



COMILLAS
UNIVERSIDAD PONTIFICIA

ICAI

ICADE

CIHS

Document Version

Accepted version

Citation for published versión:

Font, J., Galais, C. & Rico, C. (Slightly) different objectives, but similar results?: Party ideology and participatory institutions. *Acta Polit* (2024).

<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41269-024-00373-3>

Citing this paper

Please note that the full-text provided on Comillas' Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version.

General rights

This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence (<https://web.upcomillas.es/webcorporativo/RegulacionRepositorioInstitucionalComillas.pdf>).

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact Universidad Pontificia Comillas providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim

Acta Politica

(Slightly) different objectives, but similar results?: party ideology and participatory institutions

--Manuscript Draft--

Manuscript Number:	ACPO-D-23-00378R2	
Full Title:	(Slightly) different objectives, but similar results?: party ideology and participatory institutions	
Article Type:	Original Article	
Funding Information:	Ministerio de Ciencia, Innovación y Universidades (PID2019-106732GB-I00)	Mr Joan Font
Abstract:	<p>Do parties matter for policies? This crucial question has received considerable attention regarding central policy areas, like economic or social policies, but quite less regarding the development of participation policies. In a context where these policies have become quite widespread, the crucial question is not whether parties differentiate on doing or not some participation policies, but which policies they develop: Do different party ideologies result in the use of alternative participatory practices? We empirically analyse the participatory institutions existing in Spanish municipalities larger than 1000 inhabitants of two of the largest regions in the country around 2020, in a context where different party policies are likely to emerge. Our analyses cover 608 participatory institutions, including governing parties of centre-right, centre-left and left ideology. Results show that, once we control for structural factors, differences among municipalities governed by the three party families are small, concentrated on objectives (aiming at different policy goals) and on one relevant feature: the decisiveness of the proposals made, which is larger where the radical left governs.</p>	
Corresponding Author:	Joan Font, PhD CSIC: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas Córdoba, Córdoba SPAIN	
Corresponding Author Secondary Information:		
Corresponding Author's Institution:	CSIC: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas	
Corresponding Author's Secondary Institution:		
First Author:	Joan Font, PhD	
First Author Secondary Information:		
Order of Authors:	Joan Font, PhD Carolina Galais Carlos Rico	
Order of Authors Secondary Information:		
Author Comments:		
Response to Reviewers:	<p>Dear Editors and Reviewers,</p> <p>Thank you for accepting our text "(Slightly) different objectives, but similar results?: party ideology and participatory institutions". The suggestions made to improve the text have been valuable to clarify its content and contribution. Since reviewer 1 was already satisfied with the previous version, we clarify here the changes made following the recommendations of reviewer 2 and the editors.</p> <p>These comments concerned two aspects of the text. The first one suggested a more thorough discussion of the implications of the model fit statistics in the discussion. The second one insisted in the special character of the random selection type processes and their likely different relationship to political ideology.</p>	

Full title: (Slightly) different objectives, but similar results?: party ideology and participatory institutions

Running title: parties and participatory institutions

Authors :

Joan Font (IESA-CSIC, Spain).

Contact details : IESA, Campo Santo de los Mártires, 7, 14004 Córdoba (Spain), 34, 658786147, jfont@iesa.csic.es

Carolina Galais (UAB, Spain)

Carlos Rico (U. Pontificia Comillas, Spain)

Short bios:

Dr Joan Font Joan Font is research professor at the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-CSIC). He is interested in all the difficulties involving translating citizen preferences into public policies. His papers about participatory institutions have been published in journals as European Journal of Political Research, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Politics, Acta Politica, Public Administration, Political Studies, Politics & Policy or Administration & Society.

Dr. Carol Galais serves as an Associate Professor at the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, focusing on the psychological factors that shape political participation, with an emphasis on political interest and the duty to vote. Her research extends to the nuanced exploration of public opinion topics, encompassing topics such as populism, affective polarization, and conspiratorial thinking. Presently, Dr. Galais is dedicated to researching the role of emotions in political behavior, contributing to the ongoing understanding of these dynamics

Dr Carlos Rico is a professor of Political Science at Universidad Pontificia Comillas. His research focuses on the theory of democracy and the models of representation, participation and political deliberation. He currently leads a research project on the erosion of the democratic public sphere

[Click here to view linked References](#)

(Slightly) different objectives, but similar results?: party ideology and participatory institutions

Abstract

Do parties matter for policies? This crucial question has received considerable attention regarding central policy areas, like economic or social policies, but quite less regarding the development of participation policies. In a context where these policies have become quite widespread, the crucial question is not whether parties differentiate on doing or not some participation policies, but which policies they develop: Do different party ideologies result in the use of alternative participatory practices?

We empirically analyse the participatory institutions existing in Spanish municipalities larger than 1000 inhabitants of two of the largest regions in the country around 2020, in a context where different party policies are likely to emerge. Our analyses cover 608 participatory institutions, including governing parties of centre-right, centre-left and left ideology. Results show that, once we control for structural factors, differences among municipalities governed by the three party families are small, concentrated on objectives (aiming at different policy goals) and on one relevant feature: the decisiveness of the proposals made, which is larger where the radical left governs.

Keywords: Citizen participation; participatory institutions; participation policies; local government; party ideology

1. Introduction

The impact of governing parties in public policies has received considerable attention in critical policy domains such as economics or social welfare. In these policy areas, research shows that ideological disparities do indeed emerge, but the magnitude of these distinctions is more nuanced than party platforms might suggest (Imbeau et al., 2001). Evidence is quite more limited for other policy areas less obviously associated to the left-right dimension and this is clearly the case for participation policies.

Research about democratic innovationsⁱ has focused more intensely on issues like institutional design or impact in policy-making, but less on the relationship between political ideology and participatory institutions. Nevertheless, a relevant body of empirical research indicates that a connection may indeed exist (Donovan and Karp, 2006; Junius et al., 2020), also regarding particular institutions like participatory budgeting (Sintomer et al., 2016), referendums (Gherghina, Pilet and Mitru, 2023) or mini-publics (Rangoni et al., 2021).

While the left was notably active and influential during the first steps of participatory innovations, the proliferation of participatory policies in numerous countries and their diffusion by non-partisan international organizations may have eroded the initial ideological distinctions (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2017; Shah, 2007). Nowadays, participation and deliberation are often conceived as natural components of any policy and, therefore, regarded as transversal principles not bound to specific party positions. Consequently, the paramount question at present is not whether parties engage in participatory policies but, rather, which specific dimensions exhibit disparities due to ideological orientations.

We build three theoretical expectations concerning the impact of party ideology on participation objectives, processes, and outcomes. Specifically, we anticipate that institutions promoted by local left-wing parties will emphasize citizen empowerment and social justice. Moreover, we expect that left-wing parties will initiate more inclusive processes, allocate fewer resources to deliberation, and champion more decisive approaches compared to parties of other ideological leanings. Ideological differences should emerge in objectives, processes and outcomes, even though the inertia and incrementalism of public policies may yield less disparate outcomes than anticipated. To test our expectations, we empirically analyse the participatory institutions existing in Spanish municipalities larger than 1000 inhabitants of two of the largest regions in the country in the period 2019-2023. The dataset includes 608 institutions, as well as social and political characteristics of the municipalities. Results show that, once we control for structural factors, differences among participatory processes in municipalities governed by different parties are small, concentrated on objectives (aiming at different policy goals) and decisiveness.

