



Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales  
Grado en Relaciones Internacionales

Trabajo Fin de Grado

# **From Xizang to Xinjiang**

An Analysis of the Role of Diaspora-Based Transnational  
Social Movements in Opposing Chinese  
Ethnic Minority Treatment

Estudiante: **Blanca Marabini San Martín**

Director: Mario López Areu

Madrid, a 5 de mayo de 2020

*The land of Ili is full of flowers  
there is a strong cold in the summer months  
the red roses of our homeland  
is the blood of our martyrs shed for this land.*

*The land of Ili is very bright and full of passion  
its caves and valleys are full of rich miracles  
songs of Sadir echoes  
lyrics of Nuzugum resonate all around.*

*The land of Ili is full of mysteries  
even dark nights don't fall into sleep  
they awaken the light of dawn  
the sheer lyrics of nightingales.*

*The land of Ili is full of lilacs.*

– Kasim Sidik,  
Uyghur writer and poet

# Contents

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Chapter I: Introduction.....  | 1  |
| 1.1. Objective and Motives .....  | 2  |
| Chapter II: Contextualization of the Analysis .....                               | 3  |
| 2.1. State of the Art .....   | 3  |
| 2.1.1. Transnational Social Movements.....  | 3  |
| 2.1.2. Minority Policies in China .....   | 6  |
| 2.1.3. Case Study I: Tibet.....   | 9  |
| 2.1.4. Case Study II: Xinjiang.....   | 12 |
| 2.1.5. Conclusion .....   | 15 |
| 2.2. Theoretical Framework .....  | 16 |
| 2.2.1. Defining the Conflict .....  | 16 |
| 2.2.2. Ethnic Nationalism.....  | 21 |
| 2.2.3. Chinese Colonialism .....  | 22 |
| 2.2.4. International Forms of Violent and Non-Violent Resistance .....            | 24 |
| 2.3. Research Objectives .....  | 26 |
| 2.4. Methodology .....  | 27 |
| Chapter III: Forms of International Resistance.....                               | 27 |
| Chapter IV: Context for Internationalization and Transnational Action .....       | 31 |
| Chapter V: Impact of Transnational Forms of Resistance.....                       | 35 |
| 5.1. Resistance Centralization and Leadership .....                               | 35 |
| 5.2. Diaspora Influence on Host State Public Opinion .....                        | 36 |
| 5.3. Diaspora Role in Obtaining State and International Organization Support..... | 39 |
| Chapter VI: Conclusion .....  | 41 |
| References and Bibliography .....   | 44 |

## **Index of Acronyms**

|       |  |
|-------|--|
| AKP   | <i>Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi</i> (Justice and Development Party, Turkish) |
| BRI   | Belt and Road Initiative   |
| CPC   | Communist Party of China   |
| CTA   | Central Tibetan Administration   |
| ETIM  | East Turkestan Islamic Movement  |
| ETLO  | East Turkestan Liberation Organization                                     |
| ITIM  | International Tibet Independence Movement                                  |
| PRC   | People’s Republic of China   |
| TSM   | Transnational Social Movement  |
| ULO   | Uyghur Liberation Organization   |
| UNPO  | Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization                               |
| URFET | United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan                               |

## **Index of Figures and Tables**

|   |    |
|---|----|
| Figure I: Galtung’s Triangle of Violence .....      | 25 |
| Table I: Distribution of the Tibetan Diaspora ..... | 28 |

*“Though one parts from one’s fatherland, one does not give up one’s language”*

- Tibetan proverb

## **Chapter I: Introduction**

The story of China in the last few decades is one of impressive economic and political growth. With its years of post-World War II international isolation long gone, the Asian giant has embraced the advantages afforded to it by specific aspects of the international system, benefitting from international trade and investments in order to establish itself as a regional superpower and an emerging global superpower. Beijing’s rise is undoubtedly and inextricably intertwined with the process of globalization and is therefore contemporaneous with the prevalence of views favoring cooperative efforts to solve common, global issues. This has resulted in international rules and regulations, that establish limits within which countries must operate at both the domestic and international levels. China has not always remained within these limits, setting a precedent for a particular path of national development that had not been trodden before. However, this development style comes with a cost in areas such as the environment or human rights, which are among the main common issues that the predominant international cooperation model aims to solve.

Although some key international actors and powers have shifted their approach in engaging with the Asian giant due to the significant increase in Chinese international clout, others continue to steadily oppose Chinese methods due to the aforementioned costs. This is often the case of civil society actors, such as human rights groups, environmental movements, and NGOs. Civil society actors have been traditionally studied with a focus on either the domestic or the international sphere. However, a new form of civil society actor, whose activity is not restricted to either the domestic or the international sphere, has attracted the interest of scholars and policymakers alike: transnational social movements. This form of civil society action links migrants with their community back home, allowing them to remain politically involved in their country of origin. For China, this means that it can no longer escape the international dimension of issues that had previously belonged in the strictly domestic realm: members of the diasporas of ethnic minorities in China residing abroad now have the chance to bring the situation of their communities back home to the attention of the international community.

## **1.1. Objective and Motives**

The status of China in regional and global terms makes it an actor that cannot be ignored at either level. As international power shifts toward the east, scholars and policymakers have developed a pressing need to fully understand the finer details of Beijing's actions. The present study aims to throw some light on one of many aspects of the Chinese government's behavior, specifically that of minority policies. To this end, and considering the new relevance of the international dimension of this hitherto domestic issue, it will focus on the role of diaspora-based transnational social movements in increasing international attention to, and involvement with, the situation of ethnic minorities in China.

The reasons behind this choice of topic are many, but the main three are as follows: Firstly, the author began her International Relations studies in 2015, when the results of Xi Jinping's reform agenda were just beginning to be felt. In the following years, discussions regarding the international sphere involved, more often than not, references to China's new hard-line stance on foreign affairs and security issues, as well as the subsequent increase in Chinese assertiveness on the world stage. Because of this, it became the first major shift in the international system that the author studied.

Secondly, during the author's year abroad at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, she developed a keen interest in the regions of Pacific and Southeast Asia and has since then focused on researching topics related to this area. Analyses of almost any issue in these areas of the globe have to take China into account as a key actor in the region. This is especially so after the author added a focus in Security and Foreign Policy to her IR studies, since China's new-found assertiveness in these areas of international relations translate into it being present in virtually all security issues in the region.

Finally, as a student of Translation and Interpreting, the author also developed an interest in intercultural relations, specifically between groups with differing ethnic and cultural identities. This ties in with her International Relations studies via topics such as ethnic conflicts and minority representation. The author recognizes the international importance acquired by such topics, via the rise of transnational social movements, both in general terms and specifically for the political style of the Chinese government.

## **Chapter II: Contextualization of the Analysis**

### **2.1. State of the Art**

The following is an overview of the topics central to this study as they are discussed in the existing literature. It is divided into three main sections, the first of which focuses on transnational movements, particularly those based on or including a religious component. The second section deals with current minority policies in China, their evolution and the ideology behind their establishment or any main changes that have taken place since their inception. The third and final section addresses the specific case studies of the Tibetan and Uyghur minorities, considering both government and minority positions on the topic and the nature of the internationalization process of each case study.

#### **2.1.1. Transnational Social Movements**

The globalization of politics since the end of the Cold War has provided an ideal framework for a marked increase in terms of attention given by academia to transnational social movements (TSMs). Their similarities to domestic social movements are such that the main social mobilization theories can still be useful tools when applied to them. It follows therefore, that major figures in the areas of contentious politics and social movements should be considered in this review. Charles Tilly (1978) has been described as the founding father of 21<sup>st</sup>-century sociology. His indifference to disciplinary orthodoxy and his innovative multidisciplinary approach resulted in a typology of social movements that is still in use today: (1) defensive, in which a group mobilizes to confront a common external threat; (2) offensive, which occurs when a group pools resources as a response to the appearance of a political opportunity for mobilization, and (3) preparatory, where resources are pooled in order to be ready should said political opportunity present itself.

There are several introductory texts to social movements, most of which argue for specific approaches to this phenomenon. Sidney Tarrow a leading expert on new social movements and contentious politics, considers the value of each approach in his book *Power in Movement* (1994). Based on his work we can group these theories into three categories: (1) classical models that understand mobilization as the result of a disruption of social life that renders all other coping mechanisms unfeasible, (2) resource mobilization theories that portray mobilization as the result of a rational choice made when the necessary resources are available, and (3) political opportunity-based approaches, according to which, the importance of resources notwithstanding, mobilization will only take place when political opportunity arises.

Tarrow supports the political opportunities model by arguing that it provides answers that have eluded previous approaches, which gives it great value as a framework in which to examine the dynamics of contention. Furthermore, through the 2011 revised edition of *Power in Movement*, he is also among the first to provide a full explanation for the shift of scholarly attention from an exclusive focus on movements at the local and national levels to the realm of transnational politics, thus tying in the more traditional approaches with newer elements, including international non-state actors such as NGOs, and TSMs themselves. As such, Tarrow's work is frequently referenced in most literature on the topic.

Valentine Moghadam provided in her book *Globalization and Social Movements* (2012) one of the first general theoretical frameworks regarding TSMs, where she defined them as “a mass mobilization uniting people in three or more countries, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with political elites, international organizations, or multinational corporations” (p. 4). According to this author, globalization provided a new opportunity structure for pre-existing social movements to take on a form that transcended borders, which has led to greater overall cultural contact and, consequently, to both better understanding and hardened opposition towards different identities. Moghadam has also contributed to narrowing the definition of TSM by emphasizing the differences between them and transnational advocacy networks and other forms of international nongovernmental organization. She subsequently applied her theoretical framework to social movements such as Feminism on a world scale or Islamist movements, that emerged within the context of globalization and that scholars from the democratic West had been struggling to address, even in the context of a post-9/11 international scene, which bear important similarities to those addressed within this study.

In the same way that globalization brought the domestic to the international level, so did international elements make their way into domestic issues. Tarrow (2005) argues that the new opportunities for social movements provided by the globalization process have led to new global attitudes, new forms of organization, and shifting campaigns and composite forms of transnational activism. Perhaps more importantly, he also provides a model to explain transnational impacts on domestic activism, according to which non-local forms of collective action are adapted locally through the spread of information and the establishment of links between the transnational movement and existing domestic causes. Based on a synthesis of the growing and increasingly complicated body of literature on the subject, Tarrow questions various common assumptions, including regarding the supposedly unprecedented nature of the current period of internationalism, laying out a strong foundation for future empirical work,



particularly in terms of systematically testing many of the hypotheses he alludes to, but does not delve further into.

