



COMILLAS

UNIVERSIDAD PONTIFICIA

ICAI

ICADE

CIHS

Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales
Grado en Relaciones Internacionales

Trabajo Fin de Grado

Genocides of Rwanda and Darfur

A Comparative Analysis Between the
Last Genocide of the 20th Century and
the First Genocide of the 21st Century

Estudiante: **Marina Daniel Mozo**

Dirección: Ariel James Trapero

Madrid, Junio 2022

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This research paper could not have been accomplished without the support of many people. I would firstly like to thank my tutor, Ariel James, who guided me in this journey and provided much needed assistance and inspiration, as well as constructive recommendations.

Thank you to my friends, who have supported me all throughout my college experience, and with whom I have built memories that I will cherish for many years.

Lastly, thank you to my family, who deserve endless gratitude. I could have never made it to where I am today without your unconditional patience and encouragement.

To all of you: thank you.

ABSTRACT

Rwanda, a small country in east-central Africa, and Darfur, a region located in the south-west of Sudan, have very different geographical, social, political, economic and linguistic characteristics, yet, as this paper will demonstrate, they share one thing in common: genocide. While the Rwandan genocide of 1994 is considered to be the last century of the 20th century, the Darfur genocide is deemed to be the first of the 21st century, one that is still ongoing and is awaiting a resolution. This essay will carry out a comparative analysis between these two internal conflicts in order to analyze the commonalities and differences both events share. Not presupposing anything, it will first examine the concept of genocide, the characteristics it entails and the actions it encompasses, setting the theoretical foundation to evaluate whether or not both of these violent conflicts qualify to be given that category. It will then present a contextual and historical chronology of each of these events, and an analysis of the actors involved, which will provide the relevant traits of both the Rwandan and the Darfur genocide. The most prominent traits will be then analyzed in depth, compared and contrasted with one another, in order to provide further insight on the causes, the factors that contribute, and the context that promotes this type of internal, protracted and catastrophic conflicts.

Key words: genocide, Rwanda, Darfur, comparative analysis, colonialism, dehumanization, intervention.

INDEX

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	
ABSTRACT.....	1
1. INTRODUCTION.....	4
1.1. Objectives of Study.....	4
1.2. Justification of the Topic.....	6
2. CURRENT SITUATION	7
2.1. Rwanda	7
2.2. Sudan.....	7
2.2.1. Darfur.....	8
3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	10
3.1. Genocide	10
3.2. Intra-State Conflicts	12
3.3. Colonialism and Neocolonialism.....	12
3.4. International Intervention.....	13
4. MATERIAL AND METHODS.....	14
5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION	15
5.1. Chronology Rwandan Genocide	15
5.1.1. Precolonial Rwanda	15
5.1.2. Rwandan Colonial Rule	16
5.1.3. Post-Colonial Rwanda.....	17
5.1.4. Rwanda Pre Genocide.....	18
5.1.5. Rwandan Genocide	19
5.1.6. Rwanda Post-Genocide	21
5.2. Chronology Darfur Genocide.....	23
5.2.1. Precolonial and Turco-Egyptian Sudan	23
5.2.2. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.....	23
5.2.3. Sudan Post-Colonialism.....	25

5.2.4.	Darfur Genocide.....	26
5.2.5.	Failed Peace Process in Darfur	27
5.2.6.	Failed Justice in Darfur	27
5.3.	COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS	28
5.3.1.	Classification as Genocides	28
5.3.2.	The Role of the International Community	33
6.	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	35
7.	BIBLIOGRAPHY	38

1. INTRODUCTION

“The acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” (United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, 1948, p.1). This is how the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines in Article II the concept of genocide. Agreed upon by the UN Member States at the time of drafting the Convention, these actions include the “killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group, or forcibly transferring children of the group to another group” (UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, 1948, p.1). Hence, this definition encompasses both a volitional or decisional element, meaning the intent to carry out these actions, and a physical dimension, that refers to actions themselves. And yet, although this Convention has been acceded or ratified by a total of 152 countries since its draft, genocides have still taken place in two states that are parties to this international treaty: Rwanda and Sudan.

1.1. Objectives of Study

This paper will aim to analyze the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the ongoing genocide taking place in the western region of Sudan, in Darfur, since 2003, following two civil wars. This investigation will carry out a comparative study between both cases, exploring the situation prior to the outbreak of violence, to understand how these conflicts came about, the factors that contributed to the buildup of tensions and escalation, and the consequences these events have had, and continue to do so, in both countries. The objective is to evaluate the existing commonalities and differences among both cases in order to draw a series of conclusions on these two genocides in terms of the historical, political and social context prior to the genocide, the escalation of tensions that culminated in violence, and the success, if any, to achieve justice and peacebuilding, as well as the involvement of the international community.

In order to do so, this paper will be organized in the following sections. Firstly, it will provide insight on the current situation of the respective areas of Rwanda, a country no longer in conflict, and Darfur, a region where the genocide is still ongoing. In relation to the latter and given the current violence, this section will also highlight the relevance of the presence of conflict, both at a national level and in the international sphere. In the theoretical framework,

the necessary concepts and terms that will be used throughout this paper will be defined and explained in depth, serving as the basis and foundation for the analysis section. Material and methods will outline the means through which this paper will achieve its objective. In order to carry out a comparative analysis between both genocides, a chronology will be established for each of the cases in order to understand the factors that contributed to the genocide prior to its outbreak, the characteristics of the killings, and the outcomes of such violence. Academic papers and journal publications will provide the foundations for these chronological assessments, from which the most important traits, conditions and actors involved in each genocide respectively will be drawn and explored in the analysis and discussion section. The aim is to evaluate the similarities and differences, through the comparative analysis among both cases, is to understand how these critical issues took place, whether they could have been prevented, and whether this could happen again in the future. Lastly, the last section will establish the conclusions reached through this investigation, highlighting the difficulties in the development of this project, and offering a series of recommendations for future lines of research on this domain.

By the conflict in Rwanda, I will understand the context, the factors and the circumstances that contributed to the outbreak of violence in the territory, and that facilitated the murder of over 800,000 citizens in a period of approximately one hundred days. I shall explain that the genocide that took place was not merely a simple response to a trigger action, in this case, the assassination of the Rwandese president, but a coordinated, planned and thought-out response that had been built-up over the years as a result of the intra-national tensions between Hutus and Tutsis, highly enhanced by the German and British colonial rule over the territory in the years prior to the genocide itself. I will highlight the importance of determining characteristics of genocide, such as the dehumanization and the demonization of the targets, as well as the important role propaganda played, both in the years preceding the violence and during the conflict itself, as well as the involvement of the international community and their own personal interests. Lastly, I will realize the utmost importance of the justice and reconciliation process, both at a national and international level, in order to overcome such a nefarious event and rebuild a society in such manner that an intractable and protracted conflict that was the relation between Tutsis and Hutus, does not repeat itself in the future.

By the conflict in Darfur, I will demonstrate that, despite the common belief that genocides are a thing of the past, the first genocide of the 21st century is still ongoing. I will comprehend the importance of the colonial past in Sudan, and its impact on the physical and cultural divisions

that, years later, would exacerbate the differences between north and south, leading to a civil war and, eventually, the partition of the territory. I will illustrate the effect the north-south conflict, and how the Khartoum government responded with mass repression towards rebel groups, would be paralleled in the Darfur situation. I shall understand the importance of the political, economic and social marginalization of the western region of the country, and how, in turn, the tensions it led to were translated into the attacks towards the government by the insurgencies of the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement. I will illustrate the relevance of government support towards militias, economic, political, and in terms of resources such as armament, and how this has culminated in systematic and indiscriminate attacks on the Darfuri population who, still today, are being victims of continuous raids. Finally, I will emphasize the importance of the involvement, or lack of, of all the actors implicated in a conflict, in the process of negotiations towards a peaceful solution of a violent dispute and the prospect of building positive and lasting peace.

1.2. Justification of the Topic

As a student majoring in International Relations and Global Communication specializing in Security and Foreign Policy, national and international conflicts are of special relevance to me. I have spent a great part of the last five years learning about the prominent factors that can lead to violence and the nefarious consequences this has on the people who suffer from it. However, as a person who is also very interested in psychology, and its impact on international affairs, genocides are one of the issues that draw my undivided attention. What are the factors that lead to someone, or several people, to want to exterminate other human beings? In what contexts has this occurred? To what extent is the historical background prior to the rise of violence determinant to the outbreak of the conflict? These are some of the questions I posed myself when choosing a theme and an area of study for my final project. Hence, I decided to carry out a comparative study two prominent genocides known to be as the last one of the 20th century, that of Rwanda, and the first one of the 21st century, the Darfur genocide, both in the African continent but one where violence is no longer present while in the other it is still ongoing. I wanted to take this opportunity to investigate an issue that I felt drawn to and research in depth relevant issues that I felt passionate about, something that this paper aims to portray and the reason why this section of the paper is written using the first person. However, the following sections will not use the first person in an attempt to portray the objectivity and seriousness this final project aims to convey.