1 The following section provides an overview of the current state of the art, offering a
2 rationale for the development of our hypotheses. Subsequently, the methodological
3 section presents the population analysed and its relevance, followed by an account of
4 the data employed. The results section shows the analyses conducted for the three
5 dependent variables, and the final discussion presents our findings and their broader
6 implications.
7
8
9

10 11 **2. Theory**

12 **2.1 Left, right and participatory institutions**

13
14 The left's traditional commitment with the core value of equality (Bobbio, 1996) makes
15 left-wing parties sympathetic towards participatory innovations (Junius et al., 2020).
16 This position, that emphasizes the republican ideas of positive freedom and equality in
17 public decision-making (Barber, 1984), sees participatory institutions as a solution to
18 mitigate power asymmetries and redress legitimacy crises, as signalled by new social
19 movements and radical left parties (March and Mudde, 2005).
20
21
22
23
24

25
26 The expansion of democratic innovations in the recent decades (Smith, 2009) finds a
27 starting point in the local experiences promoted by left-wing parties in the early 1990s,
28 as part of a broader project of democratic deepening. The participatory budget (PB)
29 model, firstly implemented by the Workers' Party in Porto Alegre, Brazil, serves as the
30 paradigm of leftist participatory goals —social justice, economic redistribution and
31 citizen empowerment—leaving efficiency as a secondary consideration (Goldfrank,
32 2011). PB arises as an experience of assembly-based democracy that aims at giving voice
33 to the most disadvantaged groups (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2014; Sintomer et al., 2012).
34
35
36
37
38

39 Conversely, the liberal-democratic right has historically been more reticent about the
40 citizens' direct involvement in policy-making. Political liberalism places the protection of
41 individual autonomy (negative freedom) at the centre of its normative model
42 (Habermas, 1994). Sceptical about the political competence of the average citizen
43 (Schumpeter, 1976), liberals argue that an extensive participation of poorly informed
44 individuals will undermine efficiency and might put the liberal rights at risk (Bessette,
45 1994: 212-215).ⁱⁱ Thus, modern right-wing parties have traditionally endorsed
46 representative democracy and its status quo, wherein decisions are entrusted to
47 politicians who are held accountable through electoral mechanisms (Junius et al., 2020).
48
49
50
51
52

53 The previous picture suggests a plausible narrative: ideological disparities between left
54 and right-wing parties result in the former championing participatory institutions while
55 the latter reject them. Nevertheless, the 'left vs right' dichotomy fails to fully address
56 the dynamism of political ideologies regarding this matter. On the one hand, the rise in
57 the late 1970s of New Public Management (NPM) theories allowed a neoliberal
58
59
60
61
62

1 approach to citizen participation. NPM aimed at optimizing the efficiency of public
2 policies by introducing market-oriented incentives and prioritizing outcomes over
3 conventional bureaucratic processes. Osborne and Gaebler (1992: 19-20) underscored
4 the shared objectives of NPM and citizen participation, which included empowering
5 citizens by shifting control from bureaucratic structures to the community, reframing
6 citizens as customers with choices, decentralizing authority, and promoting
7 participatory management, thereby mobilizing all sectors—public, private, and
8 voluntary—to address community challenges.
9

10
11
12 Unlike the leftist model of participatory democracy, NPM’s approach to citizen
13 participation is characterized by a consumer-oriented model that focuses on
14 information, access, and choice (Rowe and Shepherd, 2002: 278). This managerial
15 perspective conceptualizes citizen involvement as a technical solution oriented to gain
16 efficiency and efficacy in the provision of public goods (Osborne, 2010). In contrast to
17 the collective empowerment in the leftist model, NPM places greater emphasis on the
18 two-way relationship between citizens and the administration, incorporating tools such
19 as satisfaction surveys to assess public service performance (Kelly, 2005).
20
21
22
23
24

25 On the other hand, Western democracies underwent deep socio-political changes after
26 the fall of the Berlin Wall, which fostered a gradual convergence on public policies
27 between center-left and center-right parties. The evolution of social democracy towards
28 the liberal tenets of the Third Way drew social democrats closer to the NPM postulates
29 (Rowe and Shepard, 2002: 287). Subsequently, the New Public Governance (NPG)
30 tackled the challenge of governability in complex societies throughout an ‘inter-
31 organizational network’ approach (Osborne, 2010). In essence, the NPG reframes the
32 role of politicians and public servants from ‘authoritative decision-makers’ to
33 ‘facilitators’ who engage with other societal actors—companies, civil society and
34 nonprofit organizations—to build collaborative networks from which public policies will
35 emerge (Denhardt and Denhardt, 2000; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011: 168-169;).
36 Therefore, in the twenty-first century, center-left and center-right parties in Western
37 democracies would have converged in a post-NPM paradigm that encompasses both the
38 managerial and democratizing elements of citizen participation and sees citizens as
39 active partners in the formulation of public policies (Cavalcante, 2019: 211). This
40 convergence could explain the support of global institutions as the OECD or the World
41 Bank to the ‘participatory wave’.
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

51 Thus, it seems reasonable to anticipate that sharper differences in participatory policies
52 will emerge as we move closer to the left end of the 'left-right' spectrum. After the
53 collapse of communism in 1989, radical left and anti-capitalist parties revitalized the
54 participatory theories from the 1970s to countering neoliberalism and reinvigorating
55 democracy on an anti-elitist foundation (March and Mudde, 2005: 25). Thus, these
56 parties still adhere to the original objectives of participatory democracy: social justice
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1 and citizen empowerment. This leftist position keeps claiming for a ‘horizontal’
2 participation in which every citizen exercises an equal share of power in decision-making
3 (Florida, 2017: 177). This position does not necessarily support any kind of participatory
4 institution: some left-leaning theorists argue that deliberative practices foster an elitist
5 understanding of participation that does not empower underprivileged groups, with
6 Young (2001) or Mouffe’s (1993) contesting some of empirical literature the liberal
7 arguments in search for rational consensus through deliberation.ⁱⁱⁱ Empirical literature
8 partially supports this differentiation. This is the case in research about participatory
9 budgeting, where despite the proliferation of a less radical model of PB (Baiocchi and
10 Ganuza, 2014), ideological differences persist between the radical left and the other
11 party families (Sintomer et al, 2012; Wampler and Goldfrank, 2022; Becerril Viera et al.,
12 2024).

18 **2.2. Hypotheses**

20
21 In sum, despite the widespread adoption of participatory policies, we expect that the
22 ideological differences discussed earlier will have significant consequences for the
23 objectives, process design and expected outcomes of participatory institutions. Firstly,
24 different party families pursue distinct values and objectives when crafting and
25 sponsoring these institutions, which may translate into divergent choices. Thus, center-
26 right and center-left parties would adopt a more technocratic view on citizen
27 participation as a tool to provide valuable inputs (such as information and feedback) to
28 public managers, aimed at enhancing the efficiency of public policies. Moreover, these
29 participatory processes would serve most of times in an advisory capacity, with final
30 decisions resting in the hands of public officials. In turn, radical left parties would
31 promote processes aimed at achieving social justice and citizen empowerment. Hence,
32 these processes would involve extensive participation, granting citizens greater control
33 over the participatory process, coupled with a binding nature.

