

ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS, ACTIONS,
AND POLICIES. THE NORTH AMERICAN REGION
AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

SENTIMIENTOS, ACCIONES
Y POLÍTICAS ANTIINMIGRANTES.
AMÉRICA DEL NORTE Y LA UNIÓN EUROPEA

COORDINACIÓN DE HUMANIDADES

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UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO

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Mónica Vereá
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INTRODUCTION

Mónica Vereza

Globalization and regional integration processes have generated an advanced communications system, an exchange of information and ideas from one country to another, and the relative ease of moving from one continent to another; all of this has facilitated greater movement of persons and migrants between societies and nations in a region. In the same way, electronic communications have made it possible to disseminate knowledge about migration routes and job opportunities in different labor markets as well as more attractive living conditions in receiving countries. In 2010, the International Organization for Migrations calculated that there were 214 million migrants in the world and that by 2050, that number would nearly double: almost 400 million migrants would be spread across the main receiving nations.

One of the effects of globalization is that it has accentuated disparities in living standards between sending and receiving nations. As a result, the migration phenomenon has increased in magnitude. Analysts estimate that the work force in the developing countries will grow from 2.4 billion people in 2005 to 3.6 billion in 2040 and that, between 2005 and 2014, almost 1.2 billion people will have moved from their country of origin to a migrant-receiving nation attracted by more promising job opportunities, a better quality of life, and family reunification, which will create a bigger gap between labor supply and demand at a global level. The European Union, the United States, Canada, and Australia will continue to be the main poles of attraction for millions of migrants. However, emerging countries like China, India, and Brazil will also attract many others. China is the Asian country that sends and receives the greatest flow of international migrants. In 2005, 64 million migrants lived in the European Union, and in North America, 45 million. The European countries that receive the largest number of migrants today are Italy, Ireland, and Spain.

North America (Canada, the United States, and Mexico), with its 470 million people, is basically a commercial and investment region that has been constituted based on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which came into effect in 1994. This has resulted in a substantive increase in trade and investment, to Mexico's benefit. According to the World Bank, our country is not as developed as its counterparts: the United States is the world's foremost economy; Canada, the ninth; and Mexico, the fourteenth. U.S. GDP is 20 times larger than Mexico's, and enormous differences persist in development levels, and one of the consequences of this is migration. The NAFTA negotiations did not include regional mobility of labor

or the idea of establishing it in the long term. The thinking was that due to the very important increase in the flow of goods and capital from its regional partners toward Mexico, the flow of Mexican migrants to the north would diminish. This not only did not happen, but the flow increased: the push-pull factors of migration have not diminished. Quite to the contrary, they have sharpened. The interconnections have taken even deeper root than in the past and have woven a sophisticated bilateral labor market that works despite how expensive it has become to cross the border surreptitiously because of the significant increase in the area's "reborderization process." The on-going tradition of hiring Mexicans, whether with a temporary visa or clandestinely, is a mechanism for constantly integrating the regional labor market that is not very well-accepted by the receiving country, but provides invaluable though unrecognized exported human capital. In this complex regional process, agents intervene to get jobs and visas, traffickers who charge for transporting irregular migrants, and intermediaries who make a profit from transferring remittances, all of whom charge large sums of money for carrying out these services (Levine and Verea 2010).

The economic recession that began in 2008 slowed down the flow of Mexicans toward the United States; detentions along the border between the two countries dropped significantly due to the highly restrictive policies imposed, which have also triggered a record number of deportations of Mexicans located inside U.S. territory. Thus, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Canada and the United States—but mainly the latter—have set even more restrictive and rigid unilateral migratory policies than in previous years, focused exclusively on security, above all after the 2001 terrorist attacks.

Today, the project of North America as a region continues to be questionable, since, unfortunately, bilateralism has intensified between Canada and the United States, given that the Canadians want to preserve their traditional "special bilateral relationship"; and ties with Mexico continue to grow, without necessarily being regional. Nevertheless, we are aware that the ancestral bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States will continue to be complex, and perhaps even more conflictive, given the multiple intervening factors, such as the large migratory flows of Mexicans with and without visas who find work in different sectors of the U.S. economy, fluctuating with recessions or economic upturns. For the last few years, contraband in drugs and weapons has created critical border violence on the frontier between the two countries, "re-narcotizing" the bilateral agenda and "de-migratizing" it simultaneously. This also has to do with the scant possibilities of coming to a migratory agreement between the two and the passage of the much-promised and until-now stalled comprehensive immigration reform that would favor legalizing the status of our fellow Mexicans, who make up around 60 percent of the 11.5 million undocumented migrants residing in the United States, the world's largest number of non-authorized migrants.

The European Union, for its part, with more than 500 million inhabitants, is the world's most advanced regional project. It has established the appropriate mechanisms to allow the free mobility of persons among all the member countries, a possibility that has not been put on the table in North America. Its 26 member

countries have aging societies with very low fertility levels and have shown a notable capacity to absorb foreign labor. In contrast, in the United States, this trend has been balanced by a much higher fertility rate among immigrants. The demand for foreign labor drops or climbs temporarily according to economic upturns or momentary crises, stages of unemployment due to recurring economic crises. It is difficult to understand European Union migratory policy, since it includes sovereign nations with their own migratory policies and bilateral agreements with different countries, while simultaneously, transnational non-state actors like the EU institutions intervene as do other member countries with their own public policies. This balance of power between states and supranational institutions is extremely complex; the proliferation of actors in the regulation of migratory flows has an impact on national policies and relations between neighboring and distant member states as well as non-member states. Generally speaking, the European Union has concentrated its efforts on moving toward a comprehensive migration policy, above all to control its external borders, despite the fact that each country has handled its policies individually according to its economic needs. Today, the population born outside the EU has increased significantly, reaching U.S. levels. Now, in addition to foreigners from their own former colonies, its societies are host to important numbers of non-Europeans, non-white, non-Christian migrants—the Muslim population alone is calculated at 15 million (Verea 2010a).

The similarity between the two regions' migratory policies lies in the fact that they admit an important number of immigrants relative to the size of their populations as permanent residents or temporary workers, and, in general, they apply rigid laws through police controls at borders or ports of entry in order to apprehend and deport foreigners not authorized to reside in the destination country. Despite the growing interaction of their economies and the formation of intra-regional social networks, at the same time an important demand for foreign labor has emerged in their labor markets, above all in times of economic expansion.

The severe economic recession of the end of the decade has brought with it a substantive hike in unemployment rates in practically all migrant-receiving nations. In response, they have included a series of much more restrictive measures in their migratory policies than in the immediate past. The main objective has been to put the brakes on migratory flows by securitizing their borders even more, limiting permits or work visas, admitting fewer migrants, and, in general, establishing more requirements for entry in order to protect their labor markets to benefit their nationals.

An economic crisis affects immigrants much more than the citizens of any country. It is immigrants who are most susceptible to firings and who tend to display higher unemployment rates than their national counterparts, since they are concentrated in sectors that are more sensitive to economic crisis like construction and services. One of the unfortunate consequences has been that migrants have faced more discrimination than they have had no alternative but to accept, given that they fear returning to their places of origin where they believe things will be worse than what they face currently.

The growing number of foreign residents and undocumented migrants in certain societies has made those societies more aware of who they are and how they are constituted, since they perceive migrants negatively and pressure policy-makers to adopt highly restrictive measures to control the flow. Language, physical appearance, and certain customs that are inherent characteristics and values of certain ethnic groups, embedded in a specific place, have become more visible because of their continual growth and have changed the perception receiving societies have of migrants; this has translated into more restrictive migratory policies.

These are some of the reasons an anti-immigrant environment has emerged worldwide, much more so than in the past. It has led to the proliferation of stricter and more restrictive migratory policies on a federal and local level in several countries. And this is the main aim of this work. We analyze how and why many growing xenophobic movements have come into being in both regions, movements that are extremely aggressive and intolerant of non-authorized migrants, generating an environment that has led to the imposition of highly restrictive migratory policies. We underline how nationalism has also escalated greatly in both the European countries and the United States given that their identity is constantly blurring and shifting and their citizens feel threatened by the invasion of other cultures. Many ultraconservative political groups are even promoting nationalist, xenophobic ideas in the parties' agendas. Just as the Roma peoples are seen by Italians and French as possible criminals, U.S. anti-immigrant groups also consider Mexicans undesirable and potential criminals.

This book has several limitations: one is that the articles will be discussed in a seminar once the book has been published, so we will not be able to enrich each of the essays included here with the observations and critiques of our colleagues. Another is that it does not include the analysis of all the European nations, but it at least attempts to present a general overview, exemplifying some outstanding cases in the region. Nevertheless, we try to present a very general perception of this phenomenon, which has an impact on the two regions, North America and the European Union, to allow the reader to approach this global problem.

The book is divided into three main sections: the first includes two essays that bring us closer to an understanding of the theoretical and conceptual approximations about the significance of restrictive migratory policies, xenophobia, discrimination, and therefore, the violation of human rights. The second section includes the great majority of the essays (13 out of 21). These articles describe, on the one hand, the stiffening up of migratory policies increasingly demanded by ultraconservative movements, and, on the other hand, the anti-immigrant feelings, actions, and policies applied on a federal and state level, as well as the central points in the national debates and how they are perceived in the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Lastly, the third part brings together work on the toughening of anti-immigrant border controls and nationalist feelings, and the crisis of the integration models in the European Union.

We begin the first part of the book with a general overview of anti-immigrant feelings, actions, and policies in North America and the European Union. The first

article, written by myself, puts forward the main theoretical and conceptual approaches needed for understanding the most recent xenophobic manifestations in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The article begins by explaining how migratory policy is formulated in the receiving countries, and its intrinsic relationship with public opinion and debate on the topic and the proposal of restrictive initiatives. It describes the restrictionists' positions, as currents of thought that influence the formulation of migratory policies regarding admitting migrants to a given society. It analyzes the restrictionist current's racism and its most common expression, discrimination; it looks at the current's nativism and ethnocentrism and its insistence on assimilation policies; and finally, the article examines xenophobia as a current that expresses itself through anti-immigrant attitudes, fostering segregation, and impeding the integration that would benefit society in general and immigrants in particular. It concludes by exemplifying the increase of xenophobia, nationalism, and anti-immigrant attitudes in the United States overall and in some states in particular in the last decade.

Both in North American and in Europe, criminalization of migration and discrimination and hatred spark social conflicts of differing magnitudes, from demonstrations to ethnic disturbances, the occupation of public places, and fundamentalisms. These are the object of analysis in Ariadna Estévez's article. She argues that all these actions are violations of human rights, and as a result, are an inter-subjective lack of recognition that causes conflict. Using Coutin and Honneth's theories, she examines how the criminalization of migration and the marginalization derived from discrimination make up a space of social and legal non-protection, which she illustrates with examples specifically about human rights violations in the criminalization of migration and discrimination, the causal factors for the social conflict involving migrants.

The second part of this book is dedicated to the analysis of anti-immigrant feelings in North America. We begin with a broad examination of the United States, where these sentiments have proliferated very aggressively. Thus, we have a third chapter written by Liette Gilbert and Kathy Kolnick that explains how local anti-immigrant activities have emerged as a reaction to the federal government's inability to control "illegal" immigration and securitize its borders. Local ordinances are the extension of national security policy that increasingly criminalizes immigrants. At a municipal and community level, these measures attempt to control undocumented migrants' daily practices instead of "fixing" migratory processes and policies, over which they have no jurisdiction. To do this, Gilbert and Kolnick look at how local governments use the concept of "public nuisance" to criminalize undocumented immigrants through local ordinances. They think that politicians have legitimized their actions by pointing out that it is necessary to empower the local police. This concept has been used to describe an activity that, without basis, affects or interferes with the rights of society. Thus, those who support strengthening immigration laws utilize the concept of "public nuisance" to control and repel migrants locally from their jurisdictions, despite the fact that immigration comes under federal jurisdiction, thus making this another strategy to criminalize civic offenses

of migrants, such as their “illegal” entry. Using an interdisciplinary approach, the authors argue that the use of “public nuisance” to refer to undocumented immigrants is problematic because it promotes a discriminatory “public interest” that criminalizes “others” not for any breach of local ordinances but rather solely for their presence in the urban setting. Finally they assess the ideological and legal limitations of local police authority to enforce immigration law.

In the fourth article, Frederic I. Solop and Nancy A. Wonders review survey data on immigration to understand public attitudes about immigrants and immigration policies revealed in U.S. national polls. They put forward the idea that U.S. public opinion is more complex than the media would lead us to believe; to explain that, they explore reactions to a variety of immigration issues, proposals, and border strategies. Using polling data that show that public opinion is not homogeneous, particularly taking into account the Latino population living in border towns, whose opinion differs significantly from mainstream thinking. They demonstrate this by comparing attitudes nationwide, and those expressed in Arizona and California. Given the demographic changes that have been projected nationally, Solop and Wonders’s analysis demonstrates the important role Latinos will play in shaping U.S. public opinion in the near future.

Robert Donnelly analyzes the multiplicity of immigration legislative statutes in several U.S. states, which have jumped in only five years from 570 in 2006 to 1374 in 2010. He considers that this trend will increase in the short term with popular bills similar to Arizona’s SB1070, given the perception that federal immigration policy has failed, that the border with Mexico continues to be porous, and that there is an inability to control the increasing flows of “illegals.” Counterposed to this, pro-immigrant proposals have been very modest, particularly those that include provisions for an eventual road to citizenship. Donnelly points out that other factors have influenced the timing of the introduction of other bills, such as the very tumultuous emergence of the ultra-conservative Tea Party movement, criminal offenses committed by unauthorized migrants that the media constantly shines a light on, and the recent demographic trends among Hispanics, among others. Given these factors, he examines some bills presented in 2010, puts forward possible short-term trends, and analyzes the role nativism plays in developing anti-immigrant legislation.

In the sixth article, Michal Kohout analyzes the situation in the “Inland Empire,” a traditionally conservative area in Southern California and the destination for many migrants. The continual flow of migrants to this region has sparked violent reactions in the perceptions of this “white” population against a possible threat from undocumented immigrants. Conservative activists have urged several cities to restrict immigration through creating ordinances to ensure the use of the E-Verify system, for example, and supporting measures similar to Arizona’s SB1070 in order to drive undocumented immigrants out. The author analyzes, first of all, transcriptions of city council meetings where anti-immigrant measures were passed, to be added to national immigration policy, to show these intentions to regulate migration. In the second part of the article, he examines secondary data on national, state, and local policies to put these “Inland Empire” anti-immigrant initiatives in context.

Anna Ochoa O’Leary and Azucena Sánchez use some of the results from a bi-national study of the reproductive health care system to show how anti-immigrant policies arise and what their impact is in “mixed-immigration-status households.” This category refers to households whose members have different immigration statuses. This kind of *de facto* social organization not only complicates the enforcement of state policies, whose design singles out or excludes the undocumented, but also induces the deepening of already existing ethnically and racially based social divisions and disparities in health care, mainly in Arizona. The authors review Arizona’s legislative history, which provides an anti-immigrant context for implementing measures that negate the existence of precisely these kinds of households.

Elaine Levine, in the eighth chapter, carries out a profound analysis of anti-immigrant sentiments in the state of Georgia. She starts from an examination of the fact that over the last two decades, Georgia’s immigrant population has grown markedly from 173 000 in 1990 to approximately 929 000 in 2008. About two-thirds of these immigrants live in the Atlanta metropolitan area; a little over half come from Latin America; and one-third of all of them are Mexican. It is estimated that more than half the immigrants in the state are undocumented. During the economic boom of the 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first century, this was not considered very problematic; it is well known that in the mid-1990s, unauthorized Mexican immigrants were actively recruited to work in the construction of Atlanta’s Olympic installations, in Dalton’s carpet factories, and Gainesville’s chicken processing plants. However, a decade later, the economic and political climate had changed considerably. Starting in 2006, Georgia began passing restrictive, punitive laws about undocumented migrants. Four counties with high percentages of Latino immigrants have signed 287(g) agreements with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); the result has been the deportation of thousands. The causes and effects of these anti-immigrant policies in Georgia are precisely the topic of Levine’s analysis.

Claire Joysmith analyzes how anti-immigrant feelings have contributed to feeding the U.S. racist anti-(im)migrant imaginary that has gained strength above all since September 11, 2001. She puts forward several perspectives from the Chicana and Latino-U.S. communities as subjects—which she calls a “narrative of compassion”—and objects of that racist anti-immigrant imaginary. Joysmith bases herself on several testimonial voices-writings. “Godzilla con sombrero de charro” (Godzilla Wearing a *Charro* Hat) comes from a testimony-essay written by the renowned “chicalango”—a hybrid of “Chicano” and “Chilango,” someone from Mexico City—performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña. It catalogues a critical, thinking, and feeling vision of the greater xenophobia that was an aftermath of September 11. This is one of the testimonies that evoked the U.S. racist anti(im)migrant imaginary, as well as the narrative of compassion by U.S. Latino communities.

In the tenth article, Julie Dufort studies the phenomenon of civilian groups that patrol the border with Mexico, one of which is the highly publicized Minutemen Project. She analyzes in great detail the actions of the presidents of this movement in the contemporary debate about immigration policies and border security.

Dufort questions the reason that this movement has become a symbol representing all those who support the enforcement of strict immigration legislation in the U.S. The author considers that they have had significant influence, the object of analysis of this study; she examines some key cases of members of this movement, like its president, Jim Gilchrist, and Chris Simcox, the president of the Minutemen Civil Defense Corps, perceived as “security entrepreneurs,” committed to beginning a change in policy with their own security agenda, within the contemporary movement of civilian border patrols, as well as the influence they have had on the immigration debate in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Anna Kaganiec-Kamieńska is the author of the last of the essays in the book that analyze anti-immigrant sentiments, actions, and policies in the United States. She studies the “English-only” movement, whose aim is to establish English as the United States’ official language, and which is one of the most important manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiments in general, particularly anti-Hispanic feelings. Despite the fact that no federal regulation has been approved, a majority of states have adopted measures of this kind. The author explains how this movement has contributed to fostering anti-immigrant sentiments on a national level in the last decade, and sketches for the reader the broad context for analyzing attempts in different periods to restrict the use of foreign languages.

The twelfth article is the only one centered on the case of Mexico. Manuel Ángel Castillo and Germán G. Guerra analyze how the history of Mexico shows diverse attitudes and behavior *vis-à-vis* immigration. More recently, Mexico has been challenged by the growing number of foreigners traveling through on their way to the United States. The authors first focus on official positions contained in the legislation and regulations adopted by immigration officials at different times in contemporary history. Then, they look at the positions held by different sectors of Mexican society, a little-studied, little-known area. Because of this, they state that one of the problems they had to deal with was the lack of sources needed to systematize and conclude with some kind of generalization. This essay aspires to make a first approximation of the characteristics and importance of the phenomenon. To do that, they use the First National Survey on Discrimination, carried out in Mexico in 2005, which allows them to look at certain perceptions Mexicans have of immigrants. They analyze the debate about the relevance of some of the ideas prevailing in the imaginary about Mexican policy’s treatment of immigrants in Mexico, as well as the moral legitimacy of the Mexican state for demanding respect for the law and the protection of its immigrants abroad in light of the treatment immigrants receive within its own borders. Finally, they point to the need for a migratory policy based on a human rights perspective that would eradicate xenophobia in institutional day-to-day treatment of immigrants who arrive in Mexico or cross through it toward the United States.

The following three articles analyze the situation in Canada. Yolande Pottier-Sherman and Rima Wilkes deal with how, despite the fact that Canadians distinguish themselves worldwide for having positive attitudes toward immigrants, they have been changing. In a historic review, they show how, until 1962, Canada had an explicitly “white,” racist immigration policy, characterized by the selection of

immigrants according to a racial, ethnic hierarchy. As a result, historically, that policy included a ban on the entry of Chinese, as well as a refusal to accept refugees from the Holocaust and Canada's internment of the Japanese during World War II. After establishing these precedents, they analyze Canadians' attitudes toward immigration and immigrants. The authors particularly emphasize three historical stages: the period of pre-WWII policies not rescinded until 1962, the post-war period until 1988, and lastly, the contemporary stage until today. They posit that Canadians' positive perspective on immigration is the result of an official policy maintained because of the benefits migration has brought to the economy and the country's national identity. The authors especially stress the official policy on multiculturalism adopted in 1971, which has resulted in Canadian society's looking at immigration, and therefore immigrants, positively. Despite this, they point to recent fears and moral panics that have emerged and the questioning of the support the government must continue to give to humanitarian immigration and multicultural policies.

Jeffrey G. Reitz, for his part, analyzes the way in which, despite the fact that the majority of the Canadian public supports high immigration levels, some perceive this as a problem. He observes recent trends in attitudes about immigration and examines the social roots of high acceptance levels based on an analysis of a November 2010 Environics Institute for Survey Research poll. This survey came up with two findings: on the one hand, that immigration is an economic opportunity for the country without displacing Canadian nationals, and a matter of pride in multiculturalism, which shows the national identity and includes a progressive agenda on issues of LGBT rights and arms controls, among other matters. The policy also includes the desire for immigrants to fully integrate into their society and adhere to the prevailing values, although there is concern about whether they will really adopt them. This situation has been expressed by the Conservative Party, which has recently begun to emphasize the issue.

Graciela Martínez-Zalce deals with Canadian television production for the public English-language Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In her preface, she analyzes the series *Border Wars*, a U.S. production for National Geographic, because of the potential difference in audience ratings *vis-à-vis* Canadian productions, both in terms of the number of people in the audience and their geographical spread. She also contends that, despite the channel's pseudo-scientific tone and its pretensions of supposedly disseminating world cultures, this series' tone is scandalous, leading to the creation of negative stereotypes about the Mexican migrants it depicts. On the other hand, the author goes into a detailed analysis of two documentaries produced by the independent production company White Pines Pictures, as well as the fictional TV miniseries *Human Cargo*. Both deal with the complex situation of illegal immigrants in Canada from a perspective that attempts to be objective. Although both productions veer away from convention by not stereotyping like Hollywood border cinema did for decades, occasionally, cracks appear in the narrative through which seeps a tendency to racially profile, which then translates into a certain anti-immigrant sentiment. The analysis studies these productions' involuntarily ambiguous results.

The book's third section includes several essays about anti-immigrant actions and sentiments in the European Union as a whole, and certain countries specifically. Xavier Escandell, in the sixteenth article, describes how the European Union continues to face economic and political challenges because of the recent world economic crisis. His starting point is that in a context of economic slowdown and raging unemployment rates, the public's attitude toward immigrants and immigration policy changes. To pinpoint this change, he uses Eurobarometer 2009 data, exploring the relationship between individual and contextual predictors of confidence toward the welfare state and anti-immigrant sentiments. He examines the role played by institutions in shaping public perceptions of social-democratic policy-making and Europe's overall economic limitations and financial well-being. The author analyzes these results in the broader context of the literature about the future of European social policy and the emergence of anti-immigrant sentiments.

In Chapter 17, Anthony M. Messina argues that, starting with the public policies established after the 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as the subsequent attacks in Western Europe, the liberal state's historic, traditional commitment to open immigration policies and generous policies for incorporating immigrants into the different societies came into conflict with the responsibility of safeguarding its citizens' physical safety. Messina explores the available data about public opinion in Great Britain, France, Spain, and other western countries, to pose some questions. First, has the European Union become more liberal on immigration issues since September 11? And second, does the public feel less secure economically, socially, and physically? Despite the fact that the survey shows that immigration issues have become more politically visible since 2001, the author concludes that in the majority of Western European countries, they continue to not be priority concerns, as has been the case historically.

Christophe Bertossi, for his part, in the eighteenth article, analyzes recent reactions against liberal citizenship policies in France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Since the previous decade, these reactions have resulted in new anti-immigrant policies in countries traditionally recognized for their integration policies. Bertossi argues that understanding the policy and ideological traditions as "national integration models" prevents understanding how citizenship and immigration policies are politicalized and culturalized in Western Europe today. He stresses the shift over the last decade from a socio-economic framework to socio-cultural identity-based frames, used to define immigrants' integration and subsequent anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim parameters. Bertossi states that Europe never had "multicultural models," nor were these ever institutionalized under any kind of coherent norm. He analyzes in detail the consequences of this new culturalization of immigrants' citizenship and their integration in France, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

In article 19, Monika Banaś starts off from the premise that since the Schengen Treaty came into effect, migration and its collateral problems have become one of the main topics in the region's socio-political discourse. The rhetoric varies from country to country, from moderate to extremely conservative and nativist. Some highly developed European Union member countries, like Great Britain, France,

Germany, and the Scandinavian nations, all immigrant receivers, are formulating their own policies in accordance with their economic interests and public and social life. Public perceptions about these policies are not always friendly, and Banaś warns that there is social resentment of immigrants that has been used by right-wing conservative parties, who fight for increasingly stringent migratory policies to slow the indiscriminant entry of immigrants, arguments that have received popular support. Banaś presents the case of three Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. She analyzes politicians' speeches in these three countries, the need to reform their immigration policies, and how the media has covered them between 2005 and 2010.

The next-to-the-last article, by Guillermo Alonso and Michal Weres, describes chronologically the main landmarks in the processes in Spain, Poland, and the United States regarding the different migratory routes and flows. In recent years, Spain created barriers on some of its several land and sea borders, thus shifting migratory flows. In the case of Poland, the Iron Curtain became the European Union's eastern border; and the United States established several changes in its border policy. This essay compares the process of constructing surveillance on the three countries' respective borders and the radical changes that took place over the last two decades, and delineates the ideological and momentary differences and similarities among the three, as well as each nation's specific "local" solutions.

Pablo Nicolás Biderbost Moyano, in the book's last article, analyzes the Spanish case. He examines the political parties' stances, specifically that of the Popular Party and the Socialist Workers Party. These parties' representatives have expressed, in different ways according to the circumstances, their support for the idea of integrating immigrants into the society that has accepted them. Nevertheless, other minority parties like National Democracy and Platform for Catalonia openly raise anti-immigration slogans. In the second place, and in the light of grievance theories, the author examines how measures like the immigration rate, immigrants' scholastic levels, and unemployment rates have influenced these parties' electoral results in places where, compared with other districts, they have gotten elected to the legislature. Finally, he describes these organizations' influence in developing legislation and public policies when they have obtained parliamentary representation.

We are convinced that this book offers the reader the main guidelines and orientations for understanding what is happening today in two regions that receive an important number of immigrants: North America and the European Union. We believe that its analysis of anti-immigrant sentiments, policies, and actions in these regions is not exhaustive, but it does offer a broad overview and invite us to continue in an interdisciplinary way with the analysis of this important issue that affects millions of migrants from different regions of the world.

INTRODUCCIÓN

Mónica Vereza

La globalización y los procesos de integración regionales han generado un sistema avanzado de comunicaciones, un intercambio de información e ideas de un país a otro, una relativa facilidad para transportarse de un continente a otro, que ha permitido un mayor movimiento de personas y migrantes entre las sociedades y naciones de una región. De la misma manera, las comunicaciones electrónicas han posibilitado la diseminación de los conocimientos sobre rutas de migración y oportunidades de trabajo en otros mercados laborales, así como condiciones de vida más atractivas en los países receptores de migrantes. En 2010, la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones calculó que había doscientos catorce millones de migrantes y hacia el 2050 casi se duplicará este flujo, pues alcanzará aproximadamente cuatrocientos millones, dispersos en las principales naciones receptoras.

Uno de los efectos de la globalización es que se han acentuado las disparidades en los niveles de vida de las naciones expulsoras y receptoras; y, como consecuencia, se ha incrementado la magnitud del fenómeno migratorio. Se calcula que el crecimiento de la fuerza laboral en los países en vías de desarrollo aumentará de 2 400 millones en 2005 a 3 600 millones en 2040, es decir, entre 2005 y 2014 cerca de 1 200 millones de personas se habrán movido de su país de origen hacia una nación importadora de migrantes que sea más prometedora en cuanto a oportunidades de empleo, calidad de vida, reunificación familiar, lo que causará un mayor desfase entre la oferta y la demanda a nivel global. La Unión Europea, así como Estados Unidos, Canadá y Australia continuarán siendo los principales polos de atracción de millones de migrantes; sin embargo, los países emergentes como China, India y Brasil también atraerán a muchos otros. China es el país asiático que expulsa y recibe el mayor flujo de migrantes internacionales. La población migrante de la Unión Europea era de 64 millones en 2005, y en América del Norte de 45 millones. Los países europeos que más reciben migrantes actualmente son Italia, Irlanda y España.

América del Norte, con aproximadamente 470 millones de personas residiendo en Canadá, Estados Unidos y México, constituye una región básicamente comercial y de inversión, que se ha ido conformando a partir de un Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN) firmado en 1994. Éste ha traído como resultado un incremento sustantivo de intercambio comercial y de inversión para beneficio de México. Nuestro país no tiene el mismo nivel de desarrollo que sus contrapartes: Estados Unidos es la primera economía del mundo, Canadá la no-

vena y México la número catorce, acorde con su producto interno bruto (PIB), según fuentes del Banco Mundial. El PIB de Estados Unidos es veinte veces más grande que el de México y persisten las enormes diferencias en niveles de desarrollo; una de sus consecuencias es la migración. En la negociación del TLCAN no se incluyó una movilidad laboral regional ni se contempla establecerla a largo plazo. Se pensaba que a raíz del crecimiento tan importante del flujo de bienes y capital de sus contrapartes en la región hacia México, el flujo migratorio de mexicanos al norte disminuiría. Ello no sólo no ocurrió, sino que aumentó: los factores de migración *push-pull* no se han reducido, por el contrario, se han agudizado. Las interconexiones se han arraigado aun más profundamente que en el pasado y han tejido un sofisticado mercado laboral bilateral que funciona a pesar de lo costoso que se ha convertido cruzar la frontera subrepticamente, debido al aumento significativo de la refrontalización de la zona. La constante tradición de contratar a trabajadores mexicanos, ya sea con visa temporal o clandestinamente, constituye un mecanismo de integración laboral regional constante, poco aceptado por el país receptor, invaluable capital humano que es exportado pero no reconocido. En este complejo proceso regional intervienen agentes que consiguen trabajos y visas, traficantes que cobran por transportar migrantes irregulares, intermediarios que lucran por transferir remesas, quienes cobran altas sumas por efectuar estos servicios (Levine y Vereá, 2010).

La recesión económica a partir de 2008 ocasionó una desaceleración del flujo de mexicanos hacia Estados Unidos; las aprehensiones en la frontera entre ambos países disminuyeron significativamente debido a las políticas altamente restrictivas impuestas, que también han conllevado a deportaciones récord de mexicanos localizados en el interior del país. Así, durante la primera década del siglo XXI, Canadá, y principalmente Estados Unidos, han establecido políticas migratorias unilaterales aún más restrictivas y rígidas que en años anteriores, centradas exclusivamente con un enfoque de seguridad, sobre todo a partir de los ataques terroristas del 2001.

Hoy sigue siendo cuestionable el proyecto de América del Norte como región ya que, por desgracia, la bilateralidad se ha ido intensificando entre Canadá y Estados Unidos, dado que los canadienses desean conservar su tradicional “relación bilateral especial”; y, con México, se mantienen lazos crecientes sin ser necesariamente regionales. No obstante, estamos conscientes de que la ancestral relación bilateral entre México y Estados Unidos seguirá siendo compleja y quizás aun más conflictiva, en vista de los múltiples factores que intervienen en ella, como los cuantiosos flujos migratorios de mexicanos con y sin visa que encuentran empleo en diferentes sectores de su economía, dependiendo de recesiones o auges económicos. Durante los últimos años, el contrabando de drogas y armas ha generado una violencia fronteriza crítica entre México y Estados Unidos, “narcotizando” la agenda bilateral y “desmigratizándola” simultáneamente, en virtud de las pocas posibilidades de celebrar un acuerdo migratorio entre ambos países y de que se apruebe la tan prometida y hasta ahora congelada reforma migratoria integral que beneficiaría la legalización de nuestros connacionales: alrededor del 60 por ciento de los 11.5 millones de indocumentados que se encuentran residiendo en Estados Unidos, el mayor número de migrantes no autorizados en el mundo.

Por su parte, la Unión Europea, con más de quinientos millones de habitantes, es el proyecto regional más avanzado del mundo, ya que se han establecido los mecanismos adecuados para permitir la libre movilidad de personas entre los países miembros, posibilidad que no se ha planteado en América del Norte. Los veintisiete países miembros se caracterizan por tener sociedades envejecidas y con muy bajas tasas de fertilidad, quienes han demostrado tener una notable capacidad de absorción de mano de obra extranjera; en cambio, en Estados Unidos esta tendencia se ha equilibrado por medio de la tasa de fertilidad más alta de los inmigrantes. Esta demanda se repliega o aumenta temporalmente, acorde con los auges económicos o crisis coyunturales, etapas de desempleo por crisis económicas recurrentes. Es difícil entender la política migratoria de la Unión Europea, pues incluye, por un lado, a naciones soberanas que tienen sus propias políticas migratorias y arreglos bilaterales con diferentes países; y, por otro lado, intervienen actores transnacionales no estatales como son las instituciones de la Unión Europea y las voluntades de otros países miembros, que se traducen en políticas públicas. Este balance de poder entre Estados e instituciones supranacionales es sumamente complejo, ya que la proliferación de actores para la regulación de los flujos migratorios impacta en las políticas nacionales y las relaciones entre los Estados miembros vecinos, distantes y los no miembros. En términos generales, la Unión Europea ha concentrado sus esfuerzos para dirigirse hacia una política integral de migración, sobre todo para controlar sus fronteras externas, a pesar de que cada país ha manejado sus políticas individualmente, acorde con sus necesidades económicas. Hoy la población nacida en el exterior se ha incrementado significativamente, hasta alcanzar los niveles que tiene Estados Unidos. Ahora, sus sociedades hospedan, además de los extranjeros de sus ex colonias, a no europeos, no blancos, no cristianos en proporciones importantes (tan sólo la población musulmana se calcula en alrededor de quince millones) (Verea, 2010a).

La similitud entre ambas regiones, en cuanto a la estructura de sus políticas migratorias, radica en que admiten una cantidad importante de inmigrantes en términos relativos a su población como residentes permanentes o trabajadores temporales y, en general, aplican leyes rígidas mediante controles policíacos en las fronteras o puertos de entrada, con el fin de aprehender y deportar a los extranjeros que no están autorizados a residir en el país de destino. A pesar de la creciente interacción de sus economías y la formación de redes sociales intrarregionales, se ha generado a su vez una importante demanda de mano de obra por extranjeros en sus mercados laborales, sobre todo en épocas de expansión económica.

La severa recesión económica del fin de la década ha traído como resultado un alza sustantiva en las tasas de desempleo prácticamente en todas las naciones receptoras de migrantes. Como respuesta a esta situación han establecido una serie de medidas mucho más restrictivas en sus políticas migratorias que en el pasado inmediato. El principal objetivo ha sido frenar los flujos migratorios securitizando aún más sus fronteras, limitando los permisos o visas de trabajo, admitiendo a un número menor de inmigrantes y, en general, estableciendo un número mayor de requisitos para su ingreso con el fin de proteger sus mercados laborales para beneficio de sus nacionales.

Una crisis económica afecta mucho más a los inmigrantes que a los nacionales de cualquier país. Son ellos los más susceptibles de que sean despedidos de sus trabajos y tienden a tener más altas tasas de desempleo que sus contrapartes los nacionales, al estar concentrados en sectores más sensibles a una crisis económica, como lo son la construcción y los servicios. Una de las desafortunadas consecuencias ha sido que los migrantes se han enfrentado con una mayor discriminación que no han tenido más remedio que aceptar, dado que temen regresar a su lugar de origen en donde creen encontrar una situación peor a la que se enfrentan.

El creciente número de residentes extranjeros y migrantes indocumentados en determinadas sociedades las ha hecho conscientes de quiénes y cómo están conformadas como sociedad, pues perciben al migrante negativamente y presionan a los formuladores de políticas a que adopten medidas altamente restrictivas para controlar este flujo. El lenguaje, la apariencia física y ciertas costumbres que constituyen las características y valores inherentes a ciertas etnias, enclavadas en un lugar específico, se han hecho más visibles debido a su continuo crecimiento, y han modificado la percepción en las sociedades receptoras de migrantes, la cual se ha traducido en políticas migratorias más restrictivas.

Éstas son algunas de las razones por las cuales ha surgido un ambiente antiinmigrante a nivel mundial, mucho más vehemente que en el pasado, y ha conducido a la proliferación de más estrictas y restrictivas políticas migratorias a nivel federal y local en varios países, objetivo principal de esta obra. Analizamos cómo y por qué se han generado en ambas regiones múltiples y crecientes movimientos xenófobos sumamente agresivos e intolerantes en contra de los migrantes no autorizados, un ambiente que ha derivado en la imposición de políticas migratorias altamente restrictivas. Destacamos cómo el incremento del nacionalismo ha emergido con gran fuerza en los países europeos y en Estados Unidos, en virtud de que se desdibuja y cambia constantemente su identidad y se sienten amenazados por la invasión de otras culturas. Inclusive, muchos grupos políticos ultraconservadores están promoviendo ideas nacionalistas y xenófobas en sus agendas partidistas. Así como los gitanos son señalados por italianos y franceses como personas susceptibles de ser criminales, también los grupos antiinmigrantes estadounidenses consideran a los mexicanos como indeseables y posibles criminales.

Esta obra presenta varias limitantes: una de ellas es que los productos serán discutidos en un seminario una vez publicado el libro, por lo cual no podremos enriquecer cada uno de los ensayos aquí presentados con las observaciones y críticas hechas por nuestros colegas. Otra es que no incluye el análisis a cada una de las naciones europeas, pero al menos intenta presentar un panorama general, ejemplificando algunos casos que destacan en el entorno regional. No obstante lo anterior, intentamos plasmar una percepción muy general de este fenómeno que impacta a las dos regiones analizadas: América del Norte y la Unión Europea, y que permitirá al lector aproximarse a este problema global.

El libro está dividido en tres grandes apartados: el primero contiene dos ensayos que nos acercan al entendimiento de aproximaciones teóricas y conceptuales sobre el significado de las políticas migratorias restrictivas, la xenofobia, la discrimi-

minación y por ende la violación a los derechos humanos. El segundo aglutina la gran mayoría de los ensayos —trece de los veintiuno— en donde se describen, por un lado, la rigidización de las políticas migratorias que cada vez demandan más los movimientos ultraconservadores y por el otro, los sentimientos, acciones y políticas antiinmigrantes aplicadas a nivel federal y estatal, así como los temas de punta en los debates nacionales y la percepción al respecto en Estados Unidos, México y Canadá. Por último, la tercera parte conjunta trabajos relacionados con el endurecimiento de los controles fronterizos y los sentimientos nacionalistas, antiinmigrantes y la crisis de los modelos de integración en la Unión Europea.

Iniciamos la primera parte de la obra con una visión general de los sentimientos, acciones y políticas antiinmigrantes en América del Norte y la Unión Europea. Para ello, el primer artículo que realiza Mónica Vereá, nos plantea las principales aproximaciones teóricas y conceptuales para entender las más recientes manifestaciones xenófobas de la primera década del siglo XXI. Con el fin de entender estas manifestaciones, inicia explicando cómo se formula una política migratoria en los países receptores de migrantes y su intrínseca relación con las opiniones y debates públicos en torno a este fenómeno, los cuales tienen gran influencia para la formulación de propuestas e iniciativas de corte restrictivo. Describe las posiciones de los restriccionistas, como corrientes de opinión que influyen en la formulación de políticas migratorias sobre la admisión de migrantes en una determinada sociedad. Entre la corriente restriccionista, Vereá analiza al racismo y su expresión más común: la discriminación; al nativismo y etnocentrismo y su persistencia hacia una política de asimilación; y, finalmente, a la xenofobia como una corriente que se expresa mediante actitudes antiinmigrantes, fomentando la segregación e impidiendo una integración para beneficio de la sociedad en general y de los migrantes en particular. Finalmente, ejemplifica el aumento de la xenofobia, el nacionalismo y el importante aumento de actitudes antiinmigrantes en Estados Unidos en general y en algunos estados en particular, durante la última década.

Tanto en América del Norte como en Europa la criminalización de la migración y la discriminación y el odio generan conflictos sociales de diversas magnitudes, desde manifestaciones hasta disturbios étnicos, toma de lugares públicos y fundamentalismos, objeto de análisis del ensayo de Ariadna Estévez. Plantea que ambas acciones constituyen violaciones a los derechos humanos y en consecuencia, conforman una falta de reconocimiento intersubjetivo que deriva en conflicto. Utilizando las teorías de Coutin y Honneth, examina cómo la criminalización de la migración y marginación derivada de la discriminación conforman un espacio de desprotección social y jurídica que constituye una falta de reconocimiento intersubjetivo que puede derivar en conflicto. Ello lo ilustra con ejemplos específicamente sobre las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la criminalización de la migración y la discriminación, causas fundantes del conflicto social que involucra a los migrantes.

El análisis de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes en la región de América del Norte constituye la segunda parte de esta obra. Se inicia con el extenso examen de Estados Unidos donde han proliferado de manera sumamente agresiva estos sentimientos. Así, tenemos que en el tercer capítulo escrito por Liette Gilbert y Kathy

Kolnick se explica cómo las acciones antiinmigrantes locales han emergido como reacción a la incapacidad del gobierno federal para controlar la inmigración “ilegal” y securitizar sus fronteras. Estas ordenanzas locales constituyen la extensión de la política de seguridad nacional que criminaliza cada vez más al inmigrante. A nivel de municipalidades y comunidades, estas medidas intentan controlar las prácticas cotidianas de los migrantes indocumentados, en lugar de “componer” los procesos y políticas migratorias, sobre los cuales no tienen jurisdicción. Para ello Gilbert y Kolnick utilizan el concepto de “molestia pública”, como el fundamento para la explicación de estas ordenanzas locales con el objeto de criminalizarlas. Estiman que los políticos han legitimado sus acciones señalando que es necesario aplicar la autoridad del poder de la policía local. Este concepto ha sido utilizado para describir una actividad que, sin razón, afecta o interfiere con los derechos de la sociedad. De esta manera, aquellos que apoyan el reforzamiento de las leyes migratorias utilizan el concepto de “molestia pública” para controlar y repeler a migrantes a nivel local desde sus jurisdicciones, a pesar de ser competencia federal, constituyéndose en otra estrategia para criminalizar las ofensas civiles de los migrantes, tales como su ingreso “ilegal”. Utilizando un enfoque interdisciplinario, las autoras argumentan que el uso de “molestia pública” para referirse a migrantes indocumentados es problemático dado que promueve un “interés público” discriminatorio que criminaliza a “otros” no sólo por violar ordenanzas locales sino simplemente por su presencia en una determinada área urbana. Finalmente, puntualizan las numerosas contradicciones entre medidas antiinmigrantes locales y la ley federal, evaluando las limitaciones ideológicas y legales de la policía, como la autoridad para vigilar y aplicar las leyes sobre inmigración en Estados Unidos.

En el cuarto artículo, Frederic I. Solop y Nancy A. Wonders revisan datos provenientes de encuestas sobre el tema migratorio para comprender las actitudes públicas sobre los inmigrantes y las políticas migratorias que revelan las encuestas nacionales estadounidenses. Plantean que la opinión pública estadounidense es más compleja que la revelada por los medios y para explicarla, exploran reacciones a una variedad de temas migratorios, propuestas y estrategias fronterizas. Utilizan datos que evidencian que la opinión pública no es homogénea, particularmente entre la población latina que habita en las poblaciones fronterizas, que difiere significativamente de la opinión de la “corriente predominante”. Lo demuestran haciendo una comparación entre las actitudes nacionales y aquellas expresadas en Arizona y California. Dados los cambios demográficos que han sido proyectados a nivel nacional, el análisis que realizan Solop y Wonders demuestra el papel tan importante que jugarán los latinos en la formación de la opinión pública estadounidense en el futuro cercano.

Robert Donnelly analiza la multiplicidad de legislaciones relacionadas con la inmigración en varios estados de la Unión Americana, las cuales se han duplicado durante los últimos cinco años, de 570 en 2006 a 1 374 en 2010. Considera que esta tendencia irá en aumento a corto plazo con iniciativas populares similares a la SB1070 de Arizona, ello en virtud a la percepción que se tiene del fracaso de la política migratoria a nivel federal, de la todavía porosa frontera con México y de la

incapacidad de controlar los crecientes flujos de “ilegales”. En contraposición, las propuestas de iniciativas proinmigrantes han sido muy modestas, sobre todo aquellas que contienen provisiones que conducirían a una eventual avenida hacia la ciudadanía. Donelly apunta que existen otros factores que han influenciado el *timing* para la introducción de otras iniciativas de ley, como es la emergencia con gran furor del movimiento ultraconservador Tea Party, los crímenes cometidos por migrantes no autorizados enfatizados constantemente por los medios, y las recientes tendencias demográficas de los hispanos, entre otros. Dados estos factores, el autor examina algunas iniciativas presentadas durante 2010, plantea las tendencias posibles a corto plazo y analiza el papel que juega el nativismo en el desarrollo de las legislaciones antiinmigrantes.

En el sexto artículo, Michal Kohout analiza la situación en “Inland Empire”, una región situada en el sur de California tradicionalmente conservadora, destino de muchos migrantes. El continuo flujo de migrantes hacia esta región ha causado reacciones violentas en la percepción de esta población “blanca” contra la posible amenaza de los migrantes indocumentados. Los activistas conservadores han instado a algunas ciudades a restringir la inmigración mediante ordenanzas como la E-Verify apoyado iniciativas semejantes a la SB1070 de Arizona, con el objeto de ahuyentar a los indocumentados. En virtud de esta situación, el autor describe estas intenciones e iniciativas locales para regular la migración y unirlas a la política migratoria nacional por medio del análisis, en primer término, de transcripciones de reuniones en los municipios donde se proclaman iniciativas antiinmigrantes. La segunda parte constituye un examen de datos secundarios de las políticas nacionales, estatales y locales que contextualiza las iniciativas antiinmigrantes en el “inland Empire”.

Anna Ochoa O’Leary y Azucena Sanchez utilizan algunos resultados del estudio binacional del sistema de salud reproductiva para demostrar cómo surgen las políticas antiinmigrantes y cómo impactan en “mixed immigration status households”. Esta categoría constituye una unidad doméstica bajo la cual conviven miembros con diferentes estatus migratorios. Este tipo de organización social de facto no sólo complica la aplicación de políticas estatales que por su diseño “singularizan” o excluyen al indocumentado, sino que induce a profundizar las divisiones sociales ya existentes y las disparidades del cuidado de la salud, principalmente en Arizona, basadas en raza y etnicidad. Plantean la historia legislativa en este estado, la cual provee un contexto antiinmigrante en donde se han aplicado medidas que niegan la realidad de que existen, precisamente, hogares de migrantes con múltiples estatus migratorios.

Elaine Levine, en el octavo artículo, hace un análisis profundo de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes en el estado de Georgia. Parte del análisis de que durante las dos últimas décadas, la población inmigrante de Georgia ha crecido marcadamente, de 173 000 en 1990 a aproximadamente 929 000 en 2008. Alrededor de dos tercios de los inmigrantes radican en la zona metropolitana de Atlanta; un poco más de la mitad provienen de América Latina y un tercio del total son mexicanos. También se calcula que más de la mitad de los inmigrantes en el estado son indocumentados. Este hecho no se consideraba tan problemático durante los años de auge económico de la década de los noventa e inicios del siglo XXI; es sabido que a mediados

de los años noventa, los migrantes mexicanos no autorizados fueron reclutados activamente para trabajar en la construcción de las instalaciones olímpicas en Atlanta, las fábricas de alfombras de Dalton y las procesadoras de pollos en Gainesville. Sin embargo, una década después el clima económico y político había cambiado considerablemente. A partir del 2006 Georgia inició aprobando leyes restrictivas y punitivas para migrantes indocumentados. Cuatro condados con altos porcentajes de inmigrantes latinos han establecido acuerdos 287g con la agencia de Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), cuyo resultado ha sido la deportación de miles de personas; cuyas causas y efectos de estas políticas antiinmigrantes en el estado de Georgia que precisamente Levine analiza.

Claire Joysmith analiza cómo los sentimientos antiinmigrantes han contribuido a alimentar el imaginario racista anti(in)migrante estadounidense que ha cobrado auge sobre todo después del 11 de septiembre de 2001 (11-S). Plantea varias perspectivas que provienen de las comunidades chicanas y latinoestadunidenses en cuanto sujetos (a lo que denomina una narración de compasión), y como objetos de dichos sentimientos y dicho imaginario racista antimigratorio. Joysmith se basa en varias voces-escritos testimoniales. “Godzilla con sombrero de charro” proviene de un testimonio-ensayo cuya autoría pertenece al reconocido performancero “chicalango” (léase un híbrido de chicano y chilango, proveniente de la ciudad de México) Guillermo Gómez Peña, en el cual desglosa una visión crítica, pensante y sintiente, en torno a las secuelas xenófobas surgidas con mayor auge a partir del 11 de septiembre. Éste es uno de los testimonios que evocó el imaginario racista anti(in)migrante estadounidense así como la narración de compasión por parte de las comunidades latinoestadunidenses.

Julie Dufort, en el décimo artículo, estudia el fenómeno de los grupos civiles que patrullan la frontera con México, uno de ellos el tan publicitado Minutemen Project. Analiza detalladamente la actuación de los presidentes de este movimiento en el debate contemporáneo sobre políticas migratorias y seguridad fronteriza. Se cuestionan la razón por la cual este movimiento se ha constituido en un símbolo que representa a todos aquellos que apoyan la aplicación de estrictas leyes migratorias en territorio estadounidense. Estiman que la influencia que han tenido es significativa, objeto de análisis de este estudio; examinan algunos casos clave de miembros de este movimiento como sus presidentes Jim Gilchrist y Chris Simcox y el de the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, respectivamente, percibidos como “emprendedores en la seguridad”, comprometidos a iniciar un cambio en política con una agenda de seguridad propia, dentro del movimiento contemporáneo de patrullas fronterizas civiles y la influencia que han tenido en el debate migratorio en la primera década del siglo XXI.

Anna Kaganiec-Kamieńska es la autora del último de los ensayos del libro que analizan los sentimientos acciones y políticas antiinmigrantes adoptadas en Estados Unidos. Estudia el movimiento “English-Only”, el cual tiene como objetivo establecer el inglés como el idioma oficial de Estados Unidos, una de las manifestaciones más importantes de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes en general y antihispánicos en particular. A pesar de que no ha sido aprobada ninguna regulación a nivel federal,

se han adoptado medidas como ésta en la mayoría de los estados. La autora plantea cómo este movimiento ha contribuido a fomentar los sentimientos antiinmigrantes a nivel nacional en la última década y desarrolla un contexto amplio para analizar intentos en diferentes épocas para restringir el uso de lenguas extranjeras.

El doceavo artículo es el único que se centra el caso de México. Manuel Ángel Castillo y Germán G. Guerra analizan cómo la historia de México ha registrado actitudes y comportamientos diversos frente a la inmigración. Más recientemente, se ha visto desafiada por la creciente presencia de extranjeros que transitan por su territorio de paso hacia Estados Unidos. En primer término se enfocan en los contenidos de las posturas oficiales, materializadas en la legislación y las regulaciones adoptadas por las autoridades migratorias en distintos momentos de la historia contemporánea. Posteriormente, abordan las posturas que han mostrado distintos sectores de la sociedad mexicana, un ámbito poco trabajado y conocido. En virtud de ello, nos comentan que uno de los problemas con los que se enfrentaron es la ausencia de fuentes que permitan sistematizar y concluir en algún tipo de generalizaciones. Este trabajo aspira a plantear una primera aproximación a las características e importancia del fenómeno; para ello, recurren a la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México 2005, la cual permite acercarse a ciertas percepciones de los mexicanos hacia los inmigrantes. Analizan el debate sobre la pertinencia de algunas ideas que imperan en el imaginario respecto del trato de la política mexicana hacia los inmigrantes en México, así como la calidad moral del Estado mexicano para exigir una procuración de derecho y de protección a sus inmigrantes en otros territorios, a la luz del tratamiento que los inmigrantes reciben en el país. Finalmente, señalan la necesidad de una política migratoria que, basándose en la perspectiva de derechos humanos, erradique las expresiones xenófobas en el trato institucional y cotidiano con el inmigrante que llega a México o transita hacia Estados Unidos.

Los siguientes tres artículos analizan la situación en Canadá. Yolande Pottier-Sherman y Rima Wilkes advierten cómo, a pesar de que los canadienses se distinguen en el mundo por haber tenido actitudes positivas hacia los inmigrantes, éstas han venido modificándose. Realizan una revisión histórica de cómo, hasta 1962, Canadá tenía una política migratoria explícitamente racista “blanca”, caracterizada por la selección de inmigrantes acorde con una jerarquía racial y étnica, que tuvo como resultado la prohibición del ingreso de chinos, así como la negación de la aceptación a refugiados del holocausto y el internamiento de los japoneses durante la segunda guerra mundial. Una vez planteados estos antecedentes, las autoras analizan las actitudes de los canadienses hacia la inmigración y los inmigrantes. En particular enfatizan tres etapas históricas: la historia hasta 1962, el periodo de la posguerra hasta 1988 y, por último, el periodo contemporáneo hasta nuestros días. Plantean que la perspectiva positiva de los canadienses hacia la inmigración es el resultado de una política oficial sostenida por los beneficios que la migración aporta a la economía y a su identidad nacional; destacan particularmente la política oficial del multiculturalismo adoptada a partir de 1971, la cual ha dado como resultado que la sociedad canadiense evalúe positivamente la inmigración y por ende, a los inmigrantes. No obstante lo anterior, apuntan los recientes temores y pánicos morales que

han surgido, y cómo se ha cuestionado el apoyo que su gobierno debe seguir dando a las políticas humanitarias de inmigración y a las del multiculturalismo.

Por su parte, Jeffrey G. Reitz analiza la manera en que, a pesar de que la mayoría de la opinión pública canadiense apoya el ingreso de altos niveles de inmigración, algunos la perciben como un problema. Para ello observa las recientes tendencias de las actitudes hacia la inmigración y examina las raíces sociales del apoyo a altas tasa de aceptación, basado en un análisis de una encuesta de opinión nacional realizada por Environics Institute for Survey Research en noviembre de 2010. Dos son los hallazgos: por un lado, que la inmigración constituye una oportunidad económica para el país sin desplazar a los nacionales, y un orgullo sobre la política de multiculturalismo, que demuestra su identidad nacional e incluye una agenda progresiva en torno a los derechos de los homosexuales y el control de armas, entre otros temas. Esta política también incluye el deseo de que los inmigrantes se integren plenamente a su sociedad y que se adhieran a valores predominantes, aunque existe la preocupación de si ellos los adoptarán realmente. Esta situación ha sido expresada por el Partido Conservador, que ha puesto énfasis en ello recientemente.

Graciela Martínez-Zalce se ocupa, por un lado, la producción televisiva canadiense para la emisora pública anglohablante Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Como prefacio, analiza la serie *Frontera, zona de guerra (Border wars)*, producción estadounidense para National Geographic, por la diferencia de niveles de audiencia que puede alcanzar en relación con las producciones canadienses (tanto en número de personas como de extensión geográfica) y porque, a pesar del tono pseudo-científico del canal y de sus miras de aparente difusión de las culturas mundiales, el tono de estas series de programas es escandaloso y conduce a la creación de estereotipos negativos en relación con los migrantes mexicanos que allí aparecen. Por otro lado, realiza un detallado análisis de dos documentales producidos por la compañía independiente White Pines Pictures, así como de una miniserie ficticia de televisión, *Human Cargo*, los cuales abordan la compleja situación de los inmigrantes ilegales en Canadá desde una perspectiva que pretende ser objetiva. Aunque las producciones se alejan de lo convencional en tanto procuran no estereotipar (como lo hizo el cine fronterizo hollywoodense durante décadas), en ocasiones contienen grietas en la narrativa por las cuales se filtra la tendencia hacia un perfil racial, mismo que se traduce en un cierto sentimiento antiinmigrante. El análisis estudia los resultados, involuntariamente ambiguos, en estas producciones.

La tercera sección de esta obra comprende la conjunción de varios ensayos sobre las acciones y sentimientos antiinmigrantes emprendidas por la Unión Europea en general y algunos países en particular. Xavier Escandell, en el artículo dieciséis, nos describe cómo la Unión Europea continúa enfrentándose a desafíos económicos y políticos, debido a la reciente crisis económica mundial. Parte de la base de que en un contexto de desaceleración económica y tasas de desempleo rampantes, la actitud de la opinión pública hacia los inmigrantes y la política de inmigrantes varía. Para encontrar este cambio, utiliza el Eurobarómetro que proporciona datos del 2009. Explora la relación entre predictores de confianza individuales y contextuales sobre sentimientos antiinmigrantes, examinando en particular el papel

que juegan las percepciones de la opinión pública sobre las crecientes limitaciones económicas, el bienestar financiero y el Estado de bienestar social del sistema europeo. Los resultados encontrados indican una relativa importancia entre el modelo de competitividad económica *vis-à-vis* la importancia de la asimilación cultural de los nuevos inmigrantes, resultados que se analizan en un contexto más amplio de la literatura sobre el futuro de la política social europea y el surgimiento de sentimientos antiinmigrantes.

En el artículo diecisiete, Anthony M. Messina nos plantea que a partir de las políticas públicas establecidas por los actos terroristas del 2001, y actos subsecuentes en Europa occidental, los históricos y tradicionales compromisos del Estado liberal hacia políticas abiertas a la inmigración y generosas políticas de incorporación del inmigrante a las diversas sociedades entran en conflicto al tener la responsabilidad de salvaguardar la seguridad física de sus ciudadanos. Messina explora datos disponibles de la opinión pública de Gran Bretaña, Francia, España y otros países occidentales, para plantearse los siguientes cuestionamientos. Primero: ¿la Unión Europea se ha vuelto más liberal en cuestiones relacionadas con la inmigración desde el 11 de septiembre? Y, segundo: ¿el público se percibe menos seguro en términos económicos, sociales y físicos? A pesar de que la encuesta realizada evidencia que los asuntos sobre la inmigración han adquirido políticamente mayor visibilidad desde el 2001, concluye que en la mayoría de los países de Europa occidental permanecen, como ha ocurrido históricamente, preocupaciones no prioritarias.

Por su parte, Christophe Bertossi, en el artículo dieciocho, analiza la reciente reacción en contra de la ciudadanía liberal en Francia, Gran Bretaña y Holanda. A partir de la década anterior estas reacciones han tenido como resultado nuevas políticas antiinmigrantes en países que han sido reconocidos por practicar una política de integración. Bertossi argumenta que entender la política y las tradiciones ideológicas como “modelos nacionales de integración” impide la comprensión de la actual politización y culturización de las políticas de ciudadanía e inmigración en la Europa occidental de hoy. Destaca el cambio ocurrido en la última década de un marco socioeconómico a uno sociocultural, basado en identidad, utilizados para definir la integración de los inmigrantes y los subsecuentes parámetros antiinmigrantes y antimusulmanes. Asevera que nunca hubo “modelos multiculturales” en Europa, ni fueron institucionalizados bajo una normativa coherente. Analiza detalladamente consecuencias de esta nueva culturización de la ciudadanía de inmigrantes y su integración en Francia, Gran Bretaña y Holanda.

En el artículo diecinueve, Monika Banaś parte de la premisa de que a partir de la entrada en vigor del tratado Schengen, el fenómeno migratorio y sus problemas colaterales se han convertido en uno de los principales tópicos en el discurso sociopolítico de la región. La retórica varía entre países de moderados a extremadamente conservadores y nativistas. Algunos países miembros de la Unión Europea altamente desarrollados como Gran Bretaña, Francia, Alemania y los países escandinavos, todos ellos países receptores de migrantes, están formulando sus propias políticas de acuerdo o en concordancia con sus intereses económicos, vida política y social. La percepción pública de estas políticas no siempre es amistosa, y Banaś

advierde que existe un descontento social en contra de los inmigrantes que ha sido utilizado por los partidos conservadores de derecha, quienes pugnan por un incremento en el endurecimiento de sus políticas migratorias hacia el ingreso indiscriminado de inmigrantes, argumentos que han recibido apoyo popular. Banaś presenta el caso de tres países nórdicos: Dinamarca, Suecia y Finlandia; analiza los discursos pronunciados por los políticos en estos tres países, la necesidad de reformar sus políticas migratorias y cómo los han cubierto los medios de comunicación masiva entre 2005 y 2010.

El penúltimo artículo, escrito por Guillermo Alonso y Michal Weres describe, con un esquema cronológico, los principales hitos que conocieron los procesos en España, Polonia y Estados Unidos en relación con las distintas rutas y flujos migratorios. Durante los últimos años, en España, con varias fronteras terrestres y marítimas que vigilar, se produjo la “obstaculización” de algunas de ellas y el consiguiente desvío de flujos migratorios. El caso de Polonia, de ser la Cortina de Hierro se convirtió en la frontera oriental de la Unión Europea; y en Estados Unidos se establecieron varios cambios en su política fronteriza. El ensayo compara el proceso de construcción de la vigilancia de las respectivas fronteras entre los tres países, los cambios radicales que ocurrieron durante las últimas dos décadas y delinea las diferencias y similitudes ideológicas y coyunturales, así como las particularidades de cada nación como soluciones “locales” establecidas en los tres países.

Pablo Nicolás Biderbost Moyano, en el último artículo, analiza el caso español. Examina, en primer término, la posición de los partidos políticos, específicamente el Partido Popular y el Partido Obrero Socialista. Sus interlocutores han expresado, con matices circunstanciales, su adhesión a la idea de integración de los inmigrantes en la sociedad de acogida. No obstante, existen otros partidos minoritarios que expresan abiertamente consignas antiinmigración, como Democracia Nacional y Plataforma per Catalunya. En segundo término, y a la luz de las *grievance theories* se examina cómo han influido medidas tales como tasa de inmigración, porcentaje de escolarización de los inmigrantes y nivel de desempleo en el rendimiento electoral de estos partidos en aquellos sitios en los que, en comparación con otros distritos, han logrado presencia legislativa. Finalmente, se describe cuál ha sido la influencia de estas agrupaciones en la elaboración de legislación y políticas públicas cuando han obtenido representación parlamentaria.

Estamos convencidos que esta obra brinda los principales lineamientos y orientaciones para el entendimiento de lo que ocurre hoy día en dos regiones que reciben un importante número de inmigrantes: América del Norte y la Unión Europea. Creemos que no es exhaustivo el análisis de los sentimientos, políticas y acciones antiinmigrantes en estas regiones, pero nos brinda un panorama general y nos invita a continuar, en forma interdisciplinaria, con el análisis de este importante tema que afecta a millones de migrantes provenientes de diversas regiones del mundo.

Fuentes

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Visión general

APROXIMACIONES TEÓRICAS PARA ENTENDER LAS POLÍTICAS MIGRATORIAS RESTRICTIVAS Y LOS SENTIMIENTOS ANTIINMIGRANTES EN EL SIGLO XXI

*Mónica Vereá**

Introducción

Confrontados con altas tasas de desempleo debido a la recesión económica más severa desde la Gran Depresión de 1929, los países receptores de migrantes han establecido una serie de medidas mucho más restrictivas en sus políticas migratorias que en el pasado inmediato. El principal objetivo ha sido desalentar y frenar los flujos migratorios securitizando aún más sus fronteras. Han establecido medidas complementarias, como limitar los permisos o visas de trabajo, admitir a un número menor de inmigrantes y, en general, establecer mucho más requisitos para su ingreso, con el fin de proteger sus mercados laborales para beneficio de sus nacionales. Ciertos países como Estados Unidos han limitado el ingreso de trabajadores altamente calificados y han hecho mucho más difícil que el migrante sin documentos ingrese o permanezca por el incremento en el reforzamiento de la frontera y las crecientes e inhumanas redadas en lugares de trabajo. Otros, como España, han llegado a proponer esquemas de compensación para retornar a su lugar de origen y atenuar las presiones provenientes de los desempleados (Vereá, 2010a: 94-100).

Una crisis económica afecta mucho más a los inmigrantes que a los nacionales de cualquier país y, en la mayoría de los casos, son más susceptibles de ser despedidos de sus trabajos. En general están concentrados en sectores más sensibles a una crisis económica como son la construcción, las manufacturas y los servicios. Los migrantes indocumentados responden más rápidamente a las fluctuaciones en las economías debido a que tienden a satisfacer la demanda de los empleadores no satisfecha por los trabajadores legales (Papademetriou y Terrazas, 2009: 18-20). Una de las desafortunadas consecuencias ha sido que los migrantes han encontrado una mayor discriminación que no han tenido más remedio que aceptar, puesto que temen regresar a su lugar de origen, en donde creen encontrar una situación peor a la que se enfrentan.

El creciente número de residentes extranjeros y migrantes indocumentados en determinados países receptores ha hecho a estos conscientes de quiénes y cómo están conformados como sociedad, pues percibe al migrante negativamente y presiona a los formuladores de políticas a adoptar medidas mucho más restrictivas para controlar este flujo. Las características y valores inherentes de ciertas etnias —len-

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guaje, comportamiento, apariencia física, entre otros—, enclavados en un lugar específico debido a su continuo crecimiento, se han hecho más visibles, modificando su percepción, los cuales se han traducido en políticas migratorias más restrictivas.

Éstas son algunas de las razones por las cuales ha surgido un ambiente antiinmigrante mucho más vehemente que en el pasado y ha conducido a la proliferación de más estrictas y restrictivas políticas migratorias a nivel federal y local en varios países. Se han generado múltiples movimientos sumamente agresivos y excesivos en contra de los migrantes indocumentados en particular, culpándolos de todos los males que no necesariamente se justifican, y que se agudizan en crisis económicas como la actual. Estos sentimientos han afectado tanto a residentes legales como a migrantes indocumentados.

Para comprender estas actitudes y percepciones, a lo largo de este ensayo intentaré analizar las principales aproximaciones teóricas y conceptuales para entender las más recientes manifestaciones xenófobas. Para ello inicio explicando cómo se formula una política migratoria en los países receptores de migrantes y su intrínseca relación con las opiniones y debates públicos en torno a este fenómeno, los cuales tienen gran influencia para la formulación de propuestas e iniciativas de corte restrictivo. Describo las posiciones de los restriccionistas como corrientes de opinión que influyen en la formulación de políticas migratorias sobre la admisión de migrantes en una determinada sociedad. Dentro de esta corriente, analizo específicamente al racismo y su expresión más común: la discriminación; al nativismo y etnocentrismo, así como su persistencia hacia una política de asimilación y, finalmente, a la xenofobia como una corriente que se expresa mediante actitudes antiinmigrantes, fomentando la segregación e impidiendo una integración para beneficio de la sociedad en general y de los migrantes en particular. Finalmente, analizo la nueva era xenófoba del siglo XXI, concentrándome exclusivamente en el caso estadounidense.

Influencia de la opinión pública en la formulación de las políticas migratorias

Una política migratoria puede ser definida como el derecho fundamental que tiene un Estado soberano para controlar y vigilar los intereses nacionales de su territorio. Para llevar a cabo dicha política se requiere que el Estado establezca los límites territoriales o fronteras terrestres y marítimas, según sea el caso y, posteriormente, formular los lineamientos y mecanismos de admisión bajo diferentes categorías, con el fin de que ingresen ciertos extranjeros en forma temporal o permanente. Es decir, ejercen su poder de soberanía para establecer quién entra a su territorio, bajo qué condiciones, temporalidad y categoría. Se selecciona a los “inmigrantes”, extranjeros que son admitidos por las autoridades para poder residir en forma permanente, de un cúmulo importante de solicitudes de individuos de diferentes naciones, razas o etnias. Se otorga un número de visas con base en los objetivos de admisión, de acuerdo con un sistema de preferencias previamente establecido en relación con sus intereses nacionales, que por lo general son razones de empleo, reunificación

familiar o refugio. Los inmigrantes pueden obtener la naturalización después de haber residido legalmente por un tiempo determinado. Los “no inmigrantes” son personas admitidas por un determinado tiempo o propósito definido; en esta situación se encuentran los turistas, estudiantes, profesionistas y trabajadores temporales. El Estado rechaza a quienes no reúnen los requisitos previamente establecidos (Verea, 2003).

La migración indocumentada o no autorizada no existiría de no haber una política migratoria que restringiera la entrada o estableciera límites a la estancia de ciertas personas. Por lo general, el país receptor sanciona a quienes ingresan al país sin haber incurrido por los procedimientos señalados, es decir, en forma subrepticia, a los que utilizaron documentos falsos para su ingreso; y a aquellos que habiendo ingresado al país de destino con la visa adecuada, prolongan su estancia más allá del periodo estipulado y, con ello, su visa expira, por lo que automáticamente se convierten en extranjeros indocumentados. Los migrantes irregulares, no autorizados, ilegales o indocumentados violan las leyes o el derecho migratorio de los países receptores, ya que su presencia no es legal en términos migratorios, por lo que están sujetos a deportación.

El establecimiento de categorías de inmigrantes, es decir, quién entra a un determinado país por razones específicas, no necesariamente está relacionado con las necesidades intrínsecas de sus mercados laborales, a la falta de oferta de trabajadores locales, o a la necesidad de reunificar a familias de extranjeros que han cambiado su estancia de una temporal a una permanente. Son muy pocos los países que planean sus políticas migratorias de acuerdo con sus tasas de natalidad y la demanda de mano de obra necesarias en sus mercados laborales, ya sea de altas o bajas capacidades. Por lo general, en las sociedades industrializadas importadoras de mano de obra extranjera, los empleadores no satisfechos con las cuotas determinadas previamente por el Estado, prefieren contratar inmigrantes informalmente, es decir, migrantes indocumentados. El tiempo que toma al empresario llevar a cabo los trámites burocráticos para importar mano de obra y los salarios más altos que implica contratar a trabajadores locales, hacen que el proceso informal sea más atractivo. Esta práctica ha aumentado significativamente durante las últimas tres décadas, a pesar de las rígidas medidas de seguridad establecidas en cada país para controlar el creciente flujo de indocumentados.

A lo largo de la historia, la opinión pública de las naciones receptoras de migrantes ha reaccionado de diferentes formas con respecto al ingreso cotidiano de flujos migratorios. Estas reacciones por lo general han influido para engendrar un debate al interior de sus sociedades en donde se han manifestado sus sentimientos, actitudes y posiciones ideológicas. Por lo regular este debate ha influido en forma determinante en las posiciones de los formuladores de políticas públicas y, por ende, en cambios específicos de las políticas migratorias tanto a nivel federal como local y estatal.

Durante los últimos años, los debates públicos en las naciones receptoras de una cantidad importante de migrantes han sido extremadamente complejos, sensibles y éticamente difíciles de discutir. En términos generales, dichos debates han

estado centrados en los aspectos negativos de los migrantes no autorizados, que se repliegan o aumentan temporalmente según los auges económicos o crisis coyunturales. En épocas de crisis económicas, además de culparlos por violar las leyes migratorias, pasan a ser los chivos expiatorios y causa de todos los males y, generalmente, se culpa a las autoridades responsables por el laxo control de sus fronteras.

Como resultado de ello, surgen propuestas, iniciativas y reformas de ley de corte restriccionista provenientes tanto de la opinión pública como de autoridades, lo que impacta las políticas migratorias. Reforzar las fronteras para impedir el ingreso de migrantes sin autorización, establecer una mayor vigilancia en los lugares de trabajo para detectarlos y deportarlos a su lugar de origen, constituyen algunas de las políticas que más aplican las autoridades de los principales países receptores de migrantes. Por lo general, éstas concentran sus esfuerzos en la aprehensión de los migrantes en su trayecto al cruzar la frontera o llegar a puerto de entrada, ya que es menos costoso para el Estado receptor. El hecho de localizar al migrante en el interior del país implica castigar a empleadores y a empleados en perjuicio de los negocios, y en ocasiones no existe el deseo de hacerlo. Generalmente, las sanciones que sí existen en los principales países receptores para penalizar a los patrones que a sabiendas contratan a migrantes sin documentos, no son aplicadas. Además, en muchas ocasiones, los gobiernos y congresos de los estados no sólo no castigan al empleador, sino que buscan veladamente satisfacer sus demandas y constantes presiones por la admisión de mano de obra extranjera. Por ello, muchos países receptores de migrantes presentan importantes contradicciones con su realidad, ya que las visas emitidas anualmente para la contratación de trabajadores extranjeros no responde a sus necesidades laborales, de ahí la necesidad de contratar migrantes no autorizados. Las políticas migratorias centradas en seguridad, encaminadas a reforzar la frontera exclusivamente, no conducen sino a la elevación del costo por migrar y los que lucran con ello son los traficantes.

No obstante, el rechazo a los migrantes que se encuentran en forma no autorizada residiendo en determinadas sociedades no sólo responde a crisis económicas sino también a actitudes xenófobas. Abiertamente se cuestionan la posibilidad, capacidad y deseo de que éstos se asimilen plenamente a sus sociedades. Temen que como miembros de minorías perpetúen precisamente su condición de minoría, es decir, que no se asimilen plenamente y que, por ejemplo, no aprendan el idioma oficial y mantengan una identidad fuerte con su país de origen, y que poco a poco se vayan desdibujando los valores del *mainstream* del país receptor.

Políticas migratorias restrictivas

Existen diferentes posiciones y visiones sobre la admisión o establecimiento de migrantes con documentos o sin éstos en los principales países receptores. Las corrientes de opinión denominadas restriccionistas, por lo general estiman que sus sociedades ya tienen suficientes migrantes y que es necesario limitar la inmigración por diversas razones, motivos o principios, desde modestos límites hasta

reducciones significativas. Esta corriente es contraria a la que plantean los expansionistas, quienes propician el ingreso de cuantiosos flujos migratorios tratando de influir sobre los representantes de las instancias responsables —congresos o parlamentos—, para facilitar su ingreso.

Peter Schuck, prestigiado especialista en migración, estima que la mayoría de los expansionistas está de acuerdo con una política flexible de puertas abiertas y que los flujos deben limitarse con aumentos moderados y periódicos. No favorecen una política de fronteras abiertas, ya que por lo general están en contra de la migración no autorizada. Consideran que la migración enriquece su sociedad con individuos provenientes de otras culturas y sus talentos aportan nuevos conocimientos. Los expansionistas de principios —generalmente activistas, académicos o periodistas, entre otros—, creen que una política de puertas abiertas maximiza los derechos individuales en transacciones voluntarias entre individuos y que, por ello, el gobierno no debe limitarlas. En cambio, los expansionistas pragmáticos opinan que esta práctica les reporta beneficios personales y no piensan que sea negativa para sus sociedades. Los principales impulsores son, por lo general, algunos empresarios que requieren de mano obra más barata que la local; grupos étnicos o residentes extranjeros legales que buscan reunirse con sus familiares; sindicatos que necesitan fortalecer sus agrupaciones, y organizaciones civiles, entre otros grupos (Schuck, 1998a: 4). Los expansionistas generalmente son tolerantes ya que tienen una actitud permisiva hacia el ingreso de extranjeros a su país, no necesariamente con las mismas características físicas ligadas a la raza, valores o creencias que las propias.

De la misma manera, Schuck considera que en una sociedad receptora de migrantes se encuentran los más intolerantes, a quienes denomina “restriccionistas de principios”, y los menos, a quienes llama “restriccionistas pragmáticos”. Los restriccionistas de principios piensan cotidianamente que los niveles de inmigración son muy altos y que amenazan ciertos valores de la sociedad o metas políticas; son intolerantes por principio. Por ejemplo, estiman que un crecimiento de población “cero” es esencial para preservar la estabilidad ecológica y que las altas tasas de natalidad de ciertos inmigrantes amenazan dicha estabilidad. Otros han expresado que estas tasas de natalidad son una amenaza para su composición étnica y, la gran mayoría, considera que desplazan a trabajadores locales, absorben los escasos recursos de los programas de bienestar social —principalmente servicios educativos y de salud—, justificando que éstos deben beneficiar principalmente a los ciudadanos. Asimismo, les preocupa la unidad lingüística, la tolerancia religiosa y la coherencia cultural que, en un momento dado, pueden afectar actitudes de solidaridad nacional. Los planteamientos tan controversiales expresados por Samuel Huntington en su libro *Who Are We?* (2004) son un ejemplo claro de esta corriente. Estima que debido al crecimiento desmedido de flujos de inmigrantes a Estados Unidos se advierte una pérdida de las normas y los valores comunes de la población estadounidense, destacando que una América multicultural se convertirá en una América multiredal, situación que no puede sobrevivir debido a que “el credo común estadounidense” constituye la esencia o el pegamento que amalgama a su sociedad.

Así, mientras que los restriccionistas de principios perciben en la inmigración una amenaza a sus valores y metas, los restriccionistas pragmáticos perciben estos conflictos como inherentes e inevitables. Los pragmáticos no se oponen a la inmigración por principio, sino que tienen una posición más abierta, incluso estarían dispuestos a apoyarla, siempre y cuando los inmigrantes proporcionen beneficios económicos o políticos para su economía y sociedad. Es decir, toman en consideración sus raíces históricas como inmigrantes, les atrae la diversidad cultural pero les preocupa su capacidad de asimilación. No obstante, creen que es indispensable establecer ciertos controles para evitar niveles altos de inmigración, es decir, están favorablemente dispuestos a una inmigración regulada y legal (Schuck, 1998a: 240).

Bajo la corriente de pensamiento restriccionista, en el sentido más amplio, analizaremos al racismo y su expresión más común: la discriminación; al nativismo y etnocentrismo y su persistencia hacia una política de asimilación y, finalmente, a la xenofobia, con la que las comunidades o sectores de una sociedad expresan sentimientos antiinmigrantes o resentimientos xenófobos reprimidos y sus consecuencias para la segregación e integración de los migrantes a sus comunidades. Si bien estas actitudes se pueden distinguir analíticamente, a veces las diferencias entre sí se pierden en el debate público; por ejemplo, suelen adjudicar a un acto xenófobo el calificativo de racista.

RACISMO Y DISCRIMINACIÓN

El racismo expresa explícitamente una diferencia en tanto procedencia y color de la piel. Es la identidad consciente que tiene una población o un grupo de personas con sus ancestros, en la que el color de la piel cumple un papel determinante. Asimismo, se puede definir como la creencia o el prejuicio de que la raza constituye la determinante principal de las capacidades humanas y que, en consecuencia, existen ciertas razas superiores a otras, es decir, su eje central es la inferioridad o superioridad de una raza sobre otra.

Históricamente, la categoría “raza” ha sido utilizada como una distinción en la estratificación social de una determinada sociedad, así como para la clasificación de personas o grupos humanos que comparten rasgos físicos y biológicos, como el color de la piel, la estatura, el tipo de pelo, la forma de la cara, entre otras características, que en realidad son diferencias genéticas. Las sociedades “racializadas” se distinguen de otras porque consideran que su estatus sociocultural (educación, ingresos, riqueza, etc.) es utilizado como un criterio para definir raza (Harrison, ed., 2005: 9).

El racismo ha influido en guerras, prácticas de esclavitud, legislaciones y políticas migratorias. El ejemplo más notorio fue la esclavitud; cuando algunas potencias europeas, así como Estados Unidos, importaron africanos para trabajar como esclavos, bajo la creencia de que eran menos humanos, especies “deficientes o salvajes” y que podrían realizar trabajos arduos sin problema.¹ En un momento dado,

¹ En la rica bibliografía existente sobre los términos de raza y etnia en Estados Unidos, frecuentemente se señala que los estadounidenses “blancos” establecieron una relación de subordinación con todos los

se llegó a creer que una persona podría ser menos humana que otra debido a su tipología o rasgos físicos e intelectuales que la caracterizaban. En la segunda mitad del siglo XIX, algunos científicos, mayoritariamente europeos, trataron de comprobar la supremacía de los blancos sobre los de origen judío, culminando con su trágica aniquilación. Así, el racismo ha existido siempre y se ha proyectado por medio de creencias y prácticas sociales que conforman una estructura opresiva de relaciones de poder e incluso instituciones (Harrison, ed., 2005: 145-166). El efecto ha sido discriminar y marginalizar severamente a una clase de personas que comparten una designación racial común, actitudes que violan los derechos básicos de la dignidad humana.

La discriminación, que proviene del prejuicio de las diferencias raciales, es decir, que favorece a una raza, grupo étnico o género sobre otro en una sociedad determinada, por lo general dificulta la aceptación social y por lo tanto su integración y asimilación a sus sociedades. Si una decisión adoptada a nivel federal o estatal, cualquiera que ésta sea, está basada en cuestiones raciales, constituye una discriminación y ésta, por lo general, está prohibida por la ley de varios países. Desgraciadamente, las prohibiciones en contra de la discriminación no proveen una guía aceptable de cómo lograr alcanzar una justa equidad. De la misma manera, ninguna teoría comprensiva de equidad determina las prohibiciones legales que se requieren para combatir la discriminación; en cambio, sí existen muchas teorías que explican lo que se requiere para alcanzar la equidad, las cuales pueden ser invocadas para entender el concepto de discriminación o “daltonismo” (*colorblindness*). Muchos teóricos, tanto conservadores como liberales, a través de diferentes métodos de razonamiento, consideran la necesidad de prohibir la discriminación en su sentido más ampliamente aceptado, es decir, como una acción en contra de los miembros de un grupo minoritario, que tiene derecho a solicitar su protección. Estoy de acuerdo con Rutherglen (2004), quien considera que la discriminación racial es ilegal, inmoral, inconstitucional y destructiva para una sociedad democrática, y estima que es indispensable reconocer los derechos de grupos discriminados para que logren equidad y reconocimiento en sus sociedades.

Durante las últimas décadas se han firmado varios tratados internacionales con el fin de terminar con el racismo. Dichos tratados no sólo prohíben la discriminación racial sino incentivan a que las sociedades se comprometan a establecer políticas que promuevan la equidad. Esta obligación es particularmente importante no únicamente en materia de discriminación directa, sino también en la indirecta —que discrimina a un grupo contra otro, reflejada por lo general en desventajas particulares—, resultado de problemas estructurales en una determinada sociedad. La ONU, por medio de la Convención internacional para la eliminación de todas las formas de discriminación racial, adoptada en 1965, estableció la necesidad de eliminar la discriminación racial en todas sus formas y manifestaciones y asegurar la compren-

que no provenían de Europa occidental; aquéllos crearon una conciencia de raza o etnia —la predominancia de una raza sobre otra.

sión y el respeto de la dignidad de las personas.² Es decir, se establecen sanciones para las naciones que apliquen este tipo de políticas y se garantiza el derecho de toda persona a la igualdad ante la ley sin distinción de raza, color y origen nacional o étnico.

Es un hecho que la percepción de un trato diferente o actos de prejuicio basados en raza, etnicidad o género han tenido impactos negativos o acciones o comportamientos no esperados en diferentes sociedades. La formación de asociaciones o coaliciones —institucionalizadas o informales— surge, pues, para canalizar las demandas de intereses y percepciones comunes por parte de un grupo que se siente discriminado (García, 2000: 265-266).

NATIVISMO Y ETNOCENTRISMO:

LA PERSISTENCIA HACIA UNA POLÍTICA DE ASIMILACIÓN

Los nacionalistas son por lo general ciudadanos que sienten una extraordinaria lealtad a su país, y perciben sus tradiciones y su cultura más importantes que las de cualquier otra nación. El nativismo constituye una corriente de pensamiento anglosajón que pretende conservar a su nación predominantemente blanca, de origen europeo y de preferencia protestante, por lo que es claramente racista. John Higham define al nativismo como intensa oposición a una minoría, bajo la premisa de sus conexiones extranjeras. Sostiene que a través de cada muestra de hostilidad, corre, simultáneamente, la fuerza energizante del nacionalismo moderno (Higham, 1963: 4). Así, los nativistas tienden a ser aislacionistas, pues pretenden conservar a su nación con personas que presenten los mismos rasgos físicos y características culturales.

Los nativistas estiman se debe otorgar a los ciudadanos nacionales más derechos que a los extranjeros, y por ello, contribuyen a la formación del pensamiento xenófobo. Perciben a los inmigrantes como un grupo potencialmente problemático, social y culturalmente diferente, y que se puede constituir en una amenaza para la nación; representa la oposición más radical a las minorías internas, sobre la base de sus lazos con extranjeros (Delaet, 2000: 24).

El nativismo, en el caso de Estados Unidos y Canadá, no se refiere a las comunidades indígenas, sino a las de origen anglosajón que se convirtieron, desde la formación del Estado-nación, en la población dominante en términos demográficos, políticos y culturales. El nativismo estadounidense, por ejemplo, ha tomado varias formas: en primer término, se impuso el retorno de negros a sus países de origen —inicialmente importados como esclavos—. A principios del siglo XX, se recurrió

² Dicha convención señala: “[...] convencidos de que toda doctrina de superioridad basada en la diferenciación racial es científicamente falsa, moralmente condenable y socialmente injusta y peligrosa y que nada en la teoría y en la práctica permite justificar, en ninguna parte, la discriminación racial [...]” (ACNUR, 1965).

a la biología, la antropología y la psicología para demostrar que las otras razas o etnias —en ese entonces era claramente tendencioso en contra de los judíos, los europeos del este y los asiáticos—, contaminarían y terminarían por acabar con la genuina y “casi perfecta” raza blanca. Posteriormente, la corriente nativista de la segunda mitad del siglo XX puso énfasis en las fronteras con el fin de limitar su territorio y conservar su cultura. Desde entonces, éstas han sido definidas como muros o murallas altas y rígidas, que se deben construir con el fin de dividir, vigilar y, en su caso, detener la entrada de extranjeros “no autorizados”, a quienes en principio consideraban personas “no deseables”, vagos y semicriminales, que según la percepción de ese entonces decoloraban, afeaban, contaminaban y agredían su primacía blanca. Es decir, que ciertas razas eran intelectual y culturalmente inferiores a la de la mayoría blanca, y que presentan dificultades para asimilarse.

Las antipatías culturales y los juicios etnocéntricos constituyen las características más evidentes de los nativistas, y son generalmente las armas que utilizan para destruir a sus enemigos no pertenecientes a su nación. El etnocentrismo —que se refiere a la posesión de un ancestro común— es el mecanismo de protección que utiliza un determinado grupo cuando se siente amenazado por condicionantes externas. En la ideología estadounidense, por ejemplo, las rivalidades etnocéntricas y las presiones demográficas han tenido un papel importante en la conformación del mito fundacional (Higham, 1999: 45).

David Gutierrez define la etnicidad como una categoría socialmente construida que incluye elementos culturales de genotipo, lengua y de un determinado grupo social (Gutierrez, 1995: 7). Peter Schuck la define como la percepción que una sociedad tiene sobre “lo que distingue” (*distinctiveness*), lo singular a un determinado grupo basado en características físicas, ancestrales o culturales (Schuck, 2003: 9).

Se podría decir, entonces, que el nativismo constituye una ideología que amalgama a sus miembros por los valores comunes que profesan y que, por cierto, son heredados y no se pueden aprender. Estiman que la cultura, hábitos e ideas de ciertos extranjeros —no anglosajones en el caso estadounidense—, son inferiores a los de ellos. La cultura puede definirse desde diferentes perspectivas, una de las cuales es muy simple: es comparable a una “caja de herramientas”, en la cual distintos símbolos, historias, rituales y formas de ver el mundo ayudan a los individuos a percibir y resolver problemas concretos (Joppke, 2000: 145-158).

En general, el nativismo constituye una posición más discriminatoria que la xenofobia, una especie de racismo, ya que cree en la superioridad racial y moral de los habitantes originarios, pero sobre todo presupone la homogeneidad de una nación. Ser nativista demanda no sólo la exclusión de ciertos grupos extranjeros considerados como “inferiores” racial y culturalmente, sino que conduce a posiciones de dominio de unas culturas sobre otras en el mismo país.

Estas corrientes de pensamiento nativistas y exclusionistas han surgido en diferentes estratos de las sociedades y, por lo general, han estado presentes en la historia de la inmigración de varios países receptores de inmigrantes. La actitud de ostracismo adoptada por algunos nativistas en épocas de crisis económicas ha es-

tado dirigida a utilizar soluciones extremas, como repatriar o deportar masivamente a inmigrantes considerados como los chivos expiatorios de todos sus males.

Independientemente del concepto o categoría de que se trate, los representantes del nativismo anglosajón casi siempre han considerado que su cultura debe predominar sobre cualquier otra. Para ellos, las cuestiones étnicas siempre han sido percibidas como un problema de asimilación. En el caso de la cultura estadounidense en las primeras décadas del siglo XX, se pensaba que el continuo flujo de inmigrantes con diversas tradiciones y culturas propiciaría relaciones entre los diferentes grupos étnicos y que, al interactuar, poco a poco irían conformando una sociedad cada vez más homogénea. Por ello surgió el proceso de “americanización”, propiciado por los nativistas por el temor del arribo de inmigrantes no blancos y bajo el cual el inmigrante debía adaptarse a los parámetros de una cultura anglosajona. Se estimó que este proceso aliviaría las tensiones raciales que habían emergido con gran fuerza. Por ende, los inmigrantes debían paulatinamente “asimilarse” a la sociedad receptora, lo que equivalía a una imposición de los valores de la cultura predominante sobre cualquier otra.

La asimilación es el proceso de adaptación social a la sociedad receptora, ocultando o incluso perdiendo los valores de identidad de su cultura de origen. Milton Gordon plantea varias etapas para lograr este proceso y advierte las múltiples barreras a las cuales se enfrenta el inmigrante, una de las cuales es la discriminación por parte de la cultura receptora (Gordon, 1966: 72). Esta discriminación proviene precisamente de las características raciales y étnicas que distinguen claramente al inmigrante de la mayoría de los miembros de la sociedad receptora.

XENOFOBIA: UN IMPEDIMENTO PARA LA INTEGRACIÓN DE LOS MIGRANTES

Xenofobia, como su nombre lo indica, expresa una fobia o temor hacia los extranjeros, a la “otredad”, a lo “extraño” y diferente en una determinada comunidad, muchas veces irracional, pero que puede alcanzar sentimientos de odio agudos. Por lo general, la xenofobia surge cuando un grupo de personas de origen extranjero que habita en una ciudad o comunidad determinada es crecientemente visible, lo cual provoca reacciones de rechazo porque los nacionales desean distanciarse y diferenciarse de ellos.

A través de los años han surgido movimientos xenófobos o antiinmigrantes como una respuesta de rechazo al crecimiento del flujo de migrantes en un determinado lugar. Por lo general, los inmigrantes arriban a sitios que son demandados por diferentes razones, principalmente por ofertas de trabajo o reunificación familiar, lugares que constituyen los enclaves en donde, simultáneamente o como consecuencia, surgen y florecen los movimientos xenófobos. Aun más, la situación se agrava cuando flujos migratorios no esperados arriban en cantidades mayores a las que normalmente se esperan o aceptan y los sentimientos antiinmigrantes tienden a florecer y, por ende, a exaltarse. En ocasiones llegan a adoptar actitudes violentas.

tas, como ha ocurrido en diversas etapas de la historia europea, estadounidense, canadiense, entre varios países.

En virtud del crecimiento tan importante de la migración a nivel mundial durante las últimas décadas propiciado por la globalización, muchos países reciben extranjeros que hablan una lengua diferente, que mantienen creencias y tradiciones culturales opuestas a las suyas, y es común que muestren temor a lo desconocido con actitudes xenófobas que justifican sus temores (Bordeau, 2010: 7). En tiempos de crisis económicas, cuando las tasas de desempleo ascienden significativamente, estos temores se acentúan y se culpa a los migrantes.

Por el contrario, las sociedades receptoras de inmigrantes no xenófobas tienen políticas de aceptación e integración que facilitan su inclusión a comunidades específicas o sociedades en general. Mediante el proceso de integración el migrante se incorpora social y económicamente a una comunidad sin perder o abandonar su identidad cultural, simultáneamente respetando la cultura con la cual debe convivir. Las diferentes olas migratorias a países receptores han pasado por diversos procesos de integración: a través de la unión y residencia con sus familiares, mediante las relaciones intermatrimoniales que han surgido de la convivencia durante un periodo específico de estancia en el país receptor, entre otros factores (Mc Daniel, 1995: 179-197). En teoría, los procesos de integración deben permitir una creciente homogeneización o aceptación de las culturas, y se debe conformar un ambiente plenamente multicultural en las sociedades receptoras de migrantes; por ende, el temor a la “otredad” debe diluirse, y como consecuencia deben disminuir las actitudes xenófobas.

Cabe destacar que el multiculturalismo es un concepto flexible, incluso dentro de una sociedad específica y se ha aplicado de diferentes formas. Pero, en términos generales, esta noción se refiere a un amplio rango de formas de interacción en sociedades que contienen una variedad de culturas. Habitualmente, el término multiculturalismo se usa en contextos de movilizaciones que utilizan símbolos raciales y étnicos para demandar derechos culturales y sociales, así como el derecho a la representación política. El multiculturalismo debe ser visto como parte de la lucha de las minorías que gozan de una “inclusión igualitaria” y es al mismo tiempo la afirmación de las diferencias culturales a partir de las demandas de autenticidad étnica o racial (Solomos y Schuster, 2000: 407-424). Para los estadounidenses nativistas, el *melting pot* o “crisol de razas” constituía el proceso idóneo por medio del cual la fusión de varias culturas conllevaría al surgimiento de la cultura americana. Ingenuamente suponían que estos migrantes convivirían en armonía y lucharían por esta nueva nación que los acogía y, por ende, abandonarían sus propias culturas para formar una nueva. No obstante, a lo largo de las décadas, el proceso de la fusión de culturas tan diferentes a la predominantemente anglosajona (asiáticas, latinas, árabes, africanas, entre otras), no ha sido tan simple como los nativistas suponían. Por ello, Nathan Glazer estimó que el continuo flujo de inmigrantes impedía la cohesión de una comunidad, pues no les permitía insertarse plenamente en una sociedad determinada (Glazer, 1985: 216). Joppke diferencia al multiculturalismo estadounidense que considera la inmigración una respuesta a la opresión de los afro-

americanos, indígenas e hispanos, mientras que el multiculturalismo inglés o alemán es una respuesta simple a la inmigración.

En virtud de que los inmigrantes forman parte de una clase socioeconómica y de una comunidad cultural en una determinada sociedad, por lo general no son incorporados o integrados totalmente, a menos que el Estado receptor acepte, con cierto compromiso, sus diferencias culturales. De ahí que existen ciertos países que han adoptado políticas de integración. Un ejemplo destacado ha sido la política del multiculturalismo que implementó el gobierno de Canadá en octubre de 1971, la cual encuentra su fundamento teórico en el pluralismo cultural. Dicha teoría plantea la convivencia de diversas comunidades etnoculturales en una misma sociedad, respetando la identidad y los derechos de las comunidades ajenas a la propia. Es decir, dicha política no tiene como objetivo homogeneizar una identidad nacional única, sino conformar una nación mediante la preservación, coexistencia y colaboración de y entre diversas identidades culturales.³ En el caso canadiense, la política del multiculturalismo sirvió como punto de partida de la identidad social de Canadá como nación, con el fin de que los individuos de diversas culturas o identidades, por lo general minorías visibles no anglosajonas, pudieran integrarse y participar en la vida democrática de forma igualitaria y no fuesen relegados de las estructuras políticas y sociales del país.⁴

En términos generales, el inmigrante selecciona los elementos culturales (la lengua) y socioeconómicos (vivienda o empleo) indispensables para su sobrevivencia en la sociedad receptora, pero no necesariamente tiene que desechar sus valores culturales (religión, lengua, indumentaria, etc.); se integran a la comunidad receptora sin perder su identidad. En los debates contemporáneos sobre la identidad, el término se ha relacionado con el hecho de “pertenecer”, o sentido de pertenencia, como miembro a un grupo determinado, el cual puede ser étnico. La identidad contiene conceptos de inclusión y exclusión: para ser “nosotros” se necesita de unos “otros”, no obstante, en ocasiones se requiere un enemigo externo para unificarse y tener una identidad común. Así, el término identidad social se refiere al sentido que tiene una persona de pertenecer a un determinado grupo y el valor que éste le otorga al hecho de pertenecer (Schildkraut, 2011: 5). Las identidades colectivas están formadas por un determinado grupo que se reconoce a sí mismo con un pa-

³ El primer ministro Pierre Elliott Trudeau, del Partido Liberal, en su discurso para implementar la política del multiculturalismo en 1971 señaló: “El pluralismo cultural es la esencia propia de la sociedad canadiense. Todos los grupos étnicos tienen el derecho de preservar y enriquecer la cultura y los valores que les son propios. Al decir que existen dos lenguas oficiales, no decimos que tenemos dos culturas oficiales, y ninguna cultura determinada es más oficial que otra. Los objetivos consisten en proteger las libertades básicas, desarrollar la identidad canadiense, ampliar la participación de los ciudadanos, reforzar la unidad canadiense y fomentar la diversidad cultural (Helley, 2007).

⁴ Con el fin de implementar esta política se establecieron las siguientes medidas: *a*) apoyo estatal a los grupos étnico-culturales para el reforzamiento de su identidad cultural; *b*) derrocamiento de las barreras culturales para promover la completa participación en la sociedad canadiense; *c*) establecimiento del intercambio cultural entre los diversos grupos étnico-culturales y *d*) enseñanza oficial del idioma a los inmigrantes (Gagnon e Iacovino, 2008: 179).

sado común, es decir, una memoria colectiva que los une y los identifica. Esta memoria colectiva va acompañada de nociones, ideas y recuerdos sobre las identidades de otras naciones, por lo que los debates sobre las diferencias culturales caen fácilmente en el nacionalismo y la tramposa suposición de la superioridad de un grupo sobre otro (Solomos y Schuster, 2000: 74-91). Así, en una sociedad en donde existe una gran diversidad de razas, etnias y culturas procedentes de diversas regiones del mundo, resulta inevitable la interacción entre éstas, y es precisamente a través de este intercambio que se establecen las diferenciaciones culturales entre las que interactúan, y surge la concepción de lo otro, lo diferente, es decir, las razas y las etnias.

Estimamos que el eje central de la unificación o de la integración se da bajo el supuesto respeto de una cultura hacia otra con la que tiene que convivir. Robert Miles considera que es un proceso en el cual un grupo con una cultura distinta (incluida la religión, la lengua y la vestimenta) se adapta a (y es aceptada por) un grupo más amplio sin ser forzado a cambiar sus rasgos culturales y prácticas asociadas a favor de las de la mayoría (Miles, 1992: 146-149).

Para muchos, este proceso de integración ha sido definido como pluralismo cultural, en el sentido de la coexistencia mutuamente aceptada de culturas. Por esta razón, cualquier acto de discriminación de una sociedad determinada hacia un extranjero o un grupo de ellos, producto de su intolerancia que conlleva a actitudes xenófobas, impide la aceptación plena de la diversidad cultural y racial de otras etnias o culturas y, por ende, dificulta o impide la integración plena a su sociedad.

La nueva era xenófoba del siglo XXI en Estados Unidos

Durante la primera década del siglo XXI, los flujos migratorios se han incrementado significativamente en varias regiones del mundo y con ello se ha generado una creciente diversidad de grupos étnicos en varias naciones. Algunos países de la Unión Europea, así como Estados Unidos y Canadá, y crecientemente China y Australia, continúan siendo importantes receptores de migrantes. En virtud de este rápido crecimiento de migrantes, necesario para sus mercados laborales, simultáneamente han surgido movimientos sumamente agresivos que se oponen a su ingreso por diferentes razones, principalmente por su diversidad, por ser extraños y diferentes, exaltando una retórica antiinmigrante y evocando precisamente la importancia de conservar una identidad social colectiva. En el caso de Estados Unidos, el creciente incremento de la diversidad etnoracial se ha percibido como una amenaza a su sociedad y ha surgido la necesidad imperante de debatir sobre el ingreso y permanencia de los nuevos flujos migratorios. Grupos nativistas xenófobos, con ciertos tintes racistas, como serían los restriccionistas de principios, han mostrado sentimientos antiinmigrantes que se agudizan conforme la diversidad aumenta, especialmente hacia los grupos “no blancos”, como son los latinos, asiáticos y afroamericanos. Algunos de estos sentimientos se han expresado mediante ataques

brutales, en forma violenta, hacia migrantes principalmente no autorizados y de raza no blanca que, por lo general, son más visibles y ocupan trabajos de baja capacitación que los locales rechazan.

Simultáneamente el terrorismo y los frecuentes ataques por grupos extremistas durante la última década, por lo general de origen musulmán, han agravado la situación. Los ataques terroristas al World Trade Center en Nueva York y al Pentágono en Arlington, Virginia, el 11 de septiembre de 2001, perpetuados por musulmanes extremistas asociados con la organización Al Qaeda y su líder Osama Bin Laden, así como los acaecidos en Madrid, también un día 11 de marzo de 2004 con la destrucción de una estación de tren, y los ataques a varias las estaciones de metro en Londres el 7 de julio del 2005, han tenido como consecuencia reacciones altamente xenófobas en contra de los extranjeros, principalmente quienes tengan apariencia árabe. La reacción inmediata ha sido la securitización de las políticas exteriores en general y el establecimiento de políticas migratorias aún más restrictivas que antes. Ello ha ocasionado la exacerbación de sentimientos antiinmigrantes que han surgido con gran vehemencia, de corte racista, semejantes a los antisemiticos.

El surgimiento de la islamofobia, la xenofobia dirigida a todos aquellos que se definen como musulmanes y que profesan el islam, ha aumentado durante esta última década, ya que esta religión se ha relacionado con actitudes violentas y destructivas. Por ello, el perfil racial (*racial profiling*) se ha exacerbado en Estados Unidos y en algunos países de la Unión Europea, y puede definirse como el proceso por el cual se singulariza (*singling out*) a ciertos individuos, basado en sus antecedentes étnicos como un medio para determinar la proclividad a cometer crímenes. Es evidente, entonces, que el perfil racial es una forma de racismo y, por supuesto, de xenofobia, ya que estimula el comportamiento de sospechar, prejuiciar y estereotipar al extranjero y refuerza la intolerancia a la "otredad" y el temor basado exclusivamente en la raza y la etnicidad.

Como señalé con anterioridad, una de las razones que han influido en el repunte de estos severos sentimientos antiinmigrantes ha sido la aguda crisis económica y financiera a nivel mundial del fin de la primera década del siglo XXI, que ha tenido como consecuencia altas tasas de desempleo. Ello ha conllevado a nuevas y vehementes percepciones de sociedades envejecidas que, a pesar de que están conscientes de que requieren de mano de obra extranjera barata y joven, pues la local es insuficiente para satisfacer sus múltiples necesidades laborales, simultáneamente responden con acciones antiinmigrantes, rechazando su ingreso y apoyando su deportación.

En este sentido, es indispensable mencionar al movimiento ultraconservador Tea Party, del cual muchos de sus exponentes son conocidos por sus ataques virulentos, principalmente a inmigrantes indocumentados. Este movimiento ha emergido como una fuerza política significativa y amalgama miembros de los sectores más conservadores. Sus seguidores han batallado para ganar el alma del Partido Republicano,⁵

⁵ En varios estados, los miembros del Tea Party han ganado la nominación de varios candidatos como senadores contra republicanos que previamente habían anunciado su nominación.

quienes buscan canalizar su frustración contra el gobierno de Barack Obama, con la ex gobernadora de Alaska, Sarah Palin, como protagonista. El Tea Party ganó visibilidad en abril del 2010 con la convocatoria de centenares de manifestaciones simultáneas en todo el país, para protestar por el elevado gasto público de la Casa Blanca para sacar al país de la crisis.

Estados Unidos es la nación que recibe más migrantes con y sin documentos, pues absorbe el 20 por ciento de la población que se mueve en el mundo. Acepta aproximadamente un millón de inmigrantes anualmente, residentes permanentes. Asimismo, es el país que más trabajadores temporales extranjeros contrata anualmente, sea con o sin documentos.⁶ Es inconcebible que 11 500 000 indocumentados se encuentren residiendo en forma irregular y que muchos de ellos hayan colaborado laborando por varios años para el desarrollo económico de su país, y no tengan derechos laborales y en muchas ocasiones se violen sus derechos humanos. Pocas veces se les ha reconocido que su mano de obra y los gastos erogados e invertidos por ellos en su territorio han sido de gran beneficio para su economía.