2. CURRENT SITUATION

2.1. Rwanda

Officially known as the Republic of Rwanda, it is a landlocked country in east-central Africa, south of the Equator, and bordering four states: the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi (World Bank, 2020). Although geographically it is a considerably small country, with roughly 26,000 square kilometers, it has one of the highest population densities of the sub-Saharan region, with almost 13 million citizens and Kigali as its capital (World Bank, 2020). Politically, it has become a stable multiparty republic since the 1994 genocide, when a unicameral National Development party was replaced by the Transitional National Assembly, which enacted the 1995 constitution. Years later, in 2003, a new constitution was enacted, which designated the president as head of the state, eligible for a seven-year term that could be renewed only once, and in charge of selecting the head of government in the form of a prime minister (Britannica, 2022). However, later on, the constitution was amended in 2015, allowing the then President Kagame to run consecutively for a third time and thus, was reelected once again in 2018 (Britannica, 2022). Economically speaking, the country has been growing steadily in the past decades, aspiring to be achieve the “Middle Income Country status by 2035 and a High Income Country status by 2050” (World Bank, 2022). Additionally, this economic growth rate has been paralleled by significant improvements in the social sphere, with a decline in national poverty, child and maternal mortality, and inequality (measured by the Gini index), while school enrollment, life expectancy at birth, and access to social services has increased considerably (World Bank, 2022). However, these positive developments have been exceedingly hindered by the latest global pandemic of Covid-19, threatening many of the economic and social progresses developed in the last few years.

2.2. Sudan

Officially known as the Republic of Sudan, the country is located among the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East, sharing borders with seven other neighboring countries which include: South Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia, Chad, Eritrea and the Central African Republic. Its population is estimated to be of almost 44 million people, more than half of which, around 65%, live in rural areas, which is why the country’s economy mainly depends on agriculture. Although its largest city is Omdurman, the capital is the central city of Khartoum (African Development Bank Group, 2022). Despite the fact that a transitional government was put in place after former ruler Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir was forced to step down due to

mass public demonstrations, a new government took over after a military coup in October of 2021. While the current constitution was adopted in 2005, the legal system of the country is mainly based on Islamic Law, and also English Common Law (African Development Bank Group, 2022). The numerous internal conflicts the country has faced since it reached independence in 1956, such as that of Darfur, Blue Nile or South Kordofan, have been translated into rising poverty levels over the years. In fact, the secession of South Sudan back in 2011, under the terms established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005, that led to multiple economic shocks in its northern neighbor, with reduced economic growth, higher rates of inflation, and lower rates of education and literacy (World Bank, 2022). Additionally, both the secession of South Sudan and the internal conflicts in the country, including the Darfur genocide, have led to considerably high number of refugees and internally displaced persons recent years. Like the rest of the countries worldwide, Sudan has also been negatively affected by the most recent global pandemic of Covid-19, which has intensified the political, economic and social difficulties the country is facing. Furthermore, the extreme weather conditions in the country, including both droughts and floods depending on the year, have considerably worsened the internal problems that government is facing, further emphasized by the internal violent confrontation events among different actors at the national level (World Bank, 2022).

2.2.1. Darfur

Out of the many local conflicts that have taken place in Sudan in recent decades, Darfur is one of the regions that has suffered the most. Located at the west of Sudan, its population inhabits predominantly in rural areas, conformed by a variety of ethnic groups that encompass Fur, Masalit or Zaghawa amongst others, along with Arabic-speaking groups (Sikainga, 2009). Over the years, the region has been constantly marginalized politically, economically, and socially by the government in Khartoum (Karamalla-Gaiballa and El-Kafafi, 2021). This, combined with environmental difficulties the region continues to face, with droughts and desertification, has hindered economic development in the region. The armed conflict that escalated in the 2003, with the attack of the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement on the government as a response to the region's marginalization and was responded with government support to Arab militias that carry out systematic attacks of villages in the territory, has hindered stability in the region. In fact, in 2010 and despite some relative progress in peace negotiations between the central government and some rebel groups, attacks between the actors involved continued to take place, deteriorating the security conditions of the region

as time passed (Dagne, 2011). Despite the Al-Bashir was forced to step down back in 2019, the following year saw a surge in violence and displacements, worsened even further with UNAMID ceasing operations in the territory at the beginning of 2021 (Aljazeera, 2022). As for now, the end to violence has not yet been achieved.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section will provide a series of definitions of the concepts that are essential for the development of the analysis and discussion of this paper and necessary to achieve the objectives set out in the introduction, as well as the main authors and theories that will guide this research.

3.1. Genocide

The introduction of this paper began by defining the concept of genocide as explained by the 1948 UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide. However, the term itself was first coined to the English language by Polish and Jewish philosopher Raphael Lemkin in his 1994 book “*Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*”. Both as a response to the Nazi persecution and annihilation of Jewish people during the Second World War and taking into consideration other historical events in which groups of people had been targeted in a systematic manner, Lemkin developed the term as a combination of “*genos*”, a Greek prefix that translates to tribe or race, and “*cide*”, a Latin suffix which translates to the action of killing (Lemkin, 1944). Although it was recognized as a crime under international law by the United Nations a couple of years later, in 1946, it would not be until 1948, with the development of the previously mentioned Convention on Genocide, when this crime was codified, and the actions involved in this act were specified.

Towards the end of the 20th century, and predominantly as a response to the Rwandan genocide that had taken place barely two years earlier, founding president and chairman of Genocide Watch, Dr. George Stanton, determined that the act of genocide was a process that developed itself in ten stages which are not inexorable, since they can be predicted and prevented (Stanton, 1996). Although multiple stages can occur in a simultaneous manner, they usually follow a logical order, but can continue to take place throughout the process of genocide. To evaluate whether or not the Rwanda and Darfur conflicts can be deemed as genocide, the ten stages stated by Stanton will be explained in order to analyze whether they apply both case studies of this investigation.

1. Classification: among the initial stages, this phase refers to the division of a group into an “us vs. them” narrative based on ethnicity, religion, or nationality among other characteristics. This classification can be subjacent in society or be materialized, such as, for instance, with identity cards or physical divisions of a territory.

2. Symbolization: this phase occurs when symbols are attributed to distinguish the different categorizations in the classification stage. Combined with feelings of hatred, the symbols can be used to identify, in a negative manner, the group that could potentially become the target of violence in the future.
3. Discrimination: refers to the creation or establishment of laws or customs that deny equal rights to group of potential victims, taking away powers such as voting rights, social rights, or even their nationality, thus legitimizing a hierarchical relation between a dominant group and those that are excluded.
4. Dehumanization: one of the key steps of genocide, this step consists of the denial of the humane characteristics that make up the victimized group. Propaganda disseminated through journals, television or radio stations can serve to perpetuate comparisons of the victims with non-human elements, usually with negative connotations, associating them with insects or diseases. This depersonalization legitimizes, in the next stages, the violence towards the vilified groups, who is seen as a hindrance to society and thus, their absence, as something necessary.
5. Organization: the planning stage is crucial for the development of a genocide, which can be organized, or supported, by the state, or by citizens themselves. Arm stock or training are usually carried out before the violence commences, facilitating or speeding up the killings after a particular event that serves as a trigger for conflict.
6. Polarization: in this phase, the groups are driven apart from each other, for instance, banning social interactions or intermarriages. Indoctrination is a crucial aspect of this stage, where the reasons for targeting the victimized group become propagated through media platforms and enforced through laws or decrees. Additionally, measures are put in place in order to weaken the targeted group, preventing their own self-defense in the future through disarmament.
7. Preparation: with an increase in inflammatory and hateful rhetoric, at this stage leaders convey the belief that self-defense, in the form of genocide, is the only viable solution, using euphemisms such as “purification” to legitimize their intentions. Armies, militias, or troops are trained and prepared to take action once the trigger sparks violence.
8. Persecution: the targeted group, sometimes forced to wear symbols that facilitates their identification, are separated from the rest of society. Lists of those that must be persecuted are usually drawn up and can be propagated through media platforms such as journals or radio stations. The victims are denied of basic rights and measures to prevent their reproduction are usually taken in order to annihilate the group.

9. Extermination: this phase corresponds to the acts of killing that legally is defined as genocide, but also acts of rape, destruction and torture. The aim is to eradicate the targeted group and cause insufferable pain indiscriminately, not taking into consideration whether the victims are civilians or combatants.
10. Denial: this last stage usually continues to take place even after the genocide itself is over. It refers to the perpetrators' intents to cover up the crimes committed, eliminating possible evidence or coercing witnesses of the actions to avoid punishment. Scapegoats are often sought, sometimes even blaming the victims to provide alternative culprits. The main aim is to avoid arrest, prosecution and justice (Stanton, 1996).

3.2. Intra-State Conflicts

Intra-state conflicts can be defined as armed and prolonged combat between two or more groups within a national territory or state boundaries (Regan, 1996). These conflicts can arise through, and are affected by, a variety of factors, which include structural, political, economic, social, or ethnic factors among many others (Rwantabagu, 2001). They tend to be linked to the domestic power relations within a country and involve the break-up of the social relations of the citizens, which is why they are often deemed more devastating, both at a psychological and social level, than other types of disputes, such as inter-state conflicts. Intra-state conflicts can occur as a result of state failure, an ineffective design of the institutional system within a country or, as applied to the two case studies that will be analyzed in this paper, the materialization of years of ethnic tensions into violence. In fact, it could be argued that the events that took place both in Rwanda and Burundi could be defined as protracted conflicts, which are extremely complex and characterized by longevity and severe in terms of the violence involved.