40
41 Regarding the process design, the first crucial choice is related to participant selection
42 criteria and the role played by information. How participants are chosen is the first and
43 key stage of the process. According to our theoretical expectations, open and extensive
44 processes align more closely with transformative goals aimed at enhancing citizens’
45 status, attitudes and sense of empowerment (Barber, 1984). As such, parties more to
46 the left should be more inclined towards open processes. In contrast, smaller
47 representative samples are more in line with efficiency and efficacy goals, which align
48 with the technocratic perspective on participation commonly associated with the right
49 (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). A similar rationale can be applied to non-open processes,
50 such as those based on associative democracy (this is, institutions based on stakeholders
51 and representatives of civic associations) where the room for citizen’s empowerment is
52 more limited but the goal of incorporating preferences and information in policy-making
53 is attained (Brugué et al, 2021; Pawlowska, 2023).

1 This initial decision also impacts on how citizens' knowledge is integrated into the
2 process. The left's preference for extensive participation implies that all these citizens
3 possess lay knowledge and relevant information to contribute to the public debate (Nez,
4 2015). Center-right and center-left parties, on the other hand, may be more cautious: if
5 citizen's voices are to be heard, they should be informed by expert sources. As
6 previously stated, while deliberative quality is typically associated with democratic
7 innovations, assembly-type processes or referendums may fall short in achieving the
8 deliberative quality of other innovations such as mini-publics (Goodin and Dryzek, 2006;
9 Florida, 2017). Thus, participatory design can create a tension between extensive
10 participation and high-quality deliberation (Cohen and Fung, 2004: 27). This doesn't
11 necessarily imply a genuine passion for information and deliberation on the right, or a
12 reluctant position towards it on the left.^{iv} Instead, the argument is that the left places
13 higher value on citizens' lay knowledge. Consequently, when non-leftist parties opt for
14 participatory innovations, prioritizing filters or resources to enhance citizen knowledge
15 becomes more important.
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23 Finally, regarding outcomes, the decisiveness of a participatory process is a logical
24 outcome of the goals set by policy-makers during the design phase. A process focused
25 on collecting information or settling a conflict may not necessarily entail making
26 decisions. However, a process aiming at empowering citizens inherently involves sharing
27 decision-making power with them. Therefore, we anticipate that left-leaning
28 governments are more likely to implement more decisive participatory institutions
29 compared to center-right and center-left governments.
30
31
32
33

34 To summarize the key insights from our discussion, we propose three hypotheses
35 regarding the objectives, design, and outcomes of participatory processes:
36
37

38 **Hypothesis 1:** Left-leaning parties are inclined to orient their participatory processes
39 towards social justice and citizens' empowerment, while center-right and center-left
40 parties lean more towards efficacy and efficiency.
41
42

43 **Hypothesis 2:** Left-leaning parties tend to design open and extensive processes with
44 minimal participant selection criteria, whereas center-right and center-left parties are
45 more likely to be selective in participant criteria and prioritize citizens' enlightenment
46 through information and deliberation.
47
48
49

50 **Hypothesis 3:** Left-leaning parties are more likely to grant their participatory
51 processes a higher degree of decision-making power compared to center-right and
52 center-left parties.
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

3. Methodology

a. Context: Parties and local participatory institutions

Our research investigates participatory institutions and processes in Spain, primarily created and managed by public administrations. Among these, local administrations have been particularly active promoting citizen participation. Unlike national policies, which have limited influence on local participatory institutions, municipal engagement varies widely. This diversity provides an ideal context to examine whether different party priorities affect policies with minimal interference from national constraints (Sintomer and Del Pino, 2014), termed "vertical factors" by Wampler and Goldfrank (2022).

The emergence of Spanish local participatory institutions began in the 1980s, gaining momentum in the 21st Century (Brugué and Vallés, 2005). Initially, most of the first participatory institutions were exclusively based on associational participation, particularly advisory councils (Navarro, 2004). However, over time, other type of processes more based on individual participation gained prominence, such as participatory budgeting (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2017). Some these institutions are well-established, have a permanent character and are reflected in local regulations and by-laws, while many others are only temporary, created for specific consultations on an ad-hoc basis. Despite their increasing presence, many of these institutions still deal with minor issues and have a limited impact on most local policies (Della Porta et al, 2014). The substantial internal diversity within each organizational characteristic of these institutions allows us to explore how government ideology may influence each of them. While some activities may be initiated by various policy departments or the Mayor, most of this engagement is coordinated through dedicated participation departments, which were gradually established in many municipalities starting in the 1990s (Royo et al, 2011).

The first three decades of local democracy were marked by the gradual dominance of major political parties, with independent local tickets being rare, primarily in small municipalities. A significant shift occurred in the Spanish local party system in 2015 with the advent of "municipalismo"^v. The mobilized scenario stemming from the "indignados" movement, and Podemos' decision not to field official party candidates, led to the emergence of a considerable number of "municipalist" lists that ultimately were successful in a substantial number of cases. One of the core important demands of this movement was precisely an increased role for citizens in local policy-making (Blanco et al, 2020). The 2019 election, which coincided with our data collection period, marked an electoral crisis for these lists, resulting in the loss of many major cities they had governed. Nevertheless, some of these lists, either independently or in coalition

1 with traditional left parties, continued to hold mayoral positions or participate in
2 coalition governments^{vi}.

3
4 With this context in mind, our fieldwork aimed to capture the characteristics and
5 variation of Spanish participatory experiences without considering all 8000 Spanish
6 municipalities. To ensure our study covered a diverse range of municipalities (excluding
7 the smallest ones, which typically do not create formal participatory institutions), we
8 selected two regions: Andalucía and Madrid. These regions are (together with Catalonia)
9 the largest regions in Spain, representing together 32% of the total population. They
10 offer a balance between urban and rural dynamics and political leanings, with Andalucía
11 being traditionally more rural and historically dominated by left-leaning municipalities,
12 while Madrid tends to favour center-right electoral options. Although these regions do
13 not encompass the entire national landscape, they provide a substantial representation
14 of those contexts where regional party systems (where the impact of the left-right
15 dimension is less clear) are not crucial actors.
16
17
18
19
20
21

22 Data

23
24
25 Most of our data is derived from a survey conducted in Madrid and Andalucía
26 municipalities with populations exceeding 1,000 inhabitants, a universe totalling 699
27 municipalities. We directed the survey to the individuals responsible for overseeing
28 participation activities^{vii}. Approximately two-thirds of the responses came from
29 politicians, while the remainder were from municipal public servants. A total of 423
30 municipalities (61%) fulfilling our initial requirements responded to our survey.
31 Response rates were notably higher in larger municipalities, reaching 79% for those with
32 more than 50,000 inhabitants. Similarly, response rates were relatively higher in
33 Andalucía (61%) compared to smaller municipalities in Madrid, where response rates
34 fell below 50%, particularly in the municipalities below 5,000 inhabitants. In spite of
35 these differences, there were no significant biases in response rates based on the
36 political party affiliation of the mayor, with cooperation rates consistently exceeding
37 55%. The survey closely mirrors the real distribution of parties at the time, with most
38 municipalities governed by social-democratic PSOE, followed by centre-right PP and left
39 governed municipalities being the third most common group.
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

48 Fieldwork was conducted from May 11 to September 15, 2021, using an online
49 questionnaire, supplemented by four email reminders. For those municipalities that
50 remained unresponsive during the online fieldwork, we also employed phone contact
51 to improve their response rate.^{viii} The questionnaire included a few general inquiries
52 about each municipality and its participation activities, with a request for details on a
53 maximum of two of them^{ix}. Consequently, the dataset includes information about 608
54 participatory institutions, which serve as our primary unit of analysis^x. In addition, the
55 dataset includes contextual data about each municipality, encompassing electoral
56 results and socio-economic information, all sourced from official statistical data.
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

b. Variables and operationalization

Our research considers three dimensions of participatory institutions as dependent variables. To begin, we focus on the declared objectives of these institutions, which are a fundamental aspect of our analysis. Respondents in our study were presented with five main reasons for initiating a participatory process and asked to select one of them. These reasons encompassed obtaining information about citizens, enhancing efficacy and efficiency, reducing social injustice, empowering citizens and encouraging critical thinking, and bringing citizens closer to politics. From these options, we selected three primary objectives, coding them as binary variables: efficacy and efficiency (as opposed to other goals), mitigating social injustice (as opposed to other goals), and empowering citizens (as opposed to other goals). According to our first hypothesis, we anticipate that left-wing parties will prioritize objectives related to citizen empowerment and social justice, while center-left and center-right parties will primarily focus on efficiency and efficacy.

