values that were in 2011 a central aspect of the ENP in the Mediterranean is now displaced to a secondary priority of the ENP, revealing EU’s interest is more based on security and stability rather than in democracy promotion and exporting values.



In the field of security, as illustrated in figure 8, the transformation of how the EU names the section is remarkable, from 2015, “security dimension” to 2021 “peace and

security”. The inclusion of “peace” in the title is a statement on the aspirations of the EU to become a prominent international actor in the field of peacebuilding and diplomacy (Council of the European Union, 2020). The role of the EU in this dimension is now a mainstream discussion in Europe and also at the EU’s highest levels. The main security issues mentioned in the document are terrorism, refugees, trafficking and conflict. These concerns are very similar to the results of the 2015 Review. Cybersecurity and cybercrime also grow stronger as a primary security issue for the EU in the ENP, in line with the addition of the digitalisation concern as a general topic addressed in the document. Moreover, as in 2015, the EU focuses on capacity building and training and mentions EU Agencies and their specific role in this field as Europol, FRONTEX or Cefpol. Regarding migration, like in 2015, it is separately discussed from other security concerns but still linked to other priorities such as smuggling, trafficking and organised crime. The topic of returns as a way to manage irregular migration and a central aspect of cooperation in the field is also explicitly mentioned.



Lastly, although all the aforementioned information and the document itself is in regard to the ENP in the Southern Neighbourhood it is important to note that the region is portrayed as highly strategic for the EU. In the third paragraph, the challenges of the Mediterranean region are stated: “The region is facing governance, socio-economic, climate, environmental and security challenges” (European Commission, 2021, p.1). Then, the EU focuses mainly on explaining the security threats present in the region rather

than detailing any other above-mentioned challenge. These priorities align with the content on the paper and the word frequency count analysis result. Another new aspect of the Mediterranean as presented in the document is the concern for the common basin and the environmental issues.

7) DISCUSSION

In this section, the aforesaid result of the analysis will be discussed. The main changes in the ENP evinced in the analysis will be underlined, contextualised and rationalised using the concepts described in the theoretical framework. The aim is not only to address what the changes have been but why these transformations have taken place in order to know what has guided the policy. The following table summarizes the main aforementioned results.

Table 1: Comparison of the results

	1ST Period	2nd Period	3rd Period
EU Role:	Shared values	Universal Values	Balance: Shared & Universal
Normative power?	Regulatory approximation	Bilateral effort	Co-ownership
Differentiation	Low differentiation	Higher differentiation	Higher differentiation
Time perspective	Long-term	Short-term	Balance
Role of MS	Undifferentiated	Align policies	Support the implementation
Associations with the Mediterranean	Economic weakness and poverty	Unstable regimes, democratic opportunity and migration flows	Instable, terrorism on the rise, affected my refugee crisis and environmental concerns.

Most important issues	1. Economy	1. Economy 2. Democracy	1. Security 2. Economy
Main security concerns	1. Protracted Conflicts 2. Organised Crime	1. Protracted Conflicts 2. Migration	1. Terrorism/radicalization 2. Refugees/migration 3. Protracted conflicts
New aspects introduced (not solely related to security)	N/A	1. Democratic transformation	1. Digital transformation 2. Green transition 3. Gender equality

One of the main debates on the ENP, as described in the state of arts, was whether the policy was guided by values (constructivism) or by principles (rationalism). In the theoretical framework, the possibility that none of the theories alone fully explained the complexity of the policy was hinted at. The analysis has demonstrated that the ENP is, in fact, a mixture of both approaches. The role of the EU as a normative power is undeniable in the first stage of the policy. In this period, the export of the EU's values was a central aspect of the ENP strategy. However, as Tumels (2017) argued, this normative ambition decreased in times of instability, which in the case of the ENP and the Mediterranean is from 2011 onwards as visible in the analysis.