3.3. Colonialism and Neocolonialism

Colonialism, in its classical sense, can be defined as the occupation, in political, economic and social forms, mainly by Europeans, in territories overseas that occurred throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This territorial expansion was legitimized under the purpose of civilizing other nations, based on a notion of superiority, often claiming sovereignty, which could take different forms, for instance, through direct or indirect rule (Alzubairi, 2017). Both case studies discussed in this paper suffered forms of colonialism in their territories during the 20th century. However, the term neo-colonialism, one that implies that the political, economic, and cultural effects of colonial rule are present in current times through the repetition of colonial forms of government, could be argued to be more accurate to explain the set of occurrences that took

place both in Rwanda and Darfur, and led to systemic tensions that culminated in violence (Alzubairi, 2017). The chronological timeline of the events that occurred in both regions, including the colonial rule, will highlight the impact that the colonial rule had on both territories, and how reminiscences of this form of government can be traced to the post-colonial societies, contributing to the outbreak of violence.

3.4. International Intervention

International interventions have been an ongoing and heavily debated issue throughout history. Arguably, international intervention in cases of violence should have the reduction of the severity of the conflict in mind (Krain, 2005). However, the fact that this has not always been the case combined with the widespread respect for national sovereignty and state jurisdiction, have influenced the decision of foreign powers to intervene, even though intra-state violence, especially in the cases where human rights violations are involved, is considered a legitimate concern at an international level. In fact, third party interventions have at times been viewed as an instrument for the powerful to gain influence or control over the weak, perpetuating an image of domination (Ayoob, 2021). This belief has been further emphasized and encouraged by the rise of proxy wars, which consist of the involvement of third parties in a conflict in an attempt to influence its outcome so that it fits its own personal interests (Rauta and Mumford, 2017). As a result, the involvement of the international community in intra-state conflicts outside of their jurisdiction has raised very different responses. On the one hand, some countries, or even international organizations such as the United Nations, have demonstrated reluctance to intervene, while on the other hand, some states have taken advantage of this situation to advance their own interests (for instance, the United States in its many interventions in the Middle East).

4. MATERIAL AND METHODS

In order to attain the objectives set out by this research paper, the analysis and discussion will be divided into several sections. Firstly, a series of qualitative sources will be used to draw a chronology for both genocides. This chronology is of the utmost importance in order to understand the factors that facilitated the outbreak of violence and the context in which this happened. The aim is to understand the events that took place prior to the genocide, understanding how the respective societies functioned and were structured in the pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial periods. This will highlight the importance of the colonial period and the impact of the forms of government imposed by the European powers during these years, which were perpetuated even after the colonial rule came to an end. The chronology will also provide the relevant actors that were involved in the widespread violence and carried out systematic looting, rape and murders, understanding the planning and organization involved prior to the genocide, a critical aspect for the violence to have been so extensive. Additionally, it will analyze the post-genocide situations in both cases, evaluating whether the respective attempts to achieve peace and justice have been successful or, on the contrary, have not yet been attained.

Once the chronologies for both Rwanda and Darfur have been established, a comparative analysis will be carried out between both cases. Stanton's "*Ten Stages of Genocide*" (classification, symbolization, discrimination, dehumanization, organization, polarization, preparation, persecution, extermination and denial), previously mentioned in the theoretical framework section, will be applied to both violent conflicts in order to analyze whether or not they can indeed be deemed as genocides using a comparative table. The aim is to establish how each of the ten stages were carried out in each case and the impact they had on the violence that took place. Additionally, the other key issues mentioned in the theoretical framework will also be taken into consideration and compared in relation to both cases, drawing out the similarities and differences between both conflicts and highlighting the importance of the international context during these humanitarian crises in Rwanda and Darfur.

Finally, a series of conclusions will be stated from this comparative analysis. This final section will also provide an assessment of this research paper, highlighting any difficulties that may have been encountered during the development of this investigation, and how they were overcome. Lastly, it will underline the contributions this research paper has made to its field and present possible future lines of investigation on this domain.

5. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Chronology Rwandan Genocide

The following sections will provide a historical chronology of the events that led to the Rwandan genocide of 1994. The timeline will begin in the time period prior to the colonization era and finalize with the culmination of the justice and reconciliation process the country underwent to overcome the atrocities of the genocide and the rebuilding of the Rwandan society. This chronology will provide the foundations to draw the pertinent indicators for the following analysis sections in relation to this conflict, and that will be compared and contrasted with that of Darfur.

5.1.1. Precolonial Rwanda

Before the arrival of the Europeans, the population of what would be current day Rwanda was composed of three main identities. The first inhabitants of the territory would correspond to the ancestors of today's Twa minority group, at the time dedicated primarily to hunting or self-sufficiency. Years later, the Hutus, part of a larger group of Bantu people, migrated to the region and settled around the area of Lake Kivu, often defined as agriculturalists. It would not be until around the 15th century that the third group, the Tutsis, would immigrate into the region from the north, and became known as the pastoralists when they settled in the land due to their common possession of cattle, considered a source of wealth at the time (Sellstrom et al., 1996). While the Twa were more marginalized and mistreated by the other two identities, Tutsis assimilated themselves into the Hutu identity, through the adoption of their language and traditions, intermarriage and the lack of segregation in the territory. As a result, during the precolonial period, these two groups were indistinguishable solely based on physical characteristics, other than the fact that Tutsis were overall slightly taller than their counterparts (Johnson, 2020). Instead, categorization among the Rwandan society rather depended on the occupation, the level of fortune or the possession of cattle. Because of this, individuals could move freely from one category to another as their wealth increased or decreased (Sellstrom et al., 1996). Hence, hierarchy was established through patron-client relationships among the citizens for the exchange of goods and services, in which Tutsis adopted the role of patrons and Hutus performed the role of clients, although this was not always the case. Once the Europeans arrived at the land, these relations were institutionalized and reinforced, which stimulated the rise of tensions among those who found themselves at the bottom of this hierarchy. Until then, Tutsi, Hutu and Twa groups found ways to solve social conflicts in a relatively practical manner,

forming a society founded on overall respect and economic exchanges that fulfilled the requirements to survive as a social universe (Gómez Salgado, 2009). As a result, despite the ethnic divisions among them, all three groups coexisted.

5.1.2. Rwandan Colonial Rule

However, the end of this status quo came with the arrival of the Germans, and later on the Belgians, to Rwandan lands. From 1894 until the end of the First World War in 1918, both Rwanda and Burundi were established a part of German East Africa. From 1918 until 1962, both countries were united to a single administrative entity, named the Territory of Rwanda-Burundi, under Belgian control in the form of a mandate, until this trusteeship established by the League of Nations came to an end. For almost 70 years, the Rwandan society endured significant changes at the hands of the Europeans. Both Germans and Belgians based the political, social and economic construction of the Rwandese population by intensifying the ethnic identity traits that had lost their importance prior to colonization, affirming that the Tutsi, having immigrated from the north, were somehow less Africans and more similar to Europeans, thus making them superior (White, 2007). As a result, a discriminatory caste system emerged, one where racism emerged in the form of ethnic divisions and discriminatory practices towards the Hutus, while Tutsi became synonymous of higher power and wealth privileges. According to Wilson, these systems can trigger sentiments of resentment that can eventually legitimize acts such as genocide or self-destruction (Wilson, 1993).

In an attempt to maintain stability in the territory, the Belgians opted to rely on African forms of government, deciding to instate Tutsi as the governing class with Belgian support, being the only ones allowed to acquire jobs in the public institutions and the army, and even replacing some Hutu chiefs that were in place before their arrival in the process (White, 2007). As a result, the Tutsi were positioned on top of the social, political and economic hierarchy, from where they were allowed to exploit those bellow them, primarily Hutus, through heavy taxes. However, the turning point in the establishment of a superior and an inferior group was the institutionalization and nationalization of the Belgian identity cards in the Rwandan population. These cards distinguished Hutus and Tutsis from one another, fixing their ethnic identities, and had to be carried at all times to avoid the risk of a fine or jail time for not complying with the laws. As a result, this new fixed caste system caused raising tensions among the population, especially from the Hutu group, who felt discriminated upon, but also from Tutsis as time passed. In the second half of the 20th century, the desire for political independence and the end of colonialism was spreading among many countries around the world, including in the African

continent. In an attempt to attain more political power, Hutus issued what was known as the Bahutu Manifesto, calling for the overthrow of the Tutsi elite and demanding a political voice. The Belgians, more preoccupied with becoming the target of the Hutu rising, diverted attention towards the Tutsi, depicting them as the optimal object to attack (White, 2007). In fact, the Belgian administration did not set any limitations or restrictions to the Hutu movement, thus facilitating their rise to power (Zahorik, 2012). In the years following the draft of the Manifesto, the Rwandan Revolution began, and with it, a series of inter-ethnic episodes of violence, resulting in thousands of Tutsis fleeing the country, even more being massacred, and the establishment of the Hutu Emancipation Party (Parmehutu) as the ruling government in 1961 (Sellstrom et al., 1996), overthrowing the then King Kigery V. Simultaneously, the Belgians, seeing how the Hutus had consolidated their power, withdrew from the territory, which led to the separation of Rwanda and Burundi into two separate countries. Despite the Tutsi attacks from small-scale insurgencies, supported by the Tutsi-dominated government in Burundi, the killing sprees of 1963, 1967 and 1973 ended the lives of many Tutsi people, foreshadowing events, in a lighter version, of what would then occur only a couple decades later (Britannica, 2022).

