



COMILLAS

UNIVERSIDAD PONTIFICIA

ICAI

ICADE

CIHS

Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences

Bachelor's in International Relations

Bachelor Thesis

**How the War in Ukraine Shaped EU
Foreign Policy towards Russia: A
Comprehensive Analysis of the Economic,
Defense and Diplomacy factors**

Student: Ana Chun Lucas Sánchez

Director: Carlos Miguel Rico Motos

Madrid, April 2023

Abstract

The following study provides a comprehensive analysis of the European Union's foreign policy towards Russia before and after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. The research question is whether the war in Ukraine has forced the EU to adopt a more realistic foreign policy towards Russia within the trade, defense and security, and diplomacy areas. The investigation argues that the war has made the EU develop more realistic foreign policies based on hard power instead of liberal measures based on soft power that have been predominant throughout the years within the Common Foreign and Security Policy and policies towards Russia due to their complex relationship since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The study concludes that the war in Ukraine has brought about a real change in the EU's foreign policy towards Russia only in the trade and defense and security areas, but not in the diplomatic one.

Keywords: EU, Russia, war, Ukraine, Crimea, trade, defense, security, diplomacy, energy, foreign policy.

Resumen

El siguiente estudio ofrece un análisis exhaustivo de la política exterior de la Unión Europea hacia Rusia antes y después de la invasión de Ucrania en 2022. La pregunta de la investigación es si la guerra de Ucrania ha obligado a la UE a adoptar una política exterior más realista hacia Rusia en las áreas de comercio, defensa y seguridad, y diplomacia. La investigación argumenta que la guerra ha forzado a la UE a desarrollar políticas exteriores más realistas basadas en el poder duro en lugar de las medidas liberales basadas en el poder blando que han predominado a lo largo de los años en la Política Exterior y de Seguridad Común y en las políticas hacia Rusia debido a su compleja relación desde el colapso de la Unión Soviética. El estudio concluye que la guerra en Ucrania ha provocado un cambio real en la política exterior de la UE hacia Rusia, pero principalmente en el área comercial y de defensa y seguridad, y no en el área diplomática.

Palabras clave: UE, Rusia, guerra, Ucrania, Crimea, comercio, defensa y seguridad, diplomacia, energía, política exterior.

TABLA DE CONTENIDO

1. Introduction	1
2. Proposal, objectives and Hypothesis.....	2
3. Methodology.....	3
4. Theoretical framework	6
4.1. <i>Theories of international relations</i>	6
4.1.1. <i>Realism</i>	6
4.1.2. <i>Liberalism.....</i>	9
4.1.3. <i>Hard power vs Soft power</i>	10
4.2. <i>History of the European Union and its foreign policy</i>	12
4.3. <i>The evolution of the EU-Russia relations.....</i>	16
5. Analysis.....	18
5.1 <i>The war in Ukraine and its impacts on the EU</i>	18
5.2 <i>The foreign policy of the EU towards Russia before the war in Ukraine.....</i>	19
5.2.1 <i>Trade.....</i>	20
5.2.2 <i>Defense and security.....</i>	21
5.2.3 <i>Diplomacy.....</i>	22
5.3 <i>The foreign policy of the EU towards Russia after the war in Ukraine</i>	23
5.3.1 <i>Trade.....</i>	23
5.3.2 <i>Defense and security.....</i>	25
5.3.3 <i>Diplomacy.....</i>	27
6. Discussion.....	27
7. Conclusions	31
8. Bibliography	33
9. Annex.....	43
9.1 <i>Annex 1. Figure 1. EU trade in goods with Russia (2011-2021)</i>	43
9.2 <i>Annex. 2. Figure 2. EU trade in goods with Russia (2021-2022)</i>	43

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the last few years, the European Union has experienced numerous external challenges that have emphasized the internal weaknesses of the EU, its unwillingness, and its incapability in some instances of establishing a more proactive foreign policy. However, none of these challenges have successfully obliged the European Union to adopt a more realistic approach regarding its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), moving away from its liberal strategy based on soft power instruments such as diplomacy and cooperation. A clear example of this was Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, which posed a direct security threat to the borders of the European Union with the Eastern European countries. In response to the invasion of Crimea, the European Union reconsidered its relationship with Russia and started to consider it an adversary rather than a cooperative partner (Millosevich Juaristi, 2018). As a result, the EU attempted to promote a more geostrategic foreign policy concerning Russia based on five principles. However, this new approach did not signify any real change in their foreign policy towards a more realistic and proactive approach. Yet, the same event took place eight years after, in 2022, when Russia invaded Kyiv, and the EU's reaction against Russia has been more unified. On top of this, the EU has been adopting new measures to become a more geopolitical European Union, which might suggest a shift from their traditional CSFP based on soft power towards a more realistic strategy. For this reason, the following paper will analyze if the war in Ukraine has forced the European Union to implement a more realistic foreign policy towards Russia.

2. PROPOSAL, OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESIS

This paper analyzes the impacts that the war in Ukraine had on the European Union's foreign policy towards Russia. In this regard, the study will focus on answering the following question: to what extent the war in Ukraine in 2022 has brought about a real change in EU's foreign policy concerning Russia? To address this question the paper will analyze the EU's foreign policy towards Russia before and after the war emphasizing three important aspects of their relationship: trade, defense and security, and diplomacy which are the main pillars of their long-standing relationship.

Since the beginning of the creation of the European Union, the European community has faced multiple and diverse challenges. However, in recent years, the European Union has experienced major internal challenges such as the rise of radical nationalisms in different member countries or the undermining of the rule of law in many EU members which has significantly weakened the EU by calling into question the continuity of the EU due to the lack of consensus and joint action (Hilmer, 2017, p. 18-19; McCourt, 2022). Further to this, the EU has also experienced external challenges such as migration crises, terrorist threats, the invasion of Crimea in 2014, and ultimately the war in Ukraine in 2022, which have highlighted many weaknesses of the European Community (Lehne, 2022; European Council, 2022g; Bergmann et.al., 2023). However, the invasion of Ukraine by Russia has had serious implications for European territory and its borders, as it is where the battlefield lies. For this reason, the EU has been under pressure to strengthen its neighborhood policies with Eastern Europe and promote a realistic Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to deal with its adversary, Russia. This means the birth of a geopolitical European Union that, if implemented properly, will strengthen its status quo within the international community in the long term as a geopolitical actor.

Ergo, analyzing the European Union's foreign policy around Russia before and after the war in Ukraine is of great relevance, since it could mean the beginning of a new European Union within the international context and a significant change in EU-Russia relations. Consequently, the objective of the following paper is to analyze if the war in Ukraine has forced the European Union to shift its foreign policy concerning Russia since the annexation of Crimea, towards a more realistic approach based on hard power. Thus, the research question will be the following: *to what extent the war in Ukraine has brought about a real change in the EU's foreign policy concerning Russia?* In this case, the study

of the annexation of Crimea serves as a reference point to compare it with the implications of the invasion of Ukraine for the EU foreign policy around Russia because is the same type of crisis involving the same actors and it meant a change in their relationship, however, it never meant a shift towards a realistic approach by the EU. For this reason, the hypothesis that would lead this research will be that the war in Ukraine has had an impact on EU-Russia relations resulting in a more realistic approach in three main aspects trade, defense and security, and diplomacy.

3. METHODOLOGY

The present research will be divided into four parts. The first part will address the different theories of international relations with a focus on realism, liberalism, and the use of hard and soft power in foreign policy. To do that, the paper will offer a literature review by using different resources from different university libraries, Google Academics, Dialnet and think tanks such as Real Instituto Elcano or the Center for Strategic and International Studies to understand states' behavior and the power dynamics within the international community but with especial attention to the European Union. This part intends to provide a general description of what they are and how they relate to foreign policy to identify if the current EU foreign policy measures in relation to Russia fall within the realistic perspective or not.

The following part will provide a historical review of the creation of the EU and its foreign policy to understand the values and the rationality behind the EU's way of carrying out its foreign policy. For this historical revision, apart from the resources mentioned previously, books such as *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World* (2012) by Federica Bindi or *The European Union and Global Governance* (2011) by Jens-Uwe Wunderlich and David J. Bailey, will be used along with official documents and websites of the numerous EU institutions such as the European Commission and the European Union External Action Service among others.

The next sections will explain the relations between Russia and the EU, the annexation of Crimea and how it affected the EU-Russia relations, and finally how the war in Ukraine has affected the European Union and how the political community has reacted against Russia. The objective of this part is to provide a general explanation of how the EU responded to the same type of crisis nine years before with Crimea, which will be the central focus of the comparative analysis in the fourth part in order to identify

if the Ukrainian war has changed the way the EU engages with Russia. Therefore, this last part will analyze and compare the different EU foreign policies concerning Russia, from the annexation of Crimea to the breakout of the war in Ukraine, to be able to address the central concern of this paper: to what extent has the war in Ukraine forced the European Union to adopt a more realistic foreign policy towards Russia? This section will be followed by a discussion of the comparative analysis and a conclusion.

The reasoning behind a comparative analysis in politics is that it helps to test the hypothesis and increase the knowledge about that specific topic (Landman, 2008, p. 9). Within this type of analysis, it can be found two different levels of analysis. The first level is the micro-political or individual level which focuses on the examination of the political activity of individuals such as political leaders. The second level is the macro-political or system level which focuses on the interaction between states. Further to this, the analysis can be done based on a quantitative or qualitative methodology. The former consists of presenting variation in the quantity of the specific topic of analysis while the latter tries to reveal differences in kind (Landman, 2008, p. 19-20). Nevertheless, a comparative analysis of foreign policy is more about putting the focus on the tangible things which are known as the events. The aim is to answer the question “who does what to whom and how.” Therefore, key elements for the analysis are the actors involved, the events, and the statecraft instruments used such as diplomacy, economics, or military (Hudson, 2014, p. 21). Additionally, when analyzing foreign policy measures it is important to understand that foreign policy takes place within a convoluted domestic and international context which influences actors’ decisions when implementing foreign policies making it difficult to differentiate between domestic and foreign policy.