Next, we delve into the processes themselves, using two criteria derived from our research hypotheses. We examine participant selection and the role of information and deliberation in these participatory processes. Participants in our survey were provided with five options to choose from when asked how participants were selected: no selection, open to everyone, random selection, by invitation, election within organizations, and others. We recoded this variable to differentiate open processes from those involving other selection methods, reflecting our hypothesis that center-left and center-right governments prefer participation selection systems that are not entirely open^{xi}. Additionally, we considered how knowledge is incorporated into these processes, taking into account the type of information provided to participants. The options included a written, short introduction to the subject, a written in-depth report, an oral short overview, an oral in-depth introduction, and a combination of several formats. For the sake of simplicity, we consider any approach that exceeded a short oral introduction as sufficiently informative, which encompassed 20% of the observations. We also assessed whether participants could deliberate during the process. By combining the information and deliberation variables, we created a binary indicator which takes value 1 if participants could deliberate and were given good enough information and value 0 if any or both of these conditions were not met.

Finally, we turn our attention to the outcomes of these participatory processes, focusing on their perceived decisiveness. Respondents were asked whether the process led to a decision, with three response options: yes, it produced a non-binding decision, yes, it produced a binding decision, or no decision was made. We classified processes in the second category as "decisive," dichotomizing this variable accordingly. Detailed information, including the coding and descriptive statistics of all variables, can be found in Table A1 in the appendix.

1 Our primary independent variable is ideology. To measure the ideology of the authority
2 overseeing participatory institutions, we considered the party in charge of the citizen
3 participation office. Our assumption is that the ideology of the party representative in
4 this office influences their preferences and choices. In summary, if a policy-maker in the
5 participation office belongs to a left-wing party, the resulting participation processes
6 and institutions are expected to be more oriented towards citizen empowerment,
7 feature more open processes relying on lay knowledge, and exhibit greater decisiveness.
8
9

10 We categorized parties into four groups: right-wing parties, social-democratic PSOE
11 (used as the reference category), left-wing parties, and independent or unclassified
12 groups. For our analysis, we grouped the larger PP and Ciudadanos parties under right-
13 wing due to the small presence of Ciudadanos in our sample. We grouped the parties to
14 the left of the PSOE including the communist led coalition IU, Podemos, along with
15 municipalist coalitions that were affiliated to any of these two parties- Finally, other
16 electoral groups that are specific of one municipality alone, consider themselves
17 “independents” or are difficult to categorize have been left out of the analyses (N=74,
18 12% of the sample).
19
20
21
22
23
24

25 Additionally, we also include several of control variables into our analyses, including the
26 year of the experience, the duration of the experience, the presence of a participation
27 plan, whether the municipality had staff assigned to participatory policies, the region
28 where it took place, and the size of the municipality. These variables account,
29 respectively, for time trends, the degree of institutionalization of participation, and the
30 context in which the participatory processes occurred. In regards context, we take into
31 account whether the participatory process was developed in Madrid or Andalusia, given
32 that there are differences in terms of size, centrality, budget and identity between both
33 cases. At the municipal level, we have included the Gini Index (2018), a metric of social
34 inequality. Higher Gini values (closer to 1) signify increased income disparity within
35 municipalities, while lower values (closer to 0) suggest more equitable income
36 distribution. For each of the dependent variables, we include a baseline model with the
37 primary independent variables and the main control variables. Next, we incorporated a
38 second model adding variables related to the institutionalization of participation, as
39 some of these factors could be influenced by the local governments’ ideology,
40 potentially affecting the true impact of our main independent variable.
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49

50 Given the binary nature of our dependent variables, all the estimations aimed at
51 assessing the effect of ideology on participation traits used logistic regressions, followed
52 by graphic representations of predicted values. Our models encompassed a maximum
53 of 425 observations after accounting for missing information from different variables.
54 The minimum number of observations is 358 in the case of estimations for deliberation
55 (see Table 3). It is important to note that some observations share the same
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

municipality, and a few independent variables are measured at the municipal level, which advises in favour of grouping standard errors accordingly.

4. Results

We first offer the descriptive patterns for the dependent variables involved in our analyses in Figure 1. Almost 34% of the experiences claimed to be focused on efficiency and efficacy. Far less popular were the goals related to social justice (7%) and citizens' empowerment (14%) As for their selection criteria, our observations are almost perfectly even distributed between totally open processes and those that include some selection criteria (e.g. invitation to associations' representatives). About 44% of our observations can be considered "deliberative", as the quality of the information given to participants is deemed good enough and the process acknowledge a deliberative role of those who took part in it. Decisiveness is less frequent, although almost 30% of the experiences can be considered decisive.

Figure 1: distribution of our dependent variables.




Table 1. Distribution of the dependent variables depending on Ideology

		PSOE	Centre-right	Left	Pr Chi2
Input	Goal: more efficacy and efficiency	36.18	37.59	19.10	0.06
	Goal: social justice	6.5	6.8	9	0.715
	Goal: citizens' empowerment	12.3	9	23.6	0.005
Process	Selection participants: open	47.5	50	58.1	0.204
	Deliberative process (information + deliberative role)	53	53	42.4	0.201
Output	Decisive process	24.8	35	32.5	0.091

Note: Bold type indicates that the adjusted residual is more than 1.96 or less than -1.96, therefore that the number of cases in that cell is significantly larger if the null hypothesis of independence were true, with a significance level of 0.05.

1 Table 1 shows the result of bivariate analyses for each one of our dependent variables.
2 Cells entries are column percentages obtained with a series of crosstabs (the zero
3 category for each dependent variable has been omitted as it yields redundant
4 information). The last column of the table presents the probability associated to a
5 Pearson Chi-square test, where values lower than 0.05 indicate that there is a 0.05 or
6 lower probability that the associations observed are due to chance. As of note, only in
7 three instances the relationships are significant. The goals of efficiency/efficacy, and the
8 one focused in citizens' empowerment show a significant association with ideology with
9 a $p < 0.05$. As adjusted residuals indicate, parties to the left of the PSOEs are significantly
10 less and more prone, respectively, to develop participatory experiences aimed at those
11 goals, as compared to other parties. Finally, there is a significant association between
12 the decisiveness of a process and ideology, although this relationship is only significant
13 at $p < 0.1$. The adjusted residuals indicate that the PSOE has a significantly lower tendency
14 to develop decisive processes, as compared to parties from other ideologies.
15
16
17
18

19 The results of our regression estimations are presented in Tables 2 (objectives), 3
20 (process) and 4 (decisiveness). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test assesses how accurately the
21 predicted probabilities of our models align with actual outcomes across groups. A non-
22 significant result ($p > 0.05$) indicates a good fit, while a significant result may suggest a
23 poor fit. In our analysis, all models demonstrate a generally good fit, except for the
24 baseline model related to the goals of efficacy and efficiency (first column, Table 2), and
25 the baseline model for decisiveness (first column, Table 4). This outcome reinforces the
26 appropriateness of our chosen control variables.
27
28
29