5.1.3. Post-Colonial Rwanda

During the years prior to the genocide, the Hutu form of government was relatively similar to that of the Tutsis in the early years of Belgian colonization. Quota systems were established to limit the number of Tutsis that were allowed in schools and universities, public institutions, or other employment sectors (Magnarella, 2005). This discrimination against Tutsis was even more exacerbated once Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew the then ruler Kayibanda, taking power over the army using clientelism, ensuring that his close circle and supporters were placed in high level positions of the administration. Although when he rose to power, he initially supported a decrease of Tutsi persecution, the attacks received from the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a then military group formed in 1987 by Tutsi and Hutu refugees who had fled the country during the massacres, caused Habyarimana to harden his position and strengthen anti-Tutsi policies (Reed, 1996). The maintenance of the identity cards implanted by the Belgians facilitated government control over the Tutsis, and prevented their entrance to military or government services, positions where intermarriage between the different ethnic groups was not permitted. Legislation was used to target Tutsis, who became the scapegoat for the economic, social and political problems that the country faced (White, 2007). Despite the RPF's attempts to return to Rwanda by attacking the country, Habyarama refused their return,

arguing that the country had no way of providing the necessary jobs, land or food, even though countries such as Uganda, who had taken in thousands of refugees also lacked the means or resources to provide for them (Magnarella, 2005).

With the entrance of the 90s decade came even more repression towards the Tutsi population. Anti-Tutsi propaganda through a variety of mass media platforms including the radio (with the *Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines*) and newspapers (with the *Kangura* journal), disseminated hatred, discrimination and divisionism (Nikuze, 2014). In fact, it was through this particular journal, the *Kangura*, that the Hutu Ten Commandments were published in December of 1990. This mandate, aside from including social norms for Hutus, especially for women, were also explicitly critical of the Tutsi population. They not only depicted Tutsis as traitors and the enemy, restricted their entrance to positions of power or prohibited them from becoming part of the military, but they also declared that any Hutu who felt mercy for Tutsis or refused to spread the word of the Hutu ideology would also be considered a traitor to the country (Nikuze, 2014). Hence, although the genocide itself did not commence until 1994, the ideology of hatred towards the Tutsi population or anyone who sided against them contributed to the ease and speed with which the violence spread through the territory. Dehumanization, demonization and vilification of Tutsis, defining them as cockroaches or snakes, rid Hutus of any responsibility for the annihilation of the enemy that, they considered, had to be defeated.

5.1.4. Rwanda Pre Genocide

Although the assassination of Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana is considered to be the triggering occurrence that sparked the outburst of violence, it is important to take into account that the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was killed alongside Habyarimana, and that the events that took place in this southern neighboring country also had a strong influence over the developments that took place. During the early 1990s, encouraged by several European countries and the Organization of African Unity, various meetings took place in Arusha, Tanzania, between the Rwandan president and the RPF in an attempt to negotiate ceasefires, the return of Rwandan refugees who had fled the country in the previous decades, and the inclusion of part of the RPF into the country's military forces. These negotiations, which came to be known as the Arusha Accords and were finally signed on 1993, were frowned upon by the most extremist members of the Hutu who outright refused the changes proposed in the meetings seeing as they would remove many of their privileged positions (Magnarella, 2005). In response to the negotiations, radio stations such as the Radio Mille Collines, or the *Kangura*

journal, dedicated their platforms to disseminate both anti-Tutsi and anti-Accords propaganda, publicly announcing that the country would be freed from the Tutsi cockroaches.

Barely a month prior to the signing of the Accords, the first free elections were celebrated in Burundi, which resulted in a regime change from a previously dominated Tutsi government to Hutu Melchior Ndadaye and his *Front pour la democracie of Burundi* (FRODEBU) ruling the country (Magnarella, 2005). Fearing the new Hutu-government policies which meant to ensure proportional ethnic representation in numerous sectors of society, including school, public institutions, or the military forces, the army, who then remained to be predominantly Tutsi, carried out an attack assassinating the newly elected president and multiple members of his government. In turn, associates from the FRODEBU encouraged the Hutu population to murder any Tutsis they came across with, while the Tutsi-dominated army in Burundi persecuted and killed thousands of Hutus. Hence, these events that took place in the neighboring country begin the genocidal sentiment that shortly after would permeate to the Rwandan territory (Magnarella, 2005). The chaos in Burundi caused Rwandan President Habyarimana and other members of his political party, the *Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement* (MRND), to distrust Tutsis in their own country, and refused to enforce the Arusha Accords that had been signed just a few months earlier, which is why these negotiations are often considered to be a failure.

5.1.5. Rwandan Genocide

In the context of the growing hatred towards Tutsis, and any Hutus who stood with them, the plane in which Juvénal Habyarimana and the new president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, were flying, returning from Tanzania, was shot down by a missile, killing everyone on board (Sellstrom et al, 1996). Until this day, it is still unknown who was responsible for the launch of the missile. While at the time Hutus claimed the plane was shot down by the RPF, the Tutsi population argued it was Hutu extremists and the Rwandese military, the *Forces Armées Ruansaises* (FAR) who considered Habyarimana to be too lenient on Tutsis, as shown in a cartoon published only a month earlier by the Kangura, in which the president was depicted as an RPF accomplice, accompanied by the headline: “Habyarimana will die in March” (Magnarella, 2005, p.815). Although the event itself took place on April 6 of 1994, and not March, as had been predicted by the pro-Hutu journal, this event is considered by many to be the trigger of action seeing as, within a few hours, Hutu militias had already gathered, taking advantage of the identity cards that identified the Tutsi citizens to slaughter them without a second thought. As explained by Philip Gourevitch, an American journalist who covered the

Rwandan genocide, the first priority of those who carried out the genocide was to eliminate any Hutu opposition leaders, believing them to be the biggest threat (Gourevitch, 1999). In fact, that very same night, the moderate Hutu Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana was murdered, as were the soldiers, predominantly Belgian, who were protecting him. The main aim was to create a new Rwanda and, in order to do so, the organizers sought to create a political power vacuum that they could then fill with Hutu extremists.

In the months that followed, it is estimated that 800,000 people were killed, around a million became internally displaced and approximately two million had to flee to neighboring countries (Prunier, 1995), while countless others were psychologically and physically abused, especially women, who were systematically raped. In fact, a report carried out by Human Rights Watch concluded that, during the genocide, many of the perpetrators who were infected with HIV, purposefully raped Tutsi women in order to pass them on their disease, which would later on develop into AIDS, actions that would then be rewarded by leaders and officials at the head of the massacres with money, food, or drinks, which only promoted and incited this nefarious behavioral pattern (Human Rights Watch, 1996). As a result, the rate of HIV and AIDS infected people in the country, which was already considerably high before the genocide took place, increased dramatically by the end of 1994. While only the militias and military forces had primary access to firearms, including guns or rifles, other Hutu extremists also joined the killing sprees with whatever weapons they had access too. Cooking knives and machetes, priorly used as an agricultural tool, became utensils to carry out slaughters against Tutsis and Hutu rivals, for mutilation and for torture (Verwimp, 2006). Many Hutus who refused to become murderers were either coerced to do so under threat, or killed, being considered as traitors to the Hutu regime. All the while, propaganda played a crucial role in facilitating, organizing and promoting mass killings throughout the country. Hit lists were announced on a daily basis, orchestrating and encouraging the crusade against the Tutsi population (White, 2007).

In the meantime, the RPF, supported by the Ugandan military, preserved the same objective it has since its creation: to recover the Rwandan territory (Kuperman, 2004). However, by the time the genocide was finally declared to be over after gaining control over the capital, Kigali, on July 18, almost 80% of the Rwandese Tutsi population before the genocide had been killed. Additionally, despite their military victory, organizations such as Human Rights Watch have also been considerably critical with the RPR for their questionable actions. In their path to recover the country, the military group, the RPF assassinated both Hutu combatants and non-

combatants, and forced many others to flee the territory, seeking refuge in neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (Human Rights Watch, 2004).

5.1.6. Rwanda Post-Genocide

Only a day later after the genocide was declared to be over, a new President and Prime Minister were sworn in. However, it was not until November of that same year that a resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council to establish an international court to persecute the crimes committed during the genocide, which later on came to be known as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) (Sellstrom et al., 1996). This decision was taken after the Council determined that “genocide and other systematic, widespread and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law” had been committed in the territory, which meant a risk of destabilizing the peace and security of the international domain (Akhavan, 1996, p.502). While the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was against the creation of the Yugoslav Tribunal for similar occurrences to what happened in Rwanda, the Rwandese government was in favor of the creation of the ICTR, wanting to achieve exemplary justice, something that would be facilitated by international presence and support. Rwandan leaders were highly aware of the pre-existing culture of impunity in the country and wanted to eradicate it at all costs, aiming for national reconciliation that could enable the construction of a new society with justice and respect as fundamental values (Akhavan, 1996). However, Rwanda, as a member state of the Security Council, eventually voted against the resolution (denominated Resolution 955) of the establishment of the tribunal on the grounds that its temporal jurisdiction was too limited, that its resources were too scarce to be effective, and that, despite the Rwandese desire of the tribunal being established in their national territory, it was eventually set in Arusha, Tanzania, all among other various reasons (Akhavan, 1996).

When evaluating the effectiveness of this institution, one would find a series of successes and failures. On the positive side, some of the major successes of the tribunal is that it pioneered the consideration of rape and sexual violence as a form of genocide (particularly relevant given that many Hutu perpetrators had purposely infected women with HIV by raping them), of persons being personally responsible for the act of genocide, and of members of the media being held accountable for inciting genocide (Goldstone, 2008). In terms of apprehending and extraditing defendants, the ICTR is considered to be fairly successful, although the slow speed and long duration of the trials has hindered the positive effects of this accomplishment. Furthermore, in relation to the maintenance of peace in the region, the impact of the ICTR has been somewhat questionable. Despite some experts argue that it has influenced a moderating

approach towards intra-state conflicts in Rwanda, it is estimated that in the years after the establishment of the tribunal, thousands of citizens have died as a result of Hutu-Tutsi clashes (Barria, 2005). The ICTR was effective in the detention and trial of numerous actors directly involved in the genocide, including generals, officers and chiefs, but many others remain in unknown locations after fleeing the country before they could be convicted. In order to make up for the deficiencies, shortages and flaws of the international tribunal, in 2002, Rwanda launched a national justice system known as the Gacaca courts.