A more absolute position on the role of TSMs in the domestic sphere is provided by Fiona B. Adamson (2008), who emphasizes the role of international diasporas in domestic movements, within the framework of a continuum of different types of transnationalism based on the particularistic or universal nature of the ideology on which they are based: diasporic actors often have more resources and espouse more extreme positions than their domestic counterparts, and can therefore greatly influence the course of domestic conflicts even from afar. Considering the role played by politically active diasporas over the last decades, such as the Sikh diaspora from India, or the members of the Jewish and Armenian diasporas residing in the US, it is no surprise that many states have come to regard them as key strategic policy assets. Diaspora politics are certainly nothing new, but current networks have the added advantage of new communication technologies when it comes to following and participating in the politics of their countries of origin. Adamson's approach to TSMs is therefore useful in terms of considering the consequences of diasporic identities for both home and host countries.

TSMs are often considered within the context of ethnic or national identities. However, the start of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has shown a rise in transnational movements with a strong religious element, which underlines the importance of the approach taken by Vásquez and Marquardt (2003), who categorize religion as the main instigator of deterritorialization, or community displacement, and reterritorialization, or the restructuring of local practices and identities. James (2017) further expands on this idea by arguing that transnationalism in the religious context “refers to the fluidity of religion across borders” (p. 3), and by developing a model according to which transnational religious movements sport five key characteristics: (1) their popularity and far-reaching influence, (2) the interconnectedness of their members, which results from migration and leads to hybrid religious identities, (3) the use of sustainable principles and contemporary technologies to keep the movement together, (4) the possession of a spiritual capital that enables TSM members to remain active in two worlds, and (5) the ability to influence policies and political outcomes, including those pertaining to the treatment of ethnic and religious minorities.

From all this we can infer that literature pertaining to transnational social movements can be divided chronologically into three key groups. Firstly, there are authors such as Charles Tilly, whose work in the area of social movements, although produced at a time in which

academic focus was still mostly limited to the national and local levels, remains relevant when it comes to movements that operate across borders. Secondly, Sidney Tarrow's work connects the classic approaches to social movements and the current era, marking the rise of scholarly attention to the transnational sphere. Tarrow thus provides a definition of transnational social movement and a general theoretical framework which, along with other similar frameworks coming from different, non-Western perspectives, such as the one developed by Moghadam, provides a valuable foundation for research both in terms of how domestic movements become transnational and how the transnational movements can have effects at the domestic level. The present thesis would be contained in the third and final category, regarding specific areas or types of TSMs: the role of national and ethnic diasporas as described by Adamson, the domestic effects of transnational mobilization in movements regarding gender equality tackled by Moghadam, or, more related to the study at hand, the role of religion within the transnational sphere, which is given great importance by Vásquez and Marquardt and is even more emphasized by James, as shown by the model he develops for transnational religious movements. It seems likely that the increasing importance given to these movements not only by civil society, but also by states in terms of national security, will translate into a further development of the field, which will yield increasingly more specialized works.

### **2.1.2. Minority Policies in China**

There has historically been a debate surrounding the issue of minority policy and integration, particularly in terms of the two models known as assimilationist and pluralist or multicultural. The European Union is often used as a reference framework when it comes to this debate, which lends great value to the role of scholars such as Sabine Choquet (2017), who published an often-cited document with definitions of both models and their characteristics through the Robert Schuman Foundation, a European Union think tank. She describes the assimilation model as being based on attributing the same rights to all and, therefore, blind to cultural and religious difference; whereas the multicultural model aims to grant the same individual opportunities to all based on the idea that all citizens should be able to live according to their culture and their religion. Furthermore, her emphasis on the cultural and religious elements of integration, rather than on current topics that are more logistic in nature, such as employment or healthcare, provide a useful way to link the theoretical models with the cases selected for this study. This is also true of Cristophe Bertossi (2007), whose work complements that of Choquet by using a similar approach but with an added critical layer: he details how, on one hand, the veil of ignorance drawn by the assimilation model over the issue of ethnicity has

not prevented the presence of topics relating to discrimination in national debates, and on the other, race relations policies based on multiculturalism have still been the subject of multiple attacks. Thus, Bertossi assists the reader in keeping in mind possible shortcomings of this nonetheless still widely used dichotomy.

The debate regarding the virtues and deficits of both models is still ongoing. As such, national minority policies will often switch from favoring one model to the other. In the case of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the current cornerstone of Xi Jinping's ethnic policy is the acceleration of interethnic contact, exchange, and mingling. According to Leibold (2016), this translates into the pursuit of homogenization through various forms of social and cultural exposure. Originally, the Communist Party of China (CPC) followed an ideology closer to those originally espoused by Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin regarding self-determination. The UN Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN General Assembly, 1960), provides a widely accepted definition of the principle of self-determination by stating that "all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" (para. 2). This definition is greatly influenced by prominent political figures of the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, such as US president Woodrow Wilson, or USSR figureheads Vladimir Lenin and Josef Stalin, who explicitly embraced the principle. Lenin (1913, 1914) believed that self-determination should be supported in every case, based essentially on the idea that, given the necessary assistance, small nation-states will reach the revolutionary stage much faster than larger capitalist empires. However, he did not fully reject autonomy, but rather perceived it as necessary for purely local issues. The Stalinist conception of self-determination is similar, although less rigid, taking the shape of the "socialism in one country" paradigm that recognized that some nationalities would rather remain within a multinational state (Stalin, 1914).

As a result, and as described by Xiaohui Wu in *From Assimilation to Autonomy* (2014), Mao Zedong's initial view of the Chinese State was that of a pluralistic but unified state composed of equal minorities with the right to self-government. Nonetheless, Wu also points out that this pluralistic approach was substituted by intense assimilationism between the mid-1950s and the end of the 1970s, the latter decade being the scenario of the Cultural Revolution. During this period, Mao Zedong attempted to remove religious and cultural elements in order to free the Chinese mind from traditional beliefs, so that the citizens of the PRC would place their faith in Marxism instead, thus cleansing them of individual and materialistic desires and

molding them into a new communist man (Wang, 2018). As Wu points out, this is particularly problematic for minorities, whose cultures and lifestyles were especially targeted, resulting in the aforementioned severe assimilationist streak.

After Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, the shift slowly reversed itself. Wong (2005) and Lewis and Litai (2003) document how Jiang Zemin embarked on a lengthy operation to maintain the legitimacy of the CPC after the collapse of the USSR, and therefore communism both as a philosophy and as a socio-economic system, and after the deaths resulting from the government's response to the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Jiang ended the nation's commitment to formal Marxism and engaged in a re-education campaign, mainly via propaganda and textbook alterations, in order to spread the new nationalist twist he put on the CPC by presenting it as China's only option to regain honor lost during conflicts that involved external intervention, such as the Opium Wars or the period of imperial Japanese occupation. This new nationalist position took the shape of the Three Represents, which stipulated that the CPC should embody advanced culture, advanced social productive forces, and the interests of the overwhelming majority (Hepeng, 2004).

According to Sautman (2002) and to Teufel Dreyer (2010), who have published widely on multiple issues regarding Chinese national security, the current Chinese minority policy is based on the strategic importance granted to these groups by their size and distribution, given that they amount to almost 10% of the population and live mainly in areas of the People's Republic of China (PRC) with the most natural resources, located near important borders. Both further agree that, under the current conditions, the income and development gaps between Han-majority territories and minority autonomous regions will continue to widen and existing antagonisms are unlikely to disappear. Linzhu L. Wang (2015) further critiqued the current system based on the inconsistent application of minority identification standards, which would allow the CPC to control the number of groups and the divisions between them so that they suit their political interests regarding territorial integrity and regional stability. This would also mean unequal treatment for groups who remain unidentified or have been controversially classified. Lastly, in terms of the Autonomous Regions, authors such as Dibyesh Anand (2018) have gone as far as characterizing the current minority policies as colonization with Chinese characteristics, based on the argument that colonialism is the most appropriate lens through which to understand policies that would appear to pursue the occupation of these territories and the minoritization and securitization of the resident ethnic groups and could therefore be

understood to be part of a Chinese statist project by which the representation of these minorities as a source of insecurity legitimizes increases in state violence.

A chronological examination of literature on Chinese minority policy reveals that the strategic importance of the minorities and their territories has made them a staple of CPC policies and legitimacy since the PRC's creation, if somewhat less explicitly during certain periods. However, the changing international and domestic contexts in which the CPC operated have resulted in an alternation between approaches tending towards pluralism or towards assimilationism. The initial, more purely Marxist, approach that predominated during the early years of Mao's PRC was pluralistic in that it toed the line set by the Leninist and Stalinist positions on self-determination. However, abrupt shifts towards radical leftism in Beijing in the late 1950s resulted in a drastic reversion towards increasingly intense assimilationism, which culminated in the 1970s with the Cultural Revolution. The international perception of these events is also reflected in the literature which, although initially more objective, as exemplified by Wu, becomes increasingly critical of the Chinese government's actions, especially when it comes to Western authors such as Sautman, who published their work at the time when the UN system for intergovernmental protection of minority rights was taking shape. After the death of Mao Zedong, Beijing reverted back to a pluralist approach, although this pluralism was not as pure as during the early 1950s due to the added strategic value acquired by minorities and their territories as a result of the transformation of China's economy and the need for oil. Current literature, such as the pieces produced by Teufel Dreyer or Sautman's later works, remain critical by contrasting Chinese minority policy to current international law. The current system is also critiqued on a logistical basis by authors such as Wang, who highlights internal discrepancies of minority policy as well as external ones when said policies are set against international norms. Through this evolution the increasing interest at the international level in the issue of minority rights in China also becomes apparent, which points to a continuation of the presence of the topic in the academic sphere for the foreseeable future.

### **2.1.3. Case Study I: Tibet**

The Tibetan sovereignty debate is comprised by two key questions: (1) Should the region known as Tibet remain as part of China or become a new sovereign state? and, as a preliminary question to this, (2) was Tibet independent from China or part of Chinese territory during certain periods of its history throughout the last few centuries?

According to the Chinese government, Tibet, or what is now known as the Tibet Autonomous Region, was incorporated into Chinese territory under the Yuan dynasty (1271-1368 AD). The PRC's claim to the territory is thus historical. This position is espoused by scholars such as Jiawei and Gyaincain (2009), the pseudonyms used by the five contributors to the cited text, originally published in Chinese and Tibetan but then translated into a multitude of languages in order to bring the Chinese position to other States. This document remains particularly interesting compared to similar works due to its joint Chinese (Han) and Tibetan authorship, a rarity when it comes to Chinese publications on the subject. This position is further supported by authors who, in the line of Li Tieh-Tseng (1956), argue that the administrative arrangements established by the Yuan dynasty continued into the Ming era (1368-1644). According to these authors, the initial structures were improved over the following dynasties, bringing the region ever closer to Beijing. Jiawei and Gyaincain argue that Western expansionist and imperialist interventions supported Tibetan separatists to the point where the incorporation process was unavoidable. Nonetheless, they also use Western documents in their favor, as they comment on the inclusion of Tibet in Chinese territory in documents authored by Marco Polo (1254-1324) and in maps included in the Encyclopedia Britannica, Webster's Atlas, and other similar bodies of work.

