



Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales  
Grado en Relaciones Internacionales

Trabajo Fin de Grado

Study of the Relations  
between the Italian Mafia and  
Lazio's Governance

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Madrid, [abril, 2022]

## **Acknowledgements**

To my mother for the efforts made and her tolerance.

To my family, specifically my cousin, for the encouragements and the support in the translations.

To my friends for their support and joining me in this process.

## **Abstract:**

The Italian Mafia has been one of the most influential organized crime configurations in history. It is considered that the mafia is still significant for the governance of Italy, as well as supposes a threat for the Italian citizenship. The objective of the work will be to analyze, through extensive research, the interaction between the Italian mafia and the State, centered specifically on Lazio's local government. The key points for investigation will be corruption, territorial power, and direct violence.

## **Keywords:**

Mafia, Italy, organized crime, corruption, violence.

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# Chapter I

## 1.1. Introduction

This thesis has as purpose to study the installation of the mafias that leads to the dissolution of public administration institutions. For instance, a comparison analysis between the two Roman municipalities that have been dissolved, Nettuno and Ostia, and Pomezia.

The Mafia is present in the collective imaginary in many ways, for instance appreciated in the cinematic tradition as in *The Godfather*, *Gomorra*, *Suburra*, *Romanzo Criminale*... Stereotypes portray the mafia as a pathological event, limited to Sicilia, mafiosi are portrayed with a southern Italian accent, and to which the rest of the country is immune. Overall, the *Capo* is a mythical and omnipotent figure, which is countering a hero. After the battle between State forces and the Mafia only one message is left: the Mafia is an invincible monster. Others see the mafia only when there is a bloody dimension or undervalue its danger, they don't consider it as a reality embedded on the entire social fabric. Other interpretations equate mafias to subversive terrorism. But all fall within the same bias: one that considers it as an exclusive local phenomenon, linked only to the territories of Calabria, Sicily, and Campania, and other that reads it only in a national and international key, denying the strong link with its territories of origin (Rosato, 2014).

Its story has often been told with a romantic sight, portraying delinquency as the only possible means for social mobility. All stories share the same folkloristic representation of the Mafia. Although these representations raise public awareness of Mafia's impact, the investigative orientation should provide an objective framework. Considering this, two issues haven't been deeply explored in academics: the phenomenon of autochthonous mafias and the development of mafia groups within urban contexts (dalla Chiesa & Meli, 2021)

The motivations behind this thesis are mainly personal, being myself a person of Italian descent, and having worked and lived in Rome, I feel a strong connection with the city and the country. After an internship in the capital, I discovered that the presence of the mafia was a well-known secret. Moreover, during our degree, we have studied factors that cause and promote criminality. We studied international security, which provided us with a context of international crimes, environmental hazards, and national threats. The subject on terrorism included other national and international threats, and in which the teacher approached the mafia as a form of terrorism against the State (Blanco, 2021).

## 1.2. State of the art

To contextualize this paper, it is needed to understand the conceptualizations of the mafia and set a framework for study. Schneider described the Mafia as “translocal, adult male fraternal solidarities whose respective local ‘chapters’ lay claim to territories in which they ‘order’, against the exaction of fees and favors and backed by their capacity to threaten violence, certain sectors of the economy” (Schneider, 2016, p.9). She included features as “transgenerational continuity, an emphasis on respect, discipline and loyalty, recruitment through kinship and tapping talented wannabes, and cultural practices that underscore an exclusive, superior identity - as myths, initiation rites, nicknames, tattoos, and conviviality from which women are excluded” (Schneider, 2016, p.9).

Hess described the Mafia as a cultural phenomenon in a primitive, rural environment, to which the State ceded sovereignty to maintain the respect of rules (Rosato, 2014). However, during the maxi trials, statements of *pentiti* drew a picture of a highly professional, profit-maximizing organizations (Schneider, 2016). Research on the Mafia is now filled with skepticism on the assumption that the Mafia presence is an indication of underdevelopment which will disappear with economic development (Neumann, Lotzmann & Troitzsch, 2016).

The Court of Rome makes a distinction between traditional/historical mafias (for instance, Cosa Nostra, Camorra or ‘Ndrangheta) and autochthonous mafias, which are associations not attributable to traditional mafias. The former relies on criminal practice as form of intimidation, and their origin of the mafia association dates to a remote time, in which, through violent conducts, these criminal groups gained criminal reputation. The “premises” of the traditional mafia benefit from the branches, which are outside the territory of origin (Zuffada, 2017). Autochthonous mafias are usually small local criminal groups that adopt the mafia method (DIA, 2020). These must be analyzed in the sense of whether the violent acts are developed around a group, which spreads fear to determine subjugation and *omertà* (code of silence) and allows the association to achieve its objectives as a result of this “reputation”. The monopoly violence can be realized only by criminal associations that are derived from other associations already identified as mafia for their method and cannot be configured in the cases of mafias of new formation (Zuffada, 2017). In recent years the presence of certain charismatic figures has emerged (Pippo Calò, Francesco Coppola, Michele Senese, Francesco D’Agati or Franco D’Agapiti), to whom the clans turn to solve disputes or wars and mediate between the interests in a territory or market (dalla Chiesa & Meli, 2021).

The Italian legislation refers to the Mafia as “an association that uses the force of intimidation derived from the associative bond, the condition of subjugation and *omertà* to commit crimes, acquire directly or indirectly the management or control economic activities, concessions, authorizations, contracts and public services, or to create profit or unfair advantage for themselves or others, or to prevent or hinder the free exercise of the vote or procure votes for themselves or others during electoral consultations” (*Associazioni di tipo mafioso anche straniere, art 416 bis*, R.D. 19 October 1930, n. 1398). The Supreme Court expressed itself in 2020 reaffirming that with the provisions of *416-bis* include also “small” mafias with low number of members (three or more people), not necessarily armed, and which subjugate a limited territory or activity, availing themselves of the method of intimidation from which subjection and *omertà* derive (Court of Appeal of Rome, 2020). Article *416-bis 1* included aggravating circumstances to the use of the “mafia method”, which is based on the intimidating force, resulting a consequence of certain “criminal association”, which, in turn, creates *omertà* (Zuffada, 2017). The aim of the article is not only punishing more severely those who commit crimes using “mafia methods”, but countering in a more effectively the attitude of those who behave “like mafiosi” (DIA, 2020).

The Mafia is thus a criminal organization, unitary, hierarchically organized, family based (through blood or affiliation), and characterized by territoriality. These families are dependent on each other and exercise on territory the sovereignty the State should exercise. The Mafia tends to supervise and manage all wealth produced in their area through bribes and the gathering of public contracts (Borgogno & Rossetti, 2019). Mafias settle in the territories according to the opportunities that these offer considering the characteristics of economic, institutional and social context (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). Territory guarantees primary goods and intangible resources, as identity, belonging and social recognition, basis of the accumulation of its social capital (dalla Chiesa & Meli, 2021). Overall Mafias could be understood as the set of criminal organizations that operate within a vast and ramified relational context, configuring a system of violence and illegality aimed at the accumulation of capital and the organization and management of positions of power, which uses a cultural code and enjoys certain social consensus (Rosato, 2014).

The Official Technical Scientific Observatory for Safety and Legality of Lazio Region (Osservatorio Tecnico Scientifico per la Sicurezza e la Legalità) studies the phenomenon of organized crime in the area of study of this thesis, meaning Lazio. Since 2015, the Observatory publishes reports which state the situation of the mafia in the region, the official operations

conducted against mafiosi, and the criminals incarcerated. For five years the Technical-Scientific Observatory for Security and Legality of the Lazio Region has been publishing reports, trying to provide a snapshot of the fight against mafias and mafia-style illegality in the region with studying particularly the Capital. The Anti-Mafia Investigation Commission (Direzione Investigativa Antimafia, DIA) Reports, published every six months by the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 2002, are included as these analyze the Mafia phenomenon in each region and give a better understanding of both the overall picture of the country as well as the specific information on Lazio. Both these sources try to provide clear and verified data, on which to reason to build an articulated and effective response over time to the mafia phenomena that emerge in the territories.

Rotberg (2003) studied failed, collapsed, and weak States, their differences, and the characteristics of strong States. Alfano (2015) studied the differences and similarities between the State and the Mafia. Borgogno and Rossetti (2019) studied the mafia in comparison to the organization of the State, and the genesis of Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta and their expansion to other countries. Dagnes, Donatiello, Clementi, Valentini, and Schettino (2017) studied the distributive relationship between poverty and criminality and confirmed that these two factors are positively linked in Italy. Calderoni (2011) studied the Mafia Index to portray the mafia presence in all Italy from 1983 to 2008. Calderoni (2014) studied the Mafia Index from 2000 until 2011 and the presence of the Cosa Nostra, Camorra, 'Ndrangheta, Apulian and other mafias. Paoli (2003) studied mafia behavior, its rituals and how they retain and consolidate their political power.

Fernando dalla Chiesa and de Matteis (2020) studied organized crime in Europe and concluded the difficulty of the study because there is no common definition of organized crime at the European level. Rosato (2012) studied the countering of mafias in Italy and whether it could be applied at the European level. Brunazzo and Della Sala (2007) studied how European policies have contributed to the definition of a new policy style in Italy to strengthen the State.

