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European Peace Facility:

What is the role of European security
provider in the war of Ukraine?

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INDEX

1. Introduction.....	2
2. Motivations and reasons for research	5
3. Theoretical framework	6
3.1 Political Realism	6
3.2 The Security Dilemma Theory	7
3.3 Natural Security	8
4. State of play	10
4.1 Ukrainian and Russian tensions.....	10
4.2 The War in Ukraine and its impact to Europe.....	13
a. Refugee crisis	14
b. Economic impact.....	16
5. Methodology	18
6. Analysis	19
7. Conclusion	26
8. References	28

Resumen

El objetivo principal de ese trabajo de fin de grado es entender la guerra en Ucrania, y el papel que desempeña el Fondo Europeo de Apoyo a la Paz, internacionalmente conocido como el European Peace Facility, en la invasión rusa en Ucrania.

Palabras clave: Ucrania, Rusia, guerra, Fondo Europeo de Apoyo a la Paz, Unión Europea.

Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to understand the War in Ukraine as well as to shed light on the role of the European Peace Facility in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Key words: Ukraine, Russia, war, European Peace Facility, European Union.

Acronyms

APF (African Peace Facility)

CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)

CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy)

CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)

EPF (European Peace Facility)

EU (European Union)

GDP (Gross Domestic Product)

GNI (Gross National Income)

IR (International Relations)

MFF (Multiannual Financial Framework)

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)

NGOs (Non-governmental Organizations)

TEU (Treaty on European Union)

1. Introduction

The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a new off-budget instrument of the European Union (EU) that was adopted on the 22nd March of 2021 (EU, 2022). It has emerged as a mechanism in which to further advance the European Union's role as an international agent, because for the first time, apart from maintaining its role as a soft power the EU will provide security for its citizens and international partners. For the first time and in compliance with human rights, with the United Nations Charter and International Humanitarian Law, the European Union will be able to provide equipment and infrastructures to the armed forces of EU member countries, international and regional organizations, as well as ensure rapid support to partners who are involved in armed struggles (EU, 2022). Thus, the EPF is comprised of two pillars: the first one is devoted to finance military engagements and the second one is destined to provide assistance wherever it is needed (European Commission, 2022). Moreover, the Council of the European Union, is the institution that will be in charge of overseeing and deciding what kind of assistance or supply is needed in each situation (European Commission, 2022).

In an era where instability and security threats are on the rise, the European Union saw an opening to establish a security provider to help preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen security (European Parliament, 2021). Thus, in 2018, the Council of the European Union adopted what is known as the EU Global Strategy, which is articulated around the idea that it was time the European Union started having a bigger role in the security and defence sphere and stopped relying so much on international organizations like NATO in terms of defence, and consequently, in 2020 an agreement on the European Peace Facility was created (Consilium Europa, 2022). Apart from providing military aid, as well as support and train military units in times of warfare, the measures of the EPF aim to promote peace, domestic resilience and strengthen the defence mechanisms in regions such as Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Ukraine or even Mozambique or Somalia (Consilium Europa, 2022). In addition, the EPF mechanism would also help relief EU Member States from having to confront security threats on their own.

Under Article 41(2) of the Treaty of the European Union (TEU), 'expenditure arising from operations having military or defence implications' are prohibited from being charged to the European Union budget (European Parliament, 2017). Moreover, since the

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) serves as the mechanism in which to implement the budget of the EPF, therefore as it does not directly go through the EU budget, the funding of the EPF does not trample on the TEU (European Commission, 2022). Hence, through the CFSP member states can provide economic funding directly from their national budgets, in the name of the EU (European Parliament, 2021). The EPF will have an account of almost 6 billion euros (5.692 billion euros), which will be used in a seven-year period ranging from 2021 until 2027 (European Parliament, 2021). In fact, all 27 member states based on their gross national income (GNI), will help fund the Common Foreign and Security Policy, nonetheless, if any country wants to opt out from financing the defence mechanism, the budget will overall decrease (EU, 2022). Initially, and following a 30-year decision which exempted Denmark from joining the European Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Denmark was not going to provide economic aid to the EPF. Nonetheless, a referendum carried out on June 1st 2022, demonstrated how 69.1 percent of the Danish population endorsed joining the EU's Common Defence Policy, as a way to further increase their defence mechanism towards the east (Henley, 2022). This idea is very clearly summarized in the words of the Danish Prime Minister, Mette Frederiksen: "We're showing that when Putin invades a free country and threatens stability in Europe, we all pull together" (Henley, 2022).

From a start, the European Peace Facility's *raison d'être* has been highly questioned and criticised by NGOs, under the pretext that intervening and financing armed conflict will consequently lead to funding violence and human rights abuses around the world (European Parliament, 2021). Nonetheless, practitioners consider the EPF will in fact help enhance the European Union's image as a security provider and will allow the EU to further expand their influence in areas of armed conflict (European Parliament, 2021). In addition, the budget of the EPF will not only help fund EU military operations in third states but it will also help support peace operations led by regional or international organizations such as the African Union or the United Nations. Moreover, the EPF will supersede two off-budget mechanisms: the African Peace Facility and the Athena Mechanism which were established in 2003 and 2004. The main differences the EPF will introduce is that the new off-budget mechanism will firstly have a larger geographical scope under which to function, secondly it will have a larger budget to conduct activities and it opens up the possibility to not only provide assistance in the African continent (as it did with the African Peace Facility) but in other areas of the world as well (European

Parliament, 2021). Therefore, there seems to be no practical reason that explains the lack of support in the hands of NGOs.