Western scholars such as Anne Chayet (2008) and Elliot Sperling (2004), on the other hand, support the position defended by the India-based exiled Tibetan government, according to whom, by the time the Ming dynasty came to power, the relationship between Tibet and the Chinese Empire was of a diplomatic and ceremonial nature, rather than political. Warren W. Smith (1996) further describes how the gradual decline of the Qing dynasty (1644-1912), generated in part by Western interventions due to border- and trade-related interests, allowed Tibet to return to its original state of relative isolation; as well as detailing the violence that drove the Dalai Lama to seek asylum in India in 1959 and the harsh crackdowns that took place in Tibet during the Cultural Revolution. Fischer (2008) provides a detailed account of Tibetan marginalization during and after the Cultural Revolution as well. Years later, Smith (2010) further supported his original position by describing the 2008 uprisings in Tibet, which started as a protest calling for the release of detained monks that escalated over the following weeks, especially during the Olympic torch rally for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Both he and Barnett (2009) argue that the meaning of the word "Tibet" has been warped as a result of a historic process of linguistic manipulation, one of the sources of the frustrating complexity that they both cite as a catalyst of the 2008 riots. Han and Paik (2013) also emphasized the role of Han

migration and settlement in ethnic Tibetan areas in the 2008 disturbances, as well as throughout the evolution of the issue since 1949.

As regards the international nature of the Tibetan issue, the literature illustrates how, as pointed out in the first section of this chapter, the conflict was initially local in nature but became internationalized, thus spawning international players whose actions had significant effects on the development of the situation. Such was the case of the Free Tibet movement, which Noakes (2012), a frequent advisor to the aid community when it comes to governance issues in the PRC, describes as “a truly global network”, composed of some 170 organizations that gather around the unifying figurehead that is the Dalai Lama. Noakes explains how the movement has achieved relative success abroad, and particularly in the US as a result of the Dalai Lama’s travels in the 1980s and 1990s. David Crowe, whose *The ‘Tibet question’* (2013), provides a detailed account of how Tibetan resistance has drawn the attention of the West, further builds on the issue by underlining the role of the International Commission of Jurists, who in 1960 concluded that the events taking place in Tibet were not only violations of human rights, but amounted to acts of genocide, and were therefore a legitimate concern of the United Nations, rather than remaining solely within Chinese sovereignty. As a result, the question of Tibet was considered in multiple occasions in the UN General Assembly, which passed a series of resolutions calling for respect of human rights in Tibet (i.e. 1353, 1723, and 2079). These international and intergovernmental statements were often linked to pressures from international Tibet support groups, or even letters from the Dalai Lama, who also developed a Five-Point Peace Plan, delivered in a speech at the US Congress, that was well received internationally, but failed to convince Chinese authorities. However, Crowe also describes how the international reluctance to position one’s state against China that has accompanied the movement virtually since its inception has resulted in limited clear-cut signs of support of both States and intergovernmental bodies. This, coupled with prolonged interaction with the immutable preferences of the Chinese government, has, according to both Noakes and Crowe, led to an internal renegotiation of the movement, which now aims to secure greater autonomy and cultural protection for the Tibetan people within China, rather than full self-determination.

Literature on the Tibetan issue can therefore be grouped based on the answers given by the authors to the two main questions that constitute the debate. On one hand there are those who support the official position of the Chinese government, such as Li Tieh-Tseng or Jiawei and Gyaincain, regardless of their Han or Tibetan ethnic origins. These authors are usually Chinese in origin or connected in some fashion to Chinese authorities, but interestingly enough

will often draw on Western literature or accounts of Asian history when it comes to proving the version of history on which they base their territorial claims. Pro-Tibetan authors, on the other hand, are usually Western in origin, as is the case of Chayet, Sperling, Smith, or Barnett; or work with or within Western institutions, as do Han and Paik. The works of this second group are usually critical in nature towards the official Chinese account and the current treatment of Tibetans by Chinese authorities, and, like Noakes and Crowe, include many more references to the international dimension of the Tibetan issue, both in terms of the role of international institutions and that of transnational networks and movements. The literature on both sides does evolve along with the situation of Tibet itself, especially on the Tibetan side as the Dalai Lama's international appeals yielded favorable results. Interestingly enough, however, even if the voices raised in support of Tibet have become relatively more moderate in that they no longer call necessarily for full self-determination, this principle remains very present in the literature.

#### **2.1.4. Case Study II: Xinjiang**

A similar polarization is evident in the literature addressing the situation of the Uyghur minority residing mainly in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, in China's Northwest. The official Chinese position contrasts the substantial improvements that have resulted from government intervention when it comes to economic development and overall living standards in the region, with the activities of actors in the region who, according to Beijing, have ties to international Islamist terrorist groups that must be controlled in order to ensure national security, thus justifying existing security measures in the region. This position has the support of Chinese academics such as Hao and Liu (2012), according to whom local discontent in Xinjiang takes place despite all the rights and improvements that have been afforded to them by the Chinese government. Like in the pro-Chinese literature on the Tibetan issue, ethnic tensions are once again attributed to frequent external interventions that allow the penetration of, in this case, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism into the region. Interestingly, Hao and Liu do recognize that past policies applied in Xinjiang may not have paid enough attention to socio-economic problems, but they remain optimistic that newer strategies will be more effective due to the importance the region has for Beijing in both geopolitical and natural resource terms. They further argue that other states should support China's anti-terrorism efforts in Xinjiang due to the involvement of Xinjiang-based groups, such as the East Turkestan Independence Movement, with international terrorism.



On the other hand, many scholars have produced material supporting the preservation of the Uyghur ethnic identity. According to A. R. M. Imtiyaz (2012), a specialist in the politization of ethnic differences in the region, Chinese leaders have systematically formulated policies attempting to sinicize the region. Imtiyaz describes the Sinicization process as being twofold: through settlements and through language. Grieger (2014), from the European Parliament, provides a detailed argument according to which Beijing has been incentivizing Han immigration to ethnic Uyghur areas, as well as the erosion of Uyghur linguistic distinctiveness via the creation of an increasingly monolingual education system. Arienne M. Dwyer (2005), a prominent figure in the fields of language contact and language ideology in Central Asia, focuses on the linguistic component of Chinese minority policies in Xinjiang and depicts the current situation as the simultaneous implementation of covert and overt language policies: where *de iure* policies establish all languages of China as officially equal, *de facto* policies promote an unequal distribution of power and resources. Many authors, like Dorje (2019), underline the use of re-education camps, officially called Vocational Education Training Centers, as the newest sinicization tool.

According to Imtiyaz, it is precisely this process of sinicization, coupled with increases in the militarization of the region, that has led to heightened unrest and planted the seeds of the cultural resistance feared by Beijing. Furthermore, Imtiyaz argues that the state's policies toward the region have strengthened ties with Islamic transnational movements. Peter Navarro (2008), assistant to the US President and Director of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, explains how the international dimension of the Xinjiang issue was virtually non-existent until Beijing began tying them to the September 11 attacks in New York. Nonetheless, leaders of the key violent groups in the region, as described by James Millward (2004), a prominent scholar in the field of historical and contemporary Xinjiang, have taken great pains to distance themselves from Al Qaeda. This includes groups such as the East Turkestan Independence Movement, the East Turkestan Liberation Organization, or the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan. Kunal Mukherjee (2015), who specializes in security issues in South and East Asia, supports this statement and further emphasizes the relative geographical isolation of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, but also mentions how this has not stopped the Uyghur diaspora from playing an increasingly active role, especially in terms of raising awareness in the Western world so that Western governments and other international players put pressure on China to bring about change in Xinjiang.

Millward is especially useful when it comes to the international dimension of the situation in Xinjiang, as he not only provides a thorough examination of alleged terrorist groups with connections beyond Chinese borders, but also tackles how neighboring states position themselves regarding this topic. In the same vein as Millward, Catherine Putz (2018) emphasizes how China's western neighbor Kazakhstan, who shares a border with Xinjiang, has begun to show concern regarding the developments taking place just to the East of its borders, particularly since the rise of the re-education camps, which also hold ethnic Kazakhs and Kazakh citizens. Finally, neighboring states have also become concerned in the last few years regarding this topic due to how it ties in with China's Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI, set in motion in 2013 by Chinese president Xi Jinping. According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (2019), the BRI is a program that aims to connect China with the rest of Asia, as well as with Africa and Europe, over land and through maritime routes, in order to favor further regional integration, intensify trade, and stimulate overall economic growth. Stanley Toops (2016), whose work focuses on the cultural geography in China and, more specifically, the development and demography of Xinjiang, describes how China's commercial connections to countries such as Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Pakistan would have to go through the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, which makes it an imperative for Beijing that the area remain peaceful and stable. However, Michael Clarke (2015), an internationally recognized expert who regularly provides commentary on Uyghur-related issues to national and international media outlets, argues that the project also entails new socioeconomic pressures, which exacerbate existing interethnic tensions.

The divide within the literature related to the situation of the Uyghurs in China is similar to the literature on the Tibetan debate in that there are two clear sides, one constituted by authors such as Hao and Liu, who support the official position of the Chinese government, and a larger group of mostly Western scholars who adopt a critical stance towards it. In this case, however, the number of authors included in the first group is overall smaller, perhaps due to the more recent appearance of the international dimension of the issue. The literature from the opposing point of view, however, is plentiful and covers many dimensions: some focus on the situation within the Xinjiang region, as do Grieger, Dwyer, or Dorje; while others also include, or even concentrate on, the international dimension of the issue, as is the case with Imtiyaz, Navarro, Mukherjee, Millward, Toops, and Clarke. In this case, it is worth noting that the internationalization process was started by the Chinese authorities, rather than the targeted minority, which also translates into a more equal coverage of the international dimension by

both camps, rather than just the authors who are critical of Chinese actions in Xinjiang. Furthermore, the literature from both groups seems to include more authors with stronger stances than that of the literature on Tibet, particularly as the topics discussed evolve with the recent introduction of new key elements such as the Belt and Road initiative.

### **2.1.5. Conclusion**

After having reviewed the literature referring to the key areas pertaining to this study, there are conclusions to be drawn at multiple levels. In more general terms, the different nature of the topics covered calls for different forms of classification: where the authors in the first two sections lend themselves to a chronological classification based on the evolution of the subject of study and, consequently, of the literature addressing it, the literature referring to the selected case studies is much more easily organized into groups depending on whether the author is mainly supportive or critical of the Chinese government's policies towards the minority in question. More specifically, a chronological approach to the study of transnational social movements shows how the literature has become increasingly more specialized over time, from general social movement frameworks, to specific studies showing how easy it is for domestic movements to become internationalized and for international actors to penetrate domestic issues. It has also most recently expanded to include works covering specific types and areas of TSMs, allowing for related studies to use more specialized frameworks, even if the original general theoretical approaches of authors such as Charles Tilly are still very much in use.