Berlusconi (2014) studied the conceptualizations of the mafia, the cases of Camorra, 'Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra, and the infiltration in the private sector. Gambetta and Reuter (2000) studied the relationship between the mafia and legitimate enterprises in the US. Meli (2020) studied the relationship between mafias and sports in Rome. She concluded that criminals, seeking territoriality, expand on sport societies and commerce.

Based on the works of Gambetta (1992), Arlacchi (1993), which studied the Sicilian mafia, its birth, development, and modus operandi; Neumann, Lotzmann and Troitzsch (2016) studied so-

called mafia wars and monopoly of violence. In the empirical case of the latter, Sicilian Cosa Nostra, the authors analyzed its agents, attributes, and structure, with the variable of murder and the impact the latter would have in the authority of the leader and loyalty of soldiers. Dickie (2011) made a historical analysis of the Camorra, Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta in Southern Italy. Mosca (1994) studied the concept of mafia and the difference between the Sicilian conceptualization and an objective definition including omertà and lack of morality. Barbagallo (2010) made a complex study on the history of the Camorra and its intreccio. Gambetta (1993) studied the Sicilian Mafia through several confessions of pentiti to understand its economic and political role during the 80s. Sciarrone (2009) created empirical research on how the mafias from Sicily, Campania and Calabria intersect on the local society. Dickie (2013) studied the interconnections between mafias and the Mafia War suffered by Southern Italy during the 1990s. Mattoni (2013) historically studied the anti-mafia opposition since the end of the 1800s. She concluded that there is a lack of literature of the study of the topic in Campania, Calabria, Puglia, and Northern Italy. Santino (2009) studied the relevance of civil society in the anti-mafia process. Dickie (2006) analyzed Cosa Nostra, its emergence, history, modus operandi, and international expansion. Calderone and Arlacchi (1993) studied the confessions of a boss of the Sicilian Mafia Cosa Nostra, Antonino Calderone. Caranci (1985) studied the Sicilian mafia, specifically the personality of mafiosi, the question of honor, how it is linked to Mediterranean culture, and how mafiosi achieved power, which emerged from the feudal system. Di Cataldo and Mastrorocco (2021) studied the presence and infiltration of organized crime in local governments of Southern Italy from 1998 to 2016. Dagnes and Sorti (2014) studied mafia infiltration in northern Italy, specifically the region Valle d'Aosta. Acconcia, Corsetti and Simonelli (2009) made a quantitative study on mafia's impact on public spending, specifically the fiscal multiplier. Moiso, Pellegrino, Sciarrone and Sorti (2020) studied mafia infiltration into the public administration and local institutions in the case of Northern Italy, comparing three cases: Piemonte, Lombardy and Valle d'Aosta. Sciarrone (2014) studied Northern mafias, specifically the 'Ndrangheta and the Camorra, and their intreccio in the socioeconomic fabric. Eboli, Toto and Ziruolo (2021) studied the administrative behavior of various Italian municipalities that have been dissolved due to mafia infiltrations between 2010 and 2016. Specifically, they study the infiltration of Camorra, 'Ndrangheta and Sacra Corona Unita in Calabria, Sicily, Campania, Apulia, Piedmont, Lombardy, and Emilia-Romagna.

Gambetta (2000) studied the concept of trust inside and outside the Mafia clan. Rakopoulos (2020) studied the gendered acts that both mafiosi and *pentiti* portray. Schneider (2016) studied Sicilian mafia, explaining the terms *pentito*, *intreccio* and *omertà*. She developed on Gambetta's theories and historical analysis, then comparing his work to Japanese and Russian mafias. In 2018, she studied 50 years of Sicilian history to understand the birth of the mafia and the *intreccio* (interweaving with public administration) of the Mafia, drug trafficking, violence, and corruption. Varese (2017) studied how mafias have become a State in Asia and Latin America, the Cosa Nostra and the Italian American mafias. Ferrante, Fontana, and Reito (2019) studied mafia's impact on the private sector and their ability to influence legal economy in Sicily, and the impact of seizure measures on these criminal organizations. Chinnici and Santino (1991) made a historical analysis of the mafia and its most violent representations in Palermo.

Dovizio (2015) studied how mafias have been able to perpetuate themselves in the socioeconomic fabric, institutionalizing itself and gaining territoriality. Lupo (1993) studied the Mafia historically as a force that seeks to model itself to the State. Mocetti and Rizzica (2021) created an economic study on the infiltration of organized crime and Mafias in Italy. They concluded that criminality is increasing in areas where there are more investment opportunities, especially regarding income extraction from the public sector.

Martoni and Cavallotti (2021) studied marginalization, crime, and security policies in Lazio suburbs, specifically the case of Montesparco. The blurs between lawful and illegal act as genesis for local crime, but the areas cannot be criminalized entirely. Dipoppa (2021) studied the relationship between the periods of mass migration and the infiltration of criminal organizations in strong States. Punzo and Tidei (2020) studied the diffusion of organized crime in Lazio, specially, the characteristics of the mafia phenomenon and its evolutionary dynamics. Nando dalla Chiesa and Meli (2021) studied the mafia in Lazio, particularly the South-East area, and centered on a specific clan, the Casamonica. They made a comprehensive analysis of the Casamonica's effect based on four variables: territoriality, intimidation force, social consensus/respect, and social capital. Trocchia and Bonaccorsi (2019) studied the Casamonica as a "small" mafia and questions the very definition of these mafias. Capaldo (2013) studied the *intreccio* in Rome where 'Ndrangheta and Cosa Nostra rest, as well as other foreign mafias. Martone and Sciarrone (2017) studied the interrelationships between different mafia groups based on cooperation or conflict in the Roman littoral.

Nando dalla Chiesa (2015) studied the case on “Mafia Capitale” and proposed a redefinition of the notion of territorial control to consider the foundations of urban sociology (*omertà*) and patterns of distribution of interests (*intreccio*), and a reconsideration of the definition of mafia that considers developments in the organization. Sergi (2019) studied Mafia Capitale from a legal constructivist perspective, stating that the mafia held a prudent equilibrium with corruption. Mete and Sciarrone (2015) studied the Mafia Capitale, firstly from a legal point of view, then analyzing the linkage between corruption, private companies, governance, and the Mafia Capitale. Mazzeo (2015) studied the Mafia Capitale case and Mondo di Mezzo Operation as being one of the most influential cases against the mafia in Rome, specifically, against the Banda della Magliana. She analyzed the *intreccio* between the Mafia Capitale and the private and public sectors. Benincasa, Pellegrini and Vanucci (2017) studied the Mafia Capitale from a historical perspective and the newest criminal framework. Notariale (2012) studied the figure of Erico de Pedis, one of the capos of the Banda della Magliana, who died in 1990. Zuffada, (2017) studied the limitations regarding art. 416-bis, regarding that it can only be applied to traditional mafias. Pardo (2020) studied the fight against the mafia from a legislative point of view and made an analysis of the art. 416 bis. Paoli (2007) studied the successes of law enforcement since the 1990s against an Apulian mafia, Cosa Nostra and ‘Ndrangheta.

Forestieri (2016) studied representations of the mafia inside the public administration and in the civil conscience, and how the latter loses hope towards politics when the system is permeated by the mafia. D'Amato and La Spina (2013) studied the social representation of the mafia in the collective imaginary represented on television and videogames. Cooper and Renga (2013) studied on-screen representations of the mafia. They suggest that mafiosi are usually redeemed and their actions redeemable in these depictions. And that these hinder scholars’ work and their discussing of a traumatizing reality that is increasingly decorated.

After the revision of the literature there are still some questions pending. For instance, most of the literature is centered on the Mafia phenomenon in Sicily, Campania, or Calabria, portraying Southern Italy as an “ideal” case, whereas other regions seem to be neglected from an academic point of view. At the same time, when scholars investigate the Lazio region, they tend to only analyze the Mafia Capitale (Municipality X, Ostia), disregarding other areas that might suffer from mafia infiltration.

### 1.3. Questions, objectives, and hypothesis

The main **objective** of this thesis is to understand whether the particularities of the mafia model, as hierarchical structure, and territoriality, are applicable to the Lazio region, where the government stands at its highest form, or whether the *intreccio* seen in Calabria, Sicily and Campania is a peculiarity of less industrialized regions; and that whether this *intreccio* and strong presence inevitably leads to the dissolution of public institutions in Rome.

Several **questions** were raised regarding the functionality of the mafia and the extent of its installation in the territory. For instance:

1. How do we measure the level of infiltration?
2. What leads to the dissolution of a public institution?
3. Has the Mafia penetrated Roman public institutions and private businesses?
4. Has the Mafia in the areas a strong presence, portrayed in violence and the use of intimidatory methods?

The **secondary objectives** of this paper are:

1. Analyze the set of characteristics that compose mafias
2. Evaluate the nature of these criminal organizations in the Lazio area
3. Understand the *intreccio* between this phenomenon and both the private and public sector.

The relevance of these objectives is found in providing a background for the analysis. These questions will explain the mafia phenomenon, how it maintains power and how it converges with other sectors of society.