2. Motivations and reasons for research

In a time where a country bordering the European Union is under threat, the need for an international mechanism that will help reduce the impact and the escalation of warfare is of utmost importance. Hence, the aim of this research paper is to shed light on a very significant topic, which is the European contribution to reducing the effects of Russia's aggression in Ukraine. And thus, the writer has chosen to focus her research on the European Peace Facility, which is an international mechanism that aims to bring peace, stability, and security to the international sphere. The author hypothesises that the three theoretical paradigms she has proposed in this dissertation will help explain the international system in regard to the Ukrainian conflict. In addition, throughout this paper, the author aims to uncover the impact the European Peace Facility has had in providing military aid and assistance in the region of Ukraine.

Moreover, what makes the EPF such an interesting topic to research is not only due to its novelty, as it entered into force in 2021, but it is also due to the international relevance this European mechanism has in the political sphere of the 21st century. In addition, the writer believes it is her duty as a European citizen and an International Relations student to obtain a deeper understanding on ongoing conflicts. Nonetheless, due to the proximity of the Ukrainian nation to the European Union, and the large borders the country shares with three European Union member states: Poland, Hungary and Romania, the writer believes it is essential to comprehend the numerous scenarios in which the conflict could change.

For this research paper, the author will first focus on three theoretical paradigms to explain the Russian invasion in Ukraine: Realism, Social Dilemma and National Security. In order to fully understand the historical and political reasoning of the War in Ukraine, the document will undergo through the chronological events that lead to the invasion of Ukraine by Russian troops and it will then explain the impact the War in Ukraine in Europe as well the role of the European Peace Facility in this conflict.

3. Theoretical framework

“A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core values”- Walter Lippmann (Wolfers, 1952).

The theories in International Relations (IR) provide a frame of meaning by which to obtain possible explanations on events. Moreover, IR theories also help predict the possible outcomes that will happen next (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). In order to explain the role of the European Peace Facility in the War of Ukraine, the document addresses three different theoretical frameworks: Political Realism, the Security Dilemma and the National Security framework.

3.1 Political Realism

Realism is one of the most prominent schools of thought in the field of international relations, nonetheless, it also constitutes as a theoretical paradigm with which to describe, explain and predict events in international relations. The realist school of thought explains the functioning of the world in terms of power (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). Realism is often associated to *realpolitik* in the fact that both principles regard the quest, control and application of power, hence following a pessimistic view on human nature (Morgenthau, 1978). Furthermore, the principal belief followed by this approach focuses on the idea that all states are motivated by their national interests, and thus world politics is a field of conflict between states pursuing wealth and power (Mount Holyoke College , 2022).

For realists, the international system is ruled by an anarchical environment which following Thomas Hobbes theory on the State of Nature, could be summarized with the quote “man is a wolf to man” (Rossello, 2012). Realist states are more concerned with their relative gains vis-à-vis other nations than with absolute gains for all, creating a ruthless scenario for competition (Acharya, 2020). Moreover, as there is no supranational entity to oversee and limit the power of nations, in order to secure their interests, states need to rely on their own resources (Mount Holyoke College , 2022). Following the Realist Theory, the main thing all states have in common is the desire to protect their political autonomy as well as their territorial integrity, thus, once both interests are ensured, their goals will take different directions. Some will want to pursue a territorial,

political or economic expansion, while others will just want to be left in peace (Mount Holyoke College , 2022). Consequently, states should attempt to create relationships among them, in the pursuit of their long-term benefit, as in times of crisis cooperation among states might create the most benefit to all.

3.2 The Security Dilemma Theory

The Security Dilemma Theory, also known as the Spiral Model, was developed by Herbert Butterfield, John Herz and Robert Jervis in 1950 (Tang, 2009). The model analyses the central place security has in the international system. In addition, this theoretical idea supports the notion that the inevitability of insecurity when acted upon leads to an ever more insecure world, hence a sense of security will not be created from blindly pursuing national security. According to John Herz, that is to say that in terms of security when a country is not well enough protected, it will increase its security system by improving it. Consequently, the feeling of insecurity which stems from mutual suspicion will make neighbouring states improve their military capabilities as well. Which leads to a vicious circle of insecurity being compensated by amplifying the protection mechanisms, and thus creating a self-defeating scenario where the escalation of tension will lead to an outcome that no party desires, war (Herz, 1950).