De acuerdo con el censo de 2010, la población de origen latino era de 50.5 millones que constituyó el 16.5 por ciento de una población de 308.5 millones de habitantes, una aumentó del 43 por ciento en una década, ya que esta población era de 35.3 millones en 2000 (12.5 por ciento). Es evidente que la inmigración y fertilidad son los factores que inciden en el terreno ganado por los latinos en la demografía estadounidense. El número de personas de origen o nacidas en México que residen en territorio de Estados Unidos se elevó a 31.8 millones, que representan dos terceras partes de la población latina y 12.5 por ciento de la estadounidense.⁷ La creciente presencia de estos extranjeros, la mayoría de ellos “no blancos” como los latinos, especialmente los mexicanos, se han concentrado en ciertos estados del sur de Estados Unidos, en donde el rechazo es aun mayor. Acorde con su físico y estatus legal, los estadounidenses WASP tienden a estereotiparlos, categorizarlos y hasta discriminarlos, por lo que se han reforzado sus actitudes xenófobas y sus temores a lo extraño. Ello no sólo ha aminorado las posibilidades de lograr la integración a las comunidades donde se encuentran residiendo, sino por el contrario, las actitudes y percepciones se han polarizado en forma extrema, pues se ha llegado a adoptar posiciones altamente restrictivas, como frenar la inmigración definitivamente o actitudes intolerantes e intransigentes, como forzar su asimilación mediante medidas coercitivas (Telles y Ortiz, 2007: 292). Esta situación indica lo inoperante y contradictorio de su actual sistema migratorio, en el que se encuentra el número más cuantioso de indocumentados a nivel mundial, quienes han sido bienvenidos como mano de obra barata cuando su mercado de trabajo los demanda, pero también los rechaza, cuando no los ocupa, con actitudes xenófobas e impulsos nativistas, conservadores y extremistas que llegan a estereotiparlos como migrantes

⁶ Durante el 2007, se emitieron 337 321 visas para trabajadores temporales extranjeros, la mayor cifra registrada. Posteriormente descendió, debido a la crisis económica.

⁷ Se calcula que 11.7 millones nacieron en México (37 por ciento), 20 por ciento son ciudadanos estadounidenses y 63 por ciento llegaron después de 1990 (Pew Hispanic Center, 2011).

criminales o no asimilables, cuando en la mayoría de los casos tan sólo han violado sus leyes migratorias para laborar.

Esta situación ha provocado que muchos grupos y organizaciones antiinmigrantes con fuertes resentimientos hayan cometido actos hostiles o adversos contra la presencia de migrantes principalmente no autorizados en “su” territorio. En forma colectiva se han pronunciado con juicios negativos, protestan por canales informales o institucionales y realizan actos contra grupos o minorías determinadas, por lo general “no blancos”. Es importante destacar que estos grupos u organizaciones se encuentran bien organizados, de tal forma que sus quejas han sido esbozadas en un tono muy alto y con mucho más vigor que la mayoría silenciosa y, por desgracia, han sido escuchadas y han tenido un gran impacto entre la opinión pública estadounidense. Los culpan de todos sus males, sobre todo de que representan una carga económica y social no sólo en sus países, sino en cada una de sus localidades (municipios, estados o provincias). La percepción ha sido negativa desde hace dos décadas, con la diferencia que en los noventa gozó de un incremento sostenido y fueron contratados múltiples migrantes indocumentados en los mercados laborales. A fines de la década de los noventa se consideraba:

la percepción actual sobre los inmigrantes ha cambiado radicalmente pues son calificados como problemáticos y representan una carga importante para su sociedad. Los conservadores estiman que el flujo de inmigrantes es demasiado alto y utilizan los servicios sociales en mayor proporción al pago de sus impuestos. Los culpan de que son los causantes de impuestos altos por dólares mal gastados en los servicios sociales; por la pérdida de empleos; por los altos costos para la educación; por incrementos sustantivos en el crimen; y aún más contradictorio: por traer enfermedades a Estados Unidos. Si a estos argumentos les aunamos otros más ya muy sabidos del pasado como que les quitan a los trabajadores nativos sus empleos, abaratan los sueldos, no se asimilan rápidamente porque no aprenden inglés e introducen costumbres extranjeras del todo inaceptables en la sociedad norteamericana, entre otros, encontramos que son percibidos muy negativamente (Verea, 1999a: 98).

¿Qué podríamos añadir a los argumentos esbozados en aquel entonces? Que dada la creciente política restrictiva, sobre todo a partir de los ataques terroristas del 2001, los acusan de que les quitan los recursos que podrían ser utilizados por los ciudadanos o residentes legales; que están aún más dispuestos a trabajar por salarios muy por debajo del estándar, y que son percibidos como una amenaza para la seguridad del empleo; que atentan contra la seguridad ya que son criminales potenciales, y no se aplican sanciones a los ambiciosos y poco escrupulosos empresarios que los contratan como mano de obra mucho más barata que la local, entre otros.

Es importante destacar que los medios de comunicación masiva han desempeñado un papel muy importante para promover un ambiente antiinmigrante. Varios programas de radio y televisión y fuentes de Internet han transmitido programas o mensajes antiinmigrantes, caracterizando a los migrantes provenientes de México y Centroamérica como criminales, invasores o hasta los llaman “cucarachas”. Es

decir, se ha creado una retórica cada vez más hostil y un aumento significativo de los “discursos de odio”. Cabe destacar que los crecientes sentimientos antiinmigrantes no reflejan exclusivamente los puntos de vista de la mayoría de los estadounidenses, ni necesariamente constituyen la mayoría de los comentarios de los medios. En 2006, antes de la crisis económica, muchos estadounidenses estaban de acuerdo con la necesidad de aprobar una reforma migratoria (Schildkraut, 2011: 37).

Otro cambio significativo en la última década ha sido el surgimiento de grupos civiles extremistas, nativistas, altamente organizados para colaborar en la detección y deportación de migrantes indocumentados. Un ejemplo claro es el Minuteman Project, grupo extremista nativista que desde la década anterior se ha dedicado a vigilar la frontera Estados Unidos-México, pues estiman que la realizada por el gobierno federal y local no es suficiente; consideran a los migrantes personas violentas y criminales que no tienen problema en robar y atacan a ciudadanos estadounidenses (Bordeau, 2010: 21). Estos grupos civiles, también denominados de “odio”, realizan actividades a su juicio indispensables para frenar el flujo de migrantes “no controlado por las autoridades competentes”.

A pesar de que se realizaron esfuerzos importantes por llevar a cabo una reforma migratoria integral, no fue aprobada en 2007.⁸ Tardíamente el presidente George W. Bush apoyó el proyecto McCain-Kennedy, pero estos esfuerzos fueron insuficientes para persuadir a la mayoría en el Senado sobre la importancia de aprobar una reforma migratoria (Verea, 2008a). Los conservadores —restriccionistas de principios— se opusieron fundamentalmente al programa de amnistía, en virtud de que a los inmigrantes “ilegales” se les brindaría la posibilidad eventual de un “paso a la ciudadanía”. Asimismo se criticó la competencia del gobierno para monitorear la frontera, a pesar de las cuantiosas inversiones erogadas en su frontera sur.⁹ Los republicanos más liberales —restriccionistas pragmáticos— ponderaron la emisión de más visas de trabajo temporales a extranjeros, quizás por el mismo hecho de que, dada la cuantiosa oferta de mano de obra “no autorizada”, la cual brindaba mayores beneficios económicos a sus importantes negocios, hipócritamente estiman que no es necesaria. Algunos, sin embargo, consideraron la necesidad de contar con mano de obra extranjera temporal, con la advertencia de que un programa de trabajadores huéspedes atraería a nuevos migrantes no autorizados, tal como sucedió con el Convenio de Braceros 1942-1964 (Verea, 2003).

En virtud del fracaso de la reforma migratoria y como consecuencia de ello, simultáneamente han surgido innumerables y crueles iniciativas estatales durante

⁸ La Comprehensive Immigration Reform Bill (CIRB) fracasó por tercera vez en dos años. Los senadores Edward Kennedy y John McCain, así como Mel Martinez y Chuck Hagel, plantearon en diversas ocasiones proyectos de reforma migratoria, los cuales no se aprobaron (para mayor información consúltese Verea, 2010: 37-38).

⁹ Durante las dos gestiones de la administración de Bush (2000-2008), el gobierno federal y el Congreso aprobaron impresionantes recursos para reforzar aun más la frontera con México. Ello conllevó a una mayor institucionalización y sofisticación de la tecnología aplicada para la vigilancia fronteriza y a un aumento impresionante del número de aprehensiones en su frontera sur. Para mayor información consúltese Verea, 2008a: 109-130.

la década anterior, las cuales han construido desconfianza y odio entre las comunidades. Sin la plena conciencia y aceptación de que los migrantes se encuentran en múltiples estados trabajando para su desarrollo económico, algunos estados están desempeñando un papel clave y muy activo, y ya no se limitan exclusivamente a la jurisdicción federal para el control a la migración, lo cual crea una percepción aun más negativa de la presencia de indocumentados. Bajo la premisa de que el Congreso no ha actuado ante el tema migratorio que es de competencia federal, y la supuesta Reforma Migratoria se encuentra hasta ahora congelada, prácticamente cada legislatura estatal está discutiendo y, en algunos casos aprobando, medidas de control migratorio muy estrictas en contra de la presencia de migrantes indocumentados, lo que ha propiciado un importante incremento en los sentimientos y actitudes antiinmigratorias. A pesar de que las iniciativas difieren entre estados, los de Arizona y California son de los más “prolíficos” y agresivos, quizás porque han experimentado un rápido crecimiento poblacional de inmigrantes, lo que ha influido en cambios culturales que causan fricciones entre sus residentes. Dichos estados han aprobado iniciativas de ley altamente antiinmigratorias, y llenan el vacío que no ha llenado una reestructuración de su quebrantado sistema migratorio.

La ley SB1070 de Arizona aprobada parcialmente, ya que fue considerada por el gobierno federal como anticonstitucional,¹⁰ da derecho a la policía a detener y expulsar personas “a partir de sus apariencias, y la principal apariencia es el color de la piel”. Esta ley ha tenido consecuencias muy serias y sentó un precedente de una actitud altamente xenófoba que, por desgracia, ha contaminado a otros sectores de la sociedad. Estados como Alabama y Georgia han aprobado iniciativas similares, y también autorizan a las policías locales verificar el estatus migratorio de los residentes y a arrestar a quienes no puedan comprobar su residencia legal dentro del país. Asimismo, sanciona a las personas que faciliten el transporte y el albergue de indocumentados. Adicionalmente, exige que los negocios con más de cinco empleados utilicen el programa de verificación migratoria “E-Verify”, que se ha cuadruplicado en los últimos dos años.

Los restriccionistas de principios han llegado más allá de lo imaginable. En varios estados¹¹ —obviamente Arizona encabezando, durante nueve meses, después de que la gobernadora Jan Brewer promulgara la polémica ley SB1070 (Verea, 2010b; 2010c)— se han presentado propuestas de ley para eliminar la ciudadanía automática, y no permitir que los hijos de migrantes indocumentados que nazcan en territorio estadounidense o el estado que lo propone adquieran la ciudadanía estadounidense, un derecho garantizado por la Decimocuarta Enmienda de la Cons-

¹⁰ Una juez federal logró nulificar ciertos elementos de la medida antes de que ésta entrara en vigor en 2010. La reciente iniciativa SB1117 propuesta en Arizona otorga poder para contratar abogados que inicien procesos legales ante las cortes estatales y federales en defensa de la SB1070.

¹¹ Pensilvania, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Misisipi, Montana, Nebraska, Nueva Hampshire, Oklahoma, Texas y Utah se encuentran entre éstos. Estados como Misisipi, Tennessee, Kentucky y Virginia —que normalmente no son lugares donde la inmigración indocumentada sería un problema— están considerando proyectos de ley que tratan de reprimir a los inmigrantes indocumentados.

titución de Estados Unidos.¹² En realidad, la meta del proyecto no es que cada estado de la nación promulgue dicha ley, sino llevar la disputa a las cortes, con la esperanza de reducir los costos asociados con otorgar la ciudadanía automática, pero refleja una actitud nativista y xenófoba.¹³

Reflexiones finales

La incapacidad para llegar a un acuerdo o reforma migratoria durante la primera década del siglo XXI, y las escasas perspectivas en 2011, dado que no cuenta con el apoyo suficiente del presidente Barack Obama ni del liderazgo demócrata y republicano en el Congreso, dejan abiertas las puertas para que varios estados recrudescan sus acciones contra los inmigrantes ilegales. Entre la comunidad migrante latina permea un severo enojo ante la falta de liderazgo de Obama en el tema migratorio, incluso lo culpan por haber incrementado las acciones seguidas por Bush, no sólo para reafirmar aún más la frontera sur, sino para incrementar las deportaciones (Verea, 2010b; 2010d). A falta de un consenso en Washington, los poderes legislativos estatales seguirán teniendo la última palabra en el tema, y no precisamente para bien de los migrantes no autorizados, incluso para los residentes legales. El fin de 2010 marca una década perdida en la lucha por una reforma migratoria en la Unión Americana y un incremento sustantivo en las tendencias xenófobas.

Es un hecho que los sentimientos, acciones y políticas antiinmigrantes han aumentado sustantivamente y se encuentran presentes en varias zonas de Estados Unidos, propiciando abusos contra migrantes no autorizados y la violación a sus derechos humanos. La intolerancia y la discriminación no son actitudes nuevas, pero el sentimiento antilatino, específicamente antimexicano, ha aumentado considerablemente. Creemos que las actitudes xenófobas, nativistas y restriccionistas podrían disiparse cuando la inmigración se analice y debata a nivel nacional con un liderazgo conciliador, reconociendo los beneficios y aportaciones que los migrantes han hecho a su economía, cultura y sociedad.

¹² De acuerdo con el Pew Hispanic Center, cuatro de cada cinco niños de padres indocumentados nacieron en Estados Unidos y son ciudadanos estadounidenses y se calcula que del total de 4.3 millones de niños nacidos en Estados Unidos, 340 000 son hijos de padres extranjeros cuya estancia en el país no es legal.

¹³ Legisladores republicanos están intentando que un tribunal dictamine que un niño nacido en Estados Unidos sólo será ciudadano estadounidense si alguno de sus padres lo es.

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CONFLICTO SOCIAL, MIGRACIÓN Y DERECHOS HUMANOS EN NORTEAMÉRICA Y EUROPA

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Introducción

En América del Norte y Europa existe una creciente tendencia a la criminalización y a la discriminación de la migración indocumentada. Esta criminalización no frena la inmigración, sino que construye a los migrantes socialmente como fuera de la ley, con el fin de controlarlos, marginarlos e invisibilizarlos, y de esa manera hacer que los empleadores obtengan mejores dividendos de su trabajo. La criminalización como mecanismo de explotación se legitima con las actitudes discriminatorias, xenófobas y racistas de las sociedades receptoras.

Así, la combinación de una estructura social en la que los migrantes se encuentran en la parte más baja, con los elementos culturales que la justifican, tiene como resultado varios grados de impunidad en las violaciones a los derechos humanos de los migrantes, pues si un migrante es en sí mismo “ilegal” no puede haber actos “ilegales” en su contra, y se ve imposibilitado para denunciar violaciones o exigir sus derechos. La criminalización y la discriminación son, pues, mecanismos de control de los migrantes para mantener bajos los costos del trabajo migrante por concepto de derechos sociales y económicos no retribuidos. Estas ganancias, sin embargo, se relativizan al largo plazo, ya que la criminalización y la ilegalidad tienen un precio social muy alto.

Este ensayo mostrará que en ambos lados del Atlántico la criminalización de la migración y la no protección de los derechos humanos de los migrantes indocumentados frente a la explotación laboral, la discriminación y el odio, generan conflicto social de diversas magnitudes: desde manifestaciones, hasta disturbios étnicos, toma de lugares públicos y fundamentalismos. Para ello se explicará, primero, la forma en que la criminalización de la migración y la discriminación a migrantes y residentes constituyen violaciones a los derechos humanos. Después, recurriendo a los trabajos de Coutin (2003) y Honneth (1997), se examinará cómo la criminalización de la migración y marginación derivada de la discriminación constituyen un espacio de desprotección social y jurídica que implica una falta de reconocimiento intersubjetivo que derivaría en conflicto. Posteriormente, se citan ejemplos que ilustran cómo las violaciones a los derechos humanos en la criminalización de la

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migración y la discriminación son la causa principal del conflicto social que involucra a los migrantes.

Criminalización, discriminación y derechos humanos

Por su carácter universal y no nacional, los derechos humanos no deben ser condicionados a un estatus migratorio regular, sin embargo, en la realidad, la criminalización y la discriminación coartan los derechos humanos de los migrantes. Mientras que la criminalización genera un miedo fundado a ejercer derechos, y la marginación social, derivada de la discriminación, coloca a los migrantes en condiciones en las que no los pueden ejercer. Por un lado, con la criminalización de la migración, los migrantes no pueden ejercer sus derechos, ya que temen, con fundamento, a ser detenidos y expulsados si son ellos quienes no tienen papeles, o de que ubiquen a sus familiares, si es el caso de familias compuestas por migrantes documentados e indocumentados. Es frecuente que este temor detenga a los migrantes a buscar asistencia médica, denunciar haber sido víctimas de un delito o de explotación laboral, revelar abusos por parte de los caseros, capacitarse y aprender la lengua de la sociedad receptora, etc. Estas actividades contravienen los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales reconocidos en los principales instrumentos de la ONU: la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos (1948) (DUDH); el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (1966) (PIDESC); el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (1966) (PIDCP); la Convención Internacional sobre la Eliminación de todas las Formas de Discriminación Racial (1965); la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (1979); la Convención contra la Tortura y Otros Tratos o Penas Crueles, Inhumanos o Degradantes (1984); la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Niñas y los Niños (1989) y la Convención Internacional sobre la Protección de los Derechos de Todos los Trabajadores Migratorios y sus Familias (1990).

Por otro lado, tampoco el hecho de ser migrante o hijo(a) de migrantes debe ser motivo para no recibir protección contra la discriminación, la cual en su expresión máxima llega a atentados contra el derecho a la vida. La no discriminación y la igualdad frente a la ley son más que un derecho, son un principio general del derecho internacional. Prácticamente todas las convenciones fundamentales de derechos humanos en el sistema universal y los sistemas regionales apelan al principio de no discriminación. Según la Convención sobre los Derechos de las Mujeres (art. 1) y la Convención sobre Discriminación Racial (art. 1, inciso 1), la discriminación es toda distinción, exclusión o restricción que tenga por objeto o resultado menoscabar o anular el reconocimiento, goce o ejercicio de los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales en las esferas política, económica, social, cultural y civil o en cualquier otra esfera. El Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos (art. 2, inciso 1) y el Pacto Internacional de Derechos Económicos, Sociales y Culturales (art. 2, inciso 2) explican que la distinción que constituye discriminación es la que se da por motivos de "raza, color, sexo, idioma, religión, opinión política o

de otra índole, origen nacional o social, posición económica, nacimiento o cualquier otra condición social”. Estos convenios establecen también que los Estados parte se comprometen a garantizar los derechos reconocidos en aquéllos, sin ninguna discriminación con base en esas características.

Al ser una norma imperativa para todos los Estados que se han adherido al sistema internacional de derechos humanos, el principio de no discriminación en el caso de los migrantes significa que cualquier diferencia en el trato de las personas migrantes debe tener fundamento legal y no debe violar los derechos humanos reconocidos universalmente. Sin embargo, las diferencias que se hagan en el trato de los migrantes no solamente deben tener una base legal —la ley es una construcción social que a veces tiene funciones represivas si así conviene al *statu quo*— sino representar una preocupación social legítima, tener una justificación objetiva y no chocar desproporcionadamente con el derecho en cuestión. Por ejemplo, se justifica que los trabajadores temporales no tengan derecho al voto, pero es desproporcionado negar auxilios médicos a un migrante indocumentado o la educación a niñas y niños hijos de migrantes indocumentados.¹

La paulatina criminalización de la migración es la que no permite a los migrantes indocumentados acceder a los derechos económicos, sociales, culturales y a la justicia; asimismo, la discriminación obliga a que los migrantes residentes, o en situación precaria como los trabajadores temporales, permanezcan en situaciones de marginación social en la que la violación a sus derechos es sistemática. Esto es cierto en la Unión Europea y en Norteamérica. Las expresiones más dramáticas de la discriminación hacia las minorías étnicas son los crímenes de odio, los cuales afectan también a migrantes residentes y sus hijos nacidos o criados en el país receptor. La discriminación llega a estos niveles cuando el Estado no garantiza la protección adecuada ni el acceso a la justicia. Tanto en la Unión Europea como en Norteamérica la discriminación hacia las minorías étnicas y los migrantes es muy generalizada y tiene expresiones más graves en los países europeos o Estados y provincias estadounidenses y canadienses donde la migración (blanca o no) es un fenómeno relativamente nuevo.

Las relaciones sociales que se construyen a través de la negación de derechos humanos con la criminalización y la discriminación los describe con precisión Coutin (2003), quien ha analizado y conceptualizado como el “espacio de no existencia”. Éste resulta de la disyuntiva entre la presencia física y la legal, pues aun cuando las personas están físicamente presentes, en términos jurídicos no lo están, pues su entrada no ha sido registrada. Al no tener presencia jurídica, el nombre de los migrantes no aparece en cuentas de servicios y no pueden establecer contratos arrendatarios, entre otras cosas. Oficialmente tampoco trabajan, por lo que no generan los derechos que corresponden a la antigüedad laboral, incluyendo los derechos sociales y —en los países donde la regularización es una práctica— acogerse a leyes de amnistía (Coutin, 2003).

¹ Esto fue reiterado en Opinión Consultiva de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos de 2003 (oc/18), la misma que estableció la obligación de respetar y garantizar los derechos humanos y el carácter fundamental del principio de igualdad y no discriminación (CIDH, 2003).

El espacio de no existencia excluye a las personas, les niega derechos, les restringe los servicios y, en sentido estricto, les borra la identidad jurídica. En consecuencia, se convierte en un espacio de subyugación donde la identidad como personas también se erosiona (Coutin, 2003: 172). Se materializa como experiencias de exclusión cotidiana, especialmente en centros de trabajo, y toma la forma de efectos reales que van desde el hambre y el desempleo, hasta la violencia y la muerte (Cintron *et al.* citados por De Genova, 2002). Los límites espaciales del espacio de no existencia son difíciles de definir, pues éste se encuentra en todos lados: barrios, tiendas, lugares de esparcimiento y en centros de trabajo. En realidad, el espacio de no existencia corresponde al país receptor en su totalidad; en la medida en que la presencia de los migrantes es “ilegal”, oficialmente están “afuera” del territorio del país donde viven. En estricto sentido, su presencia se encuentra espacial y temporalmente en un espacio de no existencia (Coutin, 2003: 179).

Las implicaciones de la criminalización y la discriminación para los migrantes documentados y los hijos de migrantes nacidos en el país receptor son graves si se toma en cuenta que el espacio de no existencia no se encuentra en un limbo de relaciones sociales: los migrantes documentados e indocumentados conviven y comparten su vida cotidiana. Estos lugares solamente se vuelven prohibidos cuando se encuentran los indocumentados. Por ello, la construcción social de la “ilegalidad” opera para estigmatizar a todo aquel que viene de fuera, independientemente de si tiene o no documentos.

En los hechos no hay comunidades de migrantes indocumentados que se encuentren selladas. Los indocumentados viven o trabajan en el espacio donde habitan diversos tipos de residentes documentados e incluso ciudadanos nacionales, que pueden ser cónyuges, hijos, sobrinos, amigos, etc., que viven en el mismo barrio que con la presencia de indocumentados se vuelve un espacio de no existencia. Por esta coincidencia espacial, la marginación de las minorías, derivada de la discriminación por origen nacional, es otra consecuencia de la criminalización y la discriminación.

Las minorías son grupos cuya presencia se considera indeseable y una amenaza al orden público y la identidad nacional. La marginación social contra las minorías étnicas de migrantes es evidente cuando se concentran en áreas residenciales marginadas, y se dedican a trabajos de bajo estatus social, además de que su acceso a servicios y derechos está limitado por su condición de extranjero o no ciudadano (Castles y Miller, 2004).

Pareciera que la criminalización desincentiva la migración, pero, como ya se discutió antes, no logra ese objetivo y en su lugar constituye las relaciones sociales del espacio de no existencia. En realidad, es este efecto y no la disminución real de la migración lo que se busca con la criminalización y la discriminación. La desprotección jurídica y la clandestinidad del espacio de no existencia tiene una función político-económica. Como la ley en general está conformada por tácticas y estrategias que los Estados implementan para mediar las contradicciones de las crisis sociales y las luchas políticas en torno al trabajo, en particular, las leyes migratorias se convierten en tácticas para establecer los parámetros de la disciplina y la coerción que permita controlar el trabajo migrante. La legislación migratoria tiene, entonces,

la función de construir socialmente a los migrantes como fuera de la ley para controlarlos y marginarlos, y de esa manera obtener mejores dividendos (Calavita, 2004; De Genova, 2002; Bustamante, 2002; Solanes Corella, 2008; De Lucas, 2003). La plusvalía del trabajo de los migrantes se encuentra en los gastos no devengados en derechos económicos, sociales, civiles y políticos, como seguridad social, salarios justos, seguros contra accidentes en el trabajo, acceso a la justicia, entre otros. Como señala Calavita, “el castigo que un inmigrante recibe por su situación administrativa de ilegalidad es denegarles plenos derechos económicos. Esta sanción y su marginación económica contribuye a reforzar la ‘flexibilidad’ que los inmigrantes suministran a la economía posfordista” (Calavita, 2004: 3); o en palabras de Solanes Corella: los migrantes “No aparecen reflejados en las estadísticas oficiales porque representan nuestra fuerza de trabajo esclavizada, esa válvula de seguridad imprescindible para un sistema económico marcado por la adquisición de la fuerza de trabajo al precio más bajo posible, con la consiguiente cesión de derechos” (2008: 146).

Bustamante (2002) es quien ha buscado, empíricamente, el vínculo entre ilegalidad-retribución político-económica. Él asegura que la vulnerabilidad social en la que se hallan los migrantes indocumentados con la criminalización y la discriminación son elementos que no sólo no detienen el flujo de éstos, sino que generan la demanda del trabajo indocumentado. Para Bustamante, la combinación de una estructura social en la que los migrantes se encuentran en la parte más baja, con los elementos culturales que la justifican, tiene como resultado varios grados de impunidad en las violaciones a los derechos humanos de los migrantes (Bustamante, 2002: 339). La impunidad —la cual se entiende como la ausencia de costo social, económico o político para violadores de derechos humanos, como los patrones— desempodera a los migrantes y los vuelve vulnerables.

No es la raza ni otra característica inherente al migrante, en tanto sujeto, lo que lo hace vulnerable: es el desempoderamiento derivado de la impunidad en la que permanece el perpetrador de violaciones a los derechos humanos (Bustamante, 2002: 340). Si un migrante es en sí mismo “ilegal”, no puede haber actos “ilegales” en su contra, y se ve imposibilitado para denunciar violaciones o exigir los derechos que, de ser otorgados, tendrían como consecuencia una renta menor a la obtenida por el empleador.

La vulnerabilidad asociada a la impunidad en la que permanecen las violaciones a los derechos humanos de los migrantes es necesaria para mantener el bajo costo de los servicios que proporcionan los migrantes, lo cual crea la demanda de este tipo de trabajo en las sociedades receptoras y explica el incremento en el número de migrantes en algún lugar, en un momento determinado. Para Bustamante, si se reduce la vulnerabilidad, el costo del trabajo migrante se incrementará y, en consecuencia, disminuirá la demanda por migración económica (Bustamante, 2002: 344). Sin embargo, a pesar de los importantes dividendos que reeditúa la vulnerabilidad de los migrantes, a mediano y largo plazo ésta tiene un alto costo para las sociedades receptoras, ya que deriva en un conflicto de diversas proporciones.

La criminalización y la discriminación como desconocimiento intersubjetivo: explicación del conflicto

La criminalización y la discriminación de los migrantes en el corto y mediano plazo tiene un precio muy alto para la sociedad receptora en su conjunto, debido a lo que Honneth (1997) ha denominado como “reconocimiento intersubjetivo”. Según Honneth, éste es el reconocimiento que se da de sujeto a sujeto y cuya experiencia fundamenta la confianza, el autorrespeto y el honor, cuya función es generar la autoestima y los sentimientos positivos en las personas. Existen tres formas de reconocimiento intersubjetivo: el amor, el derecho y la solidaridad. Cuando otros sujetos o la sociedad en su conjunto no reconocen a otros individuos, los afectados lo viven como un menosprecio expresado de tres formas, correspondientes a las tres formas de reconocimiento: violación, desposesión y deshonra.

En primer lugar, la violación es el tipo de menosprecio resultante de no reconocer a un individuo a través del amor. El amor garantiza la autonomía corporal y la confianza en uno mismo y los demás. En contraste, la violación corporal —a través de la tortura o la violencia física— tiene como consecuencia la pérdida de confianza en uno mismo y los demás (Honneth, 1997). El fundamento de esta falta de reconocimiento es “que cualquier intento de apoderarse del cuerpo de una persona contra su voluntad, sea cual sea el objetivo buscado, provoca un grado de humillación, que incide destructivamente en la autorreferencia práctica de un hombre con más profundidad que las demás formas de menosprecio; ya que lo específico en tales formas de lesión física, como ocurre en la tortura o la violencia, lo constituye no el dolor corporal, sino su asociación con el sentimiento de estar indefenso frente a la voluntad de otro sujeto hasta el arrebató sensible de la realidad” (Honneth, 1997: 161).

En el ámbito del espacio de no existencia encontramos violación en prácticas como la detención temporal, las deportaciones colectivas y forzosas, las redadas en centros de trabajo, entre otros. Los migrantes son humillados con estas acciones porque se les equipara con criminales y se les tiene físicamente detenidos sin haber cometido delito alguno.

En segundo lugar, la desposesión es el resultado de no reconocer a los individuos a través del derecho. La desposesión se relaciona con la marginación social y la negación de derechos que las personas reclaman como miembros de una sociedad en la que participan activamente. La secuela de la desposesión de derechos es la pérdida de respeto en sí mismo y la convicción de no ser una persona tan moralmente valiosa como los demás (Honneth, 1997). La desposesión cambia de acuerdo con el contexto social, “porque el contenido de significación de lo que vale como persona moralmente responsable ha cambiado en el desarrollo de las relaciones jurídicas; por ello la experiencia de la desposesión de derechos se mide no sólo según el grado de universalización, sino también en cuanto al perímetro material de los derechos institucionalmente garantizados (Honneth, 1997: 163). Los migrantes pagan impuestos y contribuyen positivamente en la sociedad receptora y aun así no son

sujetos de derechos como los ciudadanos nacionales. En este contexto, el espacio de no existencia en su conjunto se constituye con prácticas sistemáticas de desposesión, entre las que destacan la pérdida de movilidad, la falta de acceso a la educación para los hijos, no acceso a servicios de salud, etcétera.

Finalmente, la deshonra es la consecuencia de no reconocer a las personas a través de la solidaridad. Aquélla resulta de la falta de reconocimiento del estatus de las personas en la sociedad, es decir, de no respetar su dignidad y no reconocerlos socialmente. La solidaridad lleva a la autorrealización a través de la aprobación social. Como lo apunta Honneth:

tales tipos de infravaloración cultural un sujeto puede referirlos a sí, en tanto que persona singular, en la medida en que los modelos de valorización social enraizados institucional e históricamente se han individualizado y, por consiguiente, se refieren a las capacidades individuales en lugar de a las cualidades colectivas, por eso, esta experiencia de menosprecio, como la de desposesión de derechos, está sujeta a un proceso de cambios históricos (Honneth, 1997: 163).

Los migrantes y las minorías experimentan deshonra porque se les mantiene al margen como si no tuvieran la dignidad y el valor moral suficientes para pertenecer a la sociedad receptora. La estigmatización social de los migrantes produce un tipo de deshonra para los individuos de ciertos grupos sociales, como los árabes y los musulmanes, en Europa, o los latinos en Estados Unidos. La deshonra es el tipo de menosprecio que se extiende a las minorías étnicas en su conjunto, pues los residentes y los migrantes indocumentados solamente pueden ser separados jurídicamente.

Los sujetos, para lograr realizarse, dependen del reconocimiento intersubjetivo, y si no lo tienen les queda un “hueco psíquico” en el que se albergan sentimientos negativos, como la vergüenza, la cólera y el desprecio. Entre las reacciones de estos sentimientos “puede venir el impulso motivacional de una lucha por el reconocimiento, pues la tensión motivacional en que el singular es forzado a entrar por el sufrimiento de humillaciones, sólo puede disolverla cuando vuelve a encontrar la posibilidad de un nuevo obrar” (Honneth, 1997: 168). El “nuevo obrar” puede ser la organización política, pero ésta no es inevitable. Tampoco es siempre pacífica. La vergüenza, la cólera y el desprecio se expresan también en un tipo de conflicto que no lleva a la construcción de los migrantes como sujetos políticos, sino que se queda en la mera resistencia —violenta o pacífica— que no moviliza a otros para buscar un cambio emancipatorio, pero sí desestabiliza socialmente. En la siguiente sección se demostrará cómo la resistencia frente a las condiciones del espacio de no existencia puede adquirir matices conflictivos con diversos grados de violencia. El conflicto violento sería la forma de resistir la violación, la desposesión y la deshonra que provoca la negación y el desconocimiento de los derechos humanos.

Desconocimiento intersubjetivo y conflicto derivado de la criminalización de la migración

La criminalización de la migración viola los derechos humanos de la asociación y la manifestación, la libertad de conciencia; la seguridad y salud públicas; la privacidad y la vida privada; no ser privado arbitrariamente de los bienes propios; la libertad y seguridad personales; la justicia pronta, expedita, en la lengua materna y sin distinción frente a los nacionales; no ser detenido o encarcelado arbitrariamente; no ser expulsado por no cumplir con un contrato de trabajo; que sus documentos de identidad o migratorios no sean destruidos o confiscados arbitrariamente; reconocimiento de personalidad jurídica; derechos laborales (desde salario justo y sin discriminación, hasta sindicalización y asociación laboral); la seguridad social y las prestaciones vinculadas al empleo, así como el derecho a la salud en casos de emergencia. Estas violaciones a los derechos humanos son una forma de desconocimiento intersubjetivo en la forma de desposesión, y se expresa en dos tipos de conflicto: 1) protestas por la explotación laboral o la inacción gubernamental frente a ésta; 2) demandas de protección y regularización jurídicas.

PROTESTAS POR LA EXPLOTACIÓN LABORAL Y LA INACCIÓN GUBERNAMENTAL FRENTE A ÉSTA

Por la falta de reconocimiento jurídico que limita o impide el emplazamiento a huelga, los trabajadores migrantes protestan violentamente para demandar salarios justos y castigo y alto a la explotación por parte de los empleadores; explotación que incluye (mas no se limita a) la retención de salarios y documentos migratorios en caso de trabajadores temporales; detenciones arbitrarias dentro de los centros de trabajo; despidos injustificados; la denuncia de argucias de los empleadores para denunciar su situación irregular a las autoridades y así evitar pagar sus sueldos, por ejemplo, exámenes toxicológicos, llamadas anónimas a las autoridades migratorias, así como la denuncia de despido sin pago, o de despido luego de intento de organización sindical.

Este tipo de conflictos se han registrado tanto en Europa como en América del Norte. Las demandas se hacen al gobierno para que los proteja de los abusos de los empleadores y estallan violentamente luego de que la explotación laboral llega a un punto de crisis en total impunidad. Por ejemplo, en Ilia, Grecia, en abril de 2008, hubo un enfrentamiento entre agricultores de fresas y trabajadores agrícolas migrantes que demandaban incremento salarial. Según los sindicatos que apoyan a los migrantes, unos cuatrocientos de éstos fueron atacados por los agricultores.

Los enfrentamientos ocurrieron en la plaza de Neo Manolada, en Ilia, donde se produce 90 por ciento de las fresas en Grecia. Los trabajadores reciben salarios por debajo del promedio nacional, viven en barracas y se ven obligados a pagar más de la mitad de su salario al empleador por rentarlas. La semana previa al enfrentamiento, inmigrantes del sur de Asia y de los Balcanes se fueron a huelga para pedir

un incremento de 36 a 47 dólares, pero los agricultores aseguraron que eso los arruinaría (Coenders *et al.*, 2003).

En Francia, en julio de 2007, trabajadores indocumentados de la cadena de comida rápida Buffalo Grill ocuparon las oficinas centrales de la cadena restaurantera en Viry-Chatillon, en el sur de París, luego de haber sido despedidos y denunciados ante las autoridades migratorias. Los inmigrantes, en su mayoría africanos con años de trabajar allí, enfrentaban deportación. El año anterior, un empleado había anunciado su candidatura para representación laboral, y meses después su situación irregular fue denunciada “anónimamente” ante la policía, la cual procedió a inspeccionar los papeles de los más de seiscientos empleados extranjeros de la cadena.

Un grupo de trabajadores indocumentados, apoyados por la Federación de Comercio, Distribución y Servicios, protestaron por la decisión ocupando las oficinas. La ocupación, en el estacionamiento de las oficinas, duró un mes y resultó en la regularización de los veinte trabajadores que ocuparon el restaurante. En otro caso más reciente (en septiembre de 2008), decenas de inmigrantes africanos ocuparon el antiguo y famoso restaurante la Tour d'Argent, el cual es un símbolo cultural de París, para exigir la regularización de siete empleados de Mali, quienes se habían declarado en huelga y fueron expulsados del restaurante. Como otros empleadores en casos similares, el dueño dijo que no sabía que eran trabajadores irregulares.

En junio de 2009, en Inglaterra, decenas de estudiantes tomaron las instalaciones de la Escuela de Estudios Africanos y Asiáticos de la Universidad de Londres demandando la reinstalación de los trabajadores que deportaron luego de una redada. En represalia, la compañía de limpieza subcontratada ISS llamó a las autoridades migratorias porque un grupo de migrantes indocumentados pertenecientes a un sindicato afiliado a la central obrera nacional Unison se fueron a huelga para protestar por el despido de uno de sus compañeros. Los estudiantes demandaron también que la Universidad de Londres prohibiera la entrada de oficiales de migración en sus instalaciones, pues mientras la llamada la hizo ISS, fueron las autoridades escolares las que permitieron que los más de cuarenta policías antimotines entraran a la sala de juntas donde los trabajadores fueron convocados para una supuesta “reunión urgente de empleados”.

DEMANDAS DE PROTECCIÓN Y REGULARIZACIÓN JURÍDICAS

Ante la falta de reconocimiento como sujetos de derechos, los migrantes protestan para demandar regularización migratoria, suspensión de su inminente deportación y un trato igualitario frente a los lugareños. En este tipo de conflicto destaca el caso de España, donde, en junio de 2006, la policía desalojó a unos quinientos inmigrantes que tomaron la Catedral de Barcelona para pedir que se regularizara su situación. Otros quinientos desalojaron voluntariamente después de que la Secretaría de Migración les prometiera no identificarlos si desalojaban la catedral. Los inmigrantes pedían regularizar a todos los inmigrantes indocumentados; la mayoría

provenía de India, Bangladesh, Pakistán, Ecuador y Colombia. En 2001, un grupo de migrantes había hecho lo mismo y había logrado su regularización.

En Paola, Malta, en julio de 2006, unos doscientos inmigrantes indocumentados se amotinaron e hirieron con piedras a tres policías y dos soldados cuando las fuerzas de seguridad los detuvieron en su camino a la oficina del primer ministro. También resultaron heridos cuatro inmigrantes. El grupo fue interceptado en Paola, cerca de la capital Valletta, por cientos de policías y soldados, algunos de ellos portaban trajes antimotines. Los inmigrantes se quejaban por la detención en la que permanecen cientos de inmigrantes que han sido interceptados en su camino a Europa continental, pues Malta detiene durante 18 meses a los inmigrantes indocumentados para desalentar la inmigración irregular, incluso antes de la Directiva sobre Retorno. Asimismo, otro caso es el de los treinta solicitantes de asilo, en Bruselas, Bélgica, quienes en julio de 2008 hicieron un plantón sobre seis plumas de construcción en varias obras, a lo largo de la capital europea, demandando el derecho de trabajar y vivir en la ciudad. Los quejosos estaban molestos por la tardanza en el trámite de sus documentos. El grupo de inmigrantes (mayoritariamente argelinos) empezó su plantón en una pluma cerca de la Grand Place y luego ocuparon varias cerca de la sede de la Unión Europea.

En Nápoles, Italia, en julio de 2008, indigentes africanos se enfrentaron a la policía en el Duomo, luego de que mantuvieran un plantón fuera de la catedral. La violencia se desató cuando la policía trató de desalojar a los inmigrantes del edificio y dos personas fueron arrestadas. Los inmigrantes —originarios de Ghana, Costa de Marfil y Burkina Faso— protestaban porque un incendio los dejó sin casa y las autoridades no los reubicaron, mientras que a los italianos sí.

En Estados Unidos, las marchas y la represión a manifestaciones por la reforma migratoria frecuentemente terminan en disturbios. En mayo de 2007, se registraron manifestaciones de migrantes en diversos puntos de la Unión Americana: en Alabama, Maryland y Washington, D.C., fueron detenidos varios individuos que intentaban atacarlos con granadas, pistolas semiautomáticas y de municiones. En el caso específico de Washington D.C., la policía local arrestó a Tyler J. Froatz, luego de que atacara a los marchistas. Le decomisaron dos cuchillos, un martillo, dos pistolas y gas pimienta. En un posterior cateo en su casa, la policía encontró también quince pistolas, bombas molotov, una granada y más de mil cargas de municiones. Los incidentes en los tres estados recibieron poca atención de la prensa.

En mayo de 2010, en Santa Cruz, California, un grupo anarquista destruyó e incendió comercios y pintó grafitis, demandando una reforma migratoria luego de que se decretara la represiva Ley SB 2010. Lo mismo ocurrió en Los Ángeles, donde la policía reaccionó ante la provocación de una persona que quizá ni estaba involucrada en una manifestación por los derechos de los migrantes documentados e indocumentados, convocada por la Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network. Mientras que los provocadores lanzaron botellas de plástico vacías, la policía respondió con balas de plástico e hirió a 24 personas, incluyendo a periodistas.

Conflicto y desconocimiento intersubjetivo relacionado con la marginación social derivada de la discriminación

La discriminación y la marginación derivada de la discriminación hacia las minorías étnicas, en las que confluyen migrantes recién llegados, residentes y sus descendientes, niegan o desconocen los derechos humanos a la vida; estar libre de torturas, tratos o penas crueles, inhumanos o degradantes; libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión; decidir sobre la religión de los hijos; la libertad y seguridad personales; la justicia pronta, expedita y en su lengua materna y sin distinción frente a los nacionales; derechos laborales (desde salario justo y sin discriminación, hasta sindicalización y asociación laboral); la seguridad social y las prestaciones vinculadas al empleo; la educación y nacionalidad para sus hijos; conservar su cultura; el derecho a la educación y la vivienda dignas, así como a la no discriminación. Estas violaciones se viven como desposesión y deshonor, expresadas en 1) apoyo a ideologías extremistas y 2) disturbios sociales con detonante racial.

APOYO A IDEOLOGÍAS EXTREMISTAS

La exclusión de las minorías étnicas se relaciona con el apoyo que algunos de sus miembros dan a ideologías extremistas. Esto es particularmente cierto en el caso de migrantes de origen árabe o musulmán. Existe una fuerte tendencia en la política pública a ligar el “terrorismo” con los migrantes recién llegados, cuando en realidad éste es un problema más añejo, relacionado con lo que se traduciría como “jihadistas hechos en casa” (*homegrown jihadists*), es decir, los hijos de los residentes musulmanes, quienes se sienten excluidos de la mayoría cristiana y encuentran en el islamismo —que no el islam— una forma de expresión.²

De hecho, a partir del 11 de septiembre, cuando empezó a establecerse el dudoso vínculo entre migración y terrorismo debido a que los perpetradores de los ataques eran extranjeros, solamente en un caso de terrorismo posterior a los ataques en Nueva York se encontró la participación directa de inmigrantes: los ataques terroristas en la red ferroviaria de Madrid, España, el 11 de marzo de 2004. Todos los detenidos eran ciudadanos marroquíes residentes en territorio español. Uno de ellos obtuvo una beca del gobierno español para estudiar un doctorado en economía, aunque se desempeñaba como vendedor de bienes raíces (Jordán y Wesley, 2006).

Por el contrario, en los ataques del 7 de julio de 2005 en Londres, tres de los hombres que llevaban las bombas eran ciudadanos británicos de origen pakistaní.

² El islam acoge a una comunidad *religiosa* que alcanza 1.57 billones de personas alrededor del mundo. En contraste, el “islamismo” es un conjunto de ideologías *políticas* que buscan aplicar la *Sharia* o Ley Islámica en la rectoría del Estado. Las preocupaciones fundamentales en el islamismo son la pobreza y el lugar de las mujeres en la sociedad y, por ello, son naturalmente antagónicos con Occidente. Algunas corrientes islamistas utilizan medidas violentas en su proyecto de imponer la *Sharia* en el mundo.

El cuarto nació en Jamaica, pero fue llevado a Gran Bretaña a la edad de cinco meses. Todos ellos eran musulmanes y británicos —parte de los cuatro millones que componen las minorías étnicas de la isla (7 por ciento del total de población británica)—. Una investigación realizada en Estados Unidos reveló que mientras en los últimos años las agencias vinculadas con la migración han tenido como su principal función las acciones antiterroristas, entre 2004 y 2006 solamente se detuvo a un total de doce personas bajo la acusación de terrorismo, para una labor a la que han estado dedicadas 814 073 personas (Associated Press, 2007).

Hay evidencia de que la mayoría de las asociaciones musulmanas que brindan apoyo espiritual a los jóvenes socialmente excluidos no promueven el extremismo ni la violencia (Tanveer, 2004), y en cambio la discriminación religiosa sí es un motivo de conflicto entre las minorías étnicas y la mayoría de una sociedad (Fox, 2000).

No es la migración, sino el enojo de jóvenes que viven en minorías migrantes, lo que construye identidades defensivas que se articulan en redes políticas manipuladas por los líderes de organizaciones políticas extremistas como ciertas ramas del islamismo político. Esto se ha demostrado en trabajos sociológicos que examinaron que algunas de las personas que detonaron las bombas del 11 de septiembre tuvieron los primeros contactos con grupos extremistas después de haber sido víctimas de discriminación en su empleo y centros de esparcimiento (a uno de ellos no le permitieron el ingreso a una discoteca por ser asiático).

DISTURBIOS SOCIALES CON DETONANTE RACIAL

Los disturbios sociales son ocasionados principalmente por tres detonantes:

- a) ataques xenófobos,
- b) racismo institucional hacia minorías étnicas y
- c) enfrentamientos entre dos minorías.

Ataques xenófobos

Los disturbios iniciados por ataques xenófobos ocurren regularmente como reacción luego de que algún migrante presunta o realmente haya cometido algún acto criminal. Se presenta en localidades donde la inmigración es un fenómeno reciente y tiende a ser copiosa. La sociedad receptora percibe a los inmigrantes como la causa de problemas que en realidad son más añejos y complejos, como el desempleo o el incremento de los índices de delincuencia. También desapruueba los hábitos y costumbres de los recién llegados, de ahí que el enfrentamiento adquiera tintes racistas, como se han presentado muchos casos en Europa y en Norteamérica.

En Europa el problema es endémico. En Almería, España, en febrero de 2000, los residentes locales atacaron tiendas y coches de inmigrantes después de que una mujer fue presuntamente asesinada por un inmigrante marroquí. Anteriormente, un trabajador norafricano había sido acusado de matar a dos hombres; la policía dijo que esto no era evidencia de que los inmigrantes cometieran más crímenes que

la comunidad local, pero la violencia contra ellos les impide incluso salir a trabajar, pues temen ser agredidos.

La situación también es grave en Italia, donde el racismo institucional es alarmante. En enero de 2010, en la localidad de Rosarno, Calabria, se registraron disturbios luego de que dos trabajadores africanos —un nigeriano indocumentado y un profesionista originario de Togo— fueran atacados por jóvenes blancos, quienes les dispararon con pistolas de aire comprimido. Esto tuvo lugar luego de que se corriera el falso rumor de que los africanos habían atacado a una italiana embarazada que, a consecuencia del ataque, había perdido a su bebé. Los disturbios iniciados por este hecho se agravaron luego de que otros dos migrantes fueran atacados con barras de metal. El conflicto se prolongó durante días e involucró a decenas de migrantes africanos que trabajan como jornaleros para empresas controladas por Ndrangheta, la mafia local.

Los africanos duermen en fábricas abandonadas porque pocas personas les rentan viviendas, además de que apenas ganan unos 36 dólares por jornadas de más de doce horas. El enfrentamiento involucró a unos setecientos africanos y unos trescientos pobladores locales. Un italiano intentó atacar a los africanos con un tractor. Al final, la policía reportó 37 heridos, 18 de ellos policías y cinco migrantes.

En Saltillo, Coahuila, México, en septiembre de 2009, un hondureño fue acusado de robar y matar a puñaladas a una comerciante local. En respuesta, un albergue para migrantes, la Posada Belén, fue apedreada por desconocidos, y su coordinador, Pedro Pantoja Arreola, recibió amenazas telefónicas de muerte. El albergue Belén recibe entre ochenta y cien migrantes todos los días, y se quedan como máximo un par de días. El legislador local derechista Carlos Orta Canales abogó por la regulación de los refugios para migrantes, porque éstos “por lo regular” cometen delitos. En Estados Unidos, los ataques xenófobos son frecuentes, aunque no hayan desatado todavía conflictos.

Racismo institucional hacia minorías étnicas

Los disturbios de este tipo son una reacción hacia el racismo institucional, frecuentemente de tipo policiaco. Es común que los perpetradores permanezcan impunes, aunque en casos como los de Inglaterra las crisis han llevado a cambios sustanciales para abatir o por lo menos registrar el racismo policiaco. El caso que más atención mediática y académica internacional ha recibido fue el ocurrido el 27 de octubre de 2005 en París, Francia, que duró dos semanas (Koff, 2009; Koff y Duprez, 2009). Jóvenes descendientes de inmigrantes norafricanos quemaron coches y saquearon tiendas luego de que dos muchachos murieran electrocutados en una subestación eléctrica en el popular barrio de inmigrantes Seine-Saint Denis, cuando eran perseguidos por la policía. El saldo fue de más de siete mil autos quemados y unos dos mil detenidos.

Menos sonado (pero igualmente grave) fue el caso de Bélgica, donde se han registrado diversos episodios. Antes de los disturbios de París, en noviembre de

2002, en Amberes, el asesinato a balazos de un marroquí de 26 años desató disturbios en esta ciudad. El joven fue asesinado por un belga de 66 años, quien le hizo varios disparos. El asesinato causó gran descontento en el distrito de Borgerhout, el cual tiene una población inmigrante mayoritaria. El padre de la víctima y los miembros de la mezquita intentaron calmar a los jóvenes, pero no tuvieron éxito. Sin embargo, también estuvo presente Abou Jahjah, un personaje importante de la Liga Árabe Europea, quien inició una campaña de patrullaje por las calles de Bruselas para asegurarse de que no se acuse falsamente a inmigrantes de cometer crímenes. Como Francia, Bélgica tiene un gran número de población inmigrante, especialmente de origen marroquí, entre quienes hay desempleo alarmante. Sin embargo, a diferencia de Francia, los inmigrantes no se concentran en guetos alrededor de las ciudades grandes.

Como eco de los disturbios de París, en la capital y provincias belgas de Amberes, Lokeren, Mechelen y Ledeborg, jóvenes musulmanes provenientes de familias de inmigrantes hicieron numerosos desmanes, entre los que se incluyó la quema de quince automóviles. Los disturbios se extendieron durante cuatro noches en noviembre de 2005. Un año después de estos disturbios, también en Bélgica, al parecer para conmemorar los ocurridos en París en 2005, jóvenes musulmanes de familias inmigrantes celebraron el Ramadán tirando piedras a transeúntes, así como destruyendo e incendiando autos estacionados. De igual manera arrojaron bombas molotov a un hospital. Los jóvenes estaban furiosos por el deceso de Fayçal Chaaban, un joven de 25 años de edad que murió en custodia.

En Inglaterra, el conflicto también es de larga data y se han dado diversos conflictos parecidos al de París en 2005. En mayo de 2001, en Oldham, Manchester, jóvenes de origen asiático se enfrentaron a una banda de jóvenes blancos. El enfrentamiento se convirtió en un ataque racial masivo en el que hombres, mujeres y niños de origen asiático fueron objeto de ataques verbales y físicos. Oldham es un condado multiétnico compuesto de sajones, pakistaníes y bangladeshíes. El desempleo entre los asiáticos es de 25 por ciento. Después de los enfrentamientos en Oldham, el racista Nacional Front intentó organizar una marcha, en Bradford, Yorkshire, que prohibió el secretario del Interior. La Anti-Nazi League intentó realizar una contramarcha que fue permitida; en el transcurso se rumoró que los del Nacional Front se juntaron en un *pub*, y poco después se armó una confrontación fuera de éste, donde un pakistaní resultó apuñalado. Esto ocasionó disturbios en los que la policía fue atacada y varios restaurantes tuvieron daños por actos vandálicos. Al menos trescientos policías y seis civiles resultaron heridos.

En Londres, en julio de 2006, la policía, armada con macanas, esposas y escudos antimotines, patrullaba la ribera del Támesis para amortiguar las tensiones entre pescadores deportivos e inmigrantes del este de Europa. Se culpó a los inmigrantes de contribuir a la escasez de peces por guardar su pesca para el consumo, en vez de regresarlos al río. Meses después, en octubre, se registraron enfrentamientos similares en la ciudad de Windsor. La mayoría blanca se enfrentó a la minoría asiática, después de que una lechería musulmana fuera incendiada y de que rompieran las ventanas de la mezquita.

Por otra parte, en Milán, Italia, hubo una marcha para denunciar la muerte a golpes de un joven de Burkina Faso a manos de los dueños de un bar donde lo descubrieron llevándose dos paquetes de galletas. Los quejosos destruyeron motocicletas y voltearon botes de basura en su camino. Éstos no eran trabajadores indocumentados, sino hijos de inmigrantes africanos nacidos en Italia. Asimismo, en Tesalónica, Grecia, en agosto de 2007, inmigrantes nigerianos y lugareños se enfrentaron después de que un inmigrante muriera al aventarse por el balcón de una cafetería pensando que lo estaba persiguiendo la policía. El inmigrante vendía discos compactos y pensó que dos hombres eran policías y lo iban a detener. Los nigerianos se reunieron afuera de la cafetería y empezaron a arrojar piedras a la policía, que respondió al ataque.

En Estocolmo, Suecia, en junio de 2010, unos cien jóvenes de ascendencia somalí quemaron una escuela y lanzaron piedras a la policía en los disturbios raciales que duraron dos noches. La razón fue que les negaron el acceso a un baile que se llevaba a cabo en la escuela.

En Canadá, el racismo institucional ha estallado en disturbios en lugares como Montreal, Quebec. En agosto de 2008, el asesinato del joven hondureño de 18 años, Freddy Villanueva, quien murió a manos de la policía. Freddy jugaba dados con su hermano Danny y otros seis amigos en el barrio de migrantes de Montreal Nord, cuando la policía llegó a arrestar a Danny por un presunto robo. Freddy se interpuso entre su hermano y la policía para evitarlo, y les pidió que se fueran; sin embargo, como sacó las manos de los bolsillos, la policía interpretó el gesto como una amenaza y le dispararon. El asesinato provocó una manifestación pacífica que terminó en disturbios en los que los inconformes cometieron actos de vandalismo en comercios y paradas de autobús. Un policía resultó herido de bala. Los barrios de migrantes en Montreal son similares a los guetos de las minorías donde se registraron los disturbios de París en 2005.

En Estados Unidos no ha habido conflictos en fechas recientes a causa del racismo institucional relacionado con los migrantes, pero lugares como Los Ángeles han sido escenarios de disturbios motivados por racismo institucional hacia afroamericanos, como ocurrió con los enfrentamientos que devinieron de la transmisión televisiva del video en el que unos policías asesinaron a golpes al automovilista afroamericano Rodney King, en 1992. Los disturbios se extendieron por varios días en esa ciudad, así como en San Francisco, Nueva York y Atlanta.

Enfrentamientos entre dos minorías

Este tipo de violencia tiene que ver con la creciente marginación de las minorías étnicas, las cuales tienen que competir por recursos y territorio en iguales condiciones de marginación. Por ejemplo, en Atenas, Grecia, el 30 de agosto de 2008, se registró en la Plaza Omonoia, en el centro de Atenas, un enfrentamiento entre unos ciento cincuenta inmigrantes africanos que trabajaban como vendedores ambulantes. El incidente dejó trece personas heridas, algunas de ellas de gravedad.

Según testigos, los inmigrantes llevaban armas blancas y peleaban por territorio. Un policía herido disparó a un inmigrante y a un transeúnte. Se arrestó a 56 personas. En Grecia viven un millón de inmigrantes, alrededor de una décima parte de la población griega.

Un caso grave ocurrió en Almería, España, el 6 de septiembre de 2008. Aquí los inmigrantes africanos se amotinaron en el barrio marginal de Roquetas del Mar —que se constituye de unas doscientas casas— luego de que un inmigrante senegalés de 28 años fuera asesinado. Según testigos, el africano fue agredido por un español de origen gitano cuando el primero trató de intervenir en una disputa entre africanos y gitanos. Los amotinados incendiaron dos casas de parientes del presunto culpable, así como varios automóviles. Los disturbios duraron siete horas y se repitieron la noche siguiente. La víctima trabajaba en los invernaderos almerienses y tenía tres años de radicar en España, donde vivía con su esposa y dos hijas.

Otro ejemplo lo encontramos de nuevo en Inglaterra. En octubre de 2005, en Birmingham, jóvenes afrobritánicos (cristianos) y asiaticobritánicos (musulmanes) se enfrentaron luego de que una adolescente de origen caribeño y estatus migratorio irregular fuera víctima de una violación tumultuaria por parte de jóvenes asiáticos. Al parecer, la joven fue sorprendida robando en la tienda de un asiático, quien ofreció no denunciarla a cambio de favores sexuales. Después de esto, se dice que la chica fue violada por un grupo de entre 8 y 19 hombres asiáticos, aunque también se asegura que no hay evidencia lo suficientemente sólida para confirmar la existencia del ataque tumultuario. Sin embargo, la posibilidad suscitó enfrentamientos entre jóvenes pertenecientes a ambas minorías y derivaron en disturbios en los que murieron dos jóvenes y se vandalizaron comercios y lugares comunitarios de sus respectivos barrios.

También en Bradford, Inglaterra, en enero de 2008, hubo un enfrentamiento entre británicos de origen asiático y polacos, iniciado por los británicos. Los jóvenes argumentan que los inmigrantes económicos de Europa del Este les quitan los trabajos. En Bradford hay un gran número de asiáticos y ya ha habido enfrentamientos antes entre asiáticos y blancos. Los inmigrantes se han asentado en cinco de los barrios más pobres, los cuales tienen altos porcentajes de minorías étnicas. Por ahora, los enfrentamientos se limitan a amenazas verbales, vandalismo contra coches y pequeñas peleas. Los líderes comunitarios sostienen que la actitud de estos jóvenes es una especie de revanchismo por lo que ellos han tenido que sufrir durante años a manos de la mayoría blanca. Los asiáticos se defienden de acusaciones de racismo, arguyendo que no se trata de raza sino de número, pues perciben que están llegando demasiados polacos, quienes se dedican a vender mercancías en las calles, como bisutería y otras baratijas.

Asimismo, en la ciudad inglesa de Dewsbury, en febrero de 2008, inmigrantes húngaros y pakistaníes se enfrentaron con machetes y cuchillos en Ravensthorpe, una comunidad multirracial. El choque empezó porque supuestamente los húngaros tocaron a una chica pakistaní. Hubo varios heridos. Ya había habido un enfrentamiento entre iraquíes y pakistaníes el verano de 2007, cuando los iraquíes kurdos hostigaban sexualmente a las chicas pakistaníes.

Hay otros casos en los que la violencia deriva de las actividades de bandas rivales que se organizan étnicamente. En Madrid, España, el 21 de enero de 2007, unos mil jóvenes españoles arrojaron piedras a la policía y prendieron fuego en un suburbio madrileño luego de un fin de semana de enfrentamientos contra una banda de jóvenes latinoamericanos conocida como los Latin Kings. Los jóvenes españoles culpan a éstos del incremento de la delincuencia; muchos jóvenes ecuatorianos se han sumado a las filas de los Latin Kings por el alto desempleo que hay entre los inmigrantes. También en Los Ángeles, California, se suscitó un motín en la cárcel Pitchess, que se prolongó durante cinco días luego de que bandas de latinos y afroamericanos se enfrentaran en febrero de 2009. El motín involucró a más de trescientos internos, treinta de los cuales resultaron heridos. Este enfrentamiento es un reflejo de las crecientes tensiones entre afroamericanos y la cada vez más copiosa minoría latina, quienes compiten por los trabajos con mejores salarios y el acceso a los beneficios sociales.

Conclusiones

En este artículo se demostró que la negación y el desconocimiento de los derechos humanos que se dan con la criminalización y la discriminación conforman lo que Coutin (2003) denomina el espacio de no existencia, y constituyen lo que Honneth (1997) ha denominado “una falta de reconocimiento intersubjetivo”. Si bien la vulnerabilidad de los migrantes (Bustamante, 2002) es lo que genera su demanda y un beneficio político-económico para las sociedades receptoras, ésta tiene un impacto social a corto, mediano y largo plazo: conflicto social de diversos calibres. El conflicto va desde apoyo a ideologías extremistas, hasta motines en los centros de detención y disturbios raciales.

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América del Norte

CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE OR ANTI-IMMIGRANT SUCCESS? LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRANT ORDINANCES AND SENTIMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

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Over the last five years, local anti-immigration actions have emerged in reaction to the U.S. federal government's perceived inability to secure national borders and control "illegal" immigration. Local restrictionist measures have sought to control, deter, and incapacitate the presence of immigrants by using police authority to regulate public health and safety and to maintain peace and public welfare. Although such ordinances defend the need to control "illegal" immigration by localizing immigration enforcement efforts at the level of municipalities and neighborhoods, anti-immigration measures have attempted to control the everyday practices of undocumented immigrants rather than the processes and policies of undocumented immigration. Local regulations have therefore purposely been conceived to restrict services to undocumented immigrants, forcing them to leave the country or at least relocate to another city.

Since 2006, local anti-immigrant ordinances, officially termed "illegal immigration relief acts," have been introduced across the United States, but very few have been enacted.¹ They have had limited legal and constitutional success, but they have had a tremendous impact in furthering anti-immigrant sentiment by reinforcing the construct of the immigrant as "illegal" and "criminal." Local ordinances have inflamed a fierce divide on how best to address the current and future presence of unauthorized immigrants. On one side are those who hold unauthorized immi-

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¹ In the U.S., more than 100 immigration-related municipal ordinances were introduced or considered in small towns, townships, and counties in 31 different states in the year following the spring 2006 historical pro-immigration mobilizations in the streets of dozens of larger U.S. cities. According to a database compiled by the Fair Immigration Reform Movement (FIRM 2007), 135 municipal governments have introduced or considered anti-immigration measures to regulate the presence of (unauthorized) migrants. As of July 23, 2007, FIRM had recorded 50 general anti-immigration relief acts, 15 combined employment and housing ordinances, 34 employment ordinances, 14 housing ordinances, 9 English-only ordinances, and 6 specific policing/enforcement ordinances. Only 36 percent of these were actually passed by local councils; most of them were deemed unenforceable or unconstitutional. Even more measures were introduced at the state level. According to the U.S. National Conference of State Legislatures (2007), 1 562 pieces of legislation were proposed in 2007 in relation to education, employment, identification (primarily the driver's license), law enforcement, public benefits, trafficking, legal assistance, and voting reform; 244 of them became law in 46 different states.

grants responsible for all the country's economic and social ills; on the opposing side are those who see unauthorized immigration as the result of foreign and economic policies benefiting U.S. employers and ultimately consumers.

In this article, we examine the concept of "public nuisance" as the foundation of these local anti-immigration ordinances and the particular reference to undocumented immigrants as "public nuisances" in order to criminalize them. We look at the narrative of local anti-immigration ordinances inscribed in the larger federal regime of criminalization and securitization prevalent in recent years in the United States. We observe profound changes and tensions in the legislative enforcement of immigration policy and the numerous mixed signals sent to local authorities wishing to get involved in regulating and curtailing immigration. Immigration has long been viewed as a "broken system." Expanding legislation to create new immigration crimes has further strengthened this image of it as a problem. Local authorities have increasingly felt compelled to enforce immigration control on their territories given the lack of progress in enacting comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level. Proponents of local anti-immigration ordinances have marshalled their authority to regulate and remove the "illegals" around the very construct of this "illegality" and through local police powers to regulate public health and safety and to maintain public peace and welfare.

Municipal anti-immigration ordinances in the United States have used the legally broad concept of "public nuisance" to criminalize the presence of immigrants in public and private spaces of their territories. While localities have the power to abate a public nuisance, the particular rationality of how they have become "empowered and mandated...to abate the nuisance of illegal immigration by diligently prohibiting the acts and policies that facilitate illegal immigration and punishing the people and businesses that aid and abet illegal aliens" (City of Hazelton 2006a) is a socio-legal misconception used in many ordinances that has been ruled unconstitutional and preemptive to federal authority. Equating "illegal" immigration to public nuisance has nevertheless boosted anti-immigration sentiments, instilled fear, and created the perception of urgency to do whatever is needed to control, deter, and remove unauthorized immigrants from communities. Our argument is that, despite the almost complete legislative failure of local anti-immigration ordinances, their success in mobilizing support and sustaining anti-immigrant sentiment rests on both the discursive use of public nuisance and the broader criminalizing narrative associated with immigration as risk and security management.

The Broken Immigration System And the Criminalization of Immigrants

Immigration has traditionally come solely under federal jurisdiction but has held a relatively low, marginalized status within the federal bureaucracy until it was prominently brought to the foreground of the domestic security regime after September 11, 2001 (Bigo 2002; Tirman 2004; Coleman 2005). Although immigration

law has traditionally been preoccupied with protecting sovereignty by controlling national borders, its rationality and implementation fluctuated according to foreign relations, labor demands, and discretionary powers. Probably more than in any other sector of the federal administration, the legal culture of immigration has been influenced by past and present currents of nativism and xenophobia, putting further political pressure on a process split between market efficiencies and exclusionist policies (Nevins 2002; Tichenor 2002; Ngai 2004). The conflicted perception of the immigration regime extends automatically to the most concerned, immigrants themselves, who, in accordance with their status, generally lack legal, cultural, and political recognition. Whether authorized or unauthorized, immigrants have customarily been blamed for the shortcomings of immigration policy, economic vibrancy, and national homogeneity. These shortcomings then legitimize the necessity of immigration reforms and immigrant control (Chavez 2008; Newton 2008; Koulish 2010).

Immigration has long been associated with securitization issues to justify sovereignty. In the past few decades, control of immigrants and immigration has linked the sovereignty narrative to a new security and risk-management narrative (Walters 2006, 2008). The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, adopted during the Reagan administration, and the 1990 Immigration Act, passed just afterward, increased sanctions and criminal fines for immigration-related offenses. Partisan lines notwithstanding, the Clinton government adopted both the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibilities Act (IIRIRA) and the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, both of which sought to eliminate judicial reviews, strengthen and expedite removal proceedings, create new federal crimes, and intensify law enforcement.

The disquieting events of September 2001 provided an astonishing opportunity and justification for consolidating the earlier efforts of immigration control reforms as risk and crime management. Anti-terrorism statutes enacted under the Bush government were laden with immigration-related criminalizing provisions, all in the name of national security. Under popular and bi-partisan pressure to secure borders, immigrants were redefined through the lens of national security, leading to preemptive strategies, often with little attention to due process or the rule of law. Among the most penalizing crime-control legislation enacted by the last Bush government, the 2001 Patriot Act provided extensive powers to intercept and detain suspected terrorists; the 2005 Real ID Act increased immigration enforcement and authentication mechanisms; and the 2006 Secure Fence Act sought to control “illegal” immigration by building a wall along the U.S.-Mexican border. Programs related to these legislative initiatives increase immigration-related criminal convictions through the erosion of the judicial process, the expansion of law enforcement and surveillance technologies, and the growth of preventive and indefinite detentions (Kanstrom 2004; Koulish 2010). Unauthorized immigrants were seen as a domestic threat to national security. Although “illegal” immigration is largely a civil offense, such a threat justified the redefinition of immigrants as criminals and terrorists. As Koulish argues,

Criminalization is a tactic in the war on immigrants. It is a form of social control that uses law and legal culture to ostracize and control segments of the population through a myriad of techniques including surveillance, biometrics, extending the reach of the criminal law, and using civil laws to help criminalize people. (2010, 39)

Conflating civil and criminal immigration law, the new risk-management discourse condemned undocumented entry as a criminal nuisance misdemeanor (rather than a violation of civil immigration law). Such discourse therefore depicts immigrants as criminals who put the nation and society at risk and consequently justifies a range of punitive preemptive measures, such as the unprecedented border wall construction and increased immigration law enforcement on local streets, as the necessary fix for the broken immigration system (Nevins 2002; Newton 2008; Doty 2009; Brown 2010).

Entangled Enforcement of Immigration Law

Civil immigration offenses have been criminalized and other aspects of immigration legislation have created a series of new immigration crimes resulting in unprecedented collaboration between the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security (Tirman 2004; Chishti 2006-2007; Legomsky 2007; Aldana 2007-2008; Koulish 2010). Official cooperation in immigration law enforcement, federally authorized by the 1996 IIRIRA Section 287(g), as well as local enforcement attempts, as in the recent anti-immigration ordinances targeting direct policing or indirect control strategies, have been some of the many ways to expand the securitization and the criminalization of immigration at the local level (Walters 2006, 2008; Coleman 2007; Varsanyi 2008). Legislative proposals, such as the Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005 (SB4437) by Representative Jim Sensenbrenner (R-Wisconsin), although not passed by the U.S. Congress, nevertheless contributed to the punitive and criminalizing climate surrounding immigrants—and in this particular case, also immigration supporters and advocates.

In recent years, immigration law enforcement has expanded from customs and border patrol agents to numerous untrained and unaccountable hands such as detention officers, airline agents, state officials, sheriff's deputies, and local politicians (Walters 2002; Koulish 2010). The problem with this outsourcing of immigration control from the federal level is that it creates the myth that a multitude of actors are suddenly enforcing immigration law, from police to landlords to vigilante groups. It accentuates the risk for harassment and, again, reifies the idea that the immigration system is broken and therefore requires these local and exceptional measures (Newton 2008). While states and localities might have a larger role to play in the management of immigration given their more direct contact with immigrants, the threat of piecemeal immigration policy and inconsistency in enforcement is highly problematic, especially given the discretionary powers and vagaries of legal norms and

processes related to immigration (Campbell 2007; Rodriguez 2008). As a result, it seems like immigration jurisprudence constantly negotiates with, and is negotiated between, the boundaries of law and exception.² New actors and tactics of immigration law enforcement have raised many challenges to its constitutionality at the local level.

The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the federal government has broad and exclusive power to regulate immigration, even though such power is not expressly drawn from the U.S. Constitution, but from the Constitution's Supremacy Clause. Immigration power is a plenary power authorizing the legislative and executive branches to regulate immigration free of judicial review in order to invoke the federal government's prerogatives over national sovereignty and security. The federal government can therefore decide to enter into agreements with state law enforcement agencies to perform immigration law enforcement functions, as it has done through IIRIRA Section 287(g). The Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, however, prevents the federal government from compelling a state to enforce federal regulation. Nevertheless, under specific conditions and agreements state and local police might be given "inherent authority" to make arrests in cases of criminal as well as civil immigration law in the narrow yet quite expandable name of security.³ However, as McKanders clarifies, "Even though the federal government has authorized state and local governments to cooperate with them in enforcing federal immigration laws, the federal government has not enacted laws that give state and local governments full authority to create laws targeting immigrants" (2009, 36). The blurred line between deputizing the enforcement of federal immigration law and proposing new immigration law exceeding the terms of Section 287(g) agreements raises much debate about the inherent power of state and local governments to make arrests for violation of federal immigration law (Keblawi 2003-2004). State and local police can actually only use 287(g) authority when people are already in custody as a result of violating other state or local criminal laws (Koulis 2010).

As states and localities have increasingly sought to enact their own measures to control immigration and ordinances defending their "inherent powers," courts across the country have so far reaffirmed the unconstitutionality of most state and

² Plenary powers imply that the federal government can decide how to enforce immigration law. The absence of normal judicial restraint means that the government can justify the criminalization of immigrants because of the security argument or what Giorgio Agamben (2005, 7) describes as the state of exception (i.e., "exceptional circumstances of necessity or emergency"). Koulis rightly states, "Perhaps more than any other field of law, immigration practices occur in the exceptional space where petty sovereigns assert their will upon the bare life of individual immigrants, specifically, the undocumented immigrants" (2010, 27). "Petty sovereigns" is a term borrowed from Judith Butler (2004) to describe the emergent class of control officials and risk managers (see also Bigo 2002).

³ According to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency, as of October 29, 2010, ICE currently "has 287(g) agreements with 71 law enforcement agencies in 25 states. Since January 2006, the 287(g) program is credited with identifying more than 185 000 potentially removable aliens —mostly at local jails. ICE has trained and certified more than 1 213 state and local officers to enforce immigration law" (2011).

local immigration initiatives that attempted to regulate any aspects of immigration.⁴ The widely-known refrain of anti-("illegal") immigration proponents reviling the federal government's incapacity to regulate borders and enforce immigration law is justified in their view given municipal police authority and mandate to protect the general welfare of the people.⁵ State and local police power has traditionally encompassed some authority to enforce criminal provisions, but until 1996, civil provisions of immigration were an exclusively federal responsibility. Civil enforcement of immigration law remains contentious terrain. Many state and local police agencies feel that enforcing civil provisions of immigration law clearly exceeds their mandate, training, and resources, and undercuts the last decades' community policing efforts to gain the trust of communities (Harris 2006; Chishti 2006-2007). It also exposes the police force to civil liability since the enforcement of civil provisions of immigration law is greatly misunderstood and can easily result in civil rights violations stemming from racial profiling practices that target "illegal" immigrants —immigration status is, of course, impossible to profile.

The problem with immigration enforcement is that it has been broadly deployed with no consideration for constitutional protections for immigrants. Enforcement agencies have "pretextually relied on the more flexible immigration law enforcement to conduct criminal investigations to also charge persons with non-immigration crimes, including allegations of identity theft, terrorism, and drugs" (Aldana 2007-2008, 1129).⁶ Recent years of immigration enforcement clearly reveal that the civil offense of "illegal" entry and the administrative process of deportation are far more often sanctioned than an employer's criminal offenses of hiring undocumented people (Legomsky 2007). Legomsky concludes that the criminal justice system has asymmetrically incorporated criminal justice norms into immigration control without the procedural and substantive rights recognized in criminal cases. As he suggests,

from a procedural standpoint, this asymmetry leaves policymakers with little political appetite for allowing adjudicative fairness and accuracy to temper cost and efficiency

⁴ Numerous state and local measures have been ruled unconstitutional on the basis that they infringed the federal government's exclusive jurisdiction over matters relating to immigration. Among the most notorious cases are the California's 1994 Proposition 187 (Save Our States initiative) that sought to prohibit "illegal" immigrants from using health care, public education, and other social services, and the 2010 Arizona State Bill 1070 (Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act), adopting an "attrition through enforcement" approach and granting Arizona's state and local agencies the power to identify, prosecute, and deport "illegal" immigrants. A federal injunction prevented the law from going into effect. At the municipal level, the most scrutinized and comprehensive anti-"illegal" immigration ordinance was drafted by Hazleton, Pennsylvania. Hazleton's illegal immigration relief act, tenant registration program, and English-only ordinances were adopted in 2006 but, in a verdict long-awaited by other small towns considering Hazleton-like legislation, were ruled unconstitutional.

⁵ Anti-(illegal) immigrant proponents turned to the Bybee Immigration Memo of 2002, which finds inherent sovereignty in the state's police power; a state can enforce federal civil immigration law when actions are authorized by state law and not preempted by federal law (Koulish 2010).

⁶ Civil and criminal immigration enforcement conflates to the point that detention, once reserved for the most dangerous, is now broadly applied to all removal cases. Immigration detention is currently the fastest growing segment of jail population in the U.S. (McKanders 2009; Koulish 2010).

concerns. From a substantive standpoint, it leaves them little incentive to balance the government interests in deterring and incapacitating immigration offenders against either the interests of the immigrants themselves or the interests of the U.S. citizen family members, friends, employers, and communities who are left behind. (2007, 473)

Indeed, in recent years, immigrants and their families across the U.S. have lived in fear of arrest in their worksites, neighborhoods, shopping malls, and homes, and of detention and charges of immigration crimes leading to their removal.

Anti-immigrant measures have drawn on exceptions of law; they have enabled an indiscriminate climate of enforcement where people have been targeted, arrested, and detained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of having committed a crime. They have done so targeting the “illegality” of residents outside established legal and constitutional norms preventing them from identifying the status of immigrants and because they are driven by and further a populist anti-immigrant agenda motivated by NIMBYism and prejudice (Chavez 2008; Newton 2008).

The Ambiguous Success Of Local Anti-immigration Ordinances

Local ordinances are defended as acts resulting from the federal inability to control national borders and efforts to give local and state government (police, department of motor vehicle clerks) and non-government actors (employers, landlords) control powers over “illegal” immigrants’ everyday spaces and encounters and apprehend them to force them out of their communities. Conflating immigration control with threats of terrorism, anti- (“illegal”) immigration ordinances sought to extend the Department of Homeland Security’s post-9/11 security regime away from the border, into small towns and neighborhoods (Gilbert 2009).

Based on a common template allegedly prepared and promoted by the Immigration Reform Law Institute, the public-interest legal body of the conservative Federation of Americans for Immigration Reform (FAIR 2007), the adoption of the model ordinance spread quickly across the country and took roots in localities that felt uneasy in the face of the growing presence of immigrants. Local ordinances generally sought to discourage the residency of “illegal” immigrants by declaring English an official language, eradicating gathering places for day laborers, establishing registration policies, forcing landlords to verify potential renters’ immigration status, and restricting hiring practices and access of services beyond federal standards. In doing so, they make enforcement agents out of local landlords, employers, municipal clerks, and police, all of whom have had no training in immigration law and no accountability.

In creating new forms of regulation for immigrants, local ordinances blatantly violated constitutional and civil rights, and key cases have been ruled unconstitutional. Their unconstitutionality has been clearly expressed by Judge Munley’s ruling in the case of *Lozano v. City of Hazleton* (2007). Because “federal law pre-empts HIRA

[Illegal Immigration Relief Act] and RO [Registration Ordinance],” Munley argues that these ordinances “violate the procedural due process protection of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution” and, therefore, that “enacting unconstitutional laws is beyond the defendant’s police powers” (191-192). Hazleton was therefore permanently enjoined from enforcing its ordinances by the courts, first in 2007, and again in 2010. Other municipalities have experienced similar legal challenges resulting in the same preemption and unconstitutionality rulings. Despite the public expressions of support for Hazleton-like ordinances, their unconstitutionality has been clearly established and regulatory authority over immigration remains concentrated at the federal level. But the controversy does not end here.

Equally contentious is the discriminatory motive behind local ordinances. Proponents of anti-immigration ordinances (among others, Hazleton’s former mayor and now U.S. Representative Lou Barletta [R-Pennsylvania] and Kris W. Kobach, former legal counsel with the Immigration Law Reform Institute and now Kansas secretary of state) “readily admitted that the true goal behind the listed protections is to have immigrants relocate or self-deport” (McKanders 2009, 117). The most vicious aspect of anti-immigration ordinances is the belief that local police authorities can determine who may be legal and “illegal” without prejudice and discrimination, by observing such attributes as race, accent, appearance, or surname profiling. Such a flawed assumption indicates a profound conviction that undocumented immigrants are “illegals” and “criminals” and that constitutional provisions of protection and due process do not apply to those entering or present in the country “illegally.” However, in the *Lozano v. City of Hazleton* ruling, Judge Munley unambiguously insisted that people unlawfully entering or present in the country are guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.

We cannot say clearly enough that persons who enter this country without legal authorization are not stripped immediately of all their rights because of this single act. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no State may “deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction with the equal protection of the laws.”... The United States Supreme Court has consistently interpreted this provision to apply to all people present in the United States, whether they were born here, immigrated here through legal means, or violated federal law to enter the country. (*Lozano v. City of Hazleton* 2007, 43-45)

In his conclusion, Judge Munley goes even further by suggesting that the crisis of perception of “illegality” experienced by Hazleton has no bearing on the constitutional provisions of due process and equal protection. He states,

Whatever frustrations officials of the City of Hazleton may feel about the current state of federal immigration enforcement, the nature of the political system in the United States prohibits the City from enacting ordinances that disrupt a carefully drawn federal statutory scheme. Even if federal law did not conflict with Hazleton’s measures,

the City could not enact the ordinances that violates rights the Constitution guarantees to every person in the United States, whether legal resident or not....Hazleton, in its zeal to control the presence of a group deemed undesirable, violated the right of such people, as well as others within the community. (*Lozano v. City of Hazleton* 2007, 188-189)

Nevertheless, local governments used their political power to challenge federal regulation and to legitimize their ambitions by capitalizing on a climate of national insecurity in order to build consensus in the extremely contentious “illegality” debate. Beyond the constitutional argument, the discriminatory motive underlying the ordinances was promoted by local politicians who seized political opportunities to fast-track political careers in the name of morality and patriotism. Politicians’ obsession with “illegal status” was refuted by court rulings, but nevertheless prevailed in sustaining and furthering the anti-“illegal” immigration sentiment. Such sentiment criminalizing a vulnerable segment of the population was supported by a strong current of populism, nativism, and neoconservatism fed by mainstream and conservative media. According to Newton, “Political elites rely on emotion in justifying political choices; they employ stories that are instinctually appealing to their audiences, packing them with language and symbols that tap into widely understood notions of who and what comprises the American immigrant experience” (2008, 3).

Oscillating between the discourses of security threat and economic scapegoating, the narratives of “illegality” and criminality continue to add confusion to the “broken federal immigration policy” discourse and to the entangled relationships of immigration enforcement. Meanwhile, in the complementary narratives of fear and urgency about reforming the so-called broken system, preemptive immigration law enforcement finds political and public support, and therefore means that exceptions and abuses will likely occur, be tolerated and, even more problematically, be rationalized through law (McKanders 2009; Koulis 2010). Central to this hortatory language of local politicians and local policies is the construction of immigrants and their practices as a public nuisance.

“Illegal” Immigration as Public Nuisance

Public nuisance has been used preemptively as the operative foundation of local anti-immigration ordinances. The legal concept of “nuisance” has traditionally been used to describe the activity or condition that unreasonably harms, annoys, or interferes with the rights of individuals (private nuisance) or with the rights of the general public (public nuisance). A nuisance is controlled by local police powers derived from a fundamental role of government (authorized by the Tenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution) to regulate public health, safety, and welfare. The common law concept of nuisance deals with violations of common interests after they occur, such as the already-operating factory that contaminates a neighbor-

hood's air, soil, or water. In such a case, neighbors can demand the abatement of a nuisance that inhibits their health, safety, and welfare. A police agency or court would then make a judgment in the particular case as to whether or not a nuisance exists (and a tort or breach of duty has been committed). Nuisance *in fact* always requires proof of the act and its consequences; and its outcome, if any, will be compensatory rather than a solution to the problem. Municipal corporations also have the right and responsibility under the police power to adopt regulations to limit the uses and occupations either considered nuisances *per se* or that tend to become nuisances in certain situations and conditions.⁷

Legal scholars have described public nuisance as an "impenetrable jungle" and a "legal garbage can" full of "vagueness, uncertainty, and confusion" and "notoriously contingent and unsummarizable" (quoted in Faulk and Gray 2007). The concept nevertheless provides a flexible judicial tool to address conflict in land use and social welfare and to prove substantial interference. Although the principle has since been replaced by more precise legislation, governmental authorities generally used public nuisance to stop conduct that was considered quasi-criminal because, although not strictly illegal, it was deemed potentially harmful to the general public's peace, comfort, and morals (Faulk and Gray 2007). Moreover, police power is the most comprehensive of government powers, but also the vaguest, as the precise components and definitions of public health, safety, and welfare are not unanimous and fixed; rather they vary according to the social, economic, and political conditions of a place. Thus, the determination of nuisance as serious crime or simple annoyance is not only difficult to establish but also requires proof of wrongdoing and consequent harm.

Anti-immigrant local politicians have legitimized their control-oriented actions by using their police power authority "to abate public nuisances...and...to abate the nuisance of illegal immigration by diligently prohibiting the acts and policies to facilitate illegal immigration" (City of Hazleton 2006a). Proponents of anti-immigration ordinances translate "illegal" presence in the country into criminal presence within their town boundaries. As perceived criminals, immigrants are seen as illegitimate members of local communities who are undeserving of social benefits and protections.

"Illegal" immigration as a whole and "illegal" immigrants more specifically are understood as a "public nuisance," a perceived aggravation and threat to the local quality of life and neighborhoods. Embedded in the "illegal" and nuisance narratives are the explicit collective beliefs and affirmations that legitimate members of society are victimized by the presence of criminals among them. In anti-immigrant sentiment and, in the texts of ordinances, the annoyance and menace of "illegal" immigrant others legitimize arrests and deportations because undocumented immigrants are not authorized to be in the country. By using the concept of public nui-

⁷ In 2009, the City of Hazleton developed and adopted "Chronic Nuisance Properties, providing a new process for enforcement and abatement of certain nuisance activities that repeatedly occur or exist at chronic nuisance properties within the confines of the city" (City of Hazleton 2009).

sance, local advocates for tightening U.S. immigration laws evoke local police powers to control, deter, and repel immigrants from their jurisdictions.

The particular use of the nuisance rhetoric in anti-immigration ordinances responds to a series of unsubstantiated assumptions (expressed in the preamble sections) contending that “illegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our hospitals to fiscal hardship and legal residents to substandard quality of care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing their cost and decreasing their availability to legal residents, and diminishes our overall quality of life” (City of Hazleton 2006a). The initial use of the concept of nuisance in immigrant-related ordinances might actually be linked to the control of day laborers in an early—and rejected—ordinance in San Bernardino, California (prepared by Joseph Turner of Save Our State in 2006). In that particular ordinance, “illegal” immigration, people driving any vehicle used to solicit day laborers, as well as the vehicle itself, are declared a nuisance (Turner 2006). Although targeting the use of property, the proposal seems better intended for the eradication of day laborers’ presence by criminalizing both immigrants and employers, and more broadly the regulation of public space. Other increased social controls in public space ordinances have also been unsuccessfully linked to immigration.

In fact, anti-immigration ordinances are reminiscent of past attempts by local police to regulate disorder by enforcing criminalizing laws for vagrancy, loitering, panhandling, and homelessness through property regulation tools like zoning laws. When recent anti-immigration ordinances specifically attempted to control the presence of immigrants by using trespassing laws, courts ruled that criminal trespassing charges were unconstitutional attempts at regulating immigration (Varsanyi 2008). The use of trespassing laws was seen as just another disingenuous strategy to regulate “undesirable” persons or activities.

The use of “public nuisance” to refer to undocumented immigrants is, however, misleading. The legal concept of public nuisance cannot be used preemptively. Nuisance is usually determined after the fact and requires proof of harm. In the case of local anti-immigration ordinances qualifying “illegal” immigration as public nuisance, proof of harmful conduct and consequent harm of the perceived negative impacts of immigrants is merely impossible as it would require proof that “illegal” immigrants have offended the rights of the public at large. As confident as they are, anti- (“illegal”) immigration proponents are rather equivocal in their proof of harm. In the case of Hazleton, the mayor clearly admitted he did not have data substantiating his claims but insisted that the claims were simply well-known facts (McKanders 2009). Such threat and truth narratives become pervasive and work particularly well because the basic premises are taken for granted (Chavez 2008).

Moreover, in his work on the control of misconduct in city spaces, Ellickson asserts that nuisance can only be created by acts, and not by status. He writes, “Both classical-liberal ideals and the Constitution demand that the law of street nuisances regulate a person’s choices, not some unalterable status. In particular, it is impermissible to criminalize either the status of poverty or the status of homelessness” (1996, 1186-1187). Rationalizing “illegal” immigration as a nuisance is

therefore highly problematic because it promotes a discriminatory “public interest” that criminalizes a particular group with immigrant traits (however defined and identified) not for any breach of local ordinances, but rather for their mere presence in the urban setting. The latter point takes us back to the disguised and unconstitutional attempt to regulate immigration locally.

The spirit of local anti-immigrant ordinances that make it “illegal” for undocumented immigrants to loiter in public spaces, occupy housing, or secure employment goes against the Fourth Amendment (curtailing abuses of policing powers) because it attempts to justify their arrest (often without reasonable suspicion or probable cause) in public, quasi-private, and private spaces because their constructed “illegality” makes them neither deserving nor reasonably expectant of the protection of their privacy (Aldana 2007-2008). Local anti-immigration ordinances and their associated registration programs offer neither due process nor due protection (and some would argue privacy and confidentiality of the gathered information) and therefore increase the likelihood of people being subjected to excessive searches by private and public officials. Though recent appellate court decisions have found that anti-immigrant statutes are a violation of the application of police power, the use of “public nuisance” in anti-immigration ordinances continues and conflates criminal and civil violations, national and local sovereignties, preemptive security and anti-immigrant discrimination. Equating “illegal” immigration and nuisance is motivated by the politics of exclusion and oppression.

It is also important to note that in many cases, local police do not wish to become involved in immigration enforcement because it is counterproductive to police work and threatens the efforts of community policing. The mandate of the local police force is to prevent criminal acts rather than civil violations of immigration law. The level of discretion associated with enforcing civil offenses leads policing agencies to abuse, discrimination, and profiling. Discretionary police powers might serve as a bridge (as in community policing), but might also serve as a wall (with deep foundations in discrimination). Sossin identifies three types of discretion: legal (authority to determine); interpretive (accountability of meanings); and communicative (modes of interactions and engagement) (1996). It is particularly because of these discretionary latitudes that police power must be subjected to constitutional rights in order to protect people. The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution curtails abuses of policing powers (particularly against vulnerable people), and such protection applies to non-citizens despite the regulatory expansion of immigration enforcement into everyday spaces and practices. In the face of such protection and the often vague and ambiguous definition of nuisance and extended police power, the courts have imposed liability on a wide variety of activities and conducts deemed to violate public health, safety, and welfare. Historically, the concept was used to condemn socially undesirable forms of behavior and alleged misconduct to protect public interest, health, safety, and morality (Keetin 1984 and Wood 1893, quoted in Faulk and Gray 2007). Nowadays, local police are asked to conduct immigration enforcement in the name of national security, even though immigration control has in fact very little to do with terrorism prevention (Harris

2006; Keblawi 2004; Koulis 2010). Still, the oversimplified message linking immigration to “illegality,” criminality, and national security continues to gain much support among anti-immigration and conservative forces (Chavez 2008; Newton 2008; Doty 2009).

Conclusion

Immigration is a complex issue with contentious social, political, and economic implications, of which law enforcement is presented as the most apparent in the current debate. Immigration was nevertheless always subjected to legislative ambivalence and judicial lassitude, making it a perfect conduit to fully advance a post-September 11 security regime. Rationalizing the urgency to fix the “broken immigration system,” congressional and local anti- (“illegal”) immigration proponents were able to develop policy measures that exploited the pervasive anti-immigrant sentiment. Undocumented immigrants were no longer seen just as undesirable; their presence in the U.S. was described by anti-immigrant proponents as “illegal,” who argued that such “illegality” meant that a crime had been committed against the nation and that this crime warranted arrest and deportation. How “illegality” is constructed is a contentious debate in and beyond the rule of law, but it remains one of the most powerful myths surrounding immigration.

With the increasing presence of undocumented immigrants throughout the country, and the federal government’s persistent inability to control and reform immigration policy, numerous local governments “took the law into their own hands” with anti- (“illegal”) immigration ordinances that sought to regulate immigration in their territories. With the goal of punishing and eliminating the crime of “illegal” immigration, local anti-immigration ordinances represented the impacts of “illegal” immigration as public nuisances to be abated. However, as Rose reminds us, “programs of crime control have always had less to do with control of crime than they have to do with more general concerns with the government of moral order” (2000, 321). This is most evident in local anti-immigration ordinances that have alleged the depletion of resources and services as a rationale for passing (unconstitutional) laws that apply the vague legal concept of public nuisance to certain immigrants to discourage them from entering and residing in a given locality. These ordinances successfully remind us that immigration continues to be about “who we are as people and who we wish to include as part of the nation” (Chavez 2008, 23).

Local anti-immigration ordinances, despite their constitutional failures in court, have been able to extend the discourses of preemptive criminalization and enforcement. They have done so by using the legally broad concept of public nuisance to regulate crime, annoyance, and inconvenience in which they found rhetorical and emotional comfort. However, ordinances failed to reasonably demonstrate that the “illegality” of some residents is indeed an offense to the public at large. The impossibility of linking “illegal” presence or entry to harmful intent and proving that a tort has been committed refutes the premise of nuisance. In disguising their

intent to regulate “illegal” immigration under the concept of public nuisance, ordinances propose to use nuisance and police power preemptively when the enforceability of this law is customarily reactive.

Local anti-immigration ordinances can nevertheless be seen as powerful events that publicize the perceived untenable state of immigration, the alleged crimes committed by undocumented immigrants, and the urgency of reforming immigration policy. Local ordinances have not only been instrumental in spreading the immigration debate to local communities throughout the U.S.; they have intensified that debate by reaching out to conservative and general patriotic emotions reifying the construct of “illegality,” and therefore justifying the need for protection against it.

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THE COMPLEXITY OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES IN THE UNITED STATES: PUBLIC OPINION, LATINOS, AND THE BORDER STATES OF ARIZONA AND CALIFORNIA

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Immigration has long been a dominant thread in the fabric of United States history. Indeed, virtually every U.S. history book characterizes the country as “nation of immigrants.” Despite this national identity, over the last decade, the U.S. and international press have devoted a great deal of attention to anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-immigration policies within the United States. News coverage suggests that the general public has become increasingly hostile to immigration and that unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants are widely and uniformly held. We believe that the current media spin on immigration is linked to important social realities, including the quickening pace of globalization, the increased securitization of the U.S.-Mexico border, the tragic jump in the number of border deaths, global economic crisis, and the development of anti-immigrant policies and practices in many states and local jurisdictions. At the same time, it is our view that media coverage of immigration issues is a poor gauge of the actual attitudes of the U.S. public. In this article, we aim to more accurately characterize these attitudes by reviewing what public opinion polls in the United States say about immigrants and immigration policies.

We argue that U.S. public opinion, including what appears to be “anti-migrant” sentiment, is, in fact, more complex than commonly reported by the media. To reveal this complexity, we explore U.S. public reaction to a variety of immigration issues, public policy proposals, and border strategies. We use recent polling data to evidence that public opinion in the United States is not homogeneous. In particular, Latino public opinion on immigration issues is markedly different from that of the general population. Further, public opinion about this topic in border states deviates significantly from the mainstream of opinion in the United States. We demonstrate this by comparing national attitudes with attitudes in Arizona and California, two border states with a substantial body of polling on this topic, providing ample data with which to demonstrate and analyze the complexity of U.S. public opinion on immigration.

In a democracy, public opinion research is a way to give “voice” to ordinary people. Public opinion reflects the values, attitudes, and beliefs of specific popula-

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tions, such as residents of a nation, citizens, voters, or people who self-define as being of a particular racial or ethnic group. Public opinion is also a dynamic component of the policy process. Significantly, public opinion can lead to critical social change; opinions sometimes crystallize around a particular political agenda, people mobilize for change, and important policy changes are enacted. As research has demonstrated, public opinion has played a critical role in the development of key social movements for change throughout U.S. history (Piven 2006; Tarrow 1998). We believe that an analysis of public opinion provides critical insight into public attitudes, including those that pose barriers to constructive policy change, as well as those that may create valuable opportunities for future policy reform.

Public Attitudes

In order to discern public attitudes about immigration, we draw here on previous literature reviewing U.S. public opinion in the 1990s and 2000s (Lapinski et al. 1997; Buck et al. 2003; Pantoja 2006; Segovia and Defever 2010). When looking across years of data, it is striking to see that general attitudes toward immigration have actually been relatively stable over time in the United States. Perhaps surprisingly, it has never ranked highly when respondents are asked in an open-ended format to identify the most important issues facing the nation today. Yet, when directly asked to comment on the magnitude of the immigration “problem” in the United States, three-quarters of respondents say immigration is either a “very big problem” or a “moderately big problem” (Pew September 2002, March 2006). Yet, on the whole, most people in the United States think immigration is a “good thing” for the nation (Gallup Polls June 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006) and enhances U.S. society (Hamilton College/Zogby International February 2003).

Previous public opinion research has revealed that attitudes toward immigration tend to be more negative as the number of immigrants coming into the U.S. increases and when economic conditions become unfavorable (Lapinski et al. 1997). Research has also shown that attitudes toward specific immigrant groups vary, with European immigrants viewed more favorably than those from Asia and Latin America (Lapinski et al. 1997; Buck et al. 2003). Despite the fact that U.S. residents think immigrants contribute more than detract from the nation’s well-being, majorities of the U.S. public wish to decrease the flow of illegal immigrants into the country (Lapinski et al. 1997; Buck et al. 2003) and deny legal and illegal immigrants access to a variety of public services (Pantoja 2006). Residents want to see U.S. immigration policy totally overhauled; yet, there is little confidence in the ability of elected officials to implement federal policy on the issue (Segovia and Defever 2010).

When survey questions about immigration become more specific and provide contextual information, positive public attitudes are dampened. Referencing the “growing number of newcomers,” polls find that the country is divided as to whether recent immigrants do or do not pose a threat to traditional American values (Pew

August 2002, August 2003, January 2007). When the survey question is framed in terms of “immigrants today,” 52 percent of people say that immigrants are a “burden on our country” rather than strengthen the country (Pew December 2005, March 2006). Opinion on this topic was more divided from 2003 through the end of 2005, with less than half of polling respondents saying immigrants are a “burden on our country.” Pew surveys in 2006 and 2010 suggested that opinion is currently looking more like it did in the 1990s when 63 percent of polling respondents thought of immigrants as a burden on the nation (Pew March 2006, June 2010).

Although many believe that immigrants place a burden on U.S. society, at the same time, there is widespread recognition that immigrants play an important role in its economy. From the early 1990s through today, a majority of survey respondents in the United States agree that immigrants fill jobs that U.S. citizens do not want, rather than take jobs away from U.S. residents (CBS/*New York Times* June 1993, December 1995; CBS/*New York Times* January 1994, July 2005, October 2005; Pew March 2006).

Beyond the general questions about immigration and immigrants outlined above, some polls have focused on particular issues, policies, and/or groups of migrants. To further reveal the complex and contingent character of attitudes about immigration, we explore polls that have addressed governmental regulation of immigration, the distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, various policy options, and pathways to citizenship.

GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF IMMIGRATION

Public opinion polls indicate that U.S. residents look to the federal government for solutions to immigration issues. Consistently, three-quarters of the population agrees that the nation should “restrict and control” the flow of immigrants into the country “more than we do now” (Pew June 1992, July 1994, November 1997, September 1999, August 2002, August 2003, January 2007). How can immigrant flows be better controlled? People would like to see the numbers of immigrants coming into the U.S. decreased, rather than increased (CBS/*New York Times* May 2007). At times, a majority of survey respondents have called for reductions in the flow of immigrants into the United States. This was especially evident immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks. Today, the percentage of people favoring decreases in immigration hovers in the mid-30- to mid-40-percent range. The percentage of people who would like to see immigration increased hovers in the mid-teens.

It is clear that the tragedy of September 11, 2001, had an effect on immigration attitudes in the U.S. The perpetrators of the attacks were foreign nationals who came into the U.S. across seemingly porous borders. People today believe that stricter immigration controls might have prevented their arrival on U.S. soil. When the issue of immigration is contextualized with reference to September 11, survey respondents take a firm stand against immigration. A February 2003 Hamilton College/Zogby International survey told voters that the U.S. has severely restricted

the flow of “refugees” into the nation since September 11. When asked if the U.S. should go back to pre-September 11 levels, 70 percent said, “No.”

To reiterate, whenever the conversation turns toward how best to control immigration into the United States, people expect the federal government to take the lead in this policy area. The U.S. public supports increased government spending and increased government control in this field. At the same time, residents lack confidence in the ability of their elected officials to effectively implement immigration policy.

LEGAL VS. ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Immigrants can be in the U.S. legally or illegally. United States residents distinguish between the two groups and have different attitudes toward them. While attitudes toward legal immigrants are moderately supportive, attitudes toward *illegal* immigrants are consistently negative.

Heightened concern about illegal immigrants is not new. A *New York Times/CBS News* poll asked people in the mid-1980s if most recent immigrants are here legally or illegally. Virtually half of the respondents (49 percent) said they thought recent immigrants were here illegally (June 1986). One-third (32 percent) thought most immigrants were here legally and 19 percent were not sure. Following 9/11, the percentage thinking most recent immigrants were here illegally moved up to the mid-fiftieth percentile (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard University October 2004). In 2006, attitudes looked much like they did in 1986, suggesting that the word “immigration” continued to evoke illegal rather than legal immigration (Pew March 2006). Illegal immigration was thought to be a “very serious problem” by a strong majority of registered voters in the mid-2000s (Quinnipiac Poll February 2006). Roughly another 30 percent said illegal immigration is a “somewhat serious” problem. In another survey, 67 percent say illegal immigration is an “extremely important” or “very important” issue (CNN/Opinion Research Corporation September 2006).

In the mid- to late 2000s, polls found that the U.S. public believes that illegal immigrants are filling unwanted, low-paying jobs in the U.S., rather than taking jobs away from legal residents (CBS/*New York Times* May 2007). Regardless of the types of jobs illegal immigrants are thought to hold, illegal immigration has a negative connotation. Illegal immigrants are believed to hurt the economy by driving down wages and draining available funding for social services (CNN/*USA Today*/Gallup December 2005; NPR/Kaiser/Harvard October 2004; CNN Poll June 8-11, 2006). In contrast, legal immigrants are considered to be helping the U.S. economy or to have no impact on the economy at all. Not surprisingly, the strength of the economy affects public attitudes toward immigration and employment, and attitudes toward illegal immigration are more negative during times of economic crisis (Lapinski et al. 1997).

Whereas the U.S. public is concerned about the economic impact of illegal immigration, it tends not to link illegal immigration and crime together. Most people

think legal and illegal immigrants commit crime at the same rate as “native-born Americans” (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard October 2004). Research supports the view that crime is no more common among illegal immigrants, and some research has found crime rates to be lower among migrants than among U.S. citizens (Valenzuela and Martinez 2006).

POLICY OPTIONS

Polls in the mid-1990s explored policy options for handling illegal immigration, including creating paths to citizenship, the merits of guest worker status, or deportation of illegal immigrants. The policy debate expanded in the mid-2000s and included discussion of many variants of citizenship and guest worker status. Newer options include sending the National Guard to the border, building an impenetrable fence on the border, denying a variety of social services to illegal immigrants, and empowering citizen groups to patrol the borders. The expanded policy debate has emerged from the failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform. New voices have come to the table today and more policy alternatives are being identified.

The federal government is a major focus in the immigration debate. Three out of five people think the federal government is “not tough enough” on immigration, and a majority say the government should spend more money “prevent[ing] illegal immigrants from coming to this country” (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard October 2004). There is majority support among voters in the United States for militarizing the borders with federal agents and the National Guard (56 percent-78 percent), for imposing fines on employers who hire illegal immigrants (60 percent), and for deporting immigrants who are not in the country lawfully (55 to 57 percent) (*Fox News/Opinion Dynamic Polls* May 2005, April 2006, May 2006; *Pew* March 2006; *CNN* June 2006). However, the country is divided over building a wall to stop illegal immigration (45 percent in favor, 50 percent oppose), eliminating all forms of public assistance to illegal immigrants and their children (43 percent in favor, 45 percent oppose), and sending employers who hire illegal immigrants to jail (40 percent in favor, 55 percent oppose) (*Pew* January 2007; *CNN* September 2006).

There is tremendous support in the U.S. for centralizing and strengthening the powers of government to more effectively enforce citizenship laws. Three-quarters of the population support a national identity card that would prove whether someone is a legal citizen or not (*Pew* March 2006). Two-thirds support a government database defining who is and is not legally eligible to work in the United States and requiring employers to consult it before hiring new employees (*Pew* March 2006).