From the research presenting the presence of two types of mafias in the Lazio region, traditional and autochthonous, the former presenting the cases of ‘Ndrangheta, Camorra and Cosa Nostra through delocalization Lazio, while the latter presenting new, so-called “small” mafias. The analysis stating the existence of an *intreccio* between the mafia, and private businesses and public administration. For it highlighting the use of violence and intimidation methods that produce a situation of *omertà*. For it showing that influential people, both from the private and public sector, have had a strong connection with charismatic personalities of the criminal world. And that all these factors have led to the dissolution of two city councils (Nettuno in 2005 and Municipality X of Ostia in 2015). The hypothesis presented in this thesis will be whether the characteristics already presented in the two previous cases can be applied to the Municipality of Pomezia.

**H: The Mafia infiltration (cause) leads to the end of public institutions (effect)**

## 1.4. Geographical and temporal frameworks

There will be three main cases analyzed in this thesis, each with their own geographical and temporal framework. The overall geographical framework is Rome (Lazio), whereas the temporality framework comprehends from 2000-2021.

The official dissolution of Nettuno, being the earliest, took place on November 28, 2005, situation which lasted eighteen (18) months (Pres. Decree, n. 289, 2005). However, to fully understand the situation that led to this point, former years will be considered in the analysis, which will give the background for the dissolution. Because of this, the timeframe of Nettuno will include from 2000-2005.

The official dissolution of Ostia took place on August 27, 2015, situation which lasted eighteen (18) months (Pres. Decree n. 1738, 2015). As in the previous case of Nettuno, considering that the analysis is to provide situation when a dissolution will be given, previous years will be included in the analysis, to include the period 2010-2015.

From the analysis emerged, the thesis will be developed and applied to the case of the Pomezia district. As the analysis is to be based on the building of this interweaving between the public administration and the mafia, the period included will be broader, including facts from the 1990s, but mostly centered on 2015 onwards that will provide evidence for the hypothesis.

## 1.5. Theoretical framework: Failed or Weak States

*The only way to counter the mafia is through an authoritarian rule that would not tolerate local monopolies, to get rid of the mafia, we need another, bigger and better, mafia. The only period when Italy was independent from the mafia, was when it was a Fascist regime (Gambetta, 2000, p. 8).*

With the aim of understanding the settlement of mafias, theory of weak States provides a framework that could be applied. States provide security, through methods of adjudicating disputes and regulating norms in society, which at the same time reinforce a local vision of fair play. Strong States control their territory and provide the citizens a series of political goods as fair representation, health, and education, as well as high levels of security from political and criminal violence. Weak States, on the other hand, suffer constraints as inter-communal tensions, which make crime rates higher. Their ability to provide adequate measures for overall security is diminished. Failed States are very conflicted areas, where authorities failed to impose rule of law over insurgencies, there is civil unrest, violence is directed against the government and there are disharmonies between communities. As the State weakens, lawlessness becomes more apparent, so there is a growth of criminal violence. Failed States exhibit flawed institutions, deteriorated infrastructures and economic opportunities are unparalleled. Corruption is destructive and widespread, projects are arranged to maximize the rents, licenses for nonexistent activities and generalized extortion are some of the characteristics (Rotberg, 2003).

The depictions of the genesis of the Mafia portray a weak State, unable to function, which cedes ground to the Mafia. The Italian dismantling of feudalism and industrialization processes were disruptive. The transition to liberal capitalism and the privatization of property, provoked banditry, kidnapping, and theft, due to the uncertainty over management and a deficit of social trust. The new State had to establish itself where no previous authority had existed. Mafias profited from the context, allied with ruling blocs or parties - benefited of the fight against socialism -, (Gambetta 1993) providing security to landowners and small businesses, and elevating the latter to more prestigious entrepreneurship positions. Governance was favored by organized crime and mafiosi were regarded both as 'in-laws' as well as 'out-laws'. Mafiosi helped developing industrial capitalism, gaining presence in public works and constructions led by the State. This was a phase of mutual accommodation of Mafias and States, in which the former contributes to the latter's most ambitious developmental projects, creating the Mafia-State *intreccio* (Schneider, 2016).

Caranci (1985) for instance concluded that at the emergence of the mafias, the first phase regarding their birth, the second creates an institutionalization of criminal activities. During this phase, the State respect mafiosi as these are providing charitable work activities to protect the weakest. In the next phase, the State would go into benefitting from the mafia, as these became repressors of protests and mediators (impartial and not restricted by the judicial system). Finally, the mafia stabilizes and structures the society, which has only lost power during the rise of fascism in Italy, as elections and other democratic processes were suppressed, mafiosi couldn't influence the State.

The Mafia can be defined as an economic enterprise which produces and sells private protection, customers are usually businesses although can be individuals (Gambetta, 1993). Mafias provide “services” similar to those of justice, public order, and employment, nevertheless, every need for justice satisfied comes with a corresponding injustice. Protection from criminality is provided through the imposition of other forms of criminality (Borgogno & Rossetti, 2019), in fact, the Mafia is also described as a Hobbesian society (Neumann, Lotzmann & Troitzsch, 2016). For instance, employment is assured to few, taking it away from many (Borgogno & Rossetti, 2019). The conflict with the State, the Mafia being its competition (as in territorial control and functions overlapping), is resolved by conditioning the State from within, with infiltration into public bodies (*intreccio*) that tend to condition the will of these to the interests of the Mafia (Borgogno & Rossetti, 2019). Mafia is regarded as a non-governmental institution that reaches the suppression of competition for established entrepreneurs. This phenomenon also is facilitated by low technology, unskilled labor, and unionization (Gambetta & Reuter, 2000).

The theory of Mafia formation is thus linked with an absent State to some level. For instance, citizens will ask for illegal protection where the State cannot provide it legally (Hill, 2006). This is a vicious cycle that pollutes the State evermore, corrupting institutions, citizens, and instigating violence and illegal markets; later efforts on regulating markets are blocked in the absence of licit regulations (Schneider, 2016). When governments lose legitimacy, their very nature becomes illegitimate in the eyes of citizens (Rotberg, 2003). Thus, Mafias' ideal environment is a weak state, with norms that foster unquestioned obedience (Neumann, Lotzmann & Troitzsch, 2016), but lacking power, so that they can penetrate the socio-economic fabric.

## 1.6. Methodology

We start from an initial hypothesis, the validity of which will be assessed by means of a thorough analysis of socio-economic factors relating to Mafia's infiltration in Roman territory. The strategy for investigation will be a mixture between a quantitative and a qualitative analysis. This thesis will be based on extensive research of both primary and secondary sources. Mafia infiltration will be studied through important official statements, and documents, as conclusions from legislative documents, sentences, and procedures against mafiosi, and government publications of the Technical Observatory and the DIA. Secondary sources include relevant authors and journalists' publications, which will provide a framework of the acts that will confirm the thesis.

The study is divided into three parts or time periods, Nettuno 2000-2005; Ostia 2010-2015; Pomezia 1990s (but centered since 2015) until present. Those episodes have been chosen that present a clear insertion of the mafia in the public administration system that led to the dissolution of the first two municipalities for a period of 18 months and the factors that led to this in the third one will be studied.

The research has a diachronic structure as it presents a comparison of two time-dependent processes and takes into consideration the specific features of these areas in the spatiotemporal scope. A comparative process will be carried out where the similarities and differences between the mentioned episodes can be analyzed, validating the hypothesis. The presence of mafias in the territory will be studied as well as their influence on leading people such as managers. Economic factors such as funds, taxes, debts, recruitment procedures and corruption will be regarded, although the mafia method, by the Court of Rome, considers corruption a phenomenon not necessarily associated with the mafia. Assets seized in the area will provide the level of the extent of infiltration in private businesses. This study is correlational, since it aims to discover characteristics common to the third case and to identify the common variables that would lead to the dissolution of the municipality of Pomezia.

Once the analysis has been carried out, it will be proceeded to infer a series of conclusions and recommendations on both the legislative and socioeconomic confrontation of the mafia phenomenon. Hence, the correlational explanatory comparative methodology will guide other possible studies. These conclusions will also regard limitations encountered in the making of the thesis that have hindered the study process.

## Chapter II: Nettuno

Francesco Paolo Coppola, known as “Frank Three Fingers,” in 1952 moved to Pomezia. Considered the inspirer of large-scale trafficking of narcotics and of the qualitative leap in local crime, he was instrumental in the evolution of organized crime in Nettuno and beyond. Coppola had a particular attention for politics. In Sicily he had given electoral support to many important figures of the Christian Democrats with whom he was said to have had close relations. A lesson that was exported to the Roman coast. Over the years Coppola developed a flourishing drug traffic, a business that was also approached by some local subjects such as Antonio Bonomi, who over the years became the Coppola’s godson. Bonomi managed the criminal business with various subjects Nettuno, among all stands Franco D’Agapiti. The mafia colonization did not take place only with the physical insertion of exponents of the Sicilian mafia, in a territorial context until the 50s but also through a criminal formation of local subjects that show themselves to be equal to the masters, learning a mafia method and a force of intimidation of pollution of the politics typical of the Sicilian Cosa Nostra (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

Significant investigations of Nettuno, coordinated by the public prosecutor’s office, led the Judge of Highest Court to issue 21 coercive measures, in 2005, against people living in the area. The measures concerned D’Agapiti and his associates, which used the intimidating force that comes from his criminal reputation to influence the political and administrative activity of the town of Nettuno. D’Agapiti, who inherited Coppola’s reign, exercised the force of intimidation typical of mafia associations. As a result, the City Council would be dissolved for conditioning by criminal organizations. The residual criminal activity of mafias turns out to be usury and extortion, even in the area prevailed a significant *omertà* on part of the victims of usury, very few crimes were reported against the seriousness and persistence of the phenomenon. There were zero complaints from the years 2000-2012, in contrast with the data reported by various judicial sources which disclosed arrests for usury crimes (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015), which answers to question four (4) of this thesis regarding violence and intimidation as tools used by the mafia.