Moreover, foreign policy involves many other actors who are also involved in the outcomes of the foreign policy (Neack, 2019, p. 4-5). This is the case of the European Union which is inside a two-level game where it has to take into account the internal dynamics and the international scenario when implementing foreign policies (Putnam, 1988, p. 459). In addition, its decisions and actions are limited by the different member states which affect significantly the desired outcome of the European Union’s foreign policies. As a result, it is necessary to comprehend everything around foreign policy. Because of this reason, the research paper gives an explanation of the EU’s internal situation, its foreign policy behavior, and its relationship with Russia which are essential to understand the analysis and results of the research. In spite of these two levels, many scholars have found that foreign policy analysis, which is mainly focused on states, takes

also into account the individual characteristics of the leaders, the group's decision making and culture and national identity as levels that influenced the process of making foreign policy decisions (Lantis & Beasley, 2017).

Consequently, this comparative analysis of the EU foreign policies concerning Russia before and after the war in Ukraine will be done at a systemic level through a qualitative method, since the aim of the investigation is to find if there has been a change in the EU foreign policy approach towards Russia. In this regard, the analysis will be focused on the actors involved and their relationship, the events, what has the EU done in each case in response to the Ukrainian crisis, and the statecraft instruments that have been used in each situation. It will also take into account the internal and international context to comparatively assess the key elements in order to answer the research question. So, to verify the hypothesis (the war in Ukraine has had an impact on EU-Russia relations resulting in a more realistic approach in three main aspects trade, defense and security, and diplomacy) the analysis puts the focal point on the key elements of comparative analysis and how the measures implemented or events within each area of concern identify more with a liberal or realistic approach after the outbreak, giving the fact that in the past the EU has always adopted more liberal and democratic measures. Thus, the qualitative analysis will use reports, drafts, articles, press releases, bulletins, official documents and announcements from the European Council, and European Commission as well as from other EU institutions like the European Union External Action Service and statements from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joseph Borrell. In addition to these resources, papers written by different think tanks will be used as complementary sources to address the question.

4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

4.1. THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The emergence of International Relations as a subject that, originally, focuses on the study of international life among many different civilizations traces back thousands of years ago to Ancient Greece, where many philosophers such as Plato or Aristotle have written about international politics theories. These theories were considered pre-theories of international relations that evolved throughout the time and were consolidated during the European Renaissance characterized by a Christian Western mindset due to the colonial period (Moyúa & Sanahuja, 2015, p. 24-32). Nevertheless, it was not until the end of World War I that the discipline of International Relations was officially recognized as a separate one with the establishment of International Politics at the University of Wales and the Woodrow Wilson Chair (Burchill & Linklater, 2013, p. 6). This event favored the development of different theories of International Relations and the continuity of long-standing theories such as realism and liberalism which will be explained in the following paragraphs.

4.1.1. REALISM

The origin of realism comes from ancient times with authors like Sun Tzu but the main contributions were made by philosophers and political scientists such as Thomas Hobbes, Niccoló Machiavelli from the 16th and 17th centuries, and Hans Morgenthau, E.H.Carr or Kenneth Waltz from the 20th century, which is the moment when *realpolitik* ruled state's foreign policy as a result of the wars and the failure of the League of Nations (Moyúa & Sanahuja, 2015, p. 61-64). Despite the different definitions and interpretations given by all these figures, all realists agreed on the basis of realism. This is the idea that there are certain constraints on politics imposed by the egoism of human nature and the anarchic international life due to the absence of a world government. Because of this reason, it is required the primacy of power and security in all aspects of the state's political life (Donnelly, 2013, p. 32). In this sense, realism is built on two main assumptions. The first is that egoism is what drives the state's political behavior and undermines collective interest. The second is power-centrism measured in terms of control over others and resources, which is central to political interactions (Wohlforth, 2012, p. 36). As the first theorists emphasized, it is also assumed that the world's characteristics are invariable despite the efforts, based on "goodwill", made by the various actors. As a result, realists

focus on describing the world as it is rather than how it should be. The features of this world or international scenario are danger and insecurity, as a consequence of the constant conflict and global competition among states where the equilibrium of power is necessary to avoid wars between them. Therefore, realists interpret that states only count on their own means to survive within the anarchic international scenario because the gains of one state are losses to another state (Moyúa & Sanahuja, 2015, p. 62). However, the fact that power and egoism are the two main elements that shape international politics does not exclude the presence of moral judgments. This is what differentiates radical and classical realists. The former does not recognize any presence of ethics and glorifies conflict, while the latter acknowledges the presence of ethics in international politics even though they are critical of it because they state that abstract moral values do not consider the reality of politics (Korab-Karpowicz, 2017, p. 1).

Bearing in mind these general assumptions of realism, the most relevant figures of the 20th century had their own vision of realism. On one hand, E. H. Carr's position among realists was more centered on criticizing liberals, highlighting that they were utopians who had a very idealistic view that did not allow them to pay attention to reality, instead just focusing on how international politics should be. In this sense, his most famous book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis* (1939) was more focused on criticizing liberals rather than formulating a realist theory. Notwithstanding he defended the idea that states were the main actors who cared about power, making it the most important tool for them. But he, also, considered that the search for more power was not the ultimate goal of states. The reason behind this is that he advocated that a serious and good policymaker should take into account utopia and reality at the same time because states were motivated by power but, they also cared about liberal ideas that also shape international politics. He further developed that states used ideal discourses to justify their actions that are based on cost-benefit calculations (Mearsheimer, 2005, p.139-143).

On the other hand, Morgenthau focuses on the element of power, in particular, the use of power as a tool to control others or to force others to do what you desire because it is part of human nature to want to expand and dominate. Considering this, according to Morgenthau, the beginning of wars are statesmen who pursue expansionist foreign policies to protect their national interests. With this understanding, states seek power within an anarchic international scenario to defend their interest, ensure their autonomy and independence as well as maintain their status quo. Consequently, states can never be safe in an international context where competition for power is the key to survival. In this

perspective, uncertainty is what pushes states to strive for more power to guarantee their security and eventually their survival (Moyúa & Sanahuja, 2015, p. 64-73).

Lastly, given the increasing interdependence after the Cold War, Waltz interpreted power and state behavior differently from Morgenthau. As it can be derived from the previous paragraph, Morgenthau thought saw power as a means to achieve the survival of the state while state behavior was a way of increasing power. Waltz as a neorealist, considered that the state's main concern was security instead of power. He also defended the idea that political structures are defined by their ordering principle (hierarchy and anarchy), functions (a state can only take care of itself), and distribution of capabilities, which is the most important one. Meaning, how states interact, how political functions are assigned, and how power is distributed. This is because given an anarchical system that limits cooperation and leads to unequal gains and insecurity, states are afraid of gaining less than other states from being cooperative and becoming dependent on other states. Therefore, their political interest is defined by security issues rather than economic gains. In this sense, Waltz stresses that what differs political structures is their capability, which is defined by the changing fate of great powers since in an anarchical context, states attempt to balance the power of other states to ensure their security and reduce any risk coming from a greater or rising power (Donnelly, 2013, p. 37-38; Korab-Karpowicz, 2017, p. 25-26). That being the case it can be found two types of realism: defensive and offensive.

The first one is described as states pursuing security by protecting limited foreign interests, having reduced arm forces, and promoting moderate foreign policies. In this sense, this is a more optimistic type of realism (Moyúa & Sanahuja, 2015, p. 82-84). Defensive realists argue that under specific conditions conflict can be mitigated. These conditions are having technological weapons with the ability to strike back and a strong state identity which reduces the possibility of being controlled by others and leads to a more secure international scenario. The second one is characterized by states seeking more power and influence because is the only way to ensure their security since in an anarchical system, security and survival are never guaranteed because there is no authority that can ensure compliance with agreements or the possibility that peace conditions will endure (Wohlforth, 2012, p. 39). Despite being an old tradition, the theory of realism is still very relevant in the 21st century because it explains the rationale behind many states' behaviors and their power dynamics in the current international system.

4.1.2. LIBERALISM

The theory of liberalism is also an old tradition and influential thinking that has its origins in the European Enlightenment (Burchill, 2013, p. 57). This is the time when diverse philosophers such as John Locke with the idea of rule of law, or Jeremy Bentham, highlighting the importance of international law, started to influence the debate about the modernization of the state. It is within this social context that liberal ideas started to take form (Moyúa and Sanahuja, 2015, p. 102). But is not until the end of the Cold War that the liberal theory was consolidated and become significantly important for international relations. During the aftermath of the wars, ideas such as freedom, cooperation, multilateralism, peace, free market economies, democracy, and human rights, became very important, since the collapse of the Soviet Union generated the possibility of establishing an international liberal order to reconstruct the world (Huysmans, 1995, p.473-474). This led to a more radical view of liberalism such as the one of Francis Fukuyama who believe that the end of the Cold War meant the universalization of liberal democracy and economic liberalism. Meaning, the triumph of liberalism will mean the end of history. Nevertheless, his point of view serves as an important reference for the American and European ways of foreign policy (Jackson & Xidias, p.10-13).

During this period, liberalism provided an alternative view to interpret international politics far from realism since it gave different explanations for how institutions, states, and economic connections ameliorate states' power resulting in an optimistic view of the future of global politics. In addition, it emphasized the idea of the individual's rights and the role of the government to protect them because it is considered that the well-being of the citizens is essential for a democratic political system. Therefore, if we extrapolate this idea to the international context, liberals thought that states' foreign policies affect their domestic liberty since increasing military power could be used to oppress the citizens. So, they defended that democratic systems tend to not get involved in conflicts because of the system of checks and balances, and because they perceive other democratic regimes as legitimate. Further to this, they stress the power of cooperation and interdependence instead of force and take into account the presence of other actors like international organizations that regulate how states behave based on Western international laws making a power dispersed internationally (Meiser, 2018).