30 Regarding the objectives of the experience (Table 2), two results align with our
31 hypotheses, as it was also the case in Table 1. Left-wing parties are indeed less prone to
32 launch experiences whose goal is improving the efficiency and efficacy of public policies.
33 At the same time, left-wing parties are more prone to launch experiences centred in
34 improving citizens' empowerment. However, this last effect disappears once we
35 consider traits related to the institutionalization of participation in every municipality,
36 such as having a participation plan or staff devoted to develop participatory institutions
37 or the fact of being a stable mechanism. None of the control variables reach
38 conventional levels of significance. Contrary to theoretical expectations, there are no
39 significant differences regarding the social justice goal, which is not a surprise given the
40 answers shown in table 1: left parties in Spain do not consider it the most important
41 objective of participation in almost any case. Figure 2 displays these patterns graphically,
42 evidencing no difference for social justice across party families, a quite clear one for
43 efficiency and an intermediate situation for empowerment.^{xii}
44
45
46
47
48

49 Table 3 presents the results for the two process traits considered in this paper: openness
50 and deliberation. If any (see Figure 3), left-wing parties seem to launch open processes
51 with a somewhat higher propensity, and also to sponsor experiences that are not
52 deliberative. However, these differences are not big enough to be deemed statistically
53 significant. While the variable tapping local governments' ideology doesn't reach
54 statistical significance, we observe that processes tend to be open if they are more
55 recent, if they are not stable mechanisms -a somewhat obvious findings, as stable
56 mechanisms tend to channel associative, hence organized, participation- and if the
57 municipality has a participation plan. Deliberation in turn is significantly related to
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1 stability, as stable mechanisms have a higher tendency to be limited regarding the
2 number of attendees and invested in the quality of the debates.

3
4 Finally, Table 4 presents the results for decisiveness. In regards our third hypothesis, all
5 else kept equal, parties to the left of the social democrats (PSOE) are more prone to
6 launch and sponsor decisive participatory institutions. This significant difference is
7 depicted in Figure 4, which reveals that the probability of a process to be decisive
8 increases as the local government moves to the radical left part of the spectrum. On
9 the other hand, the size of the municipality and the region seems to play an important
10 role, in the sense that Madrid's councils and bigger municipalities host more decisive
11 experiences.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Table 2: logistic regressions for goals. Log-odds.

	Goal: efficacy & efficiency		Goal: social justice		Goal: citizens' empowerment	
	baseline	Controls	baseline	Controls	baseline	Controls
Gini index	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.07)	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
Starting year	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	0.03 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Region: Madrid	0.3 (0.31)	0.2 (0.32)	-0.52 (0.67)	-0.49 (0.78)	0.14 (0.40)	0.13 (0.42)
Hab: up to 5,000	0.60 (0.40)	0.71 (0.47)	-1.06 (0.75)	-0.74 (0.91)	-0.32 (0.55)	-0.52 (0.64)
Hab: 5,001-10,000	0.57 (0.38)	0.66 (0.45)	-0.72 (0.69)	-0.11 (0.81)	-0.30 (0.53)	-0.69 (0.65)
Hab: 10,001-20,000	0.50 (0.46)	0.36 (0.52)	-0.36 (0.80)	0.31 (0.92)	-0.57 (0.57)	-0.70 (0.66)
Hab: 20,001-50,000	0.31 (0.46)	0.46 (0.51)	-2.03+ (1.14)	-1.45 (1.18)	0.04 (0.56)	-0.19 (0.55)
Ideology:Center-Right	0.07 (0.29)	-0.04 (0.32)	-0.12 (0.52)	-0.07 (0.56)	-0.65 (0.45)	-0.93+ (0.49)
Ideology:Left	-0.93** (0.35)	-0.89* (0.36)	0.25 (0.53)	0.13 (0.56)	0.74* (0.35)	0.58 (0.37)
Council has participation staff		0.22 (0.27)		0.05 (0.47)		-0.47 (0.36)
Stable mechanism		0.26 (0.24)		0.40 (0.50)		0.62+ (0.35)
Council has participation plan		-0.44+ (0.27)		-0.54 (0.50)		0.62+ (0.32)
_cons	17.00 (38.52)	8.94 (41.73)	-60.27 (86.92)	-25.31 (82.61)	-11.37 (61.99)	-44.53 (65.94)
N	422	396	422	396	422	396
Cox-Snell R ²	.032	.045	.019	.021	.033	.061
Nagelkerke R ²	.044	.062	.046	.056	.058	.106
Hosmer-Lemeshow chi2(8df)	26.9	11.9	3.03	8.28	13.6	13.4
Hosmer-Lemeshow p-value	.001	.154	.933	.406	.093	.099

Notes: : Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the municipality. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Reference category for inhabitants is: more than 50,000. Reference category for ideology is: PSOE

Table 3: logistic regressions for dynamics/processes. Log-odds.

	Dynamic: open, no selection of participants		Dynamic: deliberation. Participants were informed and could deliberate	
	baseline	Controls	baseline	Controls
Gini Index	0.01 (0.04)	0.00 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Starting year	0.04* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Region: Madrid	0.27 (0.32)	0.40 (0.32)	0.03 (0.30)	0.08 (0.32)
Hab: up to 5,000	-0.06 (0.42)	0.06 (0.46)	0.30 (0.40)	0.33 (0.46)
Hab: 5,001-10,000	-0.27 (0.40)	-0.07 (0.44)	-0.05 (0.40)	-0.09 (0.45)
Hab: 10,001-20,000	0.07 (0.47)	0.36 (0.48)	-0.31 (0.45)	-0.28 (0.49)
Hab: 20,001-50,000	-0.32 (0.46)	-0.24 (0.47)	0.68 (0.46)	0.55 (0.50)
Ideology: Center-Right	0.10 (0.29)	0.15 (0.31)	-0.10 (0.30)	0.06 (0.32)
Ideology: Left	0.46 (0.30)	0.37 (0.32)	-0.35 (0.29)	-0.42 (0.31)
Council has participation staff		0.07 (0.28)		0.08 (0.29)
Stable mechanism		-0.60* (0.24)		0.52* (0.25)
Council has participation plan		0.55* (0.26)		-0.18 (0.27)
_cons	-82.16* (38.27)	-57.39 (39.49)	17.19 (42.21)	-0.31 (42.71)
N	425	398	387	363
Cox-Snell R ²	.025	.056	.031	.049
Nagelkerke R ²	.034	.075	.041	.066
Hosmer–Lemeshow chi2(8df)	3.73	3.85	11.67	9.06
Hosmer–Lemeshow p-value	.881	.871	.167	.337


Notes: : Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the municipality. + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Reference category for inhabitants is: more than 50,000. Reference category for ideology is: PSOE

Table 4: logistic regressions for decisiveness of the process. Log-odds.