Given the lack of comprehensive immigration reform, increased pressure has been brought to bear in many states to have local police officers and, significantly, U.S. citizens, play a larger role in monitoring and reporting immigration violations (Wonders 2006, 2008). Public opinion data indicate that the U.S. public tends to support greater involvement of local police and ordinary citizens in immi-

gration enforcement efforts. Eighty-three percent of the U.S. public wants the police to check citizenship status when someone is arrested; nine out of ten people want social service agency workers to check the citizenship status of new applicants; a similar proportion of respondents say employers should be required to check the citizenship status of new employees (CNN Poll June 2006). Hospital workers are the only group spared from the expectation that agencies and citizens ought to routinely enforce immigration law; the country is divided over whether hospitals should check citizenship status before tending to an injured person (CNN Poll June 2006).

The public is very concerned that illegal immigrants are taking unfair advantage of social service benefits provided by the government. Two-thirds say illegal immigrants should not be eligible for state or local government benefits (Pew March 2006). The public does hold a special place for allowing the children of illegal immigrants to attend public school. Seventy-one percent say they should be allowed, while 26 percent say they should not (Pew March 2006).

If the federal government is not going to do the job, should citizen groups be allowed to enforce the border, especially citizens armed with weapons? Attitudes toward the “Minutemen,” a group composed of citizen volunteers who patrol the U.S. border with Mexico, divides the public. One-third or more of the U.S. public support the work of the Minutemen, while another third considers them to be little more than vigilantes (Pew March 2006; *CBS News Poll* October 2005; *Fox News/Opinion Dynamics Poll* April 2005, May 2006). Two-thirds of the country prefers having government rather than a voluntary group of citizens play the role of border enforcer.

CITIZENSHIP VS. AMNESTY FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS

Over the last decade, a variety of proposals have called for new pathways to citizenship as a policy response to illegal immigration in the United States. Many undocumented immigrants have been living in the United States for a long time. They are raising families here, working regular jobs, and paying taxes. How should the nation respond to long-term illegal immigrants, as distinguished from recent border crossers? Policy proposals run the gamut from deporting all illegal immigrants back to their country of birth to creating a path forward for these immigrants to achieve legal citizenship. What does the public think about these proposals? The answer is framed by the wording of the question itself.

If asking for a thumbs-up or thumbs-down on deporting all illegal immigrants, the country says “thumbs-up.” Two-thirds of the nation approves of the U.S. government deporting illegal immigrants back to their native country (CNN Poll June 2006). Opinion mellows slightly when deportation is played against granting “some kind of legal status” to illegal immigrants already living in the U.S. Under this scenario, 40 percent of respondents think illegal immigrants should be allowed to stay in the country (Pew March 2006). Significantly, two-thirds of registered voters support a

middle path whereby illegal immigrants would be allowed to stay in the U.S. with “temporary worker” status and then required to return to their home countries (Ayers, McHenry & Associates June 2006; Quinnipiac University Poll November 2006).

It appears that the public does not support making it easier for undocumented workers to become citizens (Gallup June 2005). However, opinion shifts 180 degrees when the policy question is qualified to narrowly focus on immigrants who have been in the U.S. for more than five years, are working, and would be required to pay back taxes. Seventy-seven percent of residents support such a policy (CNN April 2006). The distinction between older undocumented workers living in the U.S. and newer border crossers makes a significant difference in U.S. reaction to proposed solutions. Upwards of 59 percent of survey respondents say workers who have been in the U.S. for several years should be allowed to earn legal working status and not be deported (Pew April 2006, January 2007).

Finally, a significant proportion of the public prefers creating a path to citizenship for undocumented migrants, rather than creating a temporary worker program or deporting them back to their home countries (NPR/Kaiser/Harvard October 2004; *USA Today*/Gallup April 2006).

The Complexity of Public Opinion: Latinos and Border States

Thus far, we have focused on general U.S. public opinion about immigration. In reviewing this data, it is evident that it is highly contextual and dependent upon question wording. Still, we have outlined broad trends suggesting that the public is more supportive of immigration than might be expected from media accounts; at the same time, the general public consistently expresses concern about certain aspects of immigration, particularly illegal immigration, and seeks greater governmental involvement in this policy area.

In the following section, we seek to further reveal the complexity of U.S. public opinion through more focused attention on key groups and locales central to the immigration debate. First, we will explore Latino attitudes, followed by the examination of two key border states, Arizona and California.

LATINO ATTITUDES

The Pew Hispanic Center conducted a National Survey of Latinos in 2006 just before the November election. The results are interesting and bear mentioning here. First, it is quite evident from the polling data that attitudes of Latinos living in the U.S. (both native and foreign-born) are different from attitudes among the population as a whole. Whereas the general public favors increasing border control by deploying more federal agents and the National Guard, Latinos oppose these

measures (Pew July 2006). While the U.S. public is divided over proposals to build a bigger, stronger fence at the border, Latinos oppose this fence by a two-to-one margin (Pew July 2006). Ninety-three percent of Latinos prefer the U.S. developing a route to citizenship for illegal immigrants already living in this country, though the population divides over the question of allowing all illegal immigrants a chance to become citizens or only those who have been here a minimum of five years (Pew July 2006).

Arizona legislators recently signed SB1070 into law, requiring all law enforcement personnel to check the immigration status of anyone suspected of being in the country illegally. Although currently placed on hold by the federal courts, the issue has become a lightning rod for divergent attitudes. According to a 2010 Pew Hispanic Center survey of Latinos in the U.S., 64 percent of U.S. residents support SB1070. On the other hand, 79 percent of Latinos oppose Arizona's immigration law (Lopez, Morin, and Taylor 2010).

Significantly, the 2006 Pew study also shows there is growing concern within the Latino community that ongoing debate over immigration is furthering discriminatory attitudes in this country. About a third of Latinos in the 2010 survey report that they or a family member have experienced discrimination within the past five years due to their ethnicity.

At the same time, one result of recent immigration debates is a new solidarity being forged within the historically divided U.S. Latino community (Pew July 2006). Latinos believe their community will mobilize around discrimination issues and express their voice in the voting booth and in the streets with renewed social movement activity (Pew July 2006). This is a significant finding given the growing presence of Latinos in the United States and the potential of a proportionately large constituency like the Latino community for wielding power in the electoral system. As the immigration debate continues to unify Latino identity and mobilize Latino power, the character of politics in the United States will inevitably change.

TRENDS IN BORDER STATES

The complexity of U.S. public opinion about immigration is thrown into high relief when we look specifically at attitudes in border states. Detailed investigation of public opinion in border states demonstrates that attitudes and politics there are not necessarily in tune with national U.S. attitudes, and they are certainly not homogenous. To illustrate, we explore public opinion toward immigration in two border states: Arizona and California. Table 1 provides a quick glimpse of key demographic features of both, as compared to the U.S. as a whole.

As Table 1 indicates, there are significant differences in the proportion of the Latino population in California (36 percent), and Arizona (30 percent), in contrast with the United States as a whole (15 percent). Despite the similar percentage of Latinos in each state, the sheer number of Latinos in California is six times larger than in Arizona, a fact that we believe is important for understanding the differing atti-

TABLE 1
KEY DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF CALIFORNIA AND ARIZONA

	<i>U.S.</i>	<i>California</i>	<i>Arizona</i>
Population (million) ¹	307	36.9	6.6
Percent Hispanic/Latino ²	15	36	30
Numbers and percent of Undocumented Immigrants (million) ³	11.2 (3.6%)	2.55 (6.9%)	400 000 (6.1%)

¹ U.S. Census Bureau (2009).

² *American Community Survey* (2005-2009).

³ Passel and Cohn (February 2011).

tudes within each state. Pew Hispanic Center estimates that California heads the list of “Estimates of the Unauthorized Migrant Population for States” with approximately 2.55 million illegal immigrants in 2011, or 6.9 percent of the population (Passel and Cohn 2011). Many of California’s “unauthorized immigrants” are from a variety of nations, not just Spanish-speaking ones. Unauthorized immigrants constitute 6.1 percent of the Arizona population with 400 000 illegal immigrants in 2011 (Passel and Cohn 2011).

One noteworthy difference between California and Arizona is that growth in the population of “unauthorized immigrants” in the latter from 2000 to 2005 was more dramatic than in the former. California saw a 15-percent increase in the “unauthorized immigrant” population from 2000 to 2005 (Passel and Cohn 2010); in contrast, Arizona witnessed a 50-percent increase during this period. As we have evidenced, illegal immigration seems to be one of the largest sources of anxiety about immigration within the U.S. In the 1990s, California experienced a rapid rise in illegal immigration and correspondingly strong anti-immigrant sentiment, as shown by public opinion data and the Proposition 187 debate (Daniels 2004). It appears that recent anti-immigrant sentiment in Arizona is similarly linked to a large new increase in undocumented migration to the state.

In the section below, we provide more detailed analysis of how attitudes in these two border states differ from the nation, and from one another. Our analysis demonstrates that differences in public opinion about immigration in Arizona and California may be due, in part, to the timing of illegal migration. We also emphasize the increased diversity of the population in these border states, especially the relatively large and growing percentage of Latinos. The California example, in particular, suggests that as the Latino community expands in size, Latino attitudes take on increased weight in statewide surveys, leading toward a moderation of opinion on immigration issues.

ARIZONA

Arizona shares the longest border with Mexico, some 322 miles. Over the last decade, federal policy has made it more difficult for people to cross from Mexico into the U.S. at historic crossing points in California and Texas (Daniels 2004; Nevins 2010). This policy has had the effect of making Arizona the most active crossing point for irregular entry (McDowell and Wonders 2010), a fact that has likely had a significant effect on state-wide attitudes and does a great deal to explain the recent divergence of Arizona attitudes from those of the nation.

In a national survey that included a five-city oversample, Pew Hispanic Center found that Phoenix residents express greater concern about immigration issues than tends to be true elsewhere. This is noteworthy because Phoenix is the state's population center and, therefore, dominates statewide politics. People were asked in an open-ended format to say the most important issue facing their local community. Nationally, 3 percent listed "immigration." In Phoenix, 18 percent said "immigration" is the most important issue (Pew March 2006). Nationally, 41 percent of the public defines immigration as either a "very big problem" or a "moderately big problem," according to the Pew study. In Phoenix, 78 percent of the public says immigration is a very big or moderately big problem (Pew March 2006). In fact, a majority of Phoenicians (55 percent) says immigration is a "very big problem." In the national study, one-third of the U.S. public said they approve of the job the Minutemen are doing (Pew March 2006), while in Phoenix, one-half of city residents approve, suggesting greater frustration in the nation's fifth largest city at how the federal government is handling immigration.

Northern Arizona University's Social Research Laboratory, one of Arizona's major public opinion polling groups, did a series of public opinion polls on immigration issues in the state. According to their results, border and immigration issues have steadily moved to the forefront of statewide concern in Arizona. In spring 2003, just 6 percent of Arizona adults said "immigration" was the most important issue in the state (NAU Social Research Laboratory). By February 2007, 52 percent of Arizonans said "immigration/border issues" were the most important topic in the state.

By more than a 2:1 margin, Arizonans think that immigration of people from abroad to the United States in recent years has been "bad" (53 percent) rather than "good" for the country (24 percent) (NAU Social Research Laboratory Spring 2005). This contrasts dramatically with national opinion as expressed in a recent Gallup Poll in which two-thirds of people say immigration has been a good thing for the country vs. 28 percent who say it is a bad thing.

A majority of Arizonans (57 percent) would rather see the federal government spend more money on limiting the flow of immigrants into the U.S. than on integrating new immigrants into U.S. culture and society (NAU Social Research Laboratory Spring 2005).

When asked about strategies for addressing illegal immigration, Arizonans prefer law enforcement options that penalize undocumented immigrants rather than

options designed to help undocumented immigrants. Eighty-four percent want more money to be put into border enforcement, 70 percent want enforcement of laws that prohibit hiring of undocumented immigrants, and 61 percent would direct funds to deporting undocumented immigrants back to their home countries (NAU Social Research Laboratory Spring 2005).

In contrast to the national data, there is less support in Arizona for programs to facilitate immigrant access to services. Fifty-one percent of Arizonans support spending more money on legal services for immigrants wishing to apply for legal residency status. Spending on English language instruction for undocumented immigrants is supported by 46 percent. One-third of Arizonans (38 percent) support expenditures for programs to place undocumented immigrants in jobs where workers are needed, and 19 percent support funding social services for undocumented workers.

Arizonans want to see something —practically anything— done to address immigration and border issues. Sixty percent of Arizonans polled expressed support for former Arizona Congressman J.D. Hayworth's proposal to increase penalties for employers who hire illegal immigrants (NAU Social Research Laboratory Fall 2005). He also wanted to require all U.S. citizens to obtain a Social Security identification card with a photograph. Fifty-nine percent support Arizona Senator Kyl's proposal to require illegal immigrants living in the U.S. to leave the country and allow them to return legally to work temporarily if there are no U.S. workers available to fill a job. Fifty-eight percent support Arizona Senator John McCain's earlier proposal to allow illegal immigrants to pay a fine and apply for a temporary work visa. They could apply for permanent residence and eventually citizenship after a number of years.

Half of Arizonans (50 percent) expressed support for a proposal that would have allowed some illegal immigrants currently in the U.S. to legally stay for several years as long as they hold jobs that no U.S. citizen wants. Forty-eight percent indicated support for a proposal to use military technology to help the U.S. Border Patrol look into Mexico to locate and track the movements of potentially illegal immigrants before they cross the border.

More recently, Arizona's SB1070 has captured international attention. SB1070 compels state officials and agencies to enforce immigration law and also criminalizes those who employ or assist undocumented migrants. According to the May 5, 2010, Rocky Mountain Poll, 52 percent of Arizonans and 56 percent of registered Arizona voters support the Arizona legislation. Significantly, sixty-nine percent of Arizona Latinos, on the other hand, oppose SB1070.

CALIFORNIA

California is another state that shares a border with Mexico. As noted previously, one major difference between California and Arizona is that California's experience of undocumented migration, while significant, has been less dramatic than Arizona's during the last decade. Additionally, given that the most significant period

of Latino migration occurred in previous decades, the Latino population now constitutes a long-standing and vital part of the state's social and political life. It is likely that these important differences between the two states shape critical differences in public opinion.

One of the most consistent and available sources of public opinion data in California is the Field Poll. The Field Poll has conducted surveys on immigration across several years. Whereas Arizonans have a more negative perspective on the contributions of all immigrants to the United States, Californians hold a more moderate viewpoint, especially when it comes to evaluating the effect of illegal immigrants on the state overall.

Californians are very concerned about the issue of illegal immigration, though the level of that concern has subsided over time. In February 2006, three-quarters of the California population said they were either "extremely concerned" or "somewhat concerned" about immigration (Field Poll February 2006). This level of concern is quite similar to that seen in Phoenix where 55 percent say immigration is a "very big problem" and 23 percent say it is a "moderately big problem" (Pew March 2006). While high, this is somewhat lower than levels of concern in the mid-1990s when 90 percent of Californians were concerned about this issue (Field Poll October 1993).

Attitudes toward the impact illegal immigration has had on the state of California have also improved over time. In 2006, the population was divided, with 47 percent saying undocumented immigrants have a favorable effect and 45 percent saying they have an unfavorable effect on the state (Field Poll February 2006). In the early 1980s, 78 percent said illegal immigrants had an unfavorable effect on the state (Field Poll January 1982) and in the mid-1990s 68 percent of Californians held this view (Field Poll April 1994).

According to Field Poll findings, attitudes on this question bear a significant relationship to the race of the respondent. In 2006, just 33 percent of white non-Hispanics in California said illegal immigrants have had a favorable effect on the state, while 75 percent of Latinos say they have had a favorable effect (Field Poll March 2006). Forty-three percent of respondents whose race is defined as "other" (Asian, Native American, etc.) say illegal immigrants have had a favorable impact on the state.

Similarly, in 2006, 70 percent of Californians said illegal immigrants are doing jobs others do not want rather than taking jobs away from other Californians (Field Poll March 2006). In contrast, in 1994, 58 percent said illegal immigrants were doing jobs others do not want (Field Poll April 1994). In the 2006 survey, Latinos once again expressed a different viewpoint from that of white non-Hispanics (Field Poll March 2006). Eighty-five percent of Latinos said illegal immigrants are doing jobs others do not want, compared to 65 percent of white non-Hispanics.

It appears that as the proportion of Latinos and people of color residing in California grows, the proportion of people saying illegal immigrants have had a favorable impact on the state has increased. According to U.S. Census Bureau figures, Latinos were 26 percent of California's population in 1990 (1990) and 36 percent

of the population in 2009 (2009). This steady, large increase in the proportion of the population that is Latino, combined with increased Latino unity surrounding the immigration debate, has begun to crystallize into more favorable public opinion toward immigrants and immigration issues.

In 2005, almost two-thirds of Californians said that the number of illegal immigrants entering California from Mexico had increased over the past several years (Field Poll August 2005). In response, Californians expressed very strong preferences for particular policy responses. Unlike what we see in polling elsewhere, the number-one option favored by Californians (83 percent) is to create a program whereby illegal immigrants living in the U.S. for a number of years can apply for citizenship if they have a job, learned English, and pay back taxes (Field Poll April 2007). Unlike in Arizona, programs that enable undocumented workers to become citizens or at least acquire legal status are consistently favored over programs that rely on law enforcement to keep illegal workers out of the country or charging illegal immigrants with the felony of unlawful presence (Field Poll April 2006).

Increasing the number of border agents is supported by 71 percent of people, and temporary worker programs that move illegal immigrants toward being legal are supported by 67 percent of Californians. Similar to the rest of the nation, building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico and requiring all illegal immigrants to leave the country are not favored policy responses in California. A bare majority disapproves of allowing undocumented workers to obtain a California driver's license (Field Poll February 2006, March 2005, September 2003), and people are generally opposed to Minutemen activities (Field Poll August 2005, September 2003).

More recently, according to Field Poll results, Californians are divided over the merits of Arizona's SB1070 legislation. Just under half of California residents (49 percent) say they approve of the law, while 45 percent oppose it (Field Poll July 2010). Within California, white non-Hispanic voters support the law by 58 percent. Latino voters oppose the Arizona law 71 percent to 24 percent.

Complex and Changing Attitudes

This article has synthesized a large number of public opinion polls on immigration to create a complex portrait of U.S. attitudes about this important topic. Despite the media frenzy about immigration, attitudes toward immigration among the U.S. public have been relatively stable over time. Perhaps surprisingly, the U.S. public does not place immigration at the top of their list of concerns for the country. The public generally has positive feelings toward immigration, particularly past immigration, and recognizes the contributions immigrants make to the economy and culture of the United States. In this regard, we remain a nation of –and for– immigrants.

At the same time, people today are concerned that much immigration is *illegal* immigration. The public wants the federal government to play a larger role in moving forward immigration reform and, since the September 11 tragedy, has expressed heightened concern that the nation's borders should be secured. Survey

respondents consistently say they want the federal government to take more leadership in this area and to spend more tax dollars to secure the nation's borders and identify and prosecute people who violate immigration statutes.

Analysis of Latino attitudes and public opinion in border states further reveals the complexity of U.S. attitudes toward immigration. Latinos are now the largest minority population in the United States, and, significantly, the U.S. Census Bureau (2008) projects that by 2050, Latinos will constitute 30 percent of the U.S. population, a proportion consistent with their current percentage in Arizona and California. As we have documented, surveys consistently reveal that Latinos view the immigration issue differently than other population groups in the United States. For example, Latinos are more concerned than other groups that immigration debates fuel discriminatory attitudes in the country, and at least some research has found these concerns to be warranted (McDowell and Wonders 2010). At the same time, the immigration debate is bringing greater unity to Latinos, a population group that has historically been split across many divides (e.g., older immigrants vs. new arrivals, religious vs. non-religious Latinos, as well as differences based on country of origin). The immigration issue is helping to forge a more unified perspective around Latino rights and social justice. Also, as part of this new unified perspective, polling data indicate that Latinos anticipate heightened political mobilization in the future, including greater involvement in electoral politics.

Finally, this article moves from national level data about public opinion to examine differences in border state attitudes. One would imagine that two states like Arizona and California, adjacent states that both experience the impact of large numbers of irregular migrants crossing national borders, would share similar perspectives on the topic. This is not the case. While attitudes in Arizona have taken on a punitive character, corresponding to a dramatic increase in undocumented migration, attitudes in California are becoming more moderate over time. We suggest that one key factor influencing attitudes in California is the growth of the Latino population over the last two decades, particularly their unique perspective on immigration and their increased presence in community life and state politics.

Given the demographic changes currently projected for the nation, we believe that the analysis provided here suggests that Latinos will play an important role in shaping national public opinion about immigration in the future, particularly as Latinos begin to exercise social and political power at the local and state level. This will further heighten the complexity of attitudes toward immigration within the United States and will continue to create challenges for those wishing to characterize "the nation" with overly broad claims.

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STATE-LEVEL IMMIGRANT-RELATED LEGISLATION: WHAT IT MEANS FOR THE IMMIGRATION POLICY DEBATE

*Robert Donnelly**

Introduction

In the face of perceived federal inaction, the U.S. states are more aggressively debating and enacting immigrant-related legislation. Thematically, bills may be grouped in two main camps: 1) pro-enforcement legislation aimed at making life harder for unauthorized migrants through enhanced criminal sanctions and the denial of social services, and 2) pro-integration legislation intended to help legal immigrants through integration, citizenship, and education policy. As explained in greater detail in a subsequent section, this research found that pro-enforcement bills were enacted at more than twice the rate of pro-integration bills. Geographically, legislation was introduced in almost every state, with the most conspicuous growth in the South; in the first half of 2010, all 46 assemblies then in session recorded the introduction of immigrant-related bills, and 44 legislatures passed legislation. Politically, support for immigrant-related legislation appeared bi-partisan, and the most efficient combination for passage of pro-enforcement legislation appeared to be the duo of a Republican governor and a Republican legislature (ImmigrationWorks USA 2011).

The increase in immigrant-related legislation —throughout the country, mostly to enhance enforcement, and with the support of both parties— calls for a research plan to better understand its influences and effects. What does the rise in legislation tell us —if anything— about “xenophobia,” “nativism,” or anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States? And, what does it augur for comprehensive immigration reform at the federal level? This chapter will address these and other questions through an analysis of the immigrant-related legislation passed at the state level in the first half of 2010.

A principal objective of this research is to better understand the motivations behind the legislation. Is it, on balance, disposed against or for immigrant families? What share of bills can be qualified as restrictive/punitive and what share as beneficial to immigrant and refugee households? Have the media overemphasized the punitive/restrictive aspects of high-profile legislation, such as Arizona’s SB1070, while giving less coverage to other bills that might help immigrant families quiet-

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ly and non-controversially? In numbers, does legislation in support of immigrant integration, citizenship, and English-language education outweigh legislation that denies social services, enhances criminal sanctions, and creates new barriers to lawful employment? Which bills straddle the line and overlap both categories? And finally, how does immigrant-related legislation divide geographically and break down by party?

Another interest of the research is to better understand the political factors contributing to the increase of such legislation in this decade. The refrain that the federal government's ineffectiveness at controlling the southern border explains the growth of state-level initiatives may be true. However, there are also other factors at play, e.g., the emergence of the Tea Party movement, the staying power of border vigilante groups in local immigration politics, etc., and these will be discussed over the succeeding pages. The chapter additionally examines the impact that the state-level legislation as well as the political circumstances shaping it are having on the national comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) debate, as well as on prospects for CIR passage in the short term. Finally, it examines the overlapping issues of "nativism," "xenophobia," and anti-immigrant sentiment, and discusses their role in shaping legislation.

State-Level Immigrant-Related Legislation: Why Now?

A frequent argument to explain the expansion in state-level legislation faults the federal government for failing to either secure the southern border or pass comprehensive immigration reform. The argument goes that these shortcomings have forced state assemblies to step in to meet constituents' demands for action on immigration. "The federal government's failure to enforce our border has functionally turned every state into a border state... The states are stepping in and filling the void left by the federal government," said Randy Terrill, a Republican lawmaker in Oklahoma, one of the half-dozen or so states in 2011 pursuing SB1070-like legislation (Preston 2010). The U.S. Congress is famously seemingly paralyzed on a range of policy issues and not just immigration, but the argument has validity given the high salience that "undocumented immigration" obtains across the country. In fact, national and state polls show that respondents rate "undocumented immigration" as a pressing concern, even in locations far from the southern border with small foreign-born populations. This is still the case even as the unauthorized migrant population declines in many parts of the United States and falls from its 2007 peak (Pew Hispanic Center 2011). Moreover, the enhanced roles that state and local authorities are now playing in federal immigration enforcement also suggests that constituents may be expecting state officials to step forward more vigorously on these matters. Meanwhile, in immigrant-friendly locales with large foreign-born populations, such as San Jose, California, the failure of CIR and the absence of strong federal leadership have forced local governments to compensate with their own integration, citizen-

ship, and education efforts in order to meet growing demand.¹ Another recent catalyst for pro-integration legislation at the state level was the U.S. Senate's inability to bring to a vote the DREAM Act in December 2010, considered the last best chance for such a vote in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, what constituted a failure for the bill's backers has helped to fuel support for state-specific DREAM Acts, such as those being talked about in Massachusetts and Maryland (Vedantam 2010).

Anti-immigrant politics have contributed to the rapid growth in state legislative activism. In the run-up to the November 2010 midterms, candidates for assembly offices throughout the country scored points with voters by pronouncing in favor of copycat laws to Arizona's SB1070 and by voicing support for the revision of state and federal birthright citizenship laws. Turning campaigns into referendums on undocumented immigration proved a smart strategy for some politicians, as the politics surrounding the passage of Arizona's SB1070 showed in April 2010. Facing a tough reelection bid, incumbent Governor Jan Brewer used her support of the bill as a shield, strongly deflecting a tough primary challenge from the right and forcing her main rival to drop out. In the general election, Brewer easily trounced the Democratic candidate, former state Attorney General Terry Goddard, winning by 12 percentage points. Even though the main provisions of the controversial bill have been suspended following a federal judge's injunction in July, the mere signing of the bill into law proved a boon for Brewer (Donnelly 2010).

Beyond Arizona, candidates in 2010 blasted opponents with anti-immigrant rhetoric. Nevada Republican Senate candidate Sharron Angle called her opponent, Sen. Harry Reid, "the best friend an illegal alien ever had," while Louisiana Sen. David Vittier made a similar accusation against his opponent (Chishti and Bergeron 2010). Elsewhere, candidates from California, Colorado, and Kansas lined up for endorsements from Maricopa County, Arizona, Sheriff Joe Arpaio, a leading proponent of "get tough" enforcement measures against unauthorized persons (Chishti and Bergeron 2010). Media coverage also appeared to affect the timing and sequence of legislative activity. The widely publicized March 2010 slaying of Cochise County rancher Robert Krentz fueled support for SB1070 in the month before it was eventually voted —although initial suspicions of an unauthorized border-crossing killer have so far gone unproven. In Virginia, news reporting on the August 2010 death of nun Denise Mosier, killed in a car crash caused by a drunken undocumented immigrant with two prior drunk-driving convictions, probably contributed to pro-enforcement public opinion (Archibold 2010; Buske and Duggan 2010).

Trends hint that pro-enforcement state legislative activism will continue in the short term. The presence of border vigilante groups as a kind of semi-permanent backdrop in the media and the appeal of the politically influential Tea Party movement are two such forces, shaping local immigration politics at the border and elsewhere. In her book, *The Law into Their Own Hands* (2009), Roxanne Lynn Doty suggests that border vigilante groups help socially construct undocumented immi-

¹ For the specific case of San Jose, see Bada et al. 2010.

grants as dangers to the social order that require extraordinary controls. Though unsupported by the existing data, the assertion that undocumented immigrants are would-be terrorists and violent criminals undeserving of social, political, and economic rights operates as a powerful rallying tool for some politicians, she says. Furthermore, she argues, constituting migrant populations as “enemies” and defining non-migrant U.S.-born populations as “friends” advances a simple yet effective dichotomy, which, in an increasingly diverse society, helps to unambiguously define American essentialism and national identity.

Another trend-shaping force is the politically influential Tea Party movement. At the 2010 midterms, contenders endorsed by the conservative Tea Party won several key Republican Senate primary contests, in Alaska, Delaware, Kentucky, and Colorado; and some Tea Party candidates won general elections, such as the senatorial and gubernatorial races in Florida, among others. Heading into the 2012 elections, the movement is expected to exert influence over the selection of Republican candidates in many different races, amplifying the importance of its members’ views on immigration.²

Nativist and Xenophobic Impulses

What are the consequences of such legislative activism at the state level? Do the bills passed by the different assemblies reflect a pervasive nationwide disgust with undocumented immigrants and, possibly even, with the legal foreign-born? Could this sentiment culminate in tough enforcement laws like SB1070 or repeal of the Fourteenth Amendment and its birthright citizenship provisions? To what extent is such legislative activism properly classified as xenophobic or nativist? Or is this cycle’s wave of punitive/restrictive legislation more consonant with the anti-welfare discourse of the mid-1990s, reflected in the immigration and welfare reform laws Congress passed in 1996?

This analysis found that most recent state-level legislation can be classified as punitive/restrictive. Yet, it also found that the long arm of these laws appears to extend only to undocumented immigrants. Legal foreign-born residents, such as asylum seekers, refugees, legal permanent residents, etc., see no similar degradation of rights. They do not face the same punishments that undocumented persons face, and, in fact, this analysis found that support for pro-enforcement legislation did not necessarily preclude a legislature’s passage of pro-integration bills to help legal immigrants. What is more, several states have made provisions for citizenship promotion, English-language education, and refugee services—efforts to help the legal foreign-born— while promoting heavier restrictions and penalties against the undocumented foreign-born.

² At rates above those of moderate voters, Tea Party sympathizers assert that immigration should be decreased and that it causes the displacement of U.S. workers, according to a poll conducted by the University of Washington Institute for the Study of Ethnicity, Race, and Sexuality (2010).

Rather than manifest outright xenophobia, the state-level legislation signals a bifurcated and ambivalent approach to the management of foreign-born populations. On the one hand, undocumented foreigners face new restrictions brought on by the recent legislative changes, as well as by the “devolution of enforcement” trend that has beefed up interior enforcement. They may now face pressures from local officials deputized to enforce federal immigration law under 287(g) agreements or who are partners in the government’s Secure Communities program, requiring participating local police to check the fingerprints of all arrested individuals against a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) database. In addition to the stress of possible deportation should they be arrested—though not necessarily convicted—for committing a traffic violation, undocumented migrants must also now contend with the prospect of new state criminal penalties for lacking papers, the central thrust behind the SB1070 law being imitated nationwide.

By these comparisons, legal foreign-born residents enjoy many more rights and face many fewer restrictions than the undocumented. But this characterization is challenged, too, after taking into account the hardships that punitive/restrictive legislation places on mixed-status households and the heightened discrimination and racism that such laws—and the adverse political climate surrounding their passage—places on all Latino co-ethnics, whether “legal or “illegal.”

What can the latest wave of punitive/restrictive legislation tell us about anti-immigrant sentiment in the United States? Is this sentiment a matter for concern, but not too much concern? Is it a blip on a progress chart that in time will culminate in the gradual integration of today’s immigrant population, following the trajectory of prior generations? Does the principal benefit of today’s punitive/restrictive legislation lie in its theatrical political-symbolic import and its effectiveness as a rallying message at election time?

While state and local initiatives are limited in immediate scope to their respective jurisdictions, they can have national repercussions. On the one hand, state and local politics affect the positions that national-level politicians are willing to stake their reelection bids on, while political rhetoric can “move the goalposts” closer to or farther from policy objectives. Comprehensive immigration reform (CIR) is arguably one such goal, whose achievement has become even more remote because of the tone of the immigration debate at the local level. And some prognostications suggest that a serious debate on CIR is impossible until, at the earliest, January 2013 and then only if the Republicans lose control of the House of Representatives and President Barack Obama is reelected. Local and state immigration politics can also have a tangible effect on federal enforcement policy and strategy. For example, local politics conditions support at the ground level for the continuation of “devolution of enforcement” measures such as the 287(g) and Secure Communities programs. As noted in the recent edited volume *Taking Local Control* (Varsanyi 2010), which compiles studies of recent immigrant-related legislative activism in the United States, federal enforcement policy has historically relied on the sometimes tacit and sometimes more overt support of local authorities. But today’s enforcement policies appear to take a qualitative step further, explicitly forging binding partnerships.

Analysis of 2010 State-Level Immigrant-Related Legislation

This study analyzed data collected by the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) of state-level immigrant-related legislation passed in the first half of 2010. The objective was to determine what share of the bills conformed to a “punitive/restrictive” definition and what percentage fit, rather, in an “integrative/beneficial” category. The purpose was to provide a definitive breakdown between these two important categories, in order to determine the aggregate direction of immigrant-related legislation at the state level. Is most of it “punitive/restrictive” or “integrative/beneficial”? In what cases does legislation straddle both categories? Although the NCSL data do sub-divide the bills into five or so categories, these topical fields avoid judgment on the essential question of whether a particular bill is designed to make life easier or harder for a foreign-born person. At the same time, another objective of the study was to better pinpoint the geographic distribution of the legislation and to identify trends in party composition and legislative outcome.

Methodology

Each bill was evaluated using its NCSL-drafted summary and in consultation with the actual legislation as published on the respective state legislature’s website. After initial evaluation, bills were organized into one of three categories. Group A included “punitive/restrictive” legislation, such as bills dealing with enhanced local enforcement, denial of social services and benefits, higher barriers to employment and licensing, and the like. Group B encompassed “integrative/beneficial” legislation, such as bills related to refugee resettlement, funding for English-language classes, and citizenship acquisition. Bills fitting both groups, such as appropriations, were placed in Group C.

Some of the NCSL-collected legislation was disregarded for this study. Resolutions like a successful motion to institute a Louisiana Irish Week were thrown out. Entries whose summaries were ambiguously or vaguely worded and legislation that was only obliquely “immigration-related” were also discarded after consulting the actual law. Dilemmas arose in the study; the greatest involved the inadequacy of the monolithic categories to enable sufficient nuance for the different kinds of legislation being passed. For example, Arizona’s SB1070, the strongest pro-enforcement bill passed at the state level in 2010, was given the same weight in Group A as Florida House Bill 971, which placed a licensing restriction on tow truck operators who contract with the state. (In fact, a spectrum may enable a more nuanced visual representation of the different forms of legislation, especially of the enforcement-related kind, the category with greatest variation.) The original NCSL data compiled 195 pieces of legislation, which this analysis reduced to 116, also lowering the number of corresponding states from 43 to 37.

The analysis found that 67 (about 58 percent) of all bills belonged to Category A, with the remaining 49 evenly split between Group B (24 bills) and Group C (25).

The geographic distribution found that the Northeast accounted for the fewest bills, with only 8, compared with the Midwest (34), the South (43), and the West (31). The geographic quadrant with the most Category A (pro-enforcement) bills was the South, with 32, followed by the Midwest and West with 17 and 16, respectively. The Northeast posted only two pro-enforcement bills in the first half of the year. For Category B (pro-integration), the Midwest and the West posted the highest number of bills, with nine and eight respectively, while the South posted only five, and the Northeast, two. Southern states passed six times as many Group A bills as they passed Group B bills. In comparison, the other three quadrants reported greater parity between the two dominant categories. Group A bills led Group B bills by only a 2:1 rate in both the Midwest and the West, while in the Northeast both categories had the same number of bills (two). After considering the 116 bills, the analysis came to the following conclusions:

- Most bills favor enhanced enforcement and/or denial of social services to undocumented immigrants.

Approximately 58 percent of the bills passed at the state level in the first half of 2010 conformed to Group A, the category for bills related to enhanced enforcement, denial of social services, and higher barriers for employment and licensing. About 21 percent of all bills fit Group B, the “integrative/beneficial” category, and an equal number belonged in Group C.

Geographic Distribution

- Southern states account for just under half of all pro-enforcement bills in the first half of 2010.

The states of the South, as defined by the U.S. Census, accounted for 32 of the total 67 Group A bills passed in the period studied. In that same period, the southern states passed six times as many Group A bills as Group B bills (32 versus 5).³

³ According to the census, the South is made up of Delaware; Maryland; Washington, D.C.; Virginia; West Virginia; North Carolina; South Carolina; Georgia; Florida; Kentucky; Tennessee; Alabama; Mississippi; Arkansas; Louisiana; Oklahoma; and Texas. However, the following states were excluded from the study either because they were not in session in first half of 2010 (Texas) or because their legislatures passed no immigrant-related legislation in that period, according to the NCSL data: Delaware, North Carolina, and Arkansas. Washington, D.C., is not a state and does not have a state legislature, so it was not captured in the NCSL data.


- In mid-western and western states, Group A bills outpace Group B bills 2-to-1.

Group A bills surpassed Group B bills by 2-to-1 in both the Midwest and the West.⁴

- The Northeast reports the fewest bills passed in the time period.⁵

The northeastern states passed as many Group A as Group B bills in the time period, two for each category.

CHART 1
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF STATE-LEVEL IMMIGRANT-RELATED LEGISLATION (FIRST HALF OF 2010)*



* Passed legislation.

SOURCE: Developed by the author using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.).

⁴ The census defines the Midwest as Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, and Kansas. Of these 12 states, only Ohio and North Dakota (because it was not in session) did not record the passage of any piece of immigrant-related legislation in the period. The western states are Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, and Hawaii. Of these, neither Montana nor Nevada recorded immigrant-related legislation in the time period as they were out of session, and the legislation passed in Wyoming, New Mexico, and Alaska was excluded from this analysis.

⁵ The Northeast, by Census Bureau definition, encompasses Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. Immigrant-related legislation was passed in all of these states in the first half of 2010 except for New Jersey, while the New Hampshire legislation was omitted from this analysis.

Partisan Distribution


- Support for pro-enforcement legislation appears to be bi-partisan.

Support for pro-enforcement legislation appeared significantly bi-partisan. Twenty-seven pro-enforcement bills were passed and signed into law by divided governments, where the legislature and the governor were from different parties or where the legislature was evenly split. Where Democrats controlled both the governorship and the legislature, 14 pro-enforcement bills were passed, but, as of the date of this study, only 10 had been formally enacted, with four awaiting the governor’s signature, all in Illinois.

- Republican governors signed 12 more Group A bills into law than their Democratic counterparts: 39 to 27.

The most activist legislatures for immigrant-related legislation appeared to be those in which Republicans controlled the legislature and the governor was a Republican. A large percentage of Group A legislation (26 of 67) and a large share of all legislation (39 of 116) met both of the following two criteria: 1) the originating chamber had a Republican majority; and, 2) the governor was a Republican. Of the 26 pro-enforcement bills that passed, all but one was enacted, and the vetoed bill, Georgia Senate Bill 291, which placed permit restrictions on immigrant gun owners, went unsigned for a reason unrelated to immigration policy.⁶

CHART 2
GROUP A (PRO-ENFORCEMENT): LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE
COMPOSITION AND BILLS PASSED




*Tennessee state Senate.

**Mississippi state Senate and Louisiana House of Representatives.

SOURCE: Developed by the author using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.).


⁶ In a news release, the pro-immigration reform group National Immigration Forum offers seven characteristics for states considering SB1070-like legislation, including the following: 1) A re-elected

CHART 3
 GROUP B (INTEGRATIVE/BENEFICIAL: LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMPOSITION
 AND BILLS PASSED



SOURCE: Chart developed by the author using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.).

CHART 4
 TOTALS: LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE COMPOSITION AND BILLS PASSED



*Tennessee state Senate.

**Mississippi state Senate and Louisiana House of Representatives.

SOURCE: Chart developed by the author using data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.).

highly motivated potential bill sponsor; 2) A legislature where a similar bill has already been introduced or that has passed a supportive resolution; 3) A conservative governor and conservative majority in the legislature (Vargas 2010).

Post-2010 Legislation

Although far from exhaustive, this analysis does show the basic patterns and trends that shaped immigrant-related legislation at the state level in the first half of 2010. The policy thrust for the majority of the legislation was on enhanced enforcement through “attrition” and the denial of social services and/or through tougher criminal penalties similar to SB1070. Geographically, the center of pro-enforcement legislative activism was located closer to the South than to any other region, with the Midwest and the West in not-too-distant second place. And, politically, support for pro-enforcement policies was bi-partisan, although the most efficient combination for successful passage appeared to be the duo of a Republican governor and a Republican-controlled legislature. While trends can change, in the short term, it appears that these basic characteristics will hold or even harden in 2011 and beyond. Take the following most recent trends in immigrant-related legislation and debate at the state level:

SB1070 COPYCAT BILLS

Lawmakers in several states are expected to introduce bills modeled on Arizona’s SB1070, in spite of the fact that in July a federal court enjoined the bill’s core enforcement provisions. States where the legislation is popular include those located in politically conservative regions of the country, such as the South, and where long-term immigrant settlement is still considered a recent phenomenon dating to the 1990s. Among states where the legislation is expected to be discussed are Georgia, Mississippi, Nebraska, Kansas, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Oklahoma. Emboldening legislators to take up bills may be the political bonus to be gained from publicly supporting “get tough” measures on undocumented immigrants. And the absence of a conclusive ruling on the constitutionality of SB1070 by the U.S. federal judiciary, as well as support by the executive for “devolution of enforcement” policies, may have opened the door wider ideologically for the consideration of such laws. “States will push ahead regardless of the 9th Circuit [court decision upholding the injunction against SB1070’s core enforcement provisions],” Kansas’s new Secretary of State Kris Kobach was quoted as saying in a *New York Times* article (Preston 2010). As of January 2011, Mississippi’s state Senate had passed an SB1070-like bill, while Colorado lawmakers planned to introduce similar legislation, though with some important differences (La Plaza 2011a).

BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP REPEAL

Assertions that undocumented immigrants are motivated to give birth to “anchor babies” and exploit the U.S. birthright citizenship tradition have fueled a movement to repeal the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, efforts are afoot to make

statutory changes at the state level that would deny “state citizenship” to the children of undocumented immigrants, blocking access to state social services, education benefits, and licensing privileges (driver’s licenses). Such efforts could symbolize a final race to the bottom for “attrition through enforcement” advocates, considering that many states already have sharply curtailed social services for non-U.S. citizens. Anti-immigrant sentiment appears to inform the positions of some supporters of these measures. One backer of a coordinated movement to repeal citizenship in Oklahoma, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and Arizona said that the goal of the project was to eliminate “an anchor baby status, in which an illegal alien invader comes into our country and has a child on our soil that is granted citizenship automatically,” he was quoted as saying in *The New York Times* (Preston 2010).

Conclusion

Underlying the intense legislative activity of 2010 have been concerns deeper than dissatisfaction with the government’s perceived failure to control the southern border or to implement comprehensive immigration reform. Immigration can alter the social fabric quickly. It can introduce new “foreign” elements into the society. And it can wreak a kind of unexpected creative destruction. At the same time, it can also constructively transform communities; it can renew and revitalize the city and the suburb; and it regenerates America’s national self, culturally, politically, and economically.

These are the two very distinct visions of immigration that are playing out at the state and local levels in the United States. On the one hand, states with high legal permanent resident populations with long histories of immigrant settlement and where present-day political leaders may themselves be the sons and daughters of immigrants may have more sanguine outlooks on immigration and greater local demand to implement pro-integration measures. On the other hand, so-called non-traditional immigrant-receiving states, where Latino settlement is new, and those in historically conservative regions, may be more intensely focused on the question of “illegality,” responding with measures designed to shun immigrants (denying social services) or sanction them (through new criminal justice penalties). This dichotomy is complicated by differences between certain states and certain local governments, as well as within local governments themselves, such as the conflicts that exist between cities and counties on the merits of enhanced immigration-enforcement powers.

Attitudes toward immigration are highly varied in the United States and differ not only from state to state but from state to county and from county to city. Across the country, as this analysis of state legislation has shown, immigration politics are a variegated patchwork, reflecting the diversity of opinion that this controversial subject inspires, but also showing the way that it can inhibit the basic issue consensus needed to foster federal-level policy reform. While the growth in state legislation is commonly blamed on federal inaction, it may be as much a cause of this inaction as an effect.

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LOCAL ANTI-IMMIGRATION POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA'S INLAND EMPIRE

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Introduction

In summer 2010, eight cities in the Inland Empire (IE), a region located east of Los Angeles (Figure 1), passed mandatory E-Verify¹ ordinances and/or proclamations supporting Arizona's SB1070.² National and local media covering the events argued the cities' actions were the product of partisan conservative pressure on city councils in conservative places (Horseman and Hill 2010; Lovett 2011). The observation is accurate. The IE is more conservative than the rest of California and the eight cities are more conservative than the rest of the IE (Table 1). The region's increasingly militant Tea Party activists,³ who champion punitive immigration policies including criminalization and deportation, targeted city council meetings urging local officials to protect their communities from undocumented immigration and its effects.

For the past 15 years, state and local anti-immigrant politics and policies have been challenging federal authority to regulate immigration. In 1996, the Clinton administration focused its immigration policy on militarizing the U.S.-Mexico border and shifted some domestic immigration enforcement to the states (Varsanyi 2008). Since then, states and localities began legislating against immigrants arguing they are an economic burden and cultural threat. The resulting political and legal chaos stems from what Varsanyi labels the "liberal paradox" (2008, 881): competing economic and political interests in a neoliberal state concur on policies that champion free movement of goods and services and a deregulated, flexible labor market, while tightening controls over immigration and limiting immigrant and labor rights. Others point out that the paradox is played out differently depending on the nexus of national, state, and local politics one finds in a particular place (Sparke 2006). Such varied topography of immigration politics leads to a chaotic legal framework where flexible labor markets are desirable, but some who work in them are criminalized and


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¹ A U.S. government Internet database that verifies eligibility to work in the U.S.

² A sweeping anti-immigrant law that allows local law enforcement to ask for immigration documentation, criminalizes solicitation of work in public, charges all undocumented immigrants with trespassing, and mandates the use of E-Verify for all the state's public and private employers.

³ A populist conservative movement seeking to strictly limit the role of the federal government and enhance local political power.

FIGURE 1
 INLAND EMPIRE CITIES CONSIDERING/PASSED E-VERIFY ORDINANCES AND/OR
 PROCLAMATIONS SUPPORTING ARIZONA'S SB1070



SOURCE OF INSET MAP: Barr (2010).

TABLE 1
 SELECTED POPULATION, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL CHARACTERISTICS
 OF INLAND EMPIRE CITIES THAT PASSED E-VERIFY ORDINANCES AND/OR
 PROCLAMATIONS SUPPORTING ARIZONA'S SB1070

City/Inland Empire/California	Population ethnicity (percent) ¹		Unemployment (percent) ²	Voter registration (percent) ³	
	White (alone)	Hispanic (all races)		Republican	Democrat
Hemet	58.0	32.0	18.2	45.4	33.8
Highland	33.1	46.6	17.5	41.0	38.5
Lake Elsinore	41.4	46.4	14.2	38.5	34.0
Menifee	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	46.3	31.6
Murrieta	55.7	25.7	9.7	50.1	25.8
Norco	54.2	33.8	11.9	51.8	26.8
Temecula	59.4	24.7	10.0	49.8	25.4
Wildomar	58.9	32.4	12.9	47.8	27.5
Inland Empire	39.4	44.9	14.3	40.2	37.6
California	42.5	36.1	12.4	31.0	44.1

¹ U.S. Department of Commerce (2010b).

² California Employment Development Department (2010).

³ California Secretary of State (2010).

impeded from becoming formal participants. Without legal status they are vulnerable to employers, who exercise complete authority over them in every aspect of work.

This arrangement has powerful backers in the U.S. business community, who frequently oppose any attempts to constrain access to the large pool of disposable labor. Conversely anti-immigrant activists are convinced that this arrangement is harmful, portraying undocumented immigrants as an economic burden and a social threat. They have turned their politics into legislative action by targeting conservative politicians and voters at the state and local levels to challenge the federal government's exclusive authority over immigration. Currently, anti-immigrant activists are exploiting a provision in the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) that they argue allows state and local governments to regulate immigration. Passed in 1986, IRCA addressed the magnet of employment that attracted undocumented immigrants by imposing sanctions against employers who hired them. Employers became immigration enforcers because they were forced to report all workers they hired, but it was still up to the federal government to scrutinize the submitted data and remove unauthorized workers (Cunningham 2010, 415). IRCA also imposed anti-discrimination provisions meant to prevent employers from pre-screening or punishing workers based on presumed immigration status. Despite widespread consensus that IRCA's intent was to strengthen federal authority over immigration, citing one of its provisions,⁴ state and local legislatures are enacting new business licensing laws to impose additional requirements on employers for enforcing immigration law and sanctions if they do not.

Court decisions about state laws have been mixed, depending on whether jurists classified state and local laws as licensing (upheld) or immigration (struck down). The most prominent case is Arizona's Legal Arizona Worker's Act (LAWA), which mandates the use of E-Verify by all employers in the state and penalizes violators who do not use the program or willingly hire undocumented workers, by revoking their business licenses. LAWA was upheld by federal courts on the grounds that it is a licensing law.

Emboldened by LAWA's court victories, anti-immigrant activists advocate the mandatory use of E-Verify as a solution to immigration problems. This is evident in the IE where Tea Party activists have mobilized conservative politicians for their cause to pass local versions of LAWA throughout the region. This article examines this process in two parts. The first details the debates surrounding the proposed E-Verify ordinances and pro-Arizona proclamations. The second examines these debates in the context of U.S. national and state immigration politics.

⁴ "The provisions of this section preempt any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (*other than through licensing and similar laws*) upon those who employ...unauthorized aliens." (U.S. Legal Services Corporation 1986) (author's emphasis).

Local E-Verify Ordinances and Proclamations In the Inland Empire

In summer 2010, local Tea Party activists targeted several cities in the western IE, prodding them to pass mandatory E-Verify ordinances and to support Arizona's latest anti-immigrant law SB1070, which contains the same E-Verify provision as LAWA (Figure 1). The resulting mandatory E-Verify ordinances are based on LAWA and Southern California's first local ordinance, implemented in January 2010 by Lancaster in Los Angeles County. All the ordinances are complaint-based, tie the use of E-Verify to licensing, and are enforced by city staff and city managers. They differ slightly in the penalties they impose. Some merely suspend business licenses of habitual violators while others "may" revoke them permanently at the discretion of city managers. Like LAWA, none provide protection against discrimination from employers. The proclamations supporting Arizona portray it as heroic in its struggle against undocumented immigration and condemn the federal government's unwillingness to deal with the problem. The information used here to detail each city's case comes from videotaped and/or printed city council meeting minutes and from media reports.

During public debate over mandating E-Verify in Lake Elsinore, two Tea Party activists, who are actively involved in trying to pass E-Verify in all IE cities, spoke of E-Verify's accuracy and its negligible burden on business and city budgets. They also dismissed any threats of lawsuits against the city claiming that the federal court decisions upholding LAWA have opened the door for E-Verify to be implemented in cities across the U.S. One activist said that E-Verify is necessary to protect the American dream now being hijacked by illegal aliens, who are taking all the good starter jobs (e.g., fast food) and not allowing young workers to enter the job market. For their part, City Council members agreed that the council needed to do something about the growing problem of undocumented immigration, but they disagreed on whether the city could afford to enforce an E-Verify ordinance. One council member who wanted the more robust E-Verify ordinance, whereby the city would require employers to submit documented proof that they are using the program, argued it was necessary to be able to drastically lower very high local unemployment rates. He cited a Heritage Fund study on the cost of undocumented immigrants to communities and claimed that the city's investment in a harsher ordinance would be offset by the benefits of higher employment. However, based on a city staff report detailing the prohibitive costs of aggressively enforcing E-Verify, the council voted for the complaint-based option. Conspicuously absent from the debate were representatives from the local business community. City staff reported that the city's chamber of commerce asked for more time to study E-Verify, but were not explicitly opposed to the ordinance.

After its discussion of E-Verify the council passed a proclamation supporting Arizona's SB1070. Council members were almost unanimous in praising Arizona for standing up to the federal government and forcing a legal showdown over border security and immigration reform (City of Lake Elsinore 2010). To further jus-

tify the council's proclamation, the former mayor of Lake Elsinore wrote an op-ed piece in a local newspaper summing up the impact of undocumented immigration as detrimental to national security, economic prosperity, and national unity. She claimed that the law correctly divides "law-abiding people from lawbreakers," and argued that those opposing Lake Elsinore's proclamation seek to "alienate people along racial lines (pitting Latinos against Anglos)." She concluded that Lake Elsinore and other cities support Arizona because it "took a stand on the side of the law," which, along with "the relentless defense of freedom," is what unites all Americans regardless of race and background (Melendez 2010).

Temecula became another target of Tea Party activists advocating a mandatory E-Verify ordinance during council meetings. They repeated their talking points touting the program's accuracy, assuring council members that Arizona's court victories cleared the way for mandating it, and arguing that implementing it will have a dramatic positive effect on the local labor market making jobs available to legal residents who need them. Business owners present stated that they wanted to use E-Verify to weed out undocumented workers. Other members of the public commented that local government has to enforce immigration law because the federal government violates it by telling undocumented workers to come here and work. One known anti-immigrant activist accused all "Hispanics" running businesses in Temecula of laundering money from the drug trade. Another said that the reason undocumented workers come to the U.S. is because their countries are "sewers," and that they should instead stay at home and fight for their rights there. A claim was made that E-Verify is "color blind," and its use does not discriminate on the basis of race and ethnicity. Others turned that argument on its head saying that what is happening in the U.S. labor market is racial profiling against U.S. citizens by some employers who prefer undocumented immigrants who are paid less and have no rights. One person said that white people always sat back and have been made to feel guilty about their purported discrimination against minorities, and now it was time for them to stand up for themselves.

The City Council seemed to be most concerned about the enforcement costs of mandating E-Verify, but members remained united in their condemnation of illegal immigration. They all felt that it was their duty as local leaders to do something about an issue that they felt is harming their community. One council member argued that "illegals have no stake" in the community and no rights. In passing the ordinance they concluded the E-Verify process would not be a burden on the city or its businesses (City of Temecula 2010).

When the Murrieta City Council debated its ordinance, Tea Party activists argued that E-Verify would stop Mexico from getting a "double dip" from Mexican workers sending money home and U.S. companies outsourcing jobs to Mexico. One anti-immigrant activist said that "the labels Latinos and Hispanics are sugar-coated terms for illegals," and that local governments should not be responsible for them but for "American creeded" citizens. Tea Party activists challenged the council to protect their citizens and stand up to the federal government. They called the city's proposed resolution for voluntary use of E-Verify "wimpy," and urged the city to

pass a strict ordinance, arguing that if it did not follow its neighboring communities, it would be flooded with undocumented workers from those cities.

Most council members were concerned about the fiscal impact of implementing E-Verify, but were partially reassured by the local chamber of commerce president, who commented that he saw no serious cost burden. The city manager seemed reluctant about E-Verify, arguing that Murrieta was immune to an influx of low-skill undocumented workers because its businesses demand mostly highly skilled workers. Some council members were concerned the city might be sued, but Tea Party activists pointed out that not one city that passed E-Verify has been sued. While the council members seemed apprehensive, they expressed the need for acting in some way to address what they saw as a pressing economic issue in their community. One council member declared that E-Verify will eliminate the shadow labor force “that [businesses] don’t need to take care of”; thus, “Murrieta will no longer condone slavery here” (City of Murrieta 2010). In the end, the council passed E-Verify as an economic and moral imperative.

The City of Menifee is not a legal entity; however, once incorporated, the city has plans of enacting E-Verify. There was a large presence of Tea Party activists at council meetings who supported the city’s decision. In addition, the City Council debated a proclamation in support of Arizona’s SB1070. Public comments came once again from a large group of Tea Party activists. They urged standing up to the “left wing, socialist, communist Obama administration,” which does not “love our country” and is “trying to destroy our country.” They urged “Boycotting Arizona,” meaning buying as many things as possible from Arizona businesses to offset boycotts launched by California cities such as San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. Although the majority of council members felt that this was not a local issue, they were angry enough at California cities that launched boycotts against Arizona to condemn them for their actions (City of Menifee 2010).

The following cities in the IE had much scarcer documentation of their council meetings but were approached by Tea Party activists to pass E-Verify and pro-Arizona proclamations. The City of Wildomar passed an amendment to its contracting language requiring contractors to use E-Verify. Although it was urged by Tea Party activists to apply E-Verify to all businesses in the city, the council did not support the idea on the grounds that the city does not have the necessary enforcement capacity (Williams 2010). The City of Norco requires that all city contractors and vendors and their sub-contractors file affidavits with the city manager that they are using E-Verify. Norco also approved a proclamation supporting SB1070. According to press reports, Tea Party activists rallied at city hall before the council meeting and many spoke in the meeting urging support of the proclamation (Parrilla 2010). The Hemet City Council unanimously passed a proclamation supporting SB1070. From the minutes, it appears there was substantial public debate, with comments from 30 people. Supporters of the proclamation also urged a mandatory E-Verify ordinance, but were outnumbered by opponents almost two-to-one. Despite the significant public opposition, council members declared their support for the proclamation arguing that illegal immigration is an economic drain on the state and cities, that

the immigration process is broken, and that many people live in fear of illegal immigrants (City of Hemet 2010, 11). The City of Highland in San Bernardino County also passed a proclamation supporting Arizona's SB1070. During public comments, three persons supported the proclamation arguing that local governments must enforce national laws if the federal government does not. They pointed out that SB1070 has gained overwhelming public support because it deals with local problems of criminality, overpopulation, and unemployment caused by undocumented immigration (City of Highland 2010). After the resolution passed unanimously, the mayor of Highland said that the resolution was "for the people that pay their taxes" and that if "people don't like it, then they don't have to live here." One council member said that the vote was against amnesty for "illegals," while another claimed that "all of Highland's residents agree with the resolution" (Sorba 2010).

National, State, and Local Nexus

To understand what is happening in the Inland Empire, it is important to understand immigration politics in the national, state, and local contexts. Connecting anti-immigrant politics and policies at all levels explains IE anti-immigrant activists' current strategy and its impact on local immigration politics. Although the following analysis is divided into three categories (economic, political/legal, and social-cultural), there was significant synthesis among these categories as anti-immigrant activists built their case for mandatory E-Verify ordinances and other regulations. Nevertheless, it is useful to untangle these arguments and look at them separately to evaluate their role in anti-immigrant politics at every level.

ECONOMIC

An argument used often by IE anti-immigrant activists in favor of mandatory E-Verify ordinances was that they will resolve the current unemployment problem. They argue that once implemented, E-Verify would lead to firings of undocumented immigrants, and their jobs would be taken by authorized workers. Furthermore, E-Verify would act as a deterrent, preventing employers from hiring undocumented workers, and undocumented workers from seeking work. Surprisingly, business organizations whose members would be most affected by such ordinances were hardly present during council meetings and seemed indifferent when their opinion was sought by decision-makers.

This differs from the national and state contexts where business organizations are leading the legal charge to strike down mandatory E-Verify. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce was the lead plaintiff in the Supreme Court case against Arizona's LAVA, in which it argued that LAVA is not merely a licensing law because it imposes civil and criminal sanctions on employers that surpass federal sanctions, meaning LAVA is unconstitutionally preempting federal law. The chamber also argued

that E-Verify would be costly and burdensome to businesses and lead to discriminatory hiring (*Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting*-Argued 2010).

In California, the state legislature passed a bill that prohibited all levels of government in the state from mandating the use of E-Verify (Around the Capitol 2011). The bill cited chamber claims that mandatory E-Verify use would impose crushing costs on business. It also stated that since E-Verify was error-prone, it hurts potential employees and therefore must remain voluntary as stipulated by the federal government. Finally, the bill declared that since California is suffering from high unemployment, it is prudent to remove any potential obstacles to job creation in the state. Although the bill passed by an overwhelming majority, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed it, claiming that the bill raised constitutional issues by imposing the state's authority on counties and cities on "matters that may constitute municipal affairs" (2010). This gave California cities a green light to mandate E-Verify without inviting legal challenges from the state.

Locally, IE cities that passed E-Verify ordinances have lower unemployment rates than the regional average (Table 1), but in comparison with pre-recession unemployment rates, they have experienced a significant increase. Between the fourth quarter of 2006, the peak of the IE's housing and economic boom, and the fourth quarter of 2009, the region lost almost 11 percent of its jobs, one of the highest totals in the U.S. Ironically, the hardest hit sectors were those dominated by Latinos such as construction, food services, and hospitality. Losses in these sectors have not been offset in other emerging sectors of Latino employment such as transportation and warehousing (author's calculations from U.S. Department of Commerce 2010b). The remarkable finding about the past three years of the recession in the IE is that, while the Mexican-origin population continued to grow, reaching 41 percent of all inhabitants, the percentage of Mexicans who are not U.S. citizens declined from 10 percent of residents in 2006 to almost 9 percent in 2009 (author's calculations from U.S. Department of Commerce 2010b). These numbers have led the local media to speculate that the lack of employment opportunities has resulted in an out-migration of undocumented migrants from the IE (Olson 2010).

These observations discredit the anti-immigrant activists' claims that undocumented workers are taking potential jobs from authorized workers. It may be true that labor market competition has increased dramatically in the region, but the competition seems to be primarily among authorized workers. It is also noteworthy that activists in these communities were silent on immigration issues just a few years ago when the IE was in the middle of its economic boom and unemployment hovered around 5 percent.

Part of the explanation for anti-immigrant activists' misrepresentations of labor markets dominated by undocumented immigrants is that they grossly overestimate immigrant numbers. For example, Arizona's residents vastly overestimated the number of undocumented workers in their state. According to a 2005 poll they believed that 40 percent of private sector workers were undocumented. This translated into a misperception that 70 percent of Arizona's Latino population was illegal. In fact, 74 percent of Arizona's Latinos are U.S. citizens (Behavioral Research

Center 2005). Although similar polls are not available for the IE, a quote from a local anti-immigrant Tea Party activist recently elected to the California assembly reveals the same misperception: “It is not a stretch to picture a revolt in Los Angeles, whose population is comprised of over 50 percent illegal aliens. At the rate of influx and births, it will be 80 percent illegal alien within a decade....None of this bodes well for the citizens who live in Southern California now, nor will it improve the life of the poor alien, but it is well on its way to wiping out everything that was once good in Southern California” (Maddaus 2010). In fact, the Pew Hispanic Center estimated that in California, undocumented immigrants made up less than 7 percent of the population and about 9 percent of the labor market. In addition undocumented workers hardly come into direct competition with native workers because they create complimentary services or take jobs unwanted by others (Card and Lewis 2007).

The gap between anti-immigrant activists’ claims about economic impacts of undocumented immigrants and the real impacts suggests that economic arguments are not convincing most people that undocumented immigrants are taking jobs from authorized workers. Those who are convinced use the economic impact of undocumented immigration in combination with political and cultural factors to mobilize support for anti-immigrant politics and policy in the IE and the nation. In other words, it is only when the economic factors are politicized and racialized that they become convincing to people who believe that mandatory use of E-Verify could save their communities from economic hardship.

POLITICAL/LEGAL

The political and legal arguments made by Tea Party activists and council members who supported the implementation of E-Verify and Arizona’s SB1070 focused on the necessity of local immigration regulation in light of the federal government’s willful abdication of its responsibilities. Given this, it is up to local and state governments to enforce federal laws and protect their citizens’ interests. Mandatory use of E-Verify is a way to enforce immigration laws through business licensing, which they argue is expressly allowed under IRCA (see Introduction).

Lawsuits against Arizona were twice dismissed by federal courts on the grounds that LAWAs are licensing laws, not immigration laws and, therefore, are not preempted by federal immigration laws. The courts also ruled that the mandatory use of E-Verify is not preempted by the current federal policy of voluntary use, and that its sanctions against employers do not exceed federal law (*Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano* 2008). The case was appealed to the Supreme Court where the U.S. Chamber of Commerce argued that LAWAs are not licensing laws because they sanction investigation and adjudication of immigration status by state authorities encroaching on federal jurisdiction. They also argued that it is permissible for states to “add on” sanctions through licensing laws after the federal government investigates immigration law violations, but that LAWAs illegally usurp the entire process of immigration regulation (*Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting*-Argued 2010, 17). Conversely, the state

of Arizona argued that IRCA allowed state and local governments to use the licensing law to punish employers who violate any laws including immigration statutes, and gave states the authority to investigate and adjudicate these violations. Arizona's argument was that the state's escalating problems with immigration warrant LAVA. This argument found an ally in Justice Scalia who stated, "Perhaps Congress never expected that the States would have to resort to such massive measures, and they probably wouldn't have...if the law had been uniformly enforced and vigorously enforced; right?" (*Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting*-Argued 2010, 30). Arizona seized on this point to argue that Congress may have not foreseen the current massive immigration problems, but it may have foreseen that immigration has variable geographic effects, and therefore it did not fully preempt state law.

In May 2011, the Supreme Court upheld LAVA; with the majority argued that it is indeed licensing law, not immigration law. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts argued that LAVA falls within states' authority given to them by Congress when it passed IRCA (*Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting*-Decided 2011, 2). In their dissenting opinion, Justices Breyer and Ginsburg argued LAVA's licensing provision encroaches onto immigration law and should be preempted. They were concerned that the law would undermine IRCA's efforts to protect lawful workers from discrimination and erroneous prosecution and punishment (*Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting*-Decided 2011, 33).

The politicization of this case even in the Supreme Court indicates that the most important indicator that turns anti-immigrant politics into policies is the degree of partisanship and politicization at different levels (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010, 74). As one IE Tea Party activist said, "You go to places where you can win....You go to places where there are conservative city council members" (McAllister 2010). The strategy is that local activism will shift national politics as demonstrated by the Supreme Court decision.

At the national level the debate about immigration reform has abated in Congress, but immigration enforcement has increased under both the Bush and Obama administrations. In fact during each of its first two years, the Obama administration deported more immigrants than the Bush administration did in its record last year (Slevin 2010). Part of the reason may be that the Obama administration wants to demonstrate it is determined to enforce immigration law to keep local enforcement initiatives at bay, and to score political points in states where immigration has become a key issue for Republican candidates (Preston 2010). Despite the administration's efforts, conservative state legislators continued to argue that the federal government was not doing enough. From 2005 through 2010, state legislatures across the U.S. considered over 6 600 immigration-related bills. Of those, 976 became law and 385 were adopted as resolutions (National Conference of State Legislatures 2011a). Although nationwide there are as many state laws and resolutions seeking to expand immigrant rights as there are seeking to restrict them, this statistic changes when one zooms in on a state or region. The more conservative states and places tend to be, the more likely they are to pass anti-immigrant laws and ordinances (Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010, 86).

E-Verify laws are a good example of this. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures (2011b), 14 conservative states require E-Verify, three of which mandate its use for all public and private sector employees. The most prominent of these is Arizona's LAW, passed in 2007. It was signed into law by then-Governor and now Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, who argued that Congress was incapable of addressing state needs, and therefore state immigration action was warranted.

Arizona is a conservative state where registered Republican voters outnumber Democrats by almost five percentage points. In the state legislature, Republicans outnumber Democrats more than two to one. Republican leader, state Senator Russell Pierce, who is responsible for both LAW and SB1070, was elected in 2000 when immigration was not a major issue for Arizona's voters. But as the migration flow shifted from California to Arizona due to Clinton-era border militarization policies, Pierce's aggressively anti-immigrant politics became popular and his punitive and restrictive bills began to sail through the state legislature (Riccardi 2011).

The political context is different in California, where Democratic voters outnumber Republicans by 14 percentage points and the state legislature is dominated by Democrats. This difference is reflected in state-wide perspectives on immigration, which are more tolerant. A recent survey indicated that voters who supported immigration reform that would allow undocumented migrants to become citizens outnumbered those who opposed it by 19 percentage points (Decker 2010).

However, considering the backlash against immigrants in parts of California, such as the IE, one must be aware that this is a large and diverse state segregated into ethnic and political enclaves that are products of urban fragmentation and political gerrymandering. The political context in the IE cities that passed E-Verify and pro-Arizona proclamations differs greatly from the rest of the state. Registered Republican voters are a majority, almost 18 percentage points above the state average, while Democrats are a minority, 16 percentage points under the state average (Table 1). In comparison with the rest of the IE, which is rapidly becoming majority Latino and politically moderate (Ramakrishnan 2007), those cities remain majority white and Republican. An explanation for this may be that they have attracted many conservative white voters from neighboring Republican bastions in San Diego and Orange counties (Horseman and Hill 2010).

The conservative profile of the region's voters is reflected in their political representatives, who are actively producing and championing anti-immigrant legislation at all levels of government. The recently-created Reclaim American Jobs Caucus in the U.S. Congress has four IE members and touts its goal as job creation through immigration enforcement. Other IE Republicans are also active in presenting anti-immigrant bills. Representative Miller introduced the LEAVE Act that would strip undocumented immigrants of all access to housing, birthright citizenship, access to credit or bank accounts, and use of alternate identification. In addition, the act would continue the militarization of the border, proceed with tamper-proof identification proposals, establish mandatory cooperation between federal and local law agencies in immigration enforcement, prohibit in-state tuition for immi-

grant students, eliminate sanctuary cities, and make E-Verify mandatory for all employees nationwide (U.S. Congress 2009). This legislation was co-sponsored by two of his IE colleagues. Miller wanted to make local attempts at immigration regulation part of federal law, therefore encouraging and legalizing local anti-immigrant ordinances. Other bills written or co-sponsored by IE Republicans are HR997 (to introduce English as the official language of the U.S.), HR1868 (to strike down citizenship as a birthright), HR4548 (banning in-state tuition for undocumented immigrants, even if they were brought to the U.S. as children), HR98 (creating tamper-proof Social Security ID), and HR19 (making E-Verify mandatory). In addition some IE representatives have defended Arizona's SB1070 and asserted that the federal government should not challenge *LAWA* in courts.

At the state level most of IE's state senators and assembly members are also Republican, but up to now they have not been very outspoken on immigration. However, the most recent state election radicalized some voters who elected Tea Party activists vowing to make immigration reform a state issue. Tim Donnelly, who was elected on such a platform, articulated his immigration politics this way:

We are told the illegal alien is now a resident of our communities, entitled to all the protections of the law, but none of its penalties....Really. As an American, I am not accustomed to being "told" anything. In fact, it is "we" who generally do the telling. "We the people" are finished listening....The facts are incontrovertible that allowing an illegal invasion of the United States will destroy the American Southwest, and very probably wipe out the freedoms we American Christians enjoy. (Maddaus 2010)

Donnelly's views are shared by the IE's Tea Party activists who radicalize IE politicians and then support them as they write and vote for anti-immigrant regulations. The activists also rely on successful models from other places, such as Arizona, to gain leverage over reluctant local politicians and politicize the electorate. Arizona's defense of *LAWA* in federal courts is one of these models because it gives local anti-immigrant ordinances legal legitimacy.

The recent Supreme Court decision upholding *LAWA* was a significant boost to local anti-immigrant activists. It legalized state and local mandatory E-Verify ordinances, but did not address the potential for discriminatory hiring or firing practices by employers seeking to avoid licensing sanctions. Although likely to produce illegal discriminatory practices by employers, for anti-immigrant activists this decision achieves the desired effect of immigrant attrition. In other words, the lack of protection against discriminatory use of E-Verify implicitly sanctions racial profiling that may lead immigrants and citizens to leave the cities that implemented these ordinances. This is discussed in more detail in the next section.

SOCIAL/CULTURAL

The issue of discrimination was brought up by E-Verify opponents during city council debates throughout the IE. Anti-immigrant activists countered by claiming that E-Verify is “color-blind” and that undocumented workers do not have rights anyway because of their status. Throughout the debates, undocumented immigrants were criminalized and presented as race-baiters and opportunistic cowards. City council members were urged to support E-Verify as a solution to high crime rates perpetrated by “illegals,” who purportedly open businesses to launder drug cartel profits, steal taxpayers’ money by consuming social entitlements, and must be made to pay for being “law breakers” in the name of a “relentless defense of freedom.” Activists and politicians alike labeled “illegals” and their supporters as race-baiters saying that “those who bring up race as an issue are undermining national unity,” because laws such as Arizona’s SB1070, LAVA, and local E-Verify ordinances do not engage in “racial profiling,” but merely separate “law abiders” from “law breakers.” In short, justice is blind. Despite this, many activists brought up race frequently, arguing for example that the labels of “Latino” and “Hispanic” are pseudonyms for “illegals” because “creeded citizens” do not need to call themselves anything but American. Some also asserted that businesses discriminate against Americans in favor of undocumented workers whom they can exploit, and that businesses and their allies in the immigrant rights movement cover their misdeeds by making white people feel guilty and labeling them as racist if they point out this illegal arrangement. Anti-immigrant activists argue that white people need to stand up for themselves. Their frustrations are once again summed up by Tim Donnelly, the recently-elected state assemblyman, who said, “We are told that ‘diversity’ is a goal, and although it is unclear when we will reach this utopian dream, it involves more Hispanics and fewer of everyone else. We are told that anyone who does not go along with the above program (or pogrom) is a ‘racist,’ ‘xenophobe,’ or a ‘vigilante’” (Mad-daus 2010). Lastly, undocumented immigrants are labeled as opportunistic cowards because they “don’t want to stand up and fight for change within their country.” Instead they “zap [sic] the vitality of a nation” by coming here and taking advantage of generous U.S. communities in which they “have no stake.”

Such rhetoric galvanizes public support in conservative areas and politicizes conservative voters who demand that their representatives act to protect them from criminal aliens and their supporters. Mandatory E-Verify ordinances and proclamations supporting Arizona’s anti-immigrant law are meant to legitimize anti-immigrant politics because they supposedly do not judge people on race, but only immigration status. Therefore anti-immigrant activists whose racialized politics are an obstacle to gaining broader popular support now point to E-Verify as a tool that strips race from the debate and impartially separates law breakers from law abiders. The activists tout E-Verify as flawless technology that makes objective decisions no matter what prejudices people may have. They convinced city councils that E-Verify is so “color blind” that not one saw the need to incorporate anti-discriminatory provisions into their ordinances. This, despite evidence of racial

profiling from Arizona and federal provisions in IRCA that developed a robust framework of anti-discriminatory laws meant to safeguard workers from arbitrary decisions by employers.

In 2009, a study of E-Verify found that it places a heavy burden on employers to process employees correctly, which has led to several types of improprieties. Employers have gamed the system by checking documents but keeping on undocumented workers at lower wages off the books, leaving it up to government prosecutors to discover their fraud. Employers admitted they discriminated against potential employees who looked or sounded like immigrants. Some stated they would not hire even immigrants who can legally work in the U.S. (Meissner and Rosenblum 2009, 3). One-quarter of employers using E-Verify said they illegally punished workers by forcing them to take unpaid leave or dismissing them if they had to adjust their flagged status. Many employers also prescreened potential employees with E-Verify, passing over workers with flagged status (Meissner and Rosenblum 2009, 13). These findings point to significant enforcement problems that must be addressed before E-Verify can become mandatory. However, state and local leaders who support its mandatory use overlook or dismiss these flaws. In most cases, they cite its 97-percent immigration-status return rate that they label as fast, accurate, burden-free, and non-discriminatory.

LAWA was challenged in courts partially on the grounds that it denies workers due process and equal protection because it exposes them to employer discrimination. However, the Federal Appeals Court found the claims of increased potential for employer discrimination against workers to be speculative, arguing that one cannot say there will be discrimination if the law is not in effect (*Chicanos por la Causa v. Napolitano* 2008). This ruling was a boost for anti-immigrant activists, who portrayed it as proof that E-Verify prevented discrimination. Nevertheless critics in Arizona continue to point out the erroneous assumptions of E-Verify's impartiality as well as its uneven implementation and enforcement. They argued that LAWA's enforcement is left up to the politically malleable discretion of county attorneys who decide whether or not to prosecute anonymous complaints, therefore enhancing the potential for racial profiling (Hansen 2007). There is also evidence that LAWA is being used as a pretext to raid businesses looking for undocumented workers as opposed to prosecuting unscrupulous employers. After its implementation, over 130 workers have been arrested in raids around Phoenix on charges of using forged documents or false identities to get work (Billeaud and Sherman 2010). As a result, some companies stopped hiring or fired Latino workers, something they can do with impunity because LAWA does not contain anti-discriminatory measures like those contained in federal law. Because of LAWA, businesses are leaving Arizona and a growing number of workers are shifting to an underground labor market, costing the state much-needed tax revenue (Rosenblum and Gorman 2010, 128). These facts do not seem to bother anti-immigrant politicians in Arizona whose goal is to purge the state of Latinos at all costs. Section one of SB1070 reads, "The legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement

the public policy of all state and local government agencies in Arizona” (Arizona Senate 2010).

Similarly local E-Verify ordinances in the IE are meant to purge cities of purported undocumented immigrants. Local politicians’ refusal to acknowledge potential discrimination against workers is due to local conservative partisanship, and the pressure exerted by populist anti-immigration activists who have politicized local constituents. This produces a political environment where the evidence of discrimination is angrily denied or ignored, leading to increases in discriminatory practices that overwhelmingly impact the Latino community, which is portrayed as undocumented and without rights.

Conclusion

Pushing local ordinances targeting immigrant workers and their families has been a frequent strategy by anti-immigrant groups in Southern California. For the most part their efforts have been stymied by the courts until the recent rulings upholding *LAWA*. Emboldened by Arizona’s example, local Tea Party and other anti-immigrant activists politicized partisan conservative IE city councils and voters to pass mandatory E-Verify ordinances supposedly meant to punish businesses employing undocumented workers. However, following *LAWA*, the ordinances have no provisions to protect workers against discrimination associated with employer hiring practices that have tended to profile workers based on their perceived, rather than real, immigration status. Such profiling seems acceptable to Arizona and IE politicians, who are aligning themselves with partisan conservative groups that use racially-charged rhetoric generating false perceptions that the entire Latino community is undocumented or at least complicit in aiding and abetting undocumented immigrants. The Latinos’ intent, the rhetoric asserts, is to increase their population in order to take political control of the nation and recast its values and morals. Such stated racist perceptions are combined with baseless “facts” portraying a group of people as an economic, social, and cultural threat to communities. The only way to reverse the threat is to make the undesirables leave, which is the objective of Arizona’s SB1070, the proclamations supporting it in the IE, and the IE ordinances based on *LAWA*. The recent Supreme Court decision upholding *LAWA* legitimizes these discriminatory anti-immigrant policies. In the case of the IE, these attrition policies probably face imminent demise because of local demographic and political trends. Within five years, Latinos and moderate independent voters will be a majority in the region, and anti-immigrant activists will likely run out of partisan conservative places that support their politics.

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MIXED-IMMIGRATION-STATUS HOUSEHOLDS IN THE CONTEXT OF ARIZONA'S ANTI-IMMIGRANT POLICIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH CARE DISPARITIES

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Introduction

In this article, we highlight some of the results from a study in which researchers working on both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border addressed related questions about reproductive health care strategies of migrant and immigrant women. The research was contextualized within the broader developments on a global scale, which increasingly engage women by integrating them into global labor markets. Paralleling these trends are recent policy developments in Arizona. We thus focus this article on some of the results of the research on the Arizona side of the border, as this state's legislative history since 2004 provides the opportunity to examine the impact of an "anti-immigrant" climate on immigrant populations that have settled there (O'Leary 2009a). In turn, this examination can be used to predict the widening of health care disparities through the "disentitlement" politics of social welfare policy reform (Marchevsky and Theoharis 2008, 90) that began as early as 1986 with California's unsuccessful Prop 187. The concept of the mixed-immigration-status household is a useful analytical approach for explaining how emerging anti-immigrant policies adversely impact more than those who have been singled out because of their immigration status to include non-immigrants who share intersecting ethnic and racial characteristics.

Key to our argument is the concept of the mixed-immigration-status household. In this domestic unit, the immigration status of at least one member is different from that of the others. This may include family members who are "undocumented," legal residents, U.S.-born, or naturalized citizens (Romero 2008; Talavera 2008). Although the category of undocumented is in itself ambiguous, it has both real and symbolic consequences for immigrants (Plascencia 2009). In the United States, the growing category of undocumented immigrants has become the focus of state-level immigration enforcement policies. Because there are different ways for individuals to fall under this label, for our research we relied on Cornelius to help us formulate the following description:

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The undocumented are those individuals who enter the United States without inspection (at a place other than a port of entry) and are present without authorization. They may have entered legally but subsequently overstayed the term limit of their visa. They may have entered legally and are legally present but are not legal residents and, therefore, not entitled to public benefits. They may be present without the legal authorization but not apprehended at the time of the interview, nor are they under suspension of deportation orders at the time they are studied. (1982, 378)

While it is difficult to ascertain how prevalent the mixed-immigration-status household is, its development is rooted in history and the adaptive processes of Mexican families in the border region (Heyman 1991; Sheridan 1992).

Migration's Global Stage

Understanding how women have come to be increasingly impacted by anti-immigrant policies stems from our grasp of how macro-economic policies have increasingly driven them into the global labor market for survival, eventually to migrate to the U.S. To be sure, the neoliberal economic philosophies that have worked to callously disrupt subsistence economies in sending communities in Mexico also underpin the political philosophies that steadily work to undermine migrants' integration in their new destinations.

Neoliberalism is a market-driven approach to economic and social policy based on a private enterprise sector allowed to operate unfettered by government regulations. Not confined to mere economic principles, neoliberalism has been instrumental in setting both political and social priorities of the state. In this way, neoliberal approaches often parallel social conservative views that include the belief that governments should not run large economic deficits due to public spending. Neoliberals consider government subsidized entitlement programs such as services for the poor, primary education, public transportation, and publicly funded health care programs to be wasteful, and that they place undue tax burdens on individuals and businesses. In fact, international economic aid for developing countries in the form of loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank are contingent on the adoption of neoliberal principals (Pomeroy and Jacob 2004). Thus, it should not come as a surprise that the wide adoption of neoliberal plans such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) by a state such as Mexico in 1994 would adversely impact the economically disadvantaged. Indeed, the literature is replete with scholarly analysis of how neoliberal economic changes resulted in the disruption of rural and agriculture-based communities (Hing 2010; McCarty 2007a). For example, with NAFTA, Mexican smallholders could not compete with U.S. subsidized corn on the market and were forced to migrate in search of jobs, resulting in eventual greater migration in general. Given these conditions, women especially have been compelled to migrate (Andrews, Ybarra, and Miramontes 2002; McCarty 2007b; McGuire 2007; Pomeroy and Jacob 2004; White 2004).

The adoption of neoliberal policies in Mexico has been blamed for increased poverty and less support for those devastated by the changes. Moreover, although migration in general to the United States from Mexico and Latin America as a result of these policies has steadily increased, the most significant change has been the greater participation of women (Marcelli and Cornelius 2001). This is due in part to the implementation of structural adjustment programs (SAPs), the conditions for loans set up by the IMF and World Bank. Also known as the Washington Consensus (McGuire 2007), some of these free-market-oriented conditions include cutting social welfare expenditures, the deregulation of labor relations, and the devaluation of a nation's currency to remain globally competitive (Canales 2000). In this way, SAPs result in harsher conditions for Mexico's poor, especially for women who increasingly contend with rising education and health care costs for their families (McCarty 2007b), diminishing employment opportunities, and declining purchasing power (Crummett 2001; Labrecque 1998; Marchand and Runyan 2000). To compensate for this, an unprecedented number of women have entered the labor market through migration, a combination known to produce the feminization of migration (McGuire 2007; Sadasivam 1997).

The disruption of local economies and the ensuing migration undermines the process whereby social cohesion is preserved. Characterized as a "fracturing experience," migration places burdens on both those who leave their communities and those who stay (McGuire 2007). Splintering families can lead to negative health outcomes while at the same time offering hope of finding better opportunities. In tracing the migration of women engaged in the tomato industry, Barndt (2001) relies on the explanatory power of the Marxist concept of "alienation" to advance our understanding of how, over time and geography, industrial agriculture, fueled by free trade principles, capitalizes on the displacement of subsistence farmers. As men and women are dislodged from the land as their means of production, they become distanced from the elementary process that defines households: production, reproduction, and consumption (Netting, Wilk, and Arnould 1984). However, the process of alienation pertains not only to workers but also to the "deeper separation of us all, producers and consumers alike, from the social dynamics, context, and conditions that bring things into being (Barndt 2001: 35). How labor is reproduced and reinvented in terms of U.S. needs is one example.

Migration intensifies the changes for women and moves them toward greater independence (Hirsch 2002; Safa 1999). With the distancing of labor and production, immigrant women are also distanced from their reproductive roles. This includes choosing to have fewer children (Lindstrom and Saucedo 2002; Wilson and McQuiston 2006), marrying later in life (Raley, Durden, and Wildsmith 2004), and having less time to devote to other reproductive activities such as the socialization of family members and the care and monitoring of dependent children, the elderly, and the infirm (Wilson 2000). Flexible employment patterns also fracture hours worked for wages from the costs of reproducing the labor force, to the advantage of businesses (Barndt 2001; Canales 2000; O'Leary 2006). Anti-immigrant policies advance this fracturing process by helping the state determine and

institutionalize differences *among* family members through the construction of legal categories (Romero 2008, 132), many of which support a state-regulated process in which immigrants benefit industry.

Anti-Immigration Policies: Implications for Widening Health Disparities

Anti-immigrant policies and the public discourse that promotes and advances them have only recently come to the attention of researchers. A previous publication by one of the authors of this article traces Arizona's legislative actions from 2004 to show how political pressures to restrict immigrants from accessing social welfare programs have intensified (O'Leary 2009a). California's unsuccessful Proposition 187 proposing limits to health care program access (Chavez 1988; Chavez, Cornelius, and Jones 1986) and the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) (Inda 2006) were premised on the idea that immigrants were imprudent and incapable of behaving ethically (Inda 2006, 24). Indeed, many anti-immigrant propositions have gained traction from the circulation of myths that malign immigrants to justify support for the measures. King (2007) lists these myths as:

- U.S. public health insurance programs are overburdened with immigrants.
- Immigrants consume large quantities of limited health care resources.
- Immigrants come to the United States to gain access to health care services.
- Restricting immigrants' access to the health care system will not affect U.S. citizens.
- Undocumented immigrants are "free-riders" in the U.S. health care system.

In Arizona, House Bill 2030 (known as "Public Programs, Citizenship") was premised on misrepresenting Latinos as welfare-seeking intruders. Although vetoed by Arizona's governor in 2005, it passed in 2006 by focusing the electorate's attention on immigrants' access to public programs. This bill requires Arizona state government employees to verify an applicant's immigration status with the Department of Homeland Security's Secure America with Verification and Enforcement (SAVE) program before providing services.

Conventional wisdom holds that the lack of health care and health care access has a negative impact on all facets of life: from economic productivity and educational attainment to the prevention of crime and the spread of disease. However, health care and health care access is a particular problem for Latino populations. Many Latino immigrants arrive in the United States undocumented, already markedly poor, less healthy, less educated, and less connected to the rest of society (Andrews, Ybarra, and Miramontes 2002). Latinos are more likely to be engaged in high-risk occupations, such as construction and farm labor. Latinos are also likely to face obstacles to access caused by poverty and the lack of culturally competent, Spanish-

language-proficient medical service providers (Brown and Yu 2002). Because of the high cost of premiums and Latino employees' limited access to employer-based health insurance (EBHI), the group also has low rates of health insurance coverage (Brown and Yu 2002; King 2007). Despite Latinos' high employment rates—the unemployment rate reached a historic low of 4.9 percent at the end of 2006 (Kochhar 2008)—the lack of EBHI significantly contributes to Latinos' limited access to health care. Many Latinos work in Latino-owned businesses, which cannot afford to offer their employees EBHI. The type of jobs they hold is another factor. A disproportionate number of Latinos work in formal and informal service-sector jobs (as janitors, domestics, and care-givers), construction, and food-service occupations and are, therefore, more likely to be employed part-time, temporarily, or seasonally, making them ineligible for EBHI. Even when they are eligible, such occupations and the low wages they earn are not enough to pay their portion of cost-sharing health insurance plans (Brown and Yu 2002). Many Latinos are thus unable to meet their most basic health care needs: regular check-ups, routine immunizations, and necessary medications.

The Research

In this section, we highlight results from a study that examined immigrant women's access to reproductive health care programs in the climate created by Arizona's anti-immigrant legislation. For this reason, we focus here on the results from the U.S. field work, which necessarily encompasses important historical and geographical realities that have given rise to the mixed-immigration-status household.

The household is the most fundamental unit of social organization and a well established scientific unit of analysis (Netting, Wilk, and Arnould 1984). Households are strategic groupings of individuals who may be, but are not necessarily related by blood. As the most basic of decision-making structures, individual decisions inevitably impact the entire unit (Hackenberg, Murphy, and Selby 1984). For our research, a special effort was made to include study participants whose households were of a mixed immigration status. Ferreira-Pinto (2005) suggested that the application of policies aimed at excluding those who were undocumented would, in practice, have a generalized adverse "chilling effect" on health care access (Marchevsky and Theoharis 2008, 82). Since individuals do not live in isolation but are part of social groupings, we examined households where by definition individuals share a multitude of task-oriented and symbolic activities with others. In this way, we relied on the scientific understanding of the household as a "locus of negotiation" (Hackenberg, Murphy, and Selby 1984, 187), where collective decision-making necessarily weighs its interest in light of the often conflicting interests of its individual members. This is essential to understanding why policies of attrition will fail to achieve their stated goals and work instead to undermine the basic rights and the health and human capital development of an incalculable number of the state's residents who are not by definition undocumented immigrants.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS

The research project “A Multidisciplinary Binational Study of Migrant Women in the Context of a U.S. Mexico Border Reproductive Health Care Continuum” was designed to document and analyse the reproductive health care strategies of immigrant women, and their access to reproductive health care services.¹ Conducted in 2008-2009, the study shows that the reproductive health care strategies immigrant women adopt are couched within increased exposure to various types of risks associated with the migratory process, including the risk of death (Cornelius 2001; Goldsmith et al. 2006; O’Leary 2008, 2009b), sexual assault (Falcon 2001), and illness when health care services in settlement communities are restricted, denied, or under-utilized (Marchevsky and Theoharis 2008; Talavera 2008). Such services are seen as critical to women’s health and safety in the course of migration, and ultimately, to their well-being in destination communities.

Fieldwork in Tucson, Arizona, consisted of survey research using a short demographic- and health-indicators survey with both open- and closed-ended questions to immigrant women. Once permission was obtained from respondents, interviews were recorded for accuracy.

Researchers partnered with the Mexican Consulate’s health referral program, “*Ventanilla de Salud*” (A Window on Health), and El Rio Community Health Center to help recruit an initial 40 respondents (for subsample C) who had solicited reproductive health care services. A snowball sampling process was chosen to produce another 40 respondents for subsample D, women who might be responsible for the health care needs of at least one undocumented individual, which by definition might complicate their receiving services. No direct questions about respondent’s legal status were asked. Instead, proxy questions were used as indicators for behavior consistent with efforts to avoid attention, and specifically in terms of accessing health care services. In other words, questions about the difficulties immigrants might deal with for accessing health care programs for family members were used to determine if respondents were assigned to subsample C or D. Upon analysis of the responses, certain questions and answer combinations allowed us to claim with reasonable certainty that we had met our goal of interviewing and identifying at least 40 respondents in which at least one member of the household was undocumented. We used the statistical program SPSS for quantitative analysis, and open-ended questions were transcribed for later content analysis.

FINDINGS

To determine if the anti-immigrant climate in Arizona had an impact on a respondent’s access to health care, researchers in Tucson, Arizona, where the U.S. com-

¹ The research was funded by the Programa de Investigación de Migración y Salud (Migration and Health Research Program) (PIMSA) in 2008-2009, administered by Health Initiatives of the Americas (HIA).

ponent of the bi-national study was conducted, gathered data from two purposeful subsamples of immigrant women. The first subsample (C) represented those situations where eligibility for health services posed no problem. The second subsample (D) represented a situation where health care eligibility, presumably due to immigration status of at least one family member, posed a problem for accessing health care. Issues for accessing health care generally arise from an immigration status that makes the applicant ineligible, such as the category “undocumented.”

To test if there were differences between the two subsamples (C and D) with regard to the ability to access some form of health care plan or program, respondents from both samples were asked if they had any type of *aseguranza* (health insurance). Because it was anticipated that many might not be able to afford commercial forms of health insurance, the definition of health insurance included any health care program in which they were enrolled. Consistent with the notion that the combined anti-immigrant rhetoric and the ensuing policy restrictions produce a “chilling effect” on health care access (Ferreira-Pinto 2005; Marchevsky and Theoharis 2008), our null hypothesis posited that there is no difference between subsamples C and D. Table 1 shows the X^2 (Chi-Square) test results of the comparison of these two groups. The Pearson X^2 and Fishers tests yield significant differences between subsamples C and D. The difference between the two samples is informed by the research context, and it suggested that for those respondents who live in households with at least one undocumented member, access to health care programs is a problem.

TABLE 1
CHI-SQUARE TESTS FOR SUBSAMPLE (C AND D)
DIFFERENCES IN ACCESS TO INSURANCE

	<i>Value</i>	<i>df</i>	<i>Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)</i>	<i>Exact Sig. (2-sided)</i>	<i>Exact Sig. (1-sided)</i>
Pearson Chi-Square	7.622 ¹	1	.006		
Continuity correction ²	6.338	1	.012		
Likelihood ratio	7.893	1	.005		
Fisher's exact test				.008	.005
Linear-by-Linear association	7.514	1	.006		
Number of valid cases	71				

¹ 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 12.68.


² Computed only for a 2 x 2 table.

SOURCE: Developed by the authors based on O'Leary (2008-2009).

A content analysis of the narratives of women interviewed in the study confirms this assertion. For those unable to access health care programs, reasons noted included that they did not have the documents necessary for the application, or that they did not have *all* of the documentation necessary with them at the time they applied for assistance. Fifty-nine percent stated that they had difficulty in accessing services, while 41 percent did not report having issues. In addition, a majority of the respondents (65 percent) stated they had felt in some way unwelcome, discriminated against, or otherwise made to feel uncomfortable by medical staff. These accounts are consistent with findings by Marchevsky and Theoharis (2008) and Talavera (2008).

The application of such measures is predicted to be sure to have a “ripple effect” throughout the broader immigrant community. The two subsamples of respondents recruited are shown in Chart 1, which compares the overall size of those impacted when all household members are considered. Comparing subsamples C and D, this chart shows that as the sample size goes up, even a small difference in the number of respondents becomes significant. The lower number of women who were categorized as subsample C (n=30), where immigration status does not seem to be an issue, translates into a total of 107 household members. By contrast, the slightly larger number of women who were categorized as subsample D (n=41), where at least one member of the household is thought to be undocumented, translates into a total of 209 household members who are potentially impacted

CHART 1
HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION BY TOTAL NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS
BY CATEGORY (“COUNT”) AND SUBSAMPLE




SOURCE: Developed by the authors based on O'Leary (2008-2009).

by household decisions. For example, if household heads in this category decide for any reason not to apply to a health service program, nearly twice the number of individuals, including a total of 105 U.S.- and foreign-born children, are more likely to be affected by these decisions.

The data also reveals that 55 percent of the immigrant women interviewed had children born in the United States. This is broken down by women in each of the two subsamples, showing that women belonging to subsample D (mixed immigrant-status households) were more likely to have U.S.-born children. By the same token, about half of the immigrant women interviewed (48 percent) had children born outside the United States. In practice, then, women who live in households where at least one household member is undocumented may engage in household decisions to seek health care made difficult because of the fear that their application will invite additional scrutiny and possible reporting to authorities. As such, these decisions may result in *de facto* restrictions to health care services for members who are eligible for them, including children.

One way in which women are seen as contending with the cost of reproductive health care services when restrictions cannot be negotiated is avoiding them altogether. Although more research in this area is needed, some of the evidence from the current study suggests that choosing permanent sterilization as a contraceptive method may be a solution. Chart 2 shows that among the women surveyed in Tucson, those who belonged to mixed-immigration-status households were more likely to opt for this method of contraception.

CHART 2
CURRENT METHOD OF CONTRACEPTION



SOURCE: Developed by the authors based on O'Leary (2008-2009).

Discussion

In sheltering populations from —and forming resistance to— the emerging discourse of intolerance, the research by Vélez-Ibáñez (1996) is useful for showing that households are not strictly economic adaptive mechanisms, but also key to reproducing value systems that directly or subtly oppose the non-collective nature of the capitalist mode of production. To be sure, the mixed-immigration-status households are not the ideal family model that is at the heart of the U.S. legal structure, as Heyman points out (1991, 197). However, this household make-up, which takes advantage of cross-border movement and the mounting restrictions to the free movement of people, commerce, and ideas, is representative of a cultural reality of the U.S.-Mexico border region (Vélez-Ibáñez 1996) and beyond (McCarty 2007a). Related by marriage, friendship, and children, vast networks of households straddle the border and fluctuate over time in terms of size, composition, and functions consistent with cooperative arrangements, such as the care of children and the elderly, borrowing, lending, and the cultural ideologies that give them meaning. In this way, households build up and restore social bonds. Above all, bonds of trust (*confianza*) also work to buffer its members from symbolic violence, i.e., the use of denigrating language, labels (e.g., “illegals”), and images (e.g., criminals) that reproduce and legitimize relations of domination (Bourdieu 1989), and other assaults on their dignity. Thus, devastation to households and families on the U.S. side of the border inflict “collateral damage” to those on the Mexican side (McCarty 2007, 106).

Perhaps such resistance has resulted in a backlash in the form of virulent anti-immigrant sentiment and overt hostility. Marchevsky and Theoharis (2008, 76) report that states with large minority populations (black and Latino) have adopted stricter policies for accessing social welfare programs and have higher sanction rates than states where their clientele is white. The consequences of such acrimony on the health and human development of immigrants and non-immigrants alike has only recently stimulated academic interest and public outrage. Research by O'Leary and Romero (2011) shows that university students, a quarter of whom had immigrant parents, experienced stress produced by anti-immigrant rhetoric. A 2007 report by the National Council of La Raza raised concerns about the damage to families caused by intensified workplace raids in 2006 and 2007 that terrified and separated small children —many U.S.-born— from parents (Capps et al. 2007). The report presents the implications of these raids: long- and short-term learning problems in children due to the fear they triggered. Romero has argued that such state practices serve to “intimidate and stigmatize mixed-status families, deter political, social, and cultural integration of communities, and socialize citizens to a second-class status” (2008, 132). The public intimidation exhibited by police during immigration raids in Chandler, Arizona, in the form of unwarranted stops and searches of presumed undocumented immigrants serve to normalize disrespect and contempt for immigrants. The public spectacle, often in front of other immigrants or family members, in shopping areas and neighborhoods contributes to the socialization and identity formation processes. This argument is consistent with the

findings from the research by Goldsmith, Romero, Rubio Goldsmith, Escobedo, and Khoury (2009), who find that policing authorities mistreat barrio residents who exhibit more Mexican ethno-racial characteristics than those with Anglo characteristics, and that citizenship, class, and educational level offer them little protection, which is useful in light of criticisms of SB1070 for its potential to encourage racial profiling (also see Short and Magaña 2002). More to the point, although there are real differences between legal and “illegal immigrants,” the ability of the public and the media to make this distinction is less clear, making Latinos in general more susceptible to prejudice and discrimination because they share many phenotypical and cultural traits with immigrants (Short and Magaña 2002, 709; Plascencia 2009). Therefore, although the proposed policies are directed at restricting *undocumented* immigrants, they are expected to have broader ramifications throughout the communities where immigrants live—often heavily Latino—regardless of legal status.

Conclusion

Anti-immigrant sentiment normalizes generalized disrespect for and suspicion of immigrants. This encourages their being policed by social service agents. As more women enter the labor force through migration, they initiate a process whereby productive activities are separated from their reproductive activities (Wilson 2000). The distancing from these two activities is institutionalized with outward acts of disrespect, such as those articulated and effected by anti-immigrant sentiment. In 2011, Arizona’s legislators debated a proposal to deny birthright citizenship to the children of undocumented parents born in the United States. This was also debated in the U.S. Congress in spring 2011. In addition to articulating contempt for immigrants, this debate delineated the relationship between the state and the reproduction of its immigrant work force. Although the idea never gained meaningful traction, the political discourse it engendered represented one more in a long list of attempts to separate immigrant workers from the social context that ultimately brings the work force into being. A “deeper separation” (Barndt 2001, 35) of worker from family ensures more profit for the employer because the costs of reproduction remain foreign and thereby the responsibility of the foreign state. More importantly, this attempt to further separate the productive from the reproductive counters the historical use of birthright citizenship to encourage assimilation, unity, and allegiance among children of immigrants to their country of birth (Ngai 2007). As U.S. citizens, the costs of educating them and keeping them healthy would fully reside in their country of birth *and* the site of production, expenses that fundamentally counter the neoliberal agenda.

Such disciplining becomes internalized as household members contend with the possibilities of being an object of suspicion and subjected to such treatment. This results in opting out of health care services. For women, a logical outcome of this internalized understanding of their situation may include their unwillingness to expose themselves to the scrutiny of official agents charged with administering

or accessing health care. Indeed, in the research by Marchevsky and Theoharis (2008), case workers perceived Latina immigrants as undeserving of the same benefits as U.S. citizens. Latina immigrant women reported being misinformed, humiliated, and harassed by case workers. For those whose families included a person ineligible for health care, the lack of health care program participation can be explained by the fear of being openly scrutinized and perhaps even denied service. However, it is important to realize that such decisions also impact those legally entitled to receive such services, many of whom are children of immigrant parents; in turn, many of these children are U.S. citizens. Community reports such as those examined by Marchevsky and Theoharis (2008) suggest growing disparities between immigrants and citizens in terms of their access to public assistance programs. When combined with other anti-immigrant policies, progress for human development is stifled. Take for example, Arizona's Prop 300, which became law in 2007. This legislation affected adult education programs and immigrant students' access to institutions of higher learning. The adult education provisions restricted eligibility for state-funded services offered by the Arizona Department of Education Division of Adult Education. Adult education programs were targeted because of a perception that Spanish-speaking undocumented immigrants were the bulk of the students taking these English classes. The law now requires state-funded programs in school districts and other institutions and agencies to provide adult education services only to U.S. citizens, legal residents, or people otherwise lawfully present in this country. Prop 300 also prohibits adults who are not U.S. citizens or legal residents from receiving childcare assistance from the Arizona Department of Economic Security.² Thus, just when English became the state's official language, creating legal impediments to conducting official business in Arizona, the state legislature mandated obstacles to learning English.

Prop. 300 also restricted access to public higher education. Previously, students only had to prove local residency to qualify for in-state tuition rates at Arizona's colleges and universities and for state financial aid. Now, with Prop 300 in place, immigrant students in Arizona are impacted in several ways:

- A student with unauthorized immigration status does not qualify for in-state tuition.
- A student in this country unlawfully is not entitled to state-funded financial assistance.
- A student whose immigration status is unauthorized cannot be classified as an in-state student or a county resident.

On January 1, 2008, Arizona's employer-sanctions law went into effect. It targeted businesses that intentionally or knowingly employ unauthorized immigrants

² One particularly insidious stipulation of Prop 300, a third component that received little attention during the November 2006 elections, was that in addition to addressing eligibility requirements for education, it also restricts eligibility for childcare assistance to parents, guardians, and caregivers.

and largely replicated provisions of the 1996 Immigrant Responsibility and Immigrant Reform Act. Under the Arizona law, any employer who employs unauthorized workers—not just those who provide services to the state—can have their business licenses suspended for up to 10 days and be put on probation. Although the long-term economic impact of the law on Arizona's economy is not yet clear, there are historic indications that people with a tenuous hold on social and economic life, like immigrants, will suffer the ramifications of the implementation of anti-immigrant legislation. This could include increased policing by employers, and embolden racial profiling of newcomers from cultures increasingly perceived as problematic.

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SENTIMIENTOS ANTIINMIGRANTES EN EL ESTADO DE GEORGIA

*Elaine Levine**

La población inmigrante del estado de Georgia ha crecido marcadamente en las últimas dos décadas, de 173 000 en 1990 a aproximadamente 920 000 en 2009. Ahora, el 9.4 por ciento de la población estatal es inmigrante, comparado con solamente el 2.7 por ciento en 1990, y el 41.4 por ciento de ellos han llegado a partir del año 2000. Alrededor de dos tercios de los inmigrantes radican en la zona metropolitana de Atlanta. Un poco más de la mitad (54.6 por ciento) provienen de América Latina y cerca de un tercio del total (29.8 por ciento) son mexicanos (MPI, 2011). Georgia, un estado con muy pocos inmigrantes veinte años atrás, en la actualidad se encuentra entre los diez estados con el mayor número de inmigrantes a nivel nacional.