Gacaca, a word that translates to “justice on the grass”, refers to the judicial process through which those who were accused of the crime of genocide would be tried by the public and a series of judges. With a pilot phase established in 2002, this system aimed to reduce the overwhelming number of perpetrators who were still awaiting trial for the crimes they had committed, a number which is estimated to be over 100,000 trials (Corey and Joireman, 2004). To carry out this process, elders would meet in a public setting, usually patches of grass, in order to discuss the issues at hand and present a resolution to the accused killers and criminals. Although at the time some people questioned the legitimacy of the courts, given that locals with no professional experience had the responsibility of interpreting and applying national laws, many viewed it as an opportunity to promote local justice for perpetrators of minor and major crimes (but not leaders of the genocide) and reconciliation between the criminals and the victims (Longman, 2009). Seeing the successful results in the pilot phase, in 2005 the government expanded this system throughout the entire country, and, within seven years of its inauguration, estimations conclude that around a million and a half individuals were tried under these courts (Longman, 2009). However, although the Gacaca courts did indeed hold numerous perpetrators accountable for their crimes and serve as a platform and dialogue between members of the community, it has also been heavily criticized for the government’s role and influence in the process. For instance, crimes and abuses committed by the RPF and its followers, previously mentioned, in the process of their return to the country were not addressed by these courts, which is why some consider this system as a way to project state power rather than ensuring accountability and following the rule of law (Corey and Joireman, 2004). The subjectivity engrained within this justice system, where ethnic biases were almost unavoidable, undermined its effectiveness and the achievement of its goals. Nonetheless, despite its flaws, the courts provide a creative response, one with hardly any similarities to current Western judicial approaches, that undeniably contributed in a significant way to the

promotion of empathy and performed the function of a relatively successful settlement practice, justice enforcer and reconciliation mechanism (Ingelaerre, 2008).

5.2. Chronology Darfur Genocide

Similarly to the structure followed in the previous section, this part of the investigation will provide a chronology for the Darfur genocide, beginning with the precolonial times of the country of Sudan and finalizing with the most recent occurrences, up to the present day. Only then the most prominent indicators of the conflict will be drawn and compared and contrasted with those of the Rwandan genocide, being this the foundation for the next sections of the analysis and discussion.

5.2.1. Precolonial and Turco-Egyptian Sudan

For centuries, the Sudanese people based their survival on cultivation of the lands, livestock herding and trading between the regions of sub-Saharan Africa and the Mediterranean sea. As a result of the massive migration flows of Arab Muslims that predominantly took place between the 13th and the 15th century, mainly from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, many of the agricultural settlements in the territory shifted back from government-led to tribal and pastoralists organizations (Collins, 1976). However, even more destabilizing was the change provoked by the Turco-Egyptian colonial rule that took place from 1821 until the end of the 19th century, motivated by the pursuit of expansion, the quest for natural resources and the access to cheap and accessible labor force (Warburg, 1991). The colonial authorities fragmented the local communities, creating groups of a few privileged while exploiting and oppressing both urban and rural areas through excessive taxations and the attempt to obtain slaves from the indigenous population. The system of taxation became increasingly repressive as the Egyptian foreign debt increased throughout the 19th century, making the Sudanese become more reluctant to foreign intervention (Collins 1976).

5.2.2. Anglo-Egyptian Sudan

During the late 1870s, European powers such as France and the United Kingdom imposed heavy economic restrictions on Egypt, which undermined the Ottoman and Egyptian control over the Sudanese territory. Taking advantage of the weakened position of Turco-Egyptian regime, Sudanese nationalist forces, with the Mahdists as the leading force, rebelled against colonial rule between 1881 and 1884. Their main objectives were to establish an end to slavery in the territory and both economic and land equitable sharing in Sudan. However, because the Madhist movement was predominantly composed of peasants, its success was limited. The

Madhist state lasted only from 1885 until 1898 and solely managed to limit slavery rather than achieving its complete abolition (Mamdani, 2020). The British, wanting to secure their own interests and investments in Africa, decided to reconquer Sudan using Egyptian troops, after occupying the latter in 1881. After more than two years, the Anglo-Egyptian troops finally defeated the Madhist movement and established the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement in 1899, which determined that the Sudanese territory would be jointly administered by both colonial powers (Collins, 1976). From this moment on, colonial policies towards the areas of public administration, health or education, were greatly influenced by the fear of a re-rising Muslim fanaticism, limiting the activities and access of the Madhist groups while creating a small, elitist group of educated Sudanese that would facilitate their colonial control (Sharkey, 2012).

Throughout the beginning of the 20th century, the influence of the British and Egyptian colonial powers over the territory increased considerably, especially through the tribalization of Sudan. Although prior to British colonialism the population of Sudan had different languages, religions, traditions, lifestyles and social structures of the community, it was the colonial power who vested these differences with political meaning (Mamdani, 2020). Both legal and physical borders that did not exist previously were drawn, grouping the population according to what the Europeans perceived as ethnic differences, the most notable one being the north-south divide. From their point of view, this division was crucial to separate what they considered the civilized population from the north, primarily composed of Arab migrants, and the so-called Africans from the south. Because according to the British the Arabs had settled in the territory years back and organized themselves politically, they were considered more developed, while the African natives were perceived as pagan and primitive, something which the British took into consideration when determining what powers and authorities each group would be granted (Mamdani, 2020).

Hence, the division between north and south was institutionalized and politicized by the British in such way that it became a natural separation among the Sudanese population, something that decades later would be a determining factor in the conflict that would arise in the country, when the post-colonial rule of the territory would perpetuate the British colonial form of rule and not that applied prior to colonialism. Although the division was an attempt to maintain colonial control in Sudan, the ethnic separation was far from accurate, placing race over cultural traditions and identities. For instance, although more than half the population in Darfur spoke Arabic, only approximately a quarter were deemed as Arabs, while even though only roughly

40% of the region's population spoke non-Arabic languages, more than 60% were declared "Other Negroid Westerners" by a census carried out in 1929 (Mamdani, 2020, p.214). In the years that followed, laws such as the Closed Districts and Passport and Permits Ordinances further institutionalized ethnic divisions, criminalizing any non-approved movements between the north and the south, penalized with jail times or fines, and further escalating tensions. Both regions were developed as different states, foreshadowing the conflict that would take place once the Sudanese territory finally gained independence from colonial rule in 1956 (Mamdani, 2020).

5.2.3. Sudan Post-Colonialism

After the end of colonialism in the mid-1950s, it was a relatively small group of Muslim, Arab-speaking educated nationalists that took control once the British left. However even before this occurred, the issue of who would rule the territory after independence was achieved sparked what is known as the first civil war, from 1955 until 1972, and which would be later followed by a second civil war, from 1983 until 2005 (Sharkey, 2012). Combined with the two military coups of 1958 and 1969, the post-colonial period was hardly peaceful or stable. Additionally, uneven policies towards the south, perpetuating the discriminatory rule established in the colonial era by the British, including high taxation, wage inequality or restrictions on education among others, encouraged many people in southern Sudan to revolt against these policies, but were answered with heavy military repression from the north (Collins, 1976). However, the successive governments in Khartoum not only dealt with rising rebel movements from the south, but also from the region that is the focus of study of this investigation: Darfur.

During the decades of the 1980s and 1990s, numerous clashes occurred between the capital and the western region of the country, the latter motivated by the political and economic marginalization of their territory and the continuous attacks from Arab militias, supported by the government in an attempt to maintain control, which burnt down numerous African villages (Straus, 2005). In response to the Islamist government, Africans in the west united to form the two main rebel groups based in Darfur in 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement, (JEM) which became the region's first insurgencies. Later that year, the rebel groups kidnapped a military general and attacked numerous aircrafts, destroying them in the process. Similar to how Khartoum had acted towards the south, the government countered by arming and equipping militias to target the African insurgencies, calling for the elimination of the rebellion. Instead, the militias, which came to be known as the Janjaweed, which could be translated into "evil men on horsebacks", responded with mass violence and

killings towards the African population, targeting civilians and non-combatants, and thus initiating the nefarious genocide against the Darfuri people (Straus, 2005). Although it is often argued that the attacks of the Sudan Liberation Army on the government are what precipitated this violent response, the developments that took place even prior to independence, heavily contributed to the build-up of tensions that eventually, culminated in violence (Sharkey, 2007).

5.2.4. Darfur Genocide

Conflict was not new in Darfur prior to 2003. Estimations affirm that in the period between 1985 and 1988, in a series of episodes of intra-Darfurian violence, around nine thousand people died. However, the dynamic of the conflict changed significantly from 2003 onwards, escalating to unseen levels of violence, with over 200,000 deaths in the first three years after the rebel attack on the Khartoum government and almost two million internationally displaced persons in the territory, with an additional two hundred thousand refugees (Brunk, 2008). This escalation has been in great part due to the rise of the Janjaweed and the support they receive from the government. These Arab militias, also composed by former criminals, carry out systematic raids on villages in the region primarily inhabited by the Fur, the Masalit and the Zaghawa, while the government military forces often assist these attacks through the use of aircraft bombings and fighter jets (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Looting, raping and burning down entire towns and groups are some of the main actions that the Janjaweed have executed since the outbreak of severe and systematic violence in 2003, forcing many people to flee the territory.