Moreover, this theory constitutes as a double-edged sword that can lead to two perfect scenarios: one of peace and another of war. On the one hand, one of the three original developers of this theory, Herbert Butterfield, believes the Security Dilemma to be used to explain the manner in which states can be driven to war even though they might not necessarily want to harm each other (Glaser, 2010). An example that demonstrates this point of view is the start of the First World War, were following this theory the main European powers felt compelled to go to war because of the insecurity they felt about their neighbours' alliances (Tang, 2009). On the other hand, for Jervis and for Herz the Security Dilemma and the subsequent desire of preservation creates a perfect scenario for states to cooperate against a common enemy (Tang, 2009). Moreover, for the scholar Glenn H. Snyder, there are two reasons that lead to an alliance formation. The first one being that the dissatisfaction of the amount of power of one state will make it want to

align with another, and the second one justifies cooperation as the consequence of a state not trusting the reliability of its allies, and thus courting others (Jervis, 1978).

Consequently, the Security Dilemma Theory, creates a basis for political debate where national security becomes not simply a question of defending against attacks but also a matter of how to create ‘trust’ within the international system (Wolfers, 1952).




Figure 1: Security Dilemma Theory, (Josticova, 2017)

3.3 Natural Security

“The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence” (Buzan, 1991)

The concept of National Security provides an understanding of the challenges a nation might be or is facing in regards to its sovereignty, as well as the vulnerabilities of the state against these dangers (Sussex, Clarke, & Medcalf, 2017). Thus, the aim of national security is not only the pursuit of freedom from threat, but it also entails the ability of states to safeguard firstly their national identity, secondly the functional

integrity of state institutions and thirdly its borders (Buzan, 1991). Following this definition, it can be concluded that in order to protect their national interest, states should erect a plan defining the direction and the priorities to be taken into account to prevent or lessen the impact of threats. In order to do this, a strategic security analysis is needed.

By pursuing national security, security interests are overshadowed by economic ones. These take shape in the form of prioritizing border controls or military investment over social or economic welfare. As the main function of the state is to ensure not only safety but also its continuity, this normative content is used by politicians to develop and justify policies that give precedence to security demands, even if it means sacrificing values and liberties (Wolfers, 1952). As Arnold Wolfers stated, “national security is a moral choice” (Wolfers, 1952). This could be understood in the way that national security entails picking one value and giving up another, so as to maximize security. Hence, this requires making a moral choice between what is right or wrong, what is good or bad, as well as by justifying it (Wolfers, 1952).

It can be concluded therefore that all three theories, carry a Realist perspective on the way that they see the international system. Moreover, all three models view power as the central motivation behind any action taken by the State, thus, as rational actors, states only act pursuing their national interests.

4. State of play

The 24th February of 2022, by invading Ukraine, Russia brought back war to Europe (Reuters, 2022). The unprovoked and unjustified military aggression in the hands of the Russian Federation has created a new scenario in the international sphere in which Western powers have been forced to intervene in the name of democracy and human rights. Nonetheless, this new chapter in history did not start when Russian forces entered the country the 24th February of 2022, as it commenced three days prior (on 21st February 2022) when Russia recognized as its own the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts (Cosilium Europa, 2022).

4.1 Ukrainian and Russian tensions

The path of Ukraine and the Russian Federation has been entwined for years. The tension between both countries can be dated back to 1918 when after years of conflict, Ukraine declared independence from Russia (Bigg, 2022). Nonetheless, an independent Ukraine only lasted until 1922 when following the foundation of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic, the country was incorporated into the Soviet Union (Bigg, 2022). In 1991 Ukraine carried out a referendum to obtain independence from the Soviet Bloc, which obtained the backing of 92 percent of the voters (Bigg, 2022). As a consequence of the trend which envisioned the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was created in December of 1991. The CIS aimed to alleviate the impact of the death of the Soviet Union and the subsequent transition to full independence of its members, thus, the CIS could be considered ‘a marriage of convenience’, to the 12 former Soviet Union members which were part of it (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). While many CIS members such as Belarus or Kazakhstan, stayed aligned to Russia, Ukraine kept its distance and initiated a transition towards a market economy (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007).

One of the problems that emerged after the fall of the Soviet Union was the disposition of the nuclear weapons which had once been under the control of the Soviet Bloc, as they were scattered around the former Soviet countries. Nonetheless, as Russia was the leading power in the CIS bloc, the country claimed ownership of them and started moving the missiles to the Russian territory (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). Subsequently, this

created tension among the CIS leaders who were opposed to the idea that Russia was taking the long-distance missiles out of their countries and keeping it for itself (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). By 1994, Ukraine gave up its nuclear armoury and used it as a bargaining chip in which to negotiate with the Russian Federation and ensure the commitment of Moscow to “respect the independence, autonomy and the borders of Ukraine” (Bigg, 2022).