As a result, the idea of interdependence became more complex, which put in doubt the need to use force since the relations began to be dominated by multiple statesmen

rather than just two actors. These new relationships were affecting various states at the same time and at different levels which favored multilateralism. Additionally, progressively more international organizations got involved with the state leading to transnationalism. This is because security and civil rights became a shared concern, their policies were reciprocal, and the economic openness encouraged cooperation (Moyúa and Sanahuja, 2015, p. 110-111). In this sense, as it happened with the realist theory, within liberalism can be found some differentiations between liberals but there are some basic assumptions. These are that liberalism focuses on the idea that states achieve security, stability, and prosperity through cooperation, trade, and the promotion of international laws that reduce the dynamics of anarchy, enhance legitimacy, promote interdependence, and emphasize a civic identity as well as civil rights (Deudney & Ikenberry, 1999, p. 181).

Considering this, liberalism is based on the idea that international relations can adopt a more cooperative approach that will allow and promote the development of the international society until peace, justice, and democracy will be imposed. To achieve this goal, as Robert Keohane said, it is necessary to count on great liberal powers. Notwithstanding, liberals also agree with the idea that states are in an anarchical system, yet they reject the realist interpretation of the nature of anarchy because they do not contemplate that this anarchical system is a state of war in which they have to balance other's power. Instead, they believe that temporary cooperation can take place and states will focus on accommodating new powers rather than challenging and balancing states that pursue power since it leads to mutual benefits in terms of trade and alliance (Doyle, 2012, p. 65-66; Moyúa and Sanahuja, 2015, p. 102). In sum, the liberal theory is a political philosophy that enhances scientific rationality, individual rights, constitutionalism, democracy, and progress centered on capitalism to improve welfare and limitation of the state's power (Burchill, 2013, p. 57). Nonetheless, the liberal vision has been challenged in the past few years with the increasing illiberal states like China and Russia, which makes the liberal order vital for global politics (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2018, p. 16).

4.1.3. HARD POWER VS SOFT POWER

Traditionally, the concept of power in international relations has always been defined as an actor having control over others and forcing them to act in a way that otherwise they would not act. However, other scholars state that this concept does not contemplate other forms of power and fails to comprehend how the outcomes of global politics are formed and why some actors are more limited than others when choosing their fate. They

defended that power is not something that actors have instead is something that comes from social relations or interactions that shape the actors' choices and fate (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, p. 39, 45). Nonetheless, when it comes to hard power and soft power, power is understood as something that states possess. In the case of hard power, the term "power" is used from a realist perspective, which refers to the use of force to ensure its security and obtain more power and influence. This is the case of what is known as hard power and it is the oldest form of power according to Joseph Nye. Hence, hard power is understood as the capacity to achieve one's objectives by using coercive means and threats commonly named "sticks" of international politics (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 5). Some of the hard power instruments used are military power, coercive diplomacy, war, economic sanctions, and bribes among others (Huseynov, 2019, p. 65). The users of hard power continuously act having in mind cost and benefits calculations based on a zero-sum game (Gray, 2011, p. 5). Therefore, their impact tends to have a short-term duration. (Wagner, 2014, p. 2). This is why hard power has been measured by military force, economic strength, geography, territory, natural resources, and population size (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 6). Nonetheless, the most common instruments of hard power are military intervention, economic sanctions, and coercive diplomacy (Hilton, 2018).

In relation to soft power, the concept is used from a liberal approach. Given the fact that the international system was evolving during the post-world wars, the concept of power evolved and was adapted to the new configuration of the world. Meaning, there was a shift from the realist idea of power to the liberal idea of power. Soft power refers to the idea that the new international paradigm, has re-highlighted the use of intangible means of power such as institutions, culture, public opinion, and ideology among others. Taking this into account, soft power is understood as the capacity to shape other's preferences without the exercise of force or coercive measures but, using intangible assets like policies known as "carrots" of international politics (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 5-6). This is because when actors use soft power, they work through persuasive ideas that other actors find attractive and legitimate generating long-term effects (Gray, 2011, p. 5; Wagner, 2014, p. 2). As a result, Joseph Nye identified three different sources of soft power that must be included within a state's foreign policy tools. These are foreign policies perceived as legitimate, attractive, and having moral authority, political values spread externally, and culture in those places where is attractive. However, Nye did not reject the idea of using tangible means such as the military as soft power instruments for disaster relief which causes a combination of both powers (Huseynov, 2019, p. 48-49).

Albeit both concepts might seem like something of the past, especially, hard power, both types of power still play a relevant role in contemporary foreign policies of international relations. In the contemporary world, the use of both powers by states is balanced within their foreign policy strategies as a result of the alteration in the priorities of foreign policy such as dealing with non-state actors, international crime, technological revolution, global crises and the impact of media on foreign policy decisions. In addition, attempting to achieve their objectives in a globalized context has many challenges such as new types of war and the increasing constraints of acquiring and employing hard power in an interconnected world that favors the use of soft power such as public diplomacy (Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, 2010, p. 2-4). However, the use of hard and soft power depends greatly on states' availability and accessibility of power resources. Meaning, bigger states or states with a high strong economy can invest more in armed forces or pressure other state's economies, whereas smaller or weaker states tend to have fewer possibilities to acquire these types of resources since their economies are usually weaker, but they can develop strong soft power instruments.

Yet, as it can be inferred a combination of both powers can take place within a state's foreign policy strategy leading to what is known as "smart power", a term coined by Nossel and Nye (Cross, 2021, p. 50). It is the result of the use of instruments from both types of powers which is characterized by the need for a military army while investing in partnerships and institutions. Bearing in mind this, as it will be further explained in the following sections, on one hand, the European Union has been an actor known for its extensive use of soft power towards its neighboring countries to join the European Union which will guarantee them peace in the country (Wagner, 2014, 1-3). On the other hand, Russia is most commonly known for its use of hard power through military invasion and coercive diplomacy towards its neighboring countries and to balance Western influence. It also makes use of soft power instruments such as the media and public diplomacy with the aim of creating a favorable image of the country (Filimonov, 2010).

4.2. HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

To be able to understand the analysis, it is necessary to review the history of the European Union with a special emphasis on its foreign policy. How its foreign policy was developed, and what are the pillars and goals that shaped it to understand how they created a remarkable region of peace and stability throughout the years and how they tend to behave (Wunderlich and Bailey, 2011, p. 2).

The formulation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy began with the so-called Pleven Plan in 1950, which defended the idea of creating a European army constituted of national troops and commanded by their respective head of government. But this idea failed, and the defense matter became attached to NATO. Regardless of the former failure, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) was created in 1970 to promote their foreign policy based on common positions to facilitate consensus and move the focus from mainly economic foreign policies to a political aspect, presenting the EU as a political community (Stab, 2011, p. 151-154; Keukeleire & Delreux, 2014, p. 43). Yet, it is not until the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 that a more coherent common EU foreign policy was adopted. This is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which replaced the EPC (Stab, 2011, p. 155). The CFSP meant the strengthening of European integration and it entailed a European identity within the international context and having a believable EU foreign policy (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 46-47). In addition to this, the CFSP was an instrument to protect the EU's fundamental values, and interests, reinforce their security, prolong the peace, and foster cooperation based on joint actions, loyalty, and solidarity (Bindi, 2012 p. 26-27). The treaty of Maastricht included a pillar system to organize the different areas within the CFSP. The first pillar is the European Communities (EC). The second was the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third pillar was the currently known Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCCM). The first one handled economic and social matters. The second is in charge of foreign and security matters. And the third one works on fighting crime and giving justice (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 46-48).

In relation to defense, the EU established the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 breaking the taboo. This shifts the nature of the CFSP from a diplomatic-oriented policy to a proactive-oriented foreign policy but without creating a European army. However, the necessity of one was emphasized after the war in Iraq in 2003 and the 9/11 events proving the US' unwillingness to maintain its military presence in the Balkans. Because of this reason, the European Security Strategy was created in 2003 by Javier Solana, High Representative and Vice-President (HR/VP) at the time, which became an important development for the future EU foreign policy. The goals were to address external threats to the EU, build security in the EU neighbors and address these threats as priorities through multilateral cooperation with key actors (Keukeleire and Delreux, 2014, p. 52-55). Regarding the adoption of the European Security Strategy, it meant a turning point for the future development of the EU's foreign and security policies

since all member states agreed on tackling global threats that undermine the multilateral system and affect the EU as well as on setting up specific objectives together to ensure that their security interests were based on the EU's fundamental values (Solana, 2008, p. 3). The foreign policy strategies implemented to deal with the main threats of the time such as terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, or state failures were defined by being more active and coherent policies aimed at developing a more capable EU through strategic diplomatic capabilities, effective management of resources, working with partners and coordinated external action among EU members. Lastly, concerning the Eastern countries, the EU continued pursuing its objective of creating a ring of democratic and well-functioned states while promoting cooperation to foster security and prosperity in the Eastern area (Solana, 2003, p.10-15).

Thirteen years later, Federica Mogherini, the HR/VP since 2014, adopted in 2016 a new EU Global Strategy which paid more attention to the idea of resilience, strategic autonomy, and a pragmatic promotion of the EU core values and interests due to the new global threats that were shaping the global order. Among the numerous challenges, it can be found the instability in the Eastern area, and the deterioration of the global institutions as a result of the violation and undermining of international agreements by states like Russia, the US and China. The fact that relevant actors undermined the multilateral system led to unease within the EU because its foreign policies were greatly anchored on their support to the international system defined by multilateralism. Notwithstanding, the 2016 EU Global Strategy failed to comprehend the gravity of the new global threats due to some big internal EU issues of the time such as Brexit. All this has led to question EU's capability to implement its foreign policies and address its internal and external crises effectively (Haar & Christiansen, 2021, p. 1-4).