Former President Omar al-Bashir, who publicly stated that one of his government's priorities was to defeat the SLA, and as commander-in-chief of the Sudanese armed forces, has been accused on multiple occasions for being responsible for the destruction and coordination of these attacks alongside the militias the Khartoum government supports. Despite being forced to step down, under pressure from public protests and the Sudanese army back in 2019, intermittent but constant violent attacks in the Darfur region continue to take place. Multiple attacks took place that same year, followed by bouts of fighting and violence in 2021 are proof of the deteriorating security across the region and that the conflict perdures despite it temporarily has seemed to subside in the past (Aljazeera, 2021). In fact, in April of this same year, 2022, at least two hundred Darfuris were killed by a major assault by the Janjaweed in the western part of the territory.

5.2.5. Failed Peace Process in Darfur

The first attempt of negotiations to find a peaceful solution to this conflict was the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006 between the Khartoum government and the Sudan Liberation Army-Minni Minawi (SLA-MM) (Human Security Baseline Assessment, 2021). However, because the Sudan Liberation Army-Abdul Wahid (SLA-AW) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) were not included and the limited general support for the agreement, it was deemed to be a failure. In fact, it is this particular aspect, the fact that many of the rebel groups are often not included or want to be a part of the negotiations, that has repeatedly hindered any possibility of achieving peace, namely the SLA-AW, JEM or SLA-Unity. One of main requests these insurgent groups make to agree to sit at the negotiation table is the cease of government support of the Janjaweed militias and their complete disarmament, something the Sudanese government has not complied with. Additionally, the sporadic yet continuous violent attacks of the government-supported militias have also halted the attempts of rebel groups to participate in negotiations, as occurred in 2010 when the JEM ceased its participation in the Doha as a response to repeated violent attacks that same year (Human Security Baseline Assessment, 2021). Although the Juba Peace Agreement of 2020 included several of the armed groups opposing the government, it was followed by even more episodes of violence, limiting its success (World Bank, 2022). Hence, despite the attempts of the UN and the African Unions to act as mediators in the conflict, the conflict is still ongoing, and a peaceful solution seems anything but near.

5.2.6. Failed Justice in Darfur

Back in 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) began an investigation in relation to the incidents that occurred in the region of Darfur since 2003, being the first investigation by this Court since its establishment that dealt with the crime of genocide. This institution, as established by the Rome Statute of 1998, was the first permanent international criminal court at a global level and is in charge of investigating, drawing arrest warrants and trying individuals, when appropriate, charged with the crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or crimes of aggression (ICC, 2022). The Court acts as a complement to national courts, not as a replacement, adopting a supportive role when national legislative systems require it. Since the ICC began its investigation in relation to the crimes committed in Darfur, as recommended by the UN Security Council, several arrest warrants have been drawn and cases have been built, including one against former Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir (Amnesty International, 2020).

The former ruler has been charged with three counts of genocide, which include the act of killing, causing serious physical or psychological harm, and intentionally creating the necessary conditions to cause a group's destruction, as well as counts on crimes against humanity and war crimes (ICC, 2010). While the crimes were allegedly committed in the time period between 2003 and 2008, it was not until 2009 and 2010 that the arrest warrants were emitted by the ICC. However, despite the fact that Al-Bashir was committed to a two-year national sentence after being forced to step down from power in 2019 for financial corruption charges, he has not yet faced trial by the ICC (UN, 2020). Nonetheless, the Sudanese government publicly stated in 2021 that it would eventually hand over the former president of the country for him to be tried by the ICC, but not specifying any timeframe for this to occur (Aljazeera, 2021). An addition to Al-Bashir, four other arrest warrants were drawn by the ICC per their investigation. However, only one of the four other suspected criminals is currently under the Court's custody, while Al-Bashir and three others still remain at large. However, the only one who is under custody and currently undergoing trial by the Court, is facing a total of 31 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity, but not on the crime of genocide (ICC, 2022). Hence, in terms of providing justice in relation to the crimes of genocide in Darfur, the International Criminal Court remains to be inefficient. This, however, may change once Al-Bashir is handed over to the Court but, until then, it can hardly be argued that justice has taken place.

5.3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Once the respective chronologies for both conflicts have been established, this section will analyze the most prominent traits in order to draw similarities and differences among both case studies. Firstly, it will determine whether they fit the criteria to be deemed a genocide applying the theories previously mentioned in the theoretical framework section. Secondly, it will evaluate the role of the international community, both prior to the conflict and once the violence commenced.

5.3.1. Classification as Genocides

The following table will portray Stanton's "*Ten Stages of Genocide*" and apply them to each one of the case studies of this research project: Rwanda and Darfur. The aim is to demonstrate that, not only do both conflicts comply with the definition of genocide set out by the Convention on the Prevention of and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide mentioned earlier, but that the stages set out by Stanton also occurred, thus rendering these conflicts the last genocide of the 20th century and the first genocide of the 21st century.

Table 1: Comparative Table Stages of Genocide

STAGES	RWANDA	DARFUR
CLASSIFICATION	<p>In Rwanda, the construction of an “us vs. them” narrative was present even in pre-colonial times, when ethnic divisions between Hutus and Tutsis already existed. However, the form of rule during the colonial period further aggravated this distinction, materializing their division that until the time, had remained subjacent, favoring Tutsis during the first decades of the colonial era while then advancing Hutu interests.</p>	<p>Ethnic divisions also existed in Sudan prior to the colonization era. However, although differences in culture and tradition were present before the arrival of the British, the north-south division created by the European power significantly contributed to the “us vs. them” narrative, especially with the materialization of the physical division of the territory.</p>
SYMBOLIZATION	<p>Highly linked to the previous stage, the institutionalization and nationalization of the identity cards system enforced by the British during the colonial years, and which lasted even after independence, served to identify Hutus and Tutsis, who were forced to carry the identity cards at all times.</p>	<p>Although Darfurians have no official symbolism to distinguish them from the rest of Sudanese citizens, ethnic traits and their traditional way of clothing, as well as the territory they inhabit, were used to identify them prior to the outbreak of violence and target once the conflict begun.</p>
DISCRIMINATION	<p>As mentioned previously, during the colonial years, both Germans and British prioritized Tutsis, for instance, with lower taxes and better job positions, instating them as the superior group while disfavoring Hutus,</p>	<p>Policies and laws to treat unevenly the citizens of the country thrived during the colonial years, and even more once Sudan achieved its independence. Territories such as the south, or the western</p>

	<p>which contributed to the building of tensions that, years later, would manifest in the form of violence. However, once Hutus organized themselves and began to gain political power, the Belgians shifted their position, fearing they would become target of Hutu retribution, and thus sided with them instead of Tutsis.</p>	<p>region of the country, in this case, Darfur, were politically, economically and socially marginalized by central government in Khartoum, establishing a hierarchical relationship with a dominant group and those who would become victims in the years that followed.</p>
DEHUMANIZATION	<p>In the years prior to the genocide, various sources of propaganda, including journals and radio stations, referred to Tutsis as “cockroaches” or “snakes”, terms with negative connotations, depersonalizing and dehumanizing the group as a whole by denying their humane characteristics.</p>	<p>For years, black Darfurians have been stripped of their individuality and membership in the country through racial and ethnic epithets aiming to dehumanize them (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, 2008), and legitimize the episodes of violence, rape and looting.</p>
ORGANIZATION	<p>Although violence in Rwanda was triggered by the assassination of the president, planning had begun much earlier. Hit-lists had been announced through various platforms, including radio stations, and arms were readily available once the violence commenced, including both firearms and household weapons such as machetes.</p>	<p>In the Darfur case, the role played by the state towards the spread of violence is extremely significant given its support to the Janjaweed militias that carry out systematic attacks in the territory. In order to contain rebel movements such as the SLA or JEM, the government in Khartoum supplied weapons and provided economic support to militias.</p>

<p>POLARIZATION</p>	<p>The division that had been aggravated by the Belgians during the colonial rule was maintained after the Europeans left and the Hutus governed Rwanda. Laws and decrees, such as the Hutu Ten Commandments published a few years prior to 1994, were set to prevent Hutus and Tutsis from interacting, including the prohibition to marry or for Tutsis to work in public institutions or the army, becoming target before the violence even begun, and polarizing the society even more.</p>	<p>The simplification of the identities in Sudan during the European colonization era into Arabs and Africans were perpetuated once the country reached independence, with the rise of Arab supremacy ideology and the presence of Islamism in the political sphere. Propaganda that announced the need of ethnic cleansing served as legitimization for the malnourishment of the people in Darfur and the acts of violence carried out by Janjaweed militias.</p>
<p>PREPARATION</p>	<p>In the weeks prior to the assassination of the president, propaganda emitted through mass media platforms increased its hateful rhetoric, legitimizing the extermination of the “cockroaches” as the only viable solution to purify the population of the country. The fact that violence begun only hours after the president’s plane was shot down demonstrates that the militias and the army were already prepared for what would occur.</p>	<p>Before murders and assassinations took place, the government in Khartoum provided financial support to mercenaries who formed the Janjaweed militias in order for them to burn many of the villages and crops of the Darfuri people, thus causing a mass wave of internally displaced persons who sought refuge in the government-supervised camps.</p>

PERSECUTION	Once the violence broke out, the identity cards facilitated the identification and persecution of Tutsis, as did the hit-lists emitted through media platforms. The raping of women by HIV and AIDS infected men served as a strategy to prevent the reproduction of this group, facilitating their annihilation.	Because the violence in this case is mainly directed towards a specific territorial region, their separation and identification, also from their clothing, from the rest of the citizens is relatively simple for the attackers. Additionally, the destruction of roads hindered the arrival of medical and humanitarian resources.
EXTERMINATION	For one around one hundred days, violence was inflicted upon Tutsis and anyone who sided with them or tried to protect them, including non-radical Hutus. Indiscriminate murders and attacks took place with the intent to cause both physical and psychological harm, and insufferable pain.	Since violence broke out in 2003, multiple attacks have been carried out by the Janjaweed militias, sometimes supported by government military forces, with the aim of killing, raping and destroying the villages of the Darfuri population.
DENIAL	After the RPF recovered the capital of Kigali and the violence ceased, many of the perpetrators strived to flee the country in an attempt to avoid prosecution and justice. In the years that followed, many denied the crimes committed or justified their actions under the premise of being forced or coerced to carry out the attacks.	Since the violence begun, the government in Khartoum refuses to confirm its involvement and support of the Janjaweed militias, denying any relation with them or the attacks carried out in the region. Additionally, former president Al-Bashir and senior officers still have not faced justice for their crimes.