Por otra parte, se halla entre los estados que tienen los números más altos de inmigrantes indocumentados, y donde éstos constituyen los porcentajes más altos de la población total (Passel y Cohn, 2011). También es uno de los estados con los números y porcentajes más altos de indocumentados en la población económicamente activa. Se calcula que cerca de la mitad de los inmigrantes en Georgia son indocumentados. Este hecho, que ahora parece provocar tanta consternación entre los residentes del estado, no fue considerado tan problemático durante los años de auge económico de la década de los noventa e inicios del siglo XXI. Es sabido que, a mediados de los noventa, migrantes mexicanos no autorizados fueron reclutados activamente para trabajar en la construcción de las instalaciones olímpicas en Atlanta, así como en las fábricas de alfombras de Dalton y en las procesadoras de pollos en Gainesville.

Al pasar por el estado de Georgia en el verano de 2000 me llamó la atención la opinión bastante generalizada sobre las virtudes de los trabajadores migrantes mexicanos. En diversos contextos o ámbitos laborales, y desde varias perspectivas, escuché numerosos elogios de estas personas que fueron descritas como diligentes, cumplidas y excelentes trabajadores. Sin embargo, al realizar una estancia sabática en ese estado, casi diez años más tarde encontré que el panorama había cambiado considerablemente. A partir del 2006, Georgia empezó a aprobar leyes restrictivas y punitivas para migrantes indocumentados. Cuatro condados con altos porcentajes de inmigrantes latinos han establecido acuerdos 287g con la agencia Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), cuyo resultado ha sido la deportación de miles de personas.

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Actualmente se discuten nuevas medidas en la legislatura estatal (Georgia General Assembly) que penalizará transportar, albergar o proteger a un inmigrante indocumentado, así como introducirlo al estado de Georgia. Además, obligaría a todos los empleadores de cinco personas o más a verificar el estatus migratorio de éstas. Este artículo analizará el crecimiento de la población inmigrante en Georgia y explorará las posibles causas de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes que han brotado y, por ende, de las políticas antiinmigrantes que se han implementado allí en años recientes.

Breves antecedentes históricos

Desde el establecimiento de Estados Unidos como nación independiente, la historia de Georgia —como la de los demás estados del llamado “sur profundo” (Deep South) donde se instauró el sistema de plantaciones agrícolas desde la época colonial— fue hasta finales del siglo xx, sobre todo, una historia en blanco y negro, marcada por el racismo que tiene sus raíces en el pasado esclavista de esta región. Tampoco hay que olvidar las motivaciones racistas y económicas que propiciaron la expulsión de los grupos indígenas en la década de 1830. Pero de ahí en adelante, hasta la época de las luchas por los derechos civiles de los afroamericanos, la vida en el sur había transcurrido, básicamente, en dos mundos paralelos, el de los blancos y el de los negros. Después de la derrota en la guerra civil y la abolición de la esclavitud, los blancos dueños de plantaciones implementaron leyes segregacionistas que restringieron los derechos de la población negra y los relegaban a espacios, tanto públicos como privados, separados de los blancos.

Cabe mencionar que, en el sur, los judíos, muchos de ellos hijos o nietos de inmigrantes europeos, aparentemente formaban parte del mundo de los blancos. Sus hijos asistían a las mismas escuelas que los niños blancos y se sentaban adelante, no atrás como los negros, en los vehículos del transporte público. Sin embargo, había barrios donde no podían comprar casa y clubes privados que les negaban la entrada. Los judíos, al igual que los católicos y desde luego los negros, eran objeto de diversos tipos de agresiones y ataques verbales y físicos por parte de los grupos racistas como el Ku Klux Klan (KKK) que proclamaba, y sigue proclamando hoy día, la supremacía de los blancos arios.

El movimiento por los derechos civiles de la población negra, cuyos inicios se remontan a fines del siglo xix, empezó a lograr victorias significativas a mediados del siglo xx. La decisión de la Suprema Corte de Estados Unidos en el caso *Brown vs. Board of Education* en 1954 marcó el principio del fin de la segregación racial, sancionada por las leyes, en los estados sureños. William B. Hartsfield, quien fue alcalde de Atlanta de 1937 a 1941 y de 1942 a 1962, tuvo la previsión suficiente para dar los pasos que encaminarían a esta ciudad a ser un centro neurálgico de la aviación comercial del país. Junto con su sucesor, Ivan Allen Jr. —ambos en constante comunicación y consulta con Robert W. Woodruff, presidente de la empresa Coca-Cola de 1923 hasta 1955, cuando al cumplir 65 años se vio obligado a jubilarse, aunque en realidad fue el líder extraoficial de la compañía hasta su muerte en 1985—

fomentaron la idea de que Atlanta es “una ciudad demasiado ocupada para odiar” y evitaron en parte los estallidos de violencia que sacudieron a otras ciudades sureñas en esta época de transición.

No obstante el pragmatismo y la apertura al cambio de algunos eminentes políticos y hombres de negocios de la ciudad de Atlanta, el proceso de desegregación en Georgia tuvo sus conflictos y contradicciones (Pomerantz, 1996; Allen, 1996). En enero de 1965, Martin Luther King Jr. fue homenajeado, tras recibir el Premio Nobel de la Paz, con un banquete “birracial” al que acudieron los líderes y personajes más destacados de ambas comunidades. A través de los medios, los ojos del mundo estaban puestos en este evento que tuvo lugar a unas cuantas cuadras de donde, en 1960, King había sido arrestado y, en consecuencia, encarcelado por primera vez, por intentar obligar al restaurante de una de las tiendas departamentales más importantes del sureste, a atender a comensales negros.

Dos años después de que la Suprema Corte ordenó la desegregación escolar, en protesta, Georgia modificó su bandera estatal para incluir las barras y estrellas de la bandera de guerra de la antigua confederación, ampliamente reconocida como un símbolo racista. Las exhortaciones para que se enmendara esta afrenta a la dignidad de todos los seres humanos, y en particular de los afroamericanos, antes de la realización de los juegos olímpicos de 1996, no fueron escuchadas. Fue hasta 2003 cuando se quitó por completo este símbolo de la bandera estatal.

En 1965, Lester Maddox, un restaurantero de Atlanta, desató la orden federal (de la Civil Rights Act de 1964) de admitir a los negros en su establecimiento; prefirió cerrar su negocio antes de atender a clientes afroamericanos. Maddox se había postulado sin éxito para ser alcalde de Atlanta en 1957 y nuevamente en 1961, y para el cargo de “lieutenant governor” (vicegobernador) en 1962, pero llegó a ser gobernador del estado en 1966. Cuando estuvo en este cargo, se negó a poner las banderas de las oficinas estatales a media asta para la procesión fúnebre de Martin Luther King Jr. en 1968.

Hoy, la casa donde nació King es un sitio histórico al igual que la estación de bomberos que está en la esquina de la misma calle. En la siguiente cuadra está la tumba de King y más adelante la iglesia donde predicaron él, su padre y su abuelo. Éstas y otras instalaciones forman parte del Martin Luther King Jr. National Historic Site, ubicado en la Avenida Auburn. Esta calle siempre ha sido una arteria vital de lo que es todavía un barrio negro en el centro de Atlanta, ahora visitado por personas de todas partes del país y del mundo.

A partir de mediados del siglo XX, con el trasfondo de su pasado segregacionista, Georgia y el resto del sur estadounidense empezaron a experimentar profundos cambios sociales, políticos y económicos que en décadas recientes han propiciado una ola de escritos y estudios, académicos y otros, sobre el llamado “nuevo sur”,¹ e

¹ El término nuevo sur ha sido utilizado en diversos momentos para señalar cambios importantes en esta región de Estados Unidos que por sus antecedentes de una economía basada en las plantaciones agrícolas se consideraba menos propicia al cambio que otras regiones. Fue usado por primera vez después de la Guerra Civil para referirse a un sur que ya no era esclavista.

incluso ahora algunos hablan del “nuevo sur latino”. Fue la región de mayor crecimiento económico del país en las últimas décadas del siglo XX y como tal atrajo a muchos residentes nuevos provenientes de otras partes de Estados Unidos y también de otros países, entre los cuales destaca México.

Auge de los flujos migratorios

La competencia internacional obligó a una reestructuración de la economía estadounidense, cuyos efectos empiezan a sentirse a finales de la década de los setenta. La flexibilización laboral, la deslocalización y el debilitamiento de las empresas llevó a algunas industrias a reubicarse totalmente fuera de Estados Unidos y a otros a dejar los sitios tradicionales de noreste y medio oeste del país para ubicarse en el sureste. Se empezaba a hablar de esta zona como el “sun belt” (cinturón del sol), en alusión a su clima más benigno y en contraste con el término de “rust belt” (cinturón del óxido) que se utilizaba para referirse a la zona de las viejas instalaciones industriales que ya quedaron vacías y literalmente oxidándose. Entre los principales atractivos del sur para inversionistas, tanto nacionales como internacionales, se contaban los gobiernos estatales y locales dispuestos a ofrecer generosos subsidios para las empresas que se ubicaban en la región y una oferta abundante de mano de obra relativamente barata y sin tradición sindical (Murphy *et al.*, eds., 2001; Cobb y Stueck, 2005; Odem y Lacy, eds., 2009).

Además de ser la región del país con mayor dinamismo económico en los ochenta y noventa, Cobb (2005:1) dice que el sur es probablemente la región más globalizada. Este autor señala que el sur atrajo más de la mitad de las empresas extranjeras que llegaron en la década de los noventa y que, en esta región, uno de cada ocho trabajadores de la manufactura es empleado por una empresa extranjera. El fuerte crecimiento económico del sur llevó al Departamento de Estado a escoger esta región como destino para refugiados admitidos al país, en los casos de quienes no fueron patrocinados por familiares que ya residían en otros estados (Duchon y Murphy, 2001:1). Al mismo tiempo, la fuerte demanda para mano de obra barata y poco calificada para la construcción, el procesamiento de alimentos, servicios de mantenimiento y limpieza y trabajos similares, despreciados por la población nativa local, atrajo flujos importantes de inmigrantes de México, sobre todo, y también de Centroamérica (Murphy *et al.*, eds., 2001; Cobb y Stueck, eds., 2005; Odem y Lacy, eds., 2009).

Siete de los diez estados con las más altas tasas de crecimiento de la población inmigrante entre 2000 y 2009 (Carolina del Sur, Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky y Carolina del Norte) están ubicados en el sureste del país (MPI, 2011). Estos siete también registraron altas tasas (arriba del cien por ciento) por el mismo concepto entre 1990 y 2000. Sin embargo, el número absoluto de inmigrantes en estos estados suele ser bajo en comparación con el de los estados receptores tradicionales. Ahora —de hecho desde el 2000— Georgia, el estado más grande al este del río Misisipi, también se encuentra entre los diez estados con el mayor número de inmigrantes.

El estado de Georgia, y en particular la zona metropolitana de Atlanta, han adquirido prominencia como un nuevo destino para inmigrantes durante la primera década del siglo XXI (Singer *et al.*, 2008). El número de inmigrantes se calculó en 920 000 en 2009, que representa un incremento de 432 por ciento respecto de la cifra de 1990. Según los cálculos del MPI (2011), el 12 por ciento de los inmigrantes que residen en este estado llegaron antes de 1980, el 14.9 por ciento entre 1980 y 1989, el 31.7 por ciento llegaron en la década de los noventa y el 41.4 por ciento llegaron del año 2000 en adelante. Ahora, los inmigrantes constituyen el 9.4 por ciento de la población del estado, en comparación con el 7.1 por ciento en 2000 y solamente el 2.7 por ciento en 1990.

En 2009, el 34.5 por ciento de los inmigrantes, unas 317 395 personas, se habían convertido en ciudadanos de Estados Unidos, en comparación con solamente el 29.3 por ciento, o 169 232 personas en 2000. En general, como sería de esperarse, la tasa de naturalización está altamente correlacionada con el número de años en el país. Datos de 2009 muestran que el 80.2 por ciento de los que entraron antes de 1980 ya son ciudadanos, así como el 65.2 por ciento de los que llegaron durante la década de los ochenta, frente al 35 por ciento de los que llegaron durante los noventa y solamente el 9.9 por ciento de los que llegaron de 2000 en adelante. Estas cifras reflejan la alta proporción de indocumentados mexicanos que llegaron en números crecientes desde mediados de los noventa, en respuesta al auge en la demanda de su mano de obra en varios sectores hasta 2007, cuando se inició una crisis económica generalizada.

No obstante que los inmigrantes en Georgia provienen de una gran variedad de países y prácticamente todas las regiones del mundo, más de la mitad (54.6 por ciento) son latinoamericanos. La cuarta parte son asiáticos, un 10 por ciento son europeos y el 8.2 por ciento son africanos. Cerca de un tercio (29.8 por ciento) de todos los inmigrantes nacieron en México (MPI, 2011). Éste es un hecho importante para las percepciones que han formado los residentes del estado respecto de los inmigrantes y, por ende, de las actitudes y los sentimientos que manifiestan frente a ellos, puesto que ningún otro país de origen tiene un peso tan significativo. Se suma a lo anterior el hecho de que a menudo, al oír que hablan español, muchos nativos de Georgia suponen que inmigrantes de otros países latinoamericanos sean mexicanos.

Por otra parte, los lugares de origen que siguen a México en importancia son India, con 5.9 por ciento del total, y Corea, con 4.1 por ciento. Sin embargo, los inmigrantes de estos dos países, como los que provienen de Asia en general o de Europa, suelen tener niveles de escolaridad y de manejo del inglés muy superiores a los mexicanos. Estas diferencias se reflejan en los niveles de ingresos. En 2009, la mediana anual de ingresos para los trabajadores hombres de tiempo completo que nacieron en Asia fue de 47 006 dólares al año, y la de los que vienen de Europa fue de 60 988 dólares, frente a sólo 25 731 dólares para los inmigrantes latinoamericanos, e inclusive 35 600 dólares para los africanos. En el caso de las mujeres migrantes las medianas del ingreso anual fueron de 35 069 dólares para las africanas, 40 553 para las asiáticas y 40 360 para las europeas, mientras que la mediana anual de las latinoamericanas fue de 24 102 dólares (MPI, 2011).

En vista de la alta proporción de latinos entre los inmigrantes en Georgia y el hecho de que la mayoría (52 por ciento) de los latinos en el estado son inmigrantes (Pew Hispanic Center, 2009), existe una tendencia a equiparar a estos dos grupos de personas y confundir muchas de sus características. Aunado al hecho de que los inmigrantes latinoamericanos tienen ingresos menores que otros, la población latina en general tiene ingresos menores que los blancos o negros no hispanos. Las medianas del ingreso anual en 2008 para cada uno de estos grupos fueron 19 349, 32 588 y 24 260 dólares, respectivamente. Los nativos del estado suelen asociar la palabra “inmigrante” con mexicano, pobre e indocumentado.

La cada vez mayor presencia de los latinos es muy notoria en la población escolar de algunas localidades donde se han asentado por motivos de trabajo. Los latinos conforman alrededor del 8 o 9 por ciento de la población estatal. En 1995, los niños latinos constituían solamente el 1.9 por ciento de todos los inscritos en las escuelas públicas, desde el kínder hasta el grado 12 de *high school*, y para 2010 eran el 11.4 por ciento (Georgia Department of Education, 2010). En la ciudad de Gainesville, donde abunda el trabajo para los latinos en las procesadoras de pollo, los niños latinos eran el 54.4 por ciento de la matrícula escolar en 2010 y el 36.1 por ciento en todo el condado de Hall donde se ubica Gainesville. En Dalton, donde los latinos han encontrado empleos en las fábricas de alfombras, sus hijos son el 67 por ciento de la población escolar de la ciudad y el 36.9 por ciento en el condado circundante.

En el caso de Atlanta, donde el mayor crecimiento ha sido en las zonas suburbanas y la zona metropolitana abarca varios condados, la situación es un poco diferente. En el sistema escolar de la ciudad, que lo es únicamente de la parte más antigua y céntrica, hay solamente un 5.5 por ciento de niños latinos en las escuelas. En los condados de Fulton y Dekalb, a su vez los más antiguos y céntricos de la ahora muy extensa zona metropolitana, el 11.7 y el 11.3 por ciento, respectivamente, de la matrícula escolar son latinos. En los condados de Cobb y Gwinnett, colindantes hacia el noroeste y el noreste, los porcentajes de niños latinos en las escuelas públicas son 15.8 y 24.8 por ciento, respectivamente. Sin embargo, dada la segregación residencial de facto que prevalece aquí, como en muchos otros lugares del país, hay escuelas en estos condados donde la proporción de niños latinos es particularmente alta, entre el 59 y el 69 por ciento, por ejemplo, en algunas escuelas en el condado de Gwinnett en 2010.

La llegada repentina de decenas o cientos de niños latinos que no hablan inglés a escuelas donde ninguno de los profesores habla español ha sido bastante problemática en una región que nunca había tenido que enfrentar una situación como ésta. Aunque predomina el español, hay decenas de idiomas maternos más entre los niños que inician la escuela sin saber inglés. En 2009, el 18.8 por ciento de los niños que viven en el estado tiene por lo menos un progenitor (padre o madre) inmigrante; en 1990, la cifra era solamente el 4.9 por ciento (MPI, 2011). Sin embargo, el hecho de tener padres inmigrantes no significa que los hijos lo sean. Actualmente el 83 por ciento de los niños que tienen por lo menos un padre inmigrante nacieron en Estados Unidos y, por lo tanto, son ciudadanos.

Sentimientos y políticas antiinmigrantes

En la introducción al libro *Latino Workers in the Contemporary South*, los editores (Murphy *et al.*, 2001) hablan de la historia de intolerancia racial, xenofobia y pobreza que ha caracterizado a esta región. Señalan que estas características serían motivo de esperar que nuevos inmigrantes y refugiados enfrentaran problemas al arraigarse en los estados sureños; sin embargo, afirman que “Después de algunos años difíciles al principio, durante los cuales mexicanos, asiáticos y otros inmigrantes sufrieron intolerancia étnica y racial, los grupos tradicionales de la región (blancos y negros) han empezado a apreciar y valorar las contribuciones de los recién llegados” (Murphy *et al.*, eds., 2001: 2). Se podría afirmar, tal vez, que la aceptación, o por lo menos la tolerancia hacia los nuevos inmigrantes latinos y asiáticos existió hasta cierto punto y hasta determinado momento que es algo difícil de precisar. Lo cierto es que en años recientes han surgido manifestaciones de xenofobia y discriminación hacia ellos, y en particular hacia los mexicanos y otros latinos.

Originalmente el Ku Klux Klan se formó y floreció en los estados del sur en la década de 1860, dirigiendo sus ataques principalmente a la población negra, aunque posteriormente, como hemos dicho, despotricaban también en contra de los católicos y los judíos. Su visibilidad disminuyó drásticamente después de los agitados años de los movimientos por los derechos civiles de los negros y las victorias alcanzadas en este terreno. Ahora han vuelto a emerger lentamente, vociferando discursos inflamatorios en contra de los mexicanos, con el pretexto de manifestarse en contra de la inmigración no autorizada.

En años recientes, pequeños núcleos del KKK se han presentado, con sus togas blancas y sombreros puntiagudos, en varias localidades de Georgia para despotricar en contra de los inmigrantes mexicanos. Parece que una de las primeras manifestaciones de esta nueva etapa en la vida del KKK fue un mitin que realizaron a fines de octubre de 1998 en Gainesville, donde gran número de inmigrantes encuentran empleo en las plantas procesadoras de pollo. Un pequeño grupo de diecisiete miembros del Klan se presentó frente al edificio del juzgado municipal (Hall County Courthouse) para gritar y arengar en contra de los inmigrantes ilegales que les quitan los empleos a los hombres blancos (s.a., 1998). Pero también había grandes contingentes de quienes protestaban en contra de la presencia del KKK; entre ellos destaca la participación de grupos afroamericanos encabezados por Hosea Williams, líder del movimiento por los derechos civiles y colaborador cercano de Martin Luther King Jr.

Desde la fecha mencionada, y sobre todo en años más recientes, el Klan ha organizado manifestaciones similares en otras partes del estado, por ejemplo, en la pequeña ciudad de Dalton. La llegada de inmigrantes mexicanos a este lugar, donde se realiza la mayor parte de la producción de alfombras en Estados Unidos, creció marcadamente durante la década de los noventa, con pocas fricciones aparentes al principio. Un prominente político y empresario del lugar declaró que “en Dalton no se ha perdido ni un solo empleo por culpa de los trabajadores inmigrantes y es gracias a ellos que se han salvado miles de empleos para los estadounidenses” (Golden,

2002). Sin embargo, con el rápido aumento del número de mexicanos han surgido otros problemas, como el narcotráfico, de lo cual hablaremos más adelante, que han alentado la expresión más abierta de sentimientos antiinmigrantes.

En cuanto a las renovadas actividades del KKK, cabe también mencionar la manifestación que realizaron en la localidad de Nahunta, en el extremo sur de Georgia, el 20 de febrero de 2010. El motivo fue la entrada al estado de cuatro jóvenes latinos que marcharon desde Florida a Washington, D.C., en apoyo a la DREAM Act.² Miembros del Klan organizaron un mitin para protestar por la presencia de estos jóvenes y portaron pancartas con el lema “Stop the Latino invasion now” (“Paren la invasión latina ahora”). Juan, uno de los jóvenes que organizó la marcha, escribió en su blog que los del KKK dijeron que “Dios puso a cada raza en sus respectivos continentes con la intención de que debían quedarse allí” (Rodríguez, 2010). Irónicamente, Juan manifiesta su incredulidad frente a las “intenciones secretas del Klan de reclamar para los pueblos indígenas todas las tierras de América del Norte y que estén preparando un viaje de retorno a Europa”. Por otra parte, Juan señala lo importante que fue, para él y sus compañeros, contar en ese momento con el apoyo de miembros de la National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP, Asociación Nacional para el Avance de la Gente de Color), quienes estuvieron presentes para manifestar su repudio al KKK.

Lo que más llama la atención de esta anécdota, aunque tal vez no nos deba sorprender, es la ignorancia de los miembros del KKK con respecto a la historia de sus propios orígenes, así como de quiénes son los pobladores originales del continente americano. Sin embargo, es probable que muchos de los prejuicios en contra de los inmigrantes surjan precisamente de un sinnúmero de ideas falsas con respecto a ellos; en particular, se han propagado muchas contra los mexicanos indocumentados. Una de las falsedades más generalizadas en Georgia, y también otras partes del país, es que no pagan impuestos. También se piensa que reciben enormes beneficios sociales del gobierno, lo cual tampoco es cierto.

Además, se preguntan, ¿por qué no vienen legalmente?, como si esto realmente fuera una opción viable para la gran mayoría de los indocumentados. Muchas personas, al formular esta pregunta, insisten en que no tienen ningún prejuicio en contra de los inmigrantes y que solamente son los “ilegales” a quienes no pueden tolerar porque están infringiendo las leyes del país. Afirman que sus antepasados entraron a Estados Unidos “legalmente”, aun cuando lo más probable es que hayan

² Una ley para promover el “desarrollo, el apoyo y la educación para extranjeros menores de edad” (Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors DREAM Act, cuyas siglas forman la palabra “soñar” en inglés...); ha sido propuesta en el Congreso federal en varias ocasiones durante la última década pero en ningún momento ha logrado un número suficiente de votos simultáneamente en ambas cámaras para ser aprobada como ley. El objetivo principal de esta propuesta es lograr que menores de edad indocumentados, que fueron traídos a Estados Unidos por sus padres y que hayan concluido satisfactoriamente la enseñanza media (*high school*) en algún estado, podrían disfrutar de las colegiaturas aplicables a residentes de ese estado (que son mucho más bajas que las que se aplican a los no residentes) para asistir a las universidades estatales y que al concluir sus estudios, o después de algunos años de servicio militar, si optaran por esa vía, podrían convertirse en residentes legales del país.

llegado antes de que hubiera leyes y restricciones al respecto. Lo lamentable es que estas ideas y este tipo de discursos parecen estar cada vez más generalizados en Georgia, y también en otros estados, a juzgar por el incremento de medidas punitivas aprobadas en años recientes, sobre todo a partir del estallido de la crisis económica a finales de 2007.

Es bien sabido que se solicitó y reclutó activamente a mexicanos indocumentados para terminar la construcción de las instalaciones de los Juegos Olímpicos en Atlanta en 1996 (Amescua, 2006). En otro contexto, Duchon y Murphy (2001: 8) relatan que cuando el entonces Servicio de Inmigración y Naturalización (INS, por sus siglas en inglés), y cuyas funciones ahora realiza la Agencia de Inmigración y Control de Aduanas (Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE), hizo una redada durante la cosecha de cebollas (cultivo muy importante para el estado), uno de los dos senadores federales, el de mayor rango por antigüedad, vino desde Washington para intervenir a favor de los productores y negociar un acuerdo con el INS para no interrumpir la cosecha.

No obstante la importancia de los trabajadores indocumentados en varios ámbitos de la actividad económica, que ofrecen puestos y remuneraciones que por lo general han sido desdeñados por otros grupos de la población, el cuerpo legislativo del estado, Georgia Assembly, aprobó en 2006 la Georgia Security and Immigration Compliance Act. Esta ley, que entró en vigor en etapas sucesivas a partir de 2007, obliga a todas las empresas contratadas y subcontratadas por instancias gubernamentales estatales, municipales y locales a verificar el estatus migratorio legal de sus empleados (Hollis, 2006; *Business Week*, 2006). Las empresas, en general, no pueden contabilizar como deducibles, para fines del impuesto estatal sobre la renta, los pagos a trabajadores que no presentan los documentos requeridos. Además, se impone la retención automática de un impuesto (estatal) del 6 por ciento del salario de los trabajadores en esta situación. Cualquier persona mayor de dieciocho años de edad que pretenda utilizar algún servicio público o recibir cualquier beneficio local, estatal o federal administrado por agencias estatales, tiene que comprobar su estadia legal en el país, excepto en el caso de atención médica prenatal y de emergencia. La propuesta, originalmente incluida para aplicar un gravamen del 5 por ciento a todas las transferencias de dinero fuera del país por parte de quienes no sean ciudadanos de Estados Unidos, no fue aprobada.

Actualmente está bajo consideración, entre varias otras propuestas pendientes, una nueva ley (HB87) que obligaría a muchos empleadores privados (todos aquellos que tengan más de cinco trabajadores) a utilizar una base de datos federal para verificar el estatus migratorio de sus empleados. Permitiría a la policía local y estatal checar el estatus migratorio de ciertos detenidos. Impondría castigos a quienes, a sabiendas, transportan o albergan a inmigrantes indocumentados y también para quienes voluntariamente utilizan documentos falsos para obtener empleo en el estado (Redmon, 2011; Stuart, 2011). Esta controversial propuesta, que fue aprobada en la Cámara de Representantes del estado, pero, hasta la fecha de entrega de este ensayo, no por el Senado, provocó un álgido debate en muchos sectores. Por un lado, los políticos del estado alegan que hay que frenar la inmigración no autorizada, pero, por

el otro, no quieren tomar medidas que perjudiquen a los empresarios o a los productores agrícolas que dependen de la mano de obra de trabajadores indocumentados (Bookman, 2011; Tucker, 2011).

En 2008, Georgia aprobó una ley que explícitamente prohíbe que jóvenes indocumentados tengan el beneficio de pagar colegiaturas reducidas, lo que se aplica solamente a los residentes del estado, para asistir a las instituciones públicas de educación superior (Adams, 2010). Sólo tres estados más (Arizona, Colorado y Carolina del Sur) tienen una ley de este tipo. En cambio, hay diez estados que sí otorgan las colegiaturas para residentes a los jóvenes que hayan terminado el *high school* allí, independientemente de su estatus migratorio. Los demás estados no tienen políticas definidas al respecto. Actualmente, por una decisión del Board of Regents del sistema universitario estatal, en octubre de 2010, sólo se permite el acceso de los jóvenes indocumentados, independientemente de los montos de la colegiatura cobrada, a las escuelas que no aplican criterios académicos para limitar la matrícula.

De todas las medidas antiinmigrantes que se han implementado en Georgia, o incluso de las que hayan sido propuestas, tal vez las de mayor impacto negativo son los acuerdos 287g que existen actualmente en 4 de los 159 condados del estado. Estos acuerdos, entre la agencia federal de la ICE y los condados participantes, permite a agentes de la policía local que hayan recibido capacitación especial para ello, actuar como agentes migratorios federales para detener y deportar a personas no autorizadas a estar en Estados Unidos (Shahshahani, 2009). El propósito de esta medida, tal y como se anunció originalmente en 1996, fue combatir los crímenes violentos y frenar las actividades de los narcotraficantes y las pandillas. En la práctica ha servido para deportar a inmigrantes indocumentados, cuyo delito principal es manejar sin licencia, y dividir a sus familias. Como el transporte público es muy limitado en su cobertura y solamente ciudadanos o residentes legales pueden obtener licencias, muchos inmigrantes indocumentados se ven obligados a manejar sin licencia para ir a sus trabajos y realizar otras actividades necesarias. No es casual que los cuatro condados con acuerdos 287g (Cobb, Hall, Whitfield y Gwinnett) se encuentran entre los que tienen los números o los porcentajes más altos de latinos, y donde dichos acuerdos fueron establecidos a partir de 2007 en adelante.

¿Por qué hay sentimientos y políticas antiinmigrantes en Georgia?

Aunque preguntar sobre el cuándo y el porqué es inevitable, resulta difícil precisar el momento en que los “pocos” inmigrantes que había en Georgia se convirtieron en “muchos” o cómo y cuándo estos “muchos” se convirtieron en “demasiados”, según la percepción de un número significativo de los habitantes del estado. Sin embargo, hay dos momentos, o más bien, dos sucesos clave, que ayudan a explicar un poco, aunque de ninguna manera a justificar, que se manifiesten actualmente sentimientos antiinmigrantes, no solamente en Georgia, sino en muchas partes del país. El pri-

mero son los ataques terroristas del 11 de septiembre de 2001 y el segundo es la crisis económica que inició a finales del 2007.

Los acontecimientos del 11 de septiembre representan, probablemente, la agresión física, proveniente de una fuente externa, más grave que haya sufrido el país en su territorio a lo largo de toda su vida independiente. Inmediatamente se desataron manifestaciones de repudio (incluso algunas agresiones físicas) a personas de origen árabe que radican pacíficamente en Estados Unidos y que evidentemente no tuvieron absolutamente nada que ver con los atentados. De pasada, les tocaron también a algunos latinos muestras de animadversión, ya sea que por su aspecto físico fueron confundidos con árabes, o simplemente porque fueron percibidos como extranjeros, independientemente de dónde hubieran nacido y cuál sea su estatus en el país. Lo cierto es que a partir de esa fecha han estado más presentes y han sido más toleradas las expresiones de sentimientos antiinmigrantes en varias partes del país.

Algunos años más tarde, y después de más de dos décadas de crecimiento económico extraordinario, interrumpido solamente por periodos recesivos breves y poco profundos, Estados Unidos experimentó la crisis económica más grave y prolongada que haya sufrido desde la gran depresión de los años treinta. La tasa de desempleo está en su nivel más alto de los últimos veintisiete años y con pocas perspectivas de que baje significativamente en los próximos meses. Había casi quince millones de desempleados a fines de 2010 y por lo menos cuatro millones de personas más en edad de trabajar que ni siquiera buscan empleo porque están convencidas de que no lo van a encontrar. Millones de personas que han perdido sus empleos desde 2007, también han perdido sus hogares porque esta crisis ha estado relacionada de manera muy particular con la actividad especulativa en la bolsa de valores y el mercado de bienes raíces.

Parece que en tiempos difíciles siempre se busca a quien culpar. Para muchas personas resulta más fácil creer que los inmigrantes, y sobre todo los indocumentados, son responsables de que millones de personas hayan perdido sus trabajos en los últimos tres años, en vez de culpar a los magnates de Wall Street de haber provocado una crisis por sus excesos especulativos. Por lo tanto, les parece mejor deportar a miles de personas que establecer más regulaciones para las actividades financieras. Casi se da por hecho que la función de los inmigrantes es servir como mano de obra “desechable” para usar cuando se necesite y expulsar cuando no. Aun en tiempos de auge, la actitud más generalizada hacia ellos es querer su mano de obra, pero no reconocerlos a ellos y a sus familiares como personas; querer que trabajen en sus fábricas, negocios y granjas, pero no que vivan en lugares cercanos a ellos ni que sus hijos vayan a la escuela con los suyos.

Por los antecedentes racistas de los estados sureños, no es difícil pensar que la aceptación de los trabajadores latinos, en etapas de expansión económica cuando se requería más su mano de obra, se debía en parte precisamente a que son “morenos”, pero no “negros”. Hoy día, en Estados Unidos ya no es socialmente aceptable ni “políticamente correcto” manifestar, abiertamente, los sentimientos racistas; pero sí es aceptable manifestar animadversión y rechazo para los inmigrantes “ilegales”, quienes infringen las leyes del país, aunque nunca se señala ni se ataca con la misma

vehemencia a los empresarios que se benefician de su trabajo. Los indocumentados, por su vulnerabilidad, son un blanco fácil para las agresiones, frente a las cuales tienen pocas posibilidades de responder.

Por otra parte, pagan justos por pecadores. Las actividades ilícitas de mexicanos vinculados al narcotráfico (Golden, 2002; Esquivel, 2009) han convertido a Atlanta e incluso a la pequeña ciudad de Dalton en centros importantes para la distribución de drogas, negocio controlado ahora en buena medida por los cárteles mexicanos. Por lo tanto, cualquier inmigrante mexicano es percibido ahora no solamente como un indocumentado, sino también como un narcotraficante, o por lo menos un narcotraficante en potencia y, por ende, alguien que merece ser repudiado. En coyunturas de crisis, momentos de frustración personal, o cuando se perciben amenazas de cualquier tipo, la gente suele buscar revertir sus sentimientos negativos contra otros, y lo hacen generalmente agrediendo a quienes se perciben como más débiles. En este momento, en Georgia les ha tocado a los migrantes latinos desempeñar ese papel.

Para intentar ahondar un poco más en explicar el porqué de los sentimientos antiinmigrantes, resulta útil citar lo que señala Manuel Castells respecto de la opinión pública estadounidense frente a la guerra en Irak: “las personas tienden a creer lo que quieren creer” (2009: 229). Es más: “Filtran la información para adaptarla a sus juicios previos. Son considerablemente más reticentes a aceptar los hechos que contradicen sus creencias que los que coinciden con ellas” (Castells, 2009: 229-230). Así sucede con quienes buscan justificar sus actitudes de desprecio hacia ciertos grupos de inmigrantes y pugnan para la promulgación de leyes más punitivas contra ellos. Hechos como el 11 de septiembre o la crisis económica simplemente exacerbaban y proveen una salida para su necesidad arraigada de odiar y discriminar a alguien. Como afirmé al concluir el párrafo anterior, en este momento en Georgia les ha tocado a los migrantes latinos jugar ese papel.

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“GODZILLA CON SOMBRERO DE CHARRO”: VISIONES TESTIMONIALES Y EL IMAGINARIO ANTI(IN)MIGRANTE* ESTADUNIDENSE POST-11 DE SEPTIEMBRE

*Claire Joysmith***

Nosotros [los árabes] somos los nuevos mexicanos y, por extensión, todos ustedes [los mexicanos] son árabes.

GUILLERMO GÓMEZ PEÑA

And I thought about how we look just like the Arabs, that in fact we are the Arabs, and we are the Jews, since we are Mexicans, or Mixicans. A mix of this and that, of some any races.

SANDRA CISNEROS

“Godzilla con sombrero de charro”, la cita en el título y de lo cual se hablará un poco más adelante, proviene de un testimonio-ensayo cuyo autor es el reconocido y galardonado performancero Guillermo Gómez Peña, un “chicalango” (léase un híbrido de chicano y chilango, proveniente de la ciudad de México) “in process of chicanoization” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 325). Mediante un gesto performático aborda en ese testimonio-ensayo lo que llamaré el imaginario anti(in)migrante estadounidense y en el cual desglosa —al margen del giro irónico y chusco de la imagen en la cita—, de manera perspicaz y contundente, una visión crítica, pensante y sintiente, en torno a las varias secuelas relacionadas con la xenofobia surgida en Estados Unidos, sobre todo post-11-s.

A diez años de dicha fecha bien podríamos considerarla como una nueva frontera histórica surgida en el siglo XXI, a la cual el académico chicano Francisco Lomelí describe como “el momento en que la historia norteamericana se partió como las aguas en la Biblia, o como cuando los aztecas se toparon con el águila en medio de Texcoco” (Lomelí, 2008: 385) y José Emilio Pacheco resume a manera de epígrafe: “Un milenio empezó con las Cruzadas. / El otro con dos cifras: / 9/11” (Pacheco, 2008: 477).¹

* El uso del prefijo “in” entre paréntesis [anti(in)migrante] queda suficientemente aclarado de manera contextualizada en el artículo, pues en este caso no se trata sólo de migrantes sino de inmigrantes, es decir, no sólo de mexicanos, etc., que cruzan la frontera, sino de quienes ya viven allá hace varias generaciones o son primera generación, y ésta es la única manera de especificarlo sin repetir la palabra, lo cual me parece innecesario. A mi parecer, en los estudios de (in)migración este uso no es tan desconocido.

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¹ Joy Harjo, poeta *native-American*, habla del “magnific field thrown off by grief” en su testimonio-poema (Harjo, 2008: 344).

En este artículo abordaré algunas visiones de los sentimientos anti(in)migrantes vistos desde la óptica de las experiencias personales y colectivas de las chicanidades y latinidades, a través de algunos escritos de carácter testimonial-ensayístico con un enfoque particular en el racismo. Entre estas visiones testimoniales destacan las de Guillermo Gómez Peña, Gloria Anzaldúa, Ariel Dorfman, Catherine Herrera, Sandra Cisneros, Teresa Carrillo, Eliana Rivero, Demian Pritchard y otros, aun cuando son muchas más las aportaciones que tratan estos temas en los dos volúmenes de los cuales cito, en donde quedan compilados numerosos testimonios enviados por el ciberespacio: *One Wound for Another/Una herida por otra. Testimonios de Latin@s in the U.S. through Cyberspace (11 de septiembre de 2001-11 de marzo de 2002)* y *Speaking desde las heridas. Cibertestimonios Transfronterizos/ Transborder (September 11, 2001-March 11, 2006)*. Ambos volúmenes forman parte de un proyecto de mayor alcance que continúa en proceso hoy día.²

Cabe aclarar que aun cuando dichos volúmenes no fueron concebidos con la idea de abordar de manera exclusiva el tema del imaginario racista, la realidad es que dicho tema resulta intrínseco al documentar cualquier tipo de testimonio, narrativa o escrito poético surgido de las chicanidades y latinidades estadounidenses, reflejando en la larga y compleja historia de dichas comunidades sus variadas manifestaciones, ya sea una xenofobia generalizada o la práctica —y más aun desde el 11-s— normativa y podría decirse sistemática del “perfil racial” (*racial profiling*)³ que a menudo abarca también un tipo u otro de clasismo y sexismo.

Cabe aclarar que, en su conjunto, estos textos fueron enviados en respuesta a preguntas formuladas en las solicitudes de testimonio enviadas por correo electrónico (en octubre de 2001 y septiembre de 2006) con el fin de dar contorno y especificidad a los objetivos de este ejercicio de documentación ante un momento de ruptura dolorosa —al cual Gloria Anzaldúa bautiza como “tiempos nepantla”—.⁴ En los testimonios se retomaron tópicos relacionados con el racismo, la xenofobia y la subjetividad del migrante e inmigrante sugeridas de algún modo mediante las preguntas que abordaron cuestiones de raza, etnia, diferencias raciales y culturales, terrorismo, medios de comunicación, relaciones México-Estados Unidos, la frontera, tolerancia, compasión, procesos de trauma y sanación, entre otros.⁵

² He elegido sólo algunos textos de ambos volúmenes, los cuales suman un total de casi mil páginas y unos 160 testimonios.

³ “[...] hoy día política oficial y práctica cotidiana es eufemismo de un racismo ostensible y sancionado a nivel institucional” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 319).

⁴ Nepantla, derivado del náhuatl *panotla* (puente), se traduce al español como “tierra de en medio” y en inglés como *land in-between*. Según la nomenclatura utilizada por la escritora y filósofa chicana Gloria Anzaldúa, es “un espacio psicológico, liminal [...], el *locus* y signo de transición” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 99).

⁵ En *Speaking desde las heridas* la pregunta tres quedó plasmada así: “¿Has observado cambios en ti, o en lo que te rodea, relacionados con cuestiones de raza, clase, género, sexualidad, específicamente como mexicano, latinoamericano o latinoestadunidense?” La pregunta cuatro solicita comentarios sobre “las múltiples caras del terrorismo”, “los procesos de trauma y de sanación”, manifestaciones de las diferencias culturales y raciales, tanto en México como en Estados Unidos, el papel de los medios de comunicación, “tolerancia, compasión, venganza, odio”. La pregunta cinco se refiere a cuestiones rela-

El imaginario anti(in)migrante estadounidense: el terrorista como personaje

El filósofo francés Alain Badiou expresa que el término "terrorismo" no debería usarse fuera de su contexto histórico específico, en vista de que el término "terrorista" se aplicó primero a los jacobinos y más adelante en la historia a quienes resistieron la invasión nazi en Francia. Es decir, este término se asoció a lo que actualmente consideraríamos parte de la heroicidad de la Resistencia francesa antinazi.⁶

Hoy día, el término "terrorista" se usa indiscriminadamente para designar, por ejemplo, a quien comete crímenes masivos (ejemplos: quienes atentaron contra las torres gemelas en Nueva York o hicieron explotar bombas en la estación de Atocha en Madrid). Es decir, no existe *un* terrorismo, sólo situaciones concretas. Como lo plantea Badiou, "terrorista" es un término polivalente y propagandístico desplegado de manera conjunta por gobiernos y medios de comunicación (Mier Villegas, 2008: 3).

En la nomenclatura de la "guerra contra el terrorismo", el sujeto a quien se etiqueta como "terrorista" va camaleónicamente transformándose con las agendas políticas del momento, según el imaginario que de ellas se desprenda. En este sentido, el personaje del "terrorista" adquiere un rol performático múltiple de acuerdo con el contexto en el que se le nombra y se le asocia como tal, dentro de dicho imaginario.

En *Nadie es ilegal*, esto mismo lo plantean Justin Akers Chacón y Mike Davis:

De un foganazo, la tragedia del 11 de septiembre permitió a las fuerzas de extrema derecha recuperar la iniciativa contra el progreso de la agenda sobre los derechos de los inmigrantes. La política de contención de inmigrantes engranaba con el componente doméstico de la sinuosa "guerra contra el terrorismo", que de forma vergonzosa singularizaba, restringía y/o incriminaba la presencia de árabes, árabes-norteamericanos, musulmanes, y otros, perfilándolos como "posibles terroristas". El fantasma omnipresente del terrorismo doméstico refractado a través [del imaginario] de las "hordas invasoras" atravesando las fronteras, creo un maridaje oportunista entre los halcones de la Guerra y los restriccionistas antiinmigrantes (Akers Chacón y Davis, 2006: 289-290).

Es decir, el término "terrorista" queda vinculado por *default* a un imaginario que abarca tanto a los árabes y musulmanes, como a las "hordas de bárbaros" que cruzan la frontera, estigma fácilmente desdoblable y multiplicable en un imaginario en plena construcción, como lo es el muro a lo largo de la frontera.

cionadas con la frontera México-Estados Unidos: "¿Cuáles son tus perspectivas a cinco años del 11 de septiembre de 2001, en cuanto a las relaciones México-EU, migración e inmigración, las restricciones en la frontera, el muro, etcétera?"

⁶ "Frasas como 'seguridad nacional' y 'Ley Patriota' son términos fascistas que tienen un parecido muy cercano a la jerga nazi. En alemán, 'seguridad nacional' se traduce literalmente al nombre original de la S.S. nazi" (Gómez Peña, 2008: 319).

Guillermo Gómez Peña alude al imaginario racista estadounidense mediante estrategias narrativas tales como la dislocación e hiperbolización deliberada, todo enmarcado en un contexto xenófobo y cotidiano, contrapunteando imagen con sentido de humor —al estilo *comic relief*— al referirse a una situación que en la realidad resulta devastadora:

Durante un *town meeting* sobre temas fronterizos en CNN, conducido por un experto antiinmigrante de nombre Lou Dobbs, el republicano Michael Macaul explicó: “Después del 9/11, la frontera es realmente un tema de seguridad nacional. Simplemente no sabemos quién está entrando a nuestro país”. La implicación de su advertencia era clara: ¿Cómo podemos diferenciar a un trabajador inmigrante de un terrorista árabe? ¡Guáchenla locos! Godzilla con sombrero de charro podría ser un miembro de Al Qaeda (Gómez Peña, 2008: 314).

De esta manera, Gómez Peña cuestiona el imaginario anti(in)migrante estadounidense, mediatizado y con tendencias racistas, que refuerza la idea de la frontera como espacio por donde se filtra el dolor, el miedo, la muerte, la inseguridad, el caos, la otredad amenazante. Por otra parte, ese mismo imaginario trastoca la frontera como *locus* que visibiliza y pone de relieve sólo la ilegalidad transgresora de los personajes, nombrándolos de manera contigua y difuminando otros factores fundamentales de diferenciación. En el volumen que reúne testimonios multiétnicoculturales post-11-s que lleva por título *We Are All Suspects Now. Untold Stories from Immigrant Communities after 9/11*, la vietnamita-estadunidense Tram Nguyen recuerda la nomenclatura legal que contribuye a establecer el vínculo terrorista-transgresor-(in)migrante en el imaginario estadounidense:

In national security-speak, there’s a catchall term for undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, drug and human smugglers, potential terrorists —all those who cross borders and transgress national boundaries without state authorization. The term is *clandestine transnational actors* (Nguyen, 2005: xiv).

Dichos “actores transnacionales clandestinos” quedan colocados, mediatizados, en un escenario performático en donde se convierten en *suspects*, “sospechosos”. Gómez Peña comenta al respecto:

Términos tan cargados como “extranjero ilegal” [ilegal alien], “extranjero” [alien], e incluso el más represivo, “ilegal”, son ahora sinónimos de traficante, bandido fronterizo, conecte de estupefacientes y pandillero. Las distinciones entre “ilegal” y “legal” desaparecen con facilidad a los ojos del racista. El rostro moreno de la maldad se morfea en el rostro de cada “otro” cuando se oprime el botón del miedo (Gómez Peña, 2008: 317).

El sello de transgresión en la frente, los (in)migrantes indocumentados, así como documentados, son obligados a compartir el estigma de “terrorista potencial”. De suerte que en este imaginario, lo real, legal e imaginado se trastocan, se perfor-

matizan. Así surge un protagonista estereotipado, visibilizado por rasgos étnicos y raciales, objeto del sistemático e institucionalizado perfil racial en los cuales participan otros rasgos, como clase, nacionalidad, país de origen, nombre/apellido y lengua. La escritora y teórica chicana Gloria Anzaldúa, en su testimonio-ensayo vincula este imaginario con el lenguaje racializado sistemático: "Racialized language leads to racial profiling, which leads to targeting dark-skinned, Middle Eastern-looking and other people of color earmarked as potential terrorists" (Anzaldúa, 2005: 97) Muchos de ellos, resulta, de origen mexicano, centroamericano y latinoamericano.

Con ello se va elaborando y reproduciendo una narrativa y un imaginario alarmantemente reductivista del terrorista potencial asociado a ciertos fenotipos de tez morena y ubicados bajo el rubro de *illegal aliens* que, al traducirse al español como "extranjeros ilegales", se despoja de la consabida connotación de extraterrestre.

Gómez Peña resume lo anterior desglosándolo con su característico sentido del humor:

Desde el 9/11 el territorio semiótico que abarca la palabra "terrorista" se ha expandido de manera considerable. Primero se refería estrictamente a los miembros de Al Qaeda y el Talibán; después, a los "fundamentalistas" musulmanes, eventualmente abarcó a todos los musulmanes, y luego, por último, a todos los árabes y a quienes parecen árabes. En el año 2003, un amigo palestino me comentó: "Nosotros [los árabes] somos los nuevos mexicanos y, por extensión, todos ustedes son árabes". Y me di cuenta con qué facilidad se transfieren las mitologías satanizadas del cuerpo moreno de una raza a otra, de un país a otro (Gómez Peña, 2008: 314).⁷

Otra óptica desde la cual se percibe el imaginario de las "hordas de bárbaros", transgresores de la ley al cruzar la frontera, es la percepción pública mayoritaria estadounidense de la frontera sur de Estados Unidos (no así, sobra decirlo, la frontera norte con Canadá) como *locus* de potencial transgresión, "poderosamente moldeada con la imagen de la frontera que proyectan los políticos, las agencias de control y los medios", como apuntan Akers Chacón y Davis; y plantean que este imaginario se utiliza

en el contexto actual para criminalizar la inmigración desviando la atención de los temas actuales. Aunque no capturen "terroristas" cruzando la frontera por el desierto de Arizona, los políticos cultivan el temor permanente de que los terroristas están al otro lado de la frontera mezclados con las corrientes de emigrantes que pretenden entrar al país (Akers Chacón y Davis, 2006: 291).

⁷ "And I thought about how we look just like the Arabs, that in fact we are the Arabs, and we are the Jews, since we are Mexicans, or Mix-icans. A mix of this and that, of some any races. And I've been pondering this a lot, since when I look in the mirror I look more like Osama Bin Laden than I do Bush. Osama looks like my tío Nacho. The Afghans look like my brothers. They are my brothers, my brothers with their 1001 Arabian Nights eyebrows and noses. MyfatherwithhisfaceofaMoor" (Cisneros, 2005: 138).

Ante estas “hordas de bárbaros”, el imaginario racializado anti(in)migrante estadounidense recurre a la justificación en su propia narrativa mediante una “retórica de la victimización”, como apunta Gómez Peña:

La narrativa magistral [Master Narrative] del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos (tal y como fue escrito por los *neocoms* en colaboración con los medios dominantes) se lee: “Los musulmanes radicales andan tras de ‘nosotros’, los ‘extranjeros ilegales’ andan tras de ‘nuestros’ empleos. Nosotros, víctimas de la ira de la historia, somos simplemente unos inocentes espectadores. Nuestro único delito es nuestra creencia en la libertad y la democracia”. Este despliegue estratégico de la retórica de la victimización, del heroísmo y el pánico moral claramente justifica tanto el endurecimiento de las fronteras como la militarización de nuestras políticas internacionales (Gómez Peña, 2008: 313).⁸

El imaginario anti(in)migrante subvertido: la narrativa de compasión y las latinidades

Si bien un interés del presente ensayo es abordar algunas expresiones concretas de este imaginario, inventariadas y documentadas en varios de estos testimonios, el otro lado de la moneda es ofrecer un breve bosquejo de algunas formas en que la polivocalidad latinoestadunidense presente en la especificidad de estos testimonios aborda actitudes y estrategias desde la subjetividad misma de quienes genealógicamente pertenecen a movimientos migratorios hacia Estados Unidos. De manera muy escueta se plantean aquí algunas de estas actitudes y estrategias a las que recurren para expresar, desglosar, analizar, reflexionar, enfrentar y buscar vías de resolución —de maneras pensantes, sintientes, incluso compasivas— a las manifestaciones del imaginario antimigratorio y racista por quienes lo viven de manera cotidiana, sobre todo post-11-s.

Las chicanidades y latinidades estadounidenses han padecido y enfrentado un rampante racismo, sobra decirlo, desde mucho antes del 11-s. Décadas, generaciones, de polémica y luchas antirracistas relacionadas con la (in)migración se han vertido en una narrativa que ha encontrado respuesta en ámbitos culturales, políticos, de acción social, lingüísticos y literarios. Estos testimonios de algún modo reflejan esta narrativa vigente y su mutación continua.

En su testimonio Demian Pritchard habla de “racialization” como un proceso histórico que utiliza una “rhetoric of division”, agregando:

⁸ “El migrante es una figura del miedo y del terror, una masa incontrolable que cruza el desierto, toma los trabajos y las escuelas, exprime a la federación de sus recursos, deforma el idioma, pervierte el credo norteamericano sobre el que su feudo esta ‘gran nación’ y, además, se manifiesta en números cada vez mayores en las calles” (Mier y Villegas, 2008: 5). “Fabricando una atmósfera de asedio, donde los inmigrantes son demonizados en los medios y ridiculizados por los oficiales del gobierno, el movimiento antiinmigrantes ha suministrado un desfibrilador ideológico para los políticos que buscan resucitar sus moribundas carreras políticas” (Ackers Chacón y Davis, 2006: 299).

I am sad that while I saw (and see) people coming together as "Americans," I did not (and still do not) see enough discussion on race in America [...] one of the powerful lessons that we can learn from 9/11. The lesson of whiteness, whiteness—that is—as an historical structure of oppression and category of privilege, is that hierarchies are developed and privilege gained by defining what is "American" against what is "other" [...] foreign, wild, not to be trusted, above all to be feared (Pritchard, 2005: 241-242).

Gómez Peña retoma esto desde la perspectiva del lenguaje racializado, desafiando las actitudes del imaginario anti(in)migrante racista, y así regresa el debate a otro territorio en el olvido y pone el dedo en la llaga:

Si se le pone atención al tono y lenguaje del debate sobre la inmigración, uno no puede evitar preguntarse: ¿ha perdido *América* su compasión (o mejor dicho, la mitología de la compasión americana) por el desamparado y su tolerancia de la otredad cultural? ¿En qué momento los blancos se dejaron de llamar a sí mismos inmigrantes? E inicialmente, ¿no eran ellos también ilegales? (Gómez Peña, 2008: 318).

Gómez Peña analiza el imaginario y ubica el eje migratorio como un asunto de carácter más amplio y globalizado:

Para mí, el "problema" no es la inmigración sino la histeria de la inmigración. La inmigración es un producto derivado de la globalización y, como tal, es irreversible. Un tercio de la humanidad vive actualmente fuera de su nación, y lejos de su cultura y lengua maternas. Los Estados-nación de hoy en día son disfuncionales y anacrónicos. Y las estructuras legales que los contienen no responden a las nuevas complejidades de la época (Gómez Peña, 2008: 324).

Para Gómez Peña, el imaginario anti(in)migrante ha cobrado auge entre ciertos sectores del público mediatizado estadounidense que, como él apunta, se lee como una deshumanizada y deshumanizante ausencia de compasión:⁹

La histeria de la inmigración siempre sale a relucir en tiempos de crisis. Es parte integral de la historia racista de Estados Unidos. Pero en esta ocasión es diferente. Lo que caracteriza este debate sobre la inmigración es una absoluta falta de compasión cuando se habla de inmigrantes sin documentos (Gómez Peña, 2008: 316).¹⁰

⁹ Gómez Peña utiliza este término con toda deliberación. Éste y otros conceptos afines surgen con gran frecuencia en estos testimonios. Por dar un ejemplo, en el texto de Anzaldúa aparece nueve veces a lo largo de las doce páginas de su testimonio.

¹⁰ Y continúa: "Los 'extranjeros'—es decir, los de piel morena— son 'criminales' por el simple hecho de estar aquí 'ilegalmente'. Pero la criminalidad que es consecuencia de su ubicación—estar en el lado equivocado de la frontera entre Estados Unidos y México— se considera ahora sintomática de su más amplia identidad 'criminal'. Los tratan como sospechosos de tener vínculos con, o de apoyar a, los cárteles del crimen internacional y células terroristas" (Gómez Peña, 2008: 316).

Y concluye de manera contundente:

Para mí, la inmigración no es un asunto de legalidad sino un asunto humanitario y humanístico. Ningún ser humano es “ilegal”, punto. Todos los seres humanos, con o sin documentos, pertenecen a la especie humana, nuestra especie, y si necesitan nuestra ayuda, tenemos la obligación de proporcionársela. A eso se le llama ser humano [del verbo ser]. Punto. En este contexto, la nacionalidad pasa a segundo plano. Su dolor es nuestro, así como su destino es nuestro destino (Gómez Peña, 2008: 324).

Al evocar el dolor como referente de una especie de hermandad, y al vincularlo con el destino, Gómez Peña cruza múltiples fronteras semánticas, psicológicas y emotivas, tocando el corazón mismo de una narrativa de compasión en vías de creación continua, apelando, habrá que notar, no tanto al pasado, es decir, en términos historizados (intrínseca a los discursos chicanos y fronterizos), sino al destino, al futuro que ya está presente.

Y a propósito del dolor, Cristina Rivera Garza, al prologar *Speaking desde las heridas*, retoma *The Body in Pain* de Elaine Scarry y se refiere al dolor como política: “El dolor deshace al mundo y, con él, la idea de ese mundo. El dolor, entonces, es política” (Rivera Garza, 2008: 91). Así se nombra, como ella sostiene, lo que al nombrarse pierde esencia y fuerza; alude al dolor como ruptura individual y colectiva, privada y política. Y es éste un tema axiomático que siempre queda en el olvido, perdido entre las cifras numerosas de los estudios referentes a los movimientos migratorios. El dolor queda recuperado de alguna manera en esta narración de compasión que se perfila en la gran mayoría de estos testimonios, en donde éste se convierte en muchas ocasiones en uno de los principales motores del escrito testimonial. Lo que se quedaría en el sollozo, el llanto, el grito, el silencio, cobra vida de algún modo, perfilándose así una tentativa “gramática del dolor” (Rivera Garza, 2008: 91).

Dolor y ruptura como impulsores de creación, esto es, de hecho, axiomático en la producción literaria y cultural chicana y latinoestadunidense, ya sea por sujetos cruzafronteras (in)migrantes, *economic refugees* (Anzaldúa, 1987), o a cuyos ancestros se les cruzó el trazo de la frontera de la noche a la mañana, o también como refugiados políticos, en algunos casos, con lo que son todos partícipes de un modo u otro de genealogías migratorias, como lo es el pueblo estadunidense.

La narrativa de compasión, entonces, surge como respuesta al imaginario anti(in)migrante impulsado por “la narrativa magistral (*Master Narrative*) del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de Estados Unidos (tal y como fue escrito por los *neocons* en colaboración con los medios dominantes)”, como se ha citado del testimonio-ensayo de Gómez Peña, imaginario construido con intenciones políticas específicas. Gloria Anzaldúa responde a dicho imaginario en su testimonio-ensayo titulado “Let Us Be the Healing of the Wound: The Coyolxauhqui Imperative-La sombra y el sueño”:

As I see it, this country's real battle is with its shadow—its racism, propensity for violence, rapacity for consuming, neglect of its responsibility to global communities and the environment, and unjust treatment of dissenters and the disenfranchised, especially people of color (Anzaldúa, 2005: 93).

La "sombra" un tanto jungeana que invoca Anzaldúa se convierte en nomenclatura trastocada —en teoría y praxis— que busca y nombra formas que permitan desplazar el consabido binario *us vs. them/nosotros vs. ellos*¹¹ —instalado como eje diferenciador en el imaginario antimigratorio estadounidense— mediante un diferencial con base no en rasgos raciales, etnográficos o de clase, estatus migratorio, nacionalidad o lengua, sino en su propensión hacia la violencia, el consumismo, la irresponsabilidad, el trato injusto a quienes difieren de la narrativa hegemónica estadounidense.

Es así como Anzaldúa disloca el discurso racializado, enfocado en la estereotipación de la otredad transgresora —esa figura performática del (in)migrante como "terrorista potencial", sea o no documentado— y recoloca, esta vez en una narrativa de compasión, a quienes cruzan todo tipo de fronteras y no únicamente las geopolíticas: a quienes se oponen a la narrativa hegemónica estadounidense, a quienes también se les estigmatiza por su "diferencia". La "guerra contra el terrorismo", plantea Gómez Peña, "es también una guerra contra la diferencia: cultural, política, religiosa, racial e incluso sexual".¹² Dicho de otra forma, Anzaldúa desplaza a quienes quedan estigmatizados/as por ser "diferentes" "a los ojos del racista" y del imaginario, "esa otredad amenazante", recolocándolos/las en una especie de categoría alterna de diferencia: aquellos/as que enfrentan la "sombra" jungeana y participan en la creación de un "sueño" futuro de convivencia pacífica, sobre el cual ahonda, y que difiere radicalmente del caduco "sueño americano" (Anzaldúa, 2005: 99-102).

En este sentido Anzaldúa hace un llamado a "abrir los ojos" de forma auto-crítica, a realizar una interiorización como respuesta a la mirada que proyecta sus propios miedos al exterior, en la otredad, reformatizando figuras migratorias y en quienes llevan el sello de "diferente". Ella exhorta: "Abre los ojos, North America,

¹¹ "However, reason and compassion did not prevail with our president, his right wing allies in the media, and over half of the nation. In the guise of protecting our shores Bush sought to shore up his image and our national identity.... Hiding behind the rhetoric of 'good versus evil,' us versus them, he daily doled out a racialized language attributing all good to us and complete evil to the terrorists thus forging a persuasive reactionary nationalistic argument" (Anzaldúa, 2005: 93).

¹² "Enfrentémoslo, la guerra contra el terrorismo es también una guerra contra la diferencia: cultural, política, religiosa, racial e incluso sexual. Y el blanco de esta guerra —los musulmanes, los árabes, la gente que parece árabe, los inmigrantes latinos y la gente con fuertes acentos y rasgos étnicos— están siendo agrupados en una sola forma amenazante de otredad. La lista continua para incluir a los pobres y los sin techo. Los intelectuales disidentes, artistas críticos, científicos con consciencia social y activistas gay, también se han convertido en el blanco. Los 'otros', que son los 'nuevos bárbaros', se multiplican, amenazando la democracia occidental desde fuera y desde dentro" (Gómez Peña, 2008: 323).

open your eyes, look at your shadow, and listen to your soul [...]. When we own our shadow we allow the breath of healing to enter our lives” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 94, 102).

Esta mirada interiorizada la ejemplificaría el testimonio de Catherine Herrera, en el cual desglosa su propia complejidad como latinaestadunidense, sinécdoque (potencial) de las latinidades:

I have had to also see within me “the enemy”, the racist, the hatred, and I believe that is eventually what the U.S. and its people must confront. [...] as a U.S. Latina, I have seen both sides of the coin, felt both sides of the pain, and perhaps from that, hope will arise from the ashes [...] (Herrera, 2005: 190, 191).¹³

Su visión testimonial aborda de frente, acepta y expresa sus propias dualidades, incluso multiplicidades, a partir de un ejercicio consciente de interiorización, en el cual, en tanto sujeto, retoma el dolor como vivenciado y desdoblado en ella misma.

El testimonio-ensayo de Ariel Dorfman sería tal vez otro ejemplo, entre otros muchos, de cómo se va perfilando una narrativa de compasión:

I would like to think that a global tragedy such as we are now living might also guide us towards a new global compassion and identification between peoples that has been sadly lacking in these months of terror, I hope and pray that in the years to come we can find ways of globalizing mercy and understanding with as much efficiency and energy as we have put into the globalization of war and violence (Dorfman, 2008: 252).

En cuanto a la cuestión de pertenencia ante el racismo y el imaginario anti(in)migrante, Eliana Rivero narra: “My daughter is [...] getting ‘the look’ [...] that says: Who are you, do you belong here, and are you safe to be around if you don’t seem to be an Anglo? (Rivero, 2005: 248) Y formula una pregunta puntual: “If we don’t ‘look American’ what is an American supposed to look like?” (Rivero, 2005: 248) A la cual le sigue otra: “What do we say to the person who looks suspiciously at us, in airports or in stadiums, that we are Latinos or Latinas and totally unprepared for these confusing times?” (Rivero, 2005: 248). Una de las respuestas, según puede observarse en estos testimonios, es la elaboración y ampliación de narrativas creativas de compasión, tal y como lo propone Anzaldúa:

Changing the thoughts and ideas (the “stories”) we live by and their limiting beliefs (including the national narrative of supreme entitlement) will enable us to extend our hand to others con el corazón con razón en la mano. Individually and collectively we can begin to share strategies on peaceful co-existence y desparramar [nota: no va en cursivas en el original] (spread) conocimientos. Each of us can make a difference. By bringing psychological understanding and using spiritual approaches in political activism we can stop the destruction of our moral, compassionate humanity. Empowered, we’ll be motivated to organize, achieve justice, and begin to heal the world (Anzaldúa, 2005: 101).

¹³ “Como latinos, nuestros cuerpos morenos también son territorios ocupados en los que suceden otras guerras” (Gómez Peña, 2008: 320).

Por otra parte, Teresa Carrillo escribe en su testimonio:

We have been very critical of the way our country discriminates and excludes Raza immigrants and all Latinos, but, at the same time, as Americans, we had been attacked. As my other comadre put it, our link with the 6000 people killed is our flag. It is a strange position to find myself in as a Chicana: pulled in by a sense of belonging to this disaster, yet marginalized as a woman of color in normalcy (2005: 125).

De esta manera, Carrillo da otro tipo de respuesta, como sujeto racializado en la sociedad estadounidense y sujeto que se autodenomina chicana y latinaestadunidense con discurso desarrollado mediante lo vivencial, al elegir, como lo hace su "comadre", un objeto-símbolo, simbiosis alterna de unidad/solidaridad, como respuesta al violento binario del imaginario racista. Lo hace mediante la creación de una especie de "bandera-catrina" que reconoce en la muerte un eje de solidaridad como pertenencia única.

Anzaldúa menciona en su testimonio-ensayo la investigación realizada por David R. Hawkins en su libro *Power vs. Force* (2002), en el cual categoriza el comportamiento humano con base en frecuencias vibratorias.¹⁴ Según lo planteado por Hawkins, cuando el nivel de frecuencias vibracionales en una escala de 0 a 1000 es menor a 200, es un indicador de que estos individuos "tend to be powerless and see themselves as victims" (Hawkins, 2002: 87) y, por otra parte, se inclinan hacia la polarización, "which in turn creates opposition and division" (Hawkins, 2002: 85).

Lo propuesto aquí se vincula justamente con ese imaginario racista anti(in)migrante que nombra y refrenda a quienes son *suspects*, "sospechos@s", convirtiéndolos en potenciales víctimas del odio racializado dentro de la sociedad estadounidense. Mediante la reiteración, estos mismos sujetos se van identificando de manera inconsciente, dentro de ámbitos públicos que repercuten en lo privado, con ciertas frecuencias muy bajas que se asocian con *shame*, vergüenza (20), *guilt*, culpa (30) y *apathy*, apatía (50), e incluso *grief*, duelo (75), las cuales, indica Hawkins, pueden explotarse a fin de mantener el control al fomentar actitudes pasivas. Por otra parte, continúa Hawkins, aunque el nivel vibratorio asociado al *fear*, miedo (100)¹⁵ y *anger*, enojo-odio (150), es superior a los anteriores, su propia naturaleza negativa no permite o muestra pocas posibilidades de poder trascender a frecuencias más altas; más bien, tiende a revertirse, por especie de gravedad, hacia niveles vibratorios más bajos.

Desde esta óptica, podría plantearse como hipótesis el que la narrativa de compasión, como la he llamado, elaborada por las chicanidades y latinidades y ejemplificada en varios de estos testimonios, va más allá de simplemente una forma de

¹⁴ Hawkins propone las siguientes escalas (del 1 al 1000) de frecuencias vibratorias: *shame* (20), *guilt* (30), *apathy* (50), *grief* (75), *fear* (100), *desire* (125), *anger* (150), *pride* (175), *courage* (200), *neutrality* (250), *willingness* (310), *acceptance* (350), *reason* (400), *love* (500), *joy* (540), *compassion* (600), *peace* (600), *enlightenment* (700-1000).

¹⁵ En estos testimonios el concepto de miedo surge, se amplía y se analiza críticamente de manera reiterativa en su mayoría.

resistencia u oposición, sino que constituye una compleja serie de estrategias, en continua mutabilidad y camaleonicidad, capaces de lograr injerencia a gran escala. Hawkins las clasificaría mediante sus experimentos científicos en niveles vibratorios en los que establece las categorías relevantes a dichos sujetos y a la narrativa misma de compasión: *pride*, orgullo positivo (175), *courage*, valentía (200),¹⁶ *neutrality*, neutralidad (250), *love*, amor (500) y *compassion*, compasión (600) (Hawkins, 2002: 100).

Ante los sentimientos antimigratorios que han alimentado al imaginario mediatizado y racista estadounidense, en parte a través de los medios, y que ha cobrado auge sobre todo desde el 11-s, la respuesta de las chicanidades y latinidades, tal y como ha quedado documentado en varios de los testimonios compilados en estos volúmenes, resaltan en la lectura de varias respuestas que he llamado narrativas de compasión. En estos “tiempos nepantla”, tiempos de entre espacios, tiempos dolidos y fragmentados que Anzaldúa también bautiza como “tiempos de la Coyolxauhqui”, ella recurre a una imagen que permite semantizar y simbolizar las complejidades que se llevan en el cuerpo mismo, el dolor de la ruptura y del desmembramiento (léase de las chicanidades y latinidades en particular, pero no exclusivamente) post-11-s, con la intención de ofrecer una respuesta contundente y simultáneamente sutil e intrincada: “Coyolxauhqui is my symbol for the necessary process of dismemberment and fragmentation, of seeing that self or the situations you’re embroiled in differently. It is also my symbol for reconstruction and reframing, one that allows for putting the pieces together in a new way”.

Se desprende de ello un llamado a recordar, reconfigurar, recolocar a nivel individual y colectivo, y a crear una narrativa de compasión: “Let’s have compassion for all those who suffer from violence. Let’s use internal and external conflicts and wounds to enter [our] soul.” Agregando: “Like Coyolxauhqui, let’s put our dismembered psyches and patrias (homelands) together in new constructions” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 102), y concluye: “The Coyolxauhqui imperative is an ongoing process of making and unmaking. There is never any resolution, just the process of healing” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 100). Podría, entonces, decirse que la narrativa de compasión es intrínsecamente de continua recreación, sin hegemónico, cómodo y predecible final (menos aun podría augurarse un final feliz), sino que se va creando y así fortaleciendo —ya sea por individuos, en comunidades o en colectividades específicas— mediante “work that matters” (Anzaldúa, 2005: 102) frente a la historia, frente al imaginario anti(in)migrante racista estadounidense.

¹⁶ Según Hawkins, es sólo cuando se alcanza el nivel de *courage*, valentía (200) que “an attainment of true power occurs”. A este nivel, continúa, nos adentramos en “the zone of exploration, accomplishment, fortitude, and determination” (Hawkins, 2002: 84).

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CONSTRUCTING SECURITY ON THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MINUTEMEN MOVEMENT

*Julie Dufort**

This is an invasion, not a visit by neighbors asking for a cup of sugar. It is a raging invasion by illegal immigrants who are pouring unchecked into America. It could not be more obvious or more serious.
GILCHRIST AND CORSI (2006)

Introduction

It was in a Starbucks coffee shop in the city of La Mesa, California that I met Jim Gilchrist, president and founder of the Minuteman Project (MMP), for an interview. With a large cup of coffee in hand, Gilchrist gave me the inside scoop on how he feels about immigration politics. He believes that the United States is being “invaded by more than 30 million illegal aliens.” Since Congress and the president “failed” to enforce immigration laws, he is convinced that this “invasion” represents an “imminent danger” for U.S. society. In addition to considering “illegal aliens” responsible for the increase in crime and drug trafficking in the United States, he also thinks that terrorist organizations have already entered the United States by crossing the U.S.-Mexico border. With an MBA in taxation, Gilchrist blames illegal immigrants for the economic deficit. According to his calculations, the U.S. Department of the Treasury annually spends US\$384 billion to carry the cost of illegal foreigners who have and will become dependent on U.S. taxes (for education, health care, etc.). After 20 years, these expenditures reach US\$8 trillion to US\$9 trillion, an amount not surprisingly close to the U.S. deficit, which is approximately US\$12 trillion.

In order to offer an alternative to the “political corruption and dereliction of duty from the government,” Gilchrist, in collaboration with Chris Simcox, decided to found the MMP, a civilian border patrol that promotes strict immigration laws and security enforcement along the U.S.-Mexico border. Their goals are to 1) monitor U.S. borders against the “invasion of illegal aliens”; 2) draw media attention to “the chaos of illegal immigration and porous borders”; and 3) lobby the U.S. Congress and policymakers. Gilchrist insists that he is far from being the only one who

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believes immigration poses a threat to national security. He asserts that several national polls show that 80 percent to 90 percent of Americans share his vision. Following this logic, he proudly announced that the MMP has recently called those 250 million Americans “honorary members.” In other words, the MMP already has 4 out of 5 Americans in their ranks. Throughout the interview, Gilchrist used alarming, jingoistic rhetoric to praise the MMP, an organization he believes has “significantly influenced” the U.S. debate on immigration politics.

The Minutemen Movement


The MMP is far from being the first group to patrol the U.S.-Mexico border. The origin of civilian border patrol groups can be traced back to the 1970s with two local groups: the Hannigans in Arizona (1976) and the Ku Klux Klan Border Watch in California (1977) (Navarro 2009). In the 1990s and early 2000s, other civilian border patrol groups were formed, such as the American Border Patrol, Ranch Rescue, Light up the Border, and Voices of Citizens Together. However, it was only in 2005, with the foundation of the MMP and another association launched by Chris Simcox called the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC) that the term Minutemen started being associated with the civilian border patrol movement.¹

It was Gilchrist, a Vietnam War veteran, and Simcox, a kindergarten teacher and editor of the *Tombstone Tumbleweed* newspaper, who came up with the idea of creating the MMP. In April 2005, they invited war veterans, ex-Border Patrol agents and other citizens to serve their country by participating in a month-long border patrol operation in Arizona. Before the end of the year, Simcox and Gilchrist had divided the organization into two separate entities: the Minuteman Project and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps (MCDC). Gilchrist and the MMP have since lobbied Congress for immigration policy reform, while Simcox and the MCDC have focused on border actions (Douzet 2009, 4). In 2007, the MMP and the MCDC had 57 articles around the United States (see Figure 1). Furthermore, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center, they have inspired many Americans to start their own civilian border patrol groups, and only in 2005 more than 40 were formed (Minutemen American Defense, Minutemen Party, San Diego Minutemen, etc.) (Buchanan and Holthouse 2007). These organizations are part of the broader anti-immigrant movement, or, as Daniel Tichenor calls it, the classic exclusionist movement.²

¹ The term “Minutemen” has become a powerful symbol of American patriotism. Originally, it referred to the colonial militia that allowed the colonies to respond rapidly to military threats. In 1775, the Minutemen fought the British in Lexington and Concord, two famous battles that began the American Revolutionary War.

² According to Daniel Tichenor (2002), the actors interested in immigration policy fall into four broad categories: 1) cosmopolitans; 2) nationalist egalitarians; 3) free-market expansionists; and 4) classic exclusionists. Classic exclusionists favor restrictions on both immigration admissions and immigrant rights, especially because of the economic and social burden they impose on the United States.

FIGURE 1
STATES WITH AT LEAST ONE MINUTEMEN ARTICLE (MMP AND/OR MCDC)



NOTE: States in light gray have at least one Minutemen article.
MMP= Minutemen Movement in
MCDC= Minutemen Civil Defense Corps.

In addition to the overwhelming amount of attention they have received from the public, the media, and policy makers, the Minutemen movement garnered interest in academic circles. It is important to note that most of the literature published on the Minutemen agrees that they have played a major role in the immigration debate in the United States since 2005 (Akers, Chacon, and Davis 2006; Chavez 2008; Dechaine 2009; Doty 2009; Gradsky 2007; Justus 2009; Lyall 2009; Navarro 2009; Sheehy 2009; Smith 2007; Yoxall 2006). Doty summarizes this point by arguing that the Minutemen have become “a powerful symbol and a rallying point for those who advocate stronger immigration enforcement, especially those who focus predominantly on border enforcement as a solution to the current immigration crises” (Doty 2007, 121).

Though the phenomenon has been examined using various theoretical approaches, there is an important lack of research analyzing the individual. If the role of the individual were to be thoroughly scrutinized in this context, the impact of the movement on the immigration debate could be demonstrated to a greater extent. An approach carrying out an individual level of analysis seems essential, as several facts question the vast national support that they say they have. Here is an example of why I believe this: Gilchrist explained that, despite the fact that he considers his organization has 250 million honorary members, there are only three main, “authoritative” members in the Minuteman Project (Gilchrist 2009). This observation coincides with the writings of Navarro, who maintains that Gilchrist and Simcox control all the actions undertaken by their respective organizations. “Their nation-

al boards of directors consisted of a few leaders, which both Simcox and Gilchrist handpicked. Democracy was absent, meaning that there were never elections held where the mass membership voted on who would be in the leadership role of either organization. From the beginning, both militias were ‘personality and not organization driven’ (2009, 193). Several researchers have reported internal disruptions in operations as well as many disputes and differences in opinion within the movement (Doty 2009; Navarro 2009; Justus 2009).

Given this conflict inside the movement, how can we understand the civilian border patrol movement having an important role in the national immigration debate in the United States since 2005? Or, to put it more broadly, how did the Minutemen movement become such an important symbol representing those who endorse border enforcement and strict immigration laws in the United States?

This article takes an original stand by focusing on key Minutemen members and their fundamental role in promoting, developing, and implementing strategies to influence the immigration debate. The following discussion will also demonstrate that the civilian border patrol movement, or, more specifically, the Minuteman Project and the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, would not have progressed as much as they have without the determination and the dynamism of their respective presidents, Gilchrist and Simcox. Before even commenting on what impact the Minutemen movement has had, it is imperative to understand that the degree of its impact on the national level is mainly due to the entrepreneurship of Gilchrist and Simcox. They must be viewed as “security entrepreneurs” in the contemporary movement of civilian border patrols and in the debate on immigration politics from 2005 to 2010.

The concept of “security entrepreneurs” is based on two theories: “political entrepreneurs” (Carter and Scott 2006, 2009) and the “securitization process” (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998). Often considered experts on undocumented immigration and border security, the Minutemen presidents can be defined as “security entrepreneurs,” a term meaning that they are engaged in initiating policy change or innovation, and in promoting their own security agenda. With their creativity, strategies, networks, and persuasive speech acts, security entrepreneurs raise new ideas and frame the debate on a specific issue. As security entrepreneurs, the Minutemen presidents have two main avenues of influence (that is to say, two main ways of influencing their audience about the legitimacy of their concerns around illegal immigration) for achieving their goals: discursive and strategic actions. The analysis in this article will focus on these avenues of influence in order to highlight the major role Minutemen presidents have played in the immigration debate. It will demonstrate that beyond the anti-immigrant symbol the Minutemen movement represents, its strike force depends largely on two members: Gilchrist and Simcox. The research is based on academic books and articles, Minutemen biographies, speeches, and websites, as well as on field research conducted in California and interviews with members of the MMP, scholars, and activists. This fieldwork has been conducted in accordance with ethical policies and procedures for research involving human subjects at the University of Québec at Montréal (UQAM).

Discursive Strategy: The Securitization of Undocumented Immigrants

Although some journalists and policy makers have discredited civilian border patrolling and dismissed the idea as an insignificant “movement,” one of most important avenues of influence for the Minutemen presidents lies in their discursive strategy. By deliberately framing undocumented immigration and border issues in security terms, Minutemen presidents helped determine and set the political agenda. In other words, they participated in what the Copenhagen School calls the “securitization process,” a framework used to analyze how an issue becomes securitized or desecuritized. Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde argue that “securitization is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Securitization can thus be viewed as a ‘more extreme version of politicization’” (1998, 23). According to this concept, a securitizing actor uses the language of security (speech acts) to define a problem not merely in political terms, but rather in security terms in order to convince a specific audience of a real, existent threat. The Copenhagen School suggests that for a political issue to become a security one, it must go through the following 5 steps: 1) designating a referent object to be securitized; 2) subjectively defining the existence of a threat that jeopardizes the survival of a specific referent object; 3) authority figures accomplishing the securitization process; 4) taking extraordinary measures in response to an existential threat; and 5) the audience accepting the new reality (Macleod et al. 2008, 402). It would be an exaggeration to consider emergency measures taken along the U.S.-Mexico border, such as the construction of the wall, the result of the work of the Minutemen presidents or any other anti-immigrant organizations. Nevertheless, it is possible to comment on and evaluate Gilchrist and Simcox’s level of participation in making undocumented immigration a security issue by studying how they are involved in the five steps of the securitization process.

Step 1: Designating a Referent Object to Be Securitized

According to many political scientists, immigration policies are increasingly viewed through a security lens (Bigo 1998; Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde 1998; Doty 1998; Huysmans 2006). Even supporters of the Copenhagen School researchers argue that immigration is among the most important issues likely to be perceived as a threat to societal security. They postulate that the primary referent object to be secured in a context of social insecurity is the identity of a society or a community (Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde 1998, 119-140). In the context of U.S. immigration politics, the referent object to securitize is the American identity, constructed and defined in opposition to the “other,” namely “illegal aliens,” who pose an existential threat. It is important to note that since the mid-1980s, undocumented immigration

has been perceived as a cause for insecurity where American identity is concerned.³ Therefore, the Minutemen presidents did not participate directly in the first step of the securitization process. They have only continued the work initiated by their predecessors. As for other anti-immigrant organizations, they have helped maintain this issue in terms of exception, risk, and confrontation (Bigo 1998, 5). In this context, the discursive actions of the Minutemen presidents must be viewed in relation to the global rhetoric that construes undocumented immigration as a threat to American identity.

Step 2: Subjectively Defining the Existence of A Threat to the Survival of a Specific Referent Object

The second step is to subjectively define the existence of a threat to the survival of a specific referent object. Gilchrist and Simcox describe undocumented immigration and border security issues as a threat to societal security in order to influence the way policy makers think, define, and shape immigration policies. Their speech acts are aimed at making American citizens believe that undocumented immigration constitutes a problem harmful to American identity and national sovereignty. The following paragraphs will focus on how Gilchrist and Simcox show illegal aliens to be “enemies” and portray the border as a “war zone.”

CONSTRUCTING THE IMAGE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS AS THE ENEMY: ILLEGAL ALIENS ALLEGEDLY THE CAUSE OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN THE UNITED STATES

Gilchrist and Simcox use undocumented immigrants as scapegoats, by holding them responsible for U.S. social problems, such as those pertaining to employment, health,

³ The United States has identified undocumented immigration from Mexico and Latin America as a threat to the American identity since the early 1980s. This is relatively recent, since Mexicans enjoyed special status for many years. Before 1929, U.S. law allowed Mexicans to cross the border without papers. After that, Mexicans benefited from the extensive guest worker Bracero Program, which sponsored 4 million Mexicans to work in the United States between 1943 and 1964. However, the end of this program and the socio-economic context in Mexico (particularly characterized by important population growth and the rapid urbanization of society during the 1960s and 1970s) threw many Mexicans out of work. Many of these unemployed Mexicans decided to work in border towns or to enter the U.S. without work permits. The problem of undocumented immigration began with the end of the Bracero Program and gradually increased. Americans began to recognize this issue in the mid-1980s when the number of undocumented immigrants came to approximately 4 to 5 million. With some difficulty, the U.S. Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, granting amnesty to nearly 3 million undocumented immigrants, while enforcing sanctions on employers who hired undocumented immigrants and assigning new resources to the Border Patrol.

and crime. In an essay published at Georgetown University, Gilchrist argues that proactive enforcement of immigration laws and border security can have many benefits, such as the “preservation of a long-established American heritage and culture,” “the elimination of traffic gridlock, car pool lanes, or tolls for local highway use,” “a significant drop in crime,” “a positive future for the American youth,” and “the elimination of the thousands of undetected cases of communicable and deadly tuberculosis, leprosy, and hepatitis hosted by illegal aliens” (2008). The Minutemen presidents also worry about the preservation of the English language: in his essay, Gilchrist states that, by the year 2030, there could be an attempt to introduce a bill into Congress pushing for Spanish to become the United States’ official language (2008, 421).

Gilchrist and Simcox also argue that undocumented immigration harms the U.S. economy. As explained before, Gilchrist used his expertise in taxation to demonstrate how undocumented immigration leads the United States into a financial crisis. Simcox goes even further, asserting that militarization of the border would stimulate the economy: “There’s only one way to stop this. Mobilization! Militarize the Border! It would create a boom economy” (quoted in Ketcham 2005).

THE BORDER AS A “WAR ZONE”

The U.S.-Mexico border is often portrayed as a place of danger, chaos, and disorder (Payan 2006, 3). The Minutemen presidents’ discursive strategy contributes to the construction of this image, since their speech acts often rely on war metaphors to expose the immigration problem: “united army of illegal aliens,” “Minutemen battle to secure America’s borders,” “chain of command,” “stand my ground,” “Minutemen are dedicated to protect America against invaders,” “the United States are under attack,” etc. Simcox could not be clearer about this when he says, “Things are violent on the border. My God, the border’s a war zone. I don’t get out without a level 3 bullet-proof vest anywhere near the border” (quoted in Doty 2007, 125). More specifically, Gilchrist and Simcox try to prove that there is a “war” along the U.S.-Mexico border by connecting undocumented immigration with terrorism and crime, describing the growing number of undocumented immigrants with the “invasion” metaphor, and using the symbol of Uncle Sam in their recruitment campaign.

Firstly, they constantly assert that families and workers are hardly the only groups of people crossing the border illegally. The group of undocumented immigrants apparently also includes criminals, terrorists, murderers, rapists, drug dealers, and gang members. According to Gilchrist, 10 percent to 20 percent of undocumented immigrants from Mexico are criminals, and another 10 percent will become criminals after their arrival (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, xxiv). Apart from being a danger, these criminals and terrorists are also “natural allies”: Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), Los Zetas, etc. (Dechaine 2009, 55; Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, 173). Moreover, Gilchrist and Simcox continuously link undocumented immigration with terrorism and drug trafficking to generate a greater sense of anxiety. Here are two examples:

Who knows how many Hezbollah or Al Qaeda operatives have bought their way into the United States across our southern border? (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, 169)

Because illegal aliens murder 5 000 innocent Americans every year and we take a trillion dollar hit overall to our economy, illegal immigration rewards us with a 9/11 or worse every year. (Simcox quoted in Dechaine 2009, 55)

Secondly, Gilchrist and Simcox use certain metaphors and terminology such as the term “invasion” to emphasize the externality of the threat.⁴ In his book *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, Jef Huysmans explains that the term “invasion” is a powerful metaphor to securitize increased immigration without having to explain how it endangers the population (Huysmans 2006, 47-48). Gilchrist and Simcox followed this method by highlighting the danger of open borders. In a short essay published at Georgetown University, Gilchrist used the term “invasion” 15 times. Here are two examples:

At the current rate of *invasion*, by the year 2025, only 17 years hence, the Minuteman Project estimates that there will be more illegal aliens occupying U.S. territory than there will be citizen voters. (Gilchrist 2008, 7)

Annually, the size of the *invasion* explodes to the equivalent of 208 reinforced army divisions, or about five million persons, entering and occupying U.S. territory. That is larger than all the current U.S. military forces combined: Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Marines, Reservists, and the National Guard. No one knows who these millions of persons are, where they are, or what their intentions are. (Gilchrist 2008, 6)

Furthermore, Gilchrist fuels fear of a possible invasion of illegal aliens by reformulating the Greek myth of the Trojan horse. Here is how he summarizes this analogy:

The fear is that, like the ancient Trojans, we are naively bringing grave danger into our city walls. The illegal immigrants invading our country will quickly destroy the United States as a safe, economically sound nation that abides by the rule of law established by our Founding Fathers. We have allowed into our midst an army of illegal immigrants who will cause our downfall unless we do something about it now. (Gilchrist 2006, 20)

Simcox also describes the immigration issue using the invasion metaphor. On the website of his political action committee (PAC), the MCDL PAC, he posted an image featuring seven Latinos climbing the security fence. This image is accompanied by a notice board indicating the number of illegal immigrants entering the United States in “real time.” It is estimated that this figure increases by one immi-

⁴ The Minutemen are not the first to use this metaphor; many anti-immigrant organizations have done so before. Actually, the *U.S. News and World Report* was the first magazine to use the term “invasion” in 1977 on its cover to characterize immigration in the United States (Chavez 2001, 221).

grant every 45 seconds and today is higher than 15 million (MCDC PAC). According to Bigo, the use of such alarming statistics amplifies the immigration problem, “materializes the enemy,” and helps to subjectively define a threat to survival (1998, 4).

By defining the threat with the word “invasion,” the Minutemen presidents are engaging in an act of securitization. Based on the fear of “the other,” their speech acts help buttress the idea that border enforcement is necessary to control illegal immigration and protect American society. This method focuses on demonstrating the image of a harmonious society being hampered by an external attack (Huysmans 2006, 49).

Thirdly, the Minutemen presidents make analogies with past armed conflicts to demonstrate that there is a “war” on the U.S.-Mexico border. For example, Simcox used the popular image of Uncle Sam to recruit volunteers. Initially created to get people to enlist during World War I, this poster has become an icon of the United States and its government. Simcox decided to adapt it to the Minutemen reality by making two changes. First, he replaces Uncle Sam’s hat with the blue three-cornered hat of the original eighteenth-century Minutemen movement. Second, he modifies the original text, “Uncle Sam Wants YOU” for the U.S. Army, to suit the “border war” idea: “I want YOU - As a Minuteman Volunteer to Secure the U.S. Border.” By reasserting this popular image, Simcox suggests that the Minutemen have replaced Uncle Sam in the protection of the United States. Pointing directly to the viewer, the new Uncle Sam encourages Americans to join the Minutemen and fight the “war” against illegal immigration.

The aforementioned speech acts lead to the conclusion that Gilchrist and Simcox actively participate in the second step of the securitization process. Their rhetoric helps define the issue of undocumented immigration as a threat to the security of American society. To continue in this vein, a researcher might consider other figures of speech employed by Gilchrist and Simcox, such as those related to health (illness, infection, cancer, parasites, etc.) and natural disasters (flood, tsunami, tide, etc.).

Step 3: The Accomplishment of the Securitization Process

The third step is the accomplishment of the securitization process by a group of people whose authority to secure is recognized by the audience (i.e., the American government or public). For the speech acts to be recognized as legitimate, Gilchrist and Simcox must be perceived as experts on immigration politics. In other words, they cannot hope to significantly increase the probability of a political change without the approval of the audience.

And in order to be perceived as experts, Gilchrist and Simcox refer *ad nauseam* to the inaction of the state and policy makers to deal with immigration politics and border security issues, as shown in the following quote from Gilchrist:

Securing the border is something the government should be taking care of as a matter of course. As far as I can figure, President Bush is delusional, lying, or completely clueless as to the crisis this country is facing. Whatever the situation is, the president and most members of the U.S. Senate are wrong and, frankly criminally incompetent on this issue. (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, xxi)

To demonstrate that they can effectively replace the government, Gilchrist and Simcox describe the members of their organization as citizens, patriots, pioneers, activists, and lobbyists who are all dedicated to monitoring the border and curbing illegal immigration. Simcox also claims that the MCDC is a good example of an organization promoting social justice, by being “one of the most important, socially responsible, and peaceful movements for justice since the civil rights movement of the 1960s” (MCDC n.d.). These presidents focus on their patriotism and commitment to the principle of the rule of law in order to be seen as legitimate.

This technique of denouncing government inaction and promoting the dynamism of the MMP and the MCDC seems to work. According to surveys, the Minutemen have a good reputation in the United States. For example, a report entitled *Americans' Immigration Quandary* revealed that 55 percent of Americans had already heard of the Minutemen, and 60 percent supported their actions (Pew 2006, 25). Another *Fox News* poll (2006) showed that 46 percent of Americans consider Minutemen “concerned citizens,” and that 34 percent describe them as “vigilantes.” Finally, a survey conducted by *NBC News* and *The Wall Street Journal* (2006) noted that 30 percent of Americans wish to see the Minutemen surveillance allowed by the law. This figure was 50 percent among Republicans. While these surveys do not express clear agreement among Americans on this issue, we can still conclude that the Minutemen’s position on illegal immigration has a lot of support.⁵

Step 4: Taking Extraordinary Measures In Response to an Existential Threat

While the Minutemen’s actions are generally accepted, or at least tolerated, the fourth step reflects the movement’s limits. According to the Copenhagen School researchers, all extraordinary measures are mainly the responsibility of the state. Making major decisions such as those pertaining to constructing a border fence, increasing border patrols, or amending immigration laws must, according to convention, be made by the U.S. government. Even if the presidents endeavor to take their own extraordinary measures, they cannot afford to follow through with these ambi-

⁵ It is important to note that the audience is not limited to the general public, but also includes policy makers. I will discuss Gilchrist and Simcox’s political strategy in Washington later in this article, but I can already mention that several members of the House of Representatives support these presidents and carry their message to the Capitol.

tions. During their border patrol actions, the Minutemen numbered barely more than 100 in the field. Moreover, the MDCD fence-building project is going slowly, as it is only 3.2 km long on a more than 3 000 km border (Fan 2008, 712). In other words, it is impossible for these groups to make a real difference with their limited civilian and financial resources. While the U.S. Border Patrol, with approximately 11 000 officers and no less than US\$7 billion invested in border security in 2006, has relatively failed to control undocumented immigration (Payan 2006, 56), we can safely conclude that the Minutemen cannot carry out such an operation. Even within the state, extraordinary measures remain difficult to achieve. Since 2003, the U.S. Congress has introduced many bills, but it was not until the Secure Fence Act of 2006 (HR6061) that the country faced a drastic change in security measures. This act authorizes the construction of 1 100 km of double barriers and the increase of the number of Border Patrol agents.

Step 5: The Audience Accepts the New Reality

Finally, to complete the securitization process, the audience must accept the new reality. When the Secure Fence Act was enacted, 46 percent of Americans were in favor of the security fence (CNN 2006). This statistic increased to 54 percent in 2010 (CNN 2010). This growing apparent desire to secure the U.S.-Mexico border signifies that the securitization of undocumented immigration is actually underway. Even though the influx of undocumented immigrants has seen a drastic decline since 2006 (Passel and Cohn 2010), strict immigration laws such as the Arizona Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act (SB1070) have continued to appear, at least for debate or discussion, even if not ultimately put into effect. The U.S. seems to tend toward guarding against undocumented immigration.

By analyzing the five steps of the securitization process, it can be concluded that Gilchrist and Simcox have played major roles in describing undocumented immigration as a threat to American identity. It is important to note that we should not understand the Minutemen presidents' influence as if they were the cause of the securitization of undocumented immigration. However, portraying the border as a war zone and describing illegal immigration as a social and economic burden for the United States has certainly helped create an atmosphere that seems to justify stricter immigration policies. Thus, assuming that there is no single "actor" controlling the securitization process, we can say that Gilchrist and Simcox are two of the security entrepreneurs who participated to a great extent in it.

Strategic Actions: Patrolling U.S. Borders, Attracting Media Attention, And Influencing Political Decisions

The Minutemen presidents' second avenue of influence is to undertake strategic actions. Specifically, they participate in the debate on immigration and on border security by patrolling the U.S. borders, increasing media coverage, and influencing political decisions.

PATROLLING U.S. BORDERS

According to Gilchrist and Simcox, the first step in protecting the nation's sovereignty is to immediately deploy the U.S. army to the southern border until a complete security fence is erected. Once the physical barrier extending from San Diego to Brownsville is built, 35 000 Border Patrol agents should be deployed, and the ports and the Canadian border should be secured. Since they believe the federal government "has no serious intention of enforcing the borders," they started their own patrolling actions to prevent the entry of illegal immigrants (Gilchrist and Corsi 2006).

Their first surveillance operation was organized in April 2005, in Cochise County, Arizona. Since then, they have patrolled the U.S.-Mexico border as well as the U.S.-Canada border. The MCDC reported that in 279 days of patrolling, 30 671 illegal immigrants have been seen, 326 rescued, and 13 710 arrested (MCDC n.d.). These numbers are obviously exaggerated, as the number of volunteers deployed daily at the border rarely reaches 100. In addition to their daily patrolling activities, the MMP and the MCDC have organized demonstrations against the employment of undocumented immigrants in day labor centers in Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, California, Idaho, and Michigan.


It is important to note that it is almost impossible for these groups to make a real difference with such limited civilian resources. The Minutemen's success cannot be calculated in terms of arrests and border crossings, but in terms of the attention received. According to Chavez (2008, 25), the Minutemen presidents' goal is to produce a "spectacle" that draws public and media attention and influences policy makers. Gilchrist appears to agree, for he says the following:

That first border event was a dog-and-pony show....It was political activism. I organized it to draw attention to the failure of the government to secure our borders, and it did that in spades. Patrolling the border is only about 5 or 10 percent of what the Minuteman Project is about. The other 90 to 95 percent is driving this issue up through city councils, mayors, state legislatures, and governors into the halls of Congress to force change. (quoted in Thomas 2008)

In short, the surveillance operations help draw attention to certain possible solutions (border enforcement, strict immigration laws, etc.) at the expense of

others (temporary foreign worker programs, legalization of undocumented immigrants, etc.).

GRAPH 1
NUMBER OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES PUBLISHED ABOUT THE MMP AND MCDC
(2005 TO 2009)



SOURCE: FACTIVA Database (n.d.).

ATTRACTING MEDIA ATTENTION

To influence the debate on border security and immigration politics, Simcox and Gilchrist spread their message using various media such as newspapers, radio, the Internet, and television. According to Gilchrist, the core Minutemen media strategy is to build strong collaboration with radio and television hosts who will promote their ideas (2009). Over the years, Gilchrist and Simcox have developed solid collaboration with Lou Dobbs, Glenn Beck, Bill O'Reilly, and local radio hosts like Roger Hedgecock, Michael Savage, and Mark Edwards (Akers and Davis 2006, 237; Gilchrist 2009; Navarro 2009, 179). For instance, the Minutemen presidents appeared 18 and 22 times respectively on the program *Lou Dobbs Tonight* between March 2005 and March 2007 (Doty 2009, 69). Dobbs has never hidden his support for the Minutemen organizations. In response to an editorial in *The Wall Street Journal*, he said on air, "I just want to be clear to the *Journal* and to this audience, I support the Minuteman Project and the fine Americans who make it up in all they've accomplished fully, relentlessly, and proudly" (quoted in Cabrera and Glavac 2010, 692).

Moreover, the MMP and MCDC are hot topics in the media. From 2005 to 2010, over 3 900 articles on the Minutemen were published in the United States. As

the chart indicates, the Minutemen phenomenon was more popular in 2005 and 2006; 75 percent of the articles were published during the movement's first two years. Specifically, the month-long border operation in Arizona in April 2005 and Simcox's ultimatum for Bush to build a fence at the U.S.-Mexico border (May 2006) garnered most of the attention.

INFLUENCING POLITICAL DECISIONS

As important as the patrolling actions and the media strategies can be, the ultimate goal of Minutemen presidents is policy-related. Gilchrist and Simcox actively promote and present their ideas to the Immigration Reform Caucus (IRC), finance political campaigns through their political action committees (PAC), participate actively in politics—they ran for Congress—and lobby the national legislature.

Gilchrist, Simcox, and the Immigration Reform Caucus

In April, 2005, Gilchrist and Simcox, accompanied by 20 Minutemen volunteers, formally met with IRC members. In fact, about 10 days after the launch of the border operation in Arizona in 2005, former IRC Chairman Tom Tancredo (R-Colorado) said that the MMP was a success and invited Gilchrist and Simcox to Capitol Hill (Sheehy 2009, 258). The following IRC members congratulated and have publicly supported the Minutemen political agenda: Tom Tancredo, John T. Doolittle (R-California), Lamar Smith (R-Texas), Scott Garrett (R-New Jersey), J.D. Hayworth (R-Arizona), Phil Gingrey (R-Georgia), Virgil Goode (R-Virginia), Walter Jones (R-NC), Tom Price (R-Georgia), and J. Gresham Barrett (R-South Carolina) (Yoxall 2006, 545-546). Thereafter, Tancredo has collaborated several times with Gilchrist, a notable example being his writing the preface of Gilchrist's book, *Minutemen: The Battle to Secure America's Borders*. In the preface, he recognizes Gilchrist and Simcox's leading roles in the Minutemen movement:

The first Minuteman operation was a tremendous success, and much of that success was due to the tenacity and vision of Jim Gilchrist and his Minuteman Project partner, Chris Simcox, publisher of the *Tombstone Tumbleweed News* paper and founder of the Minuteman Civil Defense Corps. (Tancredo quoted in Gilchrist and Corsi 2006, xi)

Another IRC member, Charles Norwood (R-Georgia), took a stand in favor of the Minutemen movement by publishing a report on the first border operation in Arizona. According to Norwood (2005), the MMP have demonstrated that, with more manpower deployed at the border, illegal crossings could be reduced significantly. This report also suggests that auxiliary personnel, such as Minutemen volunteers, should help the Border Patrol, as they can be trained and deployed to the

border in three days, as opposed to the Border Patrol agents, who take two years to be trained (20-21).

POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES

In order to recruit, endorse, and financially support candidates who promote the Minutemen political agenda in Congress, Simcox created the Minutemen PAC and the MCDC PAC, while Gilchrist launched the Minuteman Victory PAC. According to their websites, these PACs benefited 35 members of Congress and challengers during the last mid-term elections in 2010. Each PAC had revenue ranging from US\$200 000 to US\$720 000 (Open Secrets 2010). Despite these substantial revenues, only 11 percent of contributions has been redirected to candidates, while administrative costs accounted for most of the expenses. In fact, a third of candidates received direct funding for a total of US\$13 250. Indirect funding (for example, advertisement and direct mail to support a candidate) ran to US\$115 591 and benefited only two candidates (Open Secrets 2010). These numbers demonstrate that the Minutemen's PACs did not significantly support congressional candidates, but again, these actions have helped to put the Minutemen movement on the map in Congress.

Minutemen Presidents Run for Congress

Gilchrist and Simcox both actively participated in politics by running for Congress. Gilchrist was the first to adopt this political strategy, running in 2005 on the American Independent Party ticket in Orange County, California. It was a good opportunity for Gilchrist, since Christopher Cox (R-California), who had held the position for 16 years, was the newly appointed Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Aware of the Republican tradition in the 48th Congressional District, Gilchrist openly said he was taking the opportunity to bring immigration and border security issues to the public and policy-makers' attention. He finished third, with 25 percent of the vote. Despite his defeat, he managed to persuade the incumbent, John Campbell, to publicly declare that he favored enhancing border enforcement and that he was against any bill that would allow the creation of temporary foreign worker programs. After the balloting, Gilchrist said, "I had a big smile on my face...the day after the election. There were four bills dealing with immigration chaos introduced in Congress that day. Ten weeks before, none of them were in the works. I have to give myself some credit for that" (quoted in Thomas 2008).

Five years later, in 2010, Simcox announced his candidacy for John McCain's Senate seat. His aim was to challenge McCain (R-Arizona) on border security. He said, "John McCain has failed miserably in his duty to secure this nation's borders and protect the people of Arizona from the escalating violence and lawlessness. He has fought real efforts over the years at every turn, opting to hold our nation's border security hostage to his amnesty schemes" (*The Economist* 2009). Simcox

accused McCain of being a “Republican in Name Only” (RINO), a pejorative term used to discredit Republicans who have more liberal values and principles (Simcox 2010). By mid-February 2010, Simcox had decided to drop the race and endorse Republican J.D. Hayworth, a candidate who promoted strict border enforcement. Hayworth is well-known for his anti-immigrant ideology, well summarized in his book *Whatever It Takes: Illegal Immigration, Border Security and the War on Terror* (2006).

LOBBYING CONGRESS

Since the founding of the MMP and the MCDC, many bills legitimatizing civilian border patrols have been introduced in Congress: the Illegal Immigration Enforcement and Empowerment Act (SB1823), the Border Security and Modernization Act of 2005 (SB2049), the Protecting America Together Act of 2005 (HR3704), the Border Protection Corps Act (HR3622), the Homeland Security Volunteerism Enhancement Act of 2005 (HR4099), and the State Defense Force Improvement Act of 2005 (HR3401). Although none of them have ever passed, the existence of these bills shows that Congress has not just been shrugging off the Minutemen phenomenon. Furthermore, the Congressional Research Service has issued two reports on civilian border patrols. Commissioned by the House Judiciary Committee in 2005, the first analysis provides a historical overview of the Minutemen movement (Nunez-Neto 2005). The second sheds light on political and legal issues surrounding civilian border patrols by breaking down the national debate during the 109th Congress (Vina, Blas Nunez-Neto, and Bartlett Weir 2006). Despite these actions, it remains difficult to identify Gilchrist and Simcox’s direct role in influencing Congress. However, we can say that the fact that this issue is much disputed in Congress is partly due to their activism. A further study can be conducted to investigate to what extent they have helped members of Congress to introduce these new bills.

By describing Gilchrist and Simcox’s strategic actions, we can conclude that even if the Minutemen goal is apparently to monitor the U.S.-Mexico border, they also have farther-reaching objectives, which are to draw media attention as well as to shape the political agenda. Obviously, not all their strategic actions are effective, but Gilchrist and Simcox are the ones who have taken the Minutemen movement to the heights it has reached nationally.