The ‘Ndrangheta has been present in Nettuno for forty years. The first restraining orders issued against individuals belonging to the Gallace clan date back to 1983. The investigations of the judiciary, the declarations of collaborators of justice and the sentences passed attest to the involvement of the Gallace family in numerous criminal activities: from kidnapping to drug trafficking (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

In July 1997, the Rome Public Prosecutor's Office launched two investigations: Appia and Appia 2 (Capaldo, 2013). It was suspected that the 'Ndrangheta from Calabrian origin, not historically typical of the Lazio territory (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005), was operating in the Lazio coast, specifically Nettuno (Capaldo, 2013). The investigations brought to light the existence of such decentralized 'ndrina, locally known as the "Anzio-Nettuno 'ndrina", controlled by six Gallace brothers, and which had been established for years in the area (Capaldo, 2013). The DIA investigators, more than once, follow the tracks of the "men of honor" who come down to Nettuno to ask for advice and get orders on important decisions. Proof of this is an old summit, which took place in Nettuno in 1999. Some of the criminals that attended were already investigated in other Italian regions – as Domenico Barbaro - for mafia-type criminal association or had already been sentenced as leading exponents of traditional mafias – as Vincenzo Mandalari and Roberto Arnaldi from the 'Ndrangheta - (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

Although the elective organs of the commune of Nettuno (Rome) had been renewed in 2003, new forms of interference of organized crime were detected (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). The case of Nettuno was a "precautionary measure" due to the high influence of mafias in the area, noting that no administrator constituted a crime, but due to the influence of organized crime, prevention efforts needed to be applied (Council of State, 2007). The 'ndrina was dedicated to the trafficking of weapons and drugs, and, through intimidation and extortion, it succeeded in influencing political institutions, according to a modus operandi typical of the 'Ndrangheta (Capaldo, 2013).

The 'ndrina started to do business with public tenders and control part of the resources destined to the buildings of the territory, but it was precisely this money and public orders that allowed the police to reconstruct their movements and actions (Capaldo, 2013). Authorizations, licenses, or concessions took place in a very short time from the request in favor of people with serious criminal records (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). These facts answer question one (1) of this thesis, as they are relevant indicators of the infiltration of mafia organizations in public institutions. The operation Appia 2 dismantled a network which imported drugs from Colombia and distributed them in Italy (Capaldo, 2013). In 2004, at the end of Appia 2, the Carabinieri (Italian police) carried out 25 pre-trial detention orders for crimes of mafia-type criminal association and international drug trafficking against the Gallace (Capaldo, 2013).

The Investigation Appia demonstrated the interference in the affairs of the entity and the instrumentalization of administrative choices was favored by relationships of kinship and co-

interest of an economic nature by some public administrators and employees of the municipality with mafiosi (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). The investigation underlined too the anomalous attribution and distribution of executive appointments, which have contributed to create the fertile ground for external pressures. Important administrative sectors are concentrated in the authority of a single manager to whom the mayor, Vittorio Marzoli - in office 1998-2003 - (Gerina, 2005), had gradually entrusted increasing responsibility. This new executive manager, Antonio Boni, was discovered, through financial passages, to have a connection with a known exponent of a criminal clan (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005), D'Agapiti (Gerina, 2005). Although it was a “precautionary measure”, the Court did not exclude the fact that the municipal manager, Boni, had in his office a ledger of a company which laundered money for the Banda della Magliana, nor that Boni had double the salary that of the other managers (Council of State, 2007). Particularly worrying was the relationship between D'Agapiti (Gerina, 2005), the beneficiary of various administrative measures, and a counselor who resigned in October 2004 (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). Another particularity was the issuing of authorizations and permits in favor of individuals with serious criminal records, compared to the slowness of the general administrative apparatus of the country, the criminals received the permits in a timely manner (Council of State, 2007).

There were too real estate operations carried out by persons close to the malavita and facilitated by measures of the administration as increases in real estate prices, from which certain parties benefited. Thus, an intreccio of interests of political figures and persons linked to organized crime was highlighted (Council of State, 2007). Among the arrested was Aldo Ludovisi who, until 2003, was part (appointed by the municipal council) of the board of directors of a rest home in Nettuno (Capaldo, 2013).

There were complaints regarding anomalies in the recruitment procedures of the municipality (Council of State, 2007). Violations of the limitations on the hiring powers of local authorities were trespassed when the executive attributed to his wife a place in the municipality (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). A fundamental point was the public money destined to subjects connected with criminality (Council of State, 2007). Financially, the entity systematically accumulated debts out of the budget and didn't pay creditors nor worked to increase revenues (Council of State, 2007). The decision not to increase revenues and the events of inadequately collecting taxes (the percentage of taxes collected is low and payment is not firmly demanded) can be assessed as instrumental to support mafias (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005)

These facts answer question one (1) of this thesis, as the relationship of kinship between the actors and the preferential approach are indicators of the infiltration of mafia organizations in public institutions.

The municipality participated in a corporate body with 51% of the share capital consists of two private partners, one of which was delegated the services assigned by the municipality, and blatant evidence is the fact that the company has no employees to pay. This transfer of functions has led for the municipality an increase in operating costs, as 2/3 of the commission paid to the municipality was transferred to the company. In late 2004, the company was assigned the juridical activities preparatory to the sale of real estate assets belonging to the municipal property portfolio without justification (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). The manager of the economic-financial area was linked with a known exponent of organized crime and omitted the accounting of management charges and collections made by the company (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). Out of the six representatives of the municipality, three were burdened with criminal records, while in the company there were people linked by relationships of kinship with the administration entity (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). This answers directly question three (3) of the thesis, as the mafia had penetrated both the private business (ownership) and the public institution (Nettuno municipality)

To complete a production plant, financed with funds from the municipality, the municipality entrusted an association of companies, and, in which one of them, the manager and the legal representative were closely related to the Camorra. The investigation also found out that for years the company has been working in a condition of monopoly and has been benefitting from direct awards which presented it large discounts (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). The cemetery services are done by a cooperative, whose legal representative is a councilman in office. The representative of one of the associated companies of the cooperative is part of the family of the councilman (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). Waste storage was managed by a company whose representative had a close relationship with the governing body of the municipality. The mayor authorized a special order of the storage of waste, so the entity did not have to pay the services of waste disposal (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). These facts answer directly question three (3) of the thesis regarding the infiltration of private businesses.

There was an overall avoidance of the criteria of impartiality by the municipality, found in the disbursement of large sums of money as a contribution provided by the municipality to an association whose president took part in the deliberations that provided the same disbursement

(Pres. decree, n.289, 2005), all demonstrated a distorted use of public administration (Council of State, 2007). These facts answer to question two (2) of this thesis, as this was what the official decree stated as conclusive measures for the dissolution of the city council.

All this led to the intervention on the part of the State, which aimed at removing links between local authority and organized crime. Former administrators from the area of Nettuno were already being investigated for crimes of gravity, as the known exponent of organized crime in the area, aroused great apprehension in public opinion (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005). It was considered that to restore democratic principles, the municipality of Nettuno had to be dissolved, given art.143, for a duration of eighteen (18) months (Pres. decree, n.289, 2005).

To conclude, the elective organs of Nettuno were dissolved twice, once in 2003, and another in 2005, due to mafia infiltration and influence. Although there had been for long time mafia presence in the territory, the Calabrian 'Ndrangheta, decentralized through the Gallace brothers and D'Agapiti led to the dissolution of the Nettuno Municipality in 2005. The 'ndrina controlled public and private resources, for instance in real estate operations, authorizations, and licenses. D'Agapiti represented a maximum exponent of the criminal world, who would manage the *intreccio* and be benefited by the kinship relationship. The *intreccio* with the public sector was widely noted in the relationship between D'Agapiti with Marzoli and Boni, whereas with the private sector it was appreciated by Ludovisi and the relation between the public administration and the abovementioned company. The widespread *omertà* and subjugation environment is appreciated in the fact that zero complaints were made from 2000-2012, whereas judicial sources disclosed arrests for intimidatory usurious crimes.