Table source: self-elaboration based on Stanton’s typology of genocides (Stanton, 1996).

The comparative table above demonstrates that both conflicts, that of Rwanda and that of Darfur, despite their different contexts, time periods and actors involved, comply with Stanton's stages of genocide and thus, should be deemed as such. Hence, not only would they conform to the definition offered by the 1948 UN Convention, seeing as the acts carried out in each respective region had, and in the case of Darfur, continue to do so, the intention to destroy a group of people on the basis of ethnic or racial distinctions, but all ten stages occurred for the genocides to take place.

5.3.2. The Role of the International Community

It is undeniable that external powers foreign to the conflict, although not entirely to blame, did play a significant role in the development of the genocides in both Rwanda and Darfur, especially due to the colonial forms of administration. In the case of Rwanda, the Belgian colonial administration classified the citizens into two seemingly opposed groups, the Tutsis and the Hutus, institutionalizing the identity cards to distinguish between them despite the fact that the Rwandan society at the time was mainly mixed after years of intermarriage. In a similar way, during the Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan, society was divided among those who Europeans believed to be a superior group who had settled in the territory and shared more commonalities with Western cultures, who were deemed as Arabic, while the rest were determined to be Africans, believed to be less civilized (Mamdani, 2020). In both cases, the colonial powers decided to instate a minority group, one they favored, to rule over a majority. In the case of Rwanda, Tutsis were instated as rulers of the Hutu majority, while in the case of Sudan, the small Arab elite (which did not even encompass all those who spoke Arabic but instead, an ethnic division), was elected to rule over a population that was largely African (Mamdani, 2020).

Once the colonial powers left the respective territories, both countries underwent national revolutions in the spirit of building a nation, the "Hutu Revolution" with support from the Belgians in the case of Rwanda, and the search for an Arab-nation state in the case of Sudan (Mamdani, 2020). Although tensions among the groups existed prior to the colonial era, the administration of European powers over the territory aggravated the situation and institutionalized hierarchical divisions that permeated beyond the colonial rule, laying the grounds for the development of further hostilities among the groups in the future and which, unfortunately, would eventually culminate in genocides.

In terms of involvement during the episodes of violence themselves, foreign powers have also exercised certain level of influence. In the case of Rwanda, the external power that played the greatest direct role during the genocide itself was, without a doubt, France. During the last decade of the 20th century, France intensified its exports of weaponry and military equipment, as well as army instructors, to several countries in the African continent, including Rwanda (McNulty, 2000). As a result, even before the violence begun in April of 1994, Habyarimana's military forces had been benefiting from both French economic and military support in the form of troops. This transfer of arms continued even after the killings begun, while the rest of the actors that could have intervened, for instance, the United States, rather chose to stand by acquiesce.

In the case of Darfur, there are two main external, and arguably opposing, powers that have taken a stance in relation to the conflict: the United States and China. The former has publicly recognized the events taking place in the region as a genocide, while the latter has merely deemed it a crisis. However, both have claimed that their position in relation to the situation in Darfur is entirely unrelated to national interests. On several occasions, US leaders have claimed the need for a robust humanitarian intervention to cease the violent attacks taking place in the territory, fearful of failing as could be argued occurred during the Rwandan genocide (Issak, 2021). However, the existence of oil near the territory of Darfur, primarily in South Sudan, and thus the necessity for security in the region, could easily lead one to believe that the American intentions are far from being solely a moral obligation, but that instead, are also guided by national interests. On the other hand, China has opted for another approach, one where it grounds and legitimizes its inaction towards the conflict on the basis of the principle of non-interference, but that ultimately is also driven by oil interests in Sudan, which is why the Asian power has tended to support the Sudanese government unconditionally (Issak, 2021). Hence, it could be argued that both of these major powers are currently taking advantage of the situation, using Darfur as a territory to fight their diplomatic proxy war and advance national interests under the façade of moral obligation in the case of the United States, and the principle of non-intervention in the case of China.

Hence, from this section it can be argued that, although both cases can and, according to the theoretical framework provided, should be deemed as genocides, sharing commonalities in the development of the stages, the involvement of the international community and their impact on the events that took place did differ in Rwanda and Darfur.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The introduction of this final paper begun by stating the definition of genocide according to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide. According to this treaty, the act of genocide encompasses both the intent to act as well as the actions themselves. The aim of this research was to analyze the events that took place in two particular case studies, Rwanda in 1994 and Darfur since 2003, and evaluate, according to Stanton's typology established in the theoretical framework, whether the conflicts in these regions would classify as genocide. In order to do so, this research paper provided chronological timelines for both cases, which encompassed the historical, political, economic, social and ethnic contexts in both countries not only after violence broke out, but in the years prior to the outburst of violent behavior. The objective was to highlight the issues that were subjacent in earlier years, how tensions were exacerbated during the colonial era and thus, contributed to the creation of protracted conflicts that eventually culminated in genocide. Once the respective chronologies were established, highlighting the factors that contributed to the development of violence, a comparative approach adopted, applying Stanton's typology to each of the cases. From this analysis, given that the events that took place in Rwanda and Darfur contained all ten stages developed by Stanton, it was concluded that both regions suffered from the crimes of genocide. The comparative analysis then continued evaluate the role of the international community in the conflicts of Rwanda and Darfur in an attempt to highlight the similarities and differences between both cases, the interests of the external actors involved, and their impact in the development of events. In this sense, the paper concluded that even though the involvement of the international community was relatively different in each case, genocides still took place both in Rwanda and Darfur, and in fact, systematic violence continues to be carried out in the latter.

Throughout the development of this paper, several difficulties were encountered. The main objective of this research was to determine whether or not the nature of the conflicts of Rwanda and Darfur could be deemed as a genocide. However, in order to do so, the definition for such concept had to be established. In order to narrow down the concept of genocide, this paper considered both the definition established by the international community, through the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of genocide, and the typology established by Stanton through his "*Ten Stages of Genocide*", thus standardizing genocide in order carry out the analysis. Similarly, a definition of international intervention was also provided, highlighting the cases in which such path of action is considered to be legitimate and

justified. Once these definitions were established, founded on the appropriate theoretical framework, the analysis of the events in Rwanda and Darfur could be enacted, thus achieving the goals set in the introduction. Additionally, it is important to understand that, although it is concluded that both cases consist of genocides, the factors that contributed to the development of violence in each case differed from one another. In order to overcome this challenge, the respective chronologies of each region emphasized the important features that impacted the societies in each case, providing the necessary context to understand the traits of each of these conflicts. Lastly, another difficulty encountered in the completion of this project was the temporal aspect of these genocides. While the Rwandan genocide ended when the RPF took over the capital of Kigali, the Darfur genocide is still ongoing. As a result, a comparative analysis considering the post-genocide situations could not be applied to both cases. In order to resolve this issue, the chronology of the events in Darfur concluded with a future prospect analysis of the region, defining the possible scenarios that could take place so as to achieve the justice and peace that has not yet been accomplished.

In the elaboration of this research paper, some important realizations were achieved which are worth noticing. Although both conflicts are intra-state in nature, one of the purposes of this study was to evaluate the role played by external actors in each of the genocides. Thanks to the development of the respective chronologies, the extent and the large impact of the colonial period on the building-up of tensions among the populations was highlighted. Additionally, the use of Stanton's typology to define genocide, which included the ten stages that these conflicts encompass, allowed for an in depth analysis of each of the case studies, emphasizing the importance of elements such as the prior organization and planning of the massacres, the dehumanization of the targeted group, or the key role of propaganda as a source for the dissemination of information. Applying the ten stages in the comparative analysis allowed to identify the determining characteristics and features present in both conflicts and compare them with one another.

However, it is important to take into consideration that this research paper only focused on two genocides out of the many that have taken place throughout history. Although the selection of only two conflicts allowed for an in depth analysis of the events that occurred both in Rwanda and Darfur, it would be interesting for future lines of investigation to consider other conflicts, either over such as the former or still undergoing like the latter. Additionally, another interesting aspect that would be noteworthy of future analyses would be to investigate the evolution of genocides with the passage of time. This study focused on the last genocide of the

20th century and the first genocide of the current millennium. For upcoming research, a compelling option would be to evaluate whether the precedent set by the genocides that have already taken place has had any impact on the genocides that are still ongoing in the present days, or the reaction of the international community towards these situations.