Following Mogherini, the current HR/VP, Joseph Borrell, adopted the so-called Strategic Compass in 2022 as the new guidelines and plan to reinforce EU's security and defense policy as a result of the invasion of Ukraine and other threats which has shown the necessity for securing Europe. The new plan is based on four key aspects, acting more rapidly in the light of new threats and challenges arising from the new global scenario, securing all member states and their citizens, investing in technology and diverse capabilities to address the crisis, and advancing and develop partnership with other actors to achieve shared goals. All these will be implemented while reinforcing past strategies like resilience and furthering their values and interests as well as continue guarantying solidarity and mutual assistance (Borrell, 2022a, p. 6-10).

The general mechanisms used by the EU to carry on its foreign and security policies are diplomacy based on dialogue, economic instruments like trade agreements or debt relief, and non-coercive actions such as non-violent punishments. In this sense, through dialogues, the EU is able to persuade states, encourage cooperation and show political support. Settling trade agreements, foreign investments, or providing debt relief, the EU is fostering cooperation and assisting other states like Eastern countries. Finally, by offering rewards and using non-coercive actions and punishments, the EU generates a future favorable response from the other states. The adoption of all these instruments to fulfill their foreign and security policies is mainly focused on persuading, cooperating, democratizing, and protecting human rights. Meaning, soft power tools or “carrots” to achieve their goals, which shows their historical aversion to force and coercion (Smith, 2020, p.3-14). This has been the approach of the EU to respond to all types of crises as the following example of the annexation of Crimea will illustrate.

Concerning the EU’s foreign policy towards its neighbors, commonly known as the European Neighboring Policy (ENP), began in the 20th century. The creation of this foreign policy was motivated by the idea of enlarging the EU and advancing its relationship with Eastern countries. Additionally, it served as a complementary instrument to address key external matters such as migration, energy supply, insecurity, and instability in the region as well as an opportunity to spread its values and interests through cooperation and EU normative power. Yet, the ENP began in the 1990s after the fall of the USSR (Vasilyan, 2011, p. 178-182). The EU’s interest in engaging with Eastern Europe is a direct result of assessing the issues emerging from this area which possess a direct threat to its security due to the geographical closeness. Therefore, the EU adopted an Eastern partnership in 2009, as part of the ENP, centered on boosting its relations with the Eastern countries through bilateral and multilateral agreements aimed at having economic integration and political association to ensure their development which enables peace and stability (Gatev, 2011, p. 285-290). Moreover, the EU’s interest in establishing agreements with the East is, also, a result of Russia’s geopolitical interest in the region. This has caused a clash between both actors which has complicated the situation in the region and removed from them any possibility to remain neutral since some countries have leaned towards Russia while others like Ukraine looked forward to joining the EU (Huseynov, 2019, p. 76-77). Consequently, both actors have been attempting to gain more influence in the region, the EU through soft power instruments while Russia through hard power and few soft power instruments.

4.3. THE EVOLUTION OF THE EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS

The relationship between the EU and Russia began right after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 when the EU saw new opportunities in the formation of a new Russian state. However, the EU's foreign policies towards Russia officially began with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994, which set the basis for what was going to be an asymmetric relationship for the next 20 years.

At the beginning of the relationship, the EU was the main actor of the relationship, the one who was setting the agenda and establishing their priorities with the purpose of drawing, progressively, Russia's political, economic, and social structure towards a liberal and democratic system. As a result, throughout the first 20 years, their relationship was characterized by cooperation and fluent communication with a very Eurocentric point of view (Gutiérrez, 2018, p. 1-2). In this sense, a few years after the PCA, Russia and the EU commenced to work together on what is known as "common spaces" such as economics, freedom, education, investigation, security and justice to deepen their cooperation (Millosevich, 2018). The cooperation between them continued throughout the 2000s but the relationship turned more competitive with the arrival of Vladimir Putin to power. This was a reaction to the EU's attempts to influence Russia and the pre-Soviet countries. Putin rejected the EU as a normative power since it was perceived as a threat to its national interests due to its foreign policies towards Eastern countries. Despite Putin's opinion, the EU continued fostering cooperation and implementing the ENP (Gutiérrez, 2018, p. 5-6). This cooperation which soon became interdependent made Russia one of the first commercial partners of the EU. This situation originated a dependency on Russian imported products such as oil and gas which has limited the European Union's capability to act more forcefully or pushy against Russia during a crisis or conflict since then (Millosevich, 2018). Yet, the relationship completely changed when Russia invaded Crimea in 2014, which forced the EU to rethink its relationship with Russia and consider it as an adversary rather than a strategic partner in the East of Europe (Millosevich, 2018).

The annexation of Crimea took place because of Putin's geopolitical desires and national interests of holding NATO's expansion and the EU's influence in the pre-Soviet countries (Millosevich, 2018). The event happened in 2014 after the Ukrainian internal crisis in 2013, when the president of that time, Viktor Yanukovich, refused an agreement for integrating more in the EU. This caused mass protests in the country and the expulsion

of the president, who was close to Putin. Thus, after the departure of Yanukovich, Putin illegally annexed Crimea, located in the south of Ukraine, violating the territorial integrity of Ukraine to avoid losing its influence in the geographical area (Fisher, 2014). In addition to this, Putin gave political, economic, and military support to pro-Russian rebels located in Donbas. As a consequence of these events, the cooperation between the EU and Russia deteriorated and all EU member states agreed to impose economic sanctions and diplomatic restrictions on Russia because it meant a direct threat to European security (Millosevich, 2018). Complementing the sanctions and restrictions, the EU adopted a new approach to its relationship with Russia considering that the Kremlin was a strategic challenge that needed to be addressed with a unified response from all EU members. This new approach consisted in not accepting the annexation, strengthening the EU, enhancing the resistance of the Eastern countries, and upholding their decision on how they wanted to approach the EU. In addition, the European community decided to nurture dialogue and cooperation with Russia to overcome their conflict of interests due to their interdependency and EU dependency on relevant commodities (European Union External Action Service, 2016).

The EU response could be summarized in five main principles that have served as a framework for its relationship with Russia: 1. Complete implementation of the Minsk agreements; 2. Expand the Eastern Partnership and Central Asian countries; 3. Strengthening of the EU; 4. Selective engagement with Russia and 5. Expansion of people-to-people contacts. Despite these efforts, the EU's new approach did not entail a more realistic approach, even though the annexation was a threat to its security, because the EU continued adopting soft power strategies to ameliorate the situation. This was a consequence of the different opinions that member states have of Russia, which limits the scope of action of the EU and because their strategies were applied inconsistently throughout all this time. But these responses taken by the EU supposed an uphold of their previous "common spaces" (Stewart, 2020, p. 1-2). In the end, during these past years, the EU-Russia relations have been complex due to the deterioration of the relationship itself, the EU's ambitions of promoting its liberal values in the Eastern countries, the interdependence, and more recently, the breakout of the war in Ukraine as it will be explained in the following paragraphs (Gutiérrez, 2018, p. 1-8).

5. ANALYSIS

5.1 THE WAR IN UKRAINE AND ITS IMPACTS ON THE EU

As it is mentioned before, the relations between Russia and the EU were already complex, notwithstanding, with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 their relationship has significantly shifted from economic and energy interdependence towards a less cooperative relation because of the threat that Russia imposes to the EU's security (Meister, 2022). In this context, the outbreak of the war in Ukraine meant a pivotal moment in European security and relation with Russia (Masters, 2023). Russia's invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022 when the Russian troops carried out a full-scale invasion in Kyiv and bombed military targets and killed civilians. These atrocities increased since the Russian army continued air-striking different cities, ports, and military and transport infrastructures while the Ukrainian troops tried to contain the advancement of Russian troops on Ukrainian soil. With these counteroffensives and rapid offensives, the Ukrainian troops regained part of many of their territories such as Kharkiv and Lyman. During the first year of the war, thousands of civilians and combatants were killed, and many human rights and international laws were violated which has caused a dramatic humanitarian crisis that has also impacted the world (Bigg, 2023). The invasion of Ukraine meant a continuation of Russia's geopolitical desires and competition for the Eastern countries that started with the annexation of Crimea. Regarding this, the EU's strategy and measures based on soft power adopted after the invasion of Crimea did not prevent the war in Ukraine, which has significantly impacted the EU and its relations with Russia (Meister, 2022).

The war has provoked a shift in alliances, a redrawing of European Union security lines, the return of the risk of nuclear weapons, and a disruption of food and energy supplies which affected the price of essential commodities for the EU member states and the rest of the world (Coles et al., 2023). Hence, the EU has suffered a third asymmetric shock in terms of economics. Meaning, the increase in inflation has affected different EU countries which have weakened the European Union. In addition to this, the increasing humanitarian crisis and Ukrainian refugees have posed a challenge to the European Union since it has affected more of the EU's neighboring countries. This has led to a reconsideration of their common policy about asylum and migration. Regarding its dependence on Russian gas and oil, the European Union has been forced to phase out its dependency and diversify its energy supplies while searching for energy efficiency and

accelerating the shift towards renewable energy. Additionally, since the war in Ukraine is posing a direct threat to European security and causing a redrawing of the security and defense lines, the EU saw the necessity to increase their defense spending and the drafting of a new security framework known as the Strategic Compass. Further to these, the developing countries were more deeply impacted by the war resulting from the disruption of food and energy supplies as well as price upsurges (Borrell, 2022b). As a reaction to the invasion and its impacts, the EU established different measures. It implemented different packages of economic sanctions and tried to reduce its economic ties with Russia to pressure the Russian economy. It, also, established new guidelines to address Russia and promoted a new approach to acting towards crisis from a more geopolitical perspective (Meister, 2022).

Considering the previous review of international theories and the EU's foreign policy and relation with Russia, the successive sections will analyze the foreign policies after the annexation of Crimea and before the invasion of Ukraine, in the first place, and after the breakout of the war in Ukraine towards Russia, in the second place, to address the research question of this paper: *To what extent the war in Ukraine has brought about a real change in EU's foreign policy concerning Russia?* Thus, to be able to comparatively address the European Union's foreign policy towards Russia in different time frames but in very similar or even the same situation, the analysis will compare the foreign policies measures adopted by the EU and the instruments used in each area of concern, trade, defense, and diplomacy, since the annexation of Crimea to the War in Ukraine, bearing in mind the international and internal context that have influenced the EU's foreign policy decision-making process.