The predominance of interests is evinced by the increase in bilateralism and the substitution of EU values with "universal" values or even the lack of promotion of integration as an incentive. The role of the EU was no longer to promote further integration or participation but to stabilise the region by all means. The EU emphasises the need to improve effectiveness rather than the wish to align the neighbourhood's norms with the EU's values. This efficiency-focused approach is directly connected to the highlighted need for greater security in the neighbourhood and its links to European security. Likewise, this change in perspective is identifiable in the substitution of a long-term perspective to further attention to "urging" or "pressing" concerns and the predominance of a shorter-term approach. Hence, there is a clear securitisation of issues that are dramatized as "urgent" over other traditional politicised issues e.g., migration over democracy promotion.

It can be affirmed that since the 2011 Communication, there is an increasing securitisation of the policy. This is not only showed by the changes in the priorities of the EU and the ENP but also in the connection the EU makes with security in topics that are not directly linked to this field. A clear example of this was that the EU conditioned cooperation on security to progress on other fields such as visa provisions. Moreover, this example can be also used as a case of extra-territorialisation. The EU has sought to externalise border management to the neighbouring countries, especially after the rise of migration flows due to the instability of the region. The insistence of the EU on Security Sector Reforms in the Mediterranean as well as stricter visa requirements or improving border-management capabilities can be explained by the extra-territorialisation theory as described in the fourth chapter. However, the extra-territorialisation is not limited to migration, the analysis demonstrated that this theory can also explain the search for greater cooperation in other related policies of the external dimension of the Justice and Home Affairs as expressed by Wichmann (2007). In this field, the increasing mentions of JHA agencies such as FRONTEX, Europol or Cepol and their more prominent role in the ENP and their cooperation with the neighbours are also understood in this framework.

Furthermore, the newly described ambition of the EU to reach the neighbours' neighbours in order to stabilise the main roots of irregular migration clearly exemplifies the entrenching of the EU's extended border. These actions support Pérez Caramés (2012) argument that the securitisation of policies is also carried out through the "creation of buffer zones". In this case, the Mediterranean can be considered as such, as one of the EU's main goal was to halt migration from arriving to Europe.

These trends are also visible in how the Mediterranean is conceived. At the beginning of the policy, the Southern Neighbourhood was mainly regarded as economically weak and disproportionally affected by poverty and other structural problems such as youth unemployment, which made the ENP an instrument to "develop" the region and "shape" it in accordance with EU's values and political frameworks.

However, the conception of the Mediterranean transformed over the two later stages of the policy. In the second period, the Arab Spring was first regarded as an opportunity for the EU to promote democracy in the region and to limit the power of the authoritarian regimes in the region. Despite the rise of instability, democracy and human rights promotion became a central aspect of the policy. In addition to these positive values, the increase of migration also had an opposite effect on the policy, which was the

increase of security-based conditions to the democracy-focused policies. In this sense, in the second stage, the ENP introduced for the first time the security sector reform proposals and cross-border management measures.

Lastly, the Mediterranean in the third stage is not only considered a source of instability and conflict but also a territory affected by its neighbourhood's instability as the Sahel or Syria. For that reason, the region is increasingly linked to terrorism, radicalisation and other security threats to the EU. Hence, the approach of the EU to the ENP in the neighbourhood shifted, with a renovated emphasis on migrant returns, border-security and the need to improve the security capacity of the Mediterranean neighbours. Finally, the last document also acknowledges a new concern in the neighbourhood: the environmental impact. Cooperation with the Southern Neighbourhood is portrayed as crucial given the common resources of the Mediterranean for both parties and that this region is likely to be disproportionately affected by the effects of climate change. In this regard, the EU sees in the Mediterranean a region to which its pioneer European Green Deal could be exported and therefore strengthen the EU's global position in the field.

8) CONCLUSION

This dissertation has revealed that the ENP did not remain unchanged, but the transformation of the neighbourhood and the increase in instability in the EU's backyard prompted the redefinition of the policy and the EU's interests in the region. As argued, these changes are linked to security, or, in other words, the perception of security by the EU. Some issues that were not at the core of the policy have been prioritised and have gained importance since the Arab Springs.