Examining literature regarding minority policy in China on a chronological basis yields similar results in terms of reflecting the evolution of the subject of study, showing how it has been affected both by internal political evolution and increasing external critiques and pressure, the latter resulting from growing Western interest in the topic. When it comes to specific case studies, however, the position-based approach not only allows for easier classification, but reveals the connections to key actors that influence the stance of the various members of the academic sphere. Using this approach for both case studies also allows for easier comparison of the literature on both topics, so that it is possible to pinpoint key similarities and differences between them. Such a comparison highlights how authors who adopt a critical stance towards the Chinese government are overwhelmingly Western or, at least, linked to Western institutions, although pro-Chinese authors do not shy away from using Western material to support their arguments. It is however worth noting that there is a wealth of documents on the topic written in the Chinese, Tibetan, and Uyghur languages that the author of this thesis is unable to directly

consider due to language and spatial constraints. The aforementioned comparison also shows differences in the number of authors defending the Chinese position: they are currently more abundant in the case of the Tibetan region, but their numbers are not growing as quickly as that of the pro-Chinese authors when it comes to literature on Xinjiang. This is probably tied to the more recent nature of the internationalization process of this second case study, which may also explain why pro-Chinese authors cover the international dimension of the issues much more thoroughly when it comes to Xinjiang than when it comes to Tibet.

Overall, it is possible to pinpoint elements pertaining to the situations of Tibetans and Uyghurs in China that call for further study, particularly regarding the internationalization of both case studies and the subsequent role of the international community, diasporas, and other international and transnational movements, especially given the power attributed to ethnic and religious TSMs. The next section addresses the theoretical framework used in this dissertation, which aims to shed some light on these issues.

## **2.2. Theoretical Framework**

This chapter is divided into two main sections that aim to provide the context and the key concepts needed for the analysis undertaken in Chapters III to V. The first is centered around defining the conflict analyzed in the present study, as well as the key actors involved. The second section tackles the concept of ethnic nationalism and the key theories surrounding it, with a focus on Chinese colonialism and the resulting forms of national and international resistance.

### **2.2.1. Defining the Conflict**

Peace and Conflict Studies is a relatively young field of social sciences, whose official birth is usually placed in the 1950s, with authors such as Johan Galtung and John Burton, and linked to the end of World War II and the creation of the United Nations. Although the field has advanced greatly since then, a universally agreed-upon definition of the word “conflict” does not yet exist. Consequently, analysts will resort to a series of conflict typologies that traditionally categorize conflicts as either inter- or intrastate. The present study will draw upon the classification proposed by Peter Wallensteen (2002, 2014), who added state formation conflicts as a third category.

When it comes to the question of which of these three categories best encompasses the conflicts analyzed in the present paper, it is easy to rule out the interstate category, since one of its key characteristics is that this type of conflict takes place between sovereign states. Even

though some Uyghurs and Tibetans may consider that their territories are states—independent Tibet and East Turkestan, respectively—, they do not fulfill the conditions established in the widely accepted definition of State provided by Max Weber in *Politics as a Vocation* (1946), which requires a monopoly on violence in order to be considered a state, something that neither Tibetans nor Uyghurs have. Nonetheless, it is important to note that there are elements present reminiscent of Wallensteen’s *idealpolitik* interstate conflicts, that is, interstate conflicts based on conflicting ideologies or issues of legitimacy, in the style of Samuel P. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* (1993). However, as pointed out by James Millward (2004), the actors and causes within the wide array of episodes encompassed in these conflicts are more diverse than Huntington’s formula allows, as will be established in the final part of this section. Therefore, the conflict in Xinjiang should not just be understood as a clash between Huntington’s Sinic and Islamic civilizations. The conflict in the Tibetan region is even harder to fit into Huntington’s theory, as both of the conflicting parties would be part of the Sinic civilization.

The question then becomes whether the situations in Tibet and Xinjiang constitute intrastate or state formation conflicts. According to Wallensteen’s model, intrastate conflicts take place between the government of a country and a rebel group, and tend to be linked to domestic power relations, economic inequality, and social structures, especially those related to ethnic, religious, or racial factors. State formation conflicts, on the other hand, are defined as a confrontation between a government and an identity-based opposition, often with links to a specific territory. In order to choose between these two categories, the key variable is perspective. From the Chinese point of view, it would make sense to approach the issue as if it were strictly intrastate, since their policies regarding these conflicts are constructed around a zero-sum game perception. This is based on the idea that maintaining the order they currently defend is essential for conserving the current Chinese political system, both in terms of power in the domestic sphere and of newly gained influence in the international sphere. Relinquishing control of these minorities would allow greater freedom for secessionist movements, one of the Three Evil Forces—namely terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism—which the Chinese government determined to be its key security concerns in the 1990s. Beijing has since made them a key part of its foreign policy and regional international relations in general, as evidenced by their prominence in international forums such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization<sup>1</sup> (Aris, 2009).

---

<sup>1</sup> International forum composed of eight member states (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, and Pakistan) that aims to promote cooperation and coordination in politics, economy, culture,

Despite the fact that security, to which the Chinese government gives so much importance, is cited by Wallensteen as a driving factor when it comes to intrastate conflicts, there are characteristics of the conflict to which the state formation model is better suited. This includes the territory-based nature of both the Tibetan and the Uyghur positions, as well as the groups in both Xinjiang and Xizang who are calling for independence or perceive their territories as occupied nations. Both of these conflicts started during the Cold War period when, according to Wallensteen, state formation conflicts were mostly related to colonialism which is the theoretical approach chosen in the section below for the analysis carried out in the present thesis. However, the post-Cold War state formation conflicts described by Wallensteen can be argued to best encompass the Xinjiang and Tibet issues, especially in terms of the differences in how each party involved perceives the conflict. Wallensteen describes how the rebel groups will approach such conflicts as the historical pursuit of self-determination, whereas the existing government will present it as a struggle for territorial integrity, which they argue is for the benefit of all.

We have already addressed the Chinese government's position on secessionism, whereas Uyghurs and Tibetans often refer to historical claims regarding the times when their territories were independent, mainly before the Chinese Qing Dynasty. The logical step is therefore to approach the situations in Xinjiang and Xizang as state formation conflicts, as it is the approach that best encompasses the claims and perspectives of both actors involved. This will be studied in more detail in the following section, which addresses the key actors involved in the conflict.

#### **2.2.1.1. Key Actors**

Keeping in mind restraints such as unclear limits of conflicting parties, this section aims to paint a brief picture of the key actors involved in the conflicts analyzed. To this end, it will use the models proposed by Graham T. Allison in *Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (1969). Allison explains how the behavior of national governments is often explained in terms of the rational policy model, according to which government decision-making is based on national interest and on maximizing benefits and reducing costs for the state. He further posits that, although this traditional framework is still useful, it needs to be supplemented in

---

and security and military affairs. The first five members constituted the Shanghai Five, a predecessor of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization which operated between 1996 and 2001. There is debate on whether these organizations should be considered a Chinese tool to increase its international presence, given that one of the organization's primary objectives is to combat the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, a key part of Chinese international rhetoric (Albert, 2015; Desai, 2017).

order to incorporate new perspectives, such as a non-monolithic perception of actors. Consequently, Allison proposed two complementary models, which are further explained below: the bureaucratic model and the organizational model. While applying these models, this section will also draw on the levels of analysis set out by Kenneth Waltz in *Man, the State, and War* (1959), namely actors at the individual, state, and systemic levels.

Regarding the state level, the most influential actor is the Chinese government, whose decisions determine key factors in this conflict, such as the nature of the political system and the distribution and levels of power. Furthermore, this actor interacts with other crucial elements in this case, particularly the geographical context, based on the need to keep the territories involved in the Belt and Road Initiative stable. The Chinese government also attempts to influence the social and cultural context in many ways, such as by providing incentives for ethnic Han to move to Xinjiang and Xizang, or through the re-education camps and associated programs, further explored in the following sections. Within this state context, the key actor at the individual level is President of the PRC and General Secretary of the Communist Party Xi Jinping, who enjoys levels of power similar to those of Chairman Mao and has gone to great lengths to ensure that his authority is formalized. His political thought has been included into the constitutions of both the party and the state and, since his tenure began, term limits for presidency have been removed and the trappings for a cult of personality system have been put into place (Torigian, 2019). Although the opaque nature of Chinese politics means that not much is known of the personal traits of the Chinese leader, or of the elements in his direct social environment that may influence his behavior and beliefs, the amount of power held by this one individual makes it inevitable that these elements would have a role in the conflict, especially given the fact that Xi's domestic policy is characterized by a focus, among other things, on national unity and stability, which directly involves the case studies examined.

The members of the CCP are all sub-actors in their own right. Some may be more relevant to these specific cases, such as the Communist Party Secretaries in Xinjiang (Chen Quanguo) and Xizang (Wu Yingjie), who hold the highest political position in each of these regions. Interestingly, Chen Quanguo held this position in Tibet from 2011 to 2016 and was then transferred to Xinjiang, where he has since attracted the attention of the press due to his security policies in the region, most notably the re-education system. Nonetheless, the system used by the Chinese government to deal with perceived separatist threats is what keeps all members of the CCP involved. This system is best explained in terms of Allison's (1969)

organizational actor model, according to which state decision-making functions via standardized operational procedures. China's current approach to perceived secessionism is the result of standards set while dealing with these movements in the past, and as such remains largely the same when applied in different areas. This can be seen, for example, in the fact that, once Chen Quanguo achieved a certain level of success in Tibet, he was transferred to Xinjiang so that he could apply there the model developed in Tibet (Zenz & Leibold, 2017). Some have also drawn parallels between tactics applied in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong (Lii, 2019; World Uyghur Congress, 2019). Furthermore, the rigidity of bureaucracy and the chain of command, which are crucial in such a system, are defining factors of the political structure in place in China.

It is harder to determine state-level actors when it comes to Tibet and Uyghurs. It can be argued that the Tibetan government in exile, known as the Central Tibetan Administration, or CTA, can be included in this category. According to Stephanie Römer (2008), the CTA is being increasingly recognized, not just by Tibetans but internationally, as the legitimate representative of the Tibetan people. They may be limited in terms of applying policies in the territory disputed with China, but they have defined a state ideology of sorts, based on Buddhism and democracy, as well as determining a power distribution within their political structure. Multiple attempts have been made to create a government in exile for East Turkestan, the name given to the Xinjiang region by those in favor of establishing an independent state, but there is not yet an equivalent institution to the Tibetan government in exile, particularly in terms of international recognition. Individual-level actors for these groups also exist, namely the Dalai Lama and internationally active Uyghurs such as Dolkun Isa, current president of the World Uyghur Congress and vice-president of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (World Uyghur Congress, 2020). However, their level of influence on the case studies analyzed is much less than that of Xi Jinping.