5.2 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU TOWARDS RUSSIA BEFORE THE WAR IN UKRAINE

The annexation of Crimea, as it is mentioned previously, meant a turning point for EU-Russia relations making the EU reframe its relationship with its strategic partner and start seeing it as an adversary. Therefore, this event resulted in the decay of their cooperation, which was reflected in the new foreign policy measures that the European Union adopted towards Russia (Millosevich, 2018). Nevertheless, the President of the European Commission at the time stated that the objective was to de-escalate the situation, encounter peaceful solutions, and keep negotiations with Russia (Barroso, 2014). The next month, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood

Policy added that it was of common interest to promote and maintain stability in the region more than ever. To do so from a comprehensive approach, a series of diplomatic, economic, and defense measures were adopted for Ukraine and Russia (Füle, 2014). In addition, it is important to remember what were the five guiding principles that marked the new EU's Russian foreign policies, since it provides a glimpse of how liberals these policies are.

5.2.1 TRADE

Since the creation of the PCA, Partnership, and Cooperation Agreement, Russia became progressively one of the main trade partners of the EU which enhanced mutually beneficial economic relations and cooperation. However, with the annexation of Crimea, the European Council suspended the negotiations that were taking place since 2008 for a new EU-Russia Agreement. Moreover, the EU imposed a series of sanctions targeting four main economic sectors to hurt and weaken Russia's economy and its ability to start a war. These were arms, dual-use products, specific technologies for oil production, and access to finance (European Commission, n.d.-a).

More specifically, the EU imposed individual economic sanctions whose aim was to freeze the assets of several Russian companies and individuals who have been involved in the event such as Vladimir Putin or members of the Russian State Duma. Furthermore, the European Union imposed economic sanctions on different trade sectors. The first one was the financial sector where the EU banned any transaction with Russian banks and central, access to capital markets as well as contribution to the Russian Direct Investment Fund. The second and third sectors were transport and goods. The sanctions within these sectors were focused on closing the EU airspace to Russian-owned aircrafts and prohibiting the trade of minerals, seafood, cosmetics, luxury goods and iron among many others. In addition, the economic sanctions prohibited services to Russians such as consultancy and advisory services. And, finally, and most important trade sector for the EU, is the energy sector. Within this sector, the EU imposed a price cap on crude oil and banned the exchange of coal, and oil apart from prohibiting providing gas reserves capacities to Russia with the exception of liquified natural gas. Additionally, some areas of economic cooperation between both actors suffered economic sanctions such as stopping the finance operation of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and interrupting new economic cooperation programs (European Council, 2023b).

In relation to the energy sector, it is worth noting that gas and oil imports from Russia are the main component of their trade relations, thus the main concern for the European Union, as the European Commissioner for Energy emphasized by stating that discontinuation of gas supplies can have a huge impact on the European Union. This led to the beginning of serious negotiations, talks with Russia, and the implementation of new strategies to reduce energy imports from Russia that are still relevant in the present (Oettinger, 2014). In addition, the EU continues searching and developing ways to diversify its energy sector to limit or reduce its dependency on Russia which has a predominant position in the EU energy sector as the European Commissioner for climate action of 2015 stated (Cañete, 2015).

5.2.2 DEFENSE AND SECURITY

In reference to defense and security, the EU also adopted some economic sanctions targeting defense sectors by prohibiting exports of dual-use products, technological items, drone engines, ammunition, and military equipment (European Commission, n.d.-a).

Further to this, the EU's Russian defense and security policies were more directed towards the Eastern neighbors as a direct result of wanting to maintain stability and establish a secure region. Consequently, the European Union has developed association agreements with the Eastern countries to have closer economic relations and integration which was perceived by Russia as a direct threat to its sphere of influence because some aspects of these agreements hurt Russian exports. Nonetheless, due to the increasing military and security threats throughout the following years in the Eastern region, NATO, as an essential part of the defense and security area of the EU, responded to Russian threats by deploying troops in 2016 in Poland, as well as providing assistance to Ukraine to address the conflicts and to develop long-term capability measures to strengthen its army. and the Baltic States. As a complementary measure, the European Union, adopted a strategic communication tool, East StratCom Task Force, as part of its defense strategy to uncover Russia's lies and state propaganda directed, mainly, towards the Eastern countries (European Parliament, 2016, p. 3-6; NATO, 2015). This showed a clear weakness of the EU in terms of defense and security policies since it did not get involved directly with Russia. Instead, it promoted negotiations and peace talks with the country as a defense strategy to deter any potential threat from Russia and continued promoting cooperative agreements with the Eastern countries.

5.2.3 DIPLOMACY

Regarding the European Union's diplomatic measures towards Russia, the EU implemented restrictions on their diplomatic relations. They called off the EU-Russia Summit of 2014 and suspended their regular bilateral meetings with Russia. In addition to this, Russia was expelled from the G8 summit leading to only G7 summits until today. As a complementary measure, the European countries ceased their negotiations with Russia about the possibility of Russia joining the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Energy Agency (IEA) (European Council, 2023b). In spite of this, the European Union decided to continue supporting Russian NGOs and Russian civil society in response to Russia's Foreign Agents Law, promulgated in 2012 with the intent of limiting NGOs located in Russia to obtain foreign aid. As a result, the EU promoted and funded unsupported NGOs in Russia along with educational exchange and research programs to improve their diplomatic measures and support the Russian population as a result of Russia's restrictive laws (European Parliament, 2016, p. 7). Finally, the EU carried out several meetings to negotiate with Russia and Ukraine to cease the conflict and ensure their energy supplies as the Vice-President of Energy Union mentioned (Šefčovič, 2015).

All these policies, even though they faced some internal challenges due to some disagreements among EU members, were progressively expanded throughout the years since they were attached to the fulfillment of the Minsk Agreements that never took place. Because of this reason, the measures were expanded until March 15, 2023 (European Council, 2023b). But, despite the EU's efforts these measures did not mean a significant change in their already complex relationship because they are two very interdependent actors. Thus, the EU has put the focus on soft power instruments to carry its foreign policy towards Russia such as negotiations, peace talks, and multilateral meetings to find peaceful solutions or diplomatic measures even after the annexation of Crimea. Yet, the economic sanctions could be considered a more realistic approach towards Russia but, since they didn't mean losing Russia as the main trading partner there was not a real hit for Russia's economy because they targeted goods that were not as relevant as others. In fact, one-third of EU energy imports from Russia made 70% of Russia's export earnings, and most of the energy that the EU energy imports are liquified natural gas which was not a target of the economic sanctions. On top of that, the EU continued engaging with Russia in numerous common foreign concerns such as carrying out negotiations with Iran

relating to the nuclear deal, pleading for a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, terrorism, and climate change (European Parliament, 2016, p. 6).

5.3 THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EU TOWARDS RUSSIA AFTER THE WAR IN UKRAINE

Despite, starting to consider Russia an adversary rather than a strategic partner in 2014, and the extension of the diverse EU sanctions throughout the years as a direct result of Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea, Russia continued playing an important role for the EU due to their interdependency even though there has been a general fall of trade with Russia as it can be observed on figure 1 (see annex). In 2021, the EU continued being Russia's first trading partner, making Russia one of the main EU trading partners. The same year, the European Union imported goods from Russia worth a total of € 162.5 billion of euros which was significantly more than the two previous years and reached a trade deficit of €69 billion as it can be observed in the annex (Eurostat, 2023a; European Commission, n.d.-c; European Union External Action Service, 2021, p.2).

Because of this reason, the EU continued developing foreign policies towards Russia based on the five liberal principles established in 2016. Nevertheless, in recent years, the EU started to construct a new frame for its relations with Russia which led to the creation of the "EU-Russia relations - push back, constrain and engage" report late in 2021 (European Parliament, 2022, p.1-2). This new approach was a continuation of the five guiding principles which consisted of pushing back against Russia's violation of human rights, and international law, constraining Russia's geopolitical interest and effort to weaken the EU while engaging with Russia for key foreign issues (European Commission, 2021, p. 11-12). Yet, with the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the EU has shifted its approach and worked on different strategies towards Russia giving birth to a geopolitical European Union (Borrell, 2023a, p. 41).

5.3.1 TRADE

Trade has been constantly a complex variable of their relationship to manage due to its interdependency. The high trade figures of 2021 continued throughout the year 2022. However, as shown in figure 2 in the annex, there has been a decrease since February 2022 in EU export to and imports from Russia. Nevertheless, as the graph shows, there still is a trade deficit of €6.0 billion by December 2022, which means that the EU continued importing more than exporting to Russia even though there has been a

significant decline in trade. This denotes EU's dependency on energy supplies (Eurostat, 2023b).

This is because the ten sanctions imposed by the European Union right after the invasion of Ukraine in February targeted, again, Russia's economy and its ability to finance the war. The first package was focused on individuals and companies that threaten the sovereignty of Ukraine, on the restriction to access to financial services to Russian companies and banks that finance the Russian army, as well as banning them from the SWIFT system (European Council, 2022a). The second and third packages aimed at sanctioning Putin and Lavrov, closing the airspace to Russian aircrafts, banning the export of aviation and space industry and goods related to oil refining as well as capping the price since it is the source to finance the war (Von der Leyen, 2022; European Council, 2022b, European Council, 2023d). The fourth, fifth, and sixth packages banned transactions with state-owned companies, trade of luxury goods, and added semiconductors and quantum computing among other EU goods that Russia is very dependent on. Additionally, new investments in the energy sector in Russia, access to EU ports, consultancy services, and crude oil were added. Further to this, the EU imposed an import ban on oil and all seaborne oil supplies, which in total make up to 90% of EU oil imports. On top of this, the G7 member countries removed Russia as the most favored nation within the World Trade Organization, which cut out Russia from trade advantages (European Commission, n.d.-a; European Council, 2022c, 2022d, 2022e). The last packages targeted minerals, crypto-wallet, investment in Russian mining sectors, prohibition of gas storage capacity without, again, including liquified natural gas, and imposing the obligation to report to assure the effectiveness of all the restrictive sanctions (European Council, 2023d). As it can be inferred, the ten packages of sanctions imposed in 2022 were the result of prolongation and reinforcement of the many sanctions previously adopted, though with some additional sanctions like including more products within the banned imports, restricting trade advantages to Russia, or targeting more individuals involved in breaking the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

Regarding, the energy sector, apart from the previous measures, the EU has taken gradual and slow steps to reduce its dependency on Russian fossil fuels. However, with the invasion of Ukraine, this became a priority, and member states are looking to diversify their energy supplies and cut all their reliance on Russia by looking for new partners such as the US or Norway, while searching for renewable energy supplies. By doing this, the EU is mainly cutting Russia's energy profits which make up most of their export revenues

(European Council, 2023c). And, lastly, concerning economic cooperation, the EU continued implementing the sanctions imposed in 2014, halting all financial operations of the EIB and economic cooperation program (European Council, 2023b).