For 10 years the Kremlin abided by its word, and it did not interfere with Ukraine sovereignty or its borders, contrastingly, in 2014 Moscow illegally annexed the Crimean Peninsula. The Crimean Peninsula is a territory which had been under dispute between Russia and Ukraine since the fall of the Soviet Union. Even if Soviet Leader Khrushchev transferred the region to Ukraine in the 1950s, Russia never accepted it (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007). The annexation of the Crimean territory in 2014, was the biggest land-grab in Europe since the Second World War (Pifer, 2020). In order to understand the change of attitude of Russia, it is important to understand the political situation in Ukraine. Following a pro-Western revolution that killed more than 100 people, in 2014 protesters in Ukraine successfully overthrew President Viktor Yanukovich from power (Pifer, 2020). During his time as President, he abided by Russia’s rules, which consequently made both neighbouring countries have a peaceful coexistence. Nonetheless, the interim government that replaced him, had clear intentions of moving towards becoming a more Western-like nation. This was consolidated by signing a trade agreement with the European Union (Bigg, 2022), which the Russian Federation saw as an offensive and thus almost instantly armed men started occupying check points and key facilities in the region (Pifer, 2020). Mr. Putin quickly denied the claims that the armed men were Russian special forces, nevertheless he later admitted that in fact they were, and he even ended up awarding the men for ‘honouring the Russian nation’ (Pifer, 2020).

By early March, Russia had gotten hold of the entire Crimean territory, and thus, on March 16 a referendum was enacted in which Crimean citizens were given two choices, where remaining as part of Ukraine was not one of them. They could only choose between either becoming part of Russia or becoming an independent state (Pifer, 2020). The results showed that 96.7 percent of the population had voted towards joining Russia, nonetheless, when the votes took place there were no credible international observers, so the results might not have portrayed neither a realistic nor credible outcome (Pifer, 2020).

Subsequently, according to Russian sources there had been an 83 percent voting turnout, however, a leaked report from the Russian president's Human Rights Council revealed that only 30 percent of those eligible to vote had actually shown up to the polls, only half of which would have voted to join Russia (Pifer, 2020). Such referendum does not hold much international validity, and neither Ukraine, nor the vast majority of nations in the international community recognize the annexation. This is because not only did the referendum deny the Crimean population the opportunity to stay in Ukraine, or because when the referendum took place the region was under military occupation by outsider forces, but in fact, what demonstrates its lack of validity is that under the Constitutional Court of Ukraine such referendum is deemed unconstitutional (Peters, 2014). Nevertheless, the 18th March of 2014, political officials in both Russia and Crimea signed the 'Treaty of Accession of the Republic of Crimea to Russia', which formally gave Russia de facto control over the territory. By doing so, Russia was completely undermining and violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine (Pifer, 2020). Consequently, since then, the Kremlin's relations with Ukraine and the West have been completely ruptured and have led to numerous economic sanctions in the hands of the EU (The Economist, 2019).



Figure 2: Crimean Peninsula, a region under dispute between two nations, (DW, 2017)

The illegal annexation of Crimea was just the beginning of the first Russo-Ukrainian conflict and to Europe's post-Cold War security order (Pifer, 2020). After the illegal annexation of Crimea and the lack of Ukrainian or Western response, the secessionist regions in Donbas (located in eastern Ukraine) saw this as an opportunity to declare themselves independent from the central Ukrainian government and thus, in 2014 the Donetsk People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic were erected (Bigg, 2022). According to ABC News, since then, both regions in Donbas have been controlled by two puppet separatist governments that were established by the Russian Federation and that consequently abide by whatever the Kremlin says (Hutchinson & Reevell, 2022).




Figure 3: The secessionist regions of Donetsk and Luhansk, ABC News (Hutchinson & Reevell, 2022).

4.2 The War in Ukraine and its impact to Europe

The Russian invasion has had terrible consequences for the Ukrainian population, nonetheless, such has been the scope of impact of the conflict that in one way or another the effects have been suffered worldwide. Among the most notorious consequences of

the war, it is important to highlight the subsequent refugee crisis as well as the economic impact.

a. Refugee crisis

As a consequence of the military invasion in the hands of Russia, by March 30 2022, 6.5 million people had been displaced from their homes in the short period of five weeks. Such figures could only be likened to those at the end of the Cold War (The Economist, 2022). As a result, neighbouring countries have had to deal with the immense flow of refugees, such is the case of Poland as it has taken 3.5 million refugees (The Economist, 2022). In fact, by March 30th, Warsaw's population had almost grown by a fifth since the start of the war (The Economist, 2022). What has made the displacement of Ukrainian citizens so easy, in comparison to the refugee crisis in Venezuela, Afghanistan or Syria, is the fact that the railway system in Ukraine has not stopped functioning since the war commenced (The Economist, 2022). Subsequently, the international system has shown large amounts of support for Ukrainian citizens who aim to seek refuge in their countries: while the United States announced the 24th March that it would welcome 100,000 Ukrainian refugees, the EU took in more than 3.5 million in a matter of four weeks. It could be thus concluded that the reason behind this is no other than the fact that Ukraine is seen as a victim in the hands of a common enemy (Mr. Putin), and because of what is known as the "racial-empathy gap", which according to neuroscientists is the unconscious tendency to feel sorrow for those with whom people share physical similarities, like the fair skin tone the West shares with Ukrainians, as well as by the fact that they share the Christian religion, democratic values and overall a similar culture (The Economist, 2022). Additionally, it could be hypothesised that the overwhelming acceptance for Ukrainians is also due to the fact that only women and children have legally been able to flee the country, leaving their husbands and parents behind, thus creating a frame of sympathy towards them.