The main particularity of the actors involved on the Tibetan and Uyghur sides of the conflict, however, is the number of both organizations and individuals concerned. They constitute a spectrum of actors with different positions and objectives, which makes Allison's (1969) bureaucratic actor model the most effective when it comes to accurately representing all the players on the field. This model perceives actors as non-unitary, but instead as composed by a series of sub-actors with different preferences who all contribute to decision-making and must negotiate with each other in order to undertake collective action. For the present analysis, the value of this model resides in the fact that it is the best of Allison's models when it comes



to incorporating transnational actors and, therefore, taking into account Waltz's (1959) systemic level. Aside from placing certain limits on Chinese policy towards minorities, the systemic level here also includes members of the Tibetan and Uyghur diasporas who remain politically engaged with their homelands despite living abroad, as well as NGOs and human rights organizations, who function based on values such as democracy which are widely accepted in the international system. These actors will be further examined in Chapter III.

### **2.2.2. Ethnic Nationalism**

The first necessary step within this section is to provide a working definition of ethnic nationalism, as opposed to civic nationalism. To this end, we will draw from the definitions proposed by Anthony D. Smith in *National Identity* (1991). Ethnic nationalism understands the nation as being defined by pre-existing traits, generally determined at birth or during upbringing, so that membership in a nation depends on blood. Civic nationalism, by contrast, perceives loyalty to the state to be based on law, rather than blood, and as something to be given in exchange for certain fundamental rights which are common to all members. The case studies included in the present study will be approached from the point of view of ethnic nationalism, as Chinese minority policy encompasses all those who belong to ethnic groups other than the predominant Han, and minority nationality status has been assigned at birth since the early years of the PRC (Maurer-Fazio & Hasmath, 2015).

There are multiple theoretical approaches to ethnic nationalism and ethnic conflict. For primordialists, ethnic identity is inherent and, therefore, cannot be changed. It is understood as being composed by genetic characteristics and cultural aspects acquired during formative years. Furthermore, primordialism proposes that a shared ethnicity leads to coinciding interests at the individual and the collective level, so that individual and collective goals match. This is a natural process and, therefore, for primordialists, so is nationalism. For constructivists, on the other hand, ethnic identities are human constructions that are transmitted, rather than inherited, among members of a human community whose formation is based on the belief in a shared common ancestry. This makes ethnic identities the result of political and social environment, rather than genetics. Consequently, nationalism, from the constructivist point of view, is also an ideological phenomenon (Taras & Ganguly, 2002).

For the purpose of the present study, however, the Colonial History approach described by Anthony D. Smith (1979), according to whom the key element in shaping current ethnic divides has been their colonialist past, particularly experiences such as alliances between

colonial rulers and specific ethnic minorities, seems especially useful. Although the areas of Xinjiang and Xizang have not gone through classic colonialism (i.e. they were not exploited via the expansion of European influence and the creation of settlements inhabited by Europeans within their borders), there is a strong perception among Tibetans and Uyghurs alike of the Han Chinese and the Chinese government as external aggressors (Imtiyaz, 2012). Furthermore, Dibyesh Anand (2018) argues that China uses colonialist discourses, such as the “gift of progress” rhetoric, by which the colonized are represented as inferior and requiring the assistance of the colonizer, to justify policies that increase the economic dependency of these areas on Beijing. Anand also states that the language of the State towards these regions has always been framed in terms of proprietorship, a context which allows Uyghur and Tibetan political activism to be presented as separatist and a challenge to national stability, thus resulting in the securitization of these minorities.

### **2.2.3. Chinese Colonialism**

Within the Colonial History approach, many authors have used the concept of “internal colonialism” to define the situation of the ethnic minorities of Xinjiang and Xizang. Norrie Macqueen (2007) defines it as “the exploitation of a country’s geographical and ethnic periphery by its dominant centre” (p. xv). Although it is true that the elements of violence, discrimination, racialization, and securitization that many studies have identified as part of internal colonialism (Casanova, 1965; Das, 1978; Gouldner, 1978; Hechter, 1975; Hechter & Levi, 1979; Loring, 2014) are present in Xinjiang and Xizang, and given the fact that we have previously established that the case studies constitute state formation conflicts, the present analysis will approach the case studies from the point of view of non-internal colonialism in the interest of objectivity. We perceive the use of the term “internal colonialism” as equivalent to classifying the relevant peoples as “internal” and, therefore, granting inherent legitimacy to the Chinese colonization process and, consequently, to Beijing’s claim over these territories. Therefore, we cannot assume this position if the analysis is to remain unbiased.

Following this choice of analytical approach, it becomes important to underline the difference between collective and individual colonization. The traditional use of the term colonialism generally refers to the collective aspect, the domination of one group over another. In the case of China, however, individual colonialism, also known as colonization of the mind, plays a particularly important role. The term was popularized by Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o (1986), who used it to refer to assumptions imposed by the colonizers based on the perpetration of the idea that only the colonizer’s forms of knowledge production were correct. It then made its

way into social science through the works of key figures in the literature regarding the cultural identity of African peoples during colonialism and decolonization. Among these authors, Franz Fanon is generally considered to stand out, due to his book *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963), an analysis of the psychological consequences of the dehumanization process Fanon perceives as inextricably linked to colonization. Ashis Nandy (1983) also addressed a similar issue by arguing that traditional colonization was followed by a second colonial process which involved not just the bodies, but also the minds of the colonized, altering cultural priorities in order to fully achieve colonization. Nandy describes the colonization of the mind that took place in India and writes about how even those who opposed the first colonization embraced the acculturation that characterized the second. For Nandy, this constitutes a loss of the self.

This process is comparable to the re-education policies that successive Chinese leaderships have applied over the last decades. Since the 1950s, as part of its assimilationist approach to minorities, Beijing has implemented multiple policies that can be categorized as sinicizing, a process by which Chinese culture, usually Han, is brought into non-Chinese societies, thus affecting the local cultures, languages, cultural identity, and societal norms (Rahman, 2005). These policies mostly relate to the settlement of dominating Han Chinese in minority regions and limiting mother-tongue language education opportunities for members of linguistic minorities. However, the key element of Chinese colonization of minority minds are the political re-education facilities, officially known as Vocational Education and Training Centers. These centres, in their modern form, were introduced into Xinjiang in 2014, and slowly evolved into a network of dedicated facilities as part of what the state termed “de-extremification” efforts, with increasingly sophisticated re-education methods (Zenz, 2018). Joanne Smith Finley (2019) describes how the collection of information to determine whether specific individuals were trustworthy has become increasingly detailed. Internees study Mandarin Chinese, the state-sanctioned version of Chinese history, and specific areas of Chinese law, such as those on Islam and Politics, minorities, and religion. They are also under intense pressure to renounce Islam, replacing their loyalty to God with allegiance to the Chinese state, and are forced to criticize their beliefs and even to eat pork or drink alcohol as punishments. Overall, they are expected to show gratitude to and patriotism toward the Chinese state, intensified by quarantining sections of the population in these camps, where internees are required to go through self-criticism processes regarding instances in which they have been ungrateful or unfaithful to the state. More recently, reports of physical violence, psychological torture, and other worrying conditions have emerged, including, but not limited to, beatings,


cuffing, waterboarding, forced labor, sleep deprivation, overcrowded cells, electric shocks, administration of unknown pills and substances, and separation of families (Zenz, 2019). These camps are most numerous in Xinjiang, but recent satellite images have shown them spreading into Tibet as well (UNPO, 2019). The activities carried out within these camps amount to a loss of the self of the individuals interned in them, as defined by Nandy (1983), since the aim of the camps is to promote sinicization and to counter extremism and terrorism. According to the view of the Beijing government, this equates to removing any cultural or religious elements that government officials perceive as problematic and attempting to substitute them for support of the Chinese Communist Party.

#### **2.2.4. International Forms of Violent and Non-Violent Resistance**

Faced with this situation in Xinjiang and Xizang, many actors from both within and beyond the Chinese borders have invoked the right to self-determination, a principle arising from customary international law, enshrined in multiple international treaties, and often regarded as a *jus cogens* rule. The principle of self-determination, which we have previously defined, is a core element of the narratives and rhetoric espoused by national and international resistance resulting from Chinese policy towards Uyghur and Tibetan minorities, namely transnational social movements carried out by ethnic diasporas and the rise of fundamentalist and extremist ideologies, even resulting in instances of violence and terrorism. In general, these forms of resistance are preceded by polarization, similar to that which characterized the Cultural Revolution: Chinese citizens are either with the Chinese Communist Party or against it (Byler, 2018). Such instances of political polarization are accompanied by ethnic polarization between minorities and ethnic Han, which is aggravated by government policies encouraging Han to settle in the autonomous regions, and economic polarization in terms of income inequality, as well as differences in job and education opportunities between the coastal regions and the inland, ethnic-minority regions (Jain-Chandra et al., 2018).

Given that various instances of violence are attributed to both sides of the conflict tackled in the present thesis, the next necessary step before moving deeper into their analysis is to have at hand a typology of violence with which to inspect them. To this end, we return to Johan Galtung, one of our key figures in Peace and Conflict Studies, who proposes a three-pronged classification (Galtung, 1969, 1990). Known as Galtung's Triangle of Violence, this classification divides categories of violence into visible and invisible (or less visible) violence. Within the visible spectrum, Galtung includes what he terms "direct violence", which refers to physical or verbal violence, including events from ridicule to extermination, whose perpetrator

is easily distinguishable. The less visible area of violence encompasses structural violence and cultural violence, which also differ from visible violence in that it is much harder to pinpoint who the perpetrator is. Structural violence refers to inequalities and injustice built into the structure of a state, resulting in an uneven distribution of power and limited opportunities to cover basic needs. Lastly, cultural violence is key when it comes to legitimizing structural and direct violence, as it refers to prevailing social norms that may make the other forms of violence seem unavoidable, acceptable, or even right. Events in Tibet and Xinjiang include instances of violence from all three categories.



Having established the nature of the conflicts studied and the actors involved, and having provided a description of the approaches to ethnonationalism and violence within China

**Figure 1:** Galtung's Triangle of Violence

Source: Adapted from Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural Violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 27(3), 291-305. used throughout the present study, we move now on to the analytical section, in which the role of international forms of resistance, namely diasporas and fundamentalist movements, will be further examined. After a brief description of the research objectives and the methodology used, Chapter III will focus on the nature of the existing forms of transnational resistance. Chapter IV will provide an outline of key factors of the international context in which these groups move for each of the examined conflicts. Finally, Chapter V will bring together the main transnational movements for each conflict and compare three key aspects: the nature and role

of their leaders, the role of politically active diasporas in shaping public opinion on the conflict in their host country, and their role in obtaining support at the international level.

