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| Campo DC | Valor | Lengua/Idioma |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | García Saiz, Sergio Javier | es-ES |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-05-30T16:06:36Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2022-05-30T16:06:36Z | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11531/68378 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | We empirically study how financial regulations generate corporate governance spillovers through the institutional ownership network. Exploiting the Regulation SHO Pilot experiment, we find a significant removal of anti-takeover provisions by Non-Pilot firms when their motivated monitors are more exposed to Pilot firms. Besides, results across other corporate governance fronts such as board structure, opportunism, and innovation provide further support to a positive governance spillover. The results are consistent with the increase in market discipline in Pilot firms allowing motivated monitors to reallocate monitoring and promote investor engagement in Non-Pilot firms. Our findings provide novel insights for the evaluation of financial regulations. | es-ES |
| dc.description.abstract | We empirically study how financial regulations generate corporate governance spillovers through the institutional ownership network. Exploiting the Regulation SHO Pilot experiment, we find a significant removal of anti-takeover provisions by Non-Pilot firms when their motivated monitors are more exposed to Pilot firms. Besides, results across other corporate governance fronts such as board structure, opportunism, and innovation provide further support to a positive governance spillover. The results are consistent with the increase in market discipline in Pilot firms allowing motivated monitors to reallocate monitoring and promote investor engagement in Non-Pilot firms. Our findings provide novel insights for the evaluation of financial regulations. | en-GB |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | es_ES |
| dc.language.iso | en-GB | es_ES |
| dc.rights | Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada España | es_ES |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | es_ES |
| dc.title | Institutional Investors and the Governance Spillovers of Financial Regulations: Evidence From a Natural Experiment | es_ES |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper | es_ES |
| dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/draft | es_ES |
| dc.rights.holder | es_ES | |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
| dc.keywords | institutional ownership, short-selling constrains, corporate governance | es-ES |
| dc.keywords | institutional ownership, short-selling constrains, corporate governance | en-GB |
| Aparece en las colecciones: | Documentos de Trabajo | |
Ficheros en este ítem:
| Fichero | Descripción | Tamaño | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SSRN-id4019643.pdf | 666,73 kB | Adobe PDF |  Visualizar/Abrir |
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