Although stabilising the neighbourhood has been a central aspect of the policy since its origin, the way in which the EU has addressed this aim has substantially transformed. As described by constructivist theories, the European Union's foreign policy and, therefore, the ENP served as a tool to spread EU's values and promote the EU's system beyond its borders. This "Normative Power Europe" was clearly visible in the analysis, especially in the first stage of the policy. Moreover, the expansion of EU's regulation was also implicit in the "more for more" principle that guided the policy during its first decade. Nevertheless, as the analysis showed, the evolution of policy after the

sudden change in the conditions of the region revealed that constructivist theories need to be sided with rationalist explanations to fully explain the ENP.

In this regard, the dissertation demonstrates the duality in the objectives and guiding principles of the ENP, with a clear preference for utilitarianism and rationalism in times of instability. An example of that is the move away from the “more for more” principle and the renovated focus on rational interests and efficiency rather than values. During the second and third stage, a shift towards security-based rhetoric is evinced. This securitisation of certain topics, and in particular, migration supports the thesis of this paper. The analysis determines that, given the changing conditions in the Southern Neighbourhood, the security dimension of the policy intensified. As a result of the securitisation of certain issues, extra-territorialisation measures are evident such as the increasing interest of the EU in border management and in cooperation with JHA agencies in fields such as terrorism or organised crime through the ENP.

Accordingly, the conception of the Mediterranean and the interests in the Southern Neighbourhood evolved too, from a merely economic-based relationship to security-based cooperation. The portrayal of the neighbourhood as a region that is not only unstable itself but also affected by its neighbours’ instability has become dominant in the last stage of the policy. This fact reinforces the idea of the EU’s interest in stretching its borders and the transformation of the Southern Neighbourhood into a “buffer zone” through the latest changes in the ENP.

In conclusion, this dissertation proves that the European Neighbourhood Policy’s guiding principles and approach changed as a consequence of the increasing instability in the Mediterranean. It is noteworthy that the EU opted to securitise the neighbourhood as a reaction to these changes and extra-territorialise its management. This work is also relevant to understand the logic behind the EU’s foreign policy decisions in times of instability and uncertainty and it proposes a framework of analysis in which security is a central guiding interest for the EU. Hence, for further research, it could be interesting to analyse if this approach is also reflected in other parts of the EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, this analysis of the evolution of the ENP can also help to predict and understand future EU’s actions in the region, e.g., the expansion of the foreign policy beyond the Southern Neighbourhood to other territories like the Sahel, which is already a reality. The European Union is and will remain one of the main international actors and

its influence worldwide is undeniable. Therefore, understanding the logics behind its international politics and foreign affairs decisions is important.

9) BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aarstad, Å. K. (2017). The study of the European Neighbourhood Policy through the lenses of critical approaches. In T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti, & T. Demmelhuber, *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy* (pp. 80-92). Routledge.
- Balfour, R. (2015). Change and Continuity: A Decade of Evolution of EU Foreign Policy and the Creation of the European External Action Service. In R. Balfour, C. Carta, & K. Raik, *The European External Action Service and National Foreign Ministries: Convergence or Divergence?* (pp. 31-44). New York: Routledge.
- Balzacq, T. (2008). *The external dimension of EU justice and home affairs: Tools, processes, outcomes*. . Retrieved from CEPS working document, no. 303: <https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/1711.pdf>
- Barbé, E., & et al. (2009). Drawing the Neighbours Closer ... to What? Explaining Emerging Patterns of Policy Convergence between the EU and its Neighbours. *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 378-399.
- Barbé, E., Costa, O., Herranz, A., & Natorski, M. (2009). Which rules shape EU external governance? Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 6(6), 834-852.
- (1995). *Barcelona Declaration*. Barcelona.
- Beach, D. (2015). Liberal International Relations Theory and EU Foreign Policy. In K. Jørgensen, Å. Aarstad, E. Drieskens, K. Laatikainen, & B. Tonra, *The SAGE Handbook of European Foreign Policy: Two Volume Set* (pp. 86-98). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Bicchi, F. (2006). 'Our Size Fits All': Normative Power Europe and the Mediterranean. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 13(2), 386-303.
- Bicchi, F. (2010). The Impact of the ENP on EU-North Africa Relations: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly. In R. Whitman, & S. Wolff, *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective* (pp. 202-222). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bruns, B., & Happ, D. (2016). EU Extra-territorialization and Securitization: What Does It Mean for Ukraine and Belarus? In B. Bruns, D. Happ, & H. Zichner, *European*