### **2.3. Research Objectives**

Taking into consideration the information contained in the previous sections, the necessary conclusion is that international forms of resistance play a role in the situation of Uyghurs and Tibetans residing in the Xinjiang and Xizang autonomous regions. The fact that Beijing has attempted to push very clear narratives regarding each of these minorities at the international level begs the question: does the presence of international actors belonging to these minorities allow them to counter the official national narratives? Do they have the ability to alter the international perception of their communities in their favor? As a first step towards solving these queries, the present analysis will focus on answering the following question: ¿How has the rise of transnational social movements affected perceptions and attitudes regarding Chinese treatment of ethnic minorities?

To this end, the analytical section of the present thesis will aim to tackle the following hypotheses:

1. International attention to Tibet was higher due to timing: the peak of the 1959 revolts for self-determination took place when the post-WWII self-determination hype caused by the UN was still very present in international interests, as opposed to plurinational states.
2. The role of the USSR was one of the key factors that kept the Xinjiang issue out of the international spotlight, but its collapse allowed for instability in the region that led to the internationalization of the issue.
3. Increased international intervention by traditional actors in the Xinjiang case will remain unlikely as long as the international terrorist threat remains this present and the Uyghur issue remains embedded in the discourse of globally oriented radical Islamism.
4. The absence of a defined Xinjiang religious and political leader has limited Uyghur international presence and transnational impact in comparison with Tibet.
5. The diaspora members who have established themselves in more developed nations, although smaller in number, have more influence regarding international attitudes towards the minority in question.
6. China's membership in the UN is key in limiting international support for these minorities, as its increased international presence has given the Asian giant influence, especially in

economic terms, so that Western states are not insisting as much when it comes to the violation of human rights.

#### **2.4. Methodology**

The present analysis will use a qualitative, comparative approach, based on contrasting the nature, context, and effects of the Tibetan and Uyghur diasporas. In order to examine these two case studies, we will draw on data contained in both primary and secondary sources. The former group includes Chinese and international legislation, news reports, interviews, speeches, statistical data provided by national institutions of states where these diasporas are present, and white papers and other documents published by Beijing, the Central Tibetan Administration, or the World Uyghur Congress, containing their positions on the matter. The latter is composed mostly of academic sources, as well as analyses of the situation in Xinjiang and Xizang carried out by international organizations, such as the United Nations, and civil society groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, or the Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization. Lastly, this study will take on a constructivist approach, as it is the most suited to the study of social elements in the context of international relations, due to the fact that it takes into account ideologies, identities, and perceptions that affect state behavior.

### **Chapter III: Forms of International Resistance**

Since China began to once again increase contact with the outside world during the 1980s, emigration restrictions have been increasingly eased, greatly due to the economic reforms led by Deng Xiaoping and the end of the Cold War. As a result, the outflow of migrants has increased, and the push factors listed above caused many Tibetans and Uyghurs to move abroad. Although it is not easy to obtain exact quantitative data regarding the number of members of these ethnic minorities in China that have chosen to remain or to leave, some tentative statistics can be found. In the case of ethnic Tibetans; MacPherson, Bentz, and Ghos (2008) developed table 1 (below), according to which the Tibetan diaspora resides mainly in India and neighboring states, following the Dalai Lama's exile from China to the other Asian giant. However, the table also shows a substantial group of Tibetans residing in Western countries such as the United States. According to these authors, those belonging to this group are often able to reach higher levels of education and a higher economic status than the members of the diaspora who remained in South Asia which, in turn, enabled them to adopt positions of increased influence in their host societies. Having a presence in the national politics

of various states has enabled the members of the Tibetan diaspora to create a transnational social movement known as the Global Tibet Movement, which Noakes (2012) describes as a truly global network composed of over 170 organizations, mainly belonging to civil society.

| <i>Country of Residence</i> | <i>Tibetan Population</i> |
|-----------------------------|---------------------------|
| <i>India</i>                | 110,000                   |
| <i>Nepal</i>                | 20,184                    |
| <i>United States</i>        | 9,000                     |
| <i>Canada</i>               | 4,275                     |
| <i>Bhutan</i>               | 1,600                     |
| <i>Switzerland</i>          | 1,540                     |
| <i>Taiwan</i>               | 1,000                     |
| <i>United Kingdom</i>       | 650                       |
| <i>Australia</i>            | 533                       |
| <i>Scandinavia</i>          | 110                       |
| <i>New Zealand</i>          | 66                        |
| <i>Japan</i>                | 60                        |

**Table 1:** Distribution of the Tibetan Diaspora.

Source: MacPherson, S., Bentz, A.-S., & Ghos, D. B. (2008). *Global Nomads: The Emergence of the Tibetan Diaspora*. Migration Policy Institute.

When it comes to the Uyghurs, it is even harder to determine how many live abroad, since relevant census data is released only selectively by Chinese authorities. However, data available from other states seems to point to a pattern similar to that of the Tibetan diaspora: states near the border with Xinjiang house the largest numbers of ethnic Uyghurs outside of China. This is especially evident the case of Kazakhstan, who shares a border with the Xinjiang region, and is estimated to hold about 285.000 ethnic Uyghurs, or 1.5% of the country's



population (Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2011; CIA, 2020). However, the more internationally active groups of ethnic Uyghurs reside in states where they have access to more tools that allow them to have a presence on the international stage. Like in the case of the Tibetan diaspora, there are politically active communities in Western countries, such as the United States, leading to the birth of groups such as the Uyghur American Association, which describes itself as pursuing the preservation of Uyghur culture and supporting the right of Uyghurs to self-determination (Uyghur American Association, 2019).

Nonetheless, the Uyghur case differs from its Tibetan counterpart in that there is also a politically relevant group residing in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA). Within these, the 30,000-strong Uyghur community living in Turkey (Yackley & Shepherd, 2019) is particularly relevant. Turkey's inhabitants share ethnic and religious ties with the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, given the Turkic ethnic origins of the latter and the predominant position of Sunni Islam both in Turkey and among Uyghurs in Xinjiang. These ties have proven substantial enough for Turkey to offer sanctuary to Uyghur leaders and refugees, allowing them to set up organizations that aim to preserve Uyghur culture, and provide some forms of support to Uyghur movements. This has repeatedly hindered Sino-Turkish relations (Shichor, 2009a).

Beyond the political mobilization of the resulting diasporas, there are resistance groups whose actions are of a more violent and extremist nature. As mentioned above, China has often linked violence in Tibet and Xinjiang with separatism. In fact, it is now almost two decades since Beijing began tying Uyghur separatism to international jihadist groups. However, as James Millward (2004) points out, the main violent disturbances in these regions took place at the time of the political and economic disruptions of the Great Leap Forward (1959-61) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). In fact, Millward further argues that instances of separatist violence have declined in number and intensity since the end of the 1990s.

In the case of Tibet, reports of violence after 1980 are few and far between. There are some mentions of the role of Tibetan monks and merchants as the frontline of protests in the past (Sautman, 2008), but current reports all seem to focus on the 2008 uprisings in the Tibet Autonomous Region, and particularly the events that took place in Lhasa throughout the month of March. Both Chinese and Western sources indicate that the riots included the burning and looting of both government and privately-owned buildings and vehicles, as well as people-on-people violence. Where the Chinese focused on the violence toward ethnic Han and claimed that it was motivated by separatism and led by the Dalai Lama (Embassy of the People's

Republic of China in the Republic of Namibia, 2008), Western media and Tibetan groups abroad spoke of inflation, Han immigration, and unequal access to jobs and education (The Economist, 2008). These protests were echoed around the world, mostly in the shape of disturbances targeting Chinese embassies, ranging from throwing rocks to raising Tibetan flags in the embassy premises, in some of the states housing higher percentages of the Tibetan diaspora, such as India, Nepal, Australia, the US, and various European states (Hong & Zhouxiang, 2013). Most recently, some reports have also appeared regarding the self-immolation of Tibetans in protest against Chinese policy towards Tibet during the 2008 riots, citing self-immolation as one of the few ways left for Tibetans to have their voices heard (Carrico, 2017).

Although there is a certain concern over whether younger generations in Tibet may be rejecting the non-violent methods traditionally espoused when protesting Chinese policy, reports regarding secessionist violence are much more abundant when it comes to Xinjiang. Here, too, large-scale incidents were less common after 1990, but they have been much more publicized, especially since 9/11. Millward (2004) describes how what had generally been branded “a handful of separatists” was categorized as a full-blown terrorist organization. During the 1990s, there were bombing incidents against strategic targets, such as gas pipelines, or with strategic timing, such as the 1997 bus bombings that took place during memorial ceremonies for Deng Xiaoping. He also highlights how, since 1998, reports of Uyghur violence have not focused on violence within China itself, but on linking Uyghurs to a series of violent incidents in other states, such as assassinations and bombings in Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Finally, Millward also provides a brief description of the main groups that the People’s Republic of China linked to terrorism and separatist violence. Among these, the PRC has attributed the most incidents to the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), officially presented as a terrorist group pursuing the creation of an independent state in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and surrounding territories, who has ties to Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Islamic State. This group has the most international pull, as the aforementioned ties have led to the US, as well as a few other states, officially considering them a terrorist organization, despite ETIM leaders denying having such contacts, or even intending to commit terrorist acts (US Library of Congress, 2019). Other groups mentioned include the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), who perceives a military wing as necessary in order to achieve the independence of East Turkestan; the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET), who periodically issues press releases regarding embarking on an armed campaign against

Chinese authorities but whose leader has been largely discredited even by other exiled groups; and the Uyghur Liberation Organization (ULO), now merged with URFET. None of these has been officially recognized by the US as an official terrorist group, but the ETLO has been linked to Chechen and Afghan terrorist training facilities (Millward, 2004).

## **Chapter IV:**

### **Context for Internationalization and Transnational Action**

In order to analyze the role of members of civil society in conflicts that have become internationalized, it is first necessary to determine the international context in which these actors move and which therefore determines the level of international presence and international support received in each case. To this end, we turn back to Kenneth Waltz's (1959) three levels of analysis, and focus on the systemic level. For Waltz, this level is important based on the perception of states as actors who respond in a unitary and rational fashion to external incentives. Given the nature of the conflicts being analyzed, we can no longer assume our main actors to be unitary states. However, this does not mean that their interaction with systemic elements does not influence the conflict, especially since the peaks of both conflicts are decades apart, and therefore take place in different international contexts.