## Chapter III: X Municipality of Ostia

The criminal dynamics of Ostia anticipate what will happen shortly after in the rest of the Lazio territory (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020, p. 54). Meaning, to understand what is about to happen in Rome, one must look at what has already happened in Ostia. This interdependence has its roots in Roman criminal history and represents one of the keys to understanding the complexity and multiformity of indigenous criminal phenomena. So much happens inside Ostia and little comes to the surface: the pacts, the undeclared wars, the kneecappings, the shootings and, above all, the agreements, and the mediated interests, unravel on the coast and only afterwards they cause effects in the rest of the city (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020)

The criminal milieu that developed in the 70s in Ostia has until today mostly seen the same actors, this is a territory divided between traditional mafias (Cosa Nostra and groups linked to the Camorra) and Roman clans (the Banda della Magliana, the Fasciani and Spada clans) (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020). According to the declarations of pentiti, since the 80s, important connections have emerged between top members of the Banda della Magliana and the Senese, also through the Fasciani (which guaranteed the *pax mafiosa* following the shooting of Triassi in 2007) (DIA, 2020).

The area of the littoral has been for years at the center of attention of the activity of the Prosecutor's Office. This is one of the territories in which the mafia dynamics have turned out to be more stratified over time and the relations of the clans with the gray area have been solid and widespread, so much to lead to the operation Mondo di Mezzo and the further dissolution of the Municipality in 2015 (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020).

The presence of mafia organizations Ostia was revealed by the Assize Court of Rome, which uncovered in the area a criminal association aimed at carrying out numerous crimes. The operation Mondo di Mezzo brought light to several crimes from the 80s, for instance the kidnapping ring managed by Paolo Frau in 1981, and the discovery of a weapons cache in the basement of the Ministry of health in 1983 (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). In 1998 the criminal interests of the Triassi family emerged, which were owners of gyms, kiosks, beaches, and jewelry shops, as well as the management of the surveillance of the port in Ostia. After some members were sentenced for mafia association, including two bosses of Cosa Nostra, the Triassi suffered several attacks. Vito Triassi was kneecapped in 2006 and again in 2007 and the car of his son-in-law was set on fire in 2007. It was during the investigations to identify the perpetrators of the kneecaps that the Carabinieri of Ostia revealed the strong desire of the Roman underworld to make peace between

the clans to avoid the attention of the police (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). The autochthonous groups historically present had long adopted the mafia model, as the use of violence and intimidation, and the management of relations with a large gray area, formed by entrepreneurs, public administrators, and politicians. The power they exercised over the territory was stable and they preferred, when possible, not to act explicitly with violence (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020). Generally, autochthonous mafias measure the use of violence to avoid attracting attention of law enforcement and public opinion. Whereas the name of the bosses in itself is sufficient to express their criminal reputation, threat which goes beyond their borders and extends throughout the urban territory (dalla Chiesa & Meli, 2021).

After the attacks on Vito, the Triassi contacted Michele Senese to avoid an escalation of violence, who sent the message to stop the violence as it was attracting too much attention from the police. A *pax mafiosa* emerged, renegotiated several times, with the important role of Francesco (Don Ciccio) D'Agati, an elderly and esteemed Sicilian capo linked to Pippo Calò (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). It is to be noted that this *pax mafiosa* is still being enforced, concerning a division of markets, territory, maintaining a low profile and overall rules on how to govern the criminal environment of the coast (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020).

D'Agati represented in the Roman mafia-type panorama a figure of great importance together with other subjects and has played a role of mediation that prevented the development of armed conflicts between mafias. The figure of D'Agati was part of various criminal realities since the 80s (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020). It was understood in 2019 that D'Agati had a strong role in activities of mediation, direction, advice, facilitation of relations and more, inside and outside the criminal world. The power he showed derived from the criminal prestige of his family of origin and from his criminal career and was recognized by all the clans operating in the territory, which referred to him the resolution of disputes. D'Agati embodied the typical manners and behaviors of the Mafia bosses, as can be inferred also from the habit of organizing lunches to discuss businesses.

The first high-level criminal organization that arose in Ostia was the Banda della Magliana. This had a long and important criminal history of the group, which, however, has been interrupted for some time due to internal feuds, arrests and collaborators of justice who have progressively undermined it until 2011, when the Spada violently took power in the area, killing the opposing clan leaders. This group, which has always been present in the area, has only in recent years conquered spaces, markets, and territory, which have allowed it to accumulate the strength to

contend for control of Ostia (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020). The Assize Court highlighted the widespread climate of *omertà* in the double murder of Giovanni Galleoni and Franco Antonini of 2011, which occurred in broad daylight and the murderers acted with uncovered face, those present “saw nothing”, those who could, fled in stampede, those that have been heard by the investigators of the case denied the evidence – for instance, a witness that had gunshot residues on his clothes, claimed partial amnesia and attributed the gunshots to New Year’s fireworks (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020).

Between 2007 and 2010 there were fifteen episodes of damages followed by fire. In 2012 the director of the Port was seriously threatened. Yet, these fires and serious intimidations happen to “not be seen” and denied by the trade associations of bathing establishments. On the force of intimidation and the condition of subjugation (*omertà*) of the population was the particular interest of the investigations (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). During 2011 and 2012, 16 episodes of fire or damage followed by fire took place in Ostia. Yet, the residents in the territory nor the offended people bothered to ask protection by the State, constituting the unequivocal demonstration of the intimidating force of the clans and the condition of subjugation of the population of Ostia. The Fasciani group was rooted in the Ostia area and adopted a method by association, characterized by behavioral styles to achieve an environment of intimidation. The subjection of the population was the result of the criminal prestige of the association, which, due to its notoriety and ability to express threatening messages, including symbolic ones, was accredited as a fearsome and effective center of criminal power (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). The above-mentioned facts answer question number four (4) of the thesis, where intimidation and violence are used.

Two entrepreneurs active in Ostia, Mauro Balini and Silvano Giacometti, shared interests in the underworld environments. For instance, they provided for the maintenance of the family of one of Vito Triassi’s attackers (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). The context of criminal penetration was also important in environments of the local administration. This is illustrated in the precautionary measure issued against Aldo Papalini - former Manager of the Technical Office and of the Environment and Coastal Organizational Unit of the Municipality of Ostia - and others, as Armando Spada, for crimes against the public administration, aggravated by the mafia method, recurring the “force of intimidation” intended as the ability to instill fear by virtue of the reference to a stable and non-occasional criminal organization prepared to exercise coercion in a non-occasional manner (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). The context of criminal penetration of the

Fasciani and Spada clans in important environments of the local administration is illustrated in the conviction, in 2012, to 8 years of prison to Aldo Papalini. The seriousness of the facts is highlighted as a disturbing mixture between the public administration and representatives of organized crime and unscrupulous entrepreneurs, rooted and lasting for many years, which determines a situation of widespread illegality in the coast, placing citizens in conditions of resigned helplessness. (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). This answers question three (3) of the thesis as the mafia did manage to penetrate the private institution through relationships of kinship.

A turning point was 2013, when 500 policemen swooped on Ostia and arrested 49 people. Carmine Fasciani, a multiple convicted criminal, was notified of the order of precautionary detention in prison, being one of the leaders of the mafia association Fasciani-Spada-Triassi. The criminal escalation that between 2006 and 2012 started with violence for the completion of a mafia qualitative leap that would have polluted the business context in Ostia (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). In the face of such episodes, the Public Prosecutor reported the entire series of dynamite and incendiary attacks which marked a crystallized pattern (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). According to this investigation, there were contacts with administrative and institutional subjects, pollution of the economy with the superimposition of a hidden decision-making system, and a global conditioning of the system. There were contacts with administrative and institutional subjects, pollution of the economy with the superimposition of a hidden decision-making system, which influences capital and determines attitudes that are servile even in subjects crucial to economic life (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

The operation ended in 2013 already executed an order of preventive custody in prison against several leading figures of two clans and seizure of properties and companies in the territory. The elective bodies of the X Municipality were renewed the same year as there already was interference by organized crime that compromised the impartiality of the administration. The symptomatic acts of intimidation since 2013 affected the administrative activity of the Municipality, and serious and repeated irregularities were found in the award of contracts, waste management, maintenance of public spaces, and concessions of property. The administration had failed to adopt appropriate measures in 2013 to prevent the existence of criminality, and the situation had even gotten more dangerous. And, in 2014, the Public Prosecutor Office of the Court of Rome issued an order of application of precautionary measures because elements emerged about possible infiltration of organized crime (Pres. Decree n.1738, 2015). In this context, the mafia dynamics turned to be more

stratified over time and the *intreccio* has been solid and widespread, so much that it led to the dissolution of the Ostia Municipality in 2015 (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020, p. 47).

Before the Mafia Capitale trials, it was widely believed that there could not be mafia in Rome, as it exists in other parts of the Italian territory (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020, p. 11). The Mafia Capitale (2014) was the most recent and relevant case against the mafia in Lazio. The operation called Mondo di Mezzo aimed to counter the actors from the X Municipality (Ostia) that were a mafia threat to society, specifically the Banda della Magliana (Mazzeo, 2015). Thirty-seven (37) people were arrested as part of the Mondo di Mezzo investigation, 100 suspects were involved, and 200 million euros of assets were seized (Supreme Court of Cassation, 2019). The investigation concluded that the Mafia Capitale had a radial structure and developed in three directions: relations with entrepreneurs, *intreccio* and relations with other criminal organizations (Mura, 2020); holding a prudent equilibrium with corruption (Sergi, 2019), which relates with the three objectives of this thesis on understanding how mafias work and the *intreccio* itself.