Conclusion

Even if the Minutemen’s rhetoric and actions are hyperbolic, their presidents’ activism has been effective insofar as they have succeeded in bringing the issue of undocumented immigration and border security to the public, the media, and policymakers’ attention. Furthermore, their alarming rhetoric associating immigration with a “war,” a “disease,” and an “invasion” has certainly helped create a climate of

insecurity that justifies stricter immigration policies. It would be inaccurate to claim that Gilchrist and Simcox are the ones mainly responsible for the *securitization process* of undocumented immigration. However, their leading role in the U.S. anti-immigrant movement has helped promote strict immigration laws and border enforcement. In conclusion, this research suggests that even though Gilchrist and Simcox do not directly call the shots on border security, they can be qualified as “security entrepreneurs” in the anti-immigrant movement. Their persuasive speech acts, their surveillance operations at the border, their numerous appearances on television and radio, as well as their lobbying actions in Washington have raised new ideas and helped shape the political agenda. By focusing on the individual level of analysis, this research has demonstrated how only two members of the Minutemen movement have managed to influence the debate and become perceived as experts on immigration and border security issues.

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“THIS IS AMERICA — SPEAK ENGLISH.” THE ENGLISH-ONLY MOVEMENT AND ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

*Anna Kaganiec-Kamińska**

We must have but one flag. We must also have but one language. That must be the language of the Declaration of Independence, of Washington's Farewell address, of Lincoln's Gettysburg Speech and second inaugural.
THEODORE ROOSEVELT (1917)

I hope very much that I'm the last president in American history who can't speak Spanish.
BILL CLINTON (2000)

But understand this: instead of worrying about whether immigrants can learn English —they'll learn English— you need to make sure your child can speak Spanish.
BARACK OBAMA (2008)

Language and Identity

Language holds an important place in the theories of nation and nationalism. It is often considered an important consciousness-raising and nation-building factor. Depending on the perspective, it is perceived either as a primordial, mythical foundation of a national culture, or a foundational factor on which —or thanks to which— the national identity is created. For some, it is the factor that most clearly defines a nation; for others, it is an instrument used by the elites to build nations and legitimize their power. In short, most scholars agree that language plays a vital role in the process of national consciousness raising and its development, a factor that unites and integrates different groups within one community. Not surprisingly, it is also highly important to immigrants and conquered peoples as a crucial instrument for forming and/or preserving their unique ethnic identity. Since the mother language reflects a group's roots, culture, tradition, and distinctive way of seeing the world, language change is one of the symptoms of assimilation.

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The English language is merged with American national identity. However, the Founding Fathers did not grant English the status of an official language; instead they made what Shirley Brice Heath is widely quoted as calling “a deliberate choice of *policy not to have a policy*.” The general U.S. language policy was that of tolerance. English became dominant without actually being declared official because of the prevalence of Anglo-Saxons among the colonizers and early immigrants and, thus, as an outcome of historical processes and events.¹ It was at the turn of the twentieth century that the “ideological link” between the American national identity and proficiency in the English language was established. Several factors contributed to this merger: vast U.S. territorial acquisitions in the nineteenth century, which also meant confrontation with foreign-language speakers; mass immigration from Europe (1880-1920); anti-German sentiments in the U.S. during World War I; and the Red Scare following the Bolshevik Revolution.

Contemporary immigration to the United States, predominantly by Latin Americans (especially Mexicans), makes the issue of U.S. language policy very timely. A rapidly growing Hispanic/Latino population is sometimes perceived by some, including distinguished scholars and important politicians, as a threat to American national identity. What fuels such sentiments are, for example, the on-going debate about immigration policy and regulations —Arizona’s harsh April 2010 SB1070 is one of them— border enforcement operations (the “prevention through deterrence” strategy, or the recently approved fence on the U.S.-Mexican border), as well as other actions and proposals, such as the idea of barring U.S.-born children of illegal immigrants from automatic U.S. citizenship.

The English-Only Movement, whose goal is to establish the English language as the country’s official language, is undoubtedly one of the manifestations of the strong anti-immigrant —mostly anti-Hispanic— sentiments in the country. Even though no *federal* regulations have yet been passed, Official English measures have been adopted by the majority of the American *states*. The English-Only Movement has also focused on the reduction or elimination of language assistance (e.g., bilingual materials and programs), the elimination of bilingual ballots, the promotion of English only in the workplace, etc.

This article focuses on how the English-Only Movement stems from, and has contributed to, anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States in recent decades. The problem is presented within the broader context of earlier attempts to restrict foreign-language use.

¹ Today English is the common language in the country (the *only* language spoken at home by over 80 percent of the population) (U.S. Census Bureau 2000c).

The English Language And American Identity, Then...

The fact that the Founding Fathers did not grant English official status may have been motivated by several factors, as summed up by Terrence G. Wiley: first, “the dominance of English was self-evident”; second, “the founders respected linguistic diversity and minority rights”; and third, they did not want to “offend minorities who had supported the revolutionary cause” (2004, 320). Not mentioning English in the Constitution could also have been more symbolic, expressing a rejection of any cultural continuity with the British crown. In fact, as Baron writes, in the 1780s the Marquis de Chastellux noted that Americans preferred their language to be referred to as “American” rather than “English” (1990, 42). Despite the fact that after the revolution, some even suggested that the country choose a different language (Baron 1990, 42; Shell 1993, 108), English became the most common language in the colony, and Americans acted *as if* it were an official language.

At that time the general language policy was that of tolerance toward other languages. Many churches and parochial schools operated in other languages, while in some areas with a high concentration of German speakers, even public schools operated in German, for example, in Pennsylvania, Ohio, or Wisconsin (Schmid 2001, 19). The first state to authorize bilingual (German-English) teaching was Ohio in 1839 (Crawford 2001, 20).

This does not mean, however, that as early as the colonial times the newcomers were not sometimes perceived as a “cultural threat.” Even though America welcomed settlers from different countries from Northern and Western Europe, and was thus multilingual (Castellanos 1983), some negative, anti-immigrant sentiments arose. Benjamin Franklin himself openly expressed his concerns about the growing number of Germans.² One of the most infamous and widely quoted is in a 1753 letter to Peter Collinson, a member of the British Parliament, where he states, “Those [Germans] who come hither are generally the most ignorant Stupid Sort of their Nation” (Franklin 1753). In *Observations on the Increase of Mankind* (1755) he also called Germans “Palatine boors,” but, as James Crawford writes, this fragment was later removed from subsequent editions, probably because Franklin must have felt embarrassed by his own words (quoted in Schmid 2001, 15).

The concerns about the progress of assimilation of immigrants were particularly loudly voiced at the turn of the twentieth century, in the era of heavy immigration (1880-1920). In that period alone, 23.5 million immigrants arrived in the United States (Daniels 2004, 5), almost 90 percent from Europe (Daniels 1991, 122).

² At the end of the eighteenth century the number and status of the German group was strong enough to become part of the so-called “Muhlenberg legend,” according to which it was only one vote that prevented the German language from becoming a national language of the United States. In reality, as Carol L. Schmid writes, the whole case referred to a petition by a group of Germans from Virginia asking for some U.S. laws to be published in German as well as in English. In 1795, the House of Representatives rejected this proposition by one vote (42-41), probably cast by Frederick August Muhlenberg, then speaker of the House of Representatives (2001, 17).

The influx was so substantial that in 1890 and 1910, almost 15 percent of the population was foreign-born, the highest rate in U.S. history so far (Daniels 2004, 5). What is important about this is that, while the majority of immigrants arriving in the United States up until the 1880s were of Northern and Western European origin (Daniels 1991, 122),³ at the turn of the twentieth century a substantial group of the newcomers came from Southeastern Europe: Italians, Poles, as well as immigrants from Austria-Hungary, and Russia (Daniels 1991, 122).⁴ As Charles Jaret puts it, "This change was seen as more than a mere geographic shift; it was widely accepted that the 'new' immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe differed 'much more radically in type from the earlier American residents than did the old immigration, and that in consequence the problem of assimilation has become much more difficult'" (1999, 11). Thus, the "new" immigrants were seen, even by some of the brightest minds of the country, as less educated and skilled, racially inferior, and generally less desirable than those from Western and Northern Europe.⁵ Some official reports supported these positions. Research conducted in 1912 by Henry Goddard concluded that 83 percent of Jews, 80 percent of Hungarians, 79 percent of Italians, and 87 percent of Russians recently arrived in the U.S. were "feeble-minded" (Ricento 1996, 4). Unsurprisingly, these conclusions, as Thomas Ricento writes, helped establish migration quotas in 1924 (1996). Also, the 1911 Dillingham Commission Report suggested that "new" immigrants were not suited to the American reality (Baron 1990, 134-136).

This big influx of "new" immigrants awoke xenophobic sentiments and spurred nativist anti-immigrant movements, like Catholic immigrants or Chinese workers had in earlier periods. For example, at the turn of the twentieth century, the short-lived American Protective Association (APA) played on the fears of Americans mainly in the rural Midwest and Pacific Northwest, while in the 1920s, the "new" anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant Ku Klux Klan had about 4 million members nationally (Beirich 2010b, 8). At the same time, different organizations, for example Boston's Immigration Restriction League, some of whose members, as Joe R. Feagin points out, were also fascinated with eugenics (1997, 23),⁶ were trying to pass restrictive immigration laws.

The broadest Americanization campaign took place in the first two decades of the twentieth century (Higham 1988). By 1923 as many as 34 states introduced teaching in English only, in public as well as private schools (Leibowicz 1985, 105-106). Also, some businesses, like Ford Motor Company, started obligatory English language classes for its workers. Furthermore, some states introduced regulations restricting other language use and/or limiting the rights of the foreign-born. For example, New York, among other states, required public school teachers to be

³ Ninety-five percent of immigrants in 1820-1860, 68 percent in 1861-1900, and 41 percent in 1900-1920.

⁴ Twenty-two percent in the years from 1861 to 1900, and 44 percent in the 1900-1920 period.

⁵ For Roger Daniel's discussion of the inadequacy of the concepts of "old" and "new" immigration see Daniels 1991, 183-184.

⁶ For more on eugenics in the United States, see, for example, Black (2003).

U.S. citizens, while Oregon required English translations of foreign-language newspapers (Higham 1988). Licensing laws, which banned foreigners from certain jobs, such as being an attorney, a medical doctor, a surgeon, an engineer, or even a bus driver, were also a form of discrimination. So was the prohibition in some states (e.g., California) of owning agricultural land by those not eligible for citizenship (i.e., Asian-born) (Jaret 1999, 17).

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed the passage of important immigration and naturalization regulations. In 1906, basic English-language skills became a requirement for naturalization. In 1917, a literacy test became the main tool for restricting immigration as a criterion for admitting immigrants to the U.S. (Daniels 1991, 276-279; Leibowicz 1985, 106-107). The culmination of the Americanization campaign was the adoption of a restrictive national quota system in immigration law (1921 and 1924) that sharply reduced immigration from Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe (immigration from the Western Hemisphere was outside the quota system). The "new" Europeans, however, were neither the first group to face hostility, as mentioned before, nor the first to trigger immigration restrictions. Asians were the first to be barred. In 1882 Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, and a few years later Japanese immigration was restricted on the basis of the 1907 "Gentlemen's Agreement." The following year President Theodore Roosevelt issued an executive order stopping Asian immigration from Hawaii (Ngai 2003, 114-119). The Immigration Act of 1917 set up an Asiatic Barred Zone from which no immigrants were admitted, and in 1924 all Asian immigration was outlawed.

Language restrictions introduced at the beginning of the twentieth century thus stemmed from the desire to preserve the American-ness of the United States and assimilate immigrants. They were also rooted in internal security considerations. After World War I fueled hostile attitudes toward Germans, in different parts of the United States various attempts were made to eliminate the use of the German language in public life. In many states, it was forbidden in schools (even German language classes were stopped), sermons, and public addresses, while, as Carol L. Schmid writes, in Iowa and South Dakota, it was even forbidden over telephones. In some localities, people speaking German on the street could be fined (2001, 36). Hostility toward Germans would also take the form of physical violence or the symbolic burning of German books.

In fact, the arguments that newcomers pose a "cultural" or a "political threat" are, as Jaret points out, two of the common fears that generate anti-immigrant attitudes and actions (besides considering them a threat to the economic system or even to the natural environment) (1999, 20). Seeing Germans (and later the Japanese) as disloyal and subversive is only one possible manifestation of these attitudes. This fear may also express itself in perceiving immigrants as unqualified or unable to understand the principles of democracy. Thus, for example, today Mexican immigrants are accused of not having "good citizenship qualities" and of being "too apolitical and indifferent," and hence unwilling to participate in the political process. They are also accused of having "political interests and values" that are different from those respected by "real Americans" (Jaret 1999, 23-24).

Language (and cultural) assimilation was also important in the case of the colonized and the conquered. A striking example of Americanization through education is, clearly enough, the system of boarding schools for Native American children (1879-1920), which led to the “cultural disintegration” of Indians (Schmid 2001, 23-25). English also finally became the language of instruction in the Southwest, Louisiana, and Hawaii; however, in Puerto Rico neither English-only nor bilingual education programs proved effective (Schmid 2001, 25-27, 175-177; Baron 1990, 166-170),⁷ and in 1948 Spanish became the language of education there again (Crawford 2001, 18). “Foreign” languages were also restricted through various regulations. As for California, for example, although the first state Constitution (1849) guaranteed that state laws also would be published in Spanish, the new Constitution (1878-1879) was pro-American (Schmid 2001, 28). It gave official status to English (dropped in 1966) and abolished publications in Spanish (Constitutional Convention of the State of California 1879; Crawford 2001, 14-15).

Louisiana was the only territory to become a state (1812) with a non-English-speaking majority (Crawford 2001, 13). All the other states became states after the English language and American culture had become dominant. In the Southwest, annexed in 1848, this happened much earlier in California (1850) than in New Mexico (1912), due to their distinct demographic and economic development. While the “Gold Rush” changed California’s ethnic composition immediately after annexation (Crawford 1992, 51), the immigration of English-speakers to “Spanish” New Mexico was very slow, and they remained a minority till the beginning of the twentieth century.⁸ The language issue and Hispanic culture are also seen as an important obstacle to Puerto Rico becoming a new American state. Today the island is mainly Spanish-speaking (U.S. Census Bureau 2000b),⁹ even though since 1993 both languages are official.

...And Now...Anti-Immigration Sentiments And the English-Only Movement

Minority language rights in the United States stem from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By the 1980s other federal laws were also adopted to give protection to non-English speakers. The Bilingual Education Act of 1968 in fact started bilingual education programs; the 1975 amendment to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 provided for bilingual ballots in specific situations; and the Court Interpreters Act of 1978 provided interpreters in Federal Court. In 1990, a Native American Languages Act was also passed to maintain and recover languages spoken by the

⁷ For more see also The Language Policy Task Force (1978, 63-71).

⁸ For more on language rights in New Mexico see, for example, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1972, 58-63).

⁹ According to the 2000 U.S. Census data for Puerto Rico (2000b), 85.6 percent of the population speaks Spanish at home (3 million out of 3.8 million).

Native American population, the natives of Hawaii, and the Pacific Islands. One of the newest regulations is Executive Order 13166 ("Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency"), signed by President Bill Clinton in 2000 to improve access of limited English proficiency persons (LEP) to federally conducted and assisted programs and activities. EO 13166 and bilingual education programs and bilingual ballots are criticized by the advocates of English as an official language. While bilingual education programs were virtually ended when President Bush signed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2002, the other two are still being challenged.

The current English-Only Movement had its beginning in the early 1980s. By then, a huge new wave of immigrants (4.5 million in the 1970s, 7.3 million in the 1980s, and 9.1 million in the 1990s [Daniels 2004, 5-6]) caused an explosive rise in anti-immigrant sentiments.¹⁰ Some language restrictions were in fact introduced even before the English-Only Movement started. One of them is the very restrictive Anti-Bilingual Ordinance, adopted in 1980 in Dade County, Florida. This regulation banned county expenditures on languages other than English, at the same time changing the 1973 resolution, which made the county officially "bilingual and bicultural." All Spanish-language signs and bus schedules were thus removed and the publication of informational leaflets brought to an end. A 1984 amendment to the ordinance allowed county spending on public health, emergencies, and tourism (Crawford 1992, 131), before, finally, the ordinance was repealed in 1993 (Crawford 2001, 26).

What actually caused the increase of immigration to the United States in the second half of the twentieth century were the reforms and liberalization of immigration laws, which also led to an important change in the national origin of newcomers: the dominant groups now were Latin Americans and Asians.¹¹ The Walter-McCarran Act of 1952 abolished "all racial and ethnic bars to immigration and naturalization" and continued a non-quota system for Latin Americans. The Immigration Act of 1965 abolished the national quotas and introduced numerical restrictions for both hemispheres. It also put a preference on family relations with U.S. citizens. The closest family members could, therefore, migrate to the U.S. outside the numerical restrictions. Later, other preferences, based on national origin, were also established. Another important immigration act was the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986, which, on the one hand, introduced some restrictions, as far as the "unlawful employment of aliens" is concerned, for example, but on the other hand, granted amnesty to about three million illegal immigrants, who met all the specified conditions. This amnesty, paradoxically, led to the increase in the legal immigration of closest family members. It was especially important to

¹⁰ For the discussion of the similarities and differences between the anti-immigrant attitudes in the 1880-1920 and 1970-1998, see Jaret (1999).

¹¹ According to the 2000 U.S. Census, the majority of foreign-born are from Latin America (about 52 percent), mainly from Mexico, and from Asia (about 26 percent), mainly China and the Philippines (Malone et al. 2003, 5).

the Mexican group since they comprised 70 percent of the people admitted into the program (Daniels 2004, *passim*).

In fact, increased immigration rates, alongside a high birth rate, contributed to very fast growth in the number of Hispanics/Latinos. In only two decades (1980-2000), their absolute numbers and their share in the U.S. population doubled (from 6.4 percent to 12.5 percent, and from 14.6 million to 35.3 million, respectively) (Hobbs and Stoops 2002, 78). The fact that in mid-2006 the Hispanic/Latino group reached over 14.8 percent of the population (44.3 million) (U.S. Census Bureau 2007) and is constantly growing enhances the stereotype of all Latinos as “immigrants.” The advocates of immigration restrictions also emphasize that for the first time in U.S. history, the majority of immigrants speak the same language: Spanish. In their opinion, this is a threat to the future of the English language in the United States and even to American identity (Huntington 2004, 256).

In April 1981 Senator Samuel Ichiye Hayakawa, a Canadian immigrant of Japanese origin and a naturalized U.S. citizen, proposed an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, SJ Res. 72, which would establish English as an official language of the country. Even though it was not voted by the Congress, it did become the first proposal that referred to an official status for English.

In 1983 Hayakawa and John Tanton established an organization, U.S. English, to lobby for the establishment of English as an official language of the United States. The organization sees several reasons for Official English (U.S. English n.d.b). First, “Official English promotes unity.” It is argued that the long tradition of assimilation “has always included the adoption of English as the common means of communication. Unfortunately, the proliferation of multilingual government sends the opposite message to non-English speakers: it is not necessary to learn English because the government will accommodate them in other languages” (U.S. English n.d.b). Immigrants, as the argument goes, are slower to learn English when they receive support in their native languages. Moreover, language diversity contributes to racial and ethnic conflicts. Second, “Official English empowers immigrants....Life without English proficiency in the United States is a life of low-skilled, low-paying jobs. Studies of Census data show that an immigrant’s income rises about 30 percent as a result of learning English. Knowledge of English leads to the realization of the American dream of increased economic opportunity and the ability to become a more productive member of society, which benefits everyone” (U.S. English n.d.b). Hence, to succeed in the U.S. you must know English, while language assistance, in fact, deprives you of full participation in the society. Third, “Official English is common sense government.” It would eliminate the need to spend money on services in different languages, which could be spent on English language classes for the immigrants. U.S. English also emphasizes that giving English the status of an official language does not mean that other language use would be absolutely banned. It would be possible in emergency situations, judicial proceeding as well as *foreign-language instruction* and the *promotion of tourism* [sic!] (U.S. English n.d.b). Regulation, as they write, would not impose a language on private firms, religious celebrations, or private conversations.

U.S. English won the support of many prominent Americans. In its Advisory Board sits, for example, the former governor of California, Arnold Schwarzenegger (U.S. English n.d.b). As Crawford writes (2001, 5), the organization was also endorsed, for example, by former-President Richard Nixon, Senator Eugene McCarthy, writer Saul Bellow, and actors Charlton Heston and Whoopi Goldberg, as well as other figures, some of whom later withdrew their support. The number of U.S. English members grew substantially in a few years: from 300 in 1983, to 400 000 in 1990. In 2000, it claimed 1.4 million members, while in 2009, 400 000 more (Schmidt 2001, 44; U.S. English n.d.b). The survey commissioned by the organization itself in the 1980s revealed that their members were mostly wealthy, college-educated men over 60, conservative, of Northern European origin (Crawford 2001, 24).

Apart from U.S. English, some other organizations support giving English an official status. One of them is ProEnglish, which had its beginnings in 1994 as an initiative known as English Language Advocates that was defending Official English law in Arizona (ProEnglish n.d.). Another organization, English First, founded in 1986 by Larry Pratt, a former Virginia state representative, and the president of Gun Owners of America, currently has about 150 000 members (English First n.d.). Worth mentioning is also the American Ethnic Coalition, founded that same year in Texas by Lou Zaeske, which aims "to prevent the division of America along language or ethnic lines" (quoted in Draper and Jimenez 1996, 3).

Official English opponents do not agree with the arguments of the English-Only Movement. In their opinion, English is not in danger in the United States, since even such groups as Hispanics/Latinos, considered very loyal to their mother tongue, show a tendency to language assimilation. The Spanish language as immigrants' dominant language gives way to English as the dominant language in the second and subsequent generations, and in many cases it is finally completely dropped.¹² Hispanics/Latinos are simply perfectly aware of the fact that English proficiency is important for their socioeconomic mobility. Psychologists also point out that if immigrants are forced to shed their language and culture, it may result in serious identity problems, especially among children (Padilla et al. 1991, 4). As for bilingual education, research shows that it is effective, and, what is more, "when bilingual education is implemented in a context that fosters an attitude of additive bilingualism, then marked changes in school achievement, self-esteem, and intergroup cooperation are observed" (Padilla et al. 1991, 9). Other arguments against Official English are for example: it would limit the government's communication with those who have limited language skills or do not speak English, including American citizens; it will enhance hostility toward minority groups, especially Asians and Hispanics/Latinos; and it is inconsistent with American values, violating, basically, the right to freedom of speech, etc. (Crawford 2006, 1-2).

¹² See, for example, Alba and Nee (2003, 217-220); Padilla et al. (1991); Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family Foundation (2002 and 2004, 16).

The belief that instead of language restrictions the United States needs the protection of cultural rights led to a proposal for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution (A Cultural Rights Amendment), presented to Congress in 1987. Proposed by Louisiana Democratic Senator John Breaux and Representative Jimmy Hayes, it would have granted “the right of the people to preserve, foster, and promote their respective historic, linguistic, and cultural origins” (quoted in Draper and Jimenez 1996, 3). In clear opposition to Official English also stand state English Plus resolutions. Their supporters believe that the retention and the development of a person’s first language should be encouraged, and bilingual assistance programs and policies should be strengthened. As the “Statement of Purpose” of the English Plus Information Clearinghouse (EPIC) reads, “The English Plus concept holds that the national interest can best be served when all members of our society have full access to effective opportunities to acquire strong English proficiency *plus* mastery of a second or multiple languages” (1987, 152). The first state to approve a non-binding English Plus resolution was New Mexico in 1989, followed by Oregon and Washington, and then Rhode Island in 1992.

Crawford suggests that, the *covert agenda* of the English-Only Movement is a “determination to resist racial and cultural diversity in the United States” (2001, 23). In fact, the Southern Poverty Law Center publication *The Nativist Lobby* (2009) calls John Tanton, the co-founder of U.S. English, “the most important figure in the modern American anti-immigrant movement for three decades” (Beirich 2009, 5). As the report shows, Tanton has been interested in eugenics, linked to racist ideas, and had contact with the leading white nationalists, as well as Holocaust deniers and Klan lawyers. Widely discussed in many publications on Official English is Tanton’s 1986 memorandum “Memo to WITAN IV Attendees,” which leaked out to the public and left no doubts about what he thought about Hispanics/Latinos. He wrote, “Will the present majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group that is simply more fertile?...Can *homo contraceptivus* compete with *homo pro-genitiva* if borders aren’t controlled?” (1986). The leak had some important consequences for Tanton and U.S. English. He himself resigned, while some important members left the organization truly appalled by his statements (Crawford 2001, 33).

Tanton is also the founder of “the leading organizations of the nativist lobby” (Beirich 2009, 5). One of them is Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR),¹³ founded in 1979, which supports restrictive immigration policies and border control. FAIR is known to have accepted over US\$1.2 million support from the Pioneer Fund, “dedicated to furthering the scientific study of human ability and diversity” (Pioneer Fund n.d.). FAIR is currently listed as a “hate group” by the Southern Poverty Law Center. The second organization, the Center for Immigration Studies, is “the nativist lobby’s supposedly ‘independent’ think tank,” producing studies on immigration aspects, and which, as Beirich writes, “has never found any aspect of immigration it likes” (2009, 13). The third organization,

¹³ See also Beirich (2007).

NumbersUSA, is a grassroots organizing group whose founder, Roy Beck, has strong links to Tanton (Beirich 2009, 18-21). Tanton also currently sits on the Board of Directors of ProEnglish.

Recently there has been a substantial rise in the number of anti-immigrant movements nationwide. An important trigger for the appearance of about 300 similar groups, some more "hard-line" than others was the Minutemen Project border watch in Arizona (2005) (Beirich 2010a). In May 2010, the Minuteman Project itself started a SB1070 task force to help the state enforce the regulation. At the same time, various "hate groups," to use the Southern Poverty Law Center terminology, such as the traditionally white supremacist Council of Conservative Citizens, also became engaged in the immigration problem (Beirich 2010a).

Official English Regulations

Since Hayakawa proposed the aforementioned constitutional amendment in 1981, several other measures seeking to establish English either as an official language of the *United States* or as an official language of the *American government* have been introduced in Congress.¹⁴ Until the 110th Congress (2007-2008), five of them passed one house.¹⁵ One was the Bill Emerson English Language Empowerment Act of 1996 (HR123), approved by the House of Representatives, but not voted in the Senate. Had this regulation been adopted, English would have become the official language of the U.S. government (and, thus, of federal legislation); it would also have amended the Voting Rights Act of 1965 to repeal bilingual voting requirement provisions. Then, in May 2006 an amendment to a proposal of immigration legislation (S2611), declaring English the national language of the United States, was passed by the Senate. However, it died at year's end.

As for state legislation, in 2010, English was an official language of the majority (i.e., 29) of American states, of which Nebraska, Illinois, and Virginia had adopted Official English laws even before the English-Only Movement started, while Hawaii has been officially bilingual since 1978. Adopting English as an official language of Nebraska in 1920 was a direct consequence of anti-German sentiments caused by World War I and the Americanization campaign (Tatalovich 1995, 33-62). In Illinois, the 1969 Official English law was, in fact, an amendment to the 1923 regulation that gave "American" language an official status (and which resulted from, as the sponsor of the 1969 amendment expressed it, "Anglophobia hysteria" (quoted in Tatalovich 1995, 65-69). Official English in Virginia (1981), adopted shortly before the organization U.S. English was formed, as Raymond Tata-

¹⁴ The first "language of government" proposals were introduced in the 101th Congress (1989-1990) (HR4424 and S3179). See, for example, Legislative History at the U.S. English website.

¹⁵ Ninety-seventh Congress (1981-1982), S. Amdt. 2019 to S. 2222; 98th Congress (1983-1984), S529; 99th Congress (1985-1986), S. Amdt. 559 to S1200; 104th Congress (1995-1996), HR123; 109th Congress (2005-2006), S. Amdt. 4064 to S. 2611. See Legislative History at the U.S. English website.

lovich writes, was not symbolic: "Opposition to bilingual education was clearly the motivation behind this statute" (195-200).

By 1990, 14 other states had approved Official English laws: Indiana (1984), Kentucky (1984), Tennessee (1984), California (1986), Georgia (1986), Arkansas (1987), Mississippi (1987), North Carolina (1987), North Dakota (1987), South Carolina (1987), Arizona (1988, though later ruled unconstitutional), Colorado (1988), Florida (1988), and Alabama (1990). What undoubtedly contributed to the "second wave" of the Official English campaign were the aforementioned amnesty programs under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, on the one hand, and, on the other, the rise of anti-immigrant sentiments in regions that had experienced a big influx of immigrants in previous years. This was, for example, the case in California, where in the 1980s and the 1990s alone several harsh measures were approved, with an impact on immigrant and minority communities: an Official English law,¹⁶ a ban on bilingual education, a ban on affirmative action, and a harsh anti-immigrant law (Proposition 187).¹⁷ As a matter of fact, 1994's Proposition 187 is sometimes pointed out as a regulation that *revived* the English language campaign (e.g., Bender 1996). Montana, New Hampshire, and South Dakota adopted official English regulations in 1995. They were followed by Wyoming (1996), Missouri (1998), and Alaska (1998, challenged in court, but later upheld). Utah followed in 2000, and Iowa in 2002. The third wave started only recently. As Tony Dokoupil wrote in May 2010, "About 10 additional states have passed 'official English' laws through at least one legislative body since immigration reform broke down in 2006." Meanwhile, three states (Arizona for the second time in 2006, Kansas in 2007, and most recently, Oklahoma in 2010) approved such laws.

Apart from the 29 states, the organization U.S. English also lists Louisiana (1812) and Massachusetts (1975) as having English as an official language (U.S. English n.d.a). Yet, Crawford argues that none of them ever *officially* adopted an Official English law. Massachusetts is claimed by Official English supporters "on the basis of a casual (and uninformed) statement by a state court in 1975" (Crawford n.d.). Louisiana's first state Constitution (1812) stated that all laws and official documents would be published in the language "in which the Constitution of the United States is written" (quoted in Crawford 2001, 13). However, as Crawford writes, it did not restrict other languages. French was still used in state government and the state's second governor did not speak English at all. English as the only language of teaching was introduced in 1921. In 1974, French was granted protection by the state Constitution, as a part of its cultural heritage (Baron 1990, 87).

What is interesting, as Jewelle Taylor Gibbs and Teiahsha Bankhead point out, is that in the states where Official English was adopted by state legislators, the law is symbolic, while in the states where Official English law was accepted by state voters (e.g., Arizona, California, Colorado, and Florida), this law is a reflec-

¹⁶ For more information on Official English in California, see Adams and Brink (1990).

¹⁷ For more information on these regulations, see Gibbs and Bankhead (2001).

tion of the real concerns of the inhabitants and their will to preserve the dominant status of English (Gibbs and Bankhead 2001, 131).

But why did voters support the idea of giving English official status in the first place? As already mentioned, it has to do with the current immigration rates as well as the changes brought by the newcomers to the U.S. communities and towns (changes in ethnic composition, increased crime rates, etc.) (Crawford 2001, 24-27). Still, as Carol L. Schmid writes, public support for Official English in polls depends to a great extent on how the question itself is formulated and who is asked. A more general idea of giving English an official status, if no information is included about its possible restrictions and consequences, meets with wider support. It seems to reflect the strong symbolic meaning of the English language for American national identity. On the other hand, if the question is more detailed and includes some additional information about the Official English law and its consequences (e.g., a ban on other language use by federal institutions, even where English is spoken by a limited number of people, etc.), support for it is lower. This is why the polls range from 50 percent to almost 90 percent in favor of Official English law (Schmid 2001, 76).

Some states also adopt other regulations, which to some extent restrict other language use. In 1983, San Francisco voters supported Proposition 0 (on ballots and voting materials in English only).¹⁸ One year later, a similar initiative, Proposition 38 ("Voting Materials in English Only"), sponsored by S.I. Hayakawa and other U.S. English leaders, was supported by the state of California. California thus opposed the 1975 federal amendment to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which guarantees ballots in other languages in specific situations. Still, both propositions were non-binding because, as Kathryn A. Woolard states, "Federal legislation does not derive its authority from local voters" (1990, 125).

The supporters of Official English also object to the possibility of taking driving tests in other languages. Among those states which in 2009 offered the most opportunities in this respect were, as quoted here from the U.S. English website: California (32 languages), Massachusetts (25), Kentucky (23), Connecticut (21), and Iowa (21) (2009a). Recently, more states restricted the number of languages (8) than added new languages to the list (7). At the same time, the number of states that offer these exams *only* in English increased. In 2009 this group consisted of Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Wyoming, and Utah (2009b).

Language restrictions have also been adopted at a local level; the aforementioned Dade County "Anti-Bilingual Ordinance" is one example. U.S. English and other organizations also report American *towns* adopting Official English laws. In this context a border town of El Cenizo, Texas, is worth mentioning. In this small town of 3 500 inhabitants, in 1999, special status was granted to a language by the Predominant Language Ordinance. It was, however, not *English*, but *Spanish*. According to 2000 U.S. Census data (2000a), almost 99 percent of the inhabitants of El Cenizo were Hispanics/Latinos, over 42 percent were foreign born, and

¹⁸ For more information on Proposition 0, see Woolard (1990, 125-138).

as many as 33.5 percent were not U.S. citizens. What is more, over 90 percent of the population spoke Spanish at home. These very special characteristics of the town make its development difficult (Hart 2003, 200-201). The ordinance gave Spanish a status of a predominant language to incorporate people of limited English language skills into a broader community. It is, thus, a kind of legislation that focuses on the real needs of community members (Hart 2003, 200). Many people consider the Predominant Language Ordinance to be a Spanish-Only law, even though the document refers to Spanish as a “predominant,” not an “official” language.¹⁹

Final Thoughts

Even though the dominant status of English in the United States does not seem to be challenged, Official English advocates have continued their efforts. During the 111th session (2009-2010), several projects were presented to Congress that aimed, for example, to designate English as an official language of the U.S. government or of the United States, or challenged bilingual voting ballots and Executive Order 13166.²⁰ Meanwhile, on November 2, 2010, Oklahoma voters approved an Official English measure. Hence, Official English is seen as unifying the nation and essential to social mobility and economic advancement.

An important question needs to be answered, however, as well-known U.S. sociolinguist Joshua A. Fishman pointed out (1988, 168-169). While the supporters of Official English/English Only focus on *immigrants* and the assistance they may require, the question is why the *next generations* of Hispanic/Latino immigrants, who already speak English—and in some cases this is the only language they speak—remain in the *barrios*. English proficiency turns out, thus, to be *not* the only problem, because it is *not the only* condition of their social mobility. As Fishman wrote in 1988, “The Official English/English Only movement may largely represent the displacement of middle-class Anglo fears and anxieties from the more difficult, if not intractable, *real* causes of their fears and anxieties, to mythical and simplistic and stereotyped scapegoats” (1988, 169). The American middle-class feels insecure and uneasy about immigrants due to the socio-economic changes in the U.S. (slower economy, the discourse of multiculturalism, next generations having smaller possibilities of social mobility, etc.). Thus, the deep roots of the English Only movement lie in the economic, social, and political problems of the United States. At the same time, it seems to be a safety valve, a way of channeling, to repeat Fishman’s words, “middle-class Anglo fears and anxieties.”

It has been over 20 years since Fishman formulated these opinions. Since then, immigration from Latin America, mainly from Mexico, has grown substantially. The 2000 U.S. Census Bureau data show that almost 18 percent of the U.S. pop-

¹⁹ For more information, see Hart (2003, 201-208).

²⁰ See, for example, the U.S. English website for more about these bills.

ulation uses a language other than English at home, and in most cases they speak Spanish (2000c), while the 2010 data may be even higher.²¹ However, as has already been mentioned, research confirms that even this group undergoes language assimilation and is aware of its important role in socioeconomic advancement. At the same time, as a group, Hispanics/Latinos are still below average as far as education, wages, or other indicators are concerned.²² Although there is evidence for some socioeconomic upgrading in the second generation (including in the groups dominated by traditional labor migrants, e.g., Mexicans), concerns continue to exist, like, for example, the possible impact of parents' illegal status on the socioeconomic attainment of their U.S.-born children. Studies also find a worrying fact: the third generation shows "a stagnation in educational attainment relative to the second generation." What is more, there has been "the emergence of an oppositional culture deriding school achievement among some [Mexican-American schoolchildren] who are not immigrants" (Alba and Nee 2003, 230-248). Thus, the question may be asked: to what extent are the third generation's stagnation and derisive attitude toward education a consequence of U.S. society still perceiving Hispanics/Latinos as the "others"? Fishman's question still remains valid.

The language struggle in the United States seems to be more than just an illustration of how important language is in the national identity discourse. Promoting "unity," which is what Official English supporters claim to be doing, is another way of forcing assimilation. Those who speak an "alien" language and do not speak English are perceived as not wanting to assimilate, and therefore, as un-American "strangers." And even though most of the Official English measures do not seem to have much impact on state policies and actions, they do serve one purpose: instead of promoting "unity," these measures divide people and make them look at their fellows as "others." The mere fact of declaring English an official language turns ordinary citizens and public officials into "language vigilantes." The examples of language vigilantism (Baron 1990, 20-21; Crawford 2006, 5) show intolerance and harmful resentment toward language minorities and immigrants. At the same time, denying access to the mother tongue and imposing English on children may have a very significant impact on their identity and lead to their marginalization. In fact, the contemporary language struggle may be seen as a struggle against the "aliens," a fight to restrict immigration from culturally (and racially) different regions. Also the fact that the movement has close ties to immigration restrictionists and anti-immigration organizations leads many observers to conclude that its agenda is more far-reaching.

²¹ The 2010 U.S. Census data are not available yet at the moment of this writing.

²² See, for example, Ramirez (2004).

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XENOFOBIA Y DISCRIMINACIÓN EN MÉXICO

*Manuel Ángel Castillo**

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Introducción

Este trabajo tiene como propósito sistematizar y analizar el conjunto de percepciones y actitudes que la sociedad mexicana asume —expresa o indirectamente— hacia la población extranjera inmigrante. En un primer segmento, nos remitimos al momento histórico a partir del cual creemos que se ubica la génesis de los sentimientos de aversión o simpatía hacia los extranjeros. Intentamos dilucidarlos a partir de pronunciamientos oficiales y mecanismos legislativos elaborados durante este periodo que, en nuestra opinión, sentaron las bases de un discurso antiinmigrante, paralelamente con el nacimiento del Estado mexicano, pero también, y a la vez, de posturas xenofóbicas que dieron pie a tratos desiguales y discriminatorios.

En un segundo momento, resaltamos la importancia de las actitudes y prácticas adoptadas en tiempos recientes por diversos sectores de la sociedad mexicana hacia la población inmigrante. Con ello intentamos destacar el trato social que se da a los inmigrantes en nuestro país en distintos espacios sociales. En este sentido, se mencionan experiencias concretas en las que dichas actitudes afloran, como es el caso de las migraciones laborales, consideradas en el imaginario —al igual que en muchos otros contextos— como amenazantes para los trabajadores nativos. Se intentará documentar estas actitudes con datos proporcionados por la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México,¹ para llevar a cabo un examen más completo y actualizado del tema.

Finalmente, en un tercer momento, se reflexionará, con base en lo expuesto, en torno a la coherencia de las exigencias respecto del trato que reciben nuestros connacionales durante su experiencia migratoria en Estados Unidos, a la luz del trato que se suele brindar a los inmigrantes y transmigrantes en nuestro territorio.

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¹ Al momento de la elaboración de este documento (invierno de 2010) estaba en marcha el procesamiento de resultados preliminares de la Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México 2010 (Enadis 2010) del Consejo Nacional para Prevenir la Discriminación (Conapred). Los resultados generales fueron publicados en abril de 2011.

Debido a esta asincronía, el presente trabajo tuvo como únicos insumos los resultados de la encuesta realizada en 2005 por la misma institución. Algunas de las preguntas utilizadas en dicha encuesta

Xenofobia y xenofilia como procesos de diferenciación

LOS EXTRANJEROS DURANTE
EL MÉXICO INDEPENDIENTE Y LA REFORMA

Cabe plantear que el origen de los sentimientos de aversión-simpatía en México hacia poblaciones procedentes de ultramar se remonta a las restricciones impuestas por la Corona para la residencia de los extranjeros desembarcados en el virreinato novohispano. Estas restricciones respondían a una lógica del colonialismo imperial español, que deseaba mantener alejados de los territorios conquistados a pobladores de otras metrópolis, con la intención de salvaguardar el dominio social y político de la Corona. Los mecanismos ejercidos para el acceso de poblaciones extranjeras a la Nueva España estaban claramente delimitados por derechos de suelo, sangre y maritales, con lo cual se prohibía prácticamente la entrada de población proveniente de otros países europeos a México. Aunado a esto, los conflictos internos entre indios, castas, peninsulares y criollos expresaron el extrañamiento y recelo social que se profesaban los distintos grupos de una sociedad rígida y estamental, acostumbrada a diferenciarse tanto por sus orígenes sociales como territoriales, hecho que terminó por arraigar, en los distintos integrantes de la población nativa, la reserva hacia cualquier grupo social externo.

Con el advenimiento del México independiente y antes de la Reforma, la magra e incipiente entrada de población extranjera fue un hecho histórico. En 1820, se aceptó la admisión de extranjeros en México —no sin ciertas trabas, basadas en percepciones ideológicas sobre las distintas nacionalidades— y fue hasta la Reforma cuando se retiraron de jure todos los impedimentos en razón de nacionalidad para su admisión al país. Esto no era fortuito, pues se esperaba también en México el éxodo masivo europeo que recibieron Estados Unidos y Argentina, cosa que no sucedió (González Navarro, 1993, I: 21-24; Salazar, 1996: 54). A partir de ese momento es posible ubicar el surgimiento del sentimiento xenofílico hacia la población europea, el cual se reflejaría posteriormente en distintos aspectos y procesos en la vida de la sociedad mexicana.

En 1821, el México independiente sumaba una población de casi ocho millones de habitantes, desigualmente repartidos en cuatro millones y medio de kilómetros cuadrados. La nueva nación requería de una definición clara de fronteras y la población que éstas contendrían. Ante la incertidumbre que implicaba la emancipación española, el continuo expansionismo estadounidense y el secular conflicto entre castas y mestizaje, así como los sentimientos antihispanos y antiextranjeros

no aparecieron en la Enadis 2010, por lo que no es posible hacer una comparación directa que informe sobre el cambio de actitudes hacia la población extranjera en México durante el periodo transcurrido entre ambos levantamientos. No obstante, se mencionarán algunos resultados de preguntas similares de la Enadis 2010, que complementarán a los que se exponen, a fin de comparar indirectamente tanto los resultados de ambas encuestas como los cambios en las actitudes mencionadas.

imperantes en facciones de la incipiente clase política y sectores de la sociedad mexicana, el panorama mostraba una compleja perspectiva sobre la población extranjera, la cual oscilaba entre la franca apertura y el añejo recelo. Así, para la Comisión de Relaciones Exteriores, instaurada en 1821: “La población extranjera no era sólo un aumento cuantitativo sino cualitativo, porque trasladaba los conocimientos industriales de sus países de origen [...] atraer extranjeros ilustrados, laboriosos y de buenas costumbres es atraer talentos y riqueza; pero atraer extranjeros viciosos es atraer inmoralidad” (González Navarro, 1993, I: 42).

Los antecedentes mencionados dejan entrever elementos discriminatorios envueltos en requisitos de una política de poblamiento que se iría modificando en sus restricciones, a la par de cambios ideológicos, políticos y sociales que experimentaría el Estado mexicano a lo largo de los siglos subsecuentes. Estos cambios se materializarían en discursos, ora expansionistas, ora restrictivos, pronunciados por los grupos políticos de la época (conservadores y liberales), matizados con una diversidad de tonalidades que oscilaban entre el restriccionismo, la xenofobia y el nativismo (Verea, 2003: 66-71; Palma, 2006: 52). La proliferación de estas ideas en torno a la población extranjera marcarían el sino de las décadas por venir frente a la problemática de poblamiento que el incipiente Estado mexicano enfrentaría.

Asimismo, de forma paralela y a nivel cotidiano, surgirían en diversos grupos sociales mexicanos sentimientos de aversión y simpatía, diferenciados en función de características —reales o imaginarias—, atribuidas a los distintos grupos que conformarían la población extranjera en México como reacción a su presencia.

LA POBLACIÓN EXTRANJERA EN LAS LEGISLACIONES Y POLÍTICAS MIGRATORIAS DEL SIGLO XX

Políticas y legislaciones basadas en el nacionalismo revolucionario

A partir de la Reforma, la formalización de la recepción de población extranjera sin distingo de raza ni nacionalidad, basada en principios liberales, no estuvo exenta de ciertas prácticas discrecionales, como la discriminación en razón de la profesión de la religión católica, que operaban fácticamente desde décadas anteriores con los intentos de poblamiento en Texas y California.

A principios del siglo xx, en 1908, se promulgó la primera ley en materia de regulación de entrada de flujos de población extranjera en los puertos y fronteras.² Esta ley restringía el acceso no sólo por cuestiones sanitarias, sino sociales —como la ocupación en la prostitución, crimen, vagancia y militancia anarquista— y físicas. Dichas restricciones prevalecieron en legislaciones promulgadas a lo largo de ese siglo y fungieron como un modelo que, explotando las ideas preconcebidas en torno

² Esto aconteció tras el brote de peste bubónica registrada en 1903, presuntamente originado en un buque japonés anclado en Manzanillo.

a ciertos grupos y nacionalidades de la población extranjera, determinaría el acceso o prohibición a los inmigrantes (González Navarro, 1993, I: 35; Palma, 2006: 62; Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 180).

El periodo revolucionario trajo a colación uno de los aspectos ideológicos que permiten comprender las relaciones de México con el mundo externo: el nacionalismo. Bajo esta lente, es posible observar el comportamiento paradigmático que ha tenido la sociedad mexicana con la población extranjera, el cual se refleja en diversas acciones emprendidas hacia ésta.

Como efecto de un exaltado nacionalismo que encumbraba las ideas del mestizaje cultural y la riqueza territorial a manos de toda la población mexicana, se impusieron limitaciones políticas y de propiedad, que previamente habían gozado los extranjeros en México en el periodo de auge económico del porfiriato, de modo que la máxima “México para los mexicanos”, a la vez cotidiana e institucional, se escuchaba reiteradamente (Palma, 2006: 56-58; Gil, 2010: 133; Meyer, 2010: 16-18). Sin embargo, los capitales extranjeros resultaron indispensables para la reactivación económica del periodo posrevolucionario, por lo que sólo algunos grupos de extranjeros resultaron afectados por la xenofobia revolucionaria, en especial chinos,³ españoles y estadounidenses (Salazar, 1996: 35; Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 181). En última instancia, esto da la pauta para argumentar que el nacionalismo deja ver cierto grado de ajuste y flexibilización de su discurso en función del papel que la población extranjera tiene —o se cree que tiene— en los asuntos nacionales y el contexto internacional, como se verá más adelante en el episodio del exilio español.

El gobierno de Obregón se enfrentó al problema de la repatriación de grandes contingentes de nacionales provenientes de Estados Unidos, propiciado por la crisis económica durante la posguerra. Esto tendría como resonancia política, en materia de migración, la regulación de la entrada de flujos de población extranjera, en aras de la protección de los intereses laborales nacionales. En 1926 se promulgó la nueva Ley de Migración, que hacía patente, de manera oficial, la protección de los trabajadores mexicanos, toda vez que prohibía la entrada de extranjeros cuando existiera escasez de empleo. Esta ley tuvo muchos problemas en su operación: en primer lugar, nunca fue reglamentada, lo que propició prácticas discrecionales en materia de control de la población extranjera “que definió normas y criterios a través de acuerdos y circulares confidenciales” (Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 185). De las disposiciones emanadas de esta ley, dos resultan de particular importancia: la limitación de acceso a extranjeros, según sus actividades económicas, y la restricción de razas reticentes al mestizaje, por considerarse *científicamente* degeneradas. En la instrumentación de la segunda disposición persistía la confusión entre nacionalidad y raza, con lo que resultaba fácil imputar actividades comerciales perjudiciales a ciertos grupos de extranjeros, en el contexto de una eco-

³ El caso de los contingentes chinos “llegó a extremos vergonzantes, pues [...] incluso ocurrieron matanzas con características de masacres en el contexto de las luchas revolucionarias” (Chu, 1992; Castillo, 2010: 550; Hu-Dehart, 1997).

nomía deprimida. De este modo, además de la población negra, se restringía el acceso a los gitanos, turcos, sirios y árabes, debido a su éxito en actividades comerciales de menudeo (Salazar, 1996: 43-45; Ota, 1997). En segundo lugar, problemas de índole burocrática (escasez de presupuesto y personal) entorpecían la labor que la ley destinaba al Servicio Nacional de Migración, lo cual favoreció la consolidación de las prácticas discrecionales basadas en la confidencialidad, común denominador de la política migratoria de este periodo.

El elemento racial, que en última instancia se revestiría de argumentos *científicos* y proteccionistas para la economía nacional, permitió no sólo restringir, sino facilitar la aceptación de razas-nacionalidades que inyectarían “savia nueva en nuestra raza aborígen decadente” (Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 195). Sobre estas nacionalidades se destacaban, además de su capacidad de asimilación, sus contribuciones en la prosperidad nacional mediante actividades industriales. Como consecuencia, a principios de los años treinta, la Secretaría de Gobernación imponía prohibiciones a virtualmente toda población que no fuera europea occidental, norteamericana y latinoamericana.

Lo anterior no puede sino mirarse como un paradójico comportamiento de las políticas mexicanas hacia la población extranjera. El deseo febril de poblamiento por contingentes extranjeros se vio secularmente limitado por varios flancos: en el aspecto material —y muy a pesar del discurso decimonónico que encumbraba las riquezas naturales del país (González Navarro, 1993: I; Salazar, 1996: 54; Palma, 2006: 54-55)— los proyectos colonizadores fracasaron debido al poco interés que despertaba en la población extranjera agrícola el territorio mexicano. En el aspecto institucional, un abandonado aparato burocrático trajo a colación la débil organización de las autoridades migratorias por cumplir el control fronterizo y portuario que se les exigía. Finalmente, en el aspecto ideológico, las disposiciones confidenciales basadas en un discurso nacionalista conllevaron a restringir la entrada a una ya de por sí limitada admisión de población extranjera en nuestro territorio.

EL ASILO ESPAÑOL REPUBLICANO Y SU CONTEXTO

La tradición de *asilo* y *refugio*, que cuenta con casi dos siglos de antigüedad en México, merece examinarse bajo el más emblemático de los casos conocidos en su historia: el exilio español. Se trata de un episodio sui géneris, cronológicamente acotado (1939-1947), que puso en relieve la capacidad del Estado mexicano de atender y recibir a una población española cuyo perfil sociodemográfico distaba mucho del que tradicionalmente había recibido en migraciones pasadas. En efecto, se trató de una inmigración que huía de la guerra civil, cuya alta profesionalización marcó una diferencia de las inmigraciones económicas anteriores, lo cual facilitó su inserción en el sector terciario de la economía mexicana, principalmente en las actividades educativas, intelectuales y artísticas (Gil, 2010: 149-153, Ímaz, 1995: 47).

Asimismo, en un contexto internacional específico caracterizado por la persecución a los partidos comunistas por parte de los regímenes fascistas, y la simpatía

del gobierno mexicano hacia políticas progresistas de carácter socialista, es posible entender el refugio español en México como una de “las expresiones constructivas del nacionalismo revolucionario” (Meyer, 2010: 19), cuyo peso cualitativo supera en sus consecuencias, al cuantitativo. Si bien el número de refugiados recibidos por México fue modesto —alrededor de veinte mil frente a los casi doscientos mil recibidos por Francia (Gil, 2010: 149)—, este hecho le granjeó una *autoimagen* como país de aceptación y brazos abiertos a la población extranjera en contextos de persecución política.

Al pensar en este episodio, consolidado en el imaginario como la era de oro de la apertura y la tradición mexicana del asilo, no hay que perder de vista la continuidad de elementos raciales (moderados con el título de población extranjera “culturalmente asimilable”) y de protección laboral (impulso a industrias nacionales) que continuaron operando paralelamente en los hechos.⁴ Asimismo, algunas consecuencias del capítulo de la expropiación petrolera pueden leerse como una muestra negativa del nacionalismo que décadas atrás había restringido las libertades extranjeras, y que se volvía a manifestar a la par del asilo republicano. En efecto, este episodio orilló a alemanes, ingleses y estadounidenses, principales nacionalidades empleadas en la industria petrolera, minera y eléctrica de México, a naturalizarse para no perder sus propiedades (Salazar, 1996: 39). Estas medidas, empero, permitieron a personas de otras nacionalidades, cuyas actividades se concentraban en el comercio y las pequeñas y medianas industrias, como las españolas, francesas y libanesas, continuar expandiéndose y diversificando sus ocupaciones hasta conservar el día de hoy sus inversiones.

LA POBLACIÓN EXTRANJERA DESDE LA LEY GENERAL DE POBLACIÓN Y LAS LEGISLACIONES ACTUALES

En 1936 se aprobó la Ley General de Población, la cual disponía de la elaboración de tablas diferenciales de población extranjera que darían a conocer el número máximo de personas que se aceptarían en territorio nacional. En los periodos más restrictivos, sólo se llegó a aceptar no más de cien extranjeros al año de todos los países no procedentes de América y España. Estas cuotas estuvieron vigentes hasta 1946, pero durante toda la década que operaron, las preferencias de admisión fueron las mismas: “sexo masculino, soltero, menor de veinticinco años, hablar el idioma oficial y ser susceptibles de asimilarse a la vida cultural del país” (Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 217).

Durante la segunda guerra mundial, los criterios no fueron mucho más flexibles en su aplicación que como se venían dando, pero hubo mayores restricciones para la población europea en general (a excepción de la española, como ya se se-

⁴ A la recepción de veinte mil españoles refugiados, así como de algunos alemanes antifascistas, se le contraponen el rechazo de otros refugiados (judíos europeos, la mayoría) que solicitaron reiteradamente el asilo político sin tener éxito (Salazar, 1996: 40).

ñaló). Ya avanzados los años cincuenta y durante las décadas subsiguientes, la cuestión de los migrantes se insertó en la discusión del crecimiento poblacional del país y su dinámica demográfica, en relación con las condiciones de desarrollo económico y social. Un reflejo de esto se manifestó en la Ley General de Población de 1974 —vigente hasta la fecha y varias veces reformada—, la cual proponía dimensionar las medidas de admisión de población extranjera a los contextos culturales, políticos y sociales del país.

En la práctica, esta ley ha dado amplia cabida a la continuación de políticas específicas y coyunturales legadas de las prácticas del pasado aquí expuestas,⁵ en las que la constante es la discrecionalidad en su aplicación. Asimismo, en el aspecto formal, la ley muestra una visible obsolescencia respecto de la complejidad migratoria actual —México como país de origen, destino, tránsito y retorno de migrantes— que se manifiesta en la prevalencia de criterios migratorios aplicables en decenios pasados en cuanto a las autoridades responsables del control migratorio y la gestión de mecanismos para ello (Castillo, 2010: 574; Rodríguez, 2010: 129). Sin embargo, es posible señalar que ha habido algunos avances, sobre todo en lo que respecta a la despenalización de la migración indocumentada y la incorporación de la categoría migratoria de refugiado, entre otras.⁶ Estos progresos y reformas, empero, no habrían sido concretadas de no ser por la sinergia entre distintos grupos de la sociedad civil organizada y organizaciones internacionales que las impulsaron.⁷

FILIAS Y FOBIAS: MANIFESTACIONES EN LA VIDA COTIDIANA EN MÉXICO

Con base en lo hasta aquí señalado, resulta evidente que la restricción para la admisión de contingentes extranjeros se ha basado ciertamente en una política dis-

⁵ Para una descripción detallada de la instrumentación, implementación y consecuencias de la aplicación de estas prácticas en tiempos recientes, principalmente en la frontera sur de México, véase Grupo Guatemala-México: Migración y Desarrollo (2008; 2009).

⁶ Para una recapitulación de las declaraciones y tratados que el Estado mexicano ha ratificado (sobre todo en el tema de los refugiados y asilados) y que han tenido como consecuencia cambios en esta ley y su reglamento, véase Castillo y Venet (2010: 195-226). La reciente aprobación y entrada en vigencia de la Ley de Refugiados y Protección Complementaria en enero de 2011 (DOF, 2011) es muestra de avance para la adecuación de las leyes en la realidad migratoria del país.

⁷ Asimismo, los esfuerzos actuales han cobrado forma en la Ley de Migración aprobada en mayo de 2011. Se trata de un ordenamiento que tiene el acierto de tomar una perspectiva de protección y procuración de derechos humanos a los inmigrantes en el país, a la vez que carece de un dimensionamiento del fenómeno migratorio respecto de la emigración mexicana y la transmigración de contingentes de todo el mundo, así como de un mayor énfasis en los mecanismos de procuración de derechos humanos y acceso a la justicia. Estas observaciones se extraen del Foro de opinión sobre iniciativa de Ley de Migración, realizado los días 26 y 27 de enero de 2011 en El Colegio de México, convocado por el Grupo Guatemala-México: Migración y Desarrollo, el Instituto de Estudios y Divulgación sobre Migración, la Sociedad Mexicana de Demografía y el Centro de Estudios Demográficos, Urbanos y Ambientales de El Colegio de México.

crecional que, utilizando la fachada de la protección laboral —y recientemente, la de la seguridad nacional— ha encubierto prejuicios étnicos y raciales, así como un exacerbado nacionalismo con los cuales se discrimina a la población extranjera. Bajo la operación de prácticas discrecionales en el trato al migrante, se atribuyen a éste características, vicios y virtudes, que en última instancia harían deseable su permanencia y tolerancia en la vida cotidiana del mexicano, diferenciándose así filias y fobias hacia ciertas nacionalidades y grupos de extranjeros. Ante esto, suponemos que el correlato de una “disminución notable de los rasgos de xenofobia alguna vez experimentados [...] se daría en el marco de una política oficial que descalifica cualquier expresión o práctica discriminatoria en razón de origen, grupo étnico o nacionalidad” (Castillo, 2010: 570). Esta política involucraría en su elaboración a actores de la sociedad civil y política, en concordancia y compromiso para hacer de México un espacio de solidaridad y de apertura a los flujos de migrantes, consecuente con el contexto mundial contemporáneo y su compleja realidad migratoria.

Según lo expuesto, algunas de las manifestaciones más claras de la xenofobia o xenofilia se dan en la convivencia cotidiana con los extranjeros —particularmente en el ámbito laboral— y es posible que permanezcan vigentes hasta el día de hoy. En el siguiente apartado, intentaremos dilucidar este supuesto, a partir del examen de los datos que arroja la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México, 2005.

Percepciones sociales y xenofobia: opiniones en torno al extranjero en México

Se ha delineado el clima no precisamente favorable a la población extranjera en México, así como el valor cualitativo sobre el cuantitativo que tienen las inmigraciones extranjeras en México, debido a su capacidad de visibilizar las actitudes, percepciones y autopercepciones que tiene la sociedad mexicana respecto de los extranjeros (Castillo, 2010: 549; Yankelevich y Chenillo, 2009: 178; Vereá, 2003: 13-19). Es válido preguntarse de qué modo se hacen objetivos los sentimientos de xenofobia y xenofilia que profesa la sociedad mexicana a las poblaciones extranjeras. La historia provee algunos elementos acerca de cómo vivían o cómo se les permitía vivir a los extranjeros en México⁸ en su relación cotidiana con los mexicanos. Asimismo, una manera de objetivar la xenofobia se ha dado en los calificativos atribuidos a los extranjeros en distintos contextos históricos, de tal modo que un *explo-*

⁸ Como ejemplo —conforme señala Salazar (1996: 45)—, es posible suponer mejores niveles de vida a partir de los indicadores de propiedad, según nacionalidad en información censal de 1930 y 1940. Los europeos y estadounidenses solían ser dueños de predios urbanos y rurales en mayores proporciones que los latinoamericanos, como los guatemaltecos, que cuando declaraban tener propiedades, éstas solían ser rurales. Para las migraciones asiáticas, los provenientes de Medio Oriente solían poseer alguna propiedad en zonas urbanas, mientras que los chinos, a pesar de su importancia numérica, contaban con menos propiedades. En todo caso, este indicador permite suponer el ascenso económico de ciertos grupos de migrantes respecto de otros.

tador de la clase obrera bien podría estar representado por un estadounidense o un español, a la vez que un chino o un guatemalteco serían *oportunistas* que ocupaban fuentes de trabajo pertenecientes a los mexicanos (Ota, 1997).

Estos procesos tienen su correlato en la autosegregación y aislamiento que sufrieron los pocos contingentes poblacionales que decidieron permanecer en territorio nacional, sobre todo en los puertos y espacios urbanos (Salazar, 1996: 44-45), y sirven de ejemplo para imaginar las atribuciones que la sociedad mexicana hace a los extranjeros en el contexto migratorio, a la vez que presentan el reto de informar, de manera más precisa, las actitudes xenófobas y xenofílicas existentes en la actualidad.

El uso de encuestas de opinión en la migración se discute en el ámbito académico, debido en parte a que, según sus críticos, estos instrumentos no tienen la capacidad de poner en evidencia las diversas manifestaciones xenófobas o racistas según los distintos grupos sociales que conforman los países receptores. Asimismo, se piensa que las limitaciones de las encuestas realizadas en países receptores de inmigrantes radican en que sólo se ciñen a describir el cambio de los niveles de xenofobia respecto de años anteriores, lo cual está sujeto a eventualidades y coyunturas, o a comparar las percepciones con países vecinos (Izquierdo, 1996: 153). Por su parte, quienes defienden el uso de encuestas sobre migración argumentan la importancia de captar la opinión pública para la evaluación de políticas migratorias de integración, como en el caso de Estados Unidos y Europa (The German Marshall Fund of the United States y Fundación BBVA, 2010), o a llenar espacios de información necesaria ante la escasez o poca rigurosidad de datos en materia de política exterior, basadas en opinión pública, como sucede en la región latinoamericana (CIDE, 2010).

Teniendo en cuenta ambos argumentos, hemos optado por explorar la información disponible en la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México, 2005⁹ con la finalidad de aproximarnos a las actitudes y percepciones hacia los migrantes en la sociedad mexicana, sin soslayar las implicaciones en la política migratoria del país. Aunque no es el objetivo principal de este trabajo, la exploración de dicho instrumento nos permitirá, por ende, detectar y mencionar alguna de sus fortalezas y debilidades para la realización de diagnósticos sobre la xenofobia y el trato a los extranjeros en el país.

IMAGINARIOS DE CONVIVENCIA CON EXTRANJEROS


Por imaginarios de convivencia entendemos situaciones hipotéticas de trato cotidiano con extranjeros y el modo en que se desarrollarían las interacciones en dichos

⁹ Encuesta de representatividad nacional realizada por la Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (Sedesol) y el Consejo Nacional para Prevenir la Discriminación (Conapred), cuyas preguntas se basan en opiniones sobre la discriminación hacia grupos considerados vulnerables. Siendo conscientes de las limitaciones que tiene este tipo de encuestas, decidimos tomarla como fuente de datos para analizar e interpretar la situación de los extranjeros en México, a la luz de las opiniones que los mexicanos tienen de aquéllos, en relación con otros grupos vulnerables.

espacios. La encuesta centra muchas de sus preguntas en este tipo de situaciones, las cuales permiten aproximarse a las opiniones de los nacionales respecto de los extranjeros.

A primera vista, se pensaría que no se percibe mucha incomodidad en los mexicanos por convivir con extranjeros. En efecto, sólo 1 por ciento de los encuestados declaran no querer tener como vecinos a extranjeros. Esta baja proporción se corresponde con una preferencia mayor a convivir con extranjeros que con otros grupos (gráfica 1).

GRÁFICA 1
¿QUIÉNES NO QUISERA TENER COMO VECINOS DE SU CASA?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005. Sedesol.


No obstante, cuando se les pregunta abiertamente si estarían dispuestos a permitir que en su casa viviera un centroamericano,¹⁰ más de una tercera parte (39.8 por ciento) dijo que no lo aceptaría (gráfica 2), proporción similar a la de personas con sida (39.1 por ciento), personas con ideas diferentes (33.6 por ciento) y personas de otra religión (31.4 por ciento). Esta situación brinda una muestra de la importancia del hecho de provenir de una región o de un país específico para gozar de aceptación o rechazo por parte de los mexicanos.

Otra manera de aproximarse a las percepciones sobre la convivencia con extranjeros se encuentra en la intención que tendría la persona en organizarse con otras ante el hipotético escenario de que un grupo indígena deseara establecerse cerca de la comunidad donde reside la persona¹¹ (gráfica 3).

¹⁰ Se eligió esta pregunta porque el reactivo en la encuesta no pregunta acerca de extranjeros. La Enadis 2010 sí especifica la pregunta respecto de extranjeros y el 26.6 por ciento declaró no estar dispuesto a aceptarlos en su vivienda (Conapred 2011), lo cual puede indicar una menor disposición a aceptar personas de origen centroamericano.

¹¹ Pregunta 94 de la encuesta.

GRÁFICA 2
 ¿ESTARÍA DISPUESTO A PERMITIR QUE EN SU CASA VIVIERAN CENTROAMERICANOS?
 REPÚBLICA MEXICANA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005. Sedesol.

GRÁFICA 3
 ¿ESTARÍA DISPUESTO A ORGANIZARSE CON OTRAS PERSONAS
 PARA SOLICITAR QUE NO DEJEN VIVIR AHÍ A UN GRUPO DE INDÍGENAS
 QUE SE QUIEREN ESTABLECER CERCA DE SU COMUNIDAD?
 REPÚBLICA MEXICANA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005. Sedesol.

Se aprecia que casi uno de cada tres mexicanos estaría dispuesto a organizarse para impedir el establecimiento de grupos étnicos en su comunidad, lo cual se interpretaría como una reticencia, de importantes proporciones, para aceptar la convivencia con grupos de personas diferentes.

Tomando en cuenta estos resultados y comparándolos con otras percepciones, es posible identificar una ambigüedad en las actitudes hacia los extranjeros. En efecto, cuando se indaga sobre si consideran que los extranjeros, en función de otros grupos, están desprotegidos, sólo el 1 por ciento así lo piensa. Pero cuando se trata de tener una convivencia más cercana con ellos, la disposición no es la misma. A pesar de que la encuesta tiene limitaciones, es posible interpretar esta situación como una actitud ambivalente hacia los extranjeros, heredada del tratamiento histórico que se les ha dado en el país, así como del desconocimiento de su situación o poca convivencia que se ha tenido con ellos, lo cual lleva a preguntarse sobre las percepciones que los mexicanos tienen en torno a las necesidades de los extranjeros en México.

IMAGINARIOS DE NECESIDADES Y DERECHOS DE LOS EXTRANJEROS


Cabe suponer cierta empatía hacia los extranjeros en México, a partir de la percepción que se tiene sobre si éstos tienen razón para sentirse discriminados. En efecto, casi la mitad de los mexicanos piensa que hay razones para que los extranjeros se sientan discriminados (gráfica 4);¹² sin embargo, se detecta una dificultad para identificar en qué aspectos lo son. De este modo, cuando se indaga sobre el principal derecho que se les vulnera, dos de cada tres mexicanos declaran no saber cuál es y sólo el 4.4 por ciento opina que es su derecho a trabajar.

En el mismo sentido, al preguntar sobre las necesidades más importantes por resolver en los extranjeros, se detecta un desconocimiento de cuál sería (64 por ciento); el 9 por ciento declara que el trabajo debería ser la necesidad más importante a satisfacer y el 2.2 por ciento opina que es el apoyo a los inmigrantes.¹³

¹² Alrededor de la misma proporción alcanza la opinión en torno a los jóvenes (52.8 por ciento) y los no católicos (50.7 por ciento).

¹³ Ésta es una de las opciones de respuesta que ofrece la encuesta para esta pregunta, la cual consideramos que es muy vaga, pues no permite conocer más a fondo cómo se entiende el apoyo a los inmigrantes. La Enadis 2010 indica que sólo uno de cada diez mexicanos cree que “se respetan mucho” los derechos de los centroamericanos. El 30 por ciento piensa que “no se respetan”, otro 30 por ciento opina que “se respetan poco” y sólo uno de cada cuatro piensa que “se respeta algo”. Al preguntar a los inmigrantes qué tan de acuerdo están en que “no se respetan sus derechos”, el 23 por ciento está de acuerdo, el 24 por ciento en desacuerdo y el 36.5 por ciento no están ni de acuerdo ni en desacuerdo. Este dato podría indicar un miedo o reticencia entre ellos a externar su opinión sincera sobre el respeto de sus derechos cuando es un organismo de gobierno el que lleva a cabo la encuesta. Además de lo anterior, al preguntar a los inmigrantes qué tan de acuerdo están en que la sociedad no ayuda a los migrantes porque no conoce sus problemas, el 44 por ciento de ellos están de acuerdo (cálculos propios con base en Enadis 2010).

GRÁFICA 4
 ¿USTED CREE QUE LOS EXTRANJEROS QUE VIVEN EN MÉXICO
 TIENEN RAZÓN PARA SENTIRSE DISCRIMINADOS?
 REPÚBLICA MEXICANA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005. Sedesol.

Lo anterior indicaría una falta de sensibilización a las necesidades de los extranjeros, lo cual es, hasta cierto punto, entendible, ya que, como se expuso antes, México no se ha caracterizado por ser un destino importante en materia de atracción de población extranjera. No obstante el desconocimiento o ignorancia de los derechos que se vulnera a los extranjeros o las necesidades más importantes por resolverles, puede significar también una empatía débil que facilitaría la reproducción de estereotipos y actitudes xenófobas bajo condiciones propicias (contextos políticos, sociales, económicos, etcétera).

Líneas atrás se mencionó la importancia del tema laboral en relación con los extranjeros en México; una relevancia doble, pues, por un lado, el trabajo desempeñado por los extranjeros en México constituye una instancia para analizar el impacto socioeconómico de la actividad económica extranjera en el país. Por otro lado, dicha relación permite aproximarse a las ideas y percepciones que subyacen en el imaginario mexicano respecto del extranjero en el mercado laboral nacional.

MIGRACIONES LABORALES EN MÉXICO

México no se ha caracterizado por atraer migraciones laborales extranjeras. Esto es comprensible si se consideran las medidas predominantemente restrictivas de las que ya se ha hablado. La falta de estudios específicos de las inserciones y trayectorias laborales de los inmigrantes en México se dificulta principalmente por la

deficiencia y escasez de registros, lo cual conlleva la carencia del conocimiento sistemático y confiable sobre la trayectoria, según el estatus migratorio de los extranjeros: inmigrantes, inmigrados y naturalizados (Castillo, 2010: 559).

Sin embargo, el estudio de caso profundamente tratado de la única migración laboral extranjera históricamente establecida, representa el de los inmigrantes guatemaltecos que laboran en cultivos de temporal —café principalmente— en la región del Soconusco en Chiapas (Castillo, 2000; Castillo y Ángeles, 2000; Ángeles, 2010). Desde la década de los cincuenta, este movimiento ha dado indicios de su aporte al desarrollo económico y social del país. Este flujo se enmarca, al igual que la mayoría de las migraciones laborales en otros países, en la lógica de la necesidad de mano de obra en actividades económicas de temporada en el ámbito rural, y en momentos de expansión de inversión en el ámbito urbano, como el caso de la construcción.

A lo largo del tiempo destaca el papel marginal que el Estado mexicano ha tenido en las resoluciones y necesidades de atención de estos flujos, adoptando sólo algunas medidas aisladas en materia de salud y educación, documentación, sistemas de protección y previsión social, etc. La regulación de los mecanismos de contratación de los trabajadores por parte de los empleadores se ha dado por intermediarios que han actuado como elementos facilitadores para ese trámite. Estos mecanismos y programas se caracterizan por su discontinuidad en el tiempo, lo cual es propiciado por el cese de vigencia de acuerdos y reformas legales. El involucramiento de las autoridades laborales ha sido reducido —si no es que ha estado definitivamente ausente—, lo cual sugiere una falta de conciencia respecto de la escala internacional del movimiento, el cual requiere de un tratamiento coordinado entre distintos niveles de gobierno y órdenes jurídicos.


En las décadas recientes, el advenimiento de la terciarización de la economía mexicana ha impactado de forma importante los flujos de migración laboral en la región. Esto ha propiciado cambios en los flujos, tanto en su composición socio-demográfica, como en el ámbito de la ocupación laboral. De este modo, ciudades como Tapachula y Chetumal han absorbido contingentes en los sectores de servicios y de la construcción. Esto, a su vez, ha incidido en la “expansión del perfil de los trabajadores al incorporar de manera franca la participación de mujeres en nichos laborales específicos” (Castillo, 2010: 562), lo cual ha implicado una individualización de las mujeres como migrantes y ya no como acompañantes, papel que se les asignaba en el marco de las migraciones agrícolas.

Todo lo anterior apunta a la necesidad de un involucramiento mayor por parte de las autoridades competentes, manifiesto en la vinculación de las instancias que atienden a este histórico flujo migratorio, cada vez más complejo, que da muestras de contribuir al desarrollo regional mediante la diversificación y adaptabilidad a los mercados laborales que los reciben. No obstante, dimensionar la problemática laboral de los inmigrantes en México no es competencia exclusiva de las autoridades involucradas. Las opiniones por parte de la población mexicana en torno a la situación laboral de los inmigrantes en México contienen información esencial sobre las dificultades que ellos atraviesan cotidianamente a la luz de las percepciones de los mexicanos.

IMAGINARIOS DE LOS EXTRANJEROS Y EL ENTORNO LABORAL

Las percepciones de la población mexicana en torno a este asunto dejan ver la necesidad de una sensibilización y conocimiento de la situación de los inmigrantes que laboran en el territorio nacional, lo cual se manifiesta en sus opiniones: al igual que en los casos previos, la percepción sobre la vulnerabilidad laboral de los extranjeros, en función de otros grupos, es baja; sólo el 1.95 por ciento de los mexicanos opina que los extranjeros constituyen el grupo que más dificultades tiene en obtener un empleo. Esta percepción se complementa al cuestionar sobre qué grupo de personas nunca admitiría en un trabajo (gráfica 5).

GRÁFICA 5
¿A QUIÉN USTED JAMÁS CONTRATARÍA?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA



* Incluye a personas que ya cumplieron condenas, discapacitados, no enfermos de sida, mujeres casadas, personas menores de 25 años, hombres, personas no homosexuales, personas no católicas, no indígenas, no discapacitados, personas menores de 60 años, personas sin antecedentes penales, personas entre 25 y 40 años, indígenas, desempleados, madres solteras, mujeres, mexicanos y personas católicas.
FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005. Sedesol.

Casi uno de cada cinco mexicanos (17.1 por ciento) no contrataría a un extranjero en su trabajo. Esta proporción representa, junto con los enfermos de sida, el grupo a quienes los mexicanos dan menor preferencia para contratar, sólo superada por quienes ya tienen trabajo. Así, la percepción poco compartida sobre los extranjeros como grupo vulnerable en el mercado laboral, representada por la baja proporción de mexicanos que así lo considera, se refuerza por una escasa disposición a contratarlos.

Del mismo modo, esta opinión, que refleja sentimientos xenófobos en el ámbito laboral, no ajenos a lo que la historia mexicana señala, se refuerza en las percepciones respecto de quién debería ayudar a los extranjeros a conseguir un trabajo (gráfica 6).

GRÁFICA 6
¿QUIÉN CREE QUE DEBERÍA AYUDARLE A UN EXTRANJERO A CONSEGUIR TRABAJO?
REPÚBLICA MEXICANA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación, 2005. Sedesol.

Así, cerca de la mitad de los mexicanos coinciden en que es tarea del gobierno la gestión de colocación en empleos a los extranjeros en México; mientras que la otra mitad se divide entre los que piensan que le corresponde a sus amigos e instituciones (16.5 por ciento), a nadie (14.1 por ciento), a sus familiares (6.4 por ciento), a otros (3.8 por ciento) o a todos (3.5 por ciento). Asimismo destaca que el 5.7 por ciento declara desconocer a quién le correspondería esta tarea.¹⁴ Esto se interpretaría como una fuerte disposición entre los mexicanos a no querer tratar con extranjeros en el ámbito laboral, manifestada tanto en una negación de la solidaridad hacia aquéllos, como en una desvinculación de colaboración o ayuda en la procuración de trabajo, sustituida por medios que no le competen directamente al mexicano (gobierno o las propias redes del extranjero).

Con base en todo lo anterior, es posible argumentar que en la sociedad mexicana existe (y ha existido) una actitud xenofóbica latente que se manifiesta en

¹⁴ Datos de la Enadis 2010 indican que cerca de la mitad de los mexicanos (43 por ciento) cree que el gobierno debería crear más empleos para aquellos que vienen a trabajar desde otros países, mientras que el 25 por ciento prefiere que se controle la migración con medidas gubernamentales para estos flujos (cálculos propios con base en Enadis 2010).

las percepciones en torno a los extranjeros en el mercado laboral. Asimismo, dichas percepciones pueden traducirse y filtrarse (en la práctica) en acciones específicas que dificultan la inserción laboral de los extranjeros en México, como regulaciones cambiantes según periodos políticos o prácticas discrecionales de contratación.

Hasta donde nos es posible observar, la situación de los extranjeros y su relación con el mercado laboral mexicano se caracterizan por una doble problemática: por un lado, la discontinua atención por parte de las instituciones y autoridades competentes para atender a los inmigrantes en el mercado laboral mexicano, mediante políticas laborales adecuadas a la dimensión del fenómeno; por el otro, la latente xenofobia por parte de la población mexicana, traducida en actitudes de escasa empatía y solidaridad hacia los extranjeros en busca de trabajo o que se encuentran trabajando en México. Esto nos lleva a reflexionar sobre la calidad moral que se tiene para exigir un trato digno (basado en los derechos humanos) a los connacionales en Estados Unidos, en contrapartida con el trato y actitudes que se practican hacia los migrantes en nuestro territorio.

El principio de los derechos humanos en la política migratoria interna y externa en México

Los recientes avances en el ámbito jurídico respecto del tema migratorio toman un cariz cada vez más orientado en favor de los derechos humanos. Esto se ha materializado en la derogación de artículos de la Ley General de Población que penalizaban la migración indocumentada, así como en la entrada en vigor de la Ley de Refugiados y Protección Complementaria en enero de 2011. Paralelamente, el gobierno de México se ha dado a la tarea de defender los derechos de los emigrantes mexicanos en territorio estadounidense, con base en principios que deberían ser aplicables también a los inmigrantes en territorio nacional.

De este modo se han instrumentado diversos mecanismos para la verificación de la protección de derechos humanos tanto en la frontera norte, como para los inmigrantes en México, por parte de la Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH) y de la sociedad civil organizada (Foro Migraciones, 1999; 2002; Sin Fronteras, 2009). Sin embargo, en el ámbito social, las condiciones que obstaculizan la procuración de derechos humanos de los migrantes y transmigrantes se materializan en abusos por parte de las autoridades o actores privados coludidos con éstas para lucrar con la vulnerabilidad de estos flujos. En el peor de los escenarios, esta indefensión, falta de procuración de derechos humanos y escasa vigencia de políticas públicas destinadas a estos grupos, se observan como consecuencia en las atrocidades recientemente experimentadas por indocumentados y transmigrantes que abandonan su país en busca de mejores oportunidades: extorsiones, secuestros y asesinatos (CNDH, 1993; 1995; 1996; 2005; 2009; Sin Fronteras, 2009).

En el ámbito internacional, la observancia de derechos humanos ha estado obstaculizada por la progresiva adopción de criterios de seguridad, a raíz de los sucesos ocurridos en Nueva York y Washington en septiembre de 2001. En las repercusiones

para México, esto ha significado el tránsito de un paradigma de control y verificación de flujos migratorios, de por sí deficiente, a otro de seguridad nacional, en aras de la prevención de ataques terroristas en Estados Unidos, cuyos posibles perpetradores transitarían por los países considerados como áreas de influencia por dicha nación.

Actualmente, las prácticas que diferenciaban acciones para la seguridad pública y la seguridad nacional se han desdibujado, y el contexto de combate al crimen organizado, expresado en el tráfico de armas, narcóticos y personas, ha agudizado la criminalización del inmigrante, principalmente el indocumentado, en territorio nacional (Castillo, 2005; 2010).

Lo anterior presenta un desequilibrio de acciones respecto de lo que se quiere y exige para los emigrantes mexicanos y lo que se plantea en materia de protección de los inmigrantes en nuestro territorio. Aunado a esto, los esfuerzos recientes por articular acciones que sienten las bases para una política integral de Estado, basada en principios de derechos humanos, han sido limitados tanto por acciones políticas, como por la interrupción de gestiones por institucionalizarlos a causa de la conclusión de los periodos de gobierno, como lo muestra el caso de la formulación del documento *México frente al fenómeno migratorio* o los foros convocados por el Instituto Nacional de Migración (INM) para la formulación de una política específica para la frontera sur (INM, 2005). Pero no sólo cuestiones de índole política han propiciado un tortuoso y lento proceso de institucionalización de una política migratoria adecuada a la complejidad del fenómeno migratorio. Las jurisdicciones no acotadas y cambiantes de las instituciones y autoridades involucradas en el tema migratorio, así como la descoordinación entre sí y la eficiencia limitada para llevar a buen término sus funciones, traslucen que el tema migratorio rebasa la capacidad institucional que existe para manejarlo.

En suma, resulta imperante el compromiso por la continuidad de los esfuerzos desempeñados por varios sectores de la sociedad mexicana, si esperamos que la política integral en materia migratoria sea una realidad en el futuro. Con esto, no sólo se adquiriría la calidad moral para exigir un trato digno a los mexicanos que emigran a Estados Unidos, sino que se procuraría el trato digno y humano que todo migrante “nacional o extranjero” merece tener.

Conclusiones

En este trabajo intentamos aproximarnos a los sentimientos de aversión y empatía hacia la población extranjera en México, a partir de periodos específicos de la historia del México moderno y contemporáneo. Consideramos la xenofobia y la xenofilia como procesos de diferenciación que se explican mediante mecanismos de regulación de la admisión, presencia y desarrollo de actividades de la población extranjera en territorio nacional, basados en diversas legislaciones y decretos, cuyo común denominador ha sido su laxa reglamentación, la cual ha dado pie a una implementación discrecional, no siempre favorable a sus intereses, ni respetuosa de sus derechos, ni congruente con principios fundamentales consagrados en la legisla-

ción interna y en los instrumentos de derecho internacional que el Estado mexicano ha signado.

En efecto, durante casi dos siglos, la política de control de población extranjera en México se basó en prejuicios étnicos y nacionalistas, pero encubierta en argumentos de protección al trabajador mexicano y, más recientemente, de seguridad nacional. De ese modo, ha sido discriminatoria respecto de poblaciones procedentes de latitudes geográficas consideradas perjudiciales para el bienestar del trabajador mexicano.

Sin embargo, la preferencia por ciertas nacionalidades y el desprecio de otras no han sido estáticos a lo largo del tiempo. En épocas de nacionalismo exacerbado, como en la época de la expropiación petrolera, destaca la franca aversión por poblaciones que en otros momentos se habían considerado benignas para el mestizaje nacional, como la europea y la estadounidense. Esto ejemplifica la ambigüedad con que la población mexicana en su conjunto percibe a los extranjeros en este país, lo cual refleja la histórica reserva que los grupos étnicos en México han experimentado entre sí desde la época colonial. Al mismo tiempo, estos cambios resuenan en cada nueva promulgación de ley o reforma que versa sobre el tema de la población extranjera o migrante en México.

Asimismo, consideramos que las percepciones y opiniones cotidianas de los mexicanos respecto de los extranjeros influirían en las acciones emprendidas hacia éstos. Sin menospreciar los valiosos ejemplos solidarios de los que ha dado muestra la sociedad mexicana hacia algunos grupos de extranjeros en distintas etapas de la historia, es posible aseverar, con base en los resultados de la Primera Encuesta Nacional sobre Discriminación en México, que existe poca sensibilidad o conocimiento de la experiencia de los extranjeros en México, lo cual se observa en actitudes negativas y falta de solidaridad en escenarios hipotéticos de interacción con ellos. Estas actitudes se vincularían con la escasa relación que históricamente se ha establecido con poblaciones inmigrantes, así como con las actitudes antiinmigrantes mostradas hacia los trabajadores extranjeros en diversos momentos de la historia, principalmente en los de recesión económica. Suponemos que dichas actitudes, en todo caso producto de la ignorancia, son peligrosas; actitudes que servirían de base para otro tipo de acciones, cuando las condiciones sean propicias, mediante la alimentación de discursos nacionalistas o de seguridad nacional.

Tomando en cuenta las actitudes xenófobas latentes y la discrecionalidad en la aplicación de las leyes, así como el débil andamiaje institucional para la protección de los migrantes, la discusión de la necesidad de una política integral de Estado se antoja más necesaria que nunca, así como los esfuerzos para concretarla desde los distintos ámbitos de la sociedad mexicana en su conjunto. Sólo así será posible hablar de avances positivos en las actitudes mexicanas en las que ya no habrá lugar para filias ni fobias, sino respeto de las personas por el simple hecho de serlo.

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ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT IN CANADA

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Historical and Contemporary Trends

INTRODUCTION

Changes in immigration patterns and policy tend to invoke significant public reaction, ranging from “reluctant acceptance” to “outright rejection” (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, 311). It is imperative to understand these attitudes for several reasons. For one, politicians respond to the expressed preferences of the voting public. People’s attitudes may also indicate how members of the receiving society treat immigrants in everyday interactions (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002, 70). More positive feelings toward immigration on a societal level probably result in more positive behavior toward immigration in everyday encounters and vice-versa. Attitudes toward immigration and immigrants also contribute to the construction of national identity and belief systems about which persons or groups constitute accepted and valued members of a society. Seeing one’s country as a “nation of immigrants,” for example, may foster more positive attitudes toward newcomers (Esses, Dovidio, and Hodson 2002, 71). Given the recent increase in the breadth of comparable cross-national data, much of the recent work in the field of anti-immigration and immigrant studies (known as AIII research) (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010, 310) focuses on explaining cross-national differences in public opinion about immigrants.

In these cross-national comparisons, Canada emerges with some of the most positive public attitudes toward immigration. In a cross-national study of 22 countries using data from the ISSP National Identity Module (ISSP-NI), Mayda (2006) finds that Canada ranks first in terms of the public’s positive association between immigration and both the economy and society’s overall “openness.” In other words, Canadians, more than citizens of other countries, feel that immigrants make a positive contribution to Canada’s culture and economy. Canadians are also the most likely to believe that immigration levels should be increased. In a question gauging the strength of attitudes on increasing immigration levels, Canada ranks second only to Ireland (Mayda 2006, 527). These findings are echoed by recent Canadian research. Although characterized by negative attitudes in the 1980s, public senti-

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ment has grown increasingly positive over time (Wilkes, Guppy, and Farris 2008, 312). This trend is related to the pervasiveness of multiculturalism discourses, as well as a more positive economic environment and a government that has actively worked to promote the view that immigration is good for the economy (Wilkes and Corrigan-Brown 2010, 16).

This article considers Canada's early history of outright anti-immigrant policy and attitudes, how these changed over time, and their implications for the present. In what follows, we consider policy on and attitudes toward immigration in Canada, highlighting three major historical periods: Canada's period of openly racist immigration policy (pre-1962), the post-war period in which the policy of official multiculturalism developed (1946-1988), and contemporary attitudes and ideas about immigration, particularly following several episodes of moral panic since 1999. We argue that the positive attitudes toward immigration and immigrants in Canada are a product of a long history. This stems from a concerted official policy by successive governments since the late 1960s, and especially the 1980s, to promote immigration as essential to the nation and to national identity.

Early History (pre-1962)

Canada has a long history of anti-immigrant sentiment. The first prime minister, Sir John A. MacDonald (1878-1891), envisioned it as a white man's country. This "White Canada" nation-building project was to be accomplished first through the subjugation of indigenous peoples and expropriation of their land, and subsequently, through a number of policies encouraging *white* settlement. Immigration by the "sons and daughters of the British Empire," Anglo-Saxon British and Americans, was encouraged while racialized migrants were barred from entry (Dua 2007, 446; Gabriel and Abu-Laban 2002, 38). Other immigrants were allowed in according to a "descending order of ethnic preference" that depended on the changing economic conditions. Least desired were Asians, Jews, and blacks, tolerated only when holed up in lumber camps deep in the forest or farming the more marginal areas of the western wheat frontier (Abella and Troper 1991, 5). Canada's immigration history remains deeply scarred by its early treatment of the Chinese and South Asians, its rejection of Holocaust refugees, and the internment of the Japanese during World War II.

Canadian fear and exclusion of "Oriental immigration" was the earliest and most pronounced, carrying well into the twentieth century (Miki 2004, 19). Early Chinese migration to Canada began in the mid-nineteenth century when Chinese pioneers followed the Gold Rush up the Fraser River, establishing Canada's first Chinatown in Victoria in 1858 (Ng 1999, 10). Other migrants from southern China joined them and, gradually, small Chinese communities appeared along the Fraser River and on Vancouver Island. Chinese laborers were recruited in large numbers for the construction of the Canadian Pacific Railroad (CPR) from 1881-1885, during which time 17 000 Chinese migrants landed in British Columbia. While many returned to

China, by 1884 British Columbia's Chinese population numbered 10 000 (Ng 1999, 10). Despite their foundational role in linking eastern and western Canada through the railroad (another of Canada's nation-building projects), the increasing Chinese presence was seen as a threat to "White Canada," the "popular bar-room cry" of the era (Yu 2009, 1015). A Royal Commission warned of the "ill effects of Chinese immigration," and every effort was made to contain and discourage their presence once work on the CPR was complete (Li 2008, 128). In 1885, a "head tax" of Can\$50 was imposed on all Chinese immigrants entering Canada (Kobayashi and Jackson 1994, 38). It was justified on the grounds that Chinese immigrants were "morally depraved" and could threaten the moral fiber of white Canadian society (Dua 2007, 453). It also stipulated that there could only be one Chinese immigrant for "every fifty tons of a ship's weight" (Anderson 1991, 58). Male Chinese workers were not allowed to bring their wives and families, a measure taken to discourage permanent residency. The initial tax proved ineffective, and by 1901, it was raised to Can\$100, and by 1904 to Can\$500 (James 2004, 889).

As Canada worked —unsuccessfully— to prevent Chinese migration, South Asian and Japanese migration to Canada were also increasing. A period of economic decline coupled with an increasing number of "Orientals" spread fear of "Yellow peril" through Vancouver. It was believed that Asian migrants intended to take jobs from "white workers" and "take control first of BC [British Columbia] and eventually the nation" (Miki 2004, 20). By 1907, the Asiatic Exclusion League had formed in Vancouver. Representing a wide swath of Vancouver society, the league was entrusted with protecting British Columbia from the harmful influx of Japanese, Chinese, and Indian migrants. The anti-Asian hysteria culminated in September of that year, when a parade organized by the league to protest the Asian presence turned into a riot (Johnston 1989, 4). Thousands of people, many of them European immigrants, marched on Chinatown and Japantown. This violence was symptomatic of growing anti-immigrant sentiment in Canada. By 1923, Chinese immigration was banned entirely by the Chinese Immigration Act, and would not be reinstated until 1947.

Anti-Indian sentiment, although bound up similarly in ideas of morality and Asiatic "invasion," necessitated a different strategy. Like the Chinese migrants, efforts were made to contain South Asian settlement. These newcomers were hustled off boats and into jobs in farming and contracting in the interior of British Columbia. Indians in the city of Vancouver were harassed and often forced to live in buildings outside the urban center, with no electricity or running water (Johnston 1989, 3). Because they were British subjects, however, they could not be excluded outright by Canadian government policy. Japan had entered into a gentleman's agreement with Canada, consenting to limit Japanese migration to 400 persons per year. A similar arrangement could not be reached with British India because the colonial government feared that limiting Indians' ability to move throughout the Empire would strengthen Indian nationalism —"What kind of an empire was it that did not allow free movement of its subject people?" (Johnston 1989, 4). It was in the interests of both British India and Canada to "disguise" the limitations on the migration of Indians. This was done through the Continuous Journey Order in Council in 1908.

The order stipulated that all immigrants entering Canada must have come via direct “passage” from their home country. It was then arranged privately with steamship companies to stop providing “continuous passages” between India and Canada and to limit the number of sailings (Johnston 1989, 5). The Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR) operated the only direct trip from India to Canada and simply stopped providing this service to Indians. This policy effectively allowed for a diplomatic closing of the doors to Canada to all Indian migrants.

Famously, Gurdit Singh challenged Continuous Journey in 1914. Chartering a steamship himself, named the *Komagata Maru*, he brought 376 Indians to Canada (Dua 2007, 461). They were refused landing in Vancouver, however, on the grounds that the ship had sailed from Japan, and not directly from India. The ship sat in Vancouver’s harbor for six weeks while the issue was debated and Vancouver’s South Asian community worked to appeal the government’s decision. The case was dismissed on the grounds that not all the passengers had Can\$200, a rule established by a previous Order in Council. In the six years that followed, only one South Asian migrant gained entry into Canada (Miki 2004, 14).

Canada’s anti-Jewish history has also been well documented by Abella and Troper (1991). The official Canadian position on Jewish refugees fleeing Nazism during World War II was that “none is too many.” The nearly 1 000 Jewish refugees aboard the German ocean-liner *St. Louis* were denied entry to Canada, forcing their return to Europe, and leading eventually to many of their deaths. As the situation in Europe worsened, in 1941, Canadian immigration officer William R. Little maintained that it was in the best “interest of Canada to prevent Jewish people from coming to Canada” for fear of being over-run by an “exodus of European refugees from the Far East” (Abella and Troper 1991, 79). The Canadian Immigration Branch enforced this position stridently despite the wide array of actors who fervently worked on behalf of the Jews, such as the World Jewish Congress (WJC), the Federation of Polish Jewry, the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society, and the Canadian ambassador to France, George Vanier.

The internment of the Japanese during World War II also reinforced the white vision of Canada, albeit through a discourse of national security (Kobayashi 1992, 1; Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009, 165). The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 precipitated the arrest of 26 Japanese men in Canada, along with the closure of Japanese newspapers and government seizure of Japanese fishing boats (Dhamoon and Abu-Laban 2009, 170). By 1942, the Canadian government, under the leadership of Mackenzie King, called for the “mass uprooting of all people of Japanese ancestry living in the ‘protected zone,’” an area stretching along the west coast of British Columbia and 160 kilometers inland (Miki 2004, 2). Twenty-three thousand Japanese living in Canada, most of whom had been born there or were naturalized, were rounded up and interned as “enemy aliens,” taken to camps in the interior of British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario. Following the war, every effort was made by the government to prevent Japanese Canadians from rebuilding their lives, failing to return their property and dispersing them across the country (Kobayashi 1992, 2). The term “Jap,” a “linguistic residue of the war,” along

with the memory of the internment, has had a profound impact on Japanese-Canadian identity (Miki 2004, 14). The government denied any wrongdoing until the Redress Settlement of 1988.

Many of these statutes remained on the books until 1962.

The Post-War Period (1946-1988)

The current low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in Canada can be traced to a series of broader processes beginning in the 1940s. British identity among Canadians had begun to wane in the wake of WWII (Hawkins 1988, 80). The weakened attachment to the “mother country” raised questions about defining a separate *Canadian* identity and citizenship, and particularly how they would differ from the United States. In 1946, the Canadian Citizenship Act formally established the conditions for Canadian citizenship (Canadians had previously been considered British subjects). Shortly thereafter, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created (1949), shifting the focus of immigration policy from migration within the British Empire, to migration to Canada (Hawkins 1988, 95).

As ties to Britain weakened, a general international movement supporting human rights, civil rights, and humanitarianism gained strength. The horrific consequences of ignoring refugees in the Holocaust were widely known; the phrase “Never Again” became a worldwide motto. The year 1960 was designated by the United Nations as “World Refugee Year,” leading Canada to admit 6 000 refugees. To the south, the U.S. civil rights movement was gaining steam, as were protests against the war in Vietnam. The political, social, and cultural climate of the 1960s came to emphasize the concept of the “global village” (Knowles 2007, 269), and the concept of a “rights-based society” began to take hold in Canada and the United States. In Canada, the trend to liberalism culminated in the creation of the Bill of Rights in 1960 by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker.

Diefenbaker and the Progressive Conservatives were elected in 1957 on the platform of increasing Canada’s population to 40 million. Diefenbaker appointed the first female cabinet minister, Ellen Fairclough. She was intended to serve as a “caretaker minister” because Diefenbaker did not envision drastic changes to the portfolio. But this would soon change. A large number of Southern Italian immigrants had begun arriving to Canada in the late 1950s and early 1960s through family sponsorship. These Southern Italian immigrants, who were poor, generally unskilled, and considered racially undesirable, occupied a disproportionate percentage of Italy’s quota. Family sponsorship, or chain migration, magnified this trend over time, leaving little room for the more desired Northern Italians, who were more skilled and considered more Western European. To remedy this situation, the Progressive Conservatives (PCs) created Bill 310 in 1959, which would limit the number of “sponsorable” relatives to “immediate family members” only for “Egypt, Europe, North America, Latin America, Lebanon, Turkey, and Israel” (Knowles 2007, 181). By the end of the 1950s, however, there were significant urban concentrations of

Southern Italians (Kelley and Trebilcock 2000, 142), and they wielded considerable influence over the political representatives in their ridings, mainly held by Liberal members of Parliament. Surprisingly strong opposition from the ethnic lobby and the Liberals momentarily forced the PCs to abandon Bill 310 (Knowles 2007, 181). Interestingly, the PC goal of “prioritizing” sponsored relatives stemming from the Italian question led to Canada becoming the first country to abandon its “white immigration policy.” In 1962, Fairclough introduced a policy based on three immigration categories: sponsored, nominated relatives, and independent immigrants (Knowles 2007, 187).

The Liberals ousted the PCs in 1963, under the leadership of Lester B. Pearson. They continued the project of re-tuning Canada’s immigration policy to have more control over the economic/skill characteristics of the people entering the country, creating the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966. The new department was created under the assumption that “immigration policy must be administered in the interests of the country and of the immigrants themselves in a context that takes into account the entire position of employment, training, and placement in Canada (Pearson 1966, quoted in Knowles 2007, 192). Immigration became linked to the labor market and changing economic conditions. The deputy minister of this department, Tom Kent, created Canada’s famous immigration Point System in 1967, with the goal of creating a way to evaluate immigrant applications based on their skills objectively, efficiently, and uniformly (Knowles 2007, 195). The Point System functions by awarding set numbers of points to potential immigrants for various characteristics: skill, age, language ability, education level, etc. The pass mark was 50/100 points—it is now 67/100. The system was revisited in 1976, when points became allocated for “nominated relatives” (Hawkins 1988, 32). The point system is intended to foster “long-term...economic growth,” as then-Canadian Minister of Manpower and Immigration Jean Marchand said in 1966 (Schachar 2006, 171). It was the world’s first “talent for citizenship,” or merit-based immigrant selection strategy arrangement (Schachar 2006, 164).

While modifications in selection policy changed the nature of immigration to Canada, official multiculturalism has been instrumental in creating a Canada that values immigration and immigrants. In addition to the processes that contributed to the creation of the Point System, several other factors were crucial to the adoption of the multiculturalism policy. For one, the so-called “ethnic lobby” had grown. A particularly strong Ukrainian community began to press for formal recognition of their cultural contribution to Canadian society (Lupul 2005; Lalonde 2006, 48). Second, the move toward multiculturalism (as opposed to biculturalism) cannot be separated from the tension between Canada’s Francophone national minority, Quebec, and the majority Anglophone culture (Wood and Gilbert 2005, 682). How to reconcile these “two solitudes,” and avoid Quebec separation from Canada, was a central problem on Trudeau’s agenda. Trudeau believed that a policy of biculturalism (the recognition of two founding peoples, English and French) would prove fatal to Canadian unity.

Official multiculturalism was adopted in 1971. Its early aim was to recognize the important role of cultural groups in Canada (Hiebert and Ley 2003, 17) and

to encourage immigrants to “visibly and proudly express their ethnic identity” (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 49). Diversity became “reinterpreted...as a defining ingredient of Canadian identity” (Hiebert and Ley 2003, 12). In the 1980s multiculturalism shifted from a policy supporting the expression of cultural identity, to a policy geared toward equity (Kobayashi 1993, 205). Overall, multiculturalism continues to denote a commitment to four principles: “the recognition and accommodation of cultural diversity; removing barriers to full participation; promoting interchange between groups; and promoting the acquisition of official languages” (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 50). Multiculturalism was given statutory standing by the Canadian Multiculturalism Act of 1988 and “renewed” in 1997 (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 50).

Multiculturalism operates on many levels. At one level, the Multiculturalism Directorate is an official government body housed in the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. It provides a small amount of funding and programming for multicultural activities. At a broader level, multiculturalism also represents a “government-wide commitment” to a set of goals and guiding principles intended to guide the policies and activities of federal government bodies. The directorate oversees these goals (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 50). Multiculturalism has also been implemented variously by provincial and municipal governments, as well as by the private sector. Furthermore, on a societal level, multiculturalism signifies a demographic reality about the changing composition of society through immigration. As Banting and Kymlicka argue,

In this sense, multiculturalism policies have permeated Canadian public life, with ripple effects far removed from their original home in one branch of the federal government. The 1971 federal statement on multiculturalism has initiated a long march through institutions at all levels of Canadian society. (2010, 52)

Given the multi-faceted and multi-scalar nature of the concept of multiculturalism in Canada, the term has taken on a rather “ambiguous” connotation for the Canadian public (Banting and Kymlicka 2010, 51). People are cognizant that the official policy exists and that the make-up of society is changing around them, but are unclear about what this actually means for their everyday lives. Despite this uncertainty, public and political opposition have been relatively muted in Canada compared to European countries that have also adopted multicultural policies (i.e., the Netherlands, Britain, and Germany). While public debate over multiculturalism in Canada has always existed, the only significant political attempt to dismantle the official policy came from the —since dissolved— Reform Party in the early 1990s. In contrast, there has been a marked “retreat” from multiculturalism by European countries in the last decade, coupled with the rise of right-wing anti-immigrant policies (Joppke 2004, 238). Most recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared Germany’s attempt at multiculturalism had “utterly failed” (Wente 2010).

The Contemporary Period (1999-Present Day)

Canada has come a long way since the 1940s. Attitudes have become much more positive. Efforts have been made to address the wrongdoings of the past through official government apologies for the Chinese Head Tax in 2006 and for the *Komagata Maru* steamship incident in 2008. Nevertheless, the overall positive Canadian attitudes toward immigration have been punctuated by a series of moral panics that seem to be the cause of a periodic abandonment of support for multiculturalism, immigration, and humanitarianism.

Although there is a longstanding debate about the origins of moral panics — specifically whether such crises are imposed by elites (Hall et al. 1978, 41), driven by the media or other interest groups (Cohen 1972, 7), or begin with a pre-existing “social anxiety” at the grassroots level (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994, 25)— they represent a mixture of the three (see Hier and Greenberg 2002). Several periods of significant immigration-related moral panic have taken place in recent years.

MORAL PANICS: CHINESE AND TAMIL “BOAT PEOPLE”

On July 21, 1999, following rumors of a “ghost ship” appearing off the Queen Charlotte Islands on British Columbia’s northwestern coastline, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) stopped a Chinese fishing boat carrying 123 mostly undocumented Chinese migrants. Initially, very little was known about where they had come from, where they were headed, and why they had come. Despite these uncertainties, the media rushed to portray the event as an “invasion” of “illegal aliens,” representing the migrants as “boat people,” “human cargo,” and “detainees,” and raising the alarm about their potential as a public health risk and criminal activity (drug trafficking and organized crime) (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 501). In media images, the migrants appeared as “unkempt criminals,” escorted in handcuffs by police to detention centers (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 493).

Over the next few months, three more boats carrying Chinese migrants would arrive in British Columbia. By September 11, 1999, 599 migrants had arrived in all. With each successive arrival, the outcry grew. Groups of citizens could be seen gathering at key BC ports. It appeared that Canadian sovereignty was “in crisis” (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 493). The perceived inability of Canadian officials to stop the boats was taken as a sign that Canada needed to take a stronger stance on refugees and that “decisive intervention” was needed (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 490). Canadian newspapers began publishing polls of their readers’ opinions on what should be done with the refugees. According to one poll, conducted by the *Times Colonist*, 98 percent of respondents believed that “migrants should be returned immediately.” As Hier and Greenberg explain, although the poll was “dubiously” conducted, similar results were echoed by several of the countries’ national newspapers like the *National Post* and the *Toronto Sun*. A number of editorials began appearing echoing this sentiment. Canadian Alliance member Betty Granger

resigned after accidentally referring to the incident as an “Asian invasion” (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 497). Town hall meetings and radio phone-in shows also emphasized this message.