If we first look at the Tibetan conflict, its peak is usually associated with the 1959 uprisings (Han & Paik, 2013; Smith, 1996) which, in turn, were a key element in bringing the conflict to the international stage. By the late 1950s, the world had mostly recovered from World War II and was settling into the new bipolar world order that characterized the Cold War era. For the Tibetan conflict, the key characteristic of this era was how the international perception of the principle of self-determination evolved. Immediately after World War II, self-determination was perceived as dangerous, since the conflict itself was perceived to be a result of it. Nonetheless, the rise of the UN and the subsequent institutionalization of the principle of self-determination in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights greatly increased international support for it (Pereira, 2001; Rodríguez-Santiago, 2016).

It was within this context that some rumors that Chinese authorities planned to apprehend the Dalai Lama resulted in the 1959 popular Lhasa uprisings. During the chaos, the Dalai Lama crossed into India where, after being granted asylum, he set up the Central Tibetan Administration (W. W. Smith, 1996). These events marked the full internationalization of the

conflict into an international sphere where support for self-determination had once again become widespread. This was key in the success of various Tibetan efforts to obtain international support, which we will examine in the next section.

When it comes to the Xinjiang conflict, its peak is usually associated with the years following 9/11 and the rise of modern international terrorism, but this does not mean that the conflict was not present before. The Uyghur and Xinjiang issues were never embedded into the predominant global geopolitical discourse of the Cold War like other intrastate conflicts which were turned into proxy wars, due to China's international isolation up to the 1970s and, according to Michael Clarke (2015), the regional influence of the Soviet Union. For Clarke, Xinjiang's geographical location meant that Uyghur separatism was largely contained within Sino-Soviet relations, even if said relationship was not always positive. In fact, although the Soviet Union was in favor of the absorption of the region into the newly founded People's Republic, Moscow again supported ethnic unrest in Xinjiang in the 1960s to undermine Chinese control of the area. Nonetheless, it appears to be the presence of the USSR that kept China from taking stronger measures regarding security in Xinjiang (Kamalov, 2009). It was not until after the fall of the Soviet Union that China changed its approach to Xinjiang. The loss of Soviet control over central Asia meant the creation of new states, which resulted in greater instability on the other side of the borders of Xinjiang, especially given the Islamic revival that was part of this process. The new Chinese strategy regarding Xinjiang was based on ensuring stability and security via economic growth, which would be achieved by opening Xinjiang to Central Asia (Clarke, 2015). However, this also gave Xinjiang Uyghurs the opportunity to re-establish links with Uyghurs living in the new Central Asian republic, which marked the start of the internationalization of the Xinjiang issue in its modern form. Therefore, it was not necessarily that the presence of the USSR kept Uyghurs out of the international spotlight, but rather that its sudden absence precipitated a change of strategy in terms of security in the region that opened it up to more external influences.

Between 1990 and the turn of the century, China still managed to keep the international dimension of Uyghur resistance in check via organizations such as the Shanghai Five<sup>2</sup>. However, international events, namely the consolidation of Islamic movements in Central Asia—particularly the Taliban in Afghanistan—and the 9/11 attacks in the US, precipitated a new change in strategy: this time, China voluntarily expanded the international dimension of the

---

<sup>2</sup> See footnote 1.

Xinjiang issue. Echoing the shift in US Foreign policy, China declared its own War on Terror and, although foreign leaders are reluctant to equate the American War on Terror with domestic crackdowns on separatists, the following rise of terrorist attacks linked to religion, and particularly to Islam, has not done Uyghurs any favors. According to David C. Rapoport (2013), this current wave of religious terrorism is the most destructive by far, as perpetrators engage in tactics that are deadlier than ever before and the international dimension of the wave is stronger than that of the preceding ones. This has no doubt affected the general international perception of Islam. A study carried out by the Pew Research Center (2006) shows that, in the years following the 9/11 attacks, many in the West perceive Muslims to be arrogant, intolerant and fanatical and, therefore, likely to harbor violent tendencies, which only fosters international concerns over Islamic extremism. A second study (Pew Research Center, 2017) shows that similar values continued to be associated with Muslims over a decade later, as a result of which the warmth of the feelings of US citizens towards Muslims still remains just under 50 out of a highest possible score of 100. In comparison, the feelings towards Buddhism, for example, land them with a score over 60, which is attributed to a widespread belief that Buddhist values hinge around peace and harmony. This gave Tibetans an advantage over Uyghurs in terms of obtaining international support from Western states, which we will further examine in the next chapter.

In terms of the evolution of the context for transnational action, a final element that must be considered is the stage of development of international human rights at the time of the conflict peak. If we consider the commonly used three-generation classification of rights, we'll find that at the time of the Tibetan uprisings, only the first two generations were anywhere near being enshrined in international law through binding agreements. Furthermore, at this time, the Cold War bipolar context resulted in a relatively clean split between Western states, who prioritized first generation (i.e. civil and political) rights, and Eastern states, who focused on second generation (i.e. economic, social, and cultural) rights (Domaradzki, Khvostova, & Pupovac, 2019). The former category includes rights with clear links to the Tibetan position, such as freedom of religion or political participation, or the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatment. The latter category is more closely linked to rights emphasized by Beijing, related to fulfilment of basic and economic needs. These positions regarding human rights would have influenced the attitude of various states regarding Tibet and willingness to provide international support.

As for the third generation of rights, it began to develop internationally in the 1970s, via the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, but did not achieve widespread recognition until the 1990s, and was therefore absent during the most intense decades of the Tibetan issue. This is the generation that directly addresses the right to self-determination, as well as the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, among other categories (Viljoen, 2009), and has definitely been applied in retrospect to the events of the 1950s and 1960s involving Tibet. However, in the case of Xinjiang, the third generation of rights evolved at the same time as the conflict. The key distinguishing characteristic of this third generation of rights is that they address overlapping global concerns and therefore demand a responsibility that lies beyond the nation state, relying greatly on international law instead. This led to the adoption of international declarations that were of great relevance to the situations in both Xinjiang and Tibet, particularly the Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities which, although non-binding, is part of an increasingly elaborate international system that monitors the situation of minority groups all over the world (Viljoen, 2009). As such, there was a visible increase in attention towards Chinese treatment of their own minorities in terms of human rights, which has undoubtedly also played a role in the international presence and support of the minorities involved.

All in all, despite the increasing international influence achieved by the Chinese government, a brief analysis of the international context in which Uyghur and Tibetan forms of international resistance developed, makes it possible to pinpoint a few key elements that influenced the process of internationalization of both conflicts and the amount and type of international support the minorities have been able to achieve. For Tibet, internationalization was achieved at the end of the 1950s, at a time when the UN had once again begun to champion the right to self-determination, along with the first and second generations of human rights which aligned many states in the Western world with the Tibetan point of view. The generally peaceful and harmonious perception of Buddhism has also positively influenced the international perception of Tibet, as opposed to the general western perception of Islam, especially in the wake of 9/11, which has led to the majority of the Uyghurs allies being in the Muslim world. Internationalization of the Uyghur issue was also limited by its border with the Soviet Union until the collapse of the latter, which resulted in regional instability that Beijing attempted to resolve via internationalization. Nonetheless, the full internationalization took place at a time when the third generation of human rights was on the rise and, consequently, so was international support for the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. With these key

contextual elements in mind, we now move on to the analysis of the impact of resistance via transnational social movements.

## **Chapter V: Impact of Transnational Forms of Resistance**

The factors analysed in the previous chapter gave way to the specific forms of transnational resistance listed in Chapter III. In this section we will compare key aspects of transnational resistance by both minorities, focusing specifically on the nature and role of leaders, the role of politically active diasporas in influencing public opinion in their host country, and their role in obtaining support at the international level.

### **5.1. Resistance Centralization and Leadership**

Looking first at the nature of leadership in both cases, it quickly becomes apparent that leadership roles are closely linked to religion. In Tibet, the predominant religion is Tibetan Buddhism, of which the Dalai Lama is the foremost spiritual leader. He was also initially the leader of the government in exile and, despite relinquishing his political leadership of the Central Tibetan Administration in 2011, still remains the *de facto* leader of Tibet (Tuttle & Schaeffer, 2013; Yardley & Wong, 2011). Therefore, Tibetans have a clear leadership figure in Tenzin Gyatso, the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama. This sort of centralized structure has ensured the coordination of international action by Tibetans, resulting in the projection of a unified international image opposing the narrative presented by Beijing (Teufel Dreyer, 2010). This unified narrative has been made public through the publication of White Papers and other accompanying documents by the CTA. The Dalai Lama's role as a unifying figurehead became particularly apparent in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when he travelled widely, explaining the conflict in other states and working to gain international support. These early successes marked the birth of the international Tibet lobby, and were directly responsible for the expansion and professionalization of the network. The Dalai Lama was particularly successful in Washington, greatly contributing to the formation of the politically active Tibetan diaspora in the US, which would later serve as a stepping-stone to obtain support from other states, international organizations, and even celebrities (Noakes, 2012).

The centralized structure of Tibetan Buddhism and, consequently, transnational Tibetan resistance contrasts with the more decentralized nature of Islam, which is in turn reflected in instances of Uyghur transnational resistance. The absence of a clear, unifying figurehead means that positions further towards the end of the spectrums are more visible, whereas a centralized

structure means that the average position, which is of a more moderate nature, would play a pivotal role (Auriol & Platteau, 2017). This means that, rather than one unified narrative, the Uyghurs are engaging in multiple approaches to resistance to Beijing authorities: from propaganda, to cultural and symbolic resistance, to violence and attacks. The latter strategy is often the most visible, if only because of the increased impact and more intense media coverage. This is why there is no clear leader, but rather multiple more or less well-known figures. In the case of the Uyghur, this includes individuals ranging from academics to extremist leaders. On one end of the spectrum we find figures such as Ilham Tohti, an Uyghur economist currently imprisoned in China on separatism charges who has nonetheless been internationally recognized as a voice of moderation and reconciliation. He has been awarded multiple human rights-related international awards, including the Václav Havel Prize, the Martin Ennals Award, and, most recently, the Sakharov Prize (Sánchez, 2019). On the opposite end of the spectrum we have individuals such as Mehmet Emin Hazret, leader of the ETLO, who stands accused of violent incidents both in and beyond the borders of Xinjiang, or ETIM leader Abdullah Mansour, recognized as having links to Al-Qaeda by the US and the UN, among others.

From this we can infer that the differences in leadership and level of centralization of the transnational resistance have an influence on the effectiveness of said resistance efforts, particularly in terms of presenting a unified narrative strong enough to oppose the way in which Beijing presented the conflict internationally, an essential step in obtaining international support. Nonetheless, this does not mean that transnational Tibetan efforts are fully unified. In fact, since the formation of the transnational Tibetan network, the Dalai Lama himself has stated that he is no longer pursuing full independence for Tibet, but rather campaigns for increased autonomy of Tibet within China, while groups remain abroad that still pursue total independence (Crowe, 2013).