The Mafia Capitale was an alliance of both autochthonous and traditional mafias. For instance, the Banda della Magliana, a historically Roman mafia, associated with the Fasciani, the Spada, the Senese and the Casamonica, so-called “small” mafias (Court of Appeal of Rome, 2020). Traditional criminal organizations as ‘Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra and Camorra were involved too. A symbiotic relationship was created where traditional mafias instructed the mafia method and *modus operandi*, whereas autochthonous and small mafias provided knowledge on the territory (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020, p. 32). However, the only organization considered mafia before the Mafia Capitale trials was the Fasciani (Mazzeo, 2015). The Investigation Commission underlined how Ostia, as an important infrastructural area, was a pole of attraction of criminal associations, dedicated to international drug trafficking, extortion, usury, gambling control and money laundering (Pres. Decree n.1738, 2015).

In the sense of public administration, the Mafia Capitale managed to control several public resources – or public contracts - of the City of Rome inside a criminal system (Supreme Court of Cassation, 2019). The lack of transparency in contracts (Pres. Decree n.1738, 2015) was created through a “criminal lobby”, where pressure was ensured on public decision-makers, which unblocked funds for investment and orientated the agenda to privilege this criminal network (Mazzeo, 2015). Mafia Capitale’s power of intimidation derived from its aura of impunity, historical ties with other mafias and ties with political apparatuses. Their associative bonds created

the intimidation, nor requiring violence except in extreme cases, and their main objective was to make profits through infiltration on economic sectors and public contracts (Supreme Court of Cassation, 2019). The more the Mafia Capitale corrupted successfully, the more pervasive the group's reputation became, the more they were feared, the more *omertà* was created, and more complacent victims became. The vicious cycle created a protective aura around the group, counting on the large network of contacts (Sergi, 2019).

The existence of elements of direct and indirect links between criminal organizations' leaders and the administrators of the municipality were confirmed (Pres. Decree n.1738, 2015). The two criminal charismatic figures that managed the Mafia Capitale were Massimo Carminati and Salvatore Buzzi (Mazzeo, 2015). The most important figure arrested and sentenced was Massimo Carminati, so-called the "last king of Rome", ex-member of the NAR and the Banda della Magliana (Osservatorio Tecnico 2015). He enjoyed criminal reputation, which he expressed by force of intimidation, he maintained relations with other criminal organizations, and availed himself confidentiality of press associations, as well as the availability of weapons (Supreme Court of Cassation, 2019). Carminati exploited his historical criminal caliber and his ability to resort to violence and subjugation, imposing *omertà* (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

Influential people were also involved, as actors engaged in politics, in public administration, businesses and other professions (Mazzeo, 2015). A direct link between Massimo Carminati, and the president of the municipal authority, Andrea Tassone (Pres. Decree n.1738, 2015), was detected; there was also a direct link between Aldo Papalini, ex-director of the Technical Office of the Municipality, and Carmine Fasciani (Mazzeo, 2015). Other several important figures were arrested during the Mafia Capitale trials, as Riccardo Mancini, former director of EUR<sup>1</sup> and of AMA<sup>2</sup>, Franco Panzironi, ex-administrator delegate of Ama, and Luca Odevaine, ex-member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Osservatorio Tecnico 2015). This answers to question three (3) on the penetration of private institutions.

The Mafia Capitale also impregnated private businesses, to which the Mafia imposed business "protection" (Mazzeo, 2015). The businessmen engaged in the network were also arrested, as affiliates of the mafia (Supreme Court of Cassation, 2019). For instance, the case of Fabrizio Franco

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<sup>1</sup> Italian public company controlled by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, active in the management of real estate, in the organization of events and the management and installation of IT and telecommunications systems

<sup>2</sup> Official Roman Waste Company

Testa, manager of ENAV, an aviation company which was responsible of the arms trafficking for the Mafia (Mazzeo, 2015).

According to Pignatone, Public Prosecutor of Rome, the Mafia Capitale didn't have a clear structure nor territory but fell within *416 bis* because it used the mafia method linked to the associative bond (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015), which is linked to understanding objectives one (1) and two (2) of the thesis regarding the nature of mafia associations, particularly those of the Lazio area. The Mafia Capitale was considered as a mafia group based on 1) the existence of criminal reputation maintained through intimidation via corruption and the (potential) use of violence, 2) the illicit favors which reinforced the reputation of the group and increased fear of repercussions by the victims, 3) the reliability on businessmen and politicians to connect illicit activities with the licit world, 4) the aim of financial gains and social power. This revised conceptualization of a mafia group would separate, without denying, the idea of mafias from the traditional criminal groups linked to the Southern territories of Italy and would advance the analysis of the characteristics of the mafia phenomenon as a dynamic and fluid criminal and social behavior detached from cultures and ethnic groups and that, therefore, can exist everywhere and are not just an Italian peculiarity (Sergi, 2019). This answers questions one (1), two (2), three (3), and four (4) of the thesis on how to measure the level of infiltration, on what leads to the dissolution of an institution, on the mafia having penetrated on public institutions, and on the use of violence and intimidatory methods.

## Chapter IV: Pomezia

Francesco Paolo Coppola in 1952 moved to Pomezia with a substantial number of Sicilian Mafiosi of Cosa Nostra. This city was one of the ideal bases for the business of the Mafioso. Coppola had a particular attention for politics, in Sicily he had given electoral support to important figures of the Christian Democrats with whom he was said to have had close relations. A lesson that was exported to the Roman coast. In Lazio, around Coppola, a real mafia nucleus was constituted, which, according to the characteristic forms of the mafia, established contacts with the local environment, infiltrating, through a direct presence or compliant friendships, the very apparatus of the public administration of the municipality of Pomezia. Numerous investigations by the judiciary have ascertained contacts between top exponents of the public administration of Pomezia and the capo. The Anti-Mafia Parliamentary Commission wrote in 1972 that Coppola had frequent and intense relationships with some administrators and officials of the municipality of Pomezia to obtain favorable interventions in relation to his interests in construction initiatives and with the execution of public works (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). Mafia infiltration into the social, economic, and political fabric of Pomezia thus began (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

The municipality of Pomezia was constituted 50 years ago by ethnic groups of different extraction around the industrial settlements, which have determined its rapid economic development. However, there has been an insertion of elements dedicated to criminal activities. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the phenomenon of the Mafia stated in 1991 that the public structure had not remained immune to contamination and local administrators had been the object of frequent judicial injuries (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

The Anti-Mafia Commission in 1991 again stated that although the refusal of the stigmatization of the area is understandable, the data of a continuation of mafia rooting is tangible. For instance, Pomezia had been under investigation for two years and former administrators (Puggioni and Caponetti) had been suspected of connivance with Mafia members. Among the most problematic issues were authorities' opinions on building permits. In 1991, building permits were still being issued without the urban planning instrument, the council expressed a favorable opinion for grating Coppola allotment on big areas of land, there were repayment of debts outside the budget amounting to over 6 billion lire (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). Between 1990 and 1991 numerous attacks and intimidations against members of the public administration and the Carabinieri occurred. In 1990, two Molotov cocktails were thrown at the offices of the municipal councilor, in

1991, the car of the councilman La Manna was destroyed, and a bomb exploded in front of the station of the Carabinieri (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). In 2000, there were 12 arrests for criminal association aimed at extortion in Pomezia, in the interceptions it was highlighted the existence of alarming relations with some local administrators (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

The geographical proximity to Campania and direct links with the capital make Lazio a strategic outlet for the Camorra clans, which over time have settled in Pomezia (DIA, 2016). In the territory, the criminality of Campania invests in crime in the most diversified economic activities as management of businesses and amusement arcades, the real estate market, financial services and brokerage, public contracts, waste disposal, construction (with the related activities of management of quarries, extraction of inert materials quarries, extraction of inert materials...), without neglecting the drugs sector (DIA, 2019). For instance, in 2016 two mafiosi, Ruggiero and Nappi, linked to the Polverino camorristic clan were convicted. These fugitives, wanted by the Neapolitan Anti-Mafia Directorate for mafia type-association, extortion and international drug trafficking and distribution, were found in a villa in Pomezia, while operated in Campania (DIA, 2016). The villa was an unauthorized construction, with a garden among sheds, which had already been scene of seizures of drugs by the Polverino family (Cappelli, 2016). In the order there is also a subject investigated for external complicity in mafia association who would have favored in 2016 the absconding of Ruggiero and Nappi, stipulating in his name the rental contract of the villa. The same subject put at the disposal of the Polverino an industrial settlement in Pomezia, rented to a company of which the same was administrator for the storage of 1.500kg of hashish, coming from Spain, seized in 2012 (DIA, 2018). The southern part of the province of Rome has historically been a place of refuge for fugitives from the Camorra (DIA, 2019).