5.3.2 DEFENSE AND SECURITY

In relation to the defense and security area, the EU has continued banning the trade of technological items like radio navigational aid apparatus and dual-use goods that could be used by the Russian military. As a complementary sanction to the previous ones, the EU has begun to sanction Russian media outlets that work as disinformation actors such as Russian Today, Sputnik, and Russia 24 among others since they pose a threat to EU security and public order (European Commission, n.d.-a).

In addition to this, once again, the EU has not been involved directly with Russia in a conflict due to its architectural weakness, but it has developed a strategic defense plan and idea to strengthen EU defense and security capabilities that have allowed it to act against Russia using hard power since this plan was implemented in 2022 and has served as a guide for EU defense and security issues since then. Regarding the plan, the EU has promoted the Strategic Compass and European strategic autonomy. The first one is based on the idea of the need to change their architectural defense and security structure while adapting to the new threats by following four main guiding principles: act, secure, invest, and partner. The goals are to act collectively and quickly in all military domains (air, land, sea, and cyber outer and inner space) by creating an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity to allow military mobility whenever is necessary since Russia's invasion has emphasized the need to make use of their troops. To secure the European Union by being prepared and anticipate any cybersecurity, hybrid, or military attack by creating a series of tools and strategies that will allow them to deter rapid emerging challenges. To invest equally in defense in order to strengthen and reinforce the EU's defense capabilities and to be able to confront the new global threats. And finally, to partner with NATO, UN, and Eastern partners among other regional partners to deal with common threats through cooperation (Borrell, 2022a, p. 4-6). The second one refers to the long-standing idea of developing an "European strategic autonomy". This reflects the idea of acquiring the capacity to act autonomously in different areas, (economic technological, and defense and security) to act and address those issues that are of EU's interest while still cooperating with other partners like NATO (Borrell, 2020). This is what the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, referred to when mentioned the idea of a European geopolitical

community that goes beyond an economic and political community and whose objective is to promote stability and security in the region (Michel, 2022).

Additionally, within the Strategic Compass framework, the EU has provided Ukraine with different types of aid in terms of defense. They contributed political, financial, humanitarian and military aid to Ukraine which has been perceived as a threat by Russia. This has been done through the EU Military Assistance Mission (EUMAM) in Ukraine, launched in November 2022 under the European Peace Facility created in 2021, to reinforce the EU's capability to behave as a global security provider. This mission is controlled and led by the Political and Security Committee, which is under the direct responsibility of the HR/VP, Joseph Borrell, and the Council of the EU. The goal of the EUMAM is to train Ukrainian soldiers with basic and specialized training to be able to face the advancement of Russian troops. This materializes into an organized response of the EU to support and enhance Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAFs) with the needed training and military equipment in order to defend the territorial integrity of the country (European Union External Action Service, 2023; European Union External Action Service, 2022a).

In relation to military equipment, the EU has been providing the Ukrainian military forces packages with a value of €500 million for lethal and non-lethal military equipment including the provision the equipment like fuel, personal protective supplies, or first aid kits among others. The last package was in February 2023 which added €45 million more for assistance measures to help and support the military training. Moreover, the EU members have mobilized military equipment to Ukraine apart from funding it. Furthermore, concerning the training needs, the EU has provided all levels of training (basic, advanced and specialized) related to demining, medical assistance, maintenance of military equipment and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risk mitigation (European Commission, n.d.-b; European Council 2023a; European Union External Action Service, 2022b). In addition to this, the EU has provided a macro-financial contribution crisis and humanitarian aid of €630 million. In spite of not getting involved directly with Russia, the distribution of military funds, assistance and lethal military equipment has meant a turning point in the EU's defense and security measures and a real response to Russia's aggression. As HR/VP Borrell stated in the presentation of the first annual report of the Strategic Compass, this is the first time the European Union provides lethal military supplies to a partner and a total of €3.6 billion for deterring Russia (European Commission, 2023; Borrell, 2023b).

5.3.3 DIPLOMACY

Concerning diplomacy, the EU extended the previous diplomatic measures, keeping Russia out of the G8 summit, not holding bilateral summits with Vladimir Putin and not giving the possibility to Russia to join the OECD and IEA. In addition, it has included some measures regarding visa applications. The European Union has removed Russian officials, diplomats and businesses from the visa facilitation process which gave them the privileged to enter the Schengen area. But this measure was broadened to the Russian population which was translated into an increase in the visa fee, the presentation of additional documentaries, longer visa processing times and the restriction of multiple-entry visas that were offered to Russian citizens. In addition, since December 2022, the EU does not accept Russian international passports issued in Ukraine that were given to civils who resided in the invaded regions by Russia (European Council, 2023d). The adoption of these new measures signifies a step further for the EU, but not the cut of all diplomatic nor the prohibition of the entrance to any Russian citizen.

As it can be seen, the new EU foreign policy measures towards Russia, on one side, have resulted in the expansion of the previous measures and sanctions imposed in 2014. But, on the other side, the adoption of new policies can be seen as more realistic and based on hard power. Within the trade area, the EU has widened the sanctions to oil refining products which hits Russia's source of finances. Regarding defense and security, the EU has really implemented new policies and strategies to deal with Russia that greatly changes the way they used to address threats coming from this country. Lastly, relative to diplomatic measures the EU has just removed the privileges of the visa facilitation process while making it longer and more costly in comparison to prior sanctions.

6. DISCUSSION

Going back to the research question of this investigation, *to what extent the war in Ukraine has brought about a real change in the EU's foreign policy concerning Russia?* And taking into account the new EU's foreign policies towards Russia based, some of them, on hard power instruments, it could be answered that the war in Ukraine has forced the EU to adopt a more realistic approach regarding foreign policy. Nonetheless, the hypothesis that led this research, *the war in Ukraine has had an impact on EU-Russia relations resulting in a more realistic approach in three main aspects trade, defense and*

security and diplomacy is not valid due to the fact that there has not been a more realistic approach in all the three areas, just in two, trade and defense and security.

The policies adopted before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine were developed from a liberal perspective within the three areas. Relating to the trade area, the EU implemented economic sanctions to specific areas within diverse sectors such as individuals, transport, financial, energy, goods and services that were not as key as the ones included in 2022. In this sense, the sanctions were used as soft power tools to foster the EU's values and CFSP objectives of the moment (European Union External Action, 2021). The economic sanctions were not coercive nor punitive, since Russia continued to be a relevant trade partner for the EU due to the liquified gas supplies that were not restricted. Notwithstanding, the EU policies adopted after the outbreak of the war within the trade area were more coercive and punitive and can be considered hard power instruments. This is mainly because the European Union targeted important industrial sectors such as the oil, petroleum, gas, and coal industry that are Russia's main source of revenues that can be used to finance the war. And because Russia has no longer trade advantages within the WTO. These policies aimed not just to reduce Russia's ability to finance war but, also, to make the upgrade of these industries very costly for Russia.

Regarding the defense and security policies before the war, the EU could not face Russian threats accordingly, so it relied on NATO's partnership to deploy military troops in Poland and the Baltic States in 2016 and to provide assistance to Ukraine to develop long-term capability measures to reinforce its army. In addition, the EU relied on economic sanctions targeted at dual-use goods that could be used for military purposes. Further to this, their defense and security policies were directed to provide help and support to the Eastern partners with the objective of boosting security, peace and stability in the region since it is a shared concern. As a result, the EU focused on soft power tools such as negotiations to build partnerships, economic agreements and greater cooperation to achieve the CFSP goals. By using these soft power instruments, the EU was trying to persuade and attract the Eastern countries to continue its enlargement project and to reduce Russia's influence and power in the area. After the war, the European Union took a further step and implemented the Strategic Compass served as a framework to provide military funds, assistance and military equipment to Ukraine to deter Russia and address Russia's aggression. Consequently, the EU clearly adopted a more realistic approach within this area and developed and put hard power instruments into effect since it mobilized lethal military equipment and funded military supplies for the Ukrainian

Armed Forces. Yet, it is worth noting that this use of hard power instruments aligns with the defensive realistic approach since they are used to mitigate the conflict, deter Russia and secure the European and internal scenario.

Lastly, the diplomatic policies carried out in both scenarios, before and after the outbreak of the war, fall within the liberal approach since in the first case, it consisted of the removal of Russia from G8, suspension of the bilateral meetings and supporting Russian NGOs. And in the second case, the European Union extended the sanctions and removed the visa facilitation process for Russian officials, diplomats and businesses as well as citizens. Notwithstanding, this hasn't meant the cut of all of their diplomatic ties, but the EU has not reopened dialogue with Russia to negotiate since the last state visit of President Emmanuel Macron to Russia to de-escalate the tensions before the war began due to Putin's conditions. Despite being an important moment, the negotiation proved ineffective because of Putin's determination to achieve its geopolitical interests (The Guardian, 2022; Al Jazeera, 2022). Hence, all these policies are considered soft power instruments since are based on persuading Russia and Eastern countries to act in a specific way rather than coerce them into doing so. Pertaining to Russia, the EU tries to change its realistic behavior through negotiations, peace talks and banning the entrance of Russians into the Schengen area.