The event was used as a platform for a wider discussion about who could be considered a “Canadian.” The media had tapped into a still deeply rooted “uncertainty and fear” about Chinese migration in Canada that had existed since the nineteenth century. This longstanding hostility was compounded by increased migration in the lead-up to and following the handover of British Hong Kong to China. This new cohort of migrants was “upwardly mobile,” wealthy, and was rapidly changing both the financial and physical landscape of Vancouver (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 494; Mitchell 2004, 163; Ley 2008, 183, and 2010, 126). In particular, the new influx challenged a “deeply entrenched nostalgia for tradition and heritage, cultural-aesthetic values and political habits” (Hier and Greenberg 2002, 494).

There have been several similar cases since then. On August 12, 2010, 490 Tamil refugees arrived on Vancouver Island aboard the MV *Sun Sea*. The Canadian response to this event has been strikingly similar to that of the Chinese boat people 10 years earlier. In the same way, the effectiveness of Canada’s immigration and refugee policy has been called into question. Like in 1999, similar concerns have been raised as to the potential health risks posed by refugee claimants (in this case, tuberculosis). Key policy officials, for example Public Safety Minister Vic Toews, have sounded warning bells that the *Sun Sea* is a “test boat,” foreshadowing a situation that may spiral out of control (Chase 2010). The event was also an issue of concern in the 2010 Toronto mayoral election, given the city’s large Tamil population, particularly after then-candidate and now Mayor Rob Ford stated, “We can’t even deal with the 2.5 million people in this city. I think it’s more important to take care of the people now before we start bringing in more” (Cohn 2010). The figure of the “queue jumper” and their “abuse of Canada’s generosity” (Gunter 2010) have figured prominently in editorials and online newspaper comment sections.

Despite the similarities, there are some important differences between the two cases. First, many of the Tamil refugee claimants are likely “genuine refugees,” whereas the Chinese were largely economic migrants. Second, much of the controversy surrounding the Tamil case relates to the refugees’ potential relationship to the terrorist activities of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. In the last 10 years, the discourses of securitization and terrorism have infiltrated Canadian policy and public thinking, in a way that did not exist in 1999. An Angus Reid Global Monitor public opinion poll is cited regularly in Canada’s national newspapers, reporting that, “Almost half of Canadians would deport Tamils.” In Ontario, where outcry over the Tamil case has been the strongest, Angus Reid reports that 55 percent would send Tamil refugees home even if their cases were found to be “legitimate and there is no discernible link between the migrants and the terrorists” (Cohn 2010).

The recent crisis was compounded in early October 2010 when nine Moroccan stowaways were discovered aboard the Mediterranean Shipping Company’s *Lugano* when it docked in Montreal (Chung 2010). The chain of events has opened

up a series of debates about immigration, refugee policy, religious diversity, and multiculturalism. Angus Reid now reports that nearly half of Canadians (46 percent) feel that immigrants are “having a negative impact” on Canada (Abraham 2010). Refugee advocacy groups across the country have been actively trying to combat this reaction.

Conclusion

Recent cross-national comparisons show that Canadians have some of the most positive attitudes toward immigration and immigrants and comparatively low levels of anti-immigrant sentiment (Mayda 2006, 526). This article has situated these findings within the historical development of multiculturalism in Canada. In particular, the relatively positive levels stem from official policy support for the Canadian project of multiculturalism, which, in spite of its equivocality, has filtered through to many levels of society. Canada today is strikingly different from the Canada that promoted openly racist attitudes and policies in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century.

Still, despite the relatively positive attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, Canada’s long history of anti-immigrant sentiment should not be overlooked, nor should Canada be complacent about the contemporary situation. For nearly 100 years after Confederation, Canada had an explicitly “white” policy of immigration that actively excluded and racialized migrants who were not from the preferred white and Western European countries. This policy included a “head tax” and eventually an outright ban on Chinese migration in the early twentieth century. Strategies, such as the Continuous Journey Order, limited the numbers of South Asians entering the country. During World War II, Canada refused Jewish refugees entry and interned Japanese Canadians as enemies of the state. This white immigration policy was “on the books” until 1962, making Canada’s current relatively positive attitudes toward immigrants all the more striking. Nor is the contemporary period immune from anti-immigrant sentiment. Amplified by the media and elites, an undercurrent of anti-immigrant sentiment surfaces periodically in the form of moral panics about Canada’s inability to patrol its borders against unwanted migrants and in discourses about national security and radicalization. These attitudes reflect and influence policy decisions, and reveal deeper constructions of national identity and belonging, as well as the extent to which immigrants are welcomed into Canadian society.

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ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, MULTICULTURALISM, AND THE ROOTS OF POPULAR SUPPORT FOR HIGH IMMIGRATION IN CANADA¹

*Jeffrey G. Reitz**

Canada, which has traditionally welcomed immigrants, has remained strongly pro-immigration. This is reflected in policies mandating comparatively high immigration levels and in the fact that public opinion generally supports it. Clearly this makes the country an exception to prevailing attitudes about this issue across most industrial nations, attitudes that have received much attention, particularly in the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and the Netherlands. This “Canadian exceptionalism” on immigration is reflected in cross-national comparisons of public opinion, most recently by the German Marshall Fund (2010, 7), which also indicated that Canadians were more likely to see immigration as an opportunity than as a problem. What accounts for the generally quite positive Canadian approach to this issue? Why have anti-immigrant views such as have been seen in other countries not become more prominent in Canada? Are there indications that Canadian attitudes might turn in a more negative direction in the future? To address these questions, this chapter examines available Canadian public opinion data, including a recent national opinion survey, to attempt to clarify the social roots of popular support for high immigration levels in Canada.

Canadian immigration levels, strong throughout the nation’s history, have been particularly high for the past 20 years, when Canada has received about 250 000 permanent immigrants annually, representing between 0.7 and 0.8 percent of the total population. As a result of relatively high immigration, the Canadian population has a substantially greater foreign-born component compared to the United States and most European countries (United Nations 2006). Much of this immigration has been concentrated in the major cities of Toronto, Montreal, and Vancouver, and in the recent period, Toronto alone has received nearly 100 000 new immigrants each year, making it one of the world’s most immigrant-intensive large cities.

In this context of high immigration, it is particularly remarkable that there has been such widespread acceptance of and support for it in Canada, with relatively little of the acrimonious debate seen elsewhere. Public opinion polls show that almost

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without exception, for the last several decades, a majority of the Canadian population has either supported immigration levels or has even wanted them increased. In most countries, the reverse is true: there is less immigration, and a majority still wants reductions. Most telling, there is rarely any debate on immigration during Canadian election campaigns. Canadian federal political parties today all espouse pro-immigration policies; the public rarely asks them to defend their policies. The word “immigration” is seldom even mentioned in the nationally-televised leaders’ debates. In the debate preceding the recent May 2011 election, a question on immigration and multiculturalism was posed by a voter, and each of the four prime ministerial candidates responded with a pro-immigration position.

There are immigration critics in Canada, but in the Canadian context, even the critics can turn out to be actually pro-immigration by international standards. For example, in his book *Who Gets In: What’s Wrong with Canada’s Immigration Program - and How to Fix It* (2002), Daniel Stoffman proposed that immigration in Canada be reduced to about 175 000 per year. On a per capita basis, this reduced level of would be higher than that advocated by supporters of immigration in other countries. Implementing Stoffman’s proposal would still leave Canada as one of the industrial world’s leading pro-immigration countries.

The issues articulated in the debate over Canadian immigration policy include both economic and socio-cultural dimensions. On the economic side, proponents of immigration have argued that it is a great economic benefit to Canada, boosting development and stimulating employment, as well as increasing tax revenues and contributing to the public welfare. They also argue that immigrants are needed to offset population aging. Opponents argue that its economic benefits are exaggerated, and that immigrants depress wages levels, undercutting the position of many native-born workers. They also suggest that immigrants tend to rely on welfare and become a burden to the country.

Immigration also raises social and cultural issues, and here the debate focuses on the challenges posed by increased cultural diversity, and the impact of racism and racial discrimination. Proponents of immigration argue that as a multicultural country Canada benefits from increased diversity, and that its identity is strengthened by further immigration. Opponents argue that immigrants often bring cultural standards that are incompatible with Canadian traditions, and that immigrant groups tend to isolate themselves in enclaves, detracting from Canadian unity. The most visible debates have been in Quebec, and led to the appointment of a commission to examine what constitutes “reasonable accommodation” of cultural differences (Bouchard and Taylor 2008).

To gain further insight into Canadian attitudes, the present chapter examines trends and patterns in attitudes about immigration in Canada, based on public opinion data. I use published time series on support for immigration, which show that Canadian support for immigration has been substantial over a number of years, and remains so today. I also draw upon a recent national survey conducted by the Environics Institute in November 2010 (N=2020) to explore the popular views in greater depth.

The analysis provides insight into both economic and socio-cultural views and perceptions of immigration, and their relationship to broader characteristics of the Canadian population. Two viewpoints, belief in the economic benefits of immigration and pride in the policy of multiculturalism, are both quite widespread and important in boosting strong support for immigration in Canada. On the economic side, fears that immigrants pose an economic threat do exist, but the belief that immigration helps with the economy, reflecting a basic economic optimism, is clearly more widespread. On the socio-cultural side, many Canadians express concern that too many immigrants, perhaps particularly Muslims but other groups as well, are not adopting Canadian values. They want immigrants to blend into the society, and not to become isolated in enclaves. However, a majority of Canadians also supports the policy of multiculturalism, and expresses considerable pride in multiculturalism as part of the Canadian identity. This has the effect of moderating concerns about immigrant integration, and as a result, support for multiculturalism is associated with support for immigration policy. This support is underpinned by attachment to a variety of related “socially progressive” positions such as gun control, access to abortion, and gay rights; all of these seem to be associated with support for high levels of immigration. More conservative undercurrents seem to threaten the prevailing consensus on immigration, but on many issues they are a minority.

These elements of public opinion have interesting implications for the political dynamics of immigration policy. Immigration supporters are predominant in all political parties; however, the Conservative Party has attracted significantly more of the anti-immigrant vote. Yet, in power, the Conservatives have maintained a high-immigration policy. The Conservatives under Mulroney supported the previous Liberal policies of immigration and multiculturalism. The current Harper government approach is somewhat different: to adjust immigrant selection to display concern with the economic contribution of immigration, while also attempting to underscore the need for cultural assimilation, yet at the same time avoiding outright abandonment of multiculturalism.


Trends in Canadian Attitudes to Immigration

A review of public opinion polls conducted in Canada over recent years and decades clearly shows strong support for high immigration levels. In most years between 1975 and 2005, Gallup Canada has asked nationally representative samples of Canadians the following question: “If it were your job to plan an immigration policy for Canada at this time, would you be inclined to increase immigration, decrease immigration, or keep the number of immigrants at about the current level?” In every year but one, 1982, a recession year, the majority of the population has responded that they would support either keeping the number of immigrants at the current level, or increasing immigration (see Chart 1). In fact the highest level of support was found in the most recent year in the series, 2005. And the positive trend continued to 2010, according to polls between 2004 and 2010 by EKOS Research

Associates (2010, 4), based on responses to a similar question. In 2004, the proportion agreeing with current levels or higher was 63 percent compared to 31 percent who thought there were too many immigrants. In 2010, the proportion agreeing with current levels or higher was 67 percent, compared to 23 percent who thought there were too many immigrants.

CHART 1
CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION LEVELS

“If it were your job to plan an immigration policy for Canada at this time, would you be inclined to increase immigration, decrease immigration, or keep the number of immigrants at about the current level?”




SOURCE: Gallup Canada (2001).

A somewhat different question has been asked by Environics Canada over the period 1977 to 2010 (see Chart 2). It puts the issue in a more negative way, asking, “Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: Overall there is too much immigration to Canada.” From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, majorities agreed, either strongly or at least somewhat, presumably indicating negative attitudes to immigration. However, since the mid-1990s, respondents have begun to disagree more strongly with the statement, and since 2000 clear majorities have disagreed. The most recent poll, in 2010, showed a slight upward trend in agreement that there is too much immigration, but still a clear majority disagreed that there were too many immigrants.

For the period since the mid-1990s, the sources all show majority support for immigration, which is remarkable since this period registered the highest immigration levels. During the first part of the period since 1975, however, the sources

CHART 2
CANADIAN PUBLIC AGREEMENT THAT THERE IS TOO MUCH IMMIGRATION

1977-2010



SOURCE: Environics Institute (2010).

seem to show somewhat conflicting trends. The Gallup and EKOS polls show majority support over three decades, while the Environics polls show majority support mainly during the most recent decade or decade and a half. The discrepancy may be related to the different wording of the questions in the two sets of polls. The Gallup and EKOS polls present respondents with a neutral choice between various options, whereas the Environics polls requests agreement with a negative opinion that there is “too much” immigration. To some extent, a “positive response bias” might be at work in the Environics interviews. Positive response bias refers to the tendency of some survey respondents to agree with any statement offered by an interviewer, as a simple gesture of politeness rather than an expression of a genuine opinion. If such a source of bias is discounted, it might be suggested that over the past three decades, actual Canadian attitudes toward immigration have been more positive than the Environics poll data indicate. However, this would not explain why the Environics polls showed more significant change over time than appears in the Gallup-EKOS series. In any case, there is agreement among the polls that Canadians have been generally positive on immigration over the past decade, a period during which immigration stayed at quite high levels.

Some analysts in the media have suggested there has been a turn away from support for immigration. This has been based on the very recent downturn shown in Environics polls. However, the more complete data reviewed above show clearly that any recent negative trends are relatively small and have not overturned the majority support for high immigration levels. One particular point sometimes made by critics of immigration is that in Canadian public opinion, the proportion supporting *reduced* immigration is larger than the proportion supporting *increased* immigration (this was noted by Collacott [2002, 39], and also emphasized on the website

of the Centre for Immigration Policy Reform [n.d.] in attempting to argue that Canadians' support for high levels of immigration is what they call a "myth"). However, in analyzing public opinion on any policy, it is clearly inappropriate to focus only on those who want change and ignore the segment of the population that supports the policy as it is, particularly when this proportion is as large—roughly 50 to 60 percent—as it is in the case of immigration policy in Canada. In fact, there can be no doubt that those who want to reduce immigration levels are a minority in Canada, and have been for some time.

Analysis of Support for Immigration: EnviroNics National Survey, November 2010

The most recent survey in the EnviroNics series examined above includes many questions about immigrants and multiculturalism and may be scrutinized in more detail to find social patterns underlying support for high levels of immigration in Canada. As noted above, the survey question on immigration policy had a negative bias; respondents were asked for agreement or disagreement that "Overall, there is too much immigration in Canada," and 58.2 percent disagreed, 26.7 percent strongly so. These views are taken as support for Canada's immigration policy. Another 41.3 percent agreed there was too much immigration, 19.5 percent strongly so. These are the opponents. The survey also tapped a series of attitudes and perceptions specifically related to immigration and also broader social and economic perspectives on Canadian life, as well as a standard series of demographic variables. The first column in Table 1 presents correlations between support for immigration on the one hand, and each of these various demographic variables, economic viewpoints, and social viewpoints. In the case of variables representing region, employment status, and birthplace, they are dummy variables, with omitted categories of Ontario (as a region), full-time employment, and Canadian birthplace, respectively. Subsequent columns present a series of regression models with selected groups of variables entered. These various analyses enable us to examine how the variables are related to each other in the processes underlying support for the present policy of high immigration levels in Canada.

Reviewing the demographic categories, it is clear that support for immigration to Canada is quite widely distributed across the country. In Table 1, the first column indicates zero-order correlations between support for immigration and various social categories and variables. There is majority support not only across Ontario (51.5 percent), but also in Quebec (59.8 percent), Alberta (53.0 percent), and British Columbia (54.5 percent), as well as in the Prairie and Eastern regions. None of the correlation coefficients for region or urban area are statistically significant at the 0.05 level; support is somewhat higher in Quebec and in Eastern Canada. The data also show that majorities favor immigration in the major cities with very high immigration (the figures are Toronto, 60.2 percent; Montreal, 62.6 percent; and Vancouver, 56.4 percent), and in the smaller cities and towns with fewer than

one million inhabitants. Ethnicity and language have only minor if any correlation to support for immigration. As might be inferred from strong support for immigration in Quebec, support among Francophone Canadians is, if anything, higher than among Anglophones. And there is majority support for immigration both among immigrants themselves and among the Canadian-born; immigrants differ little regardless of whether they are born in Europe or the U.S., or outside Europe and the U.S., and would be more often recent immigrants and visible minorities. Based on these patterns, it would be expected that the most important determinants of attitudes about immigration would be issues of national rather than local or immediate personal concern.

The most important personal characteristic related to support for immigration is high educational levels. Highly educated Canadians tend to favor immigration. Of those who completed university, 69.3 percent supported current levels, and only 30.8 percent did not express support. Of those who had a high school education or less, a majority (57.1 percent) felt there was too much immigration, and only 43.0 percent supported current levels. Persons with high income also favor immigration; however the regression result (model 1, standardized betas with all demographic variables in the equation) shows that the effect of income is entirely related to educational level. Net of education and other demographics, the coefficient for the effect of income on support for immigration is close to zero. When education is controlled, persons living in the regions of eastern Canada, Quebec, and the Prairies are seen to be more supportive of immigration. Younger Canadians also support it more strongly, a pattern partly explained by their higher educational levels.

Those employed full-time are much more supportive of immigration, particularly compared to the unemployed. Among the latter, 57.0 percent felt there is too much immigration, compared to only 37.4 percent of those employed full-time. Students and the self-employed were more supportive of immigration. Retirees are less supportive of immigration, associated with the fact they are older rather than with retirement in itself. Men are more likely than women to support immigration; the regression result in model 1 shows this has little to do with employment status.

Overall, immigration is most strongly supported by the highly educated, and also by men, the young, and those employed full-time. Support is distributed widely across the country, and in both urban and rural areas, but, relative to demographics, is more pronounced in Eastern Canada, Quebec, and the Prairies. Ethnic and linguistic group affiliations do not stand out as determinants of attitudes toward immigration in Canada.

TABLE 1
SUPPORT FOR IMMIGRATION (DISAGREE ON “TOO MANY IMMIGRANTS”), OLS REGRESSION

	<i>Correlation</i>	<i>Mod.1</i>	<i>Mod.2</i>	<i>Mod.3</i>	<i>Mod.4</i>	<i>Mod.5</i>	<i>Mod.6</i>	<i>Mod.7</i>	<i>Mod.8</i>	<i>Mod.9</i>	<i>Mod.10</i>
<i>N=2020 (missing values at mean)</i>											
Demographic variables											
Young	.10***	.05†				.03				-.04	-.04
Male	.08***	.07***				.05**				.06***	.06***
Educated	.23***	.22***				.11***				.07***	.07***
High income	.11***	.01				-.01				-.00	-.00
Eastern Canada	.04†	.10***				.06**				.04*	.04*
Quebec	.04†	.09***				.02				.00	.00
Prairies	.03	.08***				.05*				.05***	.05***
Alberta	-.02	.03				.02				.04*	.04*
British Columbia	-.01	.05†				.04†				.03	.03
Part-time	-.03	-.02				-.03				-.02	-.02
Unemployed	-.08***	-.06*				-.02				-.03	-.03
Self-employed	.08***	.06**				.03†				.04†	.04†
Stay at home	-.01	.02				.03				.03	.03
Student	.06**	.05*				.04*				.02	.02
Retired	-.09***	-.02				-.03				-.04	-.04
Urban	.04†	.03				-.02				-.03	-.03
U.S./European born	.03	.03				-.01				-.00	-.00
Non-European born	-.02	-.02				-.06***				-.04*	-.04*
Economic views											
Immigrant-Specific											
Positive econ. contribution	.41***		.28***			.27***				.20***	.20***
Don't take jobs away	.51***		.42***			.41***				.32***	.31***

Viewpoints Supportive of High Immigration Levels

THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF IMMIGRATION

Canadians tend to see immigration as an economic opportunity for the country. Most (82.0 percent according to the Focus Canada 2010 survey) agree that it has a positive impact on the economy. Relatively few (25.0 per cent) think immigrants “take away jobs” from other Canadians. The first of these perceptions relates to the broader impact, and the second to the potential impact on individuals who might be displaced. The data show that these two beliefs are related to each other ($r = 0.35$), and both are important sources of support for Canada’s immigration policy; together, they account for a third of variations in attitudes ($\beta = 0.28$ for positive economic impact; $\beta = -0.42$ for taking jobs away from others; $R^2 = 0.32$; see Model 2).

The perception that immigration has a positive economic impact is common to all major regions of Canada, both English and French Canada, including the most prosperous regions that receive a lot of immigrants, like Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia, and those less prosperous such as Atlantic Canada, where unemployment is relatively high and immigrants are sought as a way of stimulating the economy and creating employment. Although perceptions of a positive economic impact are less pervasive among the unemployed, according to the Focus Canada survey, even they have a generally positive view. Among the unemployed, 68 percent see immigration as having a positive effect on the economy, and only 36 percent agree that immigrants take jobs from other Canadians.

Whether immigration does in fact benefit the economy, or at least the size of the benefit, is a matter of debate among economists, including Canadian economists. Many economists in the U.S. believe that the benefits tend to be small, although the specifics are debated. The same views apply also to Canada, according to a frequently-cited report by the Economic Council of Canada (1991). On the other hand, a more recent and up-to-date analysis by Dungan, Gunderson, and Fang (2010) provides a more optimistic analysis.

Whatever the analysis among economists, Canada’s general public adheres to the positive side of this issue, and has done so over a considerable period of time. There may be several reasons for this. One is that the government management of the program has emphasized economic objectives, and has done so consistently over many years. Canada’s so-called “points system” for selecting immigrants on the basis of education, work experience, language knowledge, and other indicators of employability and labor market value, has served to create an image of the immigrant as a valuable economic asset to the country. Over time, the emphasis on the selection of highly-educated immigrants has increased, translating into a considerably degree of employment success. Positive employment outcomes in turn lead to perceptions that immigration has a positive economic impact, with minimal social costs or impact on expenditures required to maintain the welfare state. As well, the children of these highly educated immigrants from China, India, and other Asian countries, and from Latin America and the Caribbean, have in turn become high-

ly educated and have attained employment success. Although recent cohorts of immigrants have struggled, overall their education and human capital assets have played an important role in fostering successful integration into society.

The government's ability to manage immigration successfully to enhance economic benefits is undoubtedly aided by Canadian geography. Its geographic isolation from all countries other than the United States has limited illegal immigration and made legal immigration more attractive. Geographic isolation has been important in sustaining the political perception of Canadian immigration as being controlled in the national interest. And the strong negative reactions to the arrival of small numbers of illegal immigrants from Asian in boats off the coast of British Columbia give a clear indication that public opinion could turn negative if larger numbers of illegal or non-status immigrants were entering the country.

Behind these perceptions of immigration are more general views about the general direction of the Canadian economy, and whether one's own position has been improving or not. These perceptions also appear to create positive views of immigration (see Table 1, Model 3). Those who feel confident about the national economy, and those who see their personal "standard of living" as having improved over the past decade, are more frequently found among supporters of immigration ($r = 0.11$ and 0.13 , respectively, column 1 of Table 1). The multivariate analysis (Model 4) shows that this effect is mainly or even entirely because these optimistic views foster the idea that immigration is having a positive impact. By the same token, those who are not doing well and think the economy is off track may be less inclined to think immigration has a favorable impact. (Model 5 includes demographic variables; the basic patterns remain the same.)

The economic impact of immigration is also related to the welfare state, since, if immigrants contribute to boosting the economy, they would also be expected to pay taxes and help bolster publicly-funded programs. We might therefore expect to find supporters of the welfare state taking a more positive view of immigration. This expectation is in fact confirmed by the fact that those who view taxes as important for maintaining the Canadian quality of life—the survey question mentioned health care, education, and roads as representative tax-funded amenities—are more likely to support immigration ($r = 0.17$). This also implies that opponents of the welfare state oppose immigration, possibly on the ground that immigrants may be likely to exploit the welfare system and add to an already unwanted burden. In either case, the overall perception of immigrants' economic status might be the key. In fact, the multivariate analysis (Models 4 and 5) indicates that the fact that supporters of the welfare state actually have more positive views of the economic impact of immigration is what makes them more supportive of it. The same is true of those who have a more positive view of economic conditions in Canada generally: they are more likely to support immigration because they believe in its positive benefits. Once these effects are taken into account, the more general economic viewpoints have much less weight.

The significance of economic factors in the support for immigration in Canada suggests that an economic downturn might undermine that support. However, in

the recent past, economic recessions in Canada have not produced a backlash against immigration. It is interesting to consider how the belief in its economic benefits may have been affected by the Mulroney government's decision in the early 1990s to maintain high levels of immigration during a severe recession. Traditionally, immigration levels in Canada had been moderated during recession years, in deference to a belief that immigrants would be less welcome when jobs are scarce. However, during the recession of the early 1990s, which was particularly severe in Canada, the decision was made to keep levels more or less unchanged to maintain program stability. As it happened, there was no backlash, and, in fact, as we have seen, the perception that immigrants take jobs from other Canadians actually faded during this period.

PRIDE IN MULTICULTURALISM

Canadians' views on the social and cultural side of immigration also affect their attitudes about immigration policy. First, support for multiculturalism appears to be a strong force supporting high immigration levels in Canada. Canadians support the national multiculturalism policy and regard it as a key feature of the national identity; the Focus Canada data show that this reinforces support for immigration. The correlation analysis in Table 1 (column 1) shows the positive relation between support for multiculturalism and support for immigration ($r = 0.26$). Since it was first announced in 1971, Canadians have come to see multiculturalism as a positive feature of the Canadian identity. Most polls show majority approval of multiculturalism (for an analysis of data over several decades, see Dasko [2005]). A recent Angus Reid poll (2010) also showed that 55 percent of respondents regarded multiculturalism as having been good for Canada, while 30 percent believe it has been bad. Fully 85 percent of Focus Canada respondents felt that multiculturalism was very or somewhat important to the national identity, and when they pointed to important national symbols, multiculturalism was in the top group, after health care, the flag, and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but ahead of hockey, bilingualism, and the RCMP. And in the survey, those who felt multiculturalism was important to national identity were much more likely to support high immigration levels. Of those who felt that multiculturalism is "very important" to national identity (a clear majority), 67.7 percent disagreed that there was too much immigration, compared to 49.6 percent among the smaller group who thought it was "somewhat important," and only 41.8 percent among the even smaller group (11.8 percent) who thought it was unimportant.

Multiculturalism policy could create a more positive view of immigration for several reasons. The most obvious is that it encourages the view that immigration creates positive cultural as well as economic benefits. A second, possibly related, reason is that multiculturalism may lead to a perception that if minority groups retain their culture, this does not necessarily mean they do not share or are not adopting Canadian cultural values. In fact, one of the tenets of multiculturalism

and cultural pluralism generally is that integration into society and cultural retention are not opposed to one another and are expected to occur at the same time. A third reason why multiculturalism may encourage a positive view of immigration is that its prevalence in Canada may actually enhance social inclusion for cultural minorities, smoothing their integration and supporting both socio-cultural and economic benefits. And fourth, the simple fact of asserting multiculturalism as a national policy may create a perception that immigration is an essential feature of Canadian tradition, which should be upheld as a point of national pride. In this way, multiculturalism may serve as a kind of public relations campaign supportive of immigration.

Despite support for multiculturalism, it is also clear that Canadians want immigrants to blend into the mainstream. They are concerned that many immigrants are not adopting Canadian values and worry about the implications. In the Focus Canada survey, respondents were asked whether or not they agreed that “ethnic groups should try as much as possible to blend into Canadian society and not form a separate community.” Nationally, an overwhelming 80 percent agreed with this statement, 51.3 percent “strongly.” The percentages were even higher in Quebec (90.4 percent), but they were also strong in the rest of Canada (76.6 percent).

The expectation that immigrants should “blend” into society does not necessarily imply an expectation for complete conformity to mainstream culture. Most Canadians do feel more comfortable if immigrants make the effort to become part of the mainstream society, and there are strong concerns that immigrants are not doing so. Majorities of Canadians (nearly 70 percent) agree that “there are too many immigrants coming into this country who are not adopting Canadian values,” and over 40 percent “strongly agree.”

Both the preference that immigrants should blend in, and the belief that they may not be doing so, tend to be associated with less enthusiasm for immigration (in Table 2, $r = 0.22$ for disagreeing that blending is important, and $r = 0.45$ for disagreeing that too many immigrants are not adopting Canadian values). These are quite strong effects, and the fact that majorities actually agree with these statements indicates that desire for immigrant blending and the concern that they are not blending are very important factors in qualifying support for immigration in Canada. Racial difference also matters to some Canadians, who object to immigration as a result ($r = 0.31$), but only a small group expressed this concern in the interviews. More are concerned that many refugee claims may not be valid, and this, too, is associated with less support for immigration ($r = 0.39$).

Concerns about questions of immigrant integration are clearly expressed in the Focus Canada survey specifically regarding Muslims. The survey asked, “Do you think most Muslims coming to our country today want to adopt Canadian customs and way of life or do you think they want to be distinct from the larger Canadian society?” Most respondents felt they “want to be distinct” (55.3 percent), while only 27.9 percent thought they wanted to adopt Canadian customs; 3.3 percent thought they wanted to do both, and 13.4 percent expressed no opinion. Another question asked about the ban on wearing head scarves by Muslim women in public

places, including schools, and respondents were about equally divided on whether it was a good or bad idea. There was perhaps a slightly greater proportion who thought it was a good idea (47.6 percent), compared to 43.9 percent who thought it was a bad idea. Generally, concern about the cultural integration of immigrants does not vary markedly by region; however, the controversy regarding Muslims has been particularly notable in the case of Quebec, and this is reflected in the Focus Canada survey interviews. In Quebec, 60.4 percent think Muslims want to be distinct from the larger Canadian society, compared to 53.7 percent in the rest of Canada. And in Quebec, 66 percent think banning head scarves worn by Muslim women in public places is a good idea, compared to 41.5 percent in the rest of Canada.

It should be remembered that an emphasis in public opinion on “blending” and the integration of immigrants is far from new. Although it is possible that these concerns may have intensified in recent years, with the increased attention to Muslims in particular, similar views have been found in many public opinion surveys throughout the period since the 1970s when multiculturalism policy was put in place. For example, a poll conducted by Decima Research just over two decades ago, in 1989, showed substantial majorities of Canadians supporting the idea of immigrant “blending.” Respondents were asked, “What do you think is better for Canada, for new immigrants to be encouraged to maintain their distinct culture and ways, or to change their distinct culture and ways to blend into the larger society?” Only 34 percent of Canadians at the time favored the maintenance of “distinct cultures and ways.” Comparison with a parallel poll conducted in the United States at the same time showed that this preference for blending was actually more prevalent in Canada than in the United States (Reitz and Breton 1994, 27-28). And even earlier, a national survey conducted in 1976 (Berry, Kalin, and Taylor 1977), when most immigrants were of European background, showed that although most Canadians accepted cultural retention by minorities, the emphasis was on cultural practices that did not affect mainstream society significantly. So, from the 1970s to the present time, Canadians have definitely favored the idea of immigrants becoming an integral part of mainstream society.

The two viewpoints —support for multiculturalism and support for immigrant “blending”— are different and not necessarily contradictory. Certainly in principle, they are not inconsistent, since multiculturalism in Canada was always intended to accomplish the goal of integration of minorities into the mainstream. Nevertheless, the issue has caused confusion. A *National Post* story on the November 2010 Angus Reid poll reported that more than half (54 percent) thought Canada should be a “melting pot” rather than a “mosaic” (Selley 2010). The article suggested that the public had repudiated multiculturalism, despite the fact (as cited above) that the same poll found a majority (55 percent) thinking multiculturalism was good for Canada, compared to only 30 percent who thought it was bad. To its author, it seemed that Canadians were confused and had “no idea” what multiculturalism actually is.

In interpreting such poll results, care should be taken to consider the actual meaning of the questions asked of respondents. First, the questions do not provide respondents with a definition of either multiculturalism or terms such as “melting pot,” “mosaic,” “blending,” or “separate communities.” So, they are free to attribute any meaning to any of them. Second, and more significantly, when questions present respondents with a binary choice between opposites such as “melting pot” vs. “mosaic,” or “blending” vs. “separate communities,” supporters of multiculturalism may have difficulty. In fact, multiculturalism is intended to overcome precisely this binary choice; it offers the potential for both integration and maintaining one’s culture. So, faced with what might be viewed as a philosophically inappropriate request to choose between them, many come down on the side of blending. But this response choice does not necessarily imply a demand for complete immigrant assimilation or a repudiation of multiculturalism (though of course for some it may mean that). And third, the desire for immigrant “blending” refers to the outcomes people would like to see; support for multiculturalism influences the criteria people may bring to the assessment of whether immigrant integration is working. The criteria may be less exacting for supporters of multiculturalism than for others. In short, support for multiculturalism may be quite consistent with an emphasis on blending, if the latter is understood to include a degree of minority cultural maintenance. What is clear is that Canadians support both multiculturalism and a pattern of immigrant integration into mainstream society.

The multivariate analysis helps clarify how these viewpoints affect support for immigration. It suggests that one way multiculturalism impacts is that it translates into a more open or flexible standard for assessing immigrant integration. This leads to immigrants more often being seen as meeting that standard. The impact of a positive view of multiculturalism on public expectations and perceptions of immigrant cultural conformity is clearly evident in the multivariate analysis (see Table 1, Models 6 and 7). The coefficient for importance attached to multiculturalism and the one representing the expectation that immigrants need not blend into society are both reduced and virtually eliminated when the perception of how well immigrants are adopting Canadian values is introduced into the analysis. The importance attached to multiculturalism appears to moderate the impact of the desire for blending and concerns about whether it is occurring.

Actually, in addition to multiculturalism, a number of other broader social values are related to support for immigration. Many of these involve what is sometimes called “social progressivism,” including support for the ban on capital punishment, gun control legislation, same-sex marriage, and access to abortion. All of these items are associated with support for immigration. By the same token, the so-called “social conservatives,” who hold opposite views on these topics, and also share a perception that crime rates are increasing, tend to oppose immigration and to think too many immigrants are coming into the country. The multivariate analysis suggests that these items reflect a general discomfort with diversity in society and seem to be associated with a desire for conformity, which includes cultural conformity by immigrants. The effect of these cultural values items is significantly

reduced when perceptions and expectations regarding cultural conformity are included in the analysis (Models 8 and 9).

Canadian pride in multiculturalism is also to some extent reinforced by its role in defining Canadian identity *vis-à-vis* the United States. The Canadian discourse on multiculturalism frequently underscores a presumed contrast between Canadian multiculturalism and the American melting pot. Multiculturalism is viewed as one concrete manifestation of a greater Canadian tolerance for diversity and openness to cultural inclusion, unlike the United States' supposedly traditional emphasis on assimilation and cultural conformity as patriotic duties. The juxtaposition of the American melting pot and the Canadian cultural mosaic is one of the most frequently invoked symbols of Canadian distinctiveness, along with hockey and a few others such as universal health insurance and gun control. In the Focus Canada survey, it is no surprise to find that 89.9 percent of respondents state that in comparing Canada and the U.S., Canada "maintains a better quality of life for its citizens." Only 3.6 percent preferred the U.S., with another 1.7 percent saying there is no difference. What is worth noting is that, of those who state that multiculturalism is "very important" to the national identity, the proportion of respondents who prefer Canada is 95.4 percent; whereas, of those who feel that multiculturalism is not at all important, the figure drops to 83.1 percent. As determinants of support for immigration in Canada, both multiculturalism and pride in Canada's quality of life are significant.

The multivariate analysis suggests the following causal sequence. Persons with stronger expectations for immigrants to blend into society are applying a more restrictive standard and, as a result, are more likely to view immigrants as falling short. They therefore conclude that immigration is creating problems and more often favor reductions in immigration levels. In this context, one possible effect of support for multiculturalism is to relax expectations for immigrants' cultural conformity. Supporters of multiculturalism thus apply less restrictive standards to immigrants in terms of cultural conformity, and immigrants are therefore more often perceived as meeting those standards. Immigration is thus seen as contributing to a more unified society, and this leads to support for higher immigration levels. In this way, popular support for multiculturalism translates into increased support for immigration, even in a society in which the predominant view is an expectation for immigrants to blend in and become part of the mainstream society.

Concerns about so-called "bogus" refugee claims constitute one quite controversial element in Canadian immigration. This topic appears in the news regularly, and the analysis here indicates that the validity of refugee claims is a significant issue for those who feel Canada has too much immigration ($r = 0.39$, first column in Table 1). The multivariate analysis (Model 10) shows that this matter is nearly as significant as immigrants' not adopting Canadian values and has a significant net effect on support for immigration. Put differently, a favorable view of refugee claims may be seen as one on the list of socially progressive views held by those who favor immigration. The analysis shows it is a fundamental issue related to support for immigration policy.

Political Parties and Canadian Immigration Policy

Although all major Canadian political parties have pro-immigration policies, one organization, the Conservative Party of Canada, is generally perceived to be the most reluctant to support immigration, and the least supportive of multiculturalism. Under Brian Mulroney (1984-1993), the Conservatives maintained high immigration numbers, and introduced legislation in support of multiculturalism and also employment equity. However, after the Conservative defeat in 1993, they merged with the Reform Party, which had been seen as representing social conservatism and reluctance to support immigration; and Stephen Harper (2006-present) has in fact made significant changes to immigration policy, and emphasized cultural adaptation of immigrants more than multiculturalism. Therefore, it is of interest to examine some of these issues in terms of political party support in Canada.

The data show that Conservative supporters are significantly less likely to support immigration than supporters of other major parties ($\beta = -0.09$, with Liberal Party support as the reference category). The New Democrats and Bloc Québécois are relatively strong supporters of immigration ($\beta = 0.06$ and 0.04 , respectively). The data also suggest some of the reasons for this, related to social and economic viewpoints as analyzed above. Demographic variations, linked to education, region, or employment status, are not major explanatory variables. However, although economic perspectives on immigration are important in explaining attitudes about it, Conservative Party supporters' positions appear to be related to their social views. They are less enthusiastic about multiculturalism, and express stronger views that immigrants should blend into society. They more often worry that immigrants are not adopting Canadian values. The multivariate analysis shows that these variables explain the greater opposition of Conservative Party supporters to immigration policies.²

Conclusions and Discussion

Canadian public opinion supports immigration for two main reasons: confidence in its positive economic benefits and pride in multiculturalism as a socially progressive policy. Immigration continues to be an important nation-building strategy for Canada. Immigrants are seen in fairly pragmatic terms as major building blocks for the future, keeping the country prosperous and enabling its expansion. This seems to contrast not only with countries in Europe, which are latecomers to immigration and may see it either as unwelcome, or at best as a way to fill specific needs arising from time to time, but also with the United States, which is also a traditional country of immigration but is a superpower that no longer sees itself as needing immigrants to grow and reach its destiny. Immigration issues in Canada are often discussed in terms of multiculturalism, and the analysis here confirms that support

² The author would be happy to provide this analysis to anyone who requests it.

for multiculturalism is indeed a major factor boosting the country's immigration program. Support for multiculturalism does not mean that Canadians do not want immigrants to blend in or become part of a national "melting pot," although this conclusion is often drawn in both media and academic discussion of immigration. Even among supporters of multiculturalism, there is a desire for immigrants to become part of mainstream society; this is part of the meaning and purpose of multiculturalism in Canada, as a strategy encouraging the incorporation of immigrants. Multiculturalism in Canada fosters support for immigration by encouraging a more open or tolerant view of the process of immigrant integration.

These views of immigration are rooted in more basic opinions and outlooks prevalent in Canada. On the economic side, Canadians tend to take an optimistic and expansionist view of their economic future, both at the national level and in terms of their own personal situations. This optimism is a basic feature of their positive opinion of immigration. On the social and cultural side, Canadian multiculturalism is related to other socially progressive viewpoints that tend to prevail in the country. Canada was one of the first countries to recognize gay marriage; and its laws on abortion, gun control, and capital punishment distinguish it from those of its more socially conservative southern neighbor. Many Canadians are proud of this distinction, and national pride plays into support for multiculturalism as well. The result is that the country's expansionist immigration program has become part of the mix of progressive public policies that for many are linked to the Canadian identity and what it means to be Canadian.

These findings raise the question of what factors might tend to undermine popular support for immigration in Canada in the future. The primary importance of the economic agenda, and the fact that it carries so much weight in both English and French Canada and across many social groups, suggests that expansionist immigration will probably be part of Canada's policy for some time to come. It seems likely that major economic changes would be necessary to upset this pattern, such as, for example, a very prolonged recession, or a much more visible sign of immigrants experiencing economic difficulty and requiring attention and possibly significant public expenditures. The fact that immigrants' employment situation has become more difficult might seem a possible source of such a changing view of the economics of immigration. This does not appear to have happened, and the evidence based on experience during recessions, including the most recent recession as well as the one in the early 1990s, suggests that belief in immigration as an opportunity is quite resilient and not vulnerable to rapid change. The issues of culture and multiculturalism are important but perhaps somewhat less critical. Major developments in terms of social conflict or breakdown in immigrant minority communities might have the effect of eroding the confidence that multiculturalism helps foster Canadian unity, and this could affect attitudes toward immigration.

Predictions of a weakening of Canadian support for immigration and multiculturalism have often been wrong. Such forecasts have figured prominently in the media several times over the past two decades. One was on the publication of Neil Bissoondath's book *The Selling of Illusions: The Cult of Multiculturalism in Canada*

in 1994. Another was in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and yet another when the plot by a group of Muslim youth to bomb Parliament Hill was uncovered. None of these have had the predicted effect. In fact, Canadians have been relatively unconcerned about terrorism, compared to people in other countries. However, a more important reason may be that the economic agenda behind Canadian immigration sustains overall support and is more important than these other concerns.

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LA SITUACIÓN DE LOS INMIGRANTES ILEGALES EN CANADÁ, UNA LECTURA TELEVISIVA AMBIGUA

Graciela Martínez-Zalce*

Dos documentales, producidos por la compañía independiente White Pines Pictures, así como una miniserie de televisión, *Human Cargo* (2004), abordan la inmigración a Canadá.¹ Desde una perspectiva que pretende tanto ser objetiva como presentar la paradójica situación de los inmigrantes ilegales en Canadá, los resultados de estas series se alejan de lo convencional, en tanto que procuran no estereotipar (como lo hizo el cine fronterizo hollywoodense durante décadas) y, sin embargo, en ocasiones contienen grietas en la narrativa, por las cuales se filtran tanto el sentimiento antiinmigrante como la tendencia al perfil racial. Este artículo estudiará los resultados, involuntariamente ambiguos, en estas producciones.

La “guerra” contra los migrantes: un espectáculo que genera buen *rating*

A partir de los sucesos del 11 de septiembre, el tema de la seguridad ha implicado una reafronterización de Estados Unidos; así, las fronteras en Norteamérica han adquirido tal importancia que han generado estas producciones documentales para televisión con temas que habían pertenecido casi exclusivamente al ámbito cinematográfico; en un inicio se habían constreñido a programas especiales, pero, debido al atractivo de los temas, se han desarrollado, por diversos caminos, hasta convertirse en series. En éstas, las fronteras se representan como regiones estratégicas para las relaciones bilaterales, ya sea México-Estados Unidos, ya Estados Unidos-Canadá. Pero también como la barrera que impedirá que sustancias y personas indeseables las franqueen y se internen en territorio estadounidense.

A pesar de que este artículo versa sobre la producción televisiva canadiense para la emisora pública angloparlante (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, CBC), me ha parecido pertinente —como proemio— hacer mención a un par de producciones estadounidenses para National Geographic, una cadena de televisión de paga que se difunde a nivel mundial, por dos motivos: el primero es, precisamente,

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¹ También lo hace *The Border* (2008-2010), serie policiaca de suspenso que alcanzó tres temporadas y de la cual me he ocupado en otros artículos.

la diferencia de niveles de audiencia que éstos alcanzan en relación con las producciones canadienses, tanto en número de espectadores como de extensión geográfica; el segundo es que, a pesar del tono pseudocientífico del canal y de sus miras de aparente difusión de la cultura, o mejor dicho de la diversidad de las culturas mundiales, el tono de estas series de programas es escandaloso y conduce a la creación de estereotipos negativos respecto de los mexicanos que allí aparecen.

Frontera, zona de guerra (Border Wars) se estrenó en Estados Unidos el 10 de enero de 2010 y tuvo el nivel de audiencia más alto para el debut de un programa. En México y el resto de América Latina su emisión inició el 3 de febrero de ese mismo año.

Basta el título para darnos una idea de cómo estos documentales de una hora retratan las fronteras norteamericanas, básicamente la que existe entre México y Estados Unidos. Más aún, las imágenes en la página de esta serie señalan al enemigo y cómo debe combatírsele.

El programa documenta la actividad cotidiana de los agentes estadounidenses de Aduanas y Protección Fronteriza, sobre todo en el sur de su país, combatiendo el tráfico de drogas, la migración ilegal y, en ocasiones, el terrorismo. Las situaciones se presentan de tal modo que aparecen ante el espectador como amenazas inminentes a la seguridad de Estados Unidos.

En vista de que es necesario destruir al “enemigo”, las patrullas están equipadas con cámaras de última generación y sistemas de monitoreo controlados por personal altamente especializado. Vigilan todas las entradas por agua y por aire, pero sobre todo por tierra. Estas últimas representan las vías más transitadas y, por tanto, las más filmadas.

Desde la comodidad de sus salas, los espectadores observan a los oficiales que patrullan la zona o caminan por el desierto de Altar, con aparatos que registran el calor corporal, en busca de “ilegales”, sosteniendo tiroteos, desmantelando camionetas en busca de drogas, deteniendo sospechosos en los aeropuertos o inspeccionando la correspondencia para encontrar cualquier clase de contrabando en los sobres.

Los títulos de cada episodio son directos y duros (“Night-shift Preview”, “Desert Sweep”, “The Human Stash”, “Midnight Runners”, “Human Assets”, “Explosive Search”, “Drugs Bust”, “The Big Fence”, “Road Sweep”) y se relacionan con el contenido de cada uno de éstos, el cual se construye con base en breves escenas de acción, de manera estereotípica o maniquea, en la que los agentes son los héroes, y los villanos, generalmente de origen mexicano, son todos calificados como criminales, y a todos se les trata de la misma forma, ya sea porque trafican drogas, ya porque intenten cruzar la frontera para conseguir un empleo que les permita enviar dinero a casa. Es decir, en esta serie la ilegalidad equivale a criminalidad, por lo que ser inmigrante implica, en el discurso narrativo, lo mismo que ser narcotraficante o un posible terrorista.

Así pues, en varios episodios, el tema principal es la cacería; en otros, el foco se centra en los inmigrantes; en algunos más, la actividad de mayor importancia es la investigación (en relación con documentos falsos o para descubrir contrabando

y lavado de dinero); algunos pocos tratan sobre el terrorismo y muchos más sobre el narcotráfico; pero todos desde el punto de vista de cuán necesario es defenderse de las amenazas o ataques a la seguridad nacional.

Desde esta perspectiva, resulta legítimo preguntarnos si de verdad esto es un producto de la televisión cultural. Para los espectadores mexicanos, es difícil ver cómo nuestros(as) compatriotas son cazados como si se tratara de animales; cómo, por su simple apariencia (es decir, pertenecer a cierta raza o parecer de determinada nacionalidad) y por hablar español, se les acusa de todo tipo de delitos, mientras el equipo de filmación documenta y atestigua la brutalidad a la que se les somete en nombre de la seguridad, convirtiéndonos a nosotros, también, en testigos (¿o cómplices?).

Por tratarse de una serie documental, todos los sucesos que presenciamos han ocurrido en un contexto real en las fronteras México-Estados Unidos o Estados Unidos-Canadá, y se consideraría que se trata de la filmación de algo verdadero; sin embargo, resulta de una verdad sesgada, pues, como ya se dijo, aunque se hable de las fronteras, lo que se subraya es, básicamente, lo que ocurre en el sur de Estados Unidos, con “personajes” que en su mayoría son mexicanos y que intentan atentar contra las leyes estadounidenses. En caso de equivocación por parte de los agentes de la Patrulla Fronteriza, nunca aparece cómo se remediaría ésta. Tampoco se mencionan los intercambios positivos que suceden en esta inmensa zona geográfica. Mucho menos de lo que ocurre al norte.

En opinión del crítico Julián Gorodischer, lo que la televisión antropológica ha producido en este caso es un relato paranoico: “la TV antropológica acompaña el rediseño planetario deviniendo menos en testigo de los sucesos naturales del amplio mundo que en un militante a favor de una causa nacional: órgano de una política exterior que [...] cierra filas con otros grupos noticiosos como la CNN y la Fox News” (Gorodischer, 2010).

Más allá de que el contenido del programa sea perturbador, debido a que aplica el perfil racial para la construcción de sus personajes (los mexicanos inmigrantes ilegales, polleros o narcotraficantes), lo es más aún que en su página de Internet exista un juego interactivo en el que el usuario puede convertirse en agente de la Patrulla Fronteriza y cazar indocumentados, o leer los alborozados comentarios positivos del público que no sólo apoya la tarea de “defensa” que los agentes llevan a cabo en el sur de su frontera, sino también la construcción del muro entre estos dos países.

El éxito del *rating* se ratifica porque en NatGeo TV ahora se exhibe, paralelamente a la segunda temporada de *Border Wars*, una nueva serie, exclusivamente dedicada al segmento sur de la frontera y significativamente llamada *Shadow Wolves: Border Warriors, Patrulla Fronteriza: prohibido pasar*.

El 11 de septiembre y el cambio de perspectiva en los documentales de White Pines

El Consejo Canadiense para los Refugiados (CCR) publicó (2005) un comunicado en el que expresaba la preocupación de que las medidas relacionadas con la seguridad nacional se han tomado de manera que han violado los derechos de los refugiados y de los inmigrantes; de que, tanto en la práctica como en el ámbito de la ley, exista discriminación; que en la prosecución de una agenda de seguridad ha surgido una brecha entre los derechos de quienes son ciudadanos y quienes no lo son; señalan que el hecho de que, para combatir el terrorismo, se apliquen leyes de inmigración y no penales, implica que existen dos parámetros, puesto que las leyes de inmigración no pueden imponerse a los ciudadanos de un país y, por tanto, son discriminatorias, sobre todo porque las medidas tomadas respecto de la seguridad imponen, a quienes no son ciudadanos, penas que implican hasta la deportación (potencialmente la tortura) por actos o asociaciones que serían legales para los ciudadanos; los juicios de inmigración, asegura el documento, niegan los derechos primordiales de quienes no son ciudadanos, como el derecho a un juicio justo, a la libertad y a no ser torturado.

El documento teme que, en pos de la búsqueda de cierta seguridad, al discriminar a determinados grupos étnicos o religiosos,² se viole la Carta Canadiense de Derechos y Libertades (Department of Justice, 1982), que otorga (entre otras) las libertades religiosa, de conciencia y de asociación, así como los derechos, entre otros, de movilidad, de no ser detenido o cateado arbitrariamente, de tener un juicio justo y expedito.

Como se mencionó antes, desde el 9 de septiembre de 2001, la frontera entre Canadá y Estados Unidos se ha transformado más que durante todo el siglo XX,³ debido a los comentarios negativos sobre la porosidad de esta zona común, otrora considerada la más larga y menos vigilada del mundo. Los medios atestiguan estos cambios y ello es obvio en la transformación gradual del tono de los programas para la CBC⁴ de las productoras White Pines⁵ y Force Four Entertainment.

El 9 de marzo de 1997, *Invisible Nation: Policing the Underground* (1997), se transmitió a nivel nacional en Canadá, seguido de la participación telefónica del público durante una hora. Se trata de un texto extraordinario, puesto que se plantea,

² Habla en la página 2 específicamente de musulmanes y árabes.

³ Ésta es la tesis en que se basa el excelente y detallado análisis de esta zona realizado por Konrad y Nicol (2008).

⁴ Me parece importante señalar aquí que, salvo los que estoy llevando a cabo en el proyecto "Instrucciones para vivir en el limbo", no existen estudios académicos sobre esta serie de documentales para la televisión canadiense; en el caso de las series de ficción, hay reseñas y tan sólo un artículo sobre *Human Cargo*, del que hablaré posteriormente. En contraste, además de las reseñas sobre las series de Natgeo TV, existen blogs, diarios de producción y muchos otros recursos accesibles en la red para su investigación.

⁵ Y del mismo equipo de realizadores, Peter Raymont y la ya desaparecida Lindalee Tracey, como directores y productores.

con un tono sumamente crítico, el asunto de la inmigración ilegal en la ciudad de Toronto, desde el punto de vista de los oficiales de inmigración y de los inmigrantes; pero, además, tomando en cuenta que el problema tiene implicaciones tanto legales, como en la compleja vida cotidiana de los actores.

La secuencia de créditos nos sitúa en la tónica de la película; sobre una pantalla azul, escucharemos una llamada telefónica en la que un ciudadano reporta inmigrantes ilegales; inmediatamente después, una toma panorámica del lago Ontario congelado y la icónica Torre CN nos dan el referente geográfico de Toronto. La secuencia se cierra con la voz femenina en *off* de la narradora que nos guiará a lo largo del documental, explicando lo que es la nación invisible.

De ahí en adelante, toda la información que recibamos por parte de esta narradora será en un tono poético y dará la palabra a un “nosotros” colectivo que, construido con base en el discurso, deberá leerse como “los canadienses”. También será nuestra guía en el descubrimiento del sistema que impide que individuos indeseables se queden a vivir en Canadá. La construcción de este “nosotros” interpela al espectador y lo compromete para que responda a las situaciones planteadas por el documental y vividas por personajes que son seres humanos actuantes en la realidad.

De inmediato se nos presentará el hilo conductor de la trama. Desde dentro de una patrulla, presenciamos la conversación entre dos oficiales de migración que deben arrestar a una familia rusa que tiene tres niñas y un niño. La narradora aclara que ellos no han creado la política de inmigración, sino que tan sólo deben implementarla. Aprenderemos, pues, que los protagonistas son parte de un grupo piloto de 36 investigadores de migración del área de Toronto, uno de los cuales es un hombre blanco que trabajó con la Policía Montada y otro que es un inmigrante de Guyana, quien en su país fue maestro, pero que lleva diez años en su nuevo oficio.

El espectador será testigo de la ambigüedad que existe en la tarea de los oficiales, quienes saben que los individuos comunes e inofensivos serán los deportados (porque no saben esconderse tan eficazmente como los delincuentes) y, en ocasiones, tendrán que utilizar contra ellos medidas violentas, tratarlos como si fueran criminales y, aunque no creen que lo sean, deben arrestarlos de cualquier forma. Veamos varios ejemplos de cómo se nos presenta tal complejidad.

Mientras la cámara realiza un *travelling* entre filas de archiveros y la imagen nos deja saber que la burocracia convierte a los seres humanos en mera estadística, la voz en *off* recalca que, en la sede de la aplicación de la ley, las vidas ilegales se resguardan en archivos y los juicios de conciencia se inician; la metáfora visual señala la deshumanización del proceso burocrático, mientras que el texto verbalizado subraya que justicia no es un sinónimo de equidad.

Aprenderemos también que, a finales de los años noventa, cada semana se recibían alrededor de trescientas denuncias telefónicas de inmigrantes ilegales; aunque el oficial blanco piensa que los avisos son útiles, el de Guyana siente que: “es como si nos llamaran para que recogiéramos la basura”, y está consciente de que los seres humanos han sido migrantes perpetuos y eso es lo que da su configuración actual al mundo. Por lo que el documental transluce, las denuncias se relacionan

con ciudadanos que llevan a cabo perfiles raciales y desconfían de determinadas personas por cómo se ven, es decir, porque son diferentes a ellos.

Con un *dolly* sobre rieles del tren, la voz en *off* narra partes de la historia de Canadá, basada en la migración, sobreponiendo fotografías antiguas en sepia o blanco y negro de los inmigrantes que construyeron esa misma vía férrea, pero también de los que trabajaban los campos o de los más jóvenes que acudían a las escuelas. La nostalgia provocada por las fotos se interrumpe con imágenes en movimiento de hombres y mujeres de diversos orígenes étnicos, clases sociales, oficios y profesiones en el mismo rincón de la ciudad, como una afirmación —por parte de los documentalistas— en favor de la multiplicidad como componente vital de Toronto. La narradora, nostálgica, crítica, poética, comenta: “Viven, se esconden, se ven como nosotros, tal vez son nosotros, nuestros ancestros inmigrantes que continúan su viaje a casa, o tal vez no son como nosotros, para nada”.

El documental recurre a la técnica del collage en varias ocasiones, mezclando imágenes contemporáneas en movimiento, tomas de personas de distintas razas y edades caminando por las calles, mientras que la narradora sentencia que las fronteras no pueden detener la fuerza de la esperanza. El efecto, en ocasiones, se logra también con el collage de las fotografías antiguas, complementado por un texto que le recuerda al espectador los orígenes de la multiplicidad: “vinimos como soñadores e imaginamos una nación”. Estos montajes, por supuesto, simbolizan el mosaico canadiense, ilustrado con seres humanos reales, con los que el espectador pueda identificarse.

El documental señala que el proceso de refrontalización en Canadá se da con base en las necesidades de seguridad de Estados Unidos. La voz en *off* explica que la guerra estadounidense contra el crimen envía criminales al norte y Canadá queda a merced de la geografía, de modo que se convierte en un buen escondite, debido a que la frontera está abierta. Para ilustrar este argumento, el documental muestra, entonces, a otro equipo de oficiales a la caza de verdaderos criminales: narcotraficantes, pedófilos, asaltantes a mano armada u hombres estafadores. “Somos una nación compasiva y deberíamos estar orgullosos de ello [...]. Sin embargo, debería haber un mayor escrutinio de todos los que quieran entrar al país para que nadie se pueda colar”. Estos delincuentes que cruzan la frontera ilegalmente abusan de la hospitalidad canadiense. Así, los espectadores atestiguan no sólo las persecuciones, sino también los cateos, en busca de papeles, en el cuerpo de personas que aparentemente son sospechosas. Cabe señalar que en este documental aún no se habla de la sospecha como regla ante cualquier persona de esta nacionalidad o aquella raza, como sí sucederá en textos posteriores al 11 de septiembre.

La voz en *off* afirma que “la ley debe aplicarse con imparcialidad”, porque, como el video nos permite ver, hay una distancia enorme entre arrestar criminales y arrestar familias que inmigraron por motivos de mejora económica y que están dispuestas a trabajar y a vivir conforme a las leyes canadienses.

El tono del documental desea concientizar al espectador de que la ilegalidad de un inmigrante no necesariamente equivale a la criminalización de éste; y a lo largo de su exposición modula las diferencias entre las personas que migran, sus motivos

y la invisibilidad a la que su condición los obliga. Por ello, cuando se trata el tema de las redadas en las fábricas, la narradora las considera un mal necesario, dado el incremento de la contratación de inmigrantes ilegales en aquéllas. “Se diseminan rápidamente en nuestra economía, trabajando horas largas y baratas, tal como lo hicimos nosotros cuando recién llegamos aquí”, afirma incómoda la voz en *off*, mientras escuchamos también a los oficiales de inmigración cuestionarse sobre si se trata de una situación justa. La imparcialidad no siempre resulta fácil. Los oficiales de inmigración tienen conciencia de la difícil situación de las personas a las que arrestan.

En estas escenas, los inmigrantes son retratados como víctimas de los empleadores que se aprovechan de su situación, en tanto que no pueden exigir que sus derechos laborales se cumplan ni pueden quejarse cuando ocurren estas violaciones. “Nos echamos sus sueños en el bolsillo, indulgentes de nuestra avaricia; ¿qué los protege de nosotros?”, se pregunta una vez más la narradora.

En una situación ambigua, los productores del documental optan por una visión crítica que permite que el espectador cuestione los resultados de una política de migración que se endurece y que crea un clima empático con los inmigrantes, aunque sean ilegales. En este momento de la diégesis, el documental ha logrado su meta: hacernos saber que los inmigrantes sin papeles no son criminales y que los oficiales conscientes tienen una labor muy compleja.

El caso de José y Lucy, al presentarnos un caso particular con personas que tienen nombre, apellido, lengua, nacionalidad e historia de vida, da cuerpo a los expedientes que vimos en los archivos, mientras escuchamos su relato en español. El hecho de que no existan subtítulos en inglés es otro más de los esfuerzos del documental por hacer una declaración de principios. Se nos presenta a José de espaldas, mientras trapea un pasillo. La metáfora visual nos dice que José no puede mostrar el rostro porque no tiene papeles. La pareja uruguaya tiene tres hijos y espera el cuarto; son parte de quienes llegan a Canadá ya sea porque son pobres, ya “porque tienen miedo y esperan, en silencio, que suceda un milagro”. Tuvieron que dejar su país porque José era policía y alguien que quería vengarse de él lo andaba buscando para matarlo. Lucy estaba haciendo el internado de medicina. En Canadá, ambos trabajaban en servicios de limpieza. Su subempleo es calificado por la narradora como parte de los “crímenes de la esperanza”.

Cuando arrestan a José y lo llevan a un centro de detención, la opinión de Lucy es que probablemente existe una discriminación en contra de los inmigrantes, que es inmerecida, porque ellos trabajan hasta por la mínima cosa que tienen. En el ámbito de lo visual, el documental enfatiza el desaliento de estos inmigrantes empobrecidos con metáforas claras: el pasillo que José trapeaba se oscurece y él desaparece ante nuestros ojos.

La historia continúa en su desesperanza. A pesar de que las fianzas son caras, la familia consigue pagar la de José, pero la deportación es aún posible. El caso de José es al que el CCR se refería cuando afirma que algunos inmigrantes ilegales son enviados a situaciones que ponen en peligro sus vidas. Y en ese momento la escena se vuelve dolorosamente irónica: la toma es en cámara subjetiva, desde un columpio en un hermoso y verde parque, mientras una niña canta “O Canada”. José habla

sobre el futuro de sus hijos, que han sido criados como canadienses, pero que, por no haber nacido en el país, son ilegales. En la siguiente toma, la familia camina alejándose de la cámara fija, mientras la narradora reflexiona: “vivir invisiblemente, imagina el peso del silencio”, mientras se desvanecen ante nuestra mirada. Lo último que sabremos de ellos es que Lucy, que no goza del derecho a tener asistencia médica, ha parido: “Aquí hay ya esperanza, un niño que es canadiense”.

Pero el final del programa es incierto y, me atrevería a decir, no muy optimista, puesto que el invierno ha regresado a cerrar el círculo al otro lado del lago. La narradora concluye que, como el invierno, la nación invisible es gris: “divide nuestros corazones, ¿los echamos o les permitimos quedarse en la sombra?” ¿Sería posible que, en algún momento, los inmigrantes se volvieran visibles sin que fuera peligroso para ellos? Este documental no da ninguna respuesta.

En *The Undefended Border* (2002) encontramos ya un cambio notable que responde, por supuesto, al contexto político y de seguridad. El título, por ejemplo, es una suerte de ironía en relación con el contenido del documental, mucho más largo que su predecesor y con una estructura distinta. Se trata, en este caso, de una serie de tres capítulos de una hora cada uno, escrita por Tracey y dirigida por Raymont. Ahora la focalización radica totalmente en los oficiales de migración. Se ha perdido, de alguna forma, el aliento crítico que daba la perspectiva de los dos puntos de vista en *Invisible Nation*.

La estructura de los tres episodios que conforman esta miniserie es la misma: cada uno se enfoca en una parte específica del trabajo de los oficiales de migración y las escenas de acción se complementan con indicios de las vidas de los personajes, las cuales van de sus opiniones acerca de los entrenamientos sobre el multiculturalismo y la multiplicidad a sus actividades cotidianas y sus muy atentas y educadas actitudes profesionales. Durante estas escenas, a veces aparecen subtítulos que explican algunos procedimientos o que nos proporcionan información estadística acerca de los inmigrantes ilegales, las solicitudes de refugio, las redadas y otros temas pertinentes. Los subtítulos son una manera de eliminar el matiz de autoridad que tendría una voz en *off* que proveyera tales informaciones; sin embargo, el prólogo que se repite en los tres episodios tiene un narrador que habla de la intensidad de la migración en nuestros días y que nos lanza dos preguntas retóricas: “¿A quién queremos aquí?, ¿a quién queremos mantener fuera?”.

Equívocamente, pues esto no coincide con el contenido de los episodios, la presentación está editada de tal forma que da la impresión de violencia y emoción, e inmediatamente nos hace pensar en los dramas policíacos de ficción.

Cabe mencionar, también, que en todos los capítulos, al menos uno de los oficiales de migración, señala que su familia emigró de manera legal a Canadá. Esto indudablemente está incluido para hacer que el espectador tenga en mente que se trata de un grupo de trabajo en el que el racismo resulta algo impensable, de una institución que pertenece a un país que favorece la migración, al punto en que los mismos inmigrantes se sienten orgullosos de trabajar para dicho país. Sin embargo, Marian van der Zon (2000) observa que en Canadá el mito de la ilegalidad enfrenta a los ciudadanos, “respetuosos de las leyes” que provienen de la misma etnia y que mi-

graron “legalmente”, con los “otros”, los “deshonestos”, los que pretenden darle la vuelta a los procesos de migración. El documental, entonces, presenta a estos dos tipos de migrantes y, por tanto, construye la otredad desde la perspectiva de los guardianes de la ley que vigilan para que ésta se cumpla.

El primer episodio de la miniserie se llama “Toughening the Border” y sus protagonistas son los encargados de revisar la documentación a la llegada de los extranjeros; estos guardias piensan que, en pro de la seguridad de Canadá, deben impedir la entrada de quien no es conveniente para el país y, por tanto, el endurecimiento de la indefensa frontera canadiense es indispensable. Las expresiones que utilizan resultan muy significativas, en tanto que, por ejemplo, mantenerse alerta parece sinónimo de sospechar o no tener confianza.

El otro, el extranjero, por tanto, es un sujeto poco confiable. Es interesante que, en los monitores que los oficiales consultan, podamos ver una lista de sujetos buscados por terrorismo, todos de religión islámica, y que, también, veamos mujeres con velos atravesando las aduanas. La aparición de estas imágenes, una tras otra, después del discurso de la sospecha, deja en la mente del espectador la sinonimia que se presenta entre musulmán y sospechoso. Reem Bahdi (2003) explica de qué manera ha afectado a los musulmanes y árabes la práctica de realizar perfiles raciales en la lucha contra el terrorismo.

Para los oficiales de inmigración en los puertos de entrada a Canadá, el entrenamiento es importante, pero también lo es la primera impresión. Según Bahdi (2003: 295-296), el perfil racial implica separar a una parte de la población de un segmento mayor, con base en criterios específicos relacionados con el peligro y que someten al subgrupo a un escrutinio mayor con el propósito de prevenir actos de violencia, crimen o alguna actividad indeseable. Y, con base en la importancia de la primera impresión, resulta imposible para el espectador no advertir determinado sesgo o tendencia: se desconfía de la gente que proviene de ciertas áreas geográficas y se asocia la pertenencia a la raza blanca o a determinada clase social (más alta, por supuesto) con la “inocencia”. En el documental presenciamos el caso de una oficial que interroga a dos mujeres: una tercermundista y otra de Europa oriental. Ingenua y abiertamente clasista, la oficial declara que esta última resultaba más confiable porque sabía cómo llenar los papeles y cómo responder a las preguntas que ella le formulaba.⁶

Los agentes que dan testimonio señalan que después del 11 de septiembre es necesario que mantengan los ojos muy abiertos para separar a los buenos de los malos; la línea en la que habitan no es sólo la frontera que defienden, sino también la simbólica, la que separa a las personas que viven obedeciendo la ley de las que

⁶ En su tesis, Van der Zon (2000) hace un puntual análisis de la cobertura de los medios en el incidente de las lanchas con 590 migrantes de la provincia de Fujian, en China, que llegaron a las costas de Columbia Británica en el verano de 1999, y contrasta su representación con la de los 4 374 refugiados kosovares en la primavera de ese mismo año. El proceso de racialización en el caso de los chinos hace que pasen de ser víctimas a delincuentes; mientras que al considerar que la raza blanca es el centro, los kosovares no sufrieron de categorización como parte de la otredad.

no lo hacen. Por tanto, su obligación es mantener a salvo a Canadá, libre de terroristas, pero con la frontera abierta.

El segundo episodio de la miniserie se denomina “Immigration Task Force” y documenta al grupo homónimo, conformado por agentes de migración y oficiales de la Real Policía Montada, grupo creado en 1994 para atrapar criminales que están ilegalmente en Canadá. Cuando un ciudadano canadiense realiza una denuncia telefónica anónima, la fuerza actúa como respuesta a esa llamada. Según uno de los oficiales entrevistados, las denuncias se basan, tal como se permite que los espectadores concluyan, en sospechas que se derivan ya sea de la raza o de la nacionalidad. “Mucha gente saca conclusiones”; es decir, mucha gente realiza perfiles raciales; o mejor dicho, existe el racismo en contra de los inmigrantes. Una vez que se ha transpuesto la entrada al país, alrededor de cien mil migrantes ilegales —se informa en el documental— permanecen en el área de Toronto y hay que atraparlos.

El último de los tres capítulos, “End of the Line”, versa sobre la deportación, la parte final del proceso que se lleva a cabo en pos de la defensa de la frontera y en busca de la seguridad nacional. En este episodio, los agentes trabajan organizando redadas en fábricas, por ejemplo, para detener trabajadores ilegales, quienes, paradójicamente, como una de ellos explica, llevan a cabo labores que nadie más quiere hacer. A diferencia de lo que sucede en *Invisible Nation*, aunque la paradoja se señala, no se habla de los derechos laborales violados, por ejemplo. Los agentes también buscan criminales de guerra. Situar una actividad junto a la otra le da a la migración ilegal el estatus de crimen y, por tanto, no desautoriza el punto de vista de los ciudadanos que hacen las denuncias telefónicas. Conforme el relato avanza, nos enteramos de que muchos de los buscados son algunos de los veinticinco mil llamados refugiados fallidos, personas que solicitaron la ciudadanía como refugiados y, cuando les fue negada, simplemente decidieron quedarse. El documental, al constatar la cifra, sin dar un punto de vista, señala el “peligro” que implica la facilidad con la cual se puede pedir asilo en Canadá.

En vista de que cualquiera que afirme que su vida estará en peligro en su país de origen no puede ser deportado, algunos lo hacen y esperan que su caso se revise en una corte especial, lo cual toma años, por lo que una de las oficiales de la corte que fueron entrevistadas opina que el Acta de Inmigración debería modificarse, pues otorga demasiados derechos a todos los residentes. Aunque el documental no respalda este punto de vista, tampoco presenta otro que se le oponga. Así que presenciamos detenciones justas e injustas; personajes que se resignan porque ya lo esperaban, pero que explican que preferirían quedarse, en la mayoría de los casos, para tener un mejor nivel de vida. Este último episodio muestra cómo culminan las expulsiones “afortunadas” de Canadá. Concluye con un muy elocuente epílogo de una agente, migrante escocesa ella misma, con lo cual el documental una vez más da autoridad a los migrantes legales y deja sin voz a los otros, los ilegales. Lo que la oficial desea no es impedir que la gente siga llegando, sino tener más control sobre quien llega.

La agenda en este documental de White Pines después del 11 de septiembre podría ser la del mal necesario: en algunos casos, el endurecimiento puede parecer

contrario a un punto de vista humanitario de la migración, pero es necesario debido a que la gente utiliza documentos falsos, miente, comete actos criminales y abusa de las peticiones de refugio.

Como es posible advertir en la factura de los dos documentales realizados por el mismo equipo de producción, la afirmación de que el 11 de septiembre modificó más la zona fronteriza que todo el desarrollo histórico del siglo XX queda en evidencia. También el hecho de que el perfil racial se ha vuelto una práctica cotidiana en las aduanas y puertos de entrada y que, tal como lo señala el Consejo Nacional Antirracismo de Canadá (NARCC, 2007), este país ha esgrimido razones de seguridad nacional para deportar personas que podrían sufrir tortura en sus países de origen, o cómo los gobiernos provinciales “siguen implantando medidas regresivas, recortes e implementan políticas injustas o inadecuadas que tienen un impacto en detrimento de comunidades racializadas o de inmigrantes” (NARCC, 2007: 7).

Una serie de ficción y su ambigua lectura

El 4 de enero de 2004 se transmitió el primero de seis episodios de la miniserie *Human Cargo*, filmada en Columbia Británica y Sudáfrica. En el único artículo académico que se ha escrito sobre la serie, McAllister (2008: 325-342) la incluye en un género que ella ha denominado como “el drama de complicidad geopolítica”. Me interesa seguir de cerca el inteligente análisis de esta autora, pues me servirá para probar que también aquí cabe una lectura ambigua en relación con el perfil racial.

Según McAllister (2008: 312-313), la serie traza las maneras en que la inversión global y la corrupción política conectan los destinos de individuos en el tercer y el primer mundos, mientras critica el papel de Canadá en la crisis mundial de los refugiados, con base en la tradición canadiense de los docudramas, que dramatizan situaciones basadas en hechos reales.

Son seis historias las que se entrelazan para formar la trama de la serie. La de Nina Wade, política conservadora de derecha que pierde una elección intermedia en Columbia Británica y que, al culpar a los inmigrantes de su derrota, como castigo recibe un puesto en la Junta de Refugiados, para mandarla al olvido. La de Helen Wade, la joven bisexual hija de Nina, que se enfrenta a sus puntos de vista reaccionarios y parte de Canadá para trabajar en una ONG en un campo de refugiados en Burundi, donde, por exceso de buena voluntad, causa la muerte de varios niños por haberles dado maíz de mala calidad y la de su propio amante (de quien queda embarazada), por querer enfrentarse a las milicias tutsis.

Otra historia es la de Jerry Fischer, abogado especialista en inmigración, que trabaja defendiendo peticiones de refugio, y que en algún punto de la historia se ve obligado a optar entre su ejercicio profesional y su familia.

La de Moses Buntu, profesor hutu de primaria que sufre la persecución cuando estalla en su aldea la guerra civil entre los hutus y los tutsis y que, al ser capturado por las milicias tutsis, se ve obligado a trabajar como esclavo en una mina de

propiedad canadiense, donde éstas son una suerte de guardias blancas, y logra huir para pedir asilo en Canadá.⁷ La de su hermana, Odette Kaba, casada con un tutsi, quien es arrastrada a un campo de refugiados, donde su bebida muere por el maíz contaminado y su hijo mayor se convierte en un pequeño asesino reclutado por las milicias tutsis.

Por último, la historia de Naila Zalmi, inmigrante ilegal afgana que, en la primera escena de la miniserie, llega a Canadá como única superviviente en la caja de un tráiler (donde además de ella hay cuatro niños hondureños y su cuñado muertos), en busca de su marido, otro inmigrante ilegal.

Editada para tener un ritmo veloz, adecuado a las series de suspenso político, la presentación de los personajes nos indica que la migración a Canadá es el hilo de la acción principal en la trama. El marcador geográfico contextual en que se lee “Canada Welcomes You! Super-natural British Columbia” nos lo indica. Así pues, se abre la puerta a la ambigüedad.

McAllister señala que los hilos de la acción a los que se les da mayor peso narrativo son los de Nina y Moses, quienes culminarán en su encuentro en la Junta de Refugiados, con Jerry como abogado de éste, y se enfoca en ellos para probar que la serie subvierte las convenciones de blanco=bueno, otro=malo, y que su efectividad se basa en hechos controversiales de confrontación racial que han sucedido en Columbia Británica.

Sin embargo, le toma sólo un párrafo despachar la parte correspondiente a la historia de Naila Zalmi y Youssef su esposo, la cual abre la puerta a la ambigüedad del perfil racial, la discriminación y el racismo que la serie critica.

Scot Wortley (2006) se pregunta si el público percibe la existencia de la aplicación del perfil racial y si será posible eliminarlo. No parece ser así. En la actualidad, como ya se señaló anteriormente (Badhi, 2003; NARCC, 2007; CCR, 2005; 2006), el grupo más discriminado es el de los musulmanes y los árabes. En *Human Cargo*, Naila es sospechosa porque es una inmigrante ilegal, porque es la única superviviente de una carga humana, porque es musulmana, porque le miente a la autoridad, porque guarda secretos. El abogado Jerry Fischer es el único que, indebidamente, cree en ella. Un indicio de que la desconfianza es acertada es que, en un cobertizo lleno de inmigrantes ilegales explotados por algún patrón canadiense anónimo, esconde un disco. Si el espectador ha olvidado este detalle, pensará, ingenuamente como el abogado, que de verdad se trata únicamente de una mujer que busca a un marido que tuvo que huir de su país por causas desconocidas y de la cual se piensa mal solamente por su nacionalidad, religión y raza. Craso error. La trama nos descubre que las sospechas eran acertadas. Cuando la mujer al fin halla a su esposo, el espectador descubre que está asociado con un grupo fanático que piensa destruir Canadá y ella no sólo es el vehículo para entregar los planes a los terroristas, sino también la causa tangencial por la que el abogado, quien la auxilia para cruzar por un cuerpo de agua hacia Estados Unidos, es asesinado.

⁷ Una vez que se le otorga el asilo, el subempleo en el que vive es otro signo más de que las políticas del Estado canadiense no garantizan los derechos ni de los inmigrantes legales (Galabuzi, 2005).

Marian van der Zon (2000: cap. 3) señala que, en el proceso de racializar al otro, criminalizándolo, se perpetúan narrativas que yo asociaría con la creación de estereotipos en la ficción. La autora afirma que los mitos nacionales canadienses niegan que el racismo existe y que, con base en la seguridad de su pureza e inocencia, eliminan la culpa que el racismo les produce. La raza —concluye— se convierte en algo separado de ellos; el problema no radica en la “blancura”, sino en cómo se considera al “otro”.

Entonces, es paradójico que una serie que pretende estudiar de manera seria, crítica, no convencional y desprejuiciada (y que en varios niveles lo logra) el racismo, el sentimiento antiinmigrante, caiga, de manera ingenua y casi pura, precisamente en lo que condena.

Como bien señala McAllister (2008: 324), el final abierto en pos del holocausto musulmán es reaccionario. La ambigüedad permea entonces el resultado y nos hace dudar de las ONG, las juntas de refugiados, la objetividad de los juicios y la inexistencia del perfil racial.

Un mínimo epílogo

Con un dejo de humor, el documentalista y productor de la serie *The Border* —para un análisis más detallado de esta serie, véase Martínez-Zalce (2011)—, Peter Raymond, dijo que no hay tal cosa como una mala reseña (Vlessing, 2010), aunque ésta llegue demasiado tarde,⁸ en referencia a los cables de Wikileaks,⁹ en los que un funcionario estadounidense se quejaba de que la CBC utilizaba tensiones entre Canadá y Estados Unidos, relacionadas con las políticas fronterizas, y las confrontaciones con el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, para subrayar las diferencias entre los canadienses y los estadounidenses, a expensas de estereotipar a estos últimos.

Resulta irónica la lectura unidimensional del diplomático, puesto que en esta serie de la productora White Pines hay deslices similares a los que se advierten tanto en *The Undefended Border*, como en *Human Cargo*, los cuales perpetúan la idea de que los musulmanes son sospechosos o culpables de lo que los perfiladores raciales les han achacado.

La producción de estereotipos en la narrativa comunica que determinados sectores de la población, entre los casos aquí estudiados el grupo de los inmigrantes ilegales, constituyen una amenaza; paralelamente, Badhi (2003: 312) señala que el perfil racial permite que quienes toman las decisiones en los gobiernos enfoquen su tiempo y sus recursos en un segmento específico de la población que les parece más riesgoso que otro; después del 11 de septiembre, árabes y musulmanes caben en este segmento. Sin embargo, cabría preguntarse por qué, sabiendo que el terrorista era un hombre blanco, después de los atentados de 1995 en la ciudad de Okla-

⁸ Después de tres temporadas, la serie fue cancelada en 2010.

⁹ Éstos se incluyen en el apartado de las fuentes del presente artículo.

homa, en los que hubo 169 muertos, no se produjo un discurso acerca de los blancos buenos y los blancos malos, sino que se le consideró un individuo dañado, por lo que sus actos nunca se pensaron como representativos de todo un grupo racial.

Decir que este tipo de sutilezas parecen estar lejos de las interpretaciones de quien redactó los comunicados que aparecieron en Wikileaks, podría no sorprendernos; que documentalistas y guionistas —que obviamente no son conservadores— las pierdan de vista, involuntariamente, resulta, eso sí, preocupante.

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Unión Europea

THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL POLICY MODEL AND PERCEPTIONS OF IMMIGRATION

*Xavier Escandell**

Introduction

The first decade of the twenty-first century, particularly since 9/11, has been marked by popular demands for more and more restrictive immigration policies across the globe. Recent events such as the deportation of undocumented migrants in France, the new 2010 Arizona immigration law, as well as swelling popular support for draconian immigration policies proposed by diverse political constituencies such as the Tea Partiers in the U.S. are all emblematic of this conservative turn. While multiple concerns may be fueling the rising ambivalence toward immigration, one important source of anxiety across these different contexts is the perception that migrants pose a financial burden to the state. Concerns about the type, extent, and timing of state-provided social services for immigrants—if any—reflect deep ideological divides in many countries. On the one hand, opponents of welfare programs that include immigrants as beneficiaries claim that these programs not only attract immigrants (the “magnet hypothesis”), but also create a “culture of dependency” and are an unsustainable strain on the state (Bauer and Zimmerman 2002; Borjas 2002; Brucker et al. 2001). In contrast, others recognize the importance migrants have on host societies’ economies and the future sustainability of the welfare system (Cornelius, Tsuda, Martin, et al. 2004; Facchini and Mayda 2007). This variation among institutional environments calls for the investigation of the relationship between the welfare state and practices associated with entitlement, exclusion, and overall political and social membership (Geddes 2003, 152).

In this article, I engage with the scholarly debates concerning the problematic relationship between the state and democratic institutions, as well as international migration through the lens of welfare state regimes (see Bloemraad 2006; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; Bommess and Morawska 2005; Brettell and Hollifield 2000; Castles 2007; Castles and Miller 2003; Cornelius et al. 2004; Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; Freeman 2007; Geddes 2003; Givens 2007; Hollifield 2000 and 2007; Messina 2002 and 2007; Messina and Lahav 2005). In particular, I examine whether individuals’ perceptions of the sustainability and viability of the welfare state system can be predicted by the impact immigrants are perceived to have on the economy and welfare system: what has been com-

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monly referred to as “welfare chauvinism” (Freeman 2009). Welfare chauvinism is defined as resentment of immigrants who are perceived to take natives’ jobs, cause unemployment, and are overall seen to benefit from more than contribute toward the welfare state system (Crepaz and Damron 2009). If indeed there is a relationship, this raises the question of whether the welfare state can intervene and reduce protectionism, anti-immigrant sentiment, and overall levels of prejudice. Do extensive, universal versus targeted means-tested welfare provisions schemes have the capacity to reduce protectionism? The investigation of whether countries with highly developed corporatist welfare state programs (such as Sweden and the Netherlands) are more, less, or just as likely to express protectionism than countries with more restricted welfare policies, where an ethos of individual responsibility prevails (such as Britain), can shed light on the relationship between immigration and the future of the European social policy model. Central to my analysis is the exploration of whether rich institutional environments (e.g., the policies, programs, and legislation enacted by the welfare state) are key contextual predictors in assessing the relationship between different forms of threats to and perceptions of the welfare state. If so, institutional and political environments set the stage for specific inter-group relationships to take place, and, as such, variability across institutional environments will necessarily produce differences in public opinion about immigration. At the same time, within countries, it is not clear whether groups who benefit differently from welfare state programs (such as the unemployed, the disabled, the elderly, etc.) are more or less likely to express approval of protectionism. Thus, building upon the work of Freeman (2009) and Crepaz and Damron (2009), the analysis herein provides empirical evidence for whether countries with more advanced and universal social protection systems not only avoid stigmatization and social categorization, but are also more likely to foster social cohesiveness and actually help socially integrate immigrants into host societies. The findings are particularly relevant in light of a recent study by Koopmans that suggests a very different picture: one in which labor market participation of migrants is lower in countries with more robust welfare state systems. In the Netherlands and Sweden, countries that have embraced multicultural integration policies, migrants’ participation in the labor market is lower compared to Austria, Germany and Switzerland which traditionally “chose to retain high barriers to migrants becoming full citizens and made residency right dependent on performance in the labor market and the absence of a criminal record” (2010, 20). Koopmans further shows that in countries with a limited welfare state such as the UK, immigrants are better off in terms of labor participation (2010, 21).

This article approaches these questions from two angles. First, the relationship between people’s perceptions of the welfare state and threats to it is assessed at the individual level. Thus, classic individual-level theories and controls are evaluated as they are tied to different forms of prejudice and protectionism (Quillian 1995). For example, I examine whether individuals’ socioeconomic characteristics shape their perceptions of the welfare state. What are the public responses to the coverage, sustainability, and future of the social protection system as host societies become more multiethnic?

Secondly, institutional factors are tested *vis-à-vis* other contextual effects (such as a country's economic conditions) that may be associated with processes regarding the development of welfare state policies and their relationship to perceptions of immigrants. Welfare states are defined as "powerful institutional forces embodying ideas and practices associated with inclusion, exclusion, membership, belonging, entitlement, and identity" (Geddes 2003, 152). The approach used assumes that individuals' public perceptions are expected to vary across countries depending on institutional characteristics, more specifically the type of welfare state regimes each country has. Esping-Andersen (1990) argues that institutional structures have historically resulted from class- and ethnic-based social movements leading to forms of collective action and solidarity whose outcome is specific institutional welfare regimes. Institutional arrangements that arise from these class-based social movements will lead to solidarity (and social capital) and ultimately affect the ways migrants become incorporated into the host society.

By introducing the institutional dimension, the relationship between perceptions of economic and political threats posed by immigrants and perceptions of the welfare state can be better captured as a result of the existence or lack of a robust welfare state system. From this perspective, types of welfare regimes (and the policies aimed at regulating social inequalities) may intervene in shaping public attitudes toward immigration. Thus, expenditure levels for social protection systems will help explain the interaction between perceptions of welfare state policies and the emergence of new forms of immigrant threat. Overall, the question guiding this analysis focuses on whether a relationship between micro-level predictors of protectionism and perceptions of the future of the welfare state are mediated or not by the development of welfare state policies.

Immigration and Welfare State Regimes

There is growing literature in the United States and Europe that examines the use of welfare benefits by migrants (see, for example, Bauer and Zimmerman 2002; Bean and Van Hook 1998; Borjas 2002; Freeman 2009). In this literature, one of the key tenets is that as host societies become more ethnically heterogeneous, both levels of support for welfare programs (Freeman 2009) and levels of generalized social trust/social capital decrease (Putnam 2007). Since liberal democracies have the responsibility to provide social rights and benefits to their populations, including immigrants (Soysal 1994), the available institutional framework shapes the relationship between immigration and trust in institutions (Crepaz 2008; Crepaz and Damron 2009). The existing literature thus demonstrates that immigration and ethnic heterogeneity often become an obstacle for the development of robust welfare systems (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Bay and Pedersen 2006).

Empirical research in the European context has been limited to Northern European countries and has focused mainly on addressing migrants' total partici-

pation in the system and the assessment of the overall economic burden immigration poses on specific welfare programs (Pedersen 2000). Bay and Pedersen, for example, examined the relationship between views on unconditional income redistribution policies and ethnic heterogeneity in Norway. They found that many initial supporters of an unconditional basic income policy changed positions when told it would include non-citizens living in Norway (2006, 432). Along these lines, Koopmans (2010, 8) argues that immigrants' incentives for developing language proficiency and improving human capital are lower in these societies and as such they are characterized by a culture of dependency. From this perspective, robust welfare state systems supposedly become a magnet (pull factor) as immigrants tend to gravitate to countries with relatively good protection systems (Borjas 2002). Over time, concerns also arise that continued immigration flows will endanger the very financial existence of the welfare state system (Borjas 2002). Overall, this economic argument can be summarized as follows: countries with higher social inequality are more attractive to skilled immigrants, whereas countries with generous welfare states are more attractive to unskilled immigrants resulting in what Koopmans would characterize as a "negative selection" process (2010).

With the exception of a few studies (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Crepaz and Damron 2009; Facchini and Mayda 2007; Koopmans 2010), cross-national empirical research examining perceptions of welfare state systems and immigration is scarce. Some work has focused on examining differences between the perceptions of the poor in European countries and the United States (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). In a study examining the relationship between welfare determinants and individual attitudes in Europe, Facchini and Mayda (2007) show that attitudes among high income individuals toward unskilled immigrants are more negatively affected by unskilled immigration only if taxes are raised to maintain per capita accessibility to benefits. In contrast, individuals at the bottom of the income distribution suffer more with unskilled immigration if taxes are kept constant and the adjustment is carried out through a reduction in per capita transfers. Based on this evidence, I expect differences between perceptions of immigration (unskilled and/or skilled) among individuals at the lower versus higher brackets of the income distribution.

In a recent comparative study, Crepaz and Damron further confirm that extensive welfare states *vis-à-vis* residual welfare states are in a better position to absorb immigrants and reduce overall levels of welfare chauvinism (2009, 456). Implicit in these findings is the assumption that an understanding of individuals' opinions about welfare warrants an understanding of their perceptions of those more likely to become welfare recipients. Building upon this past work, I argue that bridging the gap in the social science scholarship focused on immigration and welfare states requires a comparative framework to study cross-country differences in the institutional determinants that explain individual attitudes about immigration and immigration policies. Before setting out several hypotheses, a characterization of the different types of welfare state regimes is in order.

TYPES OF WELFARE STATE REGIMES

Across Europe, different institutional and organizational structures reflect the array of social policy models regarding migrants' social rights (Cornelius et al. 2004; Soysal 1994; Esping-Andersen 1990; Sainsbury 2006). Within the social sciences, numerous scholars have proposed different typologies of welfare state regimes (see Arts and Gelissen [2002] for an extensive literature review on this topic). Although not addressing how different regimes deal with immigration *per se* and notwithstanding some negative criticism, Esping-Andersen's 1990 seminal work has provided a useful typology, identifying three types of welfare state regimes: liberal, conservative-corporatist, and social democratic. Castles and Mitchell identified four types: liberal, conservative, non-right hegemony, and radical (1993). Other scholars have further clustered countries by different types based on entitlements (Arts and Gelissen 2002).

With regard to immigration and welfare state regimes, Sainsbury (2006) establishes a three-pronged classification: 1) the liberal *inclusive* model (e.g., the United States) characterized by bestowing citizenship on the basis of birthplace criteria (*ius solis*); 2) the conservative model based on *exclusionary* rights (e.g., Germany) derived from lineage (*ius sanguinis*); and 3) a social democratic *inclusive* model, based on residence rights (*ius domicile*). Another classification of welfare state regimes is specifically tied to international migration. Soysal (1994) provides a classification of European countries based on incorporation regimes. She distinguishes between corporatist, liberal, and statist. Examples of these models are Sweden and the Netherlands for the centralized collectivist corporatist model, Britain and Switzerland for the individualist liberal-decentralized model, France for the state-centered incorporation regimen, and Germany representing a model between the statist and corporatist. A central tenet in Soysal's classification is the variation across countries in terms of migrants' capacity to formally create advocacy groups that seek formal political representation in the host society. Swedish civil society, for example, directly supports numerous ethnic migrant organizations coupled with a comprehensive funding scheme aimed at strengthening "migrant's self-organization and increasing contact and cooperation between migrants and Swedish institutions" (1994, 91). While a similar institutional environment is found in the Netherlands, a more limited funding scheme is provided in Britain and Switzerland. In contrast, France does not directly support collective ethnic identity and organizing, while in Germany, funding for organizations is available, but is channeled through the local government (as opposed to the national centralized scheme in Sweden and the Netherlands). Also worth noting is the fact that funds oriented to the preservation of a migrant's original culture, political activities, and representation, as well as political adaptation (such as services to migrants), are more abundant in social democratic regimes compared to the other models.

Soysal also notes that the corporatist model is characterized by the function of corporate groups, such as faith-based organizations and occupational associations, which play key roles in incorporating new immigrants. Under this model, immigrants obtain their social rights through these corporate groups. Hence, it is

centrally organized and collectively oriented (1994). The liberal model does not have a centralized administration or formal collective groups that play a role in incorporation. Rather, the labor market is the main instrument of incorporation. Even though a central authority determines the basic rules and process of incorporation, that authority does not play a significant role; instead, individual action is the main source of incorporation, with help from private associations or local groups. The statist model is opposed to the liberal model, as the state is seen as the administrative unit that organizes incorporation, and the model does not have an intermediary structure (and so, it is distanced from the corporatist model). As these classifications are helpful for examining the relationship between immigration and institutions, some scholars have questioned their theoretical and construct applicability (Freeman 2006). In the analysis proposed here, I use public social benefit expenditures as a percentage of GDP as an approximation of programmatic preferences of different welfare states and move away from case-specific analysis in attempting to validate these typologies. Before I undertake the empirical analysis, I discuss the main theoretical influences informing the hypotheses.

From Threat to Perceptions of the Welfare State

One key proposition informing this study is that perceptions of the welfare state are tied to dynamics of ethnic competition and conflict (Freeman 2009). I conceptualize *perceived immigrant threat* as the belief that immigrants negatively affect the well-being of the dominant group and this belief has an impact on individuals' attitudes toward redistribution and the welfare state. The threat dimension is also conceptualized as being strongly correlated to anti-foreign exclusionism and discriminatory policy attitudes (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Pettigrew 2000). Thus, perceived threat as well as cultural and symbolic threats shape host society members' attitudes toward immigrants' modes of incorporation and their access to benefits (Fetzer 2000a, 2000b; Quillian 1995). Multi-ethnic societies are thus more likely to exhibit a lack of altruism toward others, especially if the welfare beneficiaries are perceived as physically and socially different and are ultimately seen as threatening collective well-being.

A second theoretical influence comes from studies examining how more or less expansive and universal welfare state regimes influence the relationship between perceptions of threat and perceptions of the welfare state system (Crepaz 2008). The scholars argue that protectionism, chauvinism, and pessimistic views of the future of the welfare state develop as a result of strong in-group identification. The lack of trust and inter-group solidarity toward other groups (perceived as being less worthy and "undeserving" of state benefits) may also influence exclusionary attitudes toward redistribution (see also Van Oorschot 2008). Crepez and Damron, for example, frame this process in terms of prejudice and reliance on social categorizations that starkly differentiates "us" from "them" (2009, 445). These social categorizations foster psychological processes such that "real" threat, conflict, economic competition, or even

prior contact/experience with that particular group is not necessary to spark prejudice (Sears et al. 2000). Thus, limited welfare state regimes characterized by means-tested policies, unintentionally single out “the needy,” ultimately creating stigmatization that can lead to exclusionism. In contrast, more universal expansive and inclusive welfare states foster solidarity across different racial, social, and class groups who participate and benefit from the same state benefits. While social categorization stresses the important role that threats play in creating feelings of protectionism and chauvinism with regard to social policies, the benefits of universal welfare states is framed as fostering trust and solidarity across groups.

A third theoretical influence emanates from the public opinion literature on immigration that puts the embedded nature of micro-level predictors in larger contextual frameworks center stage. Contextual factors may include the effects of ethnic composition (e.g., minority group size) and economic infrastructure (e.g., economic inequality), as well as their roles in shaping the relationships between classic individual predictors and anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Quillian 1995; Kunovich 2002; Semyonov, Rebecca, and Gorodzeisky 2006). In such scholarship, the inclusion of macro-structural factors makes possible new ways of explaining variations in attitudes. Researchers were able to test an array of propositions about the embedded nature of public responses toward immigrants and immigration policies while controlling for individual-level attributes. Studies have shown, for example, that liberal-democratic traditions constitute a key contextual predictor for the emergence of new forms of anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hello, Scheepers, and Gijssberts 2002), permissiveness of immigration policies (Hjerm 2007), or the degree of religious heterogeneity (Hello, Scheepers, and Gijssberts 2002). I add to this contextual approach the ways micro-level predictors are embedded within perceptions of welfare state regimes.

With the above theoretical trajectories in mind, I argue that more empirical attention has to be given to group threat perceptions and their effect on perceptions of welfare systems (as mechanisms of redistribution). This is especially relevant since contextual measures, such as ethnic diversity, may be playing a key role in the development of these views. Building upon this, two very distinct propositions can be formulated: 1) group threat is a powerful mechanism to explain individuals' views about the future of the welfare state, and, 2) contextual measures such as ethnic diversity, economic conditions, and size of the welfare state are mediating factors explaining the relationship between group threat and perceptions of the welfare state. Thus, I hypothesize the following:

- H1: Immigrant group threat explains increased pessimistic views about the future, extent of coverage, and sustainability of the welfare system.
- H2: Pessimism about the future of the welfare state is lower in countries with less ethnic heterogeneity.
- H3: Pessimism about the future of the welfare state is lower in countries with more robust welfare state systems.

Data and Measurements

Data for this study come from the 2009 Eurobarometer 71.3 (European Commission 2009). The pooled dataset is comprised of 30 333 individuals. For the analysis, I use 24 European Union member states: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Sweden, Great Britain, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Cyprus.

The analysis uses one dependent variable, tapping an index of perceptions of welfare (0-1), combining five questions: “At the moment, when you think of the future of your pension, would you say that you are...? Very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, and not at all confident”; “For each of the following, please tell me whether you think it applies to the social welfare system of your country: *a*) provides enough coverage; *b*) could serve as a model for other countries.” These same questions were asked about the future: “Let’s think now about what the [insert NATIONALITY] social welfare system will be in 2030” (see Table 1). Results yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.67 for the dependent variable.

Two key independent variables are operationalized to measure perceptions of group threat: 1) a dichotomous measure based on respondents’ agreement with the statement, “We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of the economy,” where 1 refers to disagreement and 0 agreement (see Table 1). The key independent variable measuring group perceptions is operationalized as a dichotomous variable based on each respondent’s opinion of the statement, “The presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment in [our country].” For this second measure, to ensure that both variables are coded in the same direction, 1 refers to agreement and 0 refers to disagreement. Moreover, the former measure captures the individual’s attitudes toward immigrants in Europe, and the latter taps an overall measure of prejudice toward ethnic groups. The analysis uses three additional individual-level variables regarding labor force status (“employed,” “unemployed” (reference category), “students,” “retired” and “never in the labor force”). Control variables were used, such as “political stance” (1-7 scale), whether the respondent lives in a rural area, and several socio-demographic variables such as “age” and “sex”; respondent age upon completion of education was also transformed as a dummy measure where 1 was “college educated,” and 0, “no college education.”

Aside from the individual-level variables, the analysis uses a series of macro-level measures to assess countries’ institutional environment, based on the official national statistics offered by the Eurostat. The direct measure for the welfare state regime is the total “social protection benefits” expenditure (as a percentage of the GDP). This measure includes health care, pensions, unemployment, and other social transfers. Regardless of whether migrants have access to these benefits or not, which varies across countries, the goal is to assess the overall size of the welfare state regimes in European Union countries. Two additional macro-level measures are included in the analysis: the first seeks to tap ethnic heterogeneity and immigrant composition of EU countries by using a proxy, the percentage of citizens from

TABLE 1
QUESTION WORDING AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
FOR THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL VARIABLES

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>S.D.</i>
Welfare state confidence	Mean index of the following four items: ^a For the following please tell me whether you think it applies to the (NATIONALITY): Provides enough coverage Could serve as a model for other countries Let's now think about what the (NATIONALITY) social welfare system will be in 2030. In your opinion: Provides enough coverage Could serve as a model for other countries At the moment, when you think of the future of your pension, would you say that you are...? (1) Very confident, somewhat confident, not very confident, (0) not at all confident	.57	.23
Perceived group size	We need immigrants to work in certain sectors of the economy ^a The presence of people from ethnic groups increases unemployment in (OUR COUNTRY) ^a	.48 .58	— —
Political stance	In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views scale on this scale (1-7)?	5.43	2.29
Unemployed	Labor force status: unemployed ^b	.09	
Students	Labor force status: students ^b	.08	
Retired	Labor force status: retired ^b	.28	
Never in work force	Labor force status: never in labor force ^b	.07	
Employed	Labor force status: employed ^b	.47	
Rural	Would you say you live in a rural area?	.37	
Education	How old were you when you stopped full-time education? ^b (=1)	.27	
Gender	Respondent's sex is male ^b	.45	—
Age	Respondent's age (years)	47.42	18.22
Marital status	Could you give me the letter which corresponds best to your own current situation?	.54	

NOTES: ^a Measured as follows: Agreement to disagreement. ^b Dichotomous variable (yes or no).

SOURCE: Eurobarometer 2009.

non-EU countries; the second is the aggregate-level control to capture disparities among countries and reflect economic circumstances measured through the per capital gross domestic product (“economic condition”).

MODEL

Using hierarchical modeling, the analysis estimates several models of perceptions about the future of the welfare state as being determined by micro- and macro-level variables. Table 2 reports the results of these models for the dependent variable used. In Table 2, Model 1 and 5, I test for the random intercept effects without any predictors at the macro level. This can be written mathematically as

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \sum_{q=1}^{13} \beta_{qj} * X_{qij} + r_{ij}, \tag{1}$$

where Y_{ij} is the response of an individual i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, n_j$) in the j th ($j = 1, 2, \dots, J$) country on the dependent variable perceptions of the welfare state; X_{qij} ($q = 1, 2, \dots, 13$) is a level-1 predicting variable q for case i in unit j ; betas are level-1 coefficients (β_{0j} the intercept and β_{qj} is a vector of slopes); and r_{ij} is a level-1 residual.

In Table 2, Models 4 and 5 include several parameters at the macro level, and enable a testing of hypothesis 2 and 3. Mathematically, the model can be written as follows:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_{s=1}^3 \gamma_{0s} * W_{0sj} + u_{0j}, \tag{2}$$

where β_{0j} is the intercept estimated in equation (1); W_{0sj} ($s = 1, 2, \dots, 5$) is a level-2 predicting variable or interaction term; γ_{00} is a level-2 intercept; γ_{0s} is the vector of slopes for the estimated level-2 predicting variables; and u_{0j} is a level-2 random effect. Table 3 introduces hypothesis 3 and tests for the cross-level interactions, expressed mathematically as

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + \sum_{m=1}^3 \gamma_{1m} * W_{1mj} + u_{1j}, \tag{3}$$

where β_{1j} is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) corresponding to the three level-1 variables measuring perceptions of the welfare state; W_{1mj} is a level-2 predicting variable (the direct and indirect measure for the institutional environment and other macro level controls); γ_{10} is a level-2 intercept; γ_{1m} is a vector of

TABLE 2
HLM STATISTICS FROM THE MODELS PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF CONFIDENCE TOWARD
THE WELFARE STATE IN 24 EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>
Fixed Effects						
Constant	0.344*** (0.022)	0.356*** (0.027)	0.368*** (0.027)	0.368*** (0.027)	0.368*** (0.027)	0.366*** (0.026)
<i>Individual level</i>						
Group threat perceptions:						
Need for the economy (yes=1)		0.044*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.044*** (0.004)	0.043*** (0.007)
Cause unemployment (yes=1)		-0.044*** (0.006)	-0.044*** (0.006)	-0.044*** (0.006)	-0.044*** (0.006)	-0.043*** (0.008)
Rural	0.007(0.005)	0.007(0.005)	-0.009(0.005)	-0.010(0.005)	-0.010(0.005)	0.009(0.006)
Age	0.010*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.009*** (0.003)	0.001*** (0.003)	0.001*** (0.003)	0.001** (0.000)
Male (yes = 1)	0.030*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.023*** (0.007)	0.024** (0.008)
Education (=1)	0.013*** (0.003)	0.012** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.008** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.008* (0.003)
Married (yes=1)	0.007(0.005)	0.008(0.005)	0.007(0.005)	0.010(0.005)	0.007(0.005)	0.007(0.005)
Labor force status:						
Unemployed ^b (ref.)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Employed (yes = 1)	0.044*** (0.011)	0.043*** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.038** (0.011)
Students (yes = 1)	0.089*** (0.013)	0.088*** (0.013)	0.085*** (0.013)	0.085*** (0.013)	0.122*** (0.013)	0.086*** (0.014)
Retired (yes = 1)	0.041*** (0.013)	0.040*** (0.013)	0.037*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.036*** (0.013)	0.036** (0.013)
Never in labor force (yes = 1)	0.024(0.018)	0.022(0.018)	0.022(0.018)	0.084(0.018)	0.024*** (0.018)	0.024(0.018)
Political stance (1-7)		-0.002(0.002)	0.001(0.002)	-0.001(0.002)	-0.001(0.002)	-0.001(0.001)
<i>Contextual Measures</i>						
Economic Conditions (A)		-	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)	0.003*** (0.000)
Immigrant group size (B)			-0.005* (0.002)	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.004(0.003)
Social Protection Benefits (C)					0.003(0.002)	0.003(0.003)
C* unemployment						-0.003*** (0.002)
Random effects^a						
Macro-level, u_{0j}	0.009	0.013	0.014	0.014	0.14	
Individual-level, r_{ij}	0.040	0.041	0.041	0.041	0.041	

NOTE: Fixed-effect entries are unweighted ML coefficients (robust standard errors in parentheses). All macro-level variables are grand-mean centered. ^aThe random effects for the intercept-only (unrestricted) model are $u_{0j} = 0.0291$ and $r_{ij} = 0.0581$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.
SOURCE: European Commission (2009).

level-2 slopes; and u_{1j} is a level-2 random effect. The overall equation for all the cross-level interactions can be expressed as follows:


$$\beta_{qj} = \gamma_{q0} + \sum_{q=2}^{13} \gamma_{q1} * W_{1j} + u_{qj}, \tag{4}$$

where β_{qj} ($q = 2, \dots, 10$) is a vector of slopes estimated in equation (1) corresponding to the level-1 control variables; W_{1j} is the level-2 predicting variable; γ_{q0} is a vector of level-2 intercepts; γ_{q1} is a vector of level-2 slopes; and u_{qj} is a level-2 random effect.