The presence of a fierce criminal consortium in Pomezia is ascribable to the Cosa Nostra has been confirmed by the numerous investigations, as well as the commission of crimes of homicide, extortion, and usury. Of particular interest were the crimes committed in 2014, where a businessman and a criminal were kneecapped, and a convicted criminal was seriously wounded and killed (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015). The operations of 2014 revealed the vast violence suffered by Pomezia's society and revealed important segments of drug dealing in the area, also leading to the seizure of two hotels (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2016)

In 2016 the DIA executed a seizure order against a person believed to be part of the Raso-Gullace-Albanese gang, as he was married to the niece of the deceased gang leader (DIA, 2019). He was hit for fictitious registration of assets and crimes against the Public Administration. The seizure order concerned 5 corporations, 2 partnerships and 1 sole-proprietorship, with offices in Pomezia, operating in the tourist, agricultural (oil production), timber processing and waste transport sectors (DIA, 2016 and 2019). In 2018, the DIA executed another seizure decree on him, community titles for a value of 22 million euros were seized (DIA, 2019)

In 2016, a 'Ndrangheta international drug trafficking network was disarticulated which involved numerous subjects in different countries, mostly South American. The investigation highlighted the whole system from the purchase to the money laundering. The money, acquired thanks to drug trafficking, passed through key men, thanks to the complicity of officials of a branch of the Embassy of the Congo in Pomezia, to Switzerland, where it was converted to US dollars, which then could be reinvested in the drug market (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2016)

Important evidence emerged in 2017, the investigation highlighted two criminal associations which belonged to Campania and Puglia operating in the Pomezia. The components of the organizations, for some time rooted in Rome, managed, with mafia modalities in agreement with well-known entrepreneurs, numerous amusement arcades with the purpose of money laundering, extortion, and usury (DIA, 2018). The Pomezia area is thus not exempt from mafia infiltration. In 2018, the operation of a Calabrian group dedicated to usury and extortion was detected, not disdaining the use of violent actions (DIA, 2019). The Carabinieri arrested 3 subjects responsible for attempted murder, threat, extortion, usury, illegal possession of weapons, with the aggravating circumstance of the mafia method (application of art. 416 bis 1). The investigation made it possible to reconstruct a series of intimidating episodes, threats, and extortion, perpetrated against some local entrepreneurs, who had not reported the crime for fear of retaliation, which added the generation of a climate of *omertà*. The perpetrators of such intimidation have been identified as belonging to Calabrian mafias (DIA, 2018).

In 2017, a mafia association was revealed, which relied on Pippo Calò. With this cooperative, the Fragalà, already active in Pomezia, extended their operativity to other territories by aggregating subjects linked to the Loria family and the Casalesi clan. Other areas of interest, apart from international drug trafficking, were the trafficking of weapons and explosives, extortion carried out with mafia methods and the control of economic activities (DIA 2019). Further confirmation of the

interest in drug trafficking of organizations linked to Cosa Nostra was confirmed in 2019, with the operation “Equilibri”, which ascertained the presence of the Fragalà clan, whose operativity was developed in Pomezia. It was dedicated to international trafficking of drugs with supply channels in Colombia and Spain, and subsequent distribution in national territory (DIA, 2019). In addition, the organization worked to build relationships and businesses with other traditional and indigenous mafia criminal groups. The mafia-like association was pivoted on Pippo Calò. The full operativity of the clan in Pomezia was revealed, where the Fragalà association was particularly dedicated to drug trafficking, with direct supply channels from Colombia and Spain, and subsequent distribution in Rome, Palermo, and Catania (DIA, 2019).

“*My project is aimed at taking over the Municipality of Pomezia*” are the words of Alessandro Fragalà, the capo of the Sicilian mafia with the same name (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020, pp 151). These words express the essence of intimidation, which is the paradigm of the mafia method, expressed in the Fragalà association: the intimidating power of the name, the violence expressed and evoked, the frightening reference, in a conceptual circuit that feeds on itself, to Sicily and the honor and respect overturned in an oxymoron of criminal values. A sodality woven of violence that privileges the collusion and the dissolving of the boundaries between lawful and unlawful (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020). After Alessandro’s words it is relevant to analyze the presence of the mafia in the area and whether Fragalà’s project is succeeding in contaminating the public administration as well as the private sector. According to the DIA investigators, the plan of the Fragalà, people capable of stipulating a “federative” pact with the Casalesi, the Fasciani and the Senese, is clear (Bisbiglia and Pasciuti, 2019). For this aim, it was necessary to gather a group of trusted people, composed of politicians, entrepreneurs, former administrators, who having ties with the Fragalà clan were available to the mafia-type association to meet its needs from a position of power within the administration of Pomezia. (Technical Observatory, 2020, p. 151).

In 2016, an entrepreneur operating in Pomezia in the field of car rental declared to be subject for days to repeated extortion requests by the Fragalà, the man was intimidated with threats characterized by an objective mafia connotation: “*I belong to the first family of Catania, if you don’t pay me, I will shoot you and your family*” (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2018, p. 177). This is what led the District Judge of Rome to sentence precautionary custody against Salvatore Fragalà (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2018).

In this case, it is to be highlighted the infiltration in the socio-political-administrative sector of Pomezia, realized thanks to historical relationships of collusion with local politicians and entrepreneurs (DIA, 2019). Regarding this aspect, three names arise: Omero Schiumarini, Fiorenzo D'Alessandri and Astrid Fragalà – the latter, daughter of Alessandro Fragalà. In 2001 Schiumarini was arrested in 2001, accused of corruption in conjunction with D'Alessandri, then group leader of Democratici di Sinistra (DS). Alessandro Fragalà was also involved in the inquiry on charges of aggravated extortion (Bisbiglia and Pasciuti, 2019). Alessandro Fragalà's project started in 2013, when Omero Schiumarini was a major candidate defeated at the ballot by the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S). Schiumarini describes himself as one of the *family* Fragalà. In 2015 he was an interlocutor since the detention of the capo Alessandro, to whom he visited in company of Astrid. Schiumarini, according to the magistrates, was a fundamental piece to Alessandro's plan, to obtain roles of a political-administrative nature (Bisbiglia and Pasciuti, 2019).

It is then to emphasize the role of Astrid Fragalà, the bridge between the Fragalà and various exponents of the public administration (DIA, 2019). Her father, Alessandro Fragalà, pushed her towards a politic-wise career. In fact, in 2009 Astrid Fragalà became president of Confcommercio (Italian General Confederation of Enterprises, Professional Activities and Self-Employed Work, an Italian body representing companies engaged in trade, tourism and services) in Pomezia and, shortly after, sponsored to become alderman in the nearby town of Anzio (Santangelo, 2019), with the support of Schiumarini, which Alessandro thanked personally (Bisbiglia and Pasciuti, 2019).

Schiumarini had been a great mentor of Astrid during Alessandro's imprisonment. Schiumarini stated "*I protected her like a sister; appointed her as President of Confcommercio and sponsored a role as an alderman in the neighboring municipality of Anzio, where the surname of Fragalà was not known*" (Technical Observatory, 2020, p. 152). She was thus involved in politics, to assume prominent positions useful for the *family*. In this context, the association had placed itself in 2015 also as a promoter of a political line-up, which aimed to take control of the Municipality of Pomezia on the local elections of 2018 (DIA, 2019). This answers question three (3) on the infiltration of public institutions.

Part of the project was also Fiorenzo D'Alessandri, former councilor of the Partito Democratico (PD), and several times candidate (Bisbiglia and Pasciuti, 2019). Two important events in 2014 are of relevance as strategic ways of intimidating the public administration of Pomezia by the Fragalà family. All these acts were perpetrated against Fiorenzo D'Alessandri, who was victim of robberies,

kidnapping, and extortion: for instance, on January four cars and part of his villa were set on fire, and a robbery with kidnapping was carried out at the same villa to the detriment of several children, including D'Alessandri's (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2018).

Alessandro pushed Omero to work with Fiorenzo to take the municipality of Pomezia, he stated that Omero must command but through another person which will favor them from the inside. Alessandro stated the importance of his daughter, Astrid in office, where everyone would understand that the city councilor would protect the name of Fragalà (Bisbiglia and Pasciuti, 2019). However, the capo aims higher, so that Astrid become member of the junta. The rise of Astrid was the result of the help provided by Omero who claimed that he had a kinship relationship with the capo (Bisbiglia and Pasciuti, 2019). On June 2019, the PD expelled Omero Schiumarini (who later resigned as Pomezia city councilor) and Fiorenzo D'Alessandri (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020). The kinship relationship is an answer to question one (1) on the level of infiltration.

It seems like pressures, threats, acts of violence and attacks continue to be registered, with worrying frequency. Episodes of violence in Pomezia are recurrent and even sensational, the latter being a characteristic of mafias trying to gain power in a territory (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020). For instance, in 2015, in Pomezia a violent attack occurred against a local businessman and his family, two grenades were launched to the garden of their house. In 2016 in Pomezia the group attacked again against the family through an automatic rifle, the windows were luckily bullet-proof (DIA, 2019). In April 2017, the Municipality of Pomezia was attacked. The incendiary episode was an intimidation strategy intended to set fire the entire municipality (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2018). Furthermore, in September 2020, inside a bathing establishment, a deadly ambush with gunshots was committed against a convicted criminal, already active in drug trafficking (DIA, 2020). This answers to question four (4) on the use of violence and intimidatory methods.