Figure 4: Refugee rates as a consequence of war, (The Economist, 2022).

Furthermore, the EU has granted Ukrainian refugees a three-year length extension for them to stay in Europe and get a job or attend to school, and neighbouring countries to Ukraine such as Romania or Poland have even granted Ukrainian refugees the same social and health services as those experienced by their own citizens (Cohen, 2022).

Contrastingly, three months after war broke out refugees are returning back to Ukraine. Following the testimony provided by a refugee that is returning back home “It’s hard to live a normal life when all you think of is your country. I am scared of going back, but I need to see my loved ones” (The Economist, 2022). For example, the two weeks that prevailed the 23rd May of 2022, 345,000 of those seeking refuge in Poland returned to their homeland (The Economist, 2022). This trend has also been experienced in other European countries. Although the figures are not large, this will help alleviate the weight of the aid provided by the EU to the refugees. Moreover, American President Joe Biden, has said that his government will contribute 1 billion dollars to alleviate some burden from the shoulders of the European Union (The Economist, 2022). Moreover, in order to encourage that Europeans host refugees in their homes, some governments around Europe are giving economic incentives to its citizens. While the Polish government is giving

households almost 9 euros monthly to host Ukrainian refugees, the United Kingdom is being more generous and is giving 438 euros (The Economist, 2022).

b. Economic impact

The impact of the refugee crisis has not just been felt by those fleeing their homes, but in fact it has also had a big toll on the economy of the European Union, as it is the biggest host of Ukrainian refugees. According to *The New York Times*, during the first year of the conflict, the costs of giving economic assistance to the refugees in providing them with food, housing, transportation and medical aid are expected to reach 30 billion dollars (29.5 billion euros) (Cohen, 2022). The burden of having these additional costs comes at a very bad time for the European Union, whose economy is still trying to overcome the negative impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Nonetheless, as it was demonstrated in Germany in 2015 after it gave refugee to more than one million Syrian refugees, long term refugees can be a positive contribution to a country's economy (Cohen, 2022). In fact, according to The Economist an estimate of 145,000 to 200,000 Ukrainians have already found a job in Poland, nonetheless, due to the language barrier, refugees often can only opt to low-paid jobs (The Economist, 2022). Additionally, as Ukrainian men have enlisted in the armed forces there is a man shortage in some sectors, which as it occurred during World War II, might force women to take over the jobs which were previously held by Ukrainian men (The Economist, 2022).

Moreover, according to the Bank Santander, the budgetary impact of the war in the EU territory will amount to 175 billion euros, which comprises around 1.1 to 1.4 percent of the GDP of the European community (Santander, 2022). This is in part caused by the soaring prices of oil and gas, by the inflation, by the cost of assisting war refugees, as well as by the loss of confidence of investors (Santander, 2022). The 175 billion euros extra budgetary cost of the war will be divided in 4 different ways: firstly, 20 billion will be invested in improving the security and defence mechanisms of the European Union, 30 billion euros will be destined towards the cost of providing refugee to all refugees arriving from Ukraine, thirdly, an amount of 50 billion euros will be used to contain to effects of tax cuts and price controls (Santander, 2022). Finally, the biggest share of the budgetary costs (75 billion euros) will be destined towards investing in developing energy alternatives to the oil and gas from Russia, with the intention of reversing the fact that

Europe pays Russia 850 million dollars (808 million euros) a day in energy (AP News, 2022). The EU thus, aims to end the dependency they have on Russia for natural gas by 2024 (Alderman, 2022). The surging energy costs have posed the biggest impact into the pockets of households and business all around the Eurozone (Alderman, 2022). Ironically, such large quantities of money are helping the Kremlin finance the war in Ukraine.

The international imbalance that has risen because of the Russian continued aggression against Ukraine was provoked an inflation record in the Eurozone. By March, the inflation rates had reach 7.5 percent, a huge spike from the 1.3 percent inflation rates experienced just one year prior (Alderman, 2022). Food prices, as well as wheat, fertilizers and barley have also soared, demonstrating one of the many impacts of how the War in Ukraine is coursing into the Eurozone economy (Alderman, 2022).




Figure 5: Inflation rates on the Eurozone, (Eurostat, 2022)

5. Methodology

This dissertation has a quantitative and theoretical-descriptive character, as the research was carried out through the study of secondary sources. The theoretical framework and the state of play section consisted of examining existing research on the topic. A special focus has been placed on three theories in the field of International Relations: Realism, Security Dilemma and National Security. Nonetheless, all three theories are intertwined and share a similar worldview, which helps further advance their realist point of view on international relations.