Besides comparing the policies adopted in both situations, it is interesting to analyze the internal and international context that also, as it is mentioned in the previous sections, influence foreign policy decisions. In this sense, some internal factors that might have limited the EU to adopt a more realistic approach before the war in Ukraine, are the EU member states that might have not agreed to certain policies on how to respond or deal with Russia and because they also affect negatively to them, especially the trade sanctions. Since it might be more costly for them to import the banned import goods from other countries. The architectural structure of the CFSP, as it has been reviewed previously, it has always been a weakness of the EU due to its reliance on NATO. Because of this reason despite countless negotiations and talks, the European Union never acted on it and left this ongoing debate in words until 2022 with the breakout of the war which has provoked the need to take this matter seriously and change it. Additionally, the EU's energy dependency on Russia has been one of the main factors that limited the EU's capability to take a more realistic approach when addressing Russia's threats until now with the war and the increasing economic consequences that it has had on energy supplies and prices, as well as the climate change.

Lastly, the fact that the EU was created as a liberal project and whose fundamental values are based on liberal ideas, might have limited EU's scope to act from a more realistic point of view. Some international factors that might have limited the EU to adopt a realistic approach could have been the 2015 Syrian refugee crisis which might have limited the resources CFSP since part of them had to be oriented to address the crisis (Spindler, 2015). Nonetheless, after the breakout of the war, there has been a clear unity of the policies adopted which has favored the implementation of a more realistic approach and use of hard power instruments. In addition, the international impacts of the war and the impacts on the European Union have emphasized the necessity to become a geopolitical actor and global security actor that provides military support to their partners and does not rely only on NATO.

Yet, as it is mentioned previously, despite the war causing a more real change in the EU foreign policies towards Russia, the hypothesis was only partly verified because the EU adopted a realistic approach and hard power instruments within two out of the three main areas analyzed. This means that as Nossel and Nye developed, despite causing a real change of their foreign policies, the European Union still used a combination of both powers, soft and hard power, which is known as smart power, in order to promote its foreign policies (Cross, 2021, p. 50).

7. CONCLUSIONS

The war in Ukraine has meant a disruption of the international order that was established after the fall of the Soviet Union and the return of the war in Europe, as Borrell has mentioned (Borrell, 2023). As a result, the war has had an impact on international relations and how the European Union relates with Russia generating new changes and a shift of power dynamics. Regarding the European Union, which was the object of the research, the war has provoked a shift in their foreign policies towards Russia from a liberal perspective to a more realistic approach. However, this change has only been reflected in trade and defense and security policies and not in diplomatic measures, which highlights the combination of both powers, hard and soft, by the European Union.

Before the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the EU's foreign policy towards Russia has always been based on a liberal approach and used soft power instruments such as cooperation, agreements, negotiations, and partnerships to influence its Eastern neighbors and reduce Russia's influence over them, as well as for dealing with threats coming from this country. This has been the general case due to the nature of their relations, which has made it difficult to manage, coordinate and balance their own interests with their common ones. Consequently, because of their interdependency, and the international and internal context before the war in Ukraine, the EU did not adopt a realistic approach and continued using soft power instruments for their foreign policies towards Russia. Yet, due to the outbreak of the war in 2022 and its impacts on the EU and the international context their relationship has been strained. As a result, the European Union has responded with coercive economic sanctions that hurt Russia's economy and restrained its capability to finance the war. Additionally, the EU has mobilized lethal military equipment, military funds and provided military assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces based on the guide for EU foreign policies, the Strategic Compass. Therefore, the war in Ukraine has brought a real change in the EU's Russian foreign policies, updating the traditional five principles established in 2016 and leading to the awakening of a European geopolitical community as a global security actor.

Notwithstanding, it is worth noting that because the subject of the present investigation is very recent, it is highly recommended to carry out further research on the topic to be able to assess if this change will be further implemented in the diplomatic area. Therefore, these future investigations could focus on the same research question as this one but take into account future EU foreign policies that will be implemented within the

next two years, which is the duration of the EUMAM Ukraine, to have even more data about the foreign policies that the EU has adopted concerning Russia and be able to delve into the topic.

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Al Jazeera. (2022, February 08). Macron says Putin told him Russia won't escalate Ukraine crisis. *Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/8/macron-says-putin-told-him-russia-wont-escalate-ukraine-crisis>
- Barnett, M., & Duvall, R. (2005). Power in International Politics. *International Organization* 59(1), 39-75. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818305050010>
- Barroso, J. M. B. (2013, March 12). Introductory statement by President Barroso on Ukraine [Speech]. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_212
- Bergmann, M., Toygür, I., & Svendsen, O. (2023). A Continent Forged in Crisis: Assessing Europe One Year into the War. *Center for Strategic and International Studies*. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/continent-forged-crisis-assessing-europe-one-year-war>
- Bigg, M. M. (2023, February 24). How Russia's war in Ukraine has unfolded, month by month. *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/article/ukraine-russia-war-timeline.html>
- Bindi, F. (2012). European Union Foreign Policy: A Historical Overview. In F. Bindi & I. Angelescu (Eds.), *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe's Role in the World* (2nd ed., pp. 11–39). Brookings Institution Press. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/theforeignpolicyoftheeuropeanunion_chapter.pdf
- Borrell, J. (2020). *Why European Strategic autonomy matters*. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en
- Borrell, J. (2022a). *A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/strategic_compass_en3_web.pdf
- Borrell, J. (2022b, March 14). *The war in Ukraine and its implications for the EU*. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/war-ukraine-and-its-implications-eu_en
- Borrell, J. (2023a). *The year that war returned to Europe. EU foreign policy in 2022*. European Union.

https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/20230369_PDF_OF0323029ENN_002.pdf

- Borrell, J. (2023b, March 20). Strategic Compass: High Representative presents first annual report on its implementation. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/strategic-compass-high-representative-presents-first-annual-report-its-implementation_en
- Burchill, S., & Linklater, A. (2013). Introduction. In Scott Burchill & Andrew Linklater (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations*. (3rd ed., pp. 1-28). Palgrave Macmillan
- Cañete, M. A. (2015, February 6). *Energy Union Conference in Riga* [Speech]. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_15_4221
- Carr, E.H. (1939). *The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939*. Macmillan.
- Coles, S., Rellstab, L., Bergsen, P., Kampfner, J., Bland, B., Vines, A., Vakil, S., Billon-Galland, A., Shea, J., Wolczuk, K., Jie, Y., Karalis, M., Giles, K., Lewis, P., Froggatt, A., Lough, J., Wellesley, L., Benton, T., Nixey, J., Bullough, O., Szostek, J., Lutsevych, O., Sago, R., & Ash, T. (2023, February 20). *Seven ways Russia's war on Ukraine has changed the world*. Chatham House. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/02/seven-ways-russias-war-ukraine-has-changed-world>
- Cross, M. K. D. (2021). The challenges ahead for European cultural diplomacy. In R. N. Haar, T. Christiansen, S. Lange, & S. Vanhoonacker (Eds.), *The Making of European Security Policy: Between institutional dynamics and global challenges*. (1st ed., pp. 46-63). Routledge
- Deudney, D., & Ikenberry, G. J. (1999). The nature and sources of liberal international order. *Review of International Studies*, 25(2), 179–196. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0260210599001795>
- Deudney, D., & Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). Liberal World: The Resilient Order. *Foreign Affairs*, 97(4), 17-24. https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/05_deudney_ikenberry.pdf
- Donnelly, J. (2013). Realism. In Scott Burchill & Andrew Linklater (Eds.), *Theories of International Relations*. (3rd ed., pp. 29-52). Palgrave Macmillan

- Doyle, M.D. (2012). Liberalism and foreign policy In Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, & Tim Dunne. (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. (2nd ed., pp. 54-78). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- European Commission. (n.d.-a). *EU sanctions against Russia following the invasion of Ukraine*. European Commission. https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-sanctions-against-russia-following-invasion-ukraine_en
- European Commission (n.d.-b). *European Peace Facility*. European Commission. https://fpi.ec.europa.eu/what-we-do/european-peace-facility_en
- European Commission. (n.d.-c). *Russia EU trade relations with Russia: Facts, figures and latest developments*. European Commission. https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/countries-and-regions/russia_en
- European Commission. (2021, June 16). *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, The European Council and the Council*. European Commission. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52021JC0020&from=EN>
- European Commission. (2023, March 24). *EU assistance to Ukraine*. European Commission. https://eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/eu-assistance-ukraine_en
- European Council. (2022a, February 22). Statement by the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission on Russian aggression against Ukraine [Press release]. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/22/statement-by-the-presidents-of-the-european-council-and-european-commission-on-russian-aggression-against-ukraine/>
- European Council. (2022b, February 25). *Russia's military aggression against Ukraine: EU imposes sanctions against President Putin and Foreign Minister Lavrov and adopts wide-ranging individual and economic sanctions* [Press release]. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/02/25/russia-s-military-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-imposes-sanctions-against-president-putin-and-foreign-minister-lavrov-and-adopts-wide-ranging-individual-and-economic-sanctions/>
- European Council. (2022c, March 15). *Russia's military aggression against Ukraine: fourth EU package of sectoral and individuals*. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/15/russia-s->

military-aggression-against-ukraine-fourth-eu-package-of-sectoral-and-individual-measures/

European Council. (2022d, April 8). *EU adopts fifth round of sanction against Russia over its military aggression against Ukraine* [Press release]. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/08/eu-adopts-fifth-round-of-sanctions-against-russia-over-its-military-aggression-against-ukraine/>

European Council. (2022e, June 3). *Russia's aggression against Ukraine: EU adopts sixth package of sanctions* [Press release]. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-against-ukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/>

European Council. (2022g, December 15). *The EU's Response to Terrorism*. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/#priority>