	Decisiveness of the process	
	baseline	Controls
Gini index	-0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)
Starting year	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)
Region: Madrid	1.58*** (0.35)	1.48*** (0.36)
Hab: up to 5,000	-1.02* (0.49)	-0.86 (0.55)
Hab: 5,001-10,000	-0.76 (0.47)	-0.59 (0.50)
Hab: 10,001-20,000	-1.27* (0.55)	-1.41* (0.62)
Hab: 20,001-50,000	-0.51 (0.53)	-0.51 (0.56)
Ideology: Center-Right	0.27 (0.34)	0.39 (0.36)
Ideology: Left	0.47 (0.37)	0.69+ (0.39)
Council has participation staff		0.33 (0.36)
Stable mechanism		0.22 (0.31)
Council has participation plan		-0.50 (0.35)
_cons	16.10 (42.78)	4.84 (42.23)
Observations	428	400
Cox-Snell R2	.13	.14
Nagelkerke R2	.19	.21
Hosmer–Lemeshow chi2(8df)	16.46	13.46
Hosmer–Lemeshow p-value	.036	.097


Notes: : Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors clustered on the municipality .+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, * p<0.01, ** p<0.001. Reference category for inhabitants is: more than 50,000. Reference category for ideology is: PSOE

1 **Figure 2: Predicted probabilities for goals**




20 Note: bars represent 83% confidence intervals.

21
22
23
24 **Figure 3: Predicted probabilities for the dynamics of the process**



49 Note: bars represent 83% confidence intervals.

Figure 4: Predicted probabilities for the decisiveness of the process



Note: bars represent 83% confidence intervals.

5. Discussion

Our central research question revolved around whether political parties of different ideological traditions exhibit differentiation in the participatory policies and types of participatory institutions they develop. Our revision of the literature led us to anticipate varying goals, processes and outputs across parties of different ideologies, especially the radical left. However, our findings challenge the notion of a strong ideological distinction. In the recent Spanish context, we observe similarities and only a few differences in the local participatory institutions developed by three ostensibly distinct party families.

In light of our hypotheses we can partially confirm the first and last ones. Regarding objectives, the radical left demonstrates a lesser interest in efficacy and efficiency, while both the social democrats and the radical left (but especially the latter) place a higher emphasis on citizen empowerment. Surprisingly, these differences do not extend to the objective of social justice, which has been central in some well-known participatory initiatives, particularly in Latin America. Our results show that, even for the Southern European radical left, creating social justice is not a primary objective of participation policies. The radical left promotes participation for somewhat different reasons, but these are more related to democratic advancement than to equality building concerns. This finding is relevant to both assessments of what the radical left represents in Europe and its priorities, as well as to build the map of European participation policy motivations.

When it comes to process traits, such as inclusiveness and deliberation, we do not find strong and consistent distinctions between parties. They employ similar strategies in terms of open recruitment, providing external information, and incorporating

1 deliberative methods for participants (hypothesis 2). On the other hand, once we
2 consider institutionalization traits, we note that radical left parties are more inclined to
3 host and sponsor more influential participatory institutions compared to social-
4 democratic parties. This difference primarily exists between these two party groups
5 (more than between radical left and center-right) and is not particularly strong
6 (hypothesis 3).
7

8 In essence, the three party families diverge in some of their prioritized goals. However,
9 they seem to face challenges when translating these objectives into distinct practices.
10 This highlights the difficulty of translating “radical aspirations” into the implementation
11 of participatory institutions (Escobar, 2022). While political theorists often justify
12 participatory institutions based on democratic values (Smith, 2009), most of their actual
13 promoters are more concerned by their ability to contribute to policy-making (Vrydagh,
14 2023). In this sense, our research reveals that despite initial inspiration from the Porto
15 Alegre model, many Spanish participatory institutions have adapted to resemble
16 German or Polish practices, emphasizing efficiency and effective management rather
17 than adhering to the Latin American transformative model.
18
19
20
21

22 The rise of the Spanish “municipalist” movement, the increased importance of
23 participation in this movement’s agenda, and the overall European populist surge -with
24 a strong focus on participatory issues- creates an ideal scenario for party ideology to
25 exert its influence on this policy area. Yet, our results point to limited differences, failing
26 to establish a consistent pattern of strongly distinctive participation policies across party
27 families. Nevertheless, it’s worth noting that although some of our analyses do not
28 achieve statistical significance, nearly all coefficients indicate relationships in the
29 expected directions, with the radical left exhibiting slightly different patterns. When we
30 consider the results as a whole, it suggests a scenario in which the radical left had
31 somewhat different goals or objectives, but had limited capacity to adopt significantly
32 different participatory practices in most local governments.
33
34
35
36

37 Our research contributes to the debate regarding which party families have more
38 distinctive policies, at least in the realm of participatory politics. The distinctions that
39 emerge tend to set the radical left apart from the rest, rather than neatly dividing right
40 from left. The minor differences between conservatives and social democrats do not
41 always align with expectations. In sum, this pattern seems to confirm ideas that
42 regarding participation policies the limited differences that exist set apart the radical left
43 from the main moderate party families (Becerril Viera et al, 2024; Rowe and Sheperd
44 2002).
45
46
47

48 Our analysis has several limitations. The cross-sectional nature of our data restricts our
49 ability to conduct a comprehensive analysis of medium and long- term effects, or to
50 explore the causal mechanisms behind the data. Therefore, we cannot rigorously
51 address the idea that the left played a crucial role in the creation of these institutions,
52 even though they were finally adopted by all parties, as the literature on participatory
53 budgeting suggests (Wampler and Goldfrank, 2022). Nonetheless, three control
54 variables could indicate this effect: the stable character of participatory institutions, the
55 existence of participation plans, and the presence of participation staff. Our models do
56 not show consistent evidence in this direction, as the coefficients vary in direction and
57 intensity. On the other hand, the presence of these three characteristics is far from
58
59
60
61
62

1 irrelevant. Municipalities with participation plans -a clear sign of institutionalization of
2 participatory policies-, tend to prioritize efficiency over empowerment (table 2). These
3 characteristics do not necessarily align with our prior expectations for left or right
4 parties, but are consistent with previous research on the crucial role of public
5 administration professionals in participatory institutions (Migchelbrink and Van der
6 Walle, 2022; Bottin and Mazeaud, 2023).
7

8 If the period analyzed were longer, further differences might have emerged. Indeed,
9 radical left parties had lost many of their local strongholds before the 2019 local
10 election, thus limiting their ability to develop long term participation policies. Case
11 studies indicate that in some cities they continued to build empowering participatory
12 institutions (Blanco et al, 2020; Feenstra and Tormey, 2023), but our research questions
13 whether this is a generalized pattern for radical left governed municipalities or only a
14 characteristic of particular cases.
15
16

17
18 The available data and the results presented have other limitations. For example, in the
19 Spanish context, the development of Minipublics and sortition-based processes was still
20 quite limited at the time, making it impossible to distinguish the potentially different
21 outcomes that would emerge from these practices. Additionally, the low model fit
22 (particularly for efficiency as a key objective) indicates that the overall explanatory
23 power of the models is limited. This suggests that factors beyond party ideology are also
24 relevant to understand the preferred objectives of participatory policies.
25
26

27
28 Several explanations could account for the observed policy similarities, and our data
29 cannot definitely prove or discard any of them. At least three possibilities stand out as
30 plausible explanations. The first one would suggest that time, incrementalism, and the
31 challenges of policy change (Lindblom, 1959) require a long-term perspective to capture
32 the effects of different parties in government (Battista et al, 2022): in this hypothesis,
33 larger differences might have emerged taking a longer time perspective. The second one
34 would emphasize that participation has evolved into a valence issue adopted by most
35 parties. The observed similarities may result from policy diffusion, benchmarking or
36 isomorphism processes that transcend party lines, as observed in the participatory
37 budgeting literature (Baiocchi and Ganuza, 2017). In this case, closer to the Wampler
38 and Goldfrank (2022) approach, we may need to distinguish who creates and who
39 spreads and maintains participatory institutions. The third explanation would highlight
40 the difficulty of aligning policy objectives and instruments to achieve them (Escobar;
41 2022; Heinelt, 2013), possibly due to limited information, resources or skills, especially
42 in setting where small under-resourced local administrations are a significant part of the
43 universe. A combination of (some) of them may be producing some of the patterns
44 observed, but only more comparative research can provide clear answers and ascertain
45 the degree of external validity of our findings in other political and temporal scenarios.
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