In order to write this final paper, the writer has mostly gathered information from news agencies such as *The Economist*, or *The New York Times*. In addition, the official website of the European Council, the Council of the European Union and most specially the official website of the European Peace Facility has been of great help. Scholar papers have only been used in order to construct an idea of the theoretical framework, as due to the novelty of both the European Peace Facility and the Russian invasion of Ukraine there is not much research done on the matter.

When conducting this research paper, the author has experienced some setbacks in regard to finding information from the European Peace Facility that did not come from an official source of the EU, hence, this has created a very one-sided point of view on the off-budget mechanism. In addition, the novelty of the mechanism has not allowed for an extensive analysis to be created. As a consequence, this factor did not allow the author to obtain a big picture on the impact of the EPF. Therefore, I believe in order to conduct a better analysis of the European Peace Facility's impact on the Russia-Ukraine conflict a bigger time frame is needed.

6. Analysis

The sound of air raid sirens across cities in Ukraine in the dawn of the 24th February 2022, signalled the beginning of the Russian invasion (Young, 2022). More than 100 days have gone by, and still no resolution has been found to the occupation. Moreover, even if physically, the conflict is between two neighbouring countries, the truth is that there has been an overwhelming attention and involvement from nations all around the world. In a way, it could be said that the war has divided the world in two dichotomous sides: those who support Russia's actions and those that favour Ukraine. There are not many countries that openly back Russia's military occupation, nonetheless, according to an analysis carried out by *The Economist newspaper*, Ukraine has obtained backing from 131 nations (The Economist, 2022). Thus, creating a rare unified Western front in which not only can we find the majority of Western nations, and international organizations such as the European Union or NATO, but its allies have also shown their stance with Ukraine.



Figure 6: Countries supporting each side of the conflict, (The Economist, 2022)

The main problem that Ukraine faces after the Russian invasion and which became more evident as the war unfolded, was the fact that the country is neither a member of NATO nor the European Union, a factor which Russia had in mind when it ordered the invasion of its neighbouring country. Both supranational organizations hold a clause of

mutual defence (for NATO it is under Article Five, and for the European Union is the Article 42 (7)) by which if one member state is attacked, the rest of the allies would have the legal obligation to aid and assist it (NATO, 2022) (EU-lex, 2022). Thus, as the Kremlin knew well enough that NATO was not obliged to come to Ukraine's defence, and it also knew that NATO would hold off until it was primordial to partake an active role in the war, the 24th February of 2022 Russia initiated a set of aggressions against the Ukrainian population. For years Mr. Putin has wanted to undermine the European Union, for which he created a frame in the media depicting the EU as a sham in the way that it is supposedly ineffective, and hypocritical, and thus, the fact that the European Union has not taken part in the conflict, has furthered advanced this notion to Russia's allies. Which as a consequence could undermine the EU's attempt of being consolidated as a hard power (Milanesse, 2022).

Furthermore, while tensions continue escalating Russia's president, Mr. Putin, has invoked the use of atomic threats, warning that "the third parties standing in the way of Russia, risk consequences that have never been seen before in the history of mankind" (The Economist, 2022). Nevertheless, the open display of support to Ukraine did not narrowed after such threats, as in fact, backing Ukraine does not only entail helping a country fight invader forces, but it consequentially also entails fighting for democracy, human rights and international security. It is in situations like this one where the Security Dilemma comes in place. That is to say that by acting upon the desire of self-preservation, states have come together to cooperate against a common enemy or a common threat, which in this case, the common threat is the possibility of Russia getting the control of the Ukrainian territory. If Russia achieves its goal, that could easily be the beginning of a future expansion over the European territory. Which subsequently, would create a constant sense of insecurity, among the European Union members and its NATO allies, forcing them to improve their security systems over the possible threat from the countries opposing to the West. This would not be limited to Russia but to other imperialist countries such as China (which has officially backed Russia) or North Korea. Success of Russia would send a message to these countries about what China typically depicts as a 'decadent Western World'. Conversely, taking into consideration Russia's role in the conflict, is a clear exemplification of the Realist Theory, which depicts countries as only looking to increase their power (territorial, economic or political), and pursue its ambitions, whatever the cost might be.

As days go by and the war is entering its fourth month duration, the consequences and the attrition of the conflict are largely being suffered in the frontlines (The Economist, 2022). Losses on both sides of the battle have been severe. According to *The Economist*, in mid-May the military force on the invaders side, shrank to by a 58 percent, by June 1st the figures had decreased even more (The Economist, 2022). On the other hand, Ukraine also felt similar losses. On May 31st, Volodymyr Zelensky stated that an average of 60 to 100 soldiers were dying daily, and 500 combatants were getting wounded every day, rates which can only be comparable to those in the Second World War (The Economist, 2022). Regarding military armour, Russia is thought to have lost an estimate of 761 tanks, which subsequently has forced the army to use equipment that was used in the 1980s (The Economist, 2022). Contrastingly, due to the enormous international backing Ukraine has experienced, artillery and equipment are not a problem for the country's military personnel. Nonetheless, a setback Ukraine is suffering is the lack of adequately trained military personnel. According to Konrad Muzyka, the founder of *Rochan Consulting* (an independent aerospace and defence consulting firm that conducts daily reports of the War in Ukraine), there is such a large number of Ukrainians that want to fight for their country, in fact the waiting list to be inducted is estimated to be one month long (The Economist, 2022). Moreover, if Ukrainian forces were to take back the lands in the east and south, which are now under Russian control, Ukrainian officials estimate the need for 25,000 men, a figure which nowadays seems be impossible to achieve due to the shortage of military trained recruits (The Economist, 2022).