Finally, in February 2020 the Palermo family of Corso dei Mille, also from Sicilian origin, was hit by the operation "Golden wood", which has, among other things, identified the reinvestment of illicit capital through companies with offices also in Pomezia (DIA, 2020)

All this confirms the propensity of mafia organizations to infiltrate local authorities, to take over with decision-making roles in the management of public affairs in favor of the interests of the syndicate in Pomezia (DIA, 2019). The territorial element has, for the Fragalà, a real referential character, since, in the criminal environment and in the social context of the territory of hegemony, identified in Lazio, specifically in Pomezia (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020, p. 148).

## Chapter V: Conclusions

Comparing the municipalities, it is no coincidence that the three are in the littoral and part of the Roman area. It seems like this region is an economic center for both licit and illicit activities. It is also the easiest and the most unnoticed way to traffic drugs and arms, as no frontiers need to be crossed.

There has been long time mafia presence in the three municipalities. For instance, the arrival of Coppola in the 1950s to the area, which, although directly living in Pomezia, affected Nettuno and other areas. The case of Ostia is a particularity, as the mafias present since the 70s are both autochthonous and traditional, and autochthonous mafias as the Banda della Magliana are those that held power. However, in Pomezia and Nettuno, although autochthonous mafias seem to be present, the Sicilian mafia-method of *intreccio* is what embedded the public administration.

The force of intimidation is also used in the three areas through relevant charismatic figures of the criminal world. For instance, Franco D'Agapiti in the case of Nettuno; Francesco D'Agati, Michele Senese, Salvatore Buzzi and Massimo Carminati in Ostia; and Alessandro Fragalà in Nettuno.

The use of the intimidation method has also led to an overall *omertà*. In the case of Nettuno, this is perceived in the fact that even if the data reported from various sources stated usury and violent crime, there were zero complaints from 2000-2012. In the case of Ostia, a self-explanatory case is that of the Galleoni and Antonini murders, where witnesses denied the evidence. Further confirmation provide the episodes of damages followed by fire, which were also denied by the victims. Finally, the characteristic is too present in Pomezia, where intimidatory episodes, threats and extortion against entrepreneurs were not denounced for fear of retaliation.

Having stated that there is mafia in the official sense of the term, which relies on intimidation, derived from criminal reputation, creating *omertà*, the *intreccio* must be analyzed. In the case of Nettuno, the *intreccio* was obviously noted. A decentralized clan from the 'Ndrangheta controlled resources destined to buildings, criminals were granted public orders, real estate operations, authorizations, and licenses. Relationships of kinship between members of the public administration and mafias were revealed. For instance, Antonio Boni's relationship with the Banda della Magliana, and D'Agapiti's relationship with a counselor. There were violations of impartiality, for instance, the Boni's salary and the appointment of his wife as member of the municipality. Money transactions were not transparent, the entity accumulated debts, collection of

taxes was not properly managed, participated as shareholder of a company whose manager was an exponent of organized crime, benefitted another company closely related to the Camorra and a waste storage company to circumvent payments.

The case of Ostia is quite similar, the Mafia Capitale controlled too public contracts. There were kinship relationships between criminals as Massimo Carminati and Salvatore Buzzi, and the administrators of the municipality as Andrea Tassone and Aldo Papalini, and other figures as Riccardo Mancini, Franco Panzironi and Luca Odevaine. Private businesses were not exempt from this influence, for instance the case of Fabrizio Franco Testa. Mafia Capitale thus relied on both public administrators and private businessmen to create a system that would favor its illicit activities.

Finally, the case of study, Pomezia, also presents similar characteristics to the former two cases of Nettuno and Ostia. For instance, there exists the presence of the Fragalà, which, as stated above, also creates an intimidation system, as concluded by the extortion cases of 2016, derived from the power of their name, and which lead to *omertà*. Moreover, there have been cases of *intreccio*, where the names of Omero Schiumarini, already accused of corruption, and Astrid Fragalà, daughter of Alessandro (the capo of the mafia) emanated. Omero Schiumarini was already part of the DS political group, which, if victorious in the ballots, would have put a person close to the *family* in power. Astrid Fragalà managed to hold power of Confcommercio, an Italian public body, in 2009. She was later sponsored too to become alderman in Anzio, with the support of Schiumarini. The Fragalà also used its intimidation method on Fiorenzo D'Alessandri, councilor of the PD, in 2014, to gain political power and a biased beneficial position in public bodies. Threats and acts of violence are recurrent in the area against businesses, but also against the Municipality itself. The reinvestment of illicit capital through companies in Pomezia has been identified. The Fragalà again tried to influence the elections of the Municipality of Pomezia in 2018.

The results are worrying, in the three areas mafias are using intimidation to acquire control of economic activities, contracts and profits. Until now it seems like the judiciary operations have been successful in halting the infiltration of the Fragalà in Pomezia, even if they were not in Nettuno and Ostia. However, the Fragalà did manage to penetrate relevant businesses and intimidate local businessmen to gain benefits. The facts point at the infiltration of the mafia in Pomezia, which will lead most probably to either the dissolution or the corruption of the municipality.

To conclude, this table provides a visual perspective on the analysis of the three cases:

	<i>Nettuno</i>	<i>Ostia</i>	<i>Pomezia</i>
<i>Geographical framework</i>	Rome, Lazio (littoral)	Rome, Lazio (littoral)	Rome, Lazio (littoral)
<i>Temporal framework</i>	2000-2005	2010-2015	2015-present
<i>Type of mafia presence</i>	Mostly traditional	Mostly autochthonous	Mostly traditional
<i>Emergence of mafia presence</i>	1950s	1970s	1950s
<i>Charismatic criminal figures</i>	Franco D'Agapiti	Francesco D'Agati, Michele Senese, Salvatore Buzzi and Massimo Carminati	Alessandro Fragalà
<i>Public administrators involved</i>	Antonio Boni	Andrea Tassone, Aldo Papalini, Riccardo Mancini, Franco Panzironi and Luca Odevaine	Omero Schiumarini and Astrid Fragalà
<i>Intimidatory episodes</i>	Present (arrests for usury crimes with intimidation)	Present and systematic (incendiary attacks, overall "criminal lobby")	Present (incendiary attack towards Municipality, and attacks towards D'Alessandri)
<i>Omertà</i>	Zero complaints from 2000-2012	Zero complaints from 2007-2012	Local entrepreneurs did not report intimidating episodes for fear of retaliation
<i>Dissolution of PA</i>	2003 and 2005	2013 and 2015	-----

After the analysis some issues are raised, the environment not falling directly in the temporality stipulated must be noted. For instance, in Nettuno, after 2006, an evident spread of crime was perceived, and the Gallace family was recognized in 2014 and the gravity of the situation was confirmed. The Gallace tend to invest their illicit proceeds in diversified economic activities as the management of commercial businesses and amusement arcades, the real estate market, public contracts, waste disposal and construction, operating through the mafia method (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2015).

In Ostia, violent episodes (kneecappings, blows against homes or businesses) have been taking place since 2016. The intimidation and *omertà* characteristics still prevail, for instance, the double attempt of murdering Carmine Spada (from the clan of the same name) who did not denounce it, and the beating of two journalists by Roberto Spada in the street, being filmed by a video camera. In 2020, the infiltration in the areas of administration and police was demonstrated by the episodes involving the manager of the police station of Ostia, Antonio Franco, who continued to support the Spada even after being transferred to another location. The existence of mafia informers at the hospital of Grassi also reinforced the intimidation system, as victims affected by injuries preferred not to undergo treatment (Osservatorio Tecnico, 2020).

The fact that violence keeps being a norm and that mafias seem to arise, the fact that *omertà* prevails and that public officers keep on supporting in one way or another criminal organizations, and keeping in mind that both the Nettuno and the Ostia municipalities had already been dissolved in 2003 and 2013 respectively, questions whether the measures taken are enough. Having stated this, the approach of dissolving a municipality could be analyzed in future thesis and whether the mafia phenomenon is being treated as a “method” or as a particular circumstance that will dissolve with the rebirth of a public body.

Given the analysis, it might be interesting to analyze whether this situation affects more municipalities of Lazio, or whether these characteristics are particular from the littoral area. The violence against the Municipality of Pomezia may be an interesting future study as the attacks towards public administration (for instance the 1990s attacks against the Carabinieri and the offices of the Municipal councilor) might be a signifier of a fragile State, where it doesn't hold the monopoly of violence.

Regarding the limitations of the thesis that have hindered the process of investigation, we should firstly note that most the sources were in Italian, which although being my second language, were difficult to analyze mostly because of the technicalities used in presidential decrees and other official documents. Secondly, most sources analyzed all of Italy, dividing by regions, instead of including an exhaustive analysis on each region. The particular analysis on regions were mostly centered on Sicilia, Calabria and Campania, which notes that most literature and qualitative analysis are based on this “ideal” case where the mafia can be easily studied, neglecting other areas of the territory which might be polluted. Thirdly and finally, the most important limitation found is the lack of transparency. Being acknowledged that the topic relates directly with systems of corruption of the State and that no government will provide this particular data. However, the presidential decrees although stating that for instance “a businessmen was attacked”, no names were provided. Thus, an extensive amount of time was exhausted in looking for these names and whether they were linked with mafia-related personalities.

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