References

- 1
2 Baiocchi, G. and Ganuza, E. (2014) Participatory Budgeting as If Emancipation Mattered.
3 *Politics & Society*, 42 (1): 29–50.
4
- 5 Baiocchi, G and Ganuza, E. (2017) *Popular democracy*. Stanford University Press
6
- 7 Barber, B. (1984) *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley, CA:
8 University of California Press.
9
- 10 Battista JC, Peress M, Richman J. Estimating the locations of voters, politicians, policy
11 outcomes, and status quos on a common scale. *Political Science Research and Methods*.
12 2022; 10(4): 806-822.
13
14
- 15 Becerril Viera, I., Ganuza, E., & Rico Motos, C. (2024). Birds of a feather flock together:
16 influence of ideology in the implementation of participation. *Democratization*, 1–21.
17 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2024.2340638>.
18
19
20
- 21 Bengtsson, A. and Mattila, M. (2009) Direct Democracy and its Critics: Support for Direct
22 Democracy and ‘Stealth’ Democracy in Finland, *West European Politics*, 32:5, 1031-1048
23
24
- 25 Bessette, J. (1994). *The Mild Voice of Reason. Deliberative Democracy and American*
26 *National Government*. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
27
- 28 Blanco, I., Salazar, Y., and Bianchi, I. (2020). Urban governance and political change
29 under a radical left government: The case of Barcelona. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 42(1),
30 18–38
31
32
- 33 Bobbio, N. (1996). *Left and Right: The Significance of a Political Distinction*. Chicago:
34 University of Chicago Press.
35
36
- 37 Bottin, J. and Mazeaud, A. (2023) The deliberative public servants: The roles of public
38 servants in citizens’ assemblies. In: Reuchamps, M Vrydagh, J and Welp, Y *De Gruyter*
39 *Handbook of Citizens’ Assemblies*, De Gruyter, p. 337-348
40
41
- 42 Brugué, Q. and Vallés, J.M. (2005), New-Style Councils, New-Style Councillors: From
43 Local Government to Local Governance. *Governance*, 18: 197-226.
44
- 45 Brugué, Q., Font, J., & Ruiz, J. (2021). The Closer, the Better? Comparing Advisory
46 Councils at Different Government Levels. *Administration & Society*, 53(6), 844-871
47
48
- 49 Bua, A. and Bussu, S. (2021), Between governance-driven democratisation and
50 democracy-driven governance: Explaining changes in participatory governance in the
51 case of Barcelona. *European Journal of Political Research*, 60: 716-737
52
53
- 54 Cavalcante, P. (2019) Trends in public administration after hegemony of the New Public
55 Management: a literature review. *Revista Serviço Público Brasília*, 70 (2): 195-218.
56
- 57 Cohen, J. and Fung, A. (2004). *Radical Democracy*. *Swiss Political Science Review*, 10(4),
58 23-34.
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

1 Della Porta, D; Reiter, H.; Alarcón, P. (2014). Institutional Participatory Initiatives and
2 Democratic Qualities, in Font, J., Della Porta, D. and Sintomer, Y. (Eds.), Participatory
3 democracy in Southern Europe, London: Rowman & Littlefield.

4
5 Escobar, O. (2022). Between radical aspirations and pragmatic challenges:
6 Institutionalizing participatory governance in Scotland, *Critical Policy Studies*, 16:2, 146-
7 161.

8
9
10 Denhardt, R. and Denhardt, J. (2000). The New Public Service: Serving Rather than
11 Steering, *Public Administration Review*, 60(6), 549-559.

12
13 Donovan, T. and Karp, J. (2006). Popular support for direct democracy, *Party Politics*,
14 12(5), 671-688.

15
16
17 Dryzek, J. (2000). *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations*.
18 New York: Oxford University Press.

19
20
21 Feenstra, R. and Tormey, S. (2023). From social mobilisation to institutional politics:
22 Reflecting on the impact of municipalism in Madrid and Barcelona, *Social Movement*
23 *Studies*, 22:1, 80-98

24
25
26 Florida, A. (2017). *From Participation to Deliberation: A Critical Genealogy of*
27 *Deliberative Democracy*. ECPR Press.

28
29 Font, J. and Blanco, I. (2007). Procedural legitimacy and political trust: The case of citizen
30 juries in Spain. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(4), 557-589.

31
32
33 Gherghina, S., Close, C., and Carman, C. (2023). Parliamentarians' Support for Direct and
34 Deliberative Democracy in Europe: An Account of Individual-Level Determinants.
35 *Comparative Politics*, 55(2), 219-238.

36
37
38 Gherghina, S., Pilet, J. B., & Mitru, B. (2023). Big ideas, little detail: how populist parties
39 talk about referendums in Europe. *Contemporary Politics*, 1–19.
40 <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2023.2296734>

41
42
43 Goldfrank, B. (2011). *Deepening Local Democracy in Latin America: Participation,*
44 *Decentralization, and the Left*. Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press.

45
46 Goodin, R., and Dryzek, J. (2006). Deliberative impacts: The macro-political uptake of
47 mini-publics. *Politics & Society*, 34(2), 219–244.

48
49 Habermas, J. (1994). Three normative models of democracy. *Constellations*, 1(1), 1-10.

50
51
52 Heinelt, H. (2013). Introduction: The Role Perception and Behaviour of Municipal
53 Councillors in the Changing Context of Local Democracy. *Local Government Studies*,
54 39(5), 633–639.

55
56
57 Imbeau, L. M., Pétry, F., and Lamari, M. (2001). Left-right party ideology and government
58 policies: A meta-analysis. *European Journal of Political Research*, 40(1), 1-29.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Jacquet, V., Niessen, C., & Reuchamps, M. (2022). Sortition, its advocates and its critics: An empirical analysis of citizens' and MPs' support for random selection as a democratic reform proposal. *International Political Science Review*, 43(2), 295-316.

Junius, N., Matthieu, J., Caluwaerts, D., and Erzeel, S. (2020). Is It Interests, Ideas or Institutions? Explaining Elected Representatives' Positions Toward Democratic Innovations in 15 European Countries. *Frontiers in Political Science*, 2, 1-14.

Kelly, J. M. (2005). The dilemma of the unsatisfied customer in a market model of public administration. *Public Administration Review*, 65(1), 76-84.

Lindblom, C. (1959). The Science of "Muddling Through", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp.79-88.

March, L. and Mudde, C. (2005) What's Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left after 1989: Decline and Mutation. *Comparative European Politics*, 3 (1): 23–49.

Migchelbrink, K., and Van de Walle, S. (2022). Serving multiple masters? Public managers' role perceptions in participatory budgeting. *Administration & Society* 54 (3), 339–365

Mouffe, C. (1993). *The Return of the Political*. London: Verso.

Navarro, C. (2004). Participatory Democracy and Political Opportunism: Municipal Experience in Italy and Spain (1960–93). *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28(4), 819–838.

Nez H., 2015, *Urbanisme : la parole citoyenne*, Lormont : Le Bord de l'eau.

Osborne, S. (2010). *The New Public Governance?* London: Routledge.