Results

Prior to estimating the multilevel models, bivariate analyses in Charts 1 to 3 assess the association between the mean attitudinal confidence level about the future of the welfare state and the three key macro-level measures in the 24 EU countries analyzed. Some clear patterns emerge in these charts. For example, Chart 1 represents the bivariate relationship between per capita GDP and the mean level of confidence about sustainability and coverage and the future of the welfare state.

CHART 1
CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE BY GDP PER CAPITA




KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY), Portugal (PT), Denmark (DK), Latvia (LV), Germany (GE), Lithuania (LT), Estonia (EE), Luxembourg (LU), Slovakia (SK), Ireland (IE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES), Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)

SOURCE: European Commission (2009).

First, the dependent measure shows great variability when it comes to assessing confidence in the future of the system. As expected, there is a positive association between per capita GDP and confidence in the future of the system. Especially relevant is the confirmation that Northern European countries such as Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria are clustered together with the highest mean confidence levels about the system. Also relevant in Chart 1 is the fact that Eastern European countries, for the most part, are clustered together at the bottom in terms of confidence levels. Luxemburg stands alone as it has the highest per capita GDP, but remains close to the median level of confidence toward the welfare state. Interestingly, France and Ireland show relatively low levels of confidence in the future of the welfare system as compared to other countries with higher GDP levels.

A less clear pattern of association is presented in Chart 2, which displays the relationship between the percentage of non-EU citizens and mean confidence levels concerning the future of the welfare state. As the measure is just a proxy of ethnic heterogeneity, it is hard to discern a specific trend; however, three Northern European countries (Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands) show a relatively high level of ethnic homogeneity and high confidence levels regarding the future

CHART 2
 CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE
 BY PERCENTAGE OF CITIZENS FROM NON-EU COUNTRIES




KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY), Portugal (PT), Denmark (DK), Latvia (LV), Germany (GE), Lithuania (LT), Estonia (EE), Luxembourg (LU), Slovakia (SK), Ireland (IE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES), Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)

SOURCE: European Commission (2009).

of the welfare state. Along opposite lines, the UK, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Spain, and Greece show relatively higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity coupled with more skepticism about the future of the welfare system. The Eastern European countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, and Slovakia) contradict the formal expectation, as these countries show the lowest levels of ethnic heterogeneity and among the lowest in confidence in the future of the welfare system. Two outliers are Estonia and Latvia, with high levels of non-EU-member citizens, particularly a large Russian minority, residing there. Overall, ethnic heterogeneity seems to be associated with lower confidence levels about the future sustainability of the welfare state.

Chart 3 further illustrates the privileged position of northern European countries, as it displays the association between social protection benefit expenditures as a percentage of GDP and overall levels of confidence in the welfare state system. Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Finland, and Austria are clustered together in the top left corner of the graph since they score high on both measures. There is a positive linear association between these two measures. Overall, investments in social protection benefits seem to translate into higher mean levels of confidence in the future of the welfare system. Such findings, however, need to be put to addi-

CHART 3
CONFIDENCE IN THE FUTURE OF THE WELFARE STATE
BY SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFITS (AS % OF GDP)



KEY: Belgium (BE), France (FR), Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Czech Republic (CZ), Cyprus (CY), Portugal (PT), Denmark (DK), Latvia (LV), Germany (GE), Lithuania (LT), Estonia (EE), Luxembourg (LU), Slovakia (SK), Ireland (IE), Hungary (HU), Finland (FI), Greece (GR), Sweden (SE), Spain (ES), Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)

SOURCE: Eurostat (n. d.).

tional tests to assess the direction of the causal relationship. To accomplish this and determine whether these contextual measures are predictors of perceptions of the welfare state, a series of hierarchical models are presented below.

I tested hypotheses 1 to 3 for the effects of key independent variables at the micro and macro level on mean confidence levels regarding the future of the welfare state. Model 1 in Table 2 shows the random intercept model of key controls—all the predictors at level 1 are allowed to vary at the intercept level. The effects show that older, highly educated, married people as well as males are more confident about the future of the welfare system than other social groups. Especially relevant is the fact that compared to the unemployed, all the groups measuring different objective economic positions in the labor market reported higher mean levels of the dependent variable. In Model 2, I introduced a key control, political stance, which interestingly did not yield statistically significant results. Thus, political conservatism does not seem to play a key role in predicting confidence levels regarding the system.

In Model 3, I introduced the two key predictors of group threat. The results are revealing, since both variables are statistically significant in predicting a change in the dependent variable ($p < .000$). The first predictor has a positive effect, as those who agree with the statement “we need migrants for certain sectors of our economy” express higher confidence levels about the future of the system. The effect is negative (as expected) when respondents agree with the statement “the presence of people from other ethnic groups increases unemployment.” This variable further demonstrates the robust effects of the group threat measures. Higher perceptions of immigrant threat seem to lower the confidence in the overall future of the system. These findings confirm hypothesis 1. Model 3 shows that with all the micro-level variables introduced in the model, the amount of explainable variance in the dependent variable between countries is 13 percent.

In Models 4 and 5, I introduce the three contextual measures at the random intercept level. In Model 4, results show that countries with higher GDP levels display statistically significant higher mean levels of confidence in the system and reiterate the findings of the bivariate analysis in Chart 1. Similarly, the ethnic heterogeneity effect is also statistically significant in predicting lower mean confidence levels regarding the future of the welfare state. These findings confirm hypothesis 2, which supports the literature exploring the embedded nature of attitudinal models. Model 5 adds the contextual institutional measure of expenditures on social protection benefits (as a percentage of GDP) which did not yield significant results in explaining the dependent variable (hypothesis 3). This effect, however, is key for estimating the cross-level interaction effects approximated in Model 6. This final model also assesses hypothesis 3 regarding whether group threat perceptions are more or less salient in more or less robust welfare state regimes. In Model 6, the random slope model displays the effects of group threat. These effects are measured as interacting with the size of the welfare state (the contextual measure of social protection benefits expenditure). The results show that group threat (in terms of ethnic minorities affecting unemployment) is a stronger

effect in reducing welfare state confidence levels in countries with robust welfare state systems. The overall estimated levels of confidence seem to be higher for individuals who do not experience group threat (especially in countries with robust welfare systems). In contrast, the effects of group threat in reducing confidence in the welfare state are also stronger among people living in a country with a robust welfare system. After introducing the macro-level variables, the overall amount of explainable variance in the dependent variable between countries is 60 percent.


Conclusion and Discussion

This article examines the hypothesis that confidence in the welfare system is affected by individuals' perceptions of the economic threat immigrants pose. The results confirm that both measures used to assess perceptions of threat (immigrants are needed in certain economic sectors and the perception that ethnic minorities cause unemployment) are strong predictors of confidence levels in the future of the welfare state. The data show that as societies become more multiethnic and plural, individuals become more ambivalent about the future of the welfare state. Is welfare chauvinism behind these perceptions? The conclusion of these findings seems to corroborate that welfare chauvinism underlies these perceptions since pessimism about the future of the system is greatly explained by the group threat factor. The conclusion of these findings is important theoretically because it confirms that perceptions of the welfare state and ethnic competition and conflict are interrelated. From this analysis, I infer that protectionism is associated with pessimism about the future in terms of coverage, pensions, and expenditures levels, while openness is associated with optimism about these dimensions of the system.

In addition to the group threat effect, the findings are theoretically relevant, as they demonstrate the embedded nature of public opinion processes. Chart 4, shows the effects of the cross-level interactions analysis reported in Model 6 in Table 3. As societies become more ethnically diverse, the trend suggests more skepticism about the future of the system. This not only confirms the group threat hypothesis but also how the visibility of minorities triggers not necessarily "realistic" perceptions of their impact on the host society. More alarmingly, the findings suggest that as societies develop more robust welfare systems, perceptions of threat seem to play a greater role in decreasing confidence in the system. This finding partially confirms the conservative turn in Finland's recent elections. Since the results support the idea that predicted mean confidence levels toward the system are higher in countries with robust welfare state systems, a reverse pattern occurs among those who are more intolerant. In other words, intolerant individuals, or those who perceive immigrants as posing a threat, are more likely to live in a country with a robust welfare system.

The results further confirm an additional model (not reported in Table 2 due to space constraints) that shows that the unemployed (compared to other occupational groups), and thus those who are more vulnerable, exhibit lower confidence

CHART 4
WELFARE STATE CONFIDENCE LEVELS BY GROUP THREAT ACROSS
DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS



SOURCE: European Commission (2009).

levels about the future of the system in countries with robust welfare state systems. These results seem to contradict Crepaz and Damron's 2009 findings regarding the leveling effects of expansive welfare systems. Rather, the results explained here suggest that threat, one of the key predictors of the dependent variable, is more salient in countries with robust welfare systems.

Overall, these results go in the direction of previous research by Bay and Pedersen (2006) in Norway based on inter-group solidarity. Ethnic competition changes views about redistribution and confidence in the system. Moreover, the results partially confirm that the unemployed are more vulnerable and express more uncertainty in countries with a strong welfare state system, compared to employed individuals in a country with low levels of social benefits expenditure. The results thus seem to corroborate that in social democratic and corporatist countries, while the predicted level of confidence in the welfare state is higher, among vulnerable populations (e.g. the unemployed), the effects of individuals' perceptions of threat are more salient.

The existence of generous state and local resources and networks of support for migrants may trigger negative feelings among the most economically vulnerable in host societies. Investing in strong local and national services not only for immigrant populations (such as universal programs to help settlement, language classes, access to health care, etc.), but also for the native born through multicultural campaigns produces the outcome of a more integrated polity. By reaching out

to the multiple constituencies within the nation-state, the implementation of governmental programs can lay the groundwork for greater social adaptation. From the perspective of public opinion, the findings in this article corroborate that anti-immigrant sentiment is lower in Western European countries compared to the former Soviet bloc. Investing in strong social protection systems seems to be a good way to reduce this gap.

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MIGRATION TO EUROPE IN AN AGE OF TERROR: WHAT EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION?

Anthony M. Messina*

The conflation of immigration with terrorism in public political discourse across post-September 11 Europe has challenged national governments to reconcile the contradictions embedded within what hitherto had been a coherent policy equilibrium. For most of the post-WWII period, this equilibrium was comprised of three discrete dimensions: 1) *economic*: securing an adequate supply of foreign labor; 2) *societal*: successfully incorporating immigrants into the host societies; and 3) *external safety*: safeguarding national territorial borders. Indeed, until September 11, Europe's political elites could more or less assume that state decisions taken along one of the aforementioned policy dimensions did not circumscribe decisions made along others. However, with the inclusion of immigration in a new "security continuum" (Aradau 2001), the veracity of this premise is challenged. Specifically, the balance of scholarly opinion has shifted from the view that Europeans are ill informed about and/or largely deferential to the preferences of political elites on immigration-related questions toward the conclusion that policy makers currently forge immigration and immigrant policy in a super-heated political environment within which their policy options are severely circumscribed by an attentive and predominantly illiberal public (Bigo 2002; Karyotis 2007, 11).

Against the backdrop of this claim, this article poses and addresses two related questions. First, *has* European public opinion become more illiberal on immigration-related questions since September 11? Is it *significantly* less receptive to new immigration and/or less accommodating toward settled immigrants than previously (Jennings 2005; Noelle-Neumann 2002, 95)? Second, does the opinion survey record demonstrate that European publics feel less economically, socially, and physically secure? Have immigration-related issues become *more* "securitized" post-September 11?

To address these questions, this article will go far back in the respective national public opinion records, paying special attention to the patterns of public attitudes in Britain, France, and Spain. Why emphasize these countries? Moreover, why conflate the aforementioned European experiences with the 9/11 U.S. tragedy? I offer two justifications. First, the trauma of September 11, 2001, serves as a useful proxy for the 1995 terrorist incidents in France, the July 2005 London bombings, and the March 11, 2004, Madrid train attack. In each of these European countries a major terrorist event linked to immigration (however tangentially and/or

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rhetorically) either preceded or followed September 11. In so doing, it potentially prepared the groundwork for the experience of terrorism in these countries to be interpreted—albeit retrospectively in the French case—by the public through the lens of the U.S. experience. Specifically, it is often hypothesized that, for Europeans, September 11 has reinforced, although to varying degrees, the appropriateness of viewing immigration-related issues through the prism of security (Guild 2003, 336; Soledad Saux 2007, 62). Second, because the events of September 11 and their links to immigration carry a meaning for the British, French, and Spanish publics that few other European publics can be expected to appreciate (Collyer 2006), we can reasonably assume that if public opinion on immigration-related issues did *not* become more illiberal or more securitized for these publics, it is highly unlikely that they did so among other Europeans.

Attitudes toward Immigration in Historical Perspective

On the basis of the evidence in the public opinion record, it is fair to conclude that few policy areas have aroused greater *apprehension* and *negativity* among Western Europeans during the past half century than immigration (Lahav 2004, 1176). This is not to suggest that the public has always and everywhere been overtly hostile to immigrants. Rather, it is simply to underscore that in contrast to other major policy issues, public opinion is unusually consensual *and* negative on immigration-related matters. Since mass immigration began after WWII, relatively few Europeans have supported it, and fewer still have embraced the social changes that permanent mass immigrant settlement have visited upon the immigration-receiving societies (Schain 2008a, 9).

EARLY AND CONTINUING APPREHENSION

To be sure, post-WWII migration to Western Europe commenced under relatively favorable economic, social, and political circumstances (Messina 2007, 52). The first wave of labor migrants generally flowed against the backdrop of widespread economic prosperity and popular and elite expectations that most migrants would eventually return “home,” thus engendering the so-called “myth of return.” Partly because of this myth, the original foreign workers were fairly well tolerated.

The context in which the second wave of predominantly family migrants unfolded was very different. By the mid-1970s the postwar economic boom had run its course. Economic stagflation, high unemployment, and painful structural economic adjustment converged to erode the generally permissive political and social environment in which, for the most part, the first wave of foreign workers had been received. Although economic conditions in Western Europe were better by the start of the third wave of migration during the late 1980s, the end of the decade and the beginning of the 1990s unfortunately coincided with a period of structural eco-

conomic adjustment and persistently high unemployment. Compounding these difficulties were the lingering political aftershocks from the first two waves of immigration. Indeed, by the time the third wave was peaking during the early 1990s, Western European mass publics were not at all disposed to embrace it, despite the positive economic contributions that immigrant workers continued to make (Kuijsten 1997, 209-228).

Even during its comparatively benign phase, however, public concern about the fallout from mass immigrant settlement was evident across the major host countries. In Britain, where the public opinion record is especially extensive, immigration-related issues emerged during the 1950s as one of the most politically charged areas of public policy. To illustrate: by the 1960s and 1970s more than 80 percent of the public felt that too many immigrants had been admitted; moreover, in 1968, more than 25 percent identified "immigrants" as the most urgent problem facing Britain (Messina 1989, 12-13). Indeed, so strongly did the British public resent immigration during the late 1960s and early 1970s that a majority (56 percent) on average agreed that immigrants should be encouraged to repatriate (Studlar 1974, 377).

Even during the late 1970s, i.e., after tens of thousands of migrants were already long settled, 49 percent of Britons expressed the opinion that the government should financially assist immigrants who were willing to return to their "country of origin" (Gallup 1980, 310). Particularly ominous for long-term immigrant-native relations were the results of seven opinion surveys conducted between 1959 and 1972, in which on average, a plurality of respondents (42 percent) said that relations between "white people and colored people" were "getting worse," and 84 percent reported a "color problem" in their district (Studlar 1974, 374).

The British public's dissatisfaction with mass immigration and permanent immigrant settlement persisted throughout the early 1980s. In July 1981, a near majority of the public (49 percent) expressed the view that Britain's political parties were not saying enough about immigration (Hastings and Hastings 1983, 386). In the same month "immigrants/colored persons" were cited as "very serious social problems" by 56 percent of respondents, outranking other social problems including drunkenness, pornography, heavy smoking, gambling, prostitution, and homosexuality (Hastings and Hastings 1983, 438). A further 38 percent of respondents endorsed repatriating immigrants as a solution to Britain's "racial problems" (Hastings and Hastings 1983, 444). From 1978 through 1990, either a plurality or a majority of the public disapproved of the government's handling of immigration in every public opinion survey but one (King 2001, 179-180).

How typical was the British public's reception of early post-WWII immigration? Although the opinion record elsewhere is less extensive, the evidence suggests that the British experience was not unusual. In Germany, for example, 55 percent of what researchers considered the attentive public in 1956 opposed allowing Italian workers into the country (Noelle and Neumann 1967, 359). In 1964, a plurality of respondents (36 percent) felt that foreign workers were a "serious problem," judging them to be "always after the girls" (42 percent), "loud" (39 percent), "not very clean" (30 percent), and "often violent" (27 percent) (Noelle and

Neumann 1967, 360-61). In 1975, 83 percent of Germans concurred that “foreign workers will become a serious problem for us in the future” (Noelle-Neumann 1981, 288). Three years later, 73 percent of the public ranked the issue of foreign workers as either “important” or “very important” (Gallup 1980, 277). Moreover, either a majority or plurality of respondents in 1980 and 1984 endorsed the respective statements that guest workers “should adjust their lifestyle to the German lifestyle” (66/56 percent), “be sent home when jobs are tight” (53/41 percent), and be barred from participating in all political activity (57/47 percent) (Hoskin 1991, 71).

The German public’s continuing unease with post-WWII immigration and its social fallout is perhaps best reflected in the results of two 1980s opinion surveys. In the first (1980) half of all respondents agreed that “in the next year or two” tensions between foreign workers and Germany would escalate (Noelle-Neumann 1981, 494). A second (1986) revealed that although most Germans (61 percent) recognized the economy needed foreign workers, a supermajority (70 percent) nevertheless advocated that their numbers be reduced (Hoskin 1991, 72).

If anything, the aversion to early post-WWII immigration was greater among the French public. Half of all respondents surveyed in 1947 (Watson 1952, 20) objected to the presence of Spanish, North African, and Italian immigrants in France, and a near majority (47 percent) opposed the “idea” of immigration (Mauco 1950, 21). Four years later only half of all French respondents judged that settled foreigners were “rendering services to the country” (Girard 1971, 834). Against this backdrop of negativity toward mass immigration, a majority of the French public in 1947, 1949, and 1965—that is, at the very height of foreign worker contributions to the postwar French economy—opposed allowing a “certain number” of foreigners to enter and settle in France (Girard 1971, 861).

The French public’s apprehension about immigration and immigrants was fueled by a fear that foreigners, particularly North Africans, black Africans, and Turks, would not assimilate into French society. In a 1971 opinion survey, for example, only 56 percent of respondents considered that foreigners in France would gradually become French, while 35 percent expressed the belief that they would always be different (Girard 1971, 840). Moreover, despite the fact that in 1971 less than a quarter of respondents (23 percent) indicated that their particular neighborhood was directly affected by immigrant settlement (Girard et al. 1974, 1021), a near-majority (49 percent) agreed that the then-existing ratio of one foreigner for every 13 French people was “too high” (Girard et al. 1974, 1022).

In comparison to the British and French, the reaction of the Spanish public to mass migration to Spain during its take-off phase in the early 1990s was relaxed and their reception of immigrants relatively tolerant. In contrast to most other Europeans during this period, only a minority (25 percent) of Spaniards during this period believed there were “too many” immigrants in their country (European Commission 1991, A35). Indeed, immigration barely registered on the Spanish public’s issue agenda through the late 1990s; moreover, even at the start of the current decade less than 10 percent of the public identified immigration as one of Spain’s three major problems (Table 4).

Nevertheless, against this generally positive backdrop were several worrying signs. First, beginning in 1992 and continuing throughout the decade, a majority of Spaniards thought that the entry of immigrants from the less developed countries should be restricted (Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001, 159). Second, in 2000 a supermajority of Spaniards (83 percent) endorsed the view that there were either “too many” or “many” persons of other nationalities residing in the country (Díez Nicolás and Ramírez Lafita 2001, 121). Third, most Spaniards felt that immigration levels would only increase: almost 80 percent predicted that the number of foreign immigrants would rise within five years (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 1999), a higher percentage than those foreseeing an increase in the overall consumption of alcohol (55 percent) and illegal drugs (50 percent), and nearly the same percentage of respondents as those who anticipated a rise in the number of couples living together outside of marriage (81 percent). Finally, in 1996 and 2000 more survey respondents than not felt that migrants were being received with “contempt,” “aggressiveness,” “distrust,” and “indifference,” rather than with “friendliness” (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas 1996-2008).

PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11

Although public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants fluctuated somewhat in response to changing economic, social, and political conditions during the late 1980s and into the 1990s (Coenders and Scheepers 2008; Kessler and Freeman 2005), they nevertheless remained mostly negative (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008). A large plurality of Europeans (46 percent) in 1988 endorsed the view that the presence of non-European Community citizens in their country was a “bad thing,” including either a plurality or majority of citizens in three of the six major European immigration destination countries: Belgium, Denmark, and Germany (European Commission 1988, 64). In France, a majority of respondents (58 percent) in 1984 concurred with the statement that the proportion of immigrants in the population was too large and an equal number (57 percent) in 1989 were “personally concerned” about immigration (Lynch and Simon 2003, 164). In the Netherlands, a plurality (45 percent) of persons surveyed in 1986 endorsed the prescription that all *legal* immigrants should be encouraged to repatriate (Moors, Van Dam, and Esveldt 1999). In Italy, a plurality of respondents in 1987 (49 percent) and 1989 (43 percent) perceived either “only” or “mainly” disadvantages to immigration; moreover, a majority (57/51 percent) wanted immigration to be restricted (Bonifazi 1992, 32-33).

With some exceptions, European public attitudes about immigrants and immigration did not improve much during the 1990s (Semyonov and Raijman 2006). As previously, a large majority (74 percent) of Britons perceived the future United Kingdom either as a “multi-racial society with tensions” or one where “groups live separately but in tension,” although in contrast to the 1959-1972 period, only a minority (27 percent) of the public perceived that British race relations were “getting worse” (Hastings and Hastings 1998, 463-464). In France, when asked to

choose between either “integrating” immigrants or having them “depart,” a majority of respondents chose the latter option in three surveys between 1990 and 1992 (TNS Sofres 2002). A majority of the French also endorsed offering “working immigrants” financial incentives to return to their respective countries of origin (Lynch and Simon 2003, 166). In the Netherlands, the 45 percent of respondents advocating that all immigrants be repatriated in 1986 swelled to 48 percent in 1990 and 51 percent in 1994 (Moors, Van Dam, and Esveldt 1999). By 1998, even larger majorities *disagreed* that “Muslims have a lot to offer Dutch culture” (55 percent) while *concurring* that Western European and Muslim “ways of life are irreconcilable” (53 percent) (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, 23). In Germany in 1991, a majority of respondents endorsed the statement that most politicians worry “too much” about foreigners and “not enough about Germans” (Legge, Jr. 1996, 520). In Italy, a robust majority (63 percent) agreed with the statement that foreigners who had lived in Italy “for quite some time should eventually return to their own country” (Bonifazi 1992, 32).

During the 1990s, Europeans as a whole continued to hold the opinion that there were “too many immigrants” in their country, although the percentage of respondents endorsing this view either declined or stayed constant in 8 out of 13 countries surveyed in both 1991 and 1997 (Table 1). Interestingly, Britain, France, and Spain were among the countries where the percentages declined. Undoubtedly fueling the public’s aversion to immigrant numbers during the decade was its un-

TABLE 1
VIEW THAT THERE ARE “TOO MANY” IMMIGRANTS, 1988-2000 (%)

Country	1988	1991	1992	1993	1994	1997	2000
Austria	—	—	—	—	—	49.6	30.5
Belgium	42.9	56.6	53.0	53.7	57.1	59.5	54.5
Denmark	35.5	42.7	45.9	42.8	40.5	46.1	33.8
Finland	—	—	—	—	—	10.4	17.3
France	44.6	55.8	51.5	55.6	55.1	46.1	42.0
Germany	48.1	54.9	55.0	59.5	40.1	51.8	43.2
Greece	19.1	28.6	45.1	57.4	63.9	71.0	58.3
Ireland	7.3	12.1	11.3	7.9	8.0	19.0	33.3
Italy	33.7	63.0	65.0	64.3	45.9	52.6	42.6
Luxembourg	30.0	20.3	32.1	20.6	23.0	32.8	23.3
Netherlands	30.0	44.1	48.7	47.3	47.2	39.6	41.3
Portugal	13.9	18.2	27.6	25.1	30.2	28.1	30.9
Spain	17.4	24.6	23.4	25.2	26.5	20.4	22.6
Sweden	—	—	—	—	—	37.8	27.6
UK	44.5	54.1	50.1	50.2	42.4	42.3	44.1
EC/EU	37.4	50.5	50.0	51.6	43.5	44.5	39.9

SOURCE: Kessler and Freeman (2005, 831).

easiness about the presence within their society of large numbers of persons of color and, increasingly, different religious traditions. As reflected in Table 2, a substantial percentage of Europeans continued to find the “presence of people of another race disturbing” during the 1990s, an especially pervasive sentiment among Belgians, Danes, and the French. Given this, it is not surprising that a fifth of European Union citizens in 2000 endorsed the view that “foreigners should be sent back to their country of origin” (Thalhammer et al. 2001).

TABLE 2
AGREE THAT THE “PRESENCE OF PEOPLE OF ANOTHER RACE
[Is] DISTURBING,” 1993-2000 (%)

Country	EB 39 1993	EB 48 1997	EB 53 2000	Average Percent	Average Rank	% Foreign- Born Pop. 2000	Rank Foreign Pop.
Belgium	21.6	22.3	26.7	23.5	1	8.4	3
Denmark	19.3	24	23.1	22.1	2	4.8	6
France	23.4	13.0	23.1	19.8	3	5.6	4
Austria	—	22.2	13.8	18.0	4	9.3	1
Germany	15.2	13.7	16.8	15.2	5	8.9	2
Italy	12.8	13.9	14.2	13.6	6	2.4	10
Britain	13.6	12.0	13.5	13.0	7	4.0	8
Ireland	8.6	8.6	19	12.1	8	3.3	9
Sweden	—	8.8	11.7	10.3	9	5.4	5
Netherlands	7.9	11.8	9.7	9.8	10	4.2	7
Finland	11.0	7.2	10.2	9.5	11	1.8	13
Portugal	8.3	5.4	11.5	8.4	12	2.1	12
Spain	10.7	6.4	5.6	7.6	13	2.2	11

Correlation between average rank and percent foreign rank = 0.75

SOURCE: European Commission (1993, 1998, and 2000).

Public Opinion after September 11

Did the events associated with September 11 transform public attitudes toward immigration and immigrants? Did public opinion become more negative? As might have been expected, European opinions about immigration and immigrants *did not* improve after September 11 (Pew Research Center 2007, 28). Nevertheless, as we will see below, it was *not* significantly transformed by the trauma of September 11; nor did it radically change in Britain, France, and Spain as a consequence of these countries' respective domestic tragedies (Fetzer and Soper 2003, 256). Although immigration-related issues became more salient after September 11, public attitudes largely continued along the trajectories established years and, in some cases, decades earlier.

More Salient?

Although it is reasonable to presume that European publics would perceive immigration as more salient after September 11, according to at least one yardstick, this does not seem to be so universally. As Table 3 demonstrates, the percentage of respondents identifying immigration as a priority for either European or national public policy actually declined in more EU countries than it increased between 2000 and 2003. Immigration also failed to become more salient in 6 of 15 member-state countries and in the EU as a whole between 1997 and 2003, a pattern which largely continues through to the present. Indeed, only 32 percent of EU citizens in 2008 expressed the view that immigration should be made a priority during the 2009 European election campaign, thus firmly establishing it as a second-order issue compared with unemployment (47 percent), economic growth (45 percent), inflation (41 percent), and crime (37 percent) (European Commission 2008b, 30).

As might have been expected, immigration increased in salience among Britons and Spaniards between 2000 and 2006, a period which conveniently brackets opinion prior to September 11 and after the 2004 train bombings in Spain and the July 2005 terrorist events in Britain. However, inexplicably, its salience declined in France: indeed, by 2004, the salience of immigration for French citizens (8 percent) was among the lowest within the EU and only half the EU average. Moreover, after increasing as a driver of vote choice in French national elections between 1984 and 1997, the immigration issue *diminished* in importance in 2002 and 2004 (Schain 2008b, 127).


TABLE 3
SALIENCE OF IMMIGRATION AS A POLICY ISSUE AMONG EUROPEANS,
1997-2008 (%)

Country	1997	2000	2003	Trend			2008	Trend	Trend
				2000-2003	2004	2006		2004-2008	1997-2008
Austria	23	17	10	-	10	17	14	+	-
Belgium	11	14	16	+	18	16	17	-	+
Britain	18	20	32	+	41	32	35	-	+
Denmark	15	13	25	+	23	27	18	-	+
Finland	5	9	5	-	5	5	7	+	+
France	15	13	11	-	8	11	7	-	-
Germany	25	22	5	-	8	8	6	-	-
Greece	2	16	6	-	6	3	4	-	+
Ireland	6	9	10	+	12	11	5	-	-
Italy	12	17	13	-	12	15	7	-	-
Luxembourg	8	10	10	N	17	12	10	-	+
Netherlands	8	16	8	-	16	16	18	+	+
Portugal	2	3	2	-	2	3	2	N	N
Spain	4	6	17	+	20	33	18	-	+
Sweden	5	6	10	+	11	7	12	+	+
EU 15	15	16	13	-	16	17	(11)	-	-

SOURCE: European Commission (1998, 2000, 2003, 2004, 2006, and 2008a).

The extent to which immigration-related issues became more salient in Britain after September 11 is clear in the data represented in Chart 1. As it indicates, immigration-related issues generally fell below the threshold of greatest import during the 1980s and 1990s; only in 2001 did they consistently rank among the most important. Since 2001, however, their salience has soared, increasing more than twofold. Indeed, 30 percent or more of respondents viewed them as among the most salient in 37 different monthly surveys between September 2001 and December 2007. By contrast, before September 2001, immigration failed to achieve this threshold of salience in *any* month during the previous 27 years (Ipsos MORI 1974-2009).

CHART 1
RACE/IMMIGRATION/IMMIGRANTS "MOST IMPORTANT"
ISSUE IN BRITAIN, 1984-2009 (%)



SOURCE: Ipsos MORI (1974-2009).

On the surface, the trajectory of Spanish public opinion was somewhat similar to the British. As we observed earlier, until this decade immigration barely registered on the Spanish public's issue agenda; less than 10 percent of the public identified it as one of Spain's three major problems (Table 4). After the March 11, 2004, bombings, however, the number of Spanish respondents identifying immigration as a major problem rose to 28 percent.

This said, three facts lend perspective to the state of contemporary Spanish public opinion on immigration. First, by 2007 public concern had fallen back to what it had been at the beginning of the decade (that is, before rising again in 2008). Second, although a large minority of the Spanish public perceived immigration as a "problem" for their country, many fewer saw it as a problem for them

“personally.” Finally, at no point either before or after September 11 did the salience of immigration for the Spanish public ascend to the heights recorded in post-September 11 Britain.

TABLE 4
MIGRATION TO SPAIN: ONE OF THREE MAJOR PROBLEMS, 1998-2008 (%)

	1998	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
For Spain	2.5	9.9	9.3	12.0	13.9	17.8	28.0	17.3	10.1	23.7
Personally	2.4	3.4	3.6	4.9	5.1	7.7	8.1	12.2	8.7	7.9

SOURCE: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (1996-2008).

More Illiberal?

Because immigration is a multi-faceted phenomenon and problems of immigration control and immigrant incorporation are often conflated in public, political discourse, any longitudinal analysis of the trajectory of public opinion must be approached cautiously. However, because we are less concerned in this essay with measuring social tolerance or prejudice toward established immigrants (Coenders and Scheepers 2008) than we are with the question of whether or not public opinion has become more securitized, the aforementioned problem is somewhat less severe.

Did the events of September 11 alter the center of gravity of public opinion? Are Europeans less tolerant of immigration and immigrants post-9/11? In Britain the opinion survey evidence suggests not. As the data in Table 5 reveals, the response of Britons to the question of whether or not there are “too many immigrants” has remained relatively constant over recent years: robust majorities agreed with this statement both *before* and *after* September 11; indeed, the distribution of responses to one survey in 2007 was strikingly similar to what it was both in 1989 and 2000. A different longitudinal opinion survey (Simon and Sikich 2007, 957), which posed the question of whether immigration should be reduced, increased, or remain the same, also discovered that the British public’s views were fairly constant pre- and post-September 11 (in 1995 and 2003, respectively). Indeed, compared to the 1960s, when more than four in five persons felt that too many immigrants had been admitted into Britain (Messina 1989, 12), contemporary British public attitudes toward immigration in the post-September 11 period seem positively relaxed and tolerant.

Evidence of greater continuity than discontinuity in British opinion after July 2005, Britain’s September 11 moment, is contained in Table 6. When asked to choose among five statements about immigration policy, large majorities predictably preferred the option of making immigration laws “tougher.” Yet, the size

TABLE 5
 "THERE ARE TOO MANY IMMIGRANTS" IN BRITAIN, 1989-2007 (%)

	<i>Total Agree</i>	<i>Total Disagree</i>	<i>Neither/Nor*</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
1989	63	18	18	1
1994	64	33	—	3
1997	61	35	—	4
1999	55	33	—	13
2000	66	17	13	3
2001	54	31	10	5
2007	68	22	8	2

* 1994-1999 data from surveys using self-completed questionnaires with no "neither/nor" option and, except in 1999, no "don't know" option.

SOURCE: Ipsos MORI (2007a).

of this majority varied little over time and was actually slightly smaller in 2003 than it was in 2006 and 2007. Fairly constant, too, were the percentage of respondents advocating that "immigration should be stopped altogether." Somewhat surprisingly given the negative environment for immigration purportedly generated by terrorism, this minority opinion never exceeded more than 13 percent between 2003 and 2007.

As Table 7 reveals, more focused public attitudes on immigration from the Middle East and North Africa did not significantly change in the wake of the 2005 London bombings either. Although the percentage of respondents affirming

TABLE 6
 BRITISH ATTITUDES ON IMMIGRATION POLICY, 2003-2007 (%)

	2003	2005	2006	2007	<i>Change 2003-2007</i>
<i>Laws on immigration should:</i>					
Be abolished, so anyone can come live in Britain.	2	2	1	2	0
Be relaxed.	4	8	5	5	+1
Remain as they are.	12	19	17	13	+1
Be much tougher.	67	58	63	64	-3
<i>Immigration should be stopped altogether:</i>					
	13	11	12	12	-1
Don't know	3	2	2	3	0

SOURCE: Ipsos MORI (2007b).

TABLE 7
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON MIGRATION FROM THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, 2002-2007 (%)

Country Year	Britain			France			Spain			Germany			Italy		Sweden			
	2002	2005	2006	2007	2002	2005	2006	2007	2002	2005	2006	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007		
Good thing	53	61	57	51	44	53	58	53	67	62	67	44	33	34	34	26	20	57
Bad thing	40	30	32	34	53	45	41	44	26	33	26	45	59	57	59	64	67	28
Don't know	7	10	11	15	3	2	1	2	7	5	7	11	8	8	7	10	14	15
Trend		Positive				Positive				Negative					Negative			

SOURCE: Pew Research Center (2007, 28).

immigration from the aforementioned region as a “good thing” declined between 2005 and 2007, a *majority* of the British public nevertheless remained positive. Moreover, the minority concluding that Middle Eastern and North African immigration was a “bad thing” actually *decreased* between 2002 and 2007.

Although attitudes toward settled immigrants have shifted somewhat in France since the 1990s, similarly to Britain, they have *not* done so in the expected, illiberal direction. As Table 8 indicates, the percentage of French respondents preferring immigrants “to depart” *decreased* in the interval prior to and after the 1995 bombings (1992-1998) and again between 1998 and 2002. Indeed, fewer respondents preferred that settled immigrants leave France in 2002 (38 percent) than in 1998 (47 percent). On the other side of the coin, the percentage of the public preferring that immigrants “integrate” into French society *increased* between 1992 and 1998 (41 to 47 percent) and again between 1998 and 2002 (47 to 53 percent).

These results do not, of course, suggest a liberal turn in public attitudes. The more recent majority advocating the integration of immigrants into French society says nothing about the motivations underlying that preference or the preferred means by which immigrants should integrate (e.g., through forced assimilation or voluntary incorporation). This said, the fact that many more respondents chose the option of immigrant integration over repatriation in 2002 dispels the notion that the terrorist events of either 1995 or 2001 caused French public opinion to become especially illiberal. Indeed, it is particularly revealing that the public opinion majorities favoring repatriating immigrants (1991 and 1992) were recorded *before and not after* the domestic terrorist bombings in 1995.

TABLE 8
FRENCH ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLED IMMIGRANTS, 1989-2002

Year	Wish for Immigrants to:	
	Depart (%)	Integrate (%)
1989	46	48
1990	46	42
1991	51	40
1992	52	41
1998	47	47
2002	38	53

SOURCE: TNS Sofres (2002).

French attitudes toward immigration from the Middle East as well as North Africa have not become more illiberal as a consequence of September 11. Indeed, if anything, the French public became more tolerant of immigration from the region over time. As Table 7 indicates, the majority perceiving this particular immigration stream to be a “bad thing” in 2002 became an equivalent majority endorsing

it as a “good thing” in 2007. This result generally echoes the findings of a 2007 opinion survey (PRNewswire 2007) in which a majority of the French public (54 percent) concurred with the suggestion that immigration “helps” the country, a sentiment also shared by either a plurality or majority of Italians (51 percent), Germans (48 percent), and Spaniards (53 percent).

In contrast to the public in Britain and France, Spaniards have become more negative toward Middle Eastern and North African immigration (Table 7), albeit over a shorter interval. From two-thirds who concurred that immigration from the region was a “good thing” in 2005, popular feeling deteriorated to the point that a plurality (45 percent) viewed it as a bad thing in 2007. This said, the erosion of Spanish public support for Middle Eastern and North African immigration is not likely to be a direct reaction to the 2004 Madrid train bombings, since the latter postdated the former result by three years. Moreover, as Table 7 demonstrates, even in 2007 Spaniards were far less negative about immigration from the Middle East and North Africa than either Germans or Italians, neither of whom has yet directly experienced a September 11 moment.

Discussion

What can be concluded about this public opinion survey evidence? First, although immigration-related issues have become more politically salient in some countries since September 11 across most of Western Europe, including in France and Spain, they are and have been historically second-order concerns: that is, they fall below the threshold of political significance routinely exceeded by economic and other issues. After increasing as a motive for vote choice in French elections between 1984 and 1997, for example, immigration declined in importance in 2002 and 2004. Moreover, immigration-related issues played only a negligible role in the 2005 British general election (*Economist* 2005).

Second, there has generally been greater continuity than discontinuity in public opinion on immigration-related issues. Put simply, European publics have always been wary of mass immigration and immigrant settlement. The post-1995 incidents of domestic terrorism as well as the U.S. experience of September 11 *do not* seem to have influenced European public opinion to become more illiberal toward new immigration or immigrants. This counterintuitive conclusion holds true even with regard to Middle Eastern and North African migration.

How can these counterintuitive results be explained? Yankelovich (1993) argues that “public opinion develops slowly over a long period—at least 10 years for a complex issue.” In doing so, he claims that it winds through seven stages, the last of which results in citizens endorsing a course of action, accepting its costs and trade-offs, and living with the consequences. Immigration, it could be reasonably assumed, is just such a complex and multifaceted issue. If so, September 11 probably had relatively little impact on the trajectory of public opinion because the most disruptive and disturbing effects of mass immigration had long ago been factored

TABLE 9
EUROPEAN ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION, 1999-2005(%)

Answers to the following:
I am going to read you a list of statements concerning topical issues. Could you please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, slightly disagree or strongly disagree (% who said "strongly agree or agree," not counting "non-response")

<i>Immigrants a threat to:</i>	<i>Italy</i>			<i>France</i>			<i>Germany</i>								
	1999	2000	2004	2005	1999	2000	2002	2004	2005						
Culture, identity, and religion	27.3	25.3	23.9	30.2	26.6	25.6	25.3	30.5	25.6	22.4	25.1	22.2	22.7	25.1	29.2
Employment	32.2	32.3	29.2	31.5	35.1	28.3	27.4	27.7	26.0	26.7	28.8	29.4	41.3	47.5	39.9
Public order and safety	46.1	42.8	39.7	37.2	39.2	29.4	35.8	40.2	29.9	22.8	22.5	24.4	31.9	33.8	34.1

SOURCE: Diamanti and Bordignon (2005, 12).

<i>Immigrants a threat to:</i>	<i>Spain</i>			<i>Britain</i>		
	1999	2000	2002	1999	2000	2002
Culture, identity, and religion	10.6	18.5	25.8	31.0	35.6	37.4
Employment	18.7	26.3	31.0	—	49.9	46.0
Public order and safety	13.7	25.8	34.2	26.2	32.0	35.9

SOURCE: Diamanti and Bordignon (2002, 13).

into most Europeans' thinking, particularly among publics within the traditional immigration-receiving countries. Indeed, McLaren has astutely observed that popular "fears related to the religion and culture of new immigrants were apparent in Europe before the attacks of September 11, July 7, and the Madrid train attack of 2004" (2008, 15).

Evidence supporting this hypothesis is presented in Tables 9 and 10. As the data demonstrate, not only were immigrants perceived negatively by many Europeans before 2001, but the former were already established as objects of general insecurity (Table 10) and viewed by a substantial minority of Europeans as specifically threatening to national culture/identity, employment, and public safety (Table 10). In short, issues pertaining to mass immigrant settlement were already "securitized" for many Europeans before September 11.

Much like the evidence reported in previous tables, the data in Table 9 reveal that whatever the level of public concern about immigrants prior to 2001, the trajectory of opinion did not significantly change after September 11. Indeed, of the five Western European countries represented, only in Spain did public perceptions of immigrants as threatening along all three security dimensions significantly spike upward from 1999 to 2005; in France and Italy it receded.

In light of the aforementioned results, public opinion does not seem to be more securitized after September 11 than before. As a consequence, and all else being equal, the historically expansive bias of state immigration and immigrant policy is likely to continue as long as political elites in Europe view immigration to be in their country's best interest (Messina 2007, 224-245).

TABLE 10
MINORITY GROUPS AS A CAUSE OF INSECURITY, 2000 (%)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Tend to Agree</i>	<i>Tend to Disagree</i>	<i>Don't Know</i>
Greece	77	19	3
Denmark	60	33	7
Belgium	56	35	9
France	51	41	8
Germany	46	34	19
Norway (2002)	45	41	14
Netherlands	45	44	11
Austria	44	39	17
Ireland	42	43	14
EU	42	47	15
Luxembourg	40	47	13
Italy	38	46	16
Spain	34	56	11
United Kingdom	32	48	20
Finland	32	61	8
Sweden	24	66	10

SOURCE: Statistics Norway (2002).

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- 1998 Eurobarometer 48, *Public Opinion in the European Union*, Brussels.
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ANTI-IMMIGRANT POLITICS AND THE CRISIS OF MODELS OF INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE: A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE

*Christophe Bertossi**

The idea that France is the striking illustration of what multiculturalism is not (Jennings 2000), or that, to the contrary, the Netherlands and Britain have epitomized a European version of multiculturalism (Hentzinger 2003) has been held as self-evident wisdom by scholars, journalists, politicians, and ordinary citizens at least since the 1980s. Who would challenge the existence of contradictions among French republican assimilation, British race relations, or Dutch pillarization? Such differences have been stylized into national models. For a long time, these models have sparked strong interest in international social science literature. Models were used to account for national idiomatic integration policies, the structure of public discourses, processes of immigrants' socio-economic and socio-cultural incorporation, and the reaction of European societies to immigration, race, ethnicity, and so forth (for a recent illustration, see Fetzer and Soper 2005).

Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, these traditional models began to go into crisis. The British and Dutch versions of multiculturalism were publicly declared failures, and French republicanism was portrayed as going through a profound crisis, mainly after the 2005 riots (Fassin and Fassin 2006). In the wake of these new discourses, Islam was dramatized as a challenge to liberal democracy and national identity; integration and citizenship were framed as institutional and symbolic sites of a cultural conflict—if not a clash of civilizations—and immigrants as the main agents of the crisis. While they attempted to explain this crisis, scholars who had been confident until then in the existence of stylized models of citizenship became embarrassed. How could the “crisis of models” that burst through in the 2000s be explained with the classical notion of “models” that had been so useful to them before?

Scholars tried to overcome this embarrassment, pointing to different possible explanations. Some speculated about the possible convergence among Western European countries' integration policies, and the crisis of models was conceived of as the indicator of a retreat from classical versions of multiculturalism and republicanism in favor of coercive integration coupled with anti-discrimination measures (Joppke 2007; Wallace Goodman 2010). Others pointed to the lack of flexibility, adaptation, or pragmatism of traditional conceptions of citizenship, at a time of increasing

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socio-cultural and religious diversity; models were much too path-dependent to adapt easily to new problems, and produced “pathologies” in public discourses and policies (Amiriaux 2010; Guiraudon 2006; Favell 1998). Finally, some scholars presented the uniqueness of Islam as the main agent of the crisis; that is, classical approaches to citizenship and integration were not appropriate anymore in the face of such an unprecedented challenge (Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2005).

I contend that these analyses help us make sense of the European anti-Islam and anti-immigrant politics that took the form of a “multicultural backlash” in the decade from 2000 to 2010 (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009). I argue that these new discourses are not merely a political puzzle that scholars must address but an epistemological challenge that calls for a critical reappraisal of notions long held as appropriate and relevant in the scholarship, such as “national models of integration.”

This is what I propose we do in this article, by answering the following question: Can “models of integration” help us explain the scenario of their crisis that seems to weigh so heavily in the explanations of new anti-immigrant and anti-Islam public discourses? My answer is that this is not the case, because the notion of models is strongly biased and ill-founded. Models are a preconceived notion rather than a genuine analytical framework, which scholars cannot use without their research paying considerable costs. However, one should not throw the baby out with the bathwater and discard models entirely. Instead, we can think about them in a way that is more useful for the social sciences.

The Crisis of National Models of Integration: A New Stage of Anti-Immigrant Discourses

On October 16, 2010, German Chancellor Angela Merkel stated that “the approach [to building] a multicultural [society] and to liv[ing] side-by-side and enjoy[ing] each other... has failed, utterly failed” (*Die Welt* 2010). Only a few months later, on February 5, 2011, the newly elected British Prime Minister David Cameron challenged the United Kingdom’s multicultural integration policies, and connected multiculturalism to radical Islamism. He declared, “Instead of ignoring this extremist ideology, we —as governments and societies— have got to confront it. Instead of encouraging people to live apart, we need a clear sense of shared national identity, open to everyone” (Wright and Taylor 2011). Eventually, the president of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, asked during a February 10, 2011, TV talk show what he thought about the question of immigrant integration, answered, “Yes, multiculturalism is a failure. In all our democracies, we have paid too much attention to the identity of the [immigrants] who arrived in France, and not enough to the identity of the country” (*Libération* 2011).

It would, of course, be hazardous to assign to “multiculturalism” any consistent definition that would encompass the differences among the national contexts of reference in these discourses. However, these anti-multicultural contentions

participate in a new framing of integration issues in the public and political debates, most salient since the 2000s.

This framing superimposes several repertoires. It focuses strictly on Islam as the main challenge to citizenship and the values of liberalism. The issue is heavily culturalized, and socio-economic dimensions disappear from the dominant frames about the “problems of integration.” Gender and sexual equality are major instrumental references in these debates about the incommensurability of Islam and Western liberal citizenship.

Another aspect is that extreme right-wing parties do not monopolize these strategic discourses about Islam and Muslims. Of course, they have a massive impact on the definition of the agenda in countries like the Netherlands or France. Populist movements and public figures such as Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders have played key roles in the emergence of anti-multicultural discourses since 2002. However, the debate started a decade before, initiated by the liberal leader Fritz Bolkenstein as early as 1991, and was visible in discussions among Social-Democrats. The publication of an article by Paul Scheffer in 2000 on “the multicultural tragedy” and the 2002 murder of Theo Van Gogh sparked a new debate, in which the Dutch multicultural integration model that had supposedly been implemented in the 1980s was accused of being the main reason for the “tragedy.”

The situation in France in the present decade is another cause for concern. A March 2011 poll forecast that Marine Le Pen, the president of the French extreme right-wing National Front party, could be in first place in the first round of the 2012 presidential elections, with 23 percent of the votes, compared to 21 percent for Nicolas Sarkozy and 21 percent for the leader of the Socialist Party (*Le Monde* 2011). This is a direct outcome of the politics of French secularism, Islam, and immigration since 2002, which accelerated after the 2007 presidential election and the creation of a Ministry of Immigration, Integration, and National Identity. In a July 2010 public speech in Grenoble, Nicolas Sarkozy (2010) stated that the French republican model was failing because of “30 years of uncontrolled immigration.”

How can we analyze this situation? As mentioned above, the literature has been increasingly concerned with this so-called “crisis of integration” connected to a “crisis of identities.” In turn, this identity crisis has been framed as a problem of the competition between, on the one hand, national conceptions of citizenship and, on the other hand, collective identity claims made by migrants in general and “Muslims” in particular (Joppke 2009; Koopmans et al. 2005). And countries like France, Germany, Britain, or the Netherlands have been held up as laboratories of this “crisis” by scholars committed to demonstrating the comparative advantages of the various “national models” they identified in each national context: that is, republicanism for France (Favell 1998), ethno-nationalism for Germany (Brubaker 1992), and multiculturalism for the Netherlands or Britain (Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and Statham 2005; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007). Underlying the crisis of traditional models of citizenship, some authors have argued about a convergence of national self-conceptions of citizenship and a retreat from

multiculturalism (Joppke 2004, 2007). Others, on the contrary, argue that these national models are strongly path-dependent (Schain, 2008) and that France remains a powerful illustration of what multiculturalism is not, while in countries like Britain or the Netherlands, multiculturalism remains something indisputably un-French (see Jennings 2000).

What this scholarship shares in common is the idea that “national integration models” would be a useful framework for the comparative study of citizenship. From this perspective, nothing could be understood about immigrants and minorities in France outside a narrative that identifies republicanism as the French model, or British “race relations” and the Dutch “multiculturalism” as national models for Britain and the Netherlands.

Instead of these understandings, I think the real cause for concern that sociologists, historians, or political scientists should be aware of is less about this “crisis of national models” that attracts so much attention in the literature, than the inability of this literature to provide us with a viable definition of these models as analytical frameworks. In other words, the scholarly notions of a British and Dutch multiculturalism—and, for similar reasons, of a French republicanism—are problematic because they are also used by other non-scholarly agents, who have structured the public and political debates along the idea of models and their crises. My point here is that models are not simply a neutral tool social scientists use when they work on immigrant integration. They are also part of the public and political discourses about immigrant integration, and an argument in the new public discourses against immigration and Islam. It is thus difficult to use an analytical framework that participates actively in the construction of the puzzling reality it proposes to analyze. This leads us to confront the notion of models and assess its virtues and drawbacks.

Key Problems with Models

A national model of integration and citizenship is usually defined as a public philosophy (Schain 2008), a policy paradigm (Favell 1998; Guiraudon 2006), an institutional and discursive opportunity structure (Koopmans et al. 2005), or a national cultural idiom (Brubaker 1992). All these concepts attempt to show how social reality is structured by pre-existing ideas about a nation’s self-understanding (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Hall 1993; Müller 2005; Goffman 1974; Skocpol 1985).¹

Within this perspective, France is conceived as an assimilationist country (as opposed to multiculturalist countries like Britain or the Netherlands), whose national identity is based on a universalistic public philosophy (as opposed to an ethno-cultural national identity, as in the case in Germany). In turn, because France is a republican country, its notion of the Republic is seen as all-encompassing: the Republic organizes the separation between public and private realms (through a

¹ The following sections were first published in Bertossi (2011).

strict color-blind approach to ethnicity and race), between the state and the church (the philosophy of French secularism, *laïcité*), and it underpins the specifically French “political, open definition” of citizenship and immigrant incorporation through nationality (for a summary of all these interrelated dimensions of the French model, see Schnapper 1994a). By contrast, in Britain and the Netherlands, different idealistic structures are viewed as enabling people to mobilize on the basis of ethnic or racial identities, while integration policies aim at promoting group-based identities instead of a common citizenship (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Koopmans and Statham 2005; Koopmans et al. 2005; Joppke 2009).

This perspective on integration models emphasizes first that agency and collective interests are marginal dimensions of institutional arrangements (in the field of education or health, for example) and the structure of public debates (Brubaker 1992, 13-16; Bleich 2003). Instead, normative and idealistic “frames,” “structures,” “idioms,” or “paradigms” are seen as being the primary and main driving force of policies and practices related to identity, citizenship, immigration, religious diversity, and so on. Social actors, from politicians to veiled Muslim women, are portrayed as simply inheriting these ideas, using and adapting to them. In turn, a public speech on immigrants or a woman’s decision to wear the *hijab* are also brought down to a single cause, namely the power of French republicanism or British and Dutch multiculturalism to drive individual behavior, social movements, institutional arrangements, and policies (Koopmans et al. 2005; Favell 1998; Schnapper 1994b).

When it comes to explaining precisely how this causal relation works and where these models come from, however, the literature is unclear. Assumptions about the aprioristic existence of a French republic, which supposedly started on July 14, 1789, and ended on October 11, 2010, with the prohibition of the *niqab*, are common, as are assumptions about the Dutch and British multicultural models. But a convincing explanation for the origins of these models and why they are emphasized in public discourse and policy is never offered. The notion of a national model is held as self-evident. It provides an account of a social world with no agency but a top-down elite-driven structure (see Mathieu 2002), with no real historicity —no substantial difference is seen between France’s republican identity in 1789, under the Third Republic, or today— but a strong path dependency —French republicanism and British and Dutch multiculturalism cannot easily be replaced by other conceptions— and in which ideas have paramount power. It gives no detailed account of where these ideas get their power from, or the processes and mechanisms through which they shape social reality and are accepted and used by social actors in different contexts. In other words, in order to accept the relevance of the notion of national models, one also has to accept as a given the pre-existence of national public philosophies with sufficient influence to shape a whole society.

Another problem is that the notion of a model of integration and citizenship used by scholars is borrowed from the discourse of a variety of stakeholders in political, media, and academic spheres. Analytical ideal types of French republicanism or British and Dutch multiculturalism are akin to political stereotypes, commonly held in public and political debates in each country. When sociologists,

political scientists, historians, or philosophers discuss republican or multicultural models, they are not writing about anything different from what politicians and journalists talk and write about, even if scholars —sometimes— discuss the models in a different way. The notion of model used by scholars is heteronomous: academic discussions on models are pervaded by normative, political, and moral interests that stem from ideological debates in the public arena in which scholars also take part (Bowen 2007; Scholten 2009; Essed and Nimako 2006; Bertossi and Duyvendak 2009). The problem here is the extent to which scholarly notions of integration models reflect and are influenced by public debates, which in turn are structured by dominant and elite-shaped frames. Often, scholarly writings presented as analyzing social and political phenomena are heavily normative. This normative dimension is strikingly obvious in the literature that has addressed the issue of a possible “crisis” of national integration models in Europe since the beginning of the 2000s (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2009). Research on the integration of immigrants in Europe has turned into discussions about the success or failure of traditional integration policies on the one hand, and on the other, about the legitimacy of ethnic minorities’ claims, particularly those made by Muslims (Joppke 2007, 2009; Koopmans and Statham 2005; Klausen 2005). By the same token, these debates have reinforced questions about Muslims’ loyalty and incorporation —“Are they with us or against us?”— and the relevance of a category (“Muslims”) that is used in and is the subject of political debates.

Finally, the notion of an integration and citizenship model has a totalizing tendency: it tends to bundle together social, institutional, and political facets of citizenship and the integration of migrants, treating these different aspects as a “cultural totality” (Foucault 1969, 25), even when scholarly discussions of models are nuanced. For instance, scholars commonly point to the contradictions, inconsistencies, and limits of the republican model in France or of multiculturalism in the Netherlands and Britain. What is usually assumed, however, and not questioned, is that France has a republication model or that the Netherlands has represented the ideal type of a European form of institutional and normative multiculturalism. This common acceptance of a French republican or a Dutch multicultural model in the social science literature hinders our understanding of diversity and integration in two ways.

First, discussions of racial, ethnic, or religious discrimination, or the integration problems of a variety of immigrant groups in a country tend to be limited to considerations of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different models. The research questions thus become: Does French republicanism produce more or less discrimination than Dutch and British multiculturalism? Does the former integrate immigrants better than the latter (Koopmans et al. 2005; Favell 1998; Schain 2008; Brubaker 1992)?

The precise meanings of the republican and multicultural models are often forgotten in such discussions. Of course, republicanism and multiculturalism refer to clear normative systems in the writings of political philosophers (Laborde 2010; Pettit 1997; Guérard de Latour 2010). But it is far from certain that these systems

provide manageable and relevant frameworks of analysis for social and political scientists looking at institutions and social interactions in different national contexts. As mentioned above, the assumption that models are an independent variable that can account for the socio-cultural and socio-economic integration of immigrants and minority groups leaves partially unanswered the question of how normative systems are translated into a complex institutional and social reality, and how they affect policies and the functioning of institutions such as schools, hospitals, the military, or the labor market. Of particular concern is the reification of the models, even when they are addressed within a frame analysis perspective inspired by Goffman (1974) (for a formulation of the reification issue, see Mathieu [2002]; for an illustration of the problem, Passy and Guigni [2005]). The ideological or symbolic dimensions of the incorporation of migrants or minority groups are reified into models, which serve, for certain scholars, as legitimate substitutes for in-depth research and analysis of empirical reality.

Secondly, this tendency affects the selection of and the analytical importance placed on various indicators that scholars use to understand differences among national contexts. It is not uncommon for scholars to derive their indicators from their *a priori* and reified notion in order to prove that these very models exist. For example, Muslim chaplaincies in prisons or in the military have been presented as proof of multiculturalism in the Netherlands (e.g., Koopmans and Statham 2005, 156). However, such institutional roles are perceived as either irrelevant or “pathological” within the French context since it is difficult to argue that Muslim chaplains in the French armed forces or prisons prove that France is a multicultural country (on the notion of “pathologies” in national philosophies of citizenship, see Favell [1998]; on ethnicity in the French military and prisons, Bertossi and Wihtol de Wenden [2007]; Beckford, Joly, and Khosrokhavar [2005]).

This example not only raises the “one-country-one-indicator” issue in comparative research, but also shows that other possible independent variables can be lost in the analysis through the use of preconceived national models. The fact is that the shift from conscription to an all-volunteer military (i.e., the specific institutional logic) has played a more important role in the implementation of Muslim chaplaincies in the French military than the general conception of French citizenship. Finally, this example also demonstrates the tendency of models to strikingly limit the predictive potential usually attributed to them: the French color-blind model of citizenship cannot predict the institutionalization of cultural accommodation in a public institution like the military (for a similar argument about policies, see Wallace Goodman [2010]).

In the end, the question concerning national models is empirical: when scholars go into the field to conduct research, how can they make sense of the behavior and attitudes of people who justify their actions using notions like the “republic,” “secularism,” “integration,” “multiculturalism,” “pillarization,” “ethnicity,” “Islam,” or “race”? I argue that, taken as a comprehensive analytical framework and independent variable, models of integration are not much use in answering this question, for all the reasons mentioned above.

In the next two sections, I propose to look at these key reasons in context. That is, I suggest that we need to observe how the notion of models has been used in recent discussions about the incorporation of immigrants and minority groups in Western European countries. Interestingly enough, these discussions have increasingly focused on a so-called “crisis” or “failure” of traditional integration models in France, Britain, and the Netherlands.

French Scholarly Politics of Republicanism: Debating the Model or Modeling the Debate?

The current debate about republicanism among French scholars has highlighted the political power of the contradictions between the republican ideal of color-blind equality, supposedly at the source of the French integration policies, and the actual discrimination suffered by immigrants and their offspring, and their stigmatization in public and political debates as members of racial and ethnic groups (De Rudder et al. 2000; Fassin and Fassin 2006). One key topic of these debates has concerned the use of “ethnic categories” to assess the level of racial and ethnic discrimination (Sabbagh and Peer 2008). The dilemma hinges on considering these categories as a breach of the traditional color-blind republican approach to citizenship—the French state does not formally recognize ethnic or racial groups—or, conversely, considering the color-blind approach an impediment to an in-depth understanding of the extent and nature of discrimination against French minority group members, a discrimination that contradicts the principle of republican equality (Martiniello and Simon 2005; Simon 2003). This discussion of ethnic categories has not been limited to the question of the state’s use of ethnic categories in the national census. It has focused on the legitimacy of their use by social scientists researching integration in France; this is a burning issue in France, which has nothing to do with the legitimate questions involved in scientific discourse and everything to do with the ideological nature of public debates (Simon and Amiraux 2006).

This debate over the use of ethnic categories reveals two mutually exclusive conceptions of the French model. For those against using ethnic categories, the immense value of French republicanism is that it emancipates individuals through its specific universalistic program, despite actual discrimination. By refusing any reference to ethnicity in research on integration and citizenship, many authors call for preserving this fundamental value (Schnapper 1994a, 1994b). They criticize fellow scholars for using ethnic and racial categories in their research, sometimes accusing them of “creating” ethnic groups in France (Pierrot 1998, 235). Those in favor of adopting ethnic categories argue that the color-blindness of the French model impedes efforts to improve the status of ethnic and racial minority group members and reduce the discrimination they suffer, and that this model must be corrected in order to restore its initial value, upholding the motto of “liberty, equality, fraternity” (Weil 2005; Laborde 2010; Guérard de Latour 2010).

Regardless of the way in which French scholars approach the question of ethnic categories, they do share a similar conception of the value of republicanism: that is, republicanism is the model France has inherited from her political tradition, and it stands, compared to other models, as the best ideological and policy framework to incorporate migrants and minority groups into French society. The existence of a singular French model remains undisputed. Scholars who criticize the contradictions and costs of republicanism nonetheless continue to accept or assume what I would call an imagined normative republic, characterized by abstract universalism, individual equality, and state neutrality in matters of religion. The French model, in other words, is at once a product of wishful thinking, a normative position, and an analytical framework.

Finally, such debates concern not only French academics or students. They have an impact of their own on the international literature for various reasons: French scholars' work is read outside of France; French scholars are often the first interviewees that foreign —junior as well as senior— researchers meet in their initial days of research in France; and French scholars are also involved in writing public or policy-oriented documents (Scholten 2009) or articles in newspapers that often end up on the desks of international academics and are used in analyzing the French situation. This circulation of French debates outside the boundaries of the republic contributes to reinforcing the belief in the existence of the French model, in the form of wishful thinking, a normative stand, or a useful analytical framework that helps explain the idiomatic approach used in France when it comes to migrants and minority groups.

More generally, what this example of French scholarly debates shows is that we cannot break with a discourse that turns unique national characteristics into a normative and explicative model simply by pointing out its contradictions. Quite the opposite. By discussing the model, we end up —reluctantly?— confirming its existence even if the discussion of its principles is nuanced. Debating republicanism does not explain what the republican model is. This leaves the field researcher without a specific answer to our initial question: Does a national integration and citizenship model exist that explains observed reality?

Debates on the European “Multicultural Backlash”: A New Normative Turn

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the question of models has taken a specific turn in public debates in Western Europe, reinforcing their normative power in the academic literature. The difference between multiculturalism and republicanism, a difference long considered a major element in citizenship policies, is less sharp than it used to be (Joppke 2007). A “backlash” seems to have emerged against multiculturalism in the Netherlands and Britain (for a critique of backlash arguments, see Vertovec and Wessendorf [2009]). Some authors, arguing against the conception of strongly path-dependent models, have addressed this multicultural backlash by

describing a convergence of national self-conceptions of citizenship, and a retreat from multiculturalism in favor of a new “civic integration” approach (Joppke 2004, 2007; Wallace Goodman 2010).

A pivotal notion of the convergence hypothesis is multiculturalism’s failure to integrate Muslims. For example, Christian Joppke emphasizes the “puzzling disjunction between an apparently ill-adapted and dissatisfied Muslim minority and a rather accommodative state policy” in Britain (2009, 455), and concludes that “the most deceptive and pernicious [wrong things to expect from the state] perhaps are ‘respect and recognition’” (2009, 470). Interestingly, authors who emphasize the path-dependent dimension of national models seem to share this view when it comes to criticizing multiculturalism as a form of “segregationism” (Koopmans et al. 2005, 11). In their comparison of Muslim collective claims in Britain and the Netherlands, Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham emphasize the singularity of Muslim groups. They argue that, in contrast to other groups, “Muslims based in the Netherlands dare to demand new group exceptions in a dynamic way” (2005, 155) in the public arena and that “claims made by certain ethnic minority groups are less easy to satisfy because they bring into question the very essence of liberal values” (2005, 140).

This discussion on the limits of multiculturalism in Britain and the Netherlands calls for two comments. First, the argument of a multicultural backlash appears merely as a stylized replication of political discourses. This argument is similar to the new politics of anti-multiculturalism that has emerged in Britain and the Netherlands since the beginning of the 2000s. In 2004, Trevor Phillips, then-president of the British Commission for Racial Equality, explained that “multiculturalism is a solution of the past. . . . It implies separation” (*Times* 2004). The statement had a strong echo within the heated debate on the future of British multiculturalism that had begun few years before (Parekh 2000; Barry 2001) in Britain and in other European countries. In the Netherlands, Paul Scheffer’s article on “The Multicultural Tragedy” (2000) generated considerable public discussion about the failure of the Dutch multicultural model, and, among other things, provided legitimacy to radical critiques of Dutch immigrant integration policies (see, among others, Duyvendak and Scholten [2009]).

Second, spurred by this new debate, scholars have become engrossed in the attempt to understand the much-announced crisis of the Dutch and British models, and the reasons for the failure of multiculturalism. Regardless of the way they look at the multicultural backlash (from a convergence or a path-dependency perspective), many authors use national multicultural integration models as an independent variable for explaining the multicultural crisis. In doing so, they strengthen the notion’s normative dimension, which is increasingly connected to the predominant political and public debates on the issue. It also reinforces the apparently obvious existence of a causal relationship between national models, policy developments, and collective mobilizations in a national context, without clarifying definitions of the models, or assessing their power to make sense of empirical reality. This has given rise to a striking paradox: never have we taken for granted so indis-

putably the analytical usefulness of these models than since we started discussing their crisis, failure, or end.

The Elusiveness of Models

Despite the problems with models that I have mentioned, the fact is that the notion of national models can still be useful for the comparative study of immigrant integration on the condition that what scholars construct as national frameworks reflects empirical reality, including instances where the constructs are an official version of this reality. In other words, in order to conduct a debate on the heuristic values of republicanism or multiculturalism as models of a given country, we ought to be able to extract a sufficiently stable definition of French republicanism or of multiculturalism in the Netherlands or Britain as normative value systems to be able to use the models as explanatory tools.

However, the normative consistency of national integration models becomes difficult to grasp when we look back at the last three decades of politics and public policies of integration in the Netherlands, Britain, and France. Indeed, the debates on republicanism and multiculturalism seem to act as a fig leaf hiding the widely varied and contradictory framings of integration and citizenship issues in each country.

In the Netherlands, the idea of a multicultural model has had a complex trajectory.² The integration of migrants was not a public issue until the late 1970s, when the guest worker program ended and it became clear that migrants were there to stay. A “minority policy” was developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s, close to the idea of Dutch multiculturalism described by Koopmans (2005) and Joppke (2007). Even though the minority policy was the reflection of a pragmatic approach rather than the political and institutional expression of “normative multiculturalism,” it was nonetheless based on the idea that, in order to optimize migrants’ socioeconomic integration, the country needed to promote their socio-cultural identities.

This minority policy, however, lasted less than a decade. Starting in the early 1990s, Dutch integration policies were reformulated to focus on the participation of immigrants and their children in the labor market and on individual equality against the backdrop of a crisis of the welfare state. The categories *allochtoon* (those with at least one parent born abroad) and *autochtoon* (those born to Dutch-born parents) were adopted to distinguish non-Western migrants from the native Dutch. This was also a time when concerns about Islam as generating integration problems became a central political issue and were taken up by the liberal parliamentary leader Frits Bolkestein from 1991 onward. In the early twenty-first century, integration policies changed, with the advent of an assimilationist approach that ended up mak-

² The following paragraphs on the Dutch case are directly inspired by Duyvendak and Scholten (2009).

ing the previous concept of Dutch multiculturalism a model of the past, and an anti-model in the present.

This account of variations in Dutch integration policies challenges the perception that multiculturalism has been an unequivocal model in the Netherlands, a question sharply debated by Dutch scholars nowadays. Thus, the significant issue is not which normative type of multiculturalism could have produced the “Dutch model,” but rather understanding why, despite repeated reversals in the way Dutch policies and integration politics were publicly conceptualized, the Netherlands is said to have a multicultural model, although that “model” was applied for barely a decade and was actually abandoned 20 years ago (Duyvendak and Scholten 2009).

Finding a multicultural model in Britain is no easy task either. The very idea of a stylized public philosophy of integration is even more difficult to grasp than in the Netherlands. The reason is that British policymakers and collective minority actors have mostly opted for a pragmatic approach to integration, rather than for a sophisticated normative model like in France (July 2007; Garbaye 2005; compare Favell 1998). In this context, the work done today by the most influential British scholars on this issue may in fact be seen as an attempt to move away from this traditional pragmatic approach and to promote a public normative conception of multiculturalism (i.e., Modood 2005; Parekh 2000).

In any case, before what is currently referred to as a multicultural model, policies of assimilation were the norm in Britain. It was only in the 1960s that public debates focused on the dilemma of a liberal citizenship fraught with racial discrimination (Rose and Deakin 1969). The new Commonwealth migrants from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, who dominated the migrant flow to Britain in the 1950s and early 1960s, were then British citizens on arrival. This had a direct impact on how public debates about immigration were framed. The public issue of integration was framed by two objectives, namely the fight against discrimination and the promotion of good relations among the various groups in Britain (Bleich 2003). The categories used to define these groups were racial in the beginning, with ethnicity becoming more important in the 1980s. Since the late 1990s, these categories have been reformulated in the country, and religion is now a central one. In 2001, the census included a question about religious identity for the first time. Interfaith dialogue is now a significant tool of public interventions on questions of integration, and one of the major topics of debate is the demand by Muslim groups for the recognition of religious categories in anti-discrimination legislation. In summary, the British “multicultural crisis” is only a discursive strategy that serves as a proxy for a new wave of changes in the frameworks defining public debates and public interventions on integration.

Finally, a comparable analysis can be done regarding the republican model in France. Ever since the question of immigrant minorities’ integration emerged on the political agenda in the mid-1980s, there have been at least four normative conceptualizations of the French model. Each of these sees integration and the corresponding public response in a specific way that clashes with the three others (Bertossi

2009): the groups labeled as “immigrants” are never defined in the same way;³ the origin of the challenge posed to the republican concept of common belonging is never perceived as being the same; behind the constant call for “tradition” and the “principles of the Republic” (Feldblum 1999), the public response is always different and always clashes with the historical republican foundation.

A first “normative republic” conception held sway in the mid-1980s with the end of the myth of the return of immigrants to their countries of origin: immigrants had become part of French society (see Sayad 1999). At the same time, the National Front, France’s extreme right-wing party, began to take on weight in the public debate, achieving its first electoral successes in local (1983), European (1984), and national (1986) elections. The public issue of the integration of immigrant minorities was defined in terms of loyalty (the *Français de papiers* or “identity-card-citizens”), allegiance (the issue of mandatory military service for individuals with dual nationalities) (Bertossi 2001), and, soon thereafter, religion (with the first headscarf affair in 1989) (Kepel 1987). After several attempts, the Law of 1993 set new conditions for access to citizenship, requiring a *manifestation de volonté* (an explicit request) and thereby eliminating the century-old tradition of automatic access to citizenship for those born in France (Weil 2002).

This first conceptualization of the republican model was replaced at the end of the 1990s by a new normative program based on the “French invention of discrimination” (Fassin 2002), which drastically changed the integration debate. The notion of formal equality (having French citizenship) became secondary to a substantive definition of equality (having French citizenship and not being discriminated against) (Conseil d’État 1997). The issue was no longer one of foreigners wanting to become French citizens, but of French citizens needing to be provided with equal opportunities by French society and institutions.

Soon afterwards, the public conceptualization of republican principles evolved toward a third normative republic that denounced the anti-discriminatory element as a “purely moral approach” unsuitable for confronting “a stream of converging indices reflected in various forms of identity-related movements and tensions” (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2006, 17). In the early 2000s, the secular republic appeared as the new yardstick in the integration debate. However, far from being defined in the terms of the 1905 law, the founding law on *laïcité*, secularism became a moral framework that defined identity and was linked to new debates on gender equality, sexuality, and the “deviance” of immigrant family structures (e.g., accusations of polygamy and machismo or concerns about overcrowded households in immigrant neighborhoods). The public response to this evolution is summed up in the Law of March 15, 2004, which disallowed “conspicuous religious signs” in public schools and imposed the posting of a “secularism charter” in the hallways of public buildings, namely hospitals (Haut Conseil à l’Intégration 2007).

³ The term “immigrant” is used in public discourse and debates in France to refer to people who are not immigrants at all, but French-born children and grandchildren of immigrants.

It seems to me that a fourth normative republic is in the making. Behind the conspicuous secular dimension of the current debate about banning the burka in public places, which affects fewer than 2 000 women, something else appears to mark a new stage in the republican framework. Current debates about integration, and in particular the integration of Muslim groups, are no longer enclosed within the limits of abstract universalism, but are part of a “civilizational program,” which Nicholas Sarkozy explicitly described in a November 12, 2009, speech on integration and French national identity. Sarkozy’s remarks heralded the return of a notion that had been explicitly abandoned by the republican integration model since the 1980s: assimilation is now supported by the notion of “immaterial public order” (meaning that sociocultural integration is a matter of public order and security) (Conseil d’État 2010).

This discussion of the four notions of the republic raises a key question: Which conceptualization are we using when we discuss the republican model? Is it the republic of nationality, anti-discrimination, secularism, or the republic of moral assimilation and public order? These four frameworks lead to different and mutually contradictory diagnoses of existing social problems, and give rise to different normative programs.

This brief comparison of the Netherlands, Britain, and France shows the limits of the idea of an unequivocal integration model prevailing in each country. It also repositions the “crisis of models” discourse beyond a before-and-after perception of a glorious past that has given way to the current decline. This repositioning allows us to rid ourselves of the idea of normative blocks being put to the test of multicultural and Muslim claims or nationalist reaction since the early twenty-first century. These highly stylized national models, as we often imagine them, have never existed, not because of the contradictions or the gap between their precepts and observable reality, but for the simple reason that they were never institutionalized or internalized on the basis of stable, univocal, and coherent normative systems over the last 30 years.

Finding the Models: Five Working Propositions

So, we come back to my original question: Do national models provide either a partial or a complete explanation of reality as empirically observed by field researchers? What can national integration models teach us about the practices of those who speak about the French Republic, multiculturalism, integration, and ethnicity? It is not enough to show, as I have done, the problems with concepts like national integration models. The fact that these models are not institutionally consistent, normatively coherent, culturally defined, or historically stable does not mean that they are simply figments of the imagination of researchers engaged in ideological debates on immigrants’ integration.

Models are not an illusion created by public or political debates. This is the most important element of my argument: when trying to address issues such as

the integration of migrants and citizenship in a context of diversity, we are confronted with a wide range of social actors (including scholars) who believe in the existence of these models and use them to justify strategic choices and their own practices.

It is not enough to conclude that national models do not exist, because the reality scholars observe is, in fact, saturated with “modelized” thoughts and “modelizing” practices. The subjects of our research (social actors) believe in the existence of a French model built on principles inherited from the French Revolution or in the existence of a Dutch and a British multiculturalism. Models are discussed everywhere: in working-class pubs, hospital hallways, at the desks of family allowance organizations, in police stations, in school staff rooms, in union or NGO meetings, in the reader commentary sections of newspaper websites, in summits of European ministers of the interior, to name just a few.

It is therefore wrong to say that national models of integration should not be taken seriously because many people do take these models very seriously. The model concepts are used, imagined, negotiated, affirmed, contested, and challenged by different types of people. Models should not be studied as if they exist in a stable and consistent normative, cultural, historical, and institutional context. It is critical to be aware of the diverse uses of models and the negotiations, discussions — and misunderstandings — in which they play a role. The cognitive turn in the social science literature on ethnicity, which conceptualizes “ethnicity, race, and nation as perspectives on the world rather than entities in the world” (Brubaker et al. 2004, 31), is therefore a promising perspective for repositioning the notion of national integration models (see also Weber 1991, 58-59; Schütz 1982). This perspective helps avoid a positivist approach that often reduces questions about national models to questions about “how institutions think” (Douglas 1986) and how members of a society are configured in idealistic structures and shaped by societal institutions. The perspective helps place social actors’ agency front and center, removing it from behind the screen of official and formal narratives of nations’ cultural self-understandings.

Models are not the *a priori* resource for action or an *ex ante* normative framework through which actors give shape to their strategies. Instead, these strategies give shape to varying, polysemic, and contradictory models. Models do not impose on social actors ready-made ways for deciding what to do and how to do it. A wide range of social actors contribute to the construction of national models through the definition of agendas, specific problematization of issues at stake, the understanding of situations, categorization of social groups, and moral entrepreneurship (Becker 1963), to which they attribute substantial content (e.g., a normative value system, a matrix of justification, typified categories within the sense of a social hierarchy, a moral judgment) (Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Lamont 2002; Bowen 2009).

If we take models as cognition, involving more than merely the policymaking community and telling much more than a mere univocal official narrative about how nations define their self-identity, we no longer conceive of them as an independent but as a dependent variable. This way, we can avoid two major drawbacks:

we can free ourselves from a totalizing and non-reflexive use of models (i.e., republicanism or multiculturalism as fully explaining citizenship in France, the Netherlands, and Britain) and steer clear of overly dismissive conceptions of models (i.e., they count for nothing at all). In other words, French republicanism, British and Dutch multiculturalism, or other national stylized conceptions of citizenship cannot be held up as objective entities. They cannot be turned into the explanatory framework for the differences that exist among national contexts. Rather, they work as what I call “cognitive vanishing-points.” These points are used as structures of reference in various contexts to frame the questions of identity, of common belonging, and of inclusion and exclusion. However, this framing activity is not monopolized by one social group (policymakers or national elites) and does not produce univocal, coherent, and homogeneous normative entities. Five inter-related working propositions about national models summarize the argument I have laid out here:

- Far from being homogeneous blocks, national models are constantly contradicted by social, political, and institutional practices. Contradictions are part of these models and can represent exogenous divergences —the precepts of a model are contradicted by public policies in certain sectors— or endogenous divergences —contradictory principles may be claimed in the name of the same model.
- Models are not stable and allow varying problematizations across time. To speak of republicanism as the French model or multiculturalism in Britain or the Netherlands leaves much to be said about the stark differences that characterize public discussions on the integration of migrants and the project of equality and inclusion of diversity within the existing national context.
- Models are not an *a priori* normative matrix but an *a posteriori* problematization. French universalism, Dutch tolerance, or British racial equality are not the starting point but the temporary outcome of public discussions. Models are the result of chaotic negotiations on the meaning of “the integration problem” and its solution. Debates about models are aimed at imposing a dominant framework, which is never given before the discussion reaches a very provisional stage. To speak of republicanism, multiculturalism, and the crisis of European national models is part of the attempt to impose a dominant frame in public discussion.
- Models are not absolute but polysemic expressions. Thus, they offer a strategic ambiguity (Eisenberg 1984; Leitch and Davenport 2007) that makes them easily manipulated by different actors who seek different outcomes from the discussion. If scholars refer in their analyses to French republicanism or Dutch and British multiculturalism, so do journalists, politicians, immigrant associations, and other actors. However, the content that each attaches to these or other similar concepts (secularism, pillarization, state neutrality, integration, etc.) is very often different. They may seem to be discussing the same issues, but behind the seeming linguistic stability of these

concepts, people attribute widely different, even opposite, normative connotations to the models. What do assertions such as “France is republican,” “republican principles require the banning of the burka,” or “because France is republican, we cannot use ethnic statistics” have in common? Each use of the word “republic” has different implications (a political regime with a constitution, a moral judgment about religious freedom, a statement about the consequence of an ideology for research). The closely-knit interrelationship among these different dimensions cannot be taken as a given—are they really part of a consistent and integrated single scheme?—but must be explained (how each belongs to different schemes and affects the others). Not only are contradictions an inherent feature of models (the first proposition), but the model-constructing process involves a variety of “spheres of justice” or “worlds of justification” (Walzer 1983; Boltanski and Thévenot 1991; Bowen 2009; Schütz 1982). The possible discrepancy between one sphere and another may lead to misunderstandings by concerned actors, which, in turn, reinforces the contradictions I already mentioned. For instance, the principle of gender equality may be used to try to liberate those viewed as being oppressed (for example, women wearing the *niqab* and seen as dominated by husbands or brothers) and, at the same time, deprive these same women of their status as citizens (by refusing them access to nationality because they wear the *niqab*). In the Netherlands, tolerance (toward same sex couples, for instance) may be used as a basis for intolerant discourse (against Muslim populations, for example).

- While they lack any stable normative content, models represent a performative practice (Austin 1962). This type of practice produces additional meaning in routine social relations between actors who share a belief in a normatively consistent and coherent social and political world but attribute very different meanings to this fact (proposition 4). Behind the various uses, contradictory practices, disagreements regarding future action, disputes on the normative approach of what the integration of migrants ought to be, or on citizenship in a context of cultural, religious, ethnic or racial diversity, actors in fact discuss the contradictions, drifting, and limitations of the models without ever doubting their existence. These discussions routinize the idea that France is undeniably republican or that Britain and the Netherlands are multicultural, the effects of which are real, including the institutionalization of the narrative. This performative effect should not only be explored in the realm of official institutions and policies, but also in the cognitive construction of social reality, in which all the segments that make up a society participate.

Conclusion

My aim in this article has not been to propose a new theory of the notion of national integration models. Instead, I have argued that models of integration are an

inappropriate tool for the comparative study of integration inasmuch as the objective of that research is to assess the success or failure of a national approach to integrating migrants and minority groups. I have shown that the notion of national models is polluted by normative (if not moral) connotations that hinder social scientists' ability to address empirical reality.

If models tend to be taken as a substitute for reality and distort research strategies, we should not discard them entirely. The five working propositions I have presented suggest a way forward to shift research on national models. A considerable amount of energy has been expended in trying to extract a complex social reality from national integration models, with the risk of caricaturing the world that we study by using extremely attractive, but limited, narratives. It seems to me that it is time for us to move backward, so to speak, inducing models from reality and conceiving of them as fluctuating dependent variables that must be explained. If we really want to understand the injustices of our societies, I believe that we need to study the actors who develop a multiplicity of conceptions of equality, inclusion, and identity, and understand from a sociological perspective how national models of integration play a role in these developments.

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ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS, ACTIONS, AND POLICIES IN EUROPE. THE CASE OF THREE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES: DENMARK, SWEDEN, AND FINLAND

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The European Union (EU) of today is a scene of clashing options: those advocating liberalizing migration policy on the one hand and those calling for stricter immigration regulations by individual member states on the other. This clash frequently happens indirectly and obliquely, substantiated by the otherwise understandable argumentation of the need to protect a given state's domestic interests. This article examines the case of three Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) and the shape of the current discourse on the need to reform today's immigration policy. The applied qualitative research method includes analysis of official statements made by politicians and analysis of media content (TV, newspapers) in the years 2005-2010. The discourse reveals the direction of changes that might be expected in the form of new immigration policy in the Nordic countries.

The French policy reform, Code on the Entry and Stay of Foreigners and the Right to Exile (CESEDA), opens the door to educated immigrants, but requires the newcomers to undertake every effort to assimilate into mainstream society. Moreover, the code restricts the family reunification law considerably, tightens the law on mixed marriages and naturalization, and —most controversially— excludes automatic legalization of the status of illegal immigrants' children (Bolzman and Baucher 2006).¹

This kind of change in immigration law, proposed in 2006 by Nicolas Sarkozy, is no novelty, not only in France, but in most of the highly developed European countries. Migration policy reform has become one of the major subjects deliberated in the first decade of the present century. Following the French example, other European Union member states also embarked on modifying their migration policies. It appears that current migration policy spans two aspects: *immigration policy* (legal regulation of immigration streams) and *immigrant policy* (policy determining the management of ethnic and cultural diversity, directly linked to immigrant groups, and their right to participate in the social, political, and economic life of the receiving country).

Legal regulation of immigration streams, from the point of view of the receiving country's interests, necessarily has to aspire to relatively conservative solutions. It exercises control over the number of immigrants and their market usefulness. As

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¹ The law makes it very difficult to obtain legal residency and prolongs procedures and multiplies the number of documents immigrants must submit.

the experience of modern Europe reveals, in some countries (e.g., France, Denmark, Belgium, Germany, or Austria) restrictions to free access to the domestic market have been introduced particularly for uneducated people or those with insufficient vocational qualifications. Instruments servicing that selection are, among others, the “reception and integration contracts.”² Failure to comply with these contracts may result in unpleasant consequences for the immigrant, including an “invitation to leave the country of residence.”

European countries unanimously agree on tightened border control along the frontier between the EU and the rest of the world, but different approaches to integrating foreigners have left every member state to develop its own strategy for immigrants’ integration.³ For some countries, effective integration policy consists of granting foreigners applying for permanent residence civil rights in all areas; for others, it boils down to selective access to social privileges, such as the right to vote, to fully enter the economic sphere (e.g., the real estate market), or to obtain citizenship.⁴ Thus, while some countries endorse immigrants’ fuller participation in society, others limit their efforts to institutionalizing immigrants’ temporary residence (Bolzman 2006).

The general perception of migration in a given country affects people’s attitudes toward immigrants as well as toward those natives who choose to emigrate. Immigrants may inspire in society both positive and negative emotions, which are in turn modified by economic, political, and cultural circumstances. An additional element that shapes *pro* or *contra* immigration attitudes is the concept of state and nation as a mono- or multi-ethnic entity. The concept is understood in many different ways within European culture and politics.

French sociologist Dominique Schnapper presented a socio-linguistic look at the phenomenon of immigration (1999, 18). To explore the true attitudes of European societies toward immigrant populations, she examined the terms used to describe them in the languages of different receiving countries. And so, according to Schnapper, the Germans speak of foreigners (*Ausländer*); the British speak of racial and ethnic minorities;⁵ the Dutch use the term cultural minorities (*culturele minderheden*); the French talk of immigrants (*immigrants*), who, with the passage of time, come to be called members of the nation and eventually citizens. This terminology points to the various ways people from a different cultural area are perceived by the indigenous population. The perception then affects the way social integration

² These “contracts” may include obligations like the ability to speak the language of the receiving country, to know its history, culture, and sometimes even its Constitution.

³ One example of a joint institution set up by the EU is FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, based in Warsaw.

⁴ Switzerland, which remains outside the EU structures, but is a member of EFTA and is located in the very center of Europe, exemplifies restrictive treatment of immigrants and their children. People who are born there, spend their entire lives there, study, and work there are still refused Swiss citizenship.

⁵ The term “immigration” appears increasingly frequently in British discourse, pointing to the region of origin of the incoming population, for example, “Eastern Europeans.”

models are constructed, which adopt different paradigms in each of the European countries.

Society's attitude to foreigners sometimes changes with the passage of time, as it is conditioned by economic, political, and social factors. In France, for instance, the fellow countryman/foreigner relationship is based primarily on the utilitarian assumption that could be translated into the following simple, though painful words: the only desirable immigrants are those who can respond to the current needs of the labor market.

In Great Britain, the presence of immigrants is a manifestation of the legacy of an extensive imperial past, and the culturally diverse society is a consequence of the country's opening to people from the former British colonies. This way of compensating for the previous exploitation of subject economies has always had both its advocates as well as violent opponents, auguring the "end of Britain."⁶ When comparing Great Britain to other colonial empires, we can easily notice that the flow of immigrants from former dominions has been greatest here. This can be accounted for by the adoption of the multiculturalism policy as a natural consequence of those migration processes.

A different integration model is characteristic of the Federal Republic of Germany, which uses the notion of the "German people" (*Deutsches Volk*), understood as ethnic, cultural, and linguistic unity (Schnapper 1999, 18). This concept of national community leads to the acknowledgement that immigrants, who form culturally and ethnically different communities, do not constitute an organic part of the nation and, in some cases, may even debilitate it. According to Rita Süßmuth, a German sociologist and chair of the Independent Council of Experts on Migration and Integration, "Since the beginning of the 1990s, it is generally believed in Germany that the presence of foreigners leads to the loss of German identity" (Center for International Relations in Warsaw 2004, 7). This is a popular opinion that can be heard on the street, especially in the eastern *Länder* of the country.

The government's 2007 Integration Plan provides for the implementation by 2013 of a series of essential actions to enhance social cohesion through education, generally accessible German language courses, sports—a very effective platform for integration—and the media, which raise awareness of cultural and ethnic diversity and through stimulation of "civic involvement" attitudes in German society (Die Bundesregierung 2007).

The Netherlands presents an entirely different model. The dissimilarity stems from historical and social differences. As a former colonial superpower, the Netherlands initially elaborated a type of an "asymmetrical consensus" of a multicultural

⁶ Enoch Powell was an ardent advocate of the removal of immigrants from Great Britain in the 1960s. See D. Childs (2001, 149-150) and Hollowell (2003, 81-82). Presently this policy is supported by Nick Griffin, the leader of the British National Party, which has two representatives in the European Parliament. Griffin officially claims that the presence of immigrants is undesirable. (BBC Television 2009).

country, in which immigrants were, above all, offered work. According to Andre Krouwel, a political scientist from the Free University of Amsterdam, in the years of massive importation of labor (1960-1980), not only the authorities, but foreign workers themselves, believed they would go back to their home countries once their employment was terminated. This belief was reflected by a policy of “many cultures,” which meant that immigrants were not included in the social mainstream and foreigners were not stimulated to learn Dutch, explore the history, culture, traditions, or anything else conducive to acculturation (Radio Free Europe 2004a). More recently, Meindert Fennema, one of the leading experts on migration processes and a professor at the same university, has concluded that the multicultural policy was abandoned too late, only in the early 1980s, when it was observed that it led to “ethnicization” of social life, understood as the establishment of closed cultural enclaves (Radio Free Europe 2004b). In order to stop the creation of ghettos detached from one another and from mainstream society, it was necessary to introduce actions based on a different way of thinking.

Thus, integration took the form of joint efforts, actively involving both parties: the minority and the so-called “mainstream” one. This paradigm shift in the perception of the integration process was also reflected by the fact that the Ministry of Integration became part of the Ministry of Education instead of, as it had been until 2008, the Ministry of Justice (Słojewska 2008). Currently, the idea that integration should be based on education and understanding prevails in the Dutch model of a cohesive society.

Switzerland, which is not part of the European Union, has worked out an immigration policy of accepting the newcomers without guaranteeing them full participation in social, economic, or political life. Immigrants are perceived as part of the work force and, as such, do not have the right to citizenship, even after a stay of many years. They are employees, tax-payers, consumers, producers, and little more (Bolzman et al. 2004, 411-429; Mahnig and Wimmer 2003). It is difficult for them to obtain a Swiss passport, even if they were born in the country and studied and worked there. Referenda on the simplification of the naturalization procedure for foreigners were rejected. Therefore, descendants of immigrants, even if they were born in Switzerland and have never lived in any other country, continue to be foreigners.⁷ The broad autonomy of the Switzerland's cantons, with its long history, produces divergent attitudes on integration, education, or religious denomination in the respective administrative districts. However, in one area, all cantons share the same stance. In the referendum held on November 29, 2009, 57 percent of those who voted supported the ban on the construction of minarets, thus expressing their

⁷ Articles 1 and 15 of the Law of September 29, 1952, stipulate that naturalization can be applied for by an individual who has spent at least 12 years in Switzerland, including 3 years of the 5-year period preceding the submission of application. Swiss legislation does not provide for the possibility of obtaining citizenship on the basis of the *jus soli* principle. One kind of rights directly associated with nationality is political rights; some cantons allow foreigners to vote in local elections, but political rights are still perceived as inseparably connected to Swiss citizenship.

attitude toward the so-called “Islamization” of the country, a specter often raised by the Swiss People’s Party (*Rzeczpospolita* 2009; BBC News 2009).

Until recently, Spain had a liberal immigration policy, but with no concrete integration mechanisms. This resulted from the country’s haste to import the much-needed work force (especially low-skilled and under-qualified workers) on the one hand, and from traditionally being a country of emigration. Later, during the time of economic boom and the resulting inflow of foreign workers, periodic regulation of immigrant streams proved insufficient as a temporary remedy for the new problems. Therefore, following the example of the United States, the Spanish authorities decided to legalize the stay of illegal immigrants who had lived in Spain for many years. The 2005 amnesty revealed the real scale of “illegal” immigration and also put a stop to new waves by creating an efficient administrative and control apparatus (Arango and Jachimowicz 2005). In consequence, a set of only partially cohesive regulations was developed, which has three weaknesses: ineffectiveness in counteracting growing spatial segregation; uneven territorial distribution of immigrants, resulting in a dense population of foreigners only in certain regions of the country; and the resultant additional burden on the provinces and communes.

The Italian case turned out to be slightly different from the Iberian one. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Italy oscillated between two poles: the liberal one, manifested in the 2002 adoption of an amnesty for illegal immigrants, and the extremely restrictive one, legalized in the Act of July 2009. While the amnesty for illegal immigrants did not raise doubts or objections throughout Europe, the introduction of the restrictive law has. European public opinion was shaken by the fact that Italian legislators and politicians decided to pass an amendment according to which illegal stay in Italy is recognized as a *criminal act* and not, as it used to be, an administrative offence. Additionally, a foreigner in detention who has no residence permit is fined €10 000, and a person who intentionally shelters an illegal immigrant runs the risk of up to three years imprisonment (Morris 2009). Such a drastic law has raised objections from institutions dealing with human rights protection, as well as other entities concerned with the nature of the newly introduced regulations, which —like it or not— resemble those from the times of the Mussolini dictatorship. Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe Thomas Hammarberg believes that the case of Italy directly points to an urgent need for developing a joint migration policy —particularly one on immigration— in Europe to eliminate the potential for creating legislation and regulations violating human dignity in the future (Hammarberg 2009; Lewis 2009).

In the era of increasingly intensive globalization and fast, cheap communication, leading to relatively easy movement and travel, the flow of immigrants entails growth in cultural diversity. The phenomenon is sometimes interpreted as a threat, all the more so because the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, or London contribute to the catastrophic vision of the effects of such an encounter of different cultures and the alleged “clash of civilizations.” Fear of terrorism, associated with cultural and religious otherness, is intensified even more by the competition of groups and individuals for the access to real and symbolic capital.

To sum up, one is bound to recognize that the strong critique of the current “working models of integration” is fully justified. Criticism itself does not solve the problem, though, which is taking on more and more advanced forms, requiring urgent and efficient solutions.

Immigrants in the Nordic Countries: The Cases of Denmark, Sweden and Finland

Integration policy models cannot be constructed without reference to the structure of the immigrant community. Apart from the demographics, profession, and competencies categories, their legal status needs to be taken into account (legality or illegality of stay), as well as the equally important way a given country defines citizenship. What should be mentioned here are two chief principles of including an individual in a civic community, i.e., two principles used to determine the conditions for an individual becoming a citizen of a given country. These are the so-called right of blood (*ius sanguinis*) and right of soil (*ius soli*).

Taking all this into account, let us take a look at the modern integration models in the three Nordic countries: Denmark, Sweden, and Finland.

DENMARK

Due to its geographic location between Scandinavia and continental Europe, Denmark has been a natural place of transit, first for the trade of goods, and later for migration. In the second half of the nineteenth century, due to the dynamically developing agriculture and food-processing industry, the country became a very attractive destination for the foreign work force in search of employment. The Danish market also continued to be highly receptive at the beginning of the following century (Olszewski 2008, 17). Thus, the phenomena of emigration and immigration were by no means alien to Denmark, which led to the development of a certain migratory tradition. Initially, it involved the neighboring countries (Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Great Britain), whose societies were culturally similar and whose economies were comparably developed. Emigrant and immigrant movement balanced out, and for a long time the number of Danish inhabitants remained virtually unchanged.

Different changes in the origin of immigration and the number of immigrants occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. The size of the new immigrant groups, consisting mainly of Turks, Pakistanis, and citizens of the former Yugoslavia, upset the former balance of emigration and immigration, in favor of the latter.

In 2007, immigrants constituted 8.7 percent of the Danish population, slightly over 454 000, far more than two decades earlier, when in 1984 they made up only 2 percent of Danish society.⁸

⁸ According to the Ministry for Integration website, there is no precise data on the size of the immigrant group following Islam in Danish population statistics. Statistics Denmark estimated that the

By adopting the 1999 Integration Act, Denmark became the first state in Europe to approach the key issue of immigration and the resultant consequences in a regulated and comprehensive manner. Danish legislators intended to create optimum conditions for the newcomers so they could be swiftly and effectively included in the social mainstream and at the same time guarantee their rights to education and professional and personal development.

Since then, the law has stipulated that the first step in the integration process is to facilitate the immigrant's contact with the Danish language, tradition, history, and reality. Immigrants enjoy the right to a three-year, free-of-charge course in Danish. Apart from that, they can take courses on Danish culture, politics, and economy. Regional and local government authorities, on the other hand, are responsible for the appropriate verification of the immigrants' professional competencies, to be able to offer them proper on-the-job or vocational courses. These activities are supervised by the Ministry for Integration.

In 2005, the government submitted an integration plan called "A New Chance for Everyone" to the parliament. The plan passed by majority vote and was approved for implementation. Key elements of the program include increasing immigrant employment, raising qualifications through education and training, and enhancing the involvement of authorities and local units in the integration process. These premises are translated into concrete actions targeting different segments of the immigrant community: women, children, youth, the elderly, etc.

Elements of integration policy were included in the 2007 government plan, determining the social development objectives for the years to come. The plan is entitled "Society of Opportunities. New Goals" and provides for the construction of an integrated society on the basis of far-reaching cooperation on all levels (local, regional, and national) involving numerous entities, both state and private (Statsministeriet 2007). The main emphasis was placed on the activation of immigrant circles, especially in the field of the so-called ethnic businesses, and on the participation of women in society.

An important element in integrating all members of society is informal education, which consists of different parallel processes such as passing on knowledge and cultivating tolerance and understanding of different cultures. At the same time, even the slightest manifestations of discrimination or hostility toward people of different ethnic, racial, or national origin as well as different sexual orientation or religion must be eliminated.

As mentioned above, integration actions involve not only state, but also private entities. The idea is to distribute the integration effort among many participants, both on the side of the receiving country as well as the incoming individuals/groups. An example of such an approach is the "All Young People Needed"

size of the Muslim population was 120 000 in 1999. Curiously enough, no detailed calculations have been performed so far to determine the number of immigrants in this category. Researchers estimate that in 2006, the Danish Muslim community totalled around 210 000 (Ministry of Refugee, Immigration, and Integration Affairs 2006).

campaign, proposing to the youth of non-Danish descent that they co-found local cultural and educational centers in their neighborhoods. Five years after the adoption of the Integration Act, the following facts speak to the effectiveness of integration actions:

- increased number of employed immigrants,
- higher employment rate of immigrants by private employers,
- greater satisfaction of Danish entrepreneurs with the work done by immigrants (76 percent of private employers and 79 percent of state employers), and
- increased percentage of young people of non-Danish descent who continue their studies in secondary schools (Statistics Denmark n. d.).

A survey carried out by Catinét Research provided additional information confirming positive changes on the path toward greater social integration: in 2001, 39 percent of immigrants had Danish friends and acquaintances, while four years later this rose to more than 50 percent with native Danes in the circle of their closest friends.

SWEDEN

Sweden, experiencing intensive migratory movements since the second half of the twentieth century, and consequently a more and more conspicuous presence of culturally, ethnically, religiously, or racially different minority groups in its territory, tried to develop a model of social, political, and economic relations that would guarantee every person full participation in the country's communal life. This did not happen right away, and as the analysis of the current situation reveals, the objective of full inclusion of immigrants in the social mainstream has not yet been achieved, even though Sweden is perceived as a role model for good integration practices.⁹ Modern Swedish society, as a result of past and current migratory flows, has become a multicultural, multiethnic society, where one-fifth of its nearly 10 million inhabitants is made up of immigrants and their children.

In the Swedish discourse on migrations and their effects, threads drawing on the native Swedish experience of immigration in the second half of the twentieth century are intertwined with the ones going back to a much earlier experience in the final three decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. That period witnessed Swedish emigration to the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, or New Zealand. "Migratory experience," made up of several generations' individual and collective experiences, is an important factor that determines the modern outlook on the phenomenon.

An ideological change in the way the relationship between the majority society and the minorities was shaped in Sweden occurred in the late 1960s. At that time, a new concept emerged, consisting of the construction of social relations on

⁹ According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) ranking (2010).

the basis of three fundamental principles: respect for difference/otherness (racial, ethnic, religious, or cultural), equal treatment of every individual on the labor market, and immigrants' right to a free-of-charge course in Swedish. The emerging foundations of "immigrant policy" (*invandrarpolitiken*), inspired by the Canadian policy of multiculturalism, provided for:

- 1) equality: first and foremost, equal treatment of every individual in the labor market;
- 2) freedom: the possibility of choosing between practicing native customs and adapting to Swedish culture;
- 3) cooperation: state endorsement of immigrant initiatives, especially activities by ethnic organizations acting as parties in the dialogue between the majority society and the minorities.

A further element within the framework of immigrant policy is refugee policy (*flyktingspolitiken*), in place since the 1970s. With time, it has taken on a separate, more independent status.

The early 1990s brought turbulence in Swedish social, political, and economic life. The country was struck by the economic crisis involving most of the developed countries in the world, as well as mass emigration from the Balkans. Growing unemployment, reaching 8.2 percent in 1993, affected immigrants first, and they became the direct victims of the crisis.¹⁰ In the new situation, Sweden was forced to tighten immigration regulations, all the more so because parties that built their potential draw on social bitterness and resentment toward the social and economic policy then in place gained popularity and came to the fore. The crowning argument of the extremely conservative parties, including the thriving right-wing New Democracy, was the need to protect the Swedish market, the Swedish economy, and, first and foremost, to protect Sweden against the inflow of individuals and groups representing different, and consequently, incongruent cultural patterns. It was a popular belief that immigrants were a group of people who ignored the Swedish social and cultural reality, were unwilling to study the Swedish language, and took advantage of the extensive social benefits offered by the welfare state.