Moreover, in a war that is expected to drag on for numerous more months and maybe even years, what will make one side of the conflict prevail over the other, mostly depends on the flow of manpower, armament, and ammunition (The Economist, 2022). Thus, in order to create a relief system to overcome the burnout levels of the Russian military reserves, Vladimir Putin might be forced to conduct a general mobilisation. This would create an enormous problem for Russian forces, as the country's authorities have not presented the conflict in Ukraine for what it is, a war, but rather it has been depicted as a "special operation". Hence, creating a frame which entails that the military intervention is not very important and thus, there is no need for the whole of the Russian society to be involved (Open Democracy, 2022). Nevertheless, if the situation demands for a mobilisation to take place, the social repercussion could be enormous, as the Russian

society will realize they have been lied to on the severity of the armed conflict by disinformation campaigns. The disinformation campaigns contain a very Machiavellian character, as according to the Italian philosopher, rulers need to maintain their position of power at all costs, and thus any action, even disinformation and manipulation manoeuvres are accepted (Goldstein & Pevehouse, 2007).

While not directly intervening in warfare, in terms of military aid, countries all around the world and international organizations have been extremely generous in providing military, humanitarian and financial support to Ukraine. The United States is by far the nation that will provide more money in the country, having pledged to give almost 26 billion dollars in weapons and equipment (Buchholz, 2022). The second country that will provide more money for military expenses is the United Kingdom, followed by Poland, which accounts for 0.1 percent and 0.3 percent respectively of both countries GDP (Buchholz, 2022).




Figure 7: What country has provided more military aid to Ukraine, (Buchholz, 2022)

Furthermore, international organizations have also been a great asset to Ukraine. NATO's support has also been exceptional, sending large amounts of arms and providing economic aid, nonetheless, in the face of a possible nuclear attack from Russia, the North Atlantic Alliance has demurred from providing missiles able to strike Russia (The Economist, 2022). This can be justified by the fact that many NATO members consider Ukraine should eventually (sooner than later) settle and find an agreement with Russia, as defeating the Russian superpower 'could even have more dire consequences' (The Economist, 2022). Nonetheless, what those NATO representatives do not seem to properly realise is that if Russia were to take control of the Ukrainian nation with almost no consequences, the chances of a new armed conflict spilling over to the European continent in the following years will largely increase, and thus the threat to the West will be imminent.

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion, the European Union has been very active in trying to provide assistance to Ukraine, in fact, five different measures have been shaped to alleviate the effects of the conflict. The 28th February 2022, just four days after the beginning of the Russian invasion, the EU adopted a 500 million euro fund to support the Ukrainian nation, which was destined to bolster the armed forces as well as to protect the civilian population by financing equipment and supplies (Consilium Europa, 2022). This marked a historic moment in the history of the EPF and the European Union as never before, had it financed the supply or delivery of lethal material. Then, on March 11th 2022 the Versailles declaration was adopted. The declaration consists of a review on the topics that were discussed in an informal meeting in Versailles among the Heads of Government. In which they reiterated their support for the people of Ukraine (those in warfare, the civilians in hiding and even the refugees entering their countries), they condemned the crimes committed by Russia, and Belarus for being an accomplice to the crimes (Consilium Europa, 2022). In addition, they encouraged Ukraine's desire to become the 28th member state of the EU and praised for the bonds between the European Union and Ukraine to get closer in the future. Finally, they enforced their desire to bolster their military capabilities and reduce their energy dependencies in Russia, as well increase their role as a security provider. Furthermore, the 21st March, the Council of the European Union formally approved what is known as the Strategic Compass, displaying a very ambitious plan with actions to follow in order to strengthen the EU's security and defence policy (Consilium Europa, 2022). This will formally allow the European Union autonomy

to pursue strategic measures to uphold its values and interests in any way they see fit (Consilium Europa, 2022).

Almost four months have gone by, and the resolution of the conflict is far from being reached. With four tranches of financial support, the European Peace Facility has destined an overall 2 billion euros to ensure that the military body in the Ukrainian side of the war has enough lethal equipment, medical supplies, protective equipment and fuel to continue defending their territorial and sovereignty interests (Consilium Europa, 2022). In addition to helping aid on matters of cyber-defence as well as on engineering and demining equipment (EU, 2022). The fact that the European Peace Facility has already invested 2 billion of the almost 6 billion euros budget it has over a five-year period, perfectly exemplifies the importance and the wide-ranging impact of the war in Ukraine. Moreover, it also sheds light into the new shift the European Union is taking with the hopes of increasing its role as an essential international actor.