Osborne, D. and Gaebler, T. (1992) *Reinventing Government*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Pawłowska, A. (2023): Role sets of advisory councils in local policymaking process: the perspective of council members, *Policy Studies*, DOI:10.1080/01442872.2023.2253776

Pogrebinschi, T (2023). *Innovating Democracy?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pollit, C. and Bouckaert, G. (2011). *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis- New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rangoni, S., Bedock, C. and Talukder, D. (2021). More competent thus more legitimate? MPs' discourses on deliberative mini-publics. *Acta Politica*, 58(4).

Rowe, R. and Sheperd, M. (2002) Public participation in the new NHS: No closer to citizen control? *Social Policy & Administration*, 36 (3): 275-290.

1 Royo, S. Yetano, A; Acerete, B. (2011) Citizen Participation in German and Spanish Local
2 Governments: A Comparative Study, *International Journal of Public*
3 *Administration*, 34:3, 139-150

4 Schäfer, A. and Merkel, W. (2023). Emancipation Against All Odds? The Conservatism
5 Charge to Deliberative Democracy Reconsidered, *Journal of Deliberative*
6 *Democracy* 19(1), 1-13.

7
8
9
10 Schumpeter, J. (1976). *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper and
11 Row.

12
13 Shah, A. (2007). *Participatory Budgeting. Public Sector Governance and Accountability*.
14 Washington, DC: World Bank.

15
16
17 Sintomer, Y. and Del Pino, E. (2014). The National and Regional Contexts of Participatory
18 Experiences. In Font, J., Della Porta, D. and Sintomer, Y. (Eds.), *Participatory democracy*
19 *in Southern Europe*, London: Rowman & Littlefield.

20
21
22 Sintomer, Y., Herzberg, C., Röcke, A., and Allegretti, G. (2012). Transnational models of
23 citizen participation: The case of participatory budgeting. *Journal of Deliberative*
24 *Democracy*, 8(2).

25
26
27 Sintomer, Y., Röcke, A., and Herzberg, C. (2016). *Participatory budgeting in Europe:*
28 *Democracy and public governance*. London: Routledge.

29
30 Smith, G. (2009) *Democratic Innovations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

31
32 Vrydagh, J. (2023). The minipublic bubble: How the contributions of minipublics are
33 conceived in Belgium (2001–2021). *European Political Science Review*, 1-16

34
35
36 Wampler, B and Goldfrank, B. (2022): *The rise, spread and decline of Brazil's*
37 *participatory budgeting. The arc of a democratic innovation*. Cham: Palgrave

38
39
40 Young, I.M. (2001). Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy, *Political Theory*,
41 29(5), 670-690.

Appendix I: Descriptive statistics for the main variables included in our analyses.

	mean	sd	min	max	count
Goal: efficacy & efficiency	.339	.474	0	1	584
Goal: social justice	.067	.250	0	1	584
Goal: citizens' empowerment	.137	.344	0	1	584
Dynamic: open, no selection of participants	.5	.500	0	1	536
Dynamic: deliberation. Participants were informed and could deliberate	.511	.500	0	1	587
Decisiveness of the process	.290	.454	0	1	525
Starting year	2017.1	5.425	1980	2021	492
Council has participation staff	.635	.482	0	1	592
Stable mechanism	.613	.487	0	1	597
Council has participation plan	0.369	0.483	0	1	565
Party: PSOE	.498	.500	0	1	608
Party: Centre-Right	.225	.418	0	1	608
Party: Left	.155	.362	0	1	608
Party: Other	.122	.327	0	1	608
Region: Madrid	.16	.370	0	1	608
Hab: up to 5,000	.437	.496	0	1	608
Hab: 5,000-10,000	.191	.393	0	1	608
Hab: 10,001-20,000	.132	.338	0	1	608
Hab: 20,000-50,000	.130	.336	0	1	608
Hab: More than 50,000	.110	.313	0	1	608

Word Count (including everything, but first page): 8712 words

Conflict of interest statement: This project received financial help from the Spanish Ministry of Science, project PID2019-106731GB-I00

ⁱ We use a few times this term when talking about previous research, since this is the most common expression used in the literature. We mostly employ participatory institutions/processes since we refer to most procedures used by public administrations to listen to citizen preferences, including more and less innovative ones, from advisory councils or referenda to minipublics.

ⁱⁱ Liberal thought encompasses different sensibilities, some of which are more sympathetic with citizens' engagement in deliberative decision-making, which by restricting deliberation to a sample of well-informed citizens, differs from the participatory model usually advocated by left-wing parties, based on the direct and extensive participation of citizens (Florida, 2017: 175-182).

ⁱⁱⁱ See Dryzek (2000: 57-80) and Schäfer and Merkel (2023: 3) for a more detailed account of these criticisms.

^{iv} Empirical research presents mixed findings. Pogrebinschi (2023: 18) identifies a clear link between left-wing parties in Latin America and deliberative innovations. Similarly, Gherghina et al. (2023) demonstrate that left-wing representatives tend to be more supportive of deliberative citizen participation. In addition, Jacquet et al. (2022) highlight that left-wing representatives are more favorable towards mixed

1 assemblies, which combine elected and randomly selected representatives. In contrast, Font and Blanco
2 (2007) found that citizen juries in Spain were developed by mayors across the ideological spectrum.
3

4 ^v Locally built tickets, not officially affiliated to any major party. On the Spanish municipalist wave of 2015
5 see, among others, Bua and Bussu (2021) and Feenstra and Tormey (2023).
6

7 ^{vi} Since these coalitions had different names in each municipality their total number of votes is unknown,
8 possibly close to 10-11%. In our dataset, these left parties represent 14% of the mayors and 15,5% of the
9 councilors in charge of participation departments.
10

11 ^{vii} The survey was sent to the email address of the individual responsible for the participation
12 department, when available (in the municipality website or after a phone call to the municipality), or to
13 the general municipality email address as an alternative, asking for an answer from the person in charge
14 of participation.
15

16 ^{viii} Previous empirical studies suggest that self-administered surveys and telephone surveys tend to cancel
17 each other's biases, as the first ones are less prone to trigger social desirability and survey satisficing,
18 while telephone-administered surveys display less item non-response and ensure a better understanding
19 of the questions. Alternative strategies for data collection, such as data mining, tend to overrepresent
20 more spectacular processes (Galais et al. 2012).
21

22 ^{ix} Since the goal was to have a sample as close as possible to a good representation of all participation
23 activities developed, the questionnaire asked for the name of a maximum of five. Then, two of them were
24 chosen randomly to ask for more details, trying to avoid that respondents chose the "best" ones.
25

26 ^x Most municipalities provided information about two institutions, some about only one.
27

28 ^{xi} We were unable to use a more refined coding to reflect the potential distinctiveness of random
29 selection-based processes due to the limited number of such cases in the dataset (only 9). Furthermore,
30 none of them were developed in municipalities governed by radical left parties. As a robustness check
31 we recalculated the models excluding these 9 cases, and the results did not change substantially (the
32 corresponding coefficient in Table 3 shifted from 0.49 to 0.42).
33

34 ^{xii} The figures present the log-odds coefficients derived from the estimations reported in the preceding
35 tables, accompanied by 83% confidence intervals. This selection of a confidence interval aims to
36 streamline the interpretation of the results, aligning with the consensus among scholars that two means
37 are significantly different (with a p-value around 0.05) when 83% confidence intervals do not overlap
38 (Goldstein & Healy, 1995; Austin & Hux, 2002).
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65