- Neighbourhood Policy: Geopolitics Between Integration and Security* (pp. 139-160). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Commission of the European Communities. (2003). *Wider Europe- Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*. Brussels.
- Commission of the European Communities. (2007). *A Strong European Neighbourhood Policy*. Brussels.
- Council of the European Union. (2020). *Concept on EU Peace Mediation*. Retrieved from EEAS: <https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/st13951.en20.pdf>
- Del Sarto, R. (2016). Normative Empire Europe: The European Union, its Borderlands, and the ‘Arab Spring’. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 54(2), 215-232.
- Del Sarto, R., & Schumacher, T. (2005). From EMP to ENP: What's at Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 10, 17-38.
- Diez, T. (2013). Normative Power as Hegemony. *Cooperation and Conflict*, 48(2), 194-210.
- Does, A. (2013). Securitization theory. In A. Does, *The Construction of the Maras: Between Politicization and Securitization*. Geneva : Graduate Institute Publications.
- Duffield, M. (2008). Global Civil War: The Non-Insured, International Containment and Post-Interventionary Society. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 21(2), 145-165.
- EEAS. (2015). *ENP Action Plans*. Retrieved from European Union External Action Service: https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/8398/enp-action-plans_en
- EEAS. (2016). *Share European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP)*. Retrieved from European External Action Service: https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic-network/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp/330/european-neighbourhood-policy-enp_en
- Emmers, R. (2011). Securitization. In A. Collins, *Contemporary Security Studies* (pp. 131-144). New York: Oxford University Press.

- European Commission. (2004). *European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper*. Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/2004_communication_from_the_commission_-_european_neighbourhood_policy_-_strategy_paper.pdf
- European Commission. (2011). *A new response to a changing neighbourhood*. Brussels.
- European Commission. (2015). *Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy* . Brussels.
- European Commission. (2021). *Renewed partnership with the Southern Neighbourhood. A new Agenda for the Mediterranean*. Brussels.
- Haukkala, H. (2011). The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The Case of European Neighbourhood Policy. In R. Whitman, *Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives* (pp. 45-64). London: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Hollis, R. (2012). No friend of democratization: Europe's role in the genesis of the Arab Spring. *International Affairs*, 88(1), 81-94.
- Hyde-Price, A. (2007). *European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity*. London: Routledge.
- Hyde-Price, A. (2017). Realism and the European Neighbourhood Policy. In T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti, & T. Demmelhuber, *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy* (pp. 60-69). London: Routledge.
- Işleyen, B. (2015). The European Union and neoliberal governmentality: Twinning in Tunisia and Egypt. *European Journal of International Relations*, 21(3), 672–690.
- Kelley, J. (2006). New Wine in Old Wineskins: Promoting Political Reforms through the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 44(1), 29-55.
- Keohane, R., & Nye, J. (2012). *Power & Interdependence*. New York: Pearson.
- Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2014). The EU's Foreign Policy System: Policy-making. In S. Keukeleire, & T. Delreux, *The Foreign Policy of the European Union* (pp. 94-115). Red Globe Press .