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akhavan, P. (1996). The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The politics and pragmatics of punishment. *American Journal of International Law*, 90(3), 501–510. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2204076>
- Al Bashir*. International Criminal Court. (2010). <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir>
- Al Jazeera. (2021). *Sudan says will 'hand over' al-Bashir to ICC for war crimes trial*. Omar al-Bashir News | Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/12/sudan-omar-al-bashir-icc-war-crimes-darfur#:~:text=The%20ICC%20issued%20an%20arrest,nationwide%20protests%20against%20his%20rule>
- Al Jazeera. (2022). *Deadly clashes erupt in Sudan's Darfur region*. Armed Groups News | Al Jazeera. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/6/deadly-clashes-erupt-in-sudans-darfur-region#:~:text=casualties%20was%20unclear.,There%20has%20been%20a%20surge%20in%20violence%20and%20displacement%20in,at%20the%20start%20of%202021>
- Alzubairi, F. (2017). *The role of colonialism and neo-colonialism in shaping anti-terrorism law in comparative and international perspectives: case studies of Egypt and Tunisia* (dissertation).
- Ayoob, M. (2002). Humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 6(1), 81–102. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714003751>
- Barria, L. A., & Roper, S. D. (2005). How Effective are International Criminal Tribunals? An Analysis of the ICTY and the ICTR. *The International Journal of Human Rights*, 9(3), 349–368. <https://doi.org/10.1080=13642980500170782>
- Brunk, D. (2008). Dissecting darfur: Anatomy of a genocide debate. *International Relations*, 22(1), 25–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117807087241>
- Collins, C. (1976). *Colonialism and class struggle in Sudan*. Middle East Research & Information Project.

- Corey, A., & Joireman, S. F. (2004). Retributive justice: The Gacaca courts in Rwanda. *African Affairs*, 103(410), 73–89. <https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adh007>
- Dagne, T. (2011). *Sudan: The crisis in Darfur and status of the North-South Peace Agreement*. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service.
- Darfur destroyed*. Human Rights Watch. (2004).
<https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/05/06/darfur-destroyed/ethnic-cleansing-government-and-militia-forces-western-sudan>
- Darfur Peace Process Chronology. (2021). *Human Security Baseline Assessment*.
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/43433BE33DF50355C125781D004B5718-Full_Report.pdf
- Darfur, Sudan*. International Criminal Court. (2022). <https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur>
- Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (2022). *Genocide and aftermath*. Encyclopædia Britannica.
<https://www.britannica.com/place/Rwanda/Genocide-and-aftermath>
- Goldstone, R. (2008). International Criminal Court and ad hoc tribunals. *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, 462–478.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199560103.003.0026>
- Gourevitch, P. (1999). *We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families: Stories from Rwanda*. Picador.
- Group, A. D. B. (2022). *Sudan - Country Profiles - 2021*. African Development Bank - Building today, a better Africa tomorrow. <https://www.afdb.org/en/documents/sudan-country-profiles-2021>
- Hagan, J., & Rymond-Richmond, W. (2008). The collective dynamics of racial dehumanization and genocidal victimization in Darfur. *American Sociological Review*, 73(6), 875–902. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240807300601>
- Human Rights Watch. (1996). *Shattered Lives Sexual Violence during the Rwandan Genocide and its Aftermath*. Rwanda. <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1996/Rwanda.htm>

- Human Rights Watch. (2004). *The Rwandan Patriotic Front*. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (HRW report). <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-03.htm>
- Huyse, L., Salter, M., & Ingelaere, B. (2008). Chapter 2: The Gacaca courts in Rwanda. In *Traditional justice and reconciliation after violent conflict: Learning from African experiences* (pp. 25–59). essay, International IDEA.
- Issak, S. A. (2021). Conflicting Perspectives on Humanitarian Intervention: In Light of the Darfur Crisis. *Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences Studies*, 3(11), 98–105. <https://doi.org/10.32996/jhsss.2021.3.11.8>
- Johnson, B. (2020, February 13). *Understanding the conflict between Rwanda's Tutsis and Hutus*. ThoughtCo. <https://www.thoughtco.com/location-of-conflict-tutsis-and-hutus-3554918>
- Karamalla-Gaiballa, N., & El-Kafafi, S. (2021). The impact of conflicts on natural resources – the case of Sudanese Darfur region. *Polish Political Science Yearbook*, 50(4), 7–18. <https://doi.org/10.15804/ppsy202144>
- Krain, M. (2005). International intervention and the severity of genocides and politicides. *International Studies Quarterly*, 49(3), 363–388. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00369.x>
- Kuperman, A. J. (2004). Provoking genocide: A revised history of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 6(1), 61–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1462352042000194719>
- Lemarchand, R. (1995). Rwanda: The rationality of genocide. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 23(2), 8. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1166499>
- Lemkin, R. (1944). *Axis rule in Occupied Europe*. Carnegie endowment for international peace, Division of international law.
- Longman, T. (2009). An assessment of rwanda's Gacaca courts. *Peace Review*, 21(3), 304–312. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402650903099369>

- Lower, M., & Hauschildt, T. (2014). The Media as a Tool of War: Propaganda in the Rwandan Genocide. *Human Rights and Conflict Resolution*, 2(1).
- Magnarella, P. J. (2005). The background and causes of the genocide in Rwanda. *Journal of International Criminal Justice*, 3(4), 801–822. <https://doi.org/10.1093/jicj/mqi059>
- Mamdani, M. (2020). *Neither settler nor native: The making and unmaking of permanent minorities*. The Belknap Press.
- McNulty, M. (2000). French arms, war and genocide in Rwanda. *Crime, Law and Social Change*, 33(1/2), 105–129. <https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008394219703>
- Nikuze, D. (2014). The Genocide against the Tutsi in Rwanda: Origins, causes, implementation, consequences, and the post-genocide era. *International Journal of Development and Sustainability*, 3(5), 1086–1098.
- The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court makes historic visit to Sudan over Darfur crimes*. Amnesty International. (2020). <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/10/sudan-icc-presently-the-best-option-for-justice-for-darfur-crimes/>
- Prunier, G. (1995). *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a genocide*. Columbia University Press.
- Purdeková, A., & Mwambari, D. (2021). Post-genocide identity politics and Colonial Durabilities in Rwanda. *Critical African Studies*, 14(1), 19–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21681392.2021.1938404>
- Rauta, V., & Mumford, A. (2017). Proxy wars and the Contemporary Security Environment. *The Palgrave Handbook of Security, Risk and Intelligence*, 99–115. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-53675-4_6
- Reed, W. C. (1996). Exile, Reform, and the Rise of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(3), 479–501.
- Regan, P. M. (1996). Conditions of successful third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 40(2), 336–359. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002796040002006>

- Rennie, J. K. (1972). The precolonial kingdom of Rwanda: a reinterpretation. *Transafrican Journal of History*, 2(2), 11–54.
- Rwanda Overview. World Bank. (2022).
<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview>
- Rwantabagu, H. (2001). Explaining Intra-State Conflicts in Africa: the case of Burundi. *International Journal on World Peace*, 18(2), 42–53.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/20753302>
- Salgado, M. G. (2009). *Ruanda: un colonialismo simbólico* (dissertation). Bogotá.
- Sellström Tor, Wohlgemuth, L., & Millwood, D. (1996). *The international response to conflict and genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda experience*. Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda.
- Sharkey, H. J. (2007). Arab identity and ideology in Sudan: The politics of language, ethnicity, and Race. *African Affairs*, 107(426), 21–43.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adm068>
- Sharkey, H. J. (2012). Jihads and crusades in Sudan from 1881 to the present. *Just Wars, Holy Wars, and Jihads*, 263–277.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755042.003.0013>
- Sikainga, A. (2009). *'The World's Worst Humanitarian Crisis': Understanding the Darfur Conflict*. Origins. https://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict?language_content_entity=en
- Stanton, G. H. (1996). *Ten stages of genocide - the genocide education project*. The Ten Stages of Genocide. https://www.genocideducation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ten_stages_of_genocide.pdf
- Straus, S. (2005). Darfur and the genocide debate. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(1), 123–133.
<https://doi.org/10.2307/20034212>
- Stys, P. (2012). Revisiting Rwanda. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 50(4), 707–720.
<https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022278x12000390>

Sudan Overview. World Bank. (2022).

<https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/sudan/overview#1>

United Nations. (1948). *Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide*. United Nations.

https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/atrocities-crimes/Doc.1_Convention%20on%20the%20Prevention%20and%20Punishment%20of%20the%20Crime%20of%20Genocide.pdf

United Nations. (2020). *Securing Justice for past crimes in Darfur must remain Sudan's priority, international criminal court prosecutor tells Security Council | Meetings coverage and press releases*. United Nations.

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14210.doc.htm>

United Nations. (2022). *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention and the responsibility to protect*. United Nations. <https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/genocide.shtml>

Verwimp, P. (2006). Machetes and firearms: The organization of massacres in Rwanda.

Journal of Peace Research, 43(1), 5–22. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343306059576>

Warburg, G. R. (1991). The turco-egyptian Sudan: A recent historiographical controversy.

Die Welt Des Islams, 31(2), 193. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1570579>

White, K. R. (2007). Scourge of racism. *Journal of Black Studies*, 39(3), 471–481.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0021934706297877>

Wilson, A. N. (1993). *The falsification of Afrikan consciousness: Eurocentric history, psychiatry and the politics of white supremacy*. Afrikan World InfoSystems.

Záhořík, J. (2012). Some Notes on the Failed Decolonization of Rwanda. *West Bohemian Historical Review*, 2(2), 133–147.