What happened in Sweden, a prosperous country at the time, was neither unusual nor strange. Any crisis, particularly one involving the economy, generates resentment and a tendency to search for a simple justification of an unacceptable situation. In such cases, one usually finds explanations in arguments that are not rational, but appeal to human emotions. This is exactly what happened when the attitude of Swedish authorities about the exodus from the Balkans and the continued admittance of refugees was highly criticized by the opposition, supported by an ever-growing portion of Swedish society. That was when discriminatory or racist speeches and acts were being witnessed more frequently than ever. Preju-

¹⁰ Interestingly enough, in 2009, unemployment reached a similar level: 8.3 percent. See *Dagens Nyheter* (2010).

dice against foreign minority groups was no longer hidden, but more and more boldly demonstrated in the form of aggressive speeches or incidents. The tense domestic situation called for a swift reaction, which consisted of a change in previous premises for immigrant and refugee policies. It was understood that previous practice led to the development of “closed,” passive attitudes among immigrants, who were allowed to choose between their native culture and the Swedish one. Paradoxically, the freedom of choice led to the creation of ethnic enclaves, cultural islands of sorts, existing next to each other, but never together. The slow, gradual separation of immigrants from the rest of the society did not help shape mutual relations, but made social dialogue, already weakened by the unfavorable economic situation, even more difficult.

Toward the end of the 1990s, a new concept of the organization and management of the Swedish multicultural society appeared. It received the “promising” name of integration policy (*integrationspolitiken*). According to its principles, the parties were granted the same rights, opportunities, and, first and foremost, obligations; this had never been as firmly emphasized before. Thus, integration, and not coexistence, became the determinant factor and the goal of Swedish domestic policy. The principle is still followed today, even though it is continually modified based on the dictates of everyday practice and necessity.

FINLAND

After World War II, Finland remained an emigrant country for a long time. Waves of Finnish emigrants poured into neighboring Sweden, but also into Norway and Denmark. A considerable percentage of emigrants chose the United States as their destination. It was only in the final two decades of the twentieth century that the emigrant flow subsided. The 1980s were characterized by an accelerated growth of the Finnish economy, which switched to the production of high technologies and filled the Finnish Diaspora with new hope for a return home. The country’s improved financial conditions soon turned out to be good enough to start building prosperity. This is indeed what happened. What was significant for the efforts undertaken at the time was Finnish cooperation within the framework of the Nordic agreement, involving the economic, political, and cultural spheres.

Starting from the early 1990s, repatriation of the people of Finnish descent from the territories of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) began. This group did not integrate easily, as its members spoke no Finnish and did not feel a particularly strong bond with the country of their ancestors (Tanner 2004). At the same time groups of people seeking refugee status started flowing into Finland, as well as individuals in search of a new homeland, often for purely economic reasons. In early 2009, Finland’s population included nearly 156 000 foreigners, a little over 3 percent of the total (Statistikcentralen 2009).

In 1997, Eduskunda, the Finnish parliament, passed a law about the principles of immigration and integration policy. According to its guidelines, integration

consists of active participation of immigrants in social, economic, and political life. The principle of equal status is characteristic of this participation. What is also significant is that the state ensures that immigrant groups can cultivate their traditions and customs as long as they do not contradict the Finnish Constitution.

According to the Finnish integration concept, foreigners are perceived as partners actively involved in the process of the construction of Finnish reality. Finland does not follow the *ius soli* principle when granting citizenship. Newcomers are allowed to apply for Finnish citizenship after a five-year legal stay in the country. Applicants need to meet several requirements: they have to speak fluent Finnish (an additional asset is good command of Swedish), have no criminal record, and have a regular, steady income (Kyntäjä 2003, 187).

Since Finland is undoubtedly a prosperous country, foreigners with permanent residency can enjoy extensive welfare benefits. Unemployed immigrants are invited to participate in special, individual integration programs from which they receive a government integration allowance whose use is monitored by an employment office worker. The solution is aimed at the best possible and most effective use of financial resources, coupled simultaneously with the development of the interested party's professional potential.

The Ombudsman for Foreigners, established in 1998, supports the implementation of integration policy. The Advisory Board for Ethnic Relations (ETNO) is an advisory body to the government institutions dealing with migration and integration that dates from the same year. The 14 board members were directly appointed by both the native and the ethnic minority groups, a practical manifestation of immigrants' real involvement in the decision-making process about integration (Kyntäjä 2003, 205).¹¹

Like Sweden, Finland has become a typical immigration country over the last 10 years. Facing the issue of the growing inflow of foreigners, the Finnish government determined (with the approval of the parliament) annual quotas of between 500 and 1 000 for the number of immigrants allowed into the country as refugees (Kyntäjä 2003, 193). These people are entitled to language courses and vocational training. Additionally, in order to facilitate quick integration, they are sent to different parts of the country to prevent the creation of ethnic clusters (Kyntäjä 2003, 198). Thanks to agreements signed with different state institutions, local district and municipal authorities can offer accommodation to immigrants and reimburse the maintenance cost from public coffers.

As far as educational programs for immigrant children and teenagers are concerned, day care and education centers, where children can learn Finnish as well as their native language free of charge, are highly popular. According to integration policy principles, children can study their native language three to four hours a week free of charge. Adults can also participate in similar courses, tailor-made for their needs. Apart from the aforementioned forms of assistance, the Finnish state

¹¹ See also the Finnish Ministry of the Interior's website about ETNO (n.d.).

offers financial support to institutions founded by immigrants, sponsors television and radio programs broadcast in native languages, and earmarks funds for ethnic press publications.

Problems with adaptation and integration occur in different spheres of communal and private life. However, in Finland the greatest problem for immigrants is their continued high unemployment rate, which is much higher than that of the native population, coming to nearly 30 percent, compared to 7 percent for the rest of society. Lack of work and frequent use of welfare benefits constitutes a direct cause of foreigners' marginalization and partial exclusion. For those very reasons, general opinion about immigrants is not particularly positive. This negative attitude is additionally strengthened by the events in neighboring Sweden and Denmark, as well as by the general tendencies to radicalize attitudes about immigrants in continental Europe.

Rhetoric Predicting Changes: Denmark

Widely discussed in Europe, the need to change migration policy is also subject to debate in the Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, we can see a dramatic change of rhetoric in the discourse on migration and its consequences. The last decade has seen the rise of great social resentment not only in terms of the general economic condition caused by the global financial crisis since 2007, but also disappointment in previous integration policies for immigrants, policies that apparently have not achieved the intended results.

In European countries with a large proportion of immigrants like France, the United Kingdom, Italy, or Spain, integration policies seem to be relatively ineffective compared to their financial and social costs. This naturally undermines citizens' confidence in political parties, politicians, and intellectuals who opt for immigration as a means to rescue aging societies.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel's statement in the German parliament in October 2010 about the failure of the German policy of multiculturalism received wide media coverage in Europe. For some in the audience, the statement was shocking, but for others it was not and merely reflected the true state of affairs. Merkel's conclusion, adopted by the media and extended later to European migration policy in general, has modified the public discourse, giving it a much more critical tone. Since then it has become much easier to question the policy of multiculturalism, and to challenge the presence of immigrants, especially those from outside the EU.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric typical of extreme right-wing circles also began to appear gradually in the statements of politicians from liberal circles. The case of Denmark constitutes such an example.

The recovery plan for the Danish economy after the 2007 financial upheaval, presented on May 25, 2010, by Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, contains several major changes. One concerns toughening the procedures for legalizing the stay on Danish soil for non-EU citizens. Another significant change boils down to

modifying —by restricting more— access to the system of social services for immigrants already residing in the country.

According to the authors of the recovery plan and the prime minister himself, the proposed changes are dictated by the need to repair state finances, as well as by the obligation (as an EU member-state) of reducing the budget deficit from five percent to three percent of GDP.

The planned savings are to be ensured by the following cuts in public expenditures:

- shortening the period for receiving unemployment benefits from four to two years;
- reducing child allowances to 30 000 crowns (This is supposed to save 1 billion crowns in 2013.);
- keeping financial support for developing countries at the same level as in previous years (This will save nearly 1.4 billion crowns.); and
- reducing subsidies for translators in hospitals (This will create a savings of 15 million crowns). (Lehmann 2010)

Critics of the plan and the reform say the government is going after simple solutions using populist arguments and applying methods that might affect the most vulnerable, including immigrants.

Some experts, observers of the Danish domestic political scene, believe that before being put into practice, the government initiatives must first gain the “silent” support of the populist party Dansk Folkeparti (DF). The party has been growing in power since the late 1990s and now constitutes a significant political force in the Danish parliament. The proposed toughening up of migration policy and reduction of social benefits are changes very welcomed by the DF.

Michael Bach Henriksen, a journalist at the *Kristeligt Dagblad* newspaper, stated that the savings proposed in the reform program could be called into question and are very small taking into account all the country’s finances. According to Henriksen, this indicates three tendencies: first, ruling politicians do not have the courage to look for savings in areas where they really should (e.g., by limiting the possibility of early retirement); second, the DF’s impact on the government is disturbingly hefty; third, the government is looking for temporary solutions, undertaking rather symbolic and irrelevant actions (2010).

In addition to all of the above, the reduction of allowances for families with more than three children strikes directly at immigrant families, which are traditionally large. This is an open warning signal to immigrants that family policy in Denmark is being toughened.

Helle Ib expressed similar comments in the *Berlingske Tidende* newspaper. The journalist stated that the government bowed to DF influence, deciding to repair the state budget at the expense of immigrants and their descendants (2010).

A contrary point of view is presented by DF leaders Pia Kjærsgaard, Kristian Dahl Thulesen, and Peter Skaarup. They believe that the reform does nothing more

than divide the cost of the Danish welfare state among all its residents, including immigrants and their descendants. The immigrants should not be treated more favorably than native Danes (Lehmann 2010).

A controversy arose after Peter Skaarup's statement that if non-European immigrants worked as much as native Danes, the state would be able to save nearly 24 billion crowns (Skaarup 2010). This is one of the examples and at the same time an indicator of the direction the public discourse on immigration may develop.

Suggestions that immigrants are prone to misuse the Danish welfare system and that they avoid work fall on fertile ground. Populist arguments about the reluctance of immigrants to integrate into Danish society, immigrants' inclination to lock themselves in ethnic ghettos, and their tendency to crime constitute very dangerous and powerful rhetoric creating a metaphoric picture of immigrants as a group of people unwilling to integrate and willing to separate and live on the expense of the rest of society.

The recovery program for the Danish economy has become a convenient moment for the DF to push through the modification of Danish (im)migration policy. Thus, in the new concept of the policy the immigrants are obliged to be ready to accept work quickly after arrival in the host country, undertake professional training courses, and learn the Danish language. Failure to fulfill these requirements would constitute grounds for expelling an immigrant from the country.

Denmark's political landscape has significantly changed during the past two decades. So has the public discourse on immigration. The contemporary discourse around the policy applied to immigrants in Denmark contains much more severe criticism than several years ago. It is powered by such events as the Islamist's reaction to the Muhammad cartoons published by *Jyllands Posten* in 2005 and the fortunately unsuccessful attempt to murder cartoonist Kurt Westergaard, their author.

The present alignment of forces in the government coalition and the parliament reflects the mood of the Danish voters, who do not deny the need to reduce the influx of immigrants to their country and to tighten the rules governing their stay.

For some political commentators, what is happening in Denmark is rather an unnecessary and embarrassing episode in the country's modern history; others understand it as an indispensable element in the process of governing a country like Denmark, with a tradition of democracy, freedom of speech, and a secular state.

The End of Political Correctness? Sweden

For several years, the Swedish discourse on the financial and social condition of the country has included increasing calls for an open, constructive, public debate about (im)migration policy. A need for such a discussion based on solid arguments has been evident for several reasons. These include the lack of transparent procedures for the admission of immigrants (including refugees); incomplete data about the financial costs involved in this process; and imprecisely stated amounts of the tax revenues paid by immigrants into state coffers.

An analysis of the discourse in the Swedish media over the past few years indicates that public opinion demands the revision of current immigration policy. There appears to be a great deal of concern about the safety of public finances. Questions are raised, among others, about the allocation methods for budgetary resources dedicated to social services. The generosity of the social system practiced for many decades had few opponents, who argued the grave consequences of such a policy. The voices of these skeptics, however, were not loud, and they remained outside the mainstream rhetoric, which accepted the current practice.

For almost four decades, generously supported disadvantaged groups had developed an attitude, a tendency to excessive use of allowances and benefits. This appealed to immigrants, but also to native Swedes.

The information policy of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, seen from today's perspective, contributed to creating the image of immigrants as individuals who needed protection and special state aid, because they came mostly from developing countries. Opinion leaders set an example by showing commitment to the immigrants' issues. This commendable attitude has become the norm, but, to some extent, it has also "disabled" the immigrant population, by indicating that it was more profitable to be dependent than to be independent and resourceful.

The question arises about the origin or source of such a generous social policy. One of the answers may be that, while becoming a welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s, Sweden wanted to change its own image, which had accompanied the country before and during World War II. Declaring itself neutral in the conflict, Sweden could afford economic agreements with each of the warring parties, thus sparking severe controversies worldwide.

Returning to the present, the criticism of current migration policy raised by some media is due to the fact that, according to the United Nations definition, 8 out of 10 asylum seekers are in fact not refugees (Sandelin 2008).

The variety of terms and a multiplicity of denominations present in the Swedish language contribute to clerical errors in the proper recognition of immigrants' status. The multiplicity and variety of terms similar in meaning seems to be a factor contributing to deficiencies in the management of migration flows.

The costs of the current migration policy are not exactly known; they remain estimates. This provides another reason to speculate about the actual amount. The daily press publishes different numbers ranging from 40 billion to 300 billion crowns a year. The large spread between the quoted sums is caused by the changing intensity of immigration flows in a particular year and in the preceding years.

This is all aggravated by the fact that the results of research conducted for the state institutions responsible for integration show that, after five years' residence in Sweden, half the men who came as refugees in 2003 continued without a job! When it comes to women, it was even worse: 60 to 70 percent, depending on the ethnic group (Sandelin 2008).

The lack of an open critical review of (im)migration policy resulted from several factors: 1) a belief in this policy's efficacy; 2) a deep-rooted conviction about the righteousness of helping disadvantaged individuals by granting asylum; and

3) political correctness. The last of these factors meant that migration issues were not a subject of public debate, but rather stayed behind ministry doors. No one taking part in the public discourse on immigration wanted to be accused of “hidden hostility toward immigrants” or “hidden racism.”

Ideologically tinged rhetoric used hitherto in public debate distorted the discourse about immigration, making it artificial, unreal, distanced from reality, in the name of solidarity and empathy for the less privileged. As it turns out, one of the major challenges for today’s migration policy in Sweden is to modify the socio-political discourse on immigration both in its form as well as its content.

A New Balance of Power in the Parliament: Finland

A need for change in immigration policy is also evident in Finland. Until the 2007 crisis, debate over immigration and immigrants was not a central theme in Finnish public discourse. It was carried out almost on the margins, using rather mild rhetoric. However, today the situation has changed. The economic downturn reduced the sense of financial stability among ordinary citizens, who began to launch negative comments about the issue of open borders. Slogans demanding tighter immigration laws are not exceptional or unusual today. They can be heard on the streets, read on Internet portals, or even seen in some media.

A dramatic increase of these negative emotions can be observed since 2008, when the elections for municipal councils took place. The pre-election struggle was fierce, full of sharp arguments, sometimes even aggressive. Astrid Thors, Finnish Minister of Migration for European Affairs, experienced the resentments personally. One of the members of the populist party *Sannfinländarna* (“True Finns”) published on Facebook a statement expressing his readiness to accept the penalty and consequences for killing the minister. These threats were immediately spotted by police and prosecutors, who began an investigation. The swift response of law enforcement agencies, however, did not discourage other party supporters from uploading further aggressive statements onto the Internet (Kaarto 2010).

The Internet has turned out to be an effective communication platform for disseminating contents impossible to publish elsewhere. Some groups, associations, or other politically oriented formations, reluctant about or opposed to immigrants, take advantage of this. The anti-immigration groups and associations that are active on the Internet are also rather well organized. They have their own forums, stay in regular contact with each other, and jointly take actions directed against their opponents. Examples can be found among harassment cases in which journalists and politicians who support liberal immigration policy have received anonymous letters, often containing threats (*Helsingin Sanomat* 2010a).

The anti-immigrant movement still remains on the margins of social movements; however, it is growing stronger and expanding its influence. One of the symptoms of this trend is the result of a Gallup survey conducted for Finland’s largest daily

Helsingin Sanomat in March 2010. According to the survey, 60 percent of those interviewed were against continuing the current immigration policy, and supported proposals for its tightening (*Helsingin Sanomat* 2010b).

Public opinion in Finland exerts a strong and clear influence on the shape of the country's domestic policy. The voice of Finnish society contributed to the modification of the asylum law in 2010, making it more restrictive in cases of family reunification when individuals granted Finnish asylum want to bring family members from abroad.

Finland's Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Stubb openly supports immigration. In an interview given to the daily *Helsingin Sanomat* in March 2010, he stated that the ongoing anti-immigrant debate was not acceptable and that it contradicted the overall interests of the state. His opinion is shared by Minister of Migration for European Affairs Astrid Thors, who, at a parliamentary meeting in May 2010, presented statistical evidence of *de facto* decreasing inflow of immigrants to Finland.

In light of this fact, the public's increasingly critical attitude toward foreigners may be problematic and confusing, especially when immigrants constitute only about 2.5 percent of Finnish society, much less than in the case of neighboring Sweden and Norway.

Historically, anti-immigration attitudes seem to have a long tradition, dating back to the mid-twentieth century. At that time, anti-immigration slogans were often expressed by the Finnish Rural Party (Finlands Landsbygds Parti), which hit its peak in the 1960s and 1970s. The party's prominent leader, Veikko Vennamo, was a charismatic, talented orator and strategist who created a significant audience of listeners and supporters.

Although Vennamo's party dissolved in 1995, his ideas survived and found followers. One of them is Timo Soini, the leader of today's populist party, the True Finns (Sannfinländarna), which won seats in parliament in 2003.

The party's increasing popularity is due to several factors. Among them are its leader's oratorical skills. Soini is an outspoken critic of the EU and its financial institutions, which makes him popular among EU skeptics. The crisis of the Greek economy, which seriously disturbed the euro zone, has provided Soini with additional arguments against the EU, and also indirectly against the immigration policy pursued by Finland as an EU member.

The growing strength of the populist party should be viewed particularly in the wider context of the upcoming parliamentary elections in April 2011.¹² Today's government coalition made up of four parties, including the strongest one, the Center Party, with 51 seats in parliament, is challenged by a similar number of opposition parties. The biggest of these, the Social Democrats, has 45 parliamentary mandates. It seems that subtle internal frictions within the Center Party may become an important factor in the possible shift of power after the elections. These fric-

¹² A majority of voters cast their ballots for the conservative/liberal National Coalition Party in those elections.

tions indicate absence of a commonly shared and united vision of the future of Finland. Consequently, the balance of power in the Finnish parliament can and probably will significantly change after the elections in April.

One may hope that the victorious party, in a position to build a government coalition after the elections, will not do so by turning to the True Finns as a possible partner.

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SIMILITUDES Y PARTICULARIDADES DEL ENDURECIMIENTO DEL CONTROL FRONTERIZO EN ESPAÑA, POLONIA Y ESTADOS UNIDOS ENTRE 1989 Y 2010

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Introducción

El mundo contemporáneo ha conocido cambios radicales, especialmente a partir del otoño de 1989, que entre otras dimensiones se han expresado en la naturaleza de las fronteras y, por ende, en el trato dispensado a los flujos migratorios. Estos cambios, además de impactar en la vida de pueblos, sociedades y en las relaciones internacionales, sorprendieron al grueso de la comunidad científico-social. La caída del muro de Berlín y del orbe comunista en Europa central y oriental en el otoño de 1989, las crisis financieras y económicas de los noventa en México, Asia, Rusia, Sudamérica, los ataques terroristas en Nueva York y Washington en septiembre del 2001, o el inicio de la crisis financiera en el 2007 y la consiguiente depresión económica mundial en el 2008 son algunos de los hitos más destacados.

No hay que olvidar que tras estos sucesos hay diferentes procesos y reacomodos que impactan la vida de los más vulnerables. De hecho, las reestructuraciones tanto a gran escala como en contextos locales y “micro” intensificaron o inauguraron algunos movimientos migratorios hasta extremos inéditos. Así, los flujos migratorios internacionales, según estimaciones de la ONU, se aproximaron a la cifra de doscientos millones de migrantes en años recientes (United Nations, 2009). Y es que aquellas turbulencias políticas y económicas produjeron la emergencia de nuevos países como destino migratorio a partir de los noventa (el caso de España), o la intensificación de flujos históricos como los que confluyen en Estados Unidos, o el cambio gradual del patrón migratorio general, como ocurre actualmente en Polonia.

No por casualidad, tanto en España como en Estados Unidos, el año de 1993 supuso el inicio de la implantación de fronteras-muro: en las ciudades norafricanas de Ceuta y Melilla y en las ciudades-condados del *southwest* estadounidense como El Paso, San Diego o Nogales. También por aquellos mismos años, Polonia conoció una transformación social, política, económica y cultural que se reflejó en la naturaleza de sus fronteras, y pasó de ser parte de la Cortina de Hierro hasta 1989 en cierta manera, a integrante de la Unión Europea en 2004 y del espacio Schengen en 2007, uno que impone fuertes restricciones al movimiento de los migrantes no

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comunitarios y, por tanto, exige un estricto control de las fronteras externas de la Unión Europea.

Resulta significativo comprobar cómo en los casos español, polaco y estadounidense se enfrentó la decisión política del control de los límites territoriales y el manejo de los flujos migratorios irregulares “cerrando” segmentos estratégicos de la frontera. Como veremos más adelante, en los tres casos concurren distintas causas y circunstancias. Sin embargo, existen indicios que apuntan a que, en cierta forma, esas políticas están vinculadas a un sentimiento antiinmigrante albergado por importantes sustratos de las distintas sociedades. Es decir, una hipótesis que emerge verosímelmente ante este panorama apunta a que las parecidas políticas de control fronterizo en tres “lugares” tan diferentes sólo se explican por un previo clima antiinmigrante que se estuvo gestando durante décadas y que atravesó más de una generación de ciudadanos. Por tanto, entendemos que las fronteras-muro reflejan una previa ideología de rechazo al extranjero migrante, bien por parte de amplias capas de las sociedades, bien por decisiones políticas/jurídicas que de facto “contienen” o vehiculan ese sentimiento antiinmigrante.

La geografía de las migraciones y la territorialidad de las políticas antiinmigrantes

La animadversión al otro-extranjero, que se manifiesta bajo múltiples formas por parte de sectores sociales con capacidad de incidencia política, propicia “políticas” y medidas de combate y represión de la inmigración. “El método más conocido y clásico de controlar la inmigración es a través del reforzamiento físico de las fronteras de una nación” (Doomernik, 2010: 22). No obstante, en los tres casos el sentimiento antiinmigrante tiene un origen, unas expresiones y un peso desigual, puesto que se trata de contextos geopolíticos, jurídico-legislativos y socioculturales distintos, sin olvidar que la cuestión del vínculo entre control fronterizo y sentimiento de animadversión al inmigrante no son fáciles de abordar o reducir a términos de análisis manejables, máxime cuando hay todo un proceso de gestación que llevó décadas, sustanciado en leyes supranacionales como las de la Unión Europea, que acaban imponiéndose en España y Polonia. O las directrices de Washington, que no necesariamente tienen en cuenta las dinámicas transfronterizas del suroeste y sus especificidades (Alonso, 2009).

La dimensión “física” y geopolítica de las fronteras es otro factor que influye. Sólo España, en el extremo suroccidental de la Unión Europea, tiene como mínimo cinco tipos de fronteras, y desde 1989 se produjo la “obstaculización” de algunas de éstas y el consiguiente desvío de flujos; es decir, se han dado en todo este tiempo distintos escenarios, distintas medidas y políticas y distintas coyunturas de animadversión a los inmigrantes y, algo de lo que a veces nos olvidamos, de animadversión a los vecinos. Hay sobrados ejemplos en que los inmigrantes pueden proceder del país vecino, inseparable de una historia de relaciones que carga con sus juicios y prejuicios. En esos casos las(os) inmigrantes van acompañados de antecedentes de

estigmas, discriminación y violencia. Para el caso español, por ejemplo, el vecino puede ser el francés en el norte o el marroquí (musulmán o no) en el sur; el inglés-gibraltareño en Gibraltar, el portugués hacia el oeste o el argelino por el sureste. Finalmente, en años más recientes, el litoral de toda África noroccidental (magrebí, saharauí y subsahariana) se transformó en una frontera “caliente” respecto de las Islas Canarias, que fue por donde se desviaron los flujos entre el 2005 y el 2008.

Por otra parte, el caso de Polonia permite visualizar un fenómeno en cierta dimensión análogo, pues de ser, en cierto sentido, parte de la Cortina de Hierro se ha convertido en un segmento importante de la frontera oriental de la Unión Europea. Además, a lo largo del siglo XX, las relaciones con algunos vecinos, sobre todo con Alemania y Ucrania, solían ser bastante turbulentas. Los cambios que empezaron a llegar a partir de los noventa en un principio tampoco facilitaban el proceso de mejoramiento de las relaciones con vecinos en el contexto migratorio; primero, a causa de la mayor protección de la frontera occidental por parte de Alemania (la entonces frontera externa de la Unión Europea) y luego, en la siguiente década, por la implementación de medidas semejantes a las padecidas hasta el 2004, sólo que aplicadas por Polonia en su frontera oriental con Rusia, Bielorrusia y Ucrania, es decir, en la nueva división entre los países comunitarios —la denominada fortaleza Europa— y “los otros”.

Finalmente, el trato a los inmigrantes y el control de las fronteras en Estados Unidos constituyen todo un paradigma. Desde su misma independencia han experimentado profundos cambios en la naturaleza política de su territorio/fronteras y la percepción de los inmigrantes. Es decir, el manejo de sus fronteras y de los flujos de inmigrantes tienen una “tormentosa” o nada civilizada historia detrás (Zolberg, 2006). Actualmente existen cuatro operativos de control (*represión*) de la migración indocumentada en la frontera con México. Allí surgió la Operation Blockade (Operación Bloqueo) que se inició el 19 de septiembre de 1993 entre El Paso, Texas, y Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua.¹ Puesta en práctica por la Border Patrol (Patrulla Fronteriza) meses después con la entrada en vigor del TLCAN,² la Operation Blockade fue “later diplomatically renamed Operation Hold-the-line” (Eschbach *et al.*, 1999: 448). Seguidamente fue reproducida en Gatekeeper (en San Diego, California) y Safeguard (en Nogales, Arizona), iniciadas en octubre de 1994. Años después se implementó la Operation Rio Grande, en Texas (agosto de 1997), que se extiende por el bajo río Bravo entre Brownsville y Laredo hasta que, con el tiempo, cada una ha desarrollado especificidades propias (Alonso, 2003). Las medidas post septiembre 11, la creación del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional (Homeland Security) y la construcción de “muros” del 2006 al 2010 cierran lo más relevante de este proceso.

Por lo expuesto sintéticamente hasta aquí, los tres países muestran un proceso de reconstrucción de las fronteras exteriores conflictivas que son indisociables de la presión de un sentimiento antiinmigrante, insistimos, con distinto peso

¹ Más exactamente, entre Sunland Park, en Nuevo México, y Fabens, en Texas (Ortiz, 1994).

² Obsérvese que en términos diplomáticos un “agreement” no es lo mismo que un “tratado”.

en cada estado. Los cambios radicales entre la caída del muro de Berlín a la ley de Arizona SB1070 del verano del 2010, pasando por las crisis de las pateras y los cayucos en España 1992-2008, muestran más de una similitud ideológica y coyuntural. Paradójicamente, el periodo que analizamos está comprendido entre la caída de la Cortina de Hierro y el levantamiento de una auténtica *Iron Curtain* en la frontera Estados Unidos-México.

Una síntesis del proceso de animadversión antiinmigrante en perspectiva histórica

Los casos español, polaco y estadounidense, aunque son regiones distantes cultural, social y geográficamente, tienen en común, también, que son los bordes de unas placas tectónicas geopolíticas y económico-financieras estratégicamente relevantes. Encierran economías y mercados de trabajo de un gran dinamismo, que atraen por igual tanto flujos de capital e inversión como flujos migratorios internacionales procedentes de distintas regiones, aunque siempre hay una nacionalidad predominante: marroquíes, ucranianos, mexicanos. Y estos colectivos de inmigrantes son el *target*, así como “el marco de referencia” (Goffman, 2006b) con el que las y los individuos de las comunidades receptoras legitiman el sentimiento de animadversión o de bienvenida: xenofobia o xenofilia.³ Siempre existe un chivo expiatorio y un marco de prejuicios, mitos (ahora se habla de leyendas urbanas) y estigmas (Goffman, 2006a), unidos en un sustrato sociocultural racista que, conjuntamente con las políticas y los discursos, encuadran el fenómeno de la migración regular o irregular para juzgarla moralmente y “combatirla”.

Los muros y los dispositivos electrónicos de detección vienen después, ya que todo apunta a que, por lo general, suelen responder en gran medida a una presión de distintos sectores sociales, *mass media* incluidos, en cuyas calderas mediáticas las más de las veces se gestan y potencian los sentimientos y actitudes antiinmigrantes. Es como si las “comunidades imaginadas” (Anderson, 1983) necesitasen “enemigos imaginados” que provocan problemas ficticios con consecuencias reales. El poema “Esperando a los bárbaros” de Kavafis podría ilustrar esto; también la siguiente cita de finales de los setenta de Wayne Cornelius:

La administración de Carter ha hecho más que cualquiera de las precedentes para elevar el nivel de preocupación entre la población estadounidense en general, sobre la inmigración indocumentada. Ha habido un esfuerzo deliberado por ciertos sectores del gobierno —especialmente el Departamento de Trabajo— para echar la culpa de altas tasas de desempleo entre los negros, los jóvenes y otros sectores de la población en los EE.UU., sobre la inmigración indocumentada. A México se le culpa por exportar su desempleo, y otros problemas sociales y económicos [...]. El público americano ya estaba dispuesto a creer que la inmigración era perjudicial para ellos mismos y para el país

³ Sobre el concepto de xenofilia y su aplicación véanse Aramburu y Zegrí (1994).

[...]. Ya para el año 1976, aproximadamente un 80 por ciento o más del pueblo estadounidense creía que los migrantes indocumentados acaparan los trabajos de los habitantes legales, que se meten en actividades criminales, que rebajan el nivel de los salarios que se pagan a los habitantes legales, y que muchos recogen pagos por desempleo o “welfare”. El 80 por ciento apoyaban el tipo de ley recientemente propuesta por el presidente Carter, que multaría a los patronos que contratan migrantes indocumentados (Cornelius, 1979: 28-30).

Wayne Cornelius señaló en este pasaje uno de los impulsos contemporáneos dados en Estados Unidos por un presidente *demócrata* que, no por casualidad, meses después tuvo que enfrentar la crisis de los rehenes *americanos* en la embajada de Teherán. Los cambios que se estaban produciendo en aquellos años —y que a su vez no pueden entenderse sin las turbulencias racistas, xenófobas y antiinmigrantes de la primera mitad del siglo XX— fueron clave para entender la actual animadversión a los inmigrantes en Estados Unidos, incluidos los muros, la propuesta SB1070 o las deportaciones récord del ICE en el periodo 2007-2010. A este respecto, Robert A. Pastor (1983) ofrecía datos esclarecedores. Si de 1900 a 1965 la mayoría de los inmigrantes de Estados Unidos procedían de Europa, ya en 1978 el 82 por ciento procedía de Asia y América Latina. Los hispanos en 1970 sumaban nueve millones, el 4.5 por ciento de la población. Diez años después, en 1980, eran 14.6 millones, el 6.4 por ciento del total, de los que a su vez el 60 por ciento eran descendientes de mexicanos. Y desde hace unos años son la primera minoría con una población culturalmente heterogénea y de diversas procedencias con más de cuarenta millones de personas (aproximadamente tres cuartas partes de origen mexicano).

Los hispanohablantes en general y los mexicanos en particular, de una u otra forma, llevaban décadas sufriendo el racismo (McWilliams, 1968; Samora, 1971; Zolberg, 2006). Pero durante la presidencia de Jimmy Carter (1977-1981) se produjeron cambios cualitativos y cuantitativos que los abocaba a ser una vez más el chivo expiatorio —la cortina de humo— en momentos de crisis; las víctimas de una información tergiversada o descontextualizada tanto por gobiernos y partidos políticos como por empresas de comunicación y prensa sin escrúpulos. Jorge Bustamante, en la misma obra colectiva en la que participó Cornelius (en Torres, comp., 1979), también señaló que periódicos de prestigio solían publicar a mediados de los setenta —antes de Carter— contenidos de un indisimulable amarillismo xenófobo:

La emigración indocumentada hacia Estados Unidos, particularmente la que se origina en México, ha llamado considerablemente la atención de los medios de comunicación masiva. En Estados Unidos la prensa se refiere a los inmigrantes indocumentados en términos tales como “una invasión de ilegales” (Withmore, 1976); “invasión silenciosa” (Fitzhugh, 1976; Jense, 1976); un caso de “crisis nacional” (*The New York Times*, 1974): una “carga de 13 000 millones de dólares para los contribuyentes” (*U.S. News and World Report*, 1976); y en titulares a ocho columnas como: “El Estado amenazado por hordas de extranjeros” del *Herald Examiner* de Los Ángeles del 8 de agosto, 1977. Sin embargo, apenas si se ha escuchado a los científicos sociales hablar de lo poco que se conoce aún sobre el tema” (Bustamante, 1979: 23).

Evidentemente, para buscar antecedentes sobre animadversión al extranjero o al “otro” podríamos retrotraernos a los clásicos grecolatinos. Sin embargo, el ensayo de Geraldo Rivera (2008), *Hispanic: Why Americans Fear Hispanics in the U.S.*,⁴ ahonda en algunas raíces de aquellos “mismos” males mediáticos que denunciaban Cornelius o Bustamante. Este análisis (es periodismo bien documentado y argumentado) critica los excesos e irresponsabilidad de los medios, especialmente programas concretos como el caso de *O’Reilly Factor*, en canales específicos: FOX News.

Sorprendentemente, parecidos antecedentes a los referidos por Bustamante o Cornelius los hallamos en Europa Occidental. La antropóloga Verena Stolcke, siguiendo la estela de trabajos que analizaron la creciente hostilidad y violencia dirigida a lo que por entonces se denominaba “inmigrantes procedentes del tercer mundo” por parte de amplios sectores de las sociedades de distintos países europeos, ya habló de esta animadversión racista y de las “nuevas retóricas de exclusión” que las legitimaban (Stolcke, 1995). Esta autora llegó a la conclusión de que aquella hostilidad y violencia estuvo vinculada previamente al resurgimiento en los años setenta del “racismo”, que tras la segunda guerra mundial y el holocausto judío había retrocedido en Occidente.

Sin duda, la crisis del petróleo después de 1973 marcó aquella época. La Europa de fines de los setenta y la década de los ochenta conoció profundos reajustes consustanciales a las crisis capitalistas, reconversiones profundas de regiones y ciudades o en sectores productivos como la minería del carbón o los astilleros. Margaret Thatcher en el Reino Unido en 1978 esgrimía el miedo a los inmigrantes de otras culturas; eran los mismos años de Jimmy Carter previos a la era de Ronald Reagan. Una vez más, los extranjeros inmigrantes fueron acusados del desempleo o la recesión económica, y de nuevo aparecieron titulares amarillistas como “avalancha de inmigrantes” o “la bomba de tiempo de la inmigración”, noticias con las que se infundía temor a la población para acrecentar el descontento y capitalizarlo políticamente en las elecciones. Irrumpían así en los programas políticos y en los medios de comunicación —Van Dijk (2003) menciona los tabloides anglosajones como los periódicos que cobijan públicamente estas ideas— discursos abiertamente antiinmigrantes. Van Dijk también señala que “la invasión de extranjeros” y “Fuera extranjeros” fueron lemas familiares y que ahora son mundiales. De esa manera se distraían y ocultaban las verdaderas causas u orígenes político-económicos de problemas como la pobreza, la violencia o el malestar que afectaban y afectan a las sociedades de salida y de destino de migrantes.

Asimismo, la relación inclusión/animadversión subyace a cualquier política inmigratoria. De esa manera, el lenguaje oficial de la Comunidad Económica Europea (la CEE, ahora denominada Unión Europea) de aquellos años, hablaba de “inmigrantes extracomunitarios”, lo que ocasionaba una exclusión dual y podría constituir una frontera simbólica interna entre los mundos “diferentes”. Obviamente, la mayo-

⁴ El título de la portada juega con colores distintos para “entresacar” *panic* de *Hispanic* (asumimos que la traducción de *Hispanics* es hispanos en el sentido de hispanohablantes).

ría de ellos, excluidos los estadounidenses, eran inmigrantes del sur pobre y de la Europa del Este, comunistas o “socialistas” por aquello de la URSS y ex comunistas, que eran objeto de discriminación por ser extranjeros indeseables, ya que portaban la diferencia cultural cual virus amenazante. Por tanto, el discurso antiinmigrante tuvo y tiene en los políticos de derecha y los gobiernos conservadores los propagadores de temores entre la población, con una retórica de la exclusión que ensalza la identidad nacional basada en la exclusividad cultural (Stolcke, 1995).

La plasmación de lo que ha ocurrido en la vida política en las últimas dos décadas se puede entender mejor repasando unos hechos de hace menos de una década. El 6 de mayo del 2002 (un día después de la derrota electoral del fascista Le Pen en Francia), fue asesinado Pim Fortuyn, el candidato de la ultraderecha de los Países Bajos. Las elecciones en Holanda se iban a producir unos días después y Fortuyn proponía frenar en seco la inmigración, criticaba duramente al mundo islámico, al que acusaba de atrasado, y esgrimía en sus campañas electorales un lema sintomático de las ideas que aún flotan en significativos sectores de la sociedad de la Unión Europea e incluso de Estados Unidos: “Holanda está llena”. Ergo, no hay sitio para más inmigrantes en las sociedades capitalistas occidentales.

La biografía de Pim Fortuyn no tenía nada que ver con la del “asesino de guerra” en Argelia y candidato a la presidencia de la República Francesa, J.-M. Le Pen; sin embargo, coincidían en bastantes puntos de sus programas políticos, casi todos democráticamente insostenibles. Aunque ellos dos no eran los únicos representantes de un discurso ideológico-político conceptualizado de “nacional-integristas” por José Vidal-Beneyto, por su rechazo y exclusión del extranjero. A la par de Fortuyn y Le Pen estaban Haider en Austria; Edmund Stoiber y Schill, en Alemania; en Gran Bretaña, Nick Griffin; en Italia, Umberto Bossi, Gianfranco Fini y Silvio Berlusconi; en Portugal, Paulo Portas; en Dinamarca, Pia Kjaersgaard y el Danske Folkeparti; en Bélgica, Dewinter y el Vlaams Blok; Carl Hagen en Noruega. Incluso en Estados Unidos, en aquella época, destacaba Pat Buchanan. Todos ellos no sólo encarnaban el ascenso de la ultraderecha y del “integrismo nacionalista” o la coartada de la “exclusividad culturalista” por vía de las urnas (el partido de Pim Fortuyn fue, días después, la segunda formación más votada en las elecciones holandesas; también representaban la parte visible de ese iceberg que tiene debajo un discurso antimigrante y xenófobo que no tiene el más mínimo problema en vocear prejuicios contra los inmigrantes).

Lo que ha ocurrido, en resumidas cuentas, fue que aquellos discursos racistas de los setenta se transformaron en el “fundamentalismo cultural” que creció en los ochenta, cuya retórica de la inclusión (el reverso de la retórica de la exclusión) propugna la vinculación entre nacionalidad y ciudadanía por una herencia cultural compartida, al menos en la Europa occidental. El clima antiinmigrante en países como el Reino Unido o Francia fue tal que el Parlamento Europeo realizó la “Declaración contra el racismo y la xenofobia” en 1986. Y durante los noventa se forjó un clima antiinmigrante que llegó a los parlamentos vía elecciones democráticas hasta bien entrado el siglo XXI. Una poderosa fuente, sin duda, generadora de sentimientos y actitudes antiinmigrante en el seno de Occidente.

Hace unos años, Immanuel Wallerstein volvía a señalar los mismos males habiendo el siglo XXI. “Los inmigrantes no son muy populares en estos tiempos, especialmente en los países ricos”, y tras apuntar que en pocos asuntos hay tanta hipocresía como en la inmigración, nos recordaba: “El resultado es que cuando la Unión Soviética no permitía a sus habitantes emigrar libremente, se le acusaba con indignación de violar los derechos humanos, pero cuando los regímenes poscomunistas permiten a la gente emigrar sin restricciones, inmediatamente los países más ricos imponen barreras a su entrada”.

El caso de Europa central y oriental. La transformación de la situación migratoria en Polonia

Durante las últimas dos décadas, la frontera oriental de lo que fue la CEE y ahora Unión Europea se ha estado trasladando significativamente hacia el este: empezando con la división de las *dos* Alemanias (RFA y RDA); luego colocándose, por bastante tiempo, en la frontera entre la Alemania “reunificada” y Polonia, para terminar en la actualidad en los territorios orientales de los nuevos países miembros de la Unión Europea. El caso de Polonia muestra los debates sobre fronteras e inmigración mundiales desde una perspectiva paradójica por los “contradictorios” roles geopolíticos que ha desempeñado; en cierta forma diferente, pero complementario, del caso español y punto de contraste con lo acaecido en el suroeste de Estados Unidos.

Polonia, debido a todas las transformaciones de índole social, económica y, sobre todo, política que ha experimentado en las últimas dos décadas, evidencia algunos procesos interesantes en cuanto al fenómeno migratorio. Al analizar este caso, se pueden observar algunas tendencias, tanto de carácter más general (es decir, europeo o mundial), como las del aspecto particular, que surgen de un determinado contexto geopolítico e histórico, y que iluminan los fundamentos relativos, ideologizados y coyunturales sobre los que se construyen fronteras férreas y excluyentes, así como la percepción de la naturaleza de las corrientes migratorias. La historia polaca, en lo tocante a la migración, es un ejemplo muy tangible de aquellas acciones que siguen el patrón descrito anteriormente por Wallerstein u otros autores críticos de la realidad, aunque bien es cierto que el caso polaco ha evolucionado a un ritmo peculiar.

Efectivamente, para entender la situación migratoria contemporánea en Polonia, con todos sus matices, hay que tener en cuenta también los procesos de carácter histórico, porque éstos, aunque aparentemente están situados en “un pasado olvidado”, siguen teniendo consecuencias a largo plazo. Sin pretender enredarnos demasiado en las peculiaridades históricas, es preciso mencionar el cambio significativo a lo largo del siglo XX en la sociedad polaca, pues aunque era un país relativamente multicultural, con minorías diversas, tras la segunda guerra mundial se convirtió en un territorio prácticamente homogéneo (en el plano nacional, étnico, lingüístico e incluso religioso). Tal cambio se produjo no sólo por la guerra misma y los exterminios planificados, sino también por sus secuelas: traslados de las fron-

teras y grandes desplazamientos de las poblaciones (también por la fuerza) en esta parte de Europa (Janicka y Bojanowski, 2008: 113).

Posteriormente, ya bajo el régimen comunista, tanto la emigración como la inmigración fueron prácticas muy difíciles de ocurrir y salvo en periodos especiales estuvo prácticamente bloqueada, al menos formalmente. El inicio de la gran y veloz transformación a partir de 1989 hizo que Polonia, junto con otros países de la región, se enfrentase a los consabidos procesos de carácter social, político o económico, los cuales influyeron a su vez, directa o indirectamente, en los procesos migratorios que la definen actualmente. En ese sentido, Polonia sigue siendo un país con un porcentaje de extranjeros relativamente pequeño, que no se puede comparar con el de España o Estados Unidos, e incluso está por debajo del promedio de la Unión Europea (Wenzel, 2009). Además, existe cierta confusión en cuanto al número exacto de los inmigrantes en Polonia. Los datos oficiales parecen ser muy imprecisos: sólo se informa de unos cien mil extranjeros en Polonia, debido a que no se contabiliza a los inmigrantes que viven o trabajan en el país sin cumplir los requisitos formales, ni tampoco los trabajadores temporales (sobre todo los ucranianos) (Łotocki, 2010: 29).

Esta cifra refleja los patrones migratorios experimentados por Polonia en las últimas dos décadas. Y para explicarla en términos muy generales podemos acudir a tres planos de análisis, que son los que suelen dar cuenta del “universo migratorio” polaco y, por ende, también de las actitudes hacia los inmigrantes. Por un lado, destaca la emigración de los polacos mismos, quienes se aprovechaban de la coyuntura trabajando, por ejemplo, en Alemania (ya desde principios de los noventa) y en otros países occidentales. El ingreso a la Unión Europea en el 2004, que implicó la posibilidad de trabajar legalmente en los países miembros, acompañado de altas tasas de desempleo en Polonia y del crecimiento de las economías de los países de Europa occidental, causó un cambio en el patrón migratorio (Iglicka, 2010).

La aparición de esta nueva ola de emigración laboral se dio desde el principio de la integración nada más con algunos países, por ejemplo Irlanda o Gran Bretaña, mientras en otros, como Alemania y Austria, se mantuvo por unos años (hasta 2010), mientras duró el periodo de transición para los trabajadores procedentes de los nuevos países miembros (Bulgaria, Rumania, etc.). Este último flujo, a partir del 2004, no se relaciona solamente en apariencia con las migraciones a Polonia, pues la escasez de trabajadores originó la decisión de 2006 de permitir a los extranjeros de países vecinos poder trabajar hasta tres meses (durante seis meses de estancia) sin permiso, prolongando este periodo hasta los seis meses, durante un año en el 2008 (Iglicka, 2010).

Y esto lleva a un segundo y tercer plano, es decir, la recepción de los extranjeros, que tiene carácter dual: los inmigrantes que nada más pasan por Polonia (migrantes en tránsito) en su camino hacia “un mundo mejor”, o sea Europa occidental, y también los inmigrantes que relacionan su futuro, a corto o largo plazo, con la vida en Polonia. En este segundo caso hay que tener en cuenta que el hecho de tener un pasaporte polaco permite circular libremente en todo el espacio Schengen. Los mayores grupos de extranjeros son los ucranianos, rusos (entre los cuales destaca un grupo de re-

fugiados de Chechenia, aunque formalmente sean ciudadanos rusos), bielorrusos y vietnamitas (Łotocki, 2010: 29-30).

Tal ordenamiento indica tanto el volumen como, al menos hasta cierto grado, la importancia de estos procesos en la sociedad, pues el tema de la inmigración, tanto temporal como permanente, no constituía parte importante del discurso público ni tampoco del político. Tampoco lo fue la emigración, a pesar de su presencia relativamente importante en Estados Unidos durante el siglo xx. Sin embargo, la conciencia de tales movimientos migratorios en la sociedad polaca tiene tendencia creciente, en especial después del ingreso a la Unión Europea, cuando se empezó a debatir sobre los efectos sociales y económicos de las migraciones, sobre todo entre los jóvenes. Esto a su vez permitió ampliar de cierto modo la agenda de los temas migratorios en toda su escala, pues al hablar de los polacos en el extranjero crecía la posibilidad de que los inmigrantes en Polonia, aprovechando la oportunidad, adquirirían cierta visibilidad y de hecho, actualmente se advierte un progreso paulatino en esta materia. Es interesante observar estos cambios, sobre todo en los medios, puesto que el discurso político sigue sin iniciar el debate público, ni plantearlo en la agenda política. Y es justo eso, un programa político claro, obviamente precedido por un debate abierto e investigaciones apropiadas, lo que los especialistas indican como un elemento importante que falta en Polonia (Miciukiewicz, 2008: 54; Iglicka, 2010).

Pasando a un nivel más general, Polonia está encajándose en un proceso más amplio que caracteriza a los países europeos y que concluiría con el paso de la etapa de la emigración neta hacia la inmigración neta, que es el horizonte frente al que se encuentra Polonia. Tal transformación está vinculada, entre otros factores, con el proceso de la modernización y el estancamiento demográfico. Y aunque dicho proceso esté atrasado respecto de los “miembros viejos” de la Unión Europea, efectivamente hay que notar esta tendencia análoga.

Lo que atrae las miradas al caso polaco en el contexto migratorio es, sobre todo, su ubicación. La situación geográfica coloca a este país en la ruta de tránsito de los flujos migratorios del este al oeste. En este contexto, lo interesante es que se postula a algunas soluciones implantadas en Polonia como un modelo a seguir en los países vecinos, como Ucrania (Kazmierkiewicz *et al.*, 2009). La tarea de proteger la frontera externa de la Unión Europea frente a los otros —inmigrantes no comunitarios— tiene también ciertas consecuencias institucionales, como la implantación de las leyes comunitarias en cuanto a las reglas que ordenan el proceso de la entrada de extranjeros, antecedido por el otorgamiento del visado de pago (a partir del 2009 se facilitaron los trámites para los ciudadanos de las franjas fronterizas, al establecerse permisos más baratos que los visados normales, válidos por dos años, que dan derecho a entrar hasta 30 kilómetros al interior) (Iglicka, 2010).

Este ajuste empezó ya antes de la entrada a la Unión Europea, durante negociaciones en las cuales se indicaba la necesidad de adaptar las leyes de los nuevos miembros al régimen migratorio comunitario, a pesar de la falta de una política migratoria europea bien definida en algunos niveles, y sin poner mucha atención a la importancia de las relaciones históricas y locales con los países vecinos. Este motivo de la homologación interna de la Unión Europea “castigo” las visas para ucra-

nianos, bielorrusos y rusos —Estados vecinos de Polonia—, y enseguida dificultó los negocios fronterizos (una fuente de ingreso ya casi “tradicional” para las poblaciones fronterizas de ambos lados de la frontera) y también, entre otros, el contrabando hormiga de cigarrillos, alcohol, gasolina, etc. Después de un descenso significativo de los cruces fronterizos, el movimiento en la frontera oriental se restableció, sólo que ya bajo reglas más estrictas (Garner, 2007: 12).

En tal contexto se observan también unas tendencias más generales, o sea, la frontera oriental de Polonia pone de manifiesto la complejidad de ciertos procesos fronterizos. Como lo señala Konrad Miciukiewicz (2008), en un entorno posnacional europeo, el nuevo orden migratorio se caracterizaría sobre todo por cuatro transformaciones que describen cambios en las políticas migratorias comunitarias. Estos procesos serían los siguientes: 1) el desarrollo de las estructuras intraterritoriales de la vigilancia inmigratoria, 2) la extrapolación del control a terceros países, 3) la privatización del control y, por fin, 4) la internacionalización de la responsabilidad por la iniciativa legislativa en materia de migración de los países miembros a las instituciones comunitarias (Miciukiewicz, 2008: 45-49).

Entre las varias polémicas y preguntas que suscitan estos procesos, se indicarían ciertas analogías con la frontera *southwest* estadounidense, pues la discusión sobre la ley SB1070 en Arizona, tan criticada en el hemisferio occidental, en Europa correría el riesgo, incluso, de no ser entendida, pues para estas sociedades parece bastante clara y prácticamente indudable la prerrogativa de las instituciones policíacas, como del Estado en general, en cuanto a la competencia para comprobar el estatus migratorio de cualquier persona, una capacidad de interpelación e interrogatorio que tienen todas las policías de la Unión Europea frente a una persona que, por los indicios o atributos que sean —desde el acento al fenotipo— pudiera “ser” inmigrante.

Al lado de todos los factores antes mencionados, la animadversión al otro-extranjero, tanto la potencial como la real, en cierto punto tiene que ver también con la general falta de confianza social (entendida como un capital social, tal como lo definía Robert Putnam) en la sociedad polaca. Entonces, se supondría que con la creciente inmigración, y vinculada a ésta una mayor posibilidad de entrar a las interacciones con el otro-extranjero, se formaría una actitud más consciente al respecto, pues, hasta la fecha, los estudios indican la existencia de actitudes relativamente positivas o, al menos, no alejadas de la actitud europea promedio hacia los extranjeros. No obstante, esto se debe también, al menos parcialmente, a la índole algo abstracta de la presencia de los extranjeros en Polonia (Wenzel, 2009), pues incluso en las ciudades grandes resulta casi imposible observar tanta presencia de extranjeros como en la mayoría de ciudades españolas, o como en ciudades californianas, texanas, etc. Tanto la intuición sociológica, como la observación del discurso público, apuntan a que aún queda un buen camino hacia el entendimiento y la aceptación de la inmigración como un proceso natural para las sociedades contemporáneas, y en ese sentido también para Polonia.

Por otro lado, el papel que desempeña Polonia en el concierto de la Unión Europea se podría haber vislumbrado con ese acto simbólico que resultó ser su desig-

nación como sede de la agencia comunitaria Frontex en Varsovia.⁵ La capital del país que en los noventa experimentó un control fronterizo férreo por parte de los alemanes, para posteriormente hacerse cargo de tales procedimientos en el amplio sentido de la palabra, respecto del control de los vecinos orientales a lo largo de más de mil kilómetros de la frontera común con Rusia, Bielorrusia y Ucrania.

En resumen, Polonia está inmersa en un proceso de cambio: de un país de emigrantes hacia un país de inmigrantes, una tendencia que caracteriza a la inmensa mayoría de países miembros de la Unión Europea. No obstante, esto no es un proceso rápido ni mucho menos unidimensional, y varios de los pronósticos se basan más bien en la extrapolación de los procesos anteriores y en la observación de lo que acaece en otros países europeos, una previsión que pudiera incurrir en el riesgo de omitir tanto algunas peculiaridades de carácter local (como la estructura del mercado laboral), como algunos factores influyentes de tipo más general o global (la crisis financiera). Además, lo que espera a la sociedad polaca es el proceso de aceptación de la situación migratoria actual (y también la que supuestamente está aún por llegar, por razones económicas y demográficas), sobre todo en el nivel simbólico, vinculado tanto con los prejuicios como con la simple ignorancia, esto es, la continuación de la familiarización con los inmigrantes, lo que a la larga pudiera encarnarse en la aceptación, tolerancia u otra actitud. Sea como fuere, el tiempo dirá si su papel de gendarme o guardián de la frontera centro-oriental de la Unión Europea se traducirá en alguna forma de animadversión hacia los vecinos y hacia los inmigrantes.

Sentimientos, actitudes, acciones y fronteras antiinmigrantes

Hay que hacer hincapié en que la reacción desde Estados Unidos y España —incluida la mayor parte de Estados integrantes de la Unión Europea— hacia las corrientes migratorias provenientes del sur a partir de los años noventa se encaminó principalmente en dos sentidos: por un lado, al control riguroso de las fronteras; por otro, los sectores estratégicos de la sociedad estadounidense y española reconvirtieron o crearon hasta prácticamente la crisis del 2008 —casi dos décadas— un mayor número de puestos de trabajo para ser desempeñados por inmigrantes con permiso e inmigrantes “irregulares”, donde la mujer desempeña cada vez más un papel de peso. La generación de este tipo de actores, que más veces de las que imaginamos muestran características de resignación y docilidad que optimizan la explotación, es un proceso que se ve potenciado por el hecho de que existen fronteras muy vigiladas y peligrosas que intimidan al flujo migratorio indocumentado. Una vez que se cruza la frontera, mejor permanecer en la sociedad de llegada aceptando las

⁵ Frontex es la agencia de la Unión Europea para el control fronterizo a través de operaciones conjuntas coordinadas (Doomernik, 2010: 27).

condiciones que hay: un ingrediente, el de la vulnerabilidad, del cual se aprovechan los discursos antiinmigrantes.

La experiencia española en el periodo 1989-2010 está a medio camino entre las experiencias estadounidense y la polaca, ante la celebración de las olimpiadas de 1992 en Barcelona y la Exposición Universal de Sevilla aquel mismo año —España comenzó a atraer migración desde prácticamente cinco años antes, 1987—, aunque los flujos más diversos y numerosos comenzaron hacia 1997, y se consolidó con el nuevo siglo. Durante el periodo 2000-2008 España fue el país que más migrantes atrajo en términos porcentuales detrás de Estados Unidos, y las fronteras españolas fueron, junto con la de Estados Unidos-México, en las que más migrantes clandestinos fallecieron.

El fenómeno de la inmigración en España se ramificó por canales y dimensiones socioculturales problemáticas, como la consolidación del tráfico clandestino de inmigrantes, la explotación laboral de mano de obra inmigrante por una parte de empresarios españoles, brotes violentos de xenofobia y racismo contra inmigrantes en distintas provincias españolas como Almería o Barcelona en el 2001, o más recientemente, en enero del 2011 en Salt, cerca de Barcelona.

En otro orden de cosas estarían la aparición pública del islam, aparición de barrios e incluso guetos (asumimos el carácter problemático de este concepto) de inmigrantes en ciudades como Madrid o Barcelona, Valencia o Almería, la creciente presencia de los hijos de inmigrantes en las escuelas y en ámbitos sociales que supone la coexistencia multicultural pública, todo lo cual indica que la sociedad española del siglo XXI, así como la Unión Europea en la cual se inserta, no podrán entenderse sin la participación activa e importante de estos colectivos de inmigrantes, procedentes de América del Sur y el Caribe, África y algunos países asiáticos, aunque la animadversión hacia ellos ha demostrado ser estructural, además de manifestarse periódicamente ante eventos coyunturales. La imagen de las pateras y los cayucos, las embarcaciones en las que los inmigrantes africanos cruzan las fronteras marítimas hacia España y la Unión Europea, son parte del discurso de la xenofilia y la xenofobia. Lo que unos interpretan como un acto arriesgado de desesperación, otros lo ven como un indicador de la invasión que se “nos” viene encima.

La experiencia de Estados Unidos es más compleja y antigua. Los muros fronterizos del sur de California, en San Diego, es decir, frente a Tijuana, tienen sus antecedentes en los debates en torno a la regularización de la IRCA en 1986 y la protesta denominada Light Up en 1990; la protagonizaron los vecinos del sur de San Diego, que al anochecer llevaban sus automóviles frente a la frontera con Tijuana para alumbrar con sus carros el terreno por donde cruzaban los indocumentados. Hacia el año 2001, los protagonistas fueron los rancheros cazaindocumentados, y hacia el 2005 los “Minuteman”, entre otros. Ellos evidencian los vínculos entre sentimiento antiinmigrante y endurecimiento del control fronterizo.

Ahora bien, ¿estas posturas políticas tuvieron o tienen un reflejo o respaldo teórico en las ciencias sociales? La respuesta es sí. Estas circunstancias y actitudes tuvieron su repercusión en la academia estadounidense y europea. Sabido es que Samuel Huntington, el autor de *El choque de las civilizaciones* (1997), ya de-

fendía a mediados de los noventa que los conflictos del siglo XXI tendrían un origen cultural-étnico y no ideológico, como el enfrentamiento bipolarizado entre comunistas y “occidentales” durante la guerra fría. Desarrollando esa tesis, este mismo autor señaló a los inmigrantes mexicanos como el principal “enemigo” de Estados Unidos en el siglo XXI: “Mexican immigration looms as a unique and disturbing challenge to our cultural integrity, our national identity, and potentially to our future as a country” (Huntington, 2000). Un breve artículo que fue el preludeo o semilla de su obra *¿Quiénes somos? Los desafíos a la sociedad estadounidense*, posiblemente el mejor epítome de la visión estadounidense prejuiciosa sobre México, donde la invasión silenciosa es el fantasma que se esgrime una vez más (Huntington, 2004).

Y en el seno de la Unión Europea destacaría Giovanni Sartori (2001), quien planteó que los migrantes extranjeros, de seguir así las cosas, pueden dinamitar las bases del pluralismo y el liberalismo de los Estados democráticos, capitalistas y occidentales. La sociedad abierta de Popper, democrática y pluralista, debe cerrarse al elemento extranjero y perturbador, según Sartori, para seguir siéndolo. O, lo que es lo mismo, la capacidad de acogida de migrantes es limitada porque, de lo contrario, pueden colapsar al sistema democrático. Paradójicamente, la sociedad abierta y plural tiene un enemigo en casa: el multiculturalismo, corriente caracterizada por su defensa de las culturas extrañas —y problemáticas— de los inmigrantes, entre otras cosas (Taylor, 1993).

Ahora bien, sí resulta difícil comparar casos y procesos entre lo que ocurre en Europa y Estados Unidos (Henke, 2005) o la experiencia de un mismo colectivo de inmigrantes a ambos lados del Océano Atlántico, aunque compartan la vaga condición de “latinos-americanos” (Relaño y Alonso, 2005), lo cierto es que en cuanto a los factores que subyacen bajo el férreo control fronterizo parece —a nuestro modo de ver— que algunas conexiones sí están presentes. Es decir, no se pueden explicar sin ver la presencia de la ideología antiinmigrante a partir de los años setenta, la cual se redimensionó en los años ochenta, y que ideológicamente ha estado marcada por la caída del muro de Berlín y el auge del fundamentalismo islámico asociado a Al-Qaeda y los atentados de Nueva York, Madrid y Londres.

Si la *coartada culturalista* sustituyó a la vieja *coartada racista*, pasando a fundamentar la retórica contemporánea de la exclusión de los extranjeros y los inmigrantes, especialmente los menos “calificados” o vulnerables, es evidente que necesariamente podemos encontrar a la exclusión culturalista como un referente ideológico que ha impactado en las políticas de inmigración, las cuales se han traducido, desde 1989 y después de la caída del “telón de acero”, en nuevas fronteras-muros inexpugnables. Las nuevas concepciones de fronteras en los tres escenarios que hemos privilegiado en este trabajo se deben, en buena parte, a una percepción ideológicamente distorsionada de los flujos migratorios indocumentados y a un concomitante “sentimiento” de rechazo gestado décadas atrás.

Para el caso estadounidense, esta genealogía ideológica es más clara; para el caso español, pero sobre todo para el caso polaco, la originalidad viene dada por las propias dinámicas políticas y legislativas de la Unión Europea, donde los modelos de fronteras son adoptados por Estados y sociedades donde la inmigración es “re-

ciente” y el sentimiento de animadversión a los inmigrantes está madurando; pero que no quepa duda que su vigencia en la Unión Europea o Estados Unidos sigue intacta. Las manifestaciones del primer ministro británico David Cameron y del presidente francés Nicolás Sarkozy (enero y febrero del 2011) rechazando la multiculturalidad en sus países, es el último ejemplo de un complejo proceso que sigue creciendo. El otro es una iniciativa de ley en Arizona para quitar la ciudadanía a los(as) menores nacidos de padres indocumentados.

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LAS CONSIGNAS ANTIINMIGRACIÓN EN LOS PARTIDOS POLÍTICOS ESPAÑOLES. LOS CASOS DE DEMOCRACIA NACIONAL Y PLATAFORMA PER CATALUNYA

Pablo Nicolás Biderbost Moyano*

Introducción

España, en poco más de una década, abandonó su perfil emigratorio tradicional y se convirtió en una sociedad netamente receptora. Antes del inicio de la crisis económica internacional, según estadísticas de la OCDE, los extranjeros representaban el 14.1 por ciento de la población española. Si bien los partidos políticos con opción real de ejercicio de gobierno (Partido Popular y Partido Obrero Socialista Español) han expresado, con matizaciones circunstanciales, su adhesión a la idea de integración de los inmigrantes en la sociedad de acogida, existen partidos minoritarios que expresan abiertamente consignas antiinmigración. En ese sentido, España no se aparta de la tendencia observada en el resto de los países europeos (Biderbost, 2010; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Koopmans *et al.*, 2005).

En el caso de la nación mediterránea, estas agrupaciones partidarias, de acuerdo con informes del Ministerio del Interior de España, se encuentran vinculadas a movimientos neonazis, *skinheads* y de ultraderecha. Esta familia de organizaciones de corte xenófobo atribuye a la inmigración el actuar como factor corrosivo de la cultura autóctona. Sus discursos y repertorios de acción se encuentran inspirados en otros utilizados por asociaciones similares en países del entorno (Hainsworth, 1992; Kriesi y Duyvendak, 1995).

El presente artículo tiene por objeto, en primer lugar, analizar el discurso de dos de estos partidos políticos (Democracia Nacional y Plataforma per Catalunya); en segundo lugar, se observará, a la luz de las *grievance theories* ("teorías del agravio"), si existe relación entre la tasa de inmigración y el nivel de desempleo con el rendimiento electoral de estos partidos en los diferentes distritos políticos. Finalmente, se describirá cuál ha sido la influencia de estas agrupaciones en la elaboración de legislación y políticas públicas cuando han obtenido representación parlamentaria. La elaboración de este artículo responde a un déficit sobre estudios en la materia en España.

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Cuando el franquismo se vuelve antiinmigrante: el discurso de Democracia Nacional

En la transición a la democracia en España, las antiguas corrientes franquistas sufrieron diferentes procesos de metamorfosis: por un lado, algunas mutaron a partidos políticos *catch all* anclados en la derecha (Alianza Popular, precursora del actual Partido Popular), o el centro ideológico (Unión de Centro Democrático) (Gunther, 1986; Huneeus, 1985; López Nieto, 1998). En ambos casos, la vocación de participación en el juego democrático resultó clara. Procedieron de tal manera quienes, desde dentro de la extinta dictadura, apostaron por la apertura institucional. Por otro lado, se encontraron los nostálgicos del régimen que optaron por la creación de agrupaciones cívicas, con pretensiones fundacionales de protagonismo político, pero con eco irregular en el resto de la sociedad. A este último grupo, deseoso de mantener la impronta sociológica de la matriz nacional-católica vigente durante la autocracia, pertenece Democracia Nacional (DN).

Este partido político nace en 1994 bajo la denominación de Alternativa Demócrata Nacional, como fruto de la fusión de antiguas agrupaciones de filiación de extrema derecha (Juntas Españolas, Frente Nacional Español, Círculo Español de Amigos de Europa, entre otros). En 1995, el partido es registrado con la actual denominación. DN nace en el marco de un ciclo contractivo de la economía y cuando, desde hacía un lustro, España estaba convirtiéndose en opción real de destino migratorio para muchos norafricanos y latinoamericanos. Juan Enrique Peligro Robledo fue su primer presidente y, en la actualidad, lo dirige Manuel Canduela, antiguo cantante y miembro fundador de un grupo musical de tendencia neonazi.

Desde su creación, se ha autodefinido como “social-patriota” y ha escogido al Frente Nacional de Jean-Marie Le Pen como referente institucional externo. En tal sentido, forma parte de la plataforma Euronat, red creada por el líder galo para propiciar la sincronización del discurso y de las actividades de los partidos de esta naturaleza en el viejo continente. Desde sus inicios, su ideario y propuestas políticas se han centrado en criticar todo lo que, por foráneo y diferente, atenta contra la esencia de la identidad española. La inmigración representa, según esta cosmovisión, una afrenta al bagaje cultural hispánico.

Según afirma Democracia Nacional (2008) en sus idearios (una especie de diagnóstico institucional sobre la realidad social española), los procesos migratorios forman parte de la historia sociológica de la humanidad. Se describen como inevitables. A pesar de ello, se condena expresamente la *inmigración masiva* por la *amenaza* que implica para el mantenimiento de la identidad nacional, cultural y social de España y de la Unión Europea. La inmigración se equipara con “un genocidio lento y bien planificado de la nación española”. La llegada indiscriminada de inmigrantes es, para esta agrupación, una de las tantas caras de la globalización. Bienes, capitales y personas, en el marco de un mercado globalizado, se trasladan de un sitio a otro sin ningún tipo de filtro.

Los inmigrantes, al ser mano de obra barata, le hacen el juego a los empresarios que lo que desean es incrementar su beneficio a partir de la reducción de lo

que abonan a sus trabajadores. En consecuencia, los obreros/empleados autóctonos son desplazados por extranjeros que realizan la misma tarea por una paga substancialmente menor. Los inmigrantes provocan *desempleo* entre los locales. Según el criterio de DN, los partidos de izquierda y los sindicatos actúan como cómplices de este esquema a partir de la defensa férrea que hacen de los colectivos inmigrantes.

A su vez, la presencia de inmigrantes provoca, luego de balancear lo que aportan y lo que reciben, un *déficit* para las arcas del Estado español. Al mismo tiempo, desvía recursos que deberían ir prioritariamente al colectivo autóctono. En el caso de quienes son indocumentados, se asume que no realizan ningún tipo de ingresos, pero sí reciben atención sanitaria y educativa. En el caso de quienes son migrantes documentados, se sostiene que, al pertenecer a las franjas menos favorecidas en la escala salarial, cotizan montos limitados a la seguridad social y, consecuentemente, mayor cantidad de subsidios reciben. Las ONG que, por las tareas que desarrollan, apoyen a los inmigrantes para la obtención de protección oficial deben, en opinión de DN, ser desarticuladas.

Al no existir una adecuada correspondencia entre puestos de trabajo creados por la economía vernácula y el número de extranjeros que arriban a España, existe un saldo de inmigrantes en el paro que, conforme a lo expuesto por este partido, pasan a conformar una masa crítica de delincuentes. Los inmigrantes, según DN, generan *inseguridad* por encontrarse vinculados a situaciones de delincuencia organizada, mafias, narcotráfico y prostitución, entre otros males sociales.

A la inseguridad física descrita, se añade otro tipo de inseguridad creada por los inmigrantes: la de tipo cultural. En otras palabras, la llegada de los inmigrantes implica potenciales *conflictos sociales* por las diferencias culturales existentes entre los oriundos y los recién llegados. Los grupos conflictivos merecen, según considera esta plataforma política, especial seguimiento por parte del Estado.

En relación con los orígenes de los inmigrantes, el que resulta menos apreciado, en los documentos constitutivos de DN, es el *islámico*. Se sostiene que el culto islámico no debe recibir ningún tipo de apoyo oficial mientras las religiones cristianas no reciban protección pública en los países árabes. Se recomienda la persecución de la poligamia y el uso de prendas religiosas por parte de individuos que no sean ministros de culto. El avance del islam se entiende como la mayor amenaza que se cierne sobre la identidad nacional y europea.

A partir del diagnóstico descrito sobre la inmigración en España, DN presenta un conjunto variopinto de propuestas para la gestión de la inmigración, las cuales se agrupan en ocho dimensiones diferentes. En primer lugar, en relación con la *seguridad y el orden público*, se sostiene que debe acentuarse la vigilancia en las fronteras y que las fuerzas de seguridad deben ser dotadas de los elementos necesarios para el combate de la inmigración ilegal. Los inmigrantes no podrán vivir en barrios o ciudades donde los inmigrantes hayan superado el umbral del 10 por ciento sobre el total poblacional (máximo tolerado por DN para evitar la incubación de conflictos).

En segundo lugar, en relación con los *derechos civiles y políticos* de los inmigrantes, se recomienda la creación de una nueva ley de extranjería que permita la

expulsión de todos los extranjeros en situación de irregularidad, la repatriación de quienes hubiesen delinquido (excepto cuando cumplan condenas por delitos graves y exista presunción de que no cumplirán la pena en sus países de origen), la anulación de los permisos de estancia y residencia para inmigrantes posteriores al año 1998 y la derogación de la figura de la reagrupación familiar. La residencia (que no debe permitir el libre tránsito dentro de la Unión Europea) sólo puede otorgarse a quien tenga solvencia en el manejo del español y su renovación, luego de una evaluación, debe ser anual. A su vez, en el contexto de matrimonios mixtos (una persona autóctona y una extranjera), la custodia de los hijos menores de edad siempre debe concederse al autóctono. Los derechos de voto y de protesta son exclusivamente patrimonio de los ciudadanos españoles.

En un tercer momento, respecto de la *naturalización* (adquisición de la nacionalidad española) de los inmigrantes, sólo podrán acceder a ésta quienes, habiendo nacido en el extranjero, fueran hijos de españoles de origen. La conversión en españoles a través del matrimonio con un local o mediante la residencia prolongada en el tiempo sólo acontecerá en casos especiales que no se especifican. Los nacidos en el marco de un matrimonio mixto podrán adquirir la nacionalidad española, pero pueden perderla en caso de ser declarados culpables de delitos.

En cuarto término, sobre el *mercado de trabajo*, DN propone la prohibición de la contratación de trabajadores inmigrantes para puestos de trabajo para los cuales existe, al menos, un autóctono preparado para ello y dispuesto a aceptarlo. A su vez, sostiene que deben incrementarse las inspecciones en los centros de trabajo para multar a empresarios que contraten a inmigrantes irregulares. Se recomienda que, en caso de no haber mano de obra vernácula disponible para diferentes empleos, el ingreso de trabajadores inmigrantes debe darse vía importación de contingente de trabajadores temporales.¹ Estos individuos no tendrán posibilidad alguna de convertir su estancia transitoria en permanente.

En quinto lugar, para evitar la *dependencia de mano de obra* inmigrante, DN propone el fomento de la natalidad, el incremento de la base de población ocupada y la elevación de la inversión en investigación destinada a mejorar la productividad de la sociedad española y, de esa manera, garantizar la supervivencia del sistema de Seguridad Social. Como sexta dimensión, se trabaja lo vinculado con el *Estado benefactor*. DN auspicia, por un lado, la eliminación de la discriminación positiva que prioriza a los inmigrantes al momento de recibir ayudas sociales; y, por el otro, sostiene que los inmigrantes, en determinado distrito, nunca podrán recibir un porcentaje

¹ Democracia Nacional considera que el acceso al mercado de trabajo español vía contingentes debe ser organizado, según los orígenes prioritarios. En primer lugar, tendrán acceso ciudadanos de países actual o potencialmente miembros de la Unión Europea. Luego, se considerará a quienes provengan de América Latina, Sahara y Guinea Ecuatorial (antiguas colonias españolas) para, en un tercer plano, considerar a postulantes procedentes de países del entorno mediterráneo. Finalmente, se encontrarán quienes sean originarios del resto del mundo. En los últimos tres casos, se eliminará a los individuos que procedan de países cuyos inmigrantes en España han sido evaluados (por las fuerzas del orden público) como "conflictivos".

de subvenciones que supere el doble del porcentaje de población extranjera residente en la circunscripción.²

En séptimo término, para evitar en los países de origen las *causas* de la inmigración, se apoya la idea de elevar la ayuda internacional al desarrollo, pero de manera condicionada. Sólo podrán recibirla los Estados que no creen condiciones de miseria entre sus ciudadanos y, consecuentemente, no estimulen su emigración. Finalmente, se sugiere crear una especie de sistema para diferenciar entre inmigrantes económicos (no merecedores de la permanencia en España como país de destino) y los *refugiados políticos* (a quienes debe protegerse en suelo ibérico, al menos, temporalmente). DN considera que una vez que han desaparecido, en los países de origen, las condiciones que originaron el desplazamiento, los refugiados o asilados deben retornar y el Estado español no debe renovarles su autorización de estancia.

El diagnóstico y las propuestas sobre inmigración de DN son dados a conocer al resto de la sociedad española a través de tres vías: la organización de manifestaciones (marchas) en las principales ciudades españolas, la colocación de carteles con claras consignas antiinmigración³ en la geografía urbana y la realización de torneos deportivos y conciertos en los que actúan agrupaciones musicales autodefinidas como nacionalistas. Excepto cuando acontecen situaciones conflictivas (abierto enfrentamiento entre miembros del partido y militantes antifascistas o denuncias, realizadas por terceros, por su marcado carácter xenófobo), no acaece la difusión, en los principales medios de comunicación hispanos, de las consignas de esta agrupación partidaria. Su presencia mediática ha sido, en términos generales, marginal.

No somos españoles, pero tampoco queremos inmigrantes: el discurso de Plataforma per Catalunya

España se encuentra conformada por comunidades autónomas, algunas de las cuales tienen una identidad cultural propia que se traduce, entre otras cuestiones, en la posesión de una lengua regional diferente al español y en la autoconsideración como naciones históricas. En estos espacios geográfico-políticos, una vez que aconteció la transición a la democracia, se enraizaron propuestas partidarias que recogían el ideario nacionalista. Éste es el caso de Catalunya. Abrevando de esta cosmovisión catalanista, emerge, en la primera década del siglo XXI, Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC).

Esta agrupación nace en el año 2001 en la ciudad de Vic (provincia de Barcelona). PxC nace, en pleno ciclo económico expansivo, luego del salto demográfico que

² En otras palabras, si los inmigrantes representan el 5 por ciento de la población de un vecindario/ciudad, no podrán recibir más del 10 por ciento de las ayudas sociales previstas para esa jurisdicción.

³ En varias ciudades, en el último quinquenio, se han encontrado carteles en los que se dibujan ovejas sobre la bandera de España. Todas las ovejas, excepto una, son de color blanco. Las ovejas, en el dibujo, expulsan de una patada a la oveja diferente (de color negro) del territorio que ocupan y le dicen como admonición: "Compórtate o lárgate". Esta campaña parece haber sido tomada de una semejante que, en su momento, fue desarrollada por el Partido Popular Suizo (SPV) (público).

implicó la llegada de inmigrantes durante el decenio de 1990 a Cataluña.⁴ Fue fundada y es dirigida desde entonces por Josep Anglada i Rius, antiguo militante del ultraderechista Partido Fuerza Nueva (Pinyol, 2010: 1). Este partido político se autodefine como “catalán, democrático, con vocación europea y decididamente innovador” (PxC, 2011).⁵ Se propone la preservación de la identidad y cohesión social catalana que se encuentra, según su criterio, amenazada por el multiculturalismo creado y alentado por las elites a partir de la llegada de inmigrantes (Casals, 2009). Como en el caso de DN, se admite no rechazar a “la persona del inmigrante”, sino el enraizamiento de determinadas culturas foráneas.

PxC forma parte de la familia de partidos vinculados a la derecha radical populista (Arzheimer y Carter, 2006; Ivarsflaten, 2008). En el plano internacional, ha estrechado vínculos con la Lega Nord (Italia) y el Vlaams Belang (Bélgica). Aunque, inicialmente, el partido pretendía una presencia en el ámbito geográfico estatal (denominación aplicada en España para hacer referencia a todo el país), desde el año 2008, en ocasión de su IV Congreso, se decide que su ámbito de acción se encuentra centrado en Cataluña (Casals, 2009; Mudde, 2007). De acuerdo con sus documentos fundacionales y con la estrategia política aplicada desde su creación, las acciones encaminadas a la conquista del poder deben darse en el espacio municipal.

Según se afirma en el documento mencionado, la inmigración es una de las tantas manifestaciones de la globalización. En este cuadro situacional, quienes detentan el poder son las grandes corporaciones financieras, las cuales han actualizado el extinto sistema feudal y han catapultado a la corrupción como su elemento central. En este texto fundacional, se crea una especie de triangulación de procesos: elevada especulación, baja natalidad vernácula y llegada de extranjeros. Según la lógica construida, los empresarios son los responsables de la llegada masiva de inmigrantes (como consecuencia de la ausencia de mano de obra local) y los últimos son quienes provocan el *descenso en los salarios* de los autóctonos. Los inmigrantes, según refleja este documento vertebral, son junto a otros grupos sociales (gitanos y drogadictos) los que concentran, producto de la aplicación de una mal concebida política de discriminación positiva, la recepción de *subsidios y beneficios sociales*.

En Cataluña, los inmigrantes se asocian con la implantación de una *cultura de la criminalidad*. El aumento de robos, terrorismo y abusos sexuales se adjudican, sin excepción, a la presencia de los inmigrantes. Los extranjeros, al no encontrar trabajo, se verían obligados a delinquir. Las autoridades procuran desorientar a la opinión pública en relación con la gravedad de esta problemática social.

La radicación de extranjeros en el territorio catalán apareja, a su vez, un peligro para el *mantenimiento de la cultura* vernácula. Se sostiene que determinadas

⁴ Entre 1980 y 2003, se septuplicó el número de inmigrantes que habitaba en Catalunya (Instituto Nacional de Estadística).

⁵ La propuesta partidaria de PxC se encuentra dirigida, según se induce de la lectura de sus documentos genésicos, a votantes que no se sienten representados por los partidos tradicionales. Al mismo tiempo, evitan posicionarse claramente en dos ejes clásicos de la política vernácula: derecha frente a izquierda y catalanismo frente a españolismo (Casals, 2009: 3).

creencias religiosas no occidentales contradicen, en material de distribución de libertades entre varones y mujeres, a los derechos humanos como parámetro ético imperante. Para justificar tal afirmación, se procede, en esta carta identitaria de PxC, a la presentación contrastada de principios expuestos tanto en la Declaración Universal de los Derechos Humanos y la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer, como en el Corán.

Dentro de los colectivos inmigrantes, como se infiere de la lectura de los párrafos previos, el que representa un peligro mayor es el islámico, porque se le supone, debido a su intolerancia constitutiva, incompatible con una cosmovisión pluralista como la que existe en Occidente (Casals, 2009: 5). Al mismo tiempo, PxC presupone que el islam no tiene otro objetivo sino la conquista del continente europeo. La islamofobia declarada por PxC parece derivar del hecho de que, en Cataluña según datos recientes, el 35.4 por ciento de los inmigrantes tiene origen musulmán y el colectivo islámico representa entre el 3.8 y el 4.9 por ciento de la población autonómica (Moreras, 2007).

PxC propone una batería de políticas para hacer frente a la inmigración como proceso social nocivo. En relación con el *control, regularización y derechos civiles* de la inmigración, recomienda la creación de cuotas de procedencia y la prohibición del ingreso de individuos adherentes a la ley islámica (*sharia*). A su vez, estima conveniente expulsar y quitar la nacionalidad (obtenida por residencia continuada en el tiempo) a quienes, siendo legales y encontrándose radicados en Cataluña, apoyen esta cosmovisión. Los ilegales también deben ser expulsados y se les eliminará la regularización vía arraigo. Estas medidas se complementarán con la penalización legal de creencias y conductas de naturaleza islámica. Se sostiene que el objetivo es que “sólo los islámicos españoles de origen puedan continuar residendo en el país [...]”.

En materia *laboral*, se propone la creación de oficinas gubernamentales a nivel local, en las que deben autorizarse todas las contrataciones de trabajadores para evitar que un no catalán tenga prioridad como acontecería (y acontece) en el caso de que el reclutamiento se acordase entre personas físicas. En lo vinculado a la *política social y habitacional*, se propone la eliminación de criterios de discriminación positiva y su reemplazo por una pauta en la que se consideran tres factores: necesidad objetiva del solicitante, su nacionalidad (preferencia para los oriundos) y la comprobación de su conducta fiscal.

En relación con lo *cultural*, PxC propone la puesta en marcha de acciones que promuevan, desde los municipios, los valores de la cultura occidental. Entre otras cuestiones, se sostiene que los fondos que actualmente se dediquen a subsidiar las actividades llevadas a cabo por ONG proinmigrantes deben redireccionarse a instituciones cuyo objeto sea velar por el mantenimiento de la cosmovisión asociada a los derechos humanos.

En materia de *seguridad*, se promueve la cooperación desde el ámbito local, en coordinación con las fuerzas policiales de los gobiernos central y autonómico, a partir de la puesta en marcha de acciones destinadas a prevenir el delito y custodiar la urbanidad. Los crímenes serán evitados desde el trabajo conjunto entre la

política municipal y la comunidad vecinal. La persecución del delito tendrá un elevado componente cultural: se supone que la difusión de los valores asociados a los derechos humanos facilitará la disminución de las faltas por parte de quienes no comparten tales criterios (los recién llegados). Los vecinos serán invitados a denunciar la presencia de inmigrantes ilegales. Los inmigrantes que se encuentran en prisión serán expulsados una vez que cumplan con su condena.

Finalmente, en el área de la *cooperación internacional*, se considera pertinente incrementar los niveles de apoyo a las sociedades expulsoras de población. A diferencia del caso de DN, no se habla de condicionamientos para la entrega de esta ayuda. PxC entiende que, de proceder así, se logrará el control y posterior disminución del flujo de inmigrantes que arriba a Cataluña.

CUADRO 1
DIFERENCIAS IDENTITARIAS Y DE DIAGNÓSTICO SOBRE LA INMIGRACIÓN
ENTRE DN Y PxC

<i>Dimensión</i>	<i>Democracia Nacional</i>	<i>Plataforma per Catalunya</i>
Autoidentidad	Social-patriota	Catalana, democrática, europea e innovadora
Caracterización	Hispánico-católico	Catalano-islamófobo
Fundación	1994 (ciclo económico recesivo)	2001 (ciclo económico expansivo)
Origen	Fusión de grupos de extrema derecha	Iniciativa personal
Ámbito de acción	Estatal (España)	Autonómico (Cataluña)
Presidente	Manuel Canduela	Josep Anglada i Rius
Referentes externos	Frente Nacional (Francia)	Liga Norte (Italia) y Vlaams Belang (Bélgica)
Consecuencia genérica de la inmigración	Genocidio de la nación española	Amenaza a la identidad y cohesión social catalana
Consecuencias parciales de la inmigración:		
Mercado de trabajo	Desempleo y reducción de salarios	Reducción de salarios
Estado benefactor	Mayores consumidores que aportantes	Acaparación de subsidios
Seguridad	Crimen organizado, mafias, narcotráfico y prostitución	Robo, terrorismo y abusos sexuales
Cultura	Conflictos sociales	Desigualdad entre varones y mujeres
Colectivo inmigrante más combatido	Islámico	Islámico

FUENTE: Elaboración propia.

CUADRO 2
 DIFERENCIAS SOBRE PROPUESTAS DE POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS
 EN MATERIA DE INMIGRACIÓN ENTRE DN Y PXC

<i>Tipo de política pública</i>	<i>Democracia Nacional</i>	<i>Plataforma per Catalunya</i>
Control, seguridad y orden público	Vigilancia en fronteras Sofisticación de las fuerzas policiales No concentración habitacional de inmigrantes	Creación de cuotas de origen Expulsión y prohibición de ingreso de individuos que apoyen la <i>sharia</i> Penalización de creencias vinculadas a la <i>sharia</i> Comunidad organizada de vecinos Denuncia, por parte de los vecinos, de los inmigrantes ilegales Promoción de la cultura occidental
Derechos civiles	Expulsión de inmigrantes irregulares Repatriación de delincuentes Derogación de permisos de residencia posteriores a 1998 Derogación de la reagrupación familiar Custodia de hijos a cargo de progenitor español	Expulsión de inmigrantes irregulares Derogación de la figura del arraigo
Derechos políticos Naturalización	Exclusividad de goce para españoles Exclusividad para inmigrantes hijos de españoles de origen	No precisa Privación de nacionalidad a individuos que apoyen la <i>sharia</i>
Mercado de trabajo	Prohibición de contratación de inmigrantes Contingentes temporales Inspección a empleadores	Creación de oficinas locales de contratación (intermediación)
Estado benefactor	Eliminación de discriminación positiva Ayudas en función de porcentaje de población inmigrante	Eliminación de discriminación positiva Priorización de necesidades de población autóctona
Fomento de la natalidad	Incremento de la población ocupada Investigación sobre mejora de la productividad	Creación de guarderías
Cooperación internacional	Apoyo condicionado a países expulsores de población	Apoyo no condicionado a países expulsores de población
Refugio	Protección transitoria a asilados y refugiados	No precisa
Cultura	No precisa	Fomento de la cultura occidental Eliminación del apoyo gubernamental a las ONG pro inmigración

FUENTE: Elaboración propia.

La difusión de su diagnóstico y propuestas de gestión de la inmigración la realiza PXC a través de la organización de marchas, la participación en debates televisivos en señales locales y el reparto de material informativo entre los vecinos de los pueblos y ciudades donde su estructura tiene presencia. A diferencia de DN, la alusión

a esta agrupación partidaria en los medios de comunicación es mucho más frecuente, en gran medida debido al ascenso electoral paulatino que ha vivido desde su creación. Obsérvese, por favor, en los siguientes cuadros comparativos las principales características en materia de autoidentidad, diagnóstico sobre la inmigración y propuestas de políticas públicas tanto de Democracia Nacional como de PxC.

Visibilidad inmigrante, desempleo y crecimiento electoral de las consignas antiinmigración

La literatura dedicada al estudio de la aparición de movimientos y partidos políticos antiinmigración se divide en dos corrientes, en función de los factores que la propician. Según nos recuerdan Koopmans *et al.* (2005: 181), este conjunto de elementos pueden distribuirse según la lógica de explicaciones vinculadas a la demanda y explicaciones vinculadas a la oferta. En relación con lo primero, se encuentran las explicaciones vinculadas a las llamadas teorías del agravio. En vinculación con lo segundo, se hallan las explicaciones basadas en la denominadas *opportunities theories* (o “teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad”).

Las teorías del agravio hacen referencia, genéricamente, a que determinadas condiciones objetivas en la sociedad conducen a situaciones de descontento entre los individuos que se sienten afectados o disminuidos por aquéllas. A partir de este diagnóstico, quienes se sienten agraviados proceden a reivindicar su punto de vista y a movilizarse (Gurr, 1970; Smelser, 1962; Collier y Hoefler, 2002).


Por el contrario, las teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad sostienen que la movilización de los individuos acontece debido a que existen circunstancias políticas que las facilitan (capacidad o incapacidad de los partidos políticos para incorporar nuevas demandas, fractura entre las elites, apertura o cierre del sistema político y capacidad represiva estatal, entre otras) (McAdam, Tarrow y Tilly, 2001; Koopmans *et al.*, 2005: 180-185).

En este apartado, se procederá a evaluar la validez de las teorías del agravio para explicar la fuerza electoral de Democracia Nacional y de Plataforma per Catalunya. Según esta mirada, a medida que acontezcan determinados procesos que provoquen, entre los autóctonos, un sentimiento subjetivo de pérdida de estatus, será posible observar un paralelo ascenso del apoyo electoral a este tipo de partidos políticos. Aquí se ha procedido a utilizar dos indicadores clásicos de este tipo de hipótesis: tasa de inmigración y tasa de paro (desempleo).

En relación con DN, se ha tomado como referencia de su fuerza electoral el apoyo recibido en oportunidad de la celebración de las últimas elecciones europeas (junio de 2009). En este tipo de comicios, las agrupaciones de extrema derecha suelen registrar un incremento en el porcentaje que sus votos representan sobre el total de sufragios, debido a que el nivel de abstención suele ser elevado (aún más entre votantes de izquierda) (Valles, 2009). En una primera observación en un diagrama de dispersión de la distribución del apoyo electoral a DN asociado a la tasa de inmigración registrada en cada comunidad autónoma, no se concluye que existe

relación entre ambas variables. Corroborando esta apreciación con la aplicación del coeficiente de Pearson, se obtiene idéntica conclusión: no se aprecia correlación estadísticamente significativa entre estos elementos.

GRÁFICA 1
RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN
POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del Interior.

CUADRO 3
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA⁶


		Correlaciones	
		<i>Apoyo DN</i>	<i>Tasa inmig.</i>
Apoyo DN	Correlación de Pearson	1	.133
	Sig. (bilateral)		.611
	N	19	17
Tasa inmigración	Correlación de Pearson	.133	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	.611	
	N	17	17

FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del Interior.

⁶ En este caso, no se ha incorporado información sobre la tasa de inmigración en las dos ciudades autónomas españolas (Ceuta y Melilla) ubicadas en el norte de África. La omisión ha sido consecuencia de no existir datos fiables para el año que se ha tomado como referencia para esta variable (2005). En las siguientes dos correlaciones, por existir disponibilidad, se han agregado a los cálculos los datos correspondientes a ambas jurisdicciones.

Cuando se realizan idénticos ejercicios para observar si existe relación entre apoyo electoral a DN y tasa de desempleo en las diferentes comunidades autónomas españolas en el trimestre en el que acontecieron los comicios europeos, los resultados distan incluso de la dirección sugerida por los presupuestos teóricos. La relación que existiría entre ambas variables es negativa. Habría, entonces, una concentración del apoyo electoral a DN entre las comunidades autónomas con menor nivel de paro. Sin embargo, esta relación no reviste mayor significación estadística.

GRÁFICA 2
RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO)
POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del Interior.


CUADRO 4
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO) POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA

		Correlaciones	
		<i>Apoyo DN</i>	<i>Tasa paro</i>
Apoyo DN	Correlación de Pearson	1	-.264
	Sig. (bilateral)		.274
	N	19	19
Tasa paro	Correlación de Pearson	.264	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	.274	
	N	19	19

FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Instituto Nacional de Estadística y del Ministerio del Interior.

Según lo observado, las teorías del agravio no serían útiles para explicar, al menos en a lo que acontece en las elecciones europeas, el apoyo que detenta DN. Probablemente, alguna variable asociada a las teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad contribuya a arrojar cierta luz sobre el desempeño electoral de esta agrupación. Para esos fines, se ha usado el apoyo electoral al Partido Popular (PP), principal partido de centro-derecha en España, como indicador de la existencia de una matriz sociocultural que, en determinadas comunidades autónomas, facilite bajo ciertas condiciones una mayor sintonía del electorado con las propuestas de DN. La visión de diagrama de dispersión dificulta la identificación de relación entre apoyo electoral al PP y apoyo electoral a DN. La realización de la correlación confirma la inexistencia de asociación estadística entre ambas variables.

GRÁFICA 3
RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y APOYO ELECTORAL AL PP POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Ministerio del Interior.


CUADRO 5
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A DN
Y APOYO ELECTORAL AL PP POR COMUNIDAD AUTÓNOMA

		Correlaciones	
		<i>Apoyo DN</i>	<i>Apoyo PP</i>
Apoyo DN	Correlación de Pearson	1	.057
	Sig. (bilateral)		.816
	N	19	19
Apoyo PP	Correlación de Pearson	.057	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	.816	
	N	19	19

FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos del Ministerio del Interior.

¿Cuál será el comportamiento de las variables estudiadas en el caso de PxC? En primer lugar, la asociación entre tasa de inmigración y apoyo electoral al partido en las últimas elecciones autonómicas (noviembre de 2010) es inexistente. El diagrama de dispersión refleja la existencia de una nube de puntos cuando se considera la relación entre ambas variables en las provincias catalanas. La realización del ejercicio de correlación brinda idénticos resultados. La tasa de inmigración parecería no ser el motivo del apoyo electoral a esta agrupación para este tipo de comicios.

GRÁFICA 4
RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos de Idescat (2011a) y del Ministerio del Interior.


CUADRO 6
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC Y TASA DE INMIGRACIÓN POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA

		Correlaciones	
		<i>Apoyo DN</i>	<i>Tasa inmig.</i>
Apoyo DN	Correlación de Pearson	1	-.336
	Sig. (bilateral)		.581
	N	5	5
Tasa inmigración	Correlación de Pearson	.336	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	.581	
	N	5	5

FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos de Idescat (2011a) y del Ministerio del Interior.

La situación cambia radicalmente cuando se analiza la asociación entre apoyo electoral a PxC y la tasa de paro por provincia catalana. En este caso, el diagrama de dispersión permite la visualización de algún tipo de relación positiva que, a posteriori, se confirma con la ejecución de la correspondiente correlación. Entre ambas variables existe asociación estadística. En otras palabras, en las provincias en las que se registra un elevado nivel de paro, existe, a la vez, un mayor apoyo electoral a PxC. Las teorías del agravio ayudan a explicar el éxito electoral de la agrupación en un contexto marcado por una profunda contracción económica.

GRÁFICA 5
RELACIÓN ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO)
POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA



FUENTE: Elaboración propia, con datos de Idescat (2011b) y del Ministerio del Interior.

CUADRO 7
ASOCIACIÓN ESTADÍSTICA ENTRE APOYO ELECTORAL A PxC
Y TASA DE PARO (DESEMPLEO) POR PROVINCIA EN CATALUÑA

		Correlaciones	
		<i>Tasa paro</i>	<i>Apoyo PxC</i>
Tasa paro	Correlación de Pearson	1	.904*
	Sig. (bilateral)		.035
	N	5	5
Apoyo PxC	Correlación de Pearson	.904*	1
	Sig. (bilateral)	.035	
	N	5	5

* La correlación es significativa a nivel 0.05 (bilateral)

FUENTE: Elaboración propia con datos de Idescat (2011b) y del Ministerio del Interior.

Como se ha observado, los indicadores utilizados para encontrar evidencia empírica en relación con las teorías del agravio han resultado muy limitados para explicar el éxito electoral de DN y PxC. La tasa de inmigración, al menos para los comicios elegidos, parece no ser un buen estimador del nivel de apoyo electoral recibido por ninguna de las dos agrupaciones. La tasa de desempleo funciona adecuadamente sólo con PxC. En el caso del apoyo electoral a DN, se estima adecuado para futuras investigaciones profundizar en variables vinculadas al universo de las teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad. Éstas deben hacer referencia a algún elemento cultural que facilite la consolidación en ciertos electorados de este tipo de propuestas partidarias. La tasa de religiosidad (cristiano católica) o la concepción de ciudadanía vigente pueden ser indicadores plausibles para tales efectos (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005: 31-73).

El turno de la acción: el papel parlamentario de los partidos políticos antiinmigración en España

El desempeño electoral nacional de Democracia Nacional ha registrado un nivel semejante desde su creación. En los comicios generales (2000, 2004 y 2008), el electorado que ha sufragado por esta agrupación se ha ubicado, en promedio, en torno al 0.5 por ciento. La situación es diferente en elecciones locales. Si bien su desempeño electoral municipal es marginal en comparación al recibido por los partidos mayoritarios, DN cuenta en la actualidad con tres concejalías obtenidas en los comicios de 2007: una en Tardajos (Burgos) y otras dos en Herradón de Pinares (Ávila).⁷ En la primera localidad, ha formado gobierno gracias a un pacto rubricado con el PP (Ministerio del Interior).

En Tardajos, DN pretendió imponer en enero de 2010 una moción sobre inmigración, cuyo objeto era evitar el empadronamiento de los inmigrantes irregulares. La adopción de una medida de esta naturaleza implica, según el diagrama del Estado benefactor español, que los inmigrantes irregulares carezcan de la prestación de servicios educativos y sanitarios por adolecer de certificado de empadronamiento.

La situación originó un importante conflicto con el Partido de Castilla y León (PCAL), la única agrupación opositora en el recinto parlamentario. La propuesta, finalmente no aprobada, introdujo la cuestión del “empadronamiento de irregulares” en la agenda política de Castilla y León, una comunidad autónoma ubicada por debajo del promedio nacional en cantidad de inmigrantes (3.60 por ciento sobre el total de su población) y que, hasta ahora, se había mantenido al margen de discusiones de este calibre. De esta manera y por primera vez, DN logró proyección a nivel nacional (debido a la repercusión en los medios de sus intenciones) no gracias a sus tradicionales campañas urbanas gráficas antiinmigración, sino a partir de una propuesta en concreto desde la gestión gubernamental (*Público*, 2010; *Noticias de Navarra*, 2010).

⁷ En la primera localidad, obtuvo el 22.13 por ciento de los votos. En la segunda, consiguió el 21.93 por ciento de los sufragios (Ministerio del Interior).

En el caso de Plataforma per Catalunya, el desempeño electoral ha registrado una senda de crecimiento constante desde su fundación. En su primera incursión en comicios locales, en 2003, ya había logrado representación a nivel de concejalías en cinco localidades catalanas (Manlleu, Vic, Cervera, El Vendrell y Premià de Mar). Las concejalías obtenidas por PxC aumentaron a 17 en las elecciones celebradas en 2007. En esta oportunidad logró constituirse en segunda fuerza política en Vic (Barcelona) y en Cervera (Lérida).

En las elecciones autonómicas, si bien no ha logrado hasta el presente obtener representación parlamentaria, PxC ha logrado sextuplicar su caudal electoral. De ser representativa de sólo el 0.15 por ciento de los votos autonómicos en 2003, ha logrado recibir el apoyo del 2.42 por ciento de los sufragantes en 2010 (Ministerio del Interior).

La mayor capacidad de influencia directa sobre las acciones del gobierno ha sido ejercida por PxC en el ayuntamiento de Vic, donde la alianza gobernante de centro izquierda,⁸ en una jugada política destinada a no perder votos frente a PxC, impulsa y aprueba la prohibición del empadronamiento a todos los inmigrantes irregulares que residiesen en la jurisdicción. La decisión provocó, por pedido de las autoridades municipales, el estudio, por parte de la Abogacía del Estado, de su legalidad. Al mismo tiempo, el proceder del gobierno de Vic originó una discusión mediática sin precedentes sobre los derechos de los inmigrantes en la sociedad española en un momento de marcada recesión económica (Abogacía del Estado).

A pesar de que los informes jurídicos del Estado español desestimaron la viabilidad de la aplicación de una decisión semejante,⁹ el gobierno de Vic, presionado por el creciente vigor electoral de PxC y deseando desarticular su influencia sobre la población, promovió posteriormente el que el ayuntamiento denunciase a los inmigrantes irregulares que residiesen en su territorio frente a la Delegación del Gobierno en Catalunya (que cuenta con las competencias de gestión de la inmigración en España). La propuesta, finalmente no aprobada, originó una crisis en el seno de la alianza a cargo de la gestión de la ciudad.

Recientemente, las autoridades de Vic exigieron a las administraciones catalana y española, a través de una moción, que los informes de arraigo¹⁰ y de reagrupación familiar que elaboran sobre sus inmigrantes tengan carácter vinculante en caso de ser desfavorables (Clota, 2011).

⁸ El gobierno de esta localidad se encontraba, al momento de acontecer los hechos relatados, a cargo de una coalición entre *Convergència i Unió* (centro), *Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya* (centro izquierda) y *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*.

⁹ Según el informe elaborado por Joaquín de Fuentes Bardají, abogado general del Estado, el empadronamiento de los inmigrantes "procede con independencia de que los mismos tengan o no residencia legal en territorio español".

¹⁰ El arraigo social es la figura jurídica que permite, en España, la obtención de documentación como residentes legales a todos los inmigrantes que se encuentren en situación de irregularidad durante un tiempo mínimo de tres años. Para la concesión de esta figura, los aplicantes deben, entre otros requisitos, tener un familiar en primer grado también viviendo en España, o presentar un informe de inserción social municipal expedido por las autoridades del pueblo o ciudad en el que se encuentran radicados.

En lo acontecido en Vic es posible detectar un claro ejemplo en el que los partidos antiinmigración tienen suficiente capacidad para reordenar, desde la oposición, las prioridades políticas de gobiernos conformados incluso por partidos de izquierda. Desde el punto de vista de los objetivos electorales, PxC ha conseguido en esta localidad que éstos se plasmen sin encontrarse a cargo de la gestión gubernamental.

No se preveía cómo reaccionaría el electorado antiinmigración en los comicios municipales (en mayo de 2011) ante las jugadas estratégicas desplegadas por la coalición gobernante para bloquear la llegada al gobierno de PxC. Las opciones parecen ser una de dos: o termina reforzando su voto pro PxC (finalmente, el gobierno ejecuta lo propuesto por la agrupación) o traslada su preferencia electoral a alternativas con mayor arraigo histórico en el sistema de partidos catalán (es decir, las que supieron operativizar su rechazo a la inmigración).

Conclusiones

Existen registros de procesos migratorios desde tiempos inmemoriales. Tan antiguos como éstos son los movimientos y actitudes de rechazo a los extranjeros. La aceleración y la profundización del fenómeno migratorio que se ha observado en los últimos decenios han encontrado su eco en la multiplicación, en las sociedades receptoras, de las propuestas políticas contrarias a la recepción de inmigrantes.

España no ha sido la excepción a esta regla histórica. En un periodo relativamente corto de tiempo (los quince años transcurridos entre 1995 y 2010), el número de inmigrantes radicados en su territorio ascendió desde un millón a 5.7 millones de personas. Ello condujo a que los movimientos y partidos políticos antiinmigración adquiriesen una renovada visibilidad. En los últimos años, la irrupción de la crisis económica y el hecho de que la tasa de desempleo se ubique en valores en torno al 20.33 por ciento aceleraron el nivel de apoyo social recibido por este tipo de agrupaciones (Instituto Nacional de Estadística).

Sin embargo, en la investigación a la que refiere este artículo, no se ha encontrado suficiente evidencia empírica para afirmar que el incremento en las tasas de inmigración y de desempleo se correlaciona con el ascenso de la fuerza electoral de partidos como Democracia Nacional y Plataforma per Catalunya. Estos indicadores de las llamadas teorías del agravio deberían ser probados con otros procedentes del universo de las llamadas teorías de la estructura de la oportunidad para observar probables efectos conjuntos sobre el apoyo electoral de partidos antiinmigración.

La correcta identificación de los factores que propician el surgimiento de sentimientos antiinmigración constituye no sólo una inquietud de tipo intelectual sino, a su vez, representa una herramienta con la cual se mejora el diseño de políticas públicas dirigidas a gestionar adecuadamente los procesos migratorios y a amortiguar sus impactos negativos en las sociedades de acogida. Este terreno del conocimiento conforma un fértil campo de diálogo entre académicos y hacedores de políticas, con miras a un único objetivo: la promoción de la paz social y la desactivación de conflictos actuales y potenciales en escenarios migratorios.

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