- Kratochvíl, P., & Tulmets, E. (2017). Constructivist approaches to the study of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In T. Schumacher, A. Marchetti, & T. Demmelhuber, *The Routledge Handbook on the European Neighbourhood Policy* (pp. 70-80). Tobias Schumacher, Andreas Marchetti, Thomas Demmelhuber: Routledge.
- Kratochvíl, P., & Tumels, E. (2010). Constructivism and Rationalism as Analytical Lenses: The Case of the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Politics in Central Europe*, 22-40.
- Lucarelli, S., & Manners, I. (2010). *Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy*. New York: Routledge.
- Maisenbacher, J., & Kunz, R. (2015). Women in the neighbourhood: reinstating the European Union's civilising mission on the back of gender equality promotion? *European Journal of International Relations*, 23(1), 122-144.
- Manners, I. (2002). Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms. *JCMS*, 40(2), 235-258.
- Mearsheimer, J. (2014). Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin. *Foreign Affairs*, 77-89.
- Mocanu, O. (2010). Brief overview on the conditionality in the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, 42-49.
- Neal, A. (2009). Securitisation and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of Frontex. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 47(2), 333-356.
- Nicholson, E. (2011). *Cutting Off the Flow: Extraterritorial Controls to Prevent Migration*. Retrieved from University of California, Berkeley Law School: <https://documentation.lastradainternational.org/lisidocs/cutting%20off%20the%20flow.pdf>
- Pérez Caramés, A. (2012). La evolución reciente de las políticas de control migratorio en España. In A. Izquierdo Escribano, & W. Cornelius, *Políticas de control migratorio: estudio comparado de España y EE.UU* (pp. 143-211). Barcelona: Edicions Bellaterra.
- Schimmelfenning, F. (2012). Europeanisation beyond Europe. *Living Reviews in European Governance*, 7(1), 5-31.

- Schneider, M. (2010). Europeanization beyond the EU: The Dynamics of Europeanization in the Southern Mediterranean Partner States. *L'Europe en Formation*, 2(356), 125-127.
- Smith, K. (2005). The Outsiders: The European Neighbourhood Policy. *Britain and Europe: Continuity and Change*, 81(4), 757-773.
- Smith, M. (2011). A liberal grand strategy in a realist world? Power, purpose and the EU's changing global role. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 144-163.
- Soler i Lecha, E. (2020). *COVID-19: Why EU solidarity should extend to its neighbours*. Retrieved from CIDOB, Barcelona Center for International Affairs: https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/europa/covid_19_why_eu_solidarity_should_extend_to_its_neighbours
- Tumels, E. (2017). Rationalist and constructivist approaches to the European Neighbourhood Policy: a growing prevalence of interests over identity? In S. Gstöhl, & S. Schunz, *Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy* (pp. 25-41). New York: Routledge.
- Verdes-Montenegro Escáñez, F. (2015). Securitización: agendas de investigación abiertas para el estudio de la seguridad. *Relaciones Internacionales*(29), 111-131.
- Waeber, O. (1995). Securitization and Desecuritization. In R. D. Lipschutz, *On Security* (pp. 46-86). New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wagner, W. (2003). Why the EU's CFSP Will Remain Intergovernmental: a rationalist institutional choice analysis of European Crisis Management Policy. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 576-95.
- Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Whitman, R. (2011). Norms, Power and Europe: A New Agenda for Study of the EU and International Relations. In R. Whitman, *Normative Power Europe* (pp. 1-22). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Whitman, R., & Wolff, S. (2010). *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context Implementation and Impact*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Wichmann, N. (2007). *The intersection between justice and home affairs and the European Neighbourhood Policy: Taking stock of the logic, objectives and practices*. Retrieved from CEPS Working Document No. 275: <https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/1546.pdf>
- Wood, S. (2009). The European Union: A normative or normal power? *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14(1), 113-128.
- Zaiotti, R. (2007). Of Friends and Fences: Europe's Neighbourhood Policy and the 'Gated Community Syndrome'. *Journal of European Integration*, 143-162.