Acting as a soft power, the European Union has imposed numerous sanctions on the Russian Federation as a way to influence the military and governmental authorities to strike back and withdrawal its forces and military equipment. In order to increase the effect of such measures, the EU has decided to impose a toll on the Russian economy, as it is a direct way in which the whole of the Russian society will be affected by the brutality imposed by the government and the military. Consequently, any transaction with the Russian Central Bank is prohibited, moreover, any Russian money that is stored in the central banks or private institutions that are located in the European territory cannot be extracted and neither the sale, transfer of supply nor Euro banknotes in Russia is allowed (Consilium Europa, 2022). In addition, several import and export restrictions have also been introduced on land, sea and air as to further debilitate the economy (Consilium Europa, 2022). Other ways in which the European Union has been successful posing a toll on the Russian economy and in its population is by shutting down the airspace for Russian planes. As a consequence of the sanctions, Russia's economy is under restrain: inflation rates are rapidly surging and banks are under slowly experiencing the effects of the war (Verma, 2022). Nonetheless, even if the sanctions are mostly directed towards Russia, as Belarus is siding with the Russian Federation the country is also experiencing economic setbacks which are affecting the mineral, tobacco, energy and steel sectors (Baume & Barigazzi, 2022)



Figure 8: Economic sanctions imposed in Russia, as a consequence of the War in Ukraine, Deloitte (Kalish, 2022)

Furthermore, the EU has introduced individual sanctions on people either in power or on those who have a very big influence on Russian society and whose members are found on sectors such as the military or technology and even to those responsible for transmitting the government propaganda. The individuals responsible for the massacres in Bucha and Mariupol are also included in this list which overall, accounts to 98 entities and 1158 individuals (Consilium Europa, 2022). Consequently, they have been imposed travel bans and their accounts have been frozen.

7. Conclusion

All in all, it can be concluded that the European Union under the European Peace Facility has had a deep impact in providing support and assistance to those affected by the War in Ukraine, but most specially to those actively partaking in the armed conflict. Although the novelty of the off-budget mechanism might have initially created a frame of disadvantage for the EPF, in contrast to other international organizations such as NATO, the large amounts of investment and aid provided by Europe have been of tremendous help. As the institutions and mechanisms of the EU work as a unified front, the role of the European Peace Facility cannot be measured without taking into account the overall support provided by the European Bloc. Hence, it is essential to keep in mind that apart from having an active role in providing aid to the military fronts in Ukraine, the European Union has had an impressive role in providing help to the civilian population, releasing some of the burden from the war, as well as trying to influence Russia to ceasefire.

All three theoretical frameworks construct a Machiavellian image of the World, in the way that they depict states as egoistic and selfish entities that only pursue their own national interests at all costs. Thus, creating an international system filled with threat and danger. Following this narrative, it can be concluded that the international system is constructed on the idea that is a 'war of all against all', in which states only carry out activities that will allow them to obtain benefits. In the case of Russia, invading Ukraine is justified in the way that the leaders of the country want to further expand their scope of influence, they also want to rule over a land with which they share a common identity, culture and history, in addition to wanting to get control of the resources of the nation. On the other hand, the fact that the European Union and all the NATO partners have provided assistance to Ukraine, can be explained not so much on the basis of altruism but in the idea that by helping Ukraine, they are limiting Russia from increasing their power, and thus that would benefit them. Furthermore, if Russia were to increase its power it would derive in an increased sense of insecurity, that originates from mutual suspicion and fear.

Contrastingly, the tensions between Ukraine and Russia will not end once a resolution of the conflict takes place. Preventing that Ukraine undergoes a nuclear attack is essential,

however it will not enough to ensure international stability until actions are taken to ensure that the Russian Federation will not carry out a similar aggression in the future (The Economist, 2022). Nonetheless, the present crisis in Ukraine has made it even more evident that Russia's interference in the geopolitical sphere is not an isolated situation, as it already participated in undermining the democracies in the United States and the European Union. Therefore, a strong and united Europe is necessary to counteract the actions that might risk the stability in Europe. Thus, the EPF perfectly exemplifies a shift in the international sphere, as the EU has transitioned from being a peace project to a military and security provider.

With the help of the Security Dilemma, it is exemplified that the cooperation between the Western powers and Ukraine stems from their desire to prevent a common enemy from becoming more powerful. In addition, if Russia were to fully invade Ukraine it will share four new borders with the European Union (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania), opening up a scenario of tremendous insecurity to the European Union member states. Furthermore, by taking the National Security Theory, one can link the idea that by prioritizing security interests a large percentage of Ukrainians, especially the male population between the ages of 18 until 60, would have to give up some of their liberties by being forced to stay in the country and fight the war.

The security dilemma, which has been considered as one of the most important theoretical ideas in international relations as it sheds light into a topic common to all: What is the extent by which increasing security measures actually leads to an increased sense of safety for all? Furthermore, the Ukrainian-Russian conflict also brings about a morality dilemma which is often questioned by the Realist paradigm, are all actions justified to fulfil ones' objectives?

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