European Council. (2023a, February 02). *Ukraine: Council agrees on further military support under the European Peace Facility* [Press release]. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/02/ukraine-council-agrees-on-further-military-support-under-the-european-peace-facility/>

European Council. (2023b, March 15). *EU restrictive measures against Russia over Ukraine (since 2014)*. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/>

European Council. (2023c, March 31). *Energy prices and security of supply*. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/energy-prices-and-security-of-supply/#dependencies>

European Council. (2023d, April 14). *EU response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine*. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-ukraine-invasion/>

European Parliament. (2016, October). *The EU's Russia Policy. Five guiding principles* [Briefing]. European Parliament. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/589857/EPRS_BRI\(2016\)589857_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/589857/EPRS_BRI(2016)589857_EN.pdf)

- European Parliament. (2022, October). *Legislative Train 4 a Stronger Europe in the World*. European Parliament. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/carriage/eu-russia-strategy/report?sid=6301>
- European Union External Action Service. (2016). *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy*. European Union External Action Service. https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf
- European Union External Action Service. (2021a). *Facts and figures about EU-Russia Relations*. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eeas-eu-russia_relation-en_2021-07.pdf
- European Union External Action Service. (2021b, October 07). *European Union Sanctions*. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-union-sanctions_en
- European Union External Action Service. (2022a, December 02). *European Union Military Assistance Mission Ukraine*. European Union External Action Service. <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023-EUMAMUkraine.pdf>
- European Union External Action Service. (2022b, December 08). *About EU Military Assistance Mission in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine)*. European Union External Action Service. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eumam-ukraine/about-eu-military-assistance-mission-support-ukraine-eumam-ukraine_en?s=410260
- European Union External Action Service. (2023, March 31). *EU MAM Ukraine (EUMAM UA)*. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-mam-ukraine-eumam-ua_en
- Eurostat. (2023a). *Russia-EU - international trade in goods statistics*. Eurostat. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Russia-EU_-_international_trade_in_goods_statistics&oldid=560076
- Eurostat. (2023b). *Russia-EU - international trade of main products*. Eurostat. <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=558089>
- Filimonov, G. (2010). *Russia's Soft Power Potential*. Russia in Global Affairs. <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-soft-power-potential/>
- Fisher, M. (2014, September 3). Everything you need to know about the 2014 Ukraine crisis. *Vox*. <https://www.vox.com/2014/9/3/18088560/ukraine-everything-you-need-to-know>

- Füle, Š. (2014, April 16). *Russian pressure on Eastern Partnership countries, destabilization of Eastern Ukraine* [Speech]. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_331
- Gatev, I. (2011). The European Union and Eastern Europe. In J.-U. Wunderlich & D. J. Bailey (Eds.), *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook* (1st ed., pp. 274-285). Routledge
- Gray, C.S. (2011) *Hard Power and Soft Power: The utility of military force as an instrument of policy in the 21st century*. Strategic Studies Institute.
- Gutiérrez, P. A. (2018). *Las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y Rusia (1990-2017)*. Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/128690/pub1059-1.pdf>
- Haar, R. N., Christiansen, T. (2021). Introduction: Global Challenges and institutional dynamics in the making of European security policy. In Haar, R. N., Christiansen, T., Lange, S., & Vanhoonacker, S. (Eds.). (2021). *The making of European security policy: between institutional dynamics and global challenges* (1st ed., pp. 1-10). Routledge.
- Hilmer, R. (2017). *The European Union Facing Massive Challenges – What are Citizens' Expectations and Concerns?* Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/12346.pdf>
- Hilton, R. B. (2018). *Soft power, hard power and public diplomacy: Deputy Chief of Mission Robert B. Hilton's remarks at BIDTI*. US Embassy in Sri Lanka. <https://lk.usembassy.gov/soft-power-hard-power-and-public-diplomacy-deputy-chief-of-mission-robert-b-hiltons-remarks-at-bidti/>
- Hudson, V. M. (2014). *Foreign Policy Analysis*. (2^a ed.). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Huseynov, V. (2019). *Geopolitical rivalries in the "common neighborhood": Russia's conflict with the West, soft power, and neoclassical realism*. Ibidem Press. https://books.google.es/books?hl=en&lr=&id=cNhSEAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&ots=faez67WL8m&sig=RmGHiZeLO-RRzBvBtC1FiTDQ1Dc&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q&f=false
- Huysmans, J. (1995). Post-Cold War Implosion and Globalization: Liberalism Running Past Itself? *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, 24(3), 471-487. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298950240031101>

- Institute for Cultural Diplomacy. (2010). *Hard vs. Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategies in Contemporary International Relations*. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy. <http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/youngleadersforums/pdf/hardpowercurrency.pdf>
- Jackson, I., & Xidias, J. (2017). *An analysis of francis fukuyama's the end of history and the last man*. (1st ed). Macat International. <https://doi-org.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/10.4324/9781912282135>
- Keukeleire, S., & Delreux, T. (2014). *The foreign policy of the European Union* (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan.
- Korab-Karpowicz, W. J. (2017). *Political Realism in International Relations*. (Summer 2017 Edition). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Landman, T. (2008). *Issues and methods in comparative politics*. Routledge.
- Lantis, J. S., & Beasley, R. (2017). *Comparative Foreign Policy Analysis*. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. <https://oxfordre.com/politics/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-398>
- Lehne, S. (2022). *The EU and the Creative and Destructive Impact of Crises*. Carnegie Europe. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/10/18/eu-and-creative-and-destructive-impact-of-crises-pub-88145>
- Masters, J. (2023, February 14). *Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-russia>
- McCourt, K. (2022). *European Commission Lacks Tenacity on the Rule of Law: Rule of Law Report Lacks Consequences for Law Breaking*. Human Rights Watch. <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/20/european-commission-lacks-tenacity-rule-law>
- Mearsheimer, J. J. (2005). E.H. Carr vs. Idealism: The Battle Rages On. *Sage Publications*, 19(2), 139–152. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117805052810>
- Meiser, J. W. (2018). *Introducing liberalism in international relations theory*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/72781>
- Meister, S. (2022, November 29). *A Paradigm Shift: EU-Russia Relations After the War in Ukraine*. Carnegie Europe. <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476>

- Michel, C (2022, May 18). Speech by President Charles Michel at the plenary session of the European Economic and Social Committee [Speech]. European Council. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/05/18/discours-du-president-charles-michel-lors-de-la-session-pleniere-du-comite-economique-et-social-europeen/>
- Millosevich Juaristi, M. (2018, March 1). *La UE y Rusia: entre la confrontación y la interdependencia*. Real Instituto Elcano. <https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/la-ue-y-rusia-entre-la-confrontacion-y-la-interdependencia/>
- Moyúa, C.A, & Sanahuja, J.A. (2015). *Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales*. Tecnos.
- NATO. (2015). *NATO-Ukraine relations: The Background*. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2015_06/20150624_1506-nato-ukraine-bg.pdf
- Neack, L. (2019). *Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively*. (4th ed). New York: Rowman & Littlefield,
- Oettinger, G. H. (2014, June 25). European Energy Security Strategy: Key priorities and actions [Speech]. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_14_505
- Parlamento Europeo. (s.f.). *El PE después del Tratado de Lisboa: un papel más importante en la construcción de Europa*. Parlamento Europeo. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/about-parliament/es/powers-and-procedures/the-lisbon-treaty>
- Putnam, R.D. (1988). Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427-459. <http://www.guillaumenicaise.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Putnam-The-Logic-of-Two-Level-Games.pdf>
- Raimzhanova, A. (2015). *Power in IR: Hard, Soft, and Smart*. Institute for Cultural Diplomacy. http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2015-12_annual/Power-In-Ir-By-Raimzhanova,-A.pdf
- Šefčovič, M. (2015). *The state of play of EU-Russia energy relations* [Speech]. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/speech_15_4709


- Smith, K. E. (2020). *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy: The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy*. European University Institute. <https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/1546>
- Solana, J. (2003). *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*. Council of the European Union. <https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15895-2003-INIT/en/pdf>
- Solana, J. (2008). *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World*. Council of the European Union. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/30823/qc7809568enc.pdf>
- Spindler, W. (2015, December 08). *2015: The year of Europe's refugee crisis*. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. <https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2015/12/56ec1ebde/2015-year-europes-refugee-crisis.html>
- Stab, A. (2011). *The European Union explained: Institution, actors, global impact* (2nd ed.). Indiana University Press.
- Stewart, S. (2020). *Introduction: A More Robust Russia Policy for the EU: How Member-State Coalitions Can Contribute*. Stiftung Wissenschaft und politik. https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2020C65_EU_RussiaPolicy.pdf
- The Guardian. (2022, February 08). Macron claims Putin gave him personal assurances on Ukraine. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/08/macron-zelenskiy-ukraine-talks-moscow-denies-deal-to-de-escalate>
- Vasilyan, S. (2011). The 'European' 'Neighbourhood' 'Policy': A holistic account. In J.-U. Wunderlich & D. J. Bailey (Eds.), *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook* (1st ed., pp. 177-187). Routledge.
- Von der Leyen, U. (2022, September 28). *Press statement by President von der Leyen on a new package of restrictive measures against Russia* [Press release]. European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_22_5856
- Wagner, J. P. (2014, May 14). *The Effectiveness of Soft & Hard Power in Contemporary International Relations*. E-International Relations. <https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/49538>

Wohlforth, W.C. (2012). Realism and foreign policy. In Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, & Tim Dunne. (eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*. (2nd ed., pp. 35-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wunderlich, J. U., & Bailey, D. J. (2011). *The European Union and Global Governance: A Handbook*. Routledge.

9. ANNEX


9.1 ANNEX 1. FIGURE 1. EU TRADE IN GOODS WITH RUSSIA (2011-2021)



Source: Eurostat (online data code: ext_st_eu27_2020sitc and DS-018995)

Source: Eurostat, 2023

9.2 ANNEX. 2. FIGURE 2. EU TRADE IN GOODS WITH RUSSIA (2021-2022)



Source: Eurostat, 2023.