## **5.2. Diaspora Influence on Host State Public Opinion**

Within the transnational resistance systems described in the previous chapter, diasporas are often among the main actors, especially when it comes to influencing the politics of their host states. As established in Chapter III, the highest numbers of diaspora members often reside in the states bordering with their homeland: India in the case of Tibetans, Kazakhstan in the case of Uyghurs. There is no denying that these diaspora groups are politically active, in fact it is precisely the Tibetan diaspora in India who keeps the CTA running, for example. However, in terms of international impact, the diasporas in other states further away from the original location of the conflict have slowly become of paramount importance. As we saw in Table 1,



the United States holds the third highest number of individuals belonging to the Tibetan diaspora (9,000). In the case of the Uyghurs, a similar situation takes place in Turkey, where over 30,000 ethnic Uyghurs reside. It is comparable in the sense that, although located further away from the conflict itself, the diaspora members residing in these states have both managed to achieve certain relevance, to the point where they have been able to influence public opinion and, therefore, the national position regarding the corresponding conflict, in favor of the minority to which they belong.

In the case of Tibet, diaspora members residing in the US have been able to build on the initial success the Dalai Lama achieved there during his travels in the 1980s and 1990s. They have since managed to influence public opinion via the work of both individuals and organizations. Thubte Jigme Norbu, elder brother of the 14<sup>th</sup> Dalai Lama, is a relevant example of the former. Since moving to the US in the 1950s and becoming a prominent civil rights activist, and until his death in 2008, Norbu singlehandedly increased awareness of the Tibetan conflict in his new country of residence through lectures, publications, and the creation of organizations such as the Tibetan Cultural Centre and the NGO known as the International Tibet Independence movement (ITIM, 2018). By making his knowledge of Tibet and the Tibetan cause widely available, he had an impact on public opinion, which was instrumental in having US citizens take up the cause for themselves, including celebrities such as American actor Richard Gere.

Norbu's ITIM is a prime example of an organization that has influenced public opinion by hosting awareness-creating events, such as walks for Tibetan freedom and, more recently, by actively participating in protests against the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Similar organizations exist throughout the world, mostly in Western states and states with a higher number of Tibetans residing within its borders. Examples include the International Tibetan Aid Organization in Netherlands, the Tibetan Youth Congress in India, and the Free Tibet Campaign in London (MacPherson et al., 2008). These NGOs often take a human rights approach to the issue, which is also appealing to the West, as was established in Chapter IV. Their existence in multiple nations throughout the world means that, along with influencing public opinion, they also provide chances for those supporting Tibet, or at least the defence of Tibetan human rights, to mobilize in their own right. The network created by the Tibetan diaspora has continued to expand, to the point where the global Tibet Movement resulted in coordinated marches and protests around the world again regarding the fact that the 2008 Olympics were to take place in Beijing, as well as calls for international leaders not to attend competitions (Barnett, 2009). All these efforts, along with the

generally positive perception of key elements of the Tibetan identity, such as Buddhism, have resulted in the predominance within public opinion in Western states of positions favorable to Tibet.

It is also possible to pinpoint instances in which the Uyghur Diaspora in Turkey has managed to influence the public opinion there, as well as in other states in the region. The initial stages of Uyghur settlement in Turkey were favored not by the convincing rhetoric of a centralized leader, as was the case of Tibet, but rather by shared historical, ethnic, and religious ties, as Uyghurs have Turkic ethnic origins and are predominantly Sunni Muslims, as is the case in Turkey. Based on these ties, individuals such as internationally famous Uyghur musician Abdurehim Heyit have played an important part in improving Turkish public opinion on the matter. Heyit engaged in overseas trips to promote elements of Uyghur culture. He visited Turkey often, and his efforts cast him in the role of bridge between the Uyghur and Turkish cultures (Tiezzi, 2019). It was also due to these ties that Turkey allowed Uyghur refugees and leaders to settle in its territory, even permitting the creation of organizations such as the Eastern Turkestan National Congress, which sought to preserve Uyghur culture and provide pro-Uyghur movements with support (Shichor, 2009a). These organizations have, however, experienced only limited success, especially since the Turkish Government, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has increased the value it places on its relationship with China, motivated by the rising Chinese investment in the nation as a result of the Belt and Road Initiative (Tiezzi, 2019). Consequently, newer organizations are being established in Western states, such as the World Uyghur Congress, headquartered in Munich. This organization is now widely considered to represent most Uyghur diaspora associations, a feat accomplished by choosing a more moderate approach than previous organizations, underlining human rights, self-determination, and democracy, rather than independence itself (Shichor, 2009b). As well as being more attractive to Uyghur movements themselves, this non-profit NGO has also been instrumental in improving public support for Uyghurs and encouraging people around the world to mobilize in their favor. This has even been felt in Turkey where, despite the economic ties to China, public opinion tends to favor Uyghurs, as shown by their participation in mass-anti-China protests that broke out in response to reports that China was applying increasing restrictions to Uyghur expressions of their Muslim faith (Tiezzi, 2019).

In general, it is clear that both the Tibetan and the Uyghur diasporas have managed to tilt the scales of public opinion in these states in their favor. Examples of political activities carried out by both diasporas show that the path to success can include both individual actions and the efforts of formal groupings, mostly of the NGO category. By comparing both diasporas

it is also possible to conclude that a more moderate stance, often based on a human rights approach, will be more effective when it comes to garnering the support of the public, as shown by the issues met by the first Uyghur diaspora groupings. Nonetheless, the ability to influence public opinion demonstrated by both diasporas has proven to be of great importance since, as we will discuss in the following section, public opinion can be a determining factor of national positions adopted by states and, consequently, of the positions of international organizations who are constituted by said state actors.

### **5.3. Diaspora Role in Obtaining State and International Organization Support**

There is a general consensus in academia that public opinion plays a role in decisions made by the executive. In general, although public opinion may not determine the details of government policies, it sets certain limits within which public officials must work: if there is a widespread demand being voiced, policymakers will usually attempt to satisfy it, or at least to avoid decisions they believe will be unwelcome (Burstein, 2003). This also affects a State's foreign policy for, as stated by Robert Putnam (1988), governments engaging in diplomacy, negotiations, and other facets of foreign policy must deal not only with the other parties with which they are negotiating, but also with internal pressures, and must therefore attempt to, through their foreign policy, fulfil these domestic demands to the furthest extent possible while limiting adverse consequences.

Regarding our case studies, this process is very visible in the case of Turkey and the position of its national public opinion in favor of the Uyghurs. On February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2019, as a result of the protests against Beijing's restrictions of Uyghur freedom of religion, the Turkish government issued a statement in which it denounced China for violating the fundamental human rights of Muslim communities in Xinjiang, and particularly those of the Uyghurs. Through this statement, Turkey would become one of the small number of majority-Muslim states that has openly criticized Beijing for its treatment of Uyghurs, particularly the mass detentions (Tiezzi, 2019). Before this statement, Erdogan's administration had remained conspicuously silent in the face of Chinese treatment of Uyghurs. However, maintaining this silence was becoming increasingly more costly for the Turkish government: opposition parties had been organizing protests to urge the AKP, the ruling party, to take action on the matter, particularly after the AKP rejected the opposition's push for a parliamentary motion to investigate the state of Uyghur rights in Xinjiang. The months prior to the statement, protests throughout the peninsula had been more and more frequent, increasing the pressure on the government (Middle East Monitor, 2020; Tiezzi, 2019)

Similarly, increasing support of Tibet in US public opinion has been a key factor in bringing about several instances of US legislation that constitute explicit support for Tibet, the most notable of which is the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002. This document, which was updated in 2019, is the core guiding document of US policy toward Tibet which, according to the text, focuses around promoting substantial dialogue between the PRC and the Dalai Lama, but also includes the protection of Tibet's cultural, religious, linguistic, and overall national identity through initiatives such as assistance to Tibetan NGOs operating in China, assistance to refugees, or educational and cultural exchanges with Tibet (Lawrence, 2014). This document amounts to the culmination of the strong interest in Tibet the US has displayed since the Dalai Lama first visited the US in the 1980s, as manifested via dozens of Tibet-related laws and resolutions and by the numerous visits of the Dalai Lama and, more recently, the political leader of the CTA.

Public opinion calls strong enough to be felt at national foreign policy levels, will consequently also have an impact in international organizations. The CTA has identified over a hundred international resolutions in favor of Tibet, not the least of which are the three resolutions passed by the UN General assembly calling for respect of human rights in Tibet (i.e. 1353, 1723, and 2079) (MacPherson, Bentz, & Ghoso, 2008b). There have also been calls for a UN resolution regarding the situation in Xinjiang, as well as a series of joint declarations by states, such as the one delivered in October of 2019 at the UN General Assembly on behalf of 23 countries, and by human rights and civil society organizations, delivered in February of the same year (Charbonneau, 2019; Human Rights Watch, 2019). Similar initiatives have also been brought up in other international bodies, such as the European Parliament (European Parliament, 2019), or even the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, of which the Central Tibetan Administration and World Uyghur Congress are both members (UNPO, 2020). It is no secret that China holds considerable influence in some of these bodies. This is particularly true in the case of the United Nations, as the second largest contributor to the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets, as well as being a permanent member on the UN Security Council, where it has exercised veto power 16 times, of which 13 have been in the last few years (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020; Security Council Report, 2020). Nonetheless, the issue of Chinese treatment of Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other minorities was brought up repeatedly in China's most recent Universal Periodic Review. The issue was tackled by Western states (USA, EU states, Australia, New Zealand), Muslim states (Afghanistan, Pakistan), neighboring Asian states (South Korea, Nepal, Bangladesh, Laos), and other developing nations in areas such as Latin America and Africa, regions where China has a strong economic hold (UNCHR, 2018).

Overall, it is possible to ascertain that, despite China's increasing international influence and power, there are still states and international organizations willing to publicly declare, at least to an extent, their support for Tibetans and Uyghurs. Domestic pressures linked to public opinion have led states in which politically active diaspora members reside to issue declarations and legislation in support of these minorities. In some cases, this has taken place after years of open support, as is the case of the US regarding Tibet, whereas in others, such as Turkey, domestic pressures have had to work against government misgivings in order to influence state foreign policy. The support shown by these states is then echoed in international organizations exercising certain levels of normative power in the international system, such as the United Nations. Therefore, it can be said that the actions initiated at a domestic level by members of the Uyghur and Tibetan diasporas living abroad have been magnified until reaching the higher international spheres. We therefore find ourselves before two thriving transnational social movements, who play an important role in providing international protection and support for those who remain in their homeland. This is not to say that these movements are without issues—for example, authors such as Roche (2019) have argued that some aspects of the Tibetan global movement are furthering the erosion of Tibetan languages instead of protecting them—, but nonetheless, evidence suggests that these minorities would be in a much worse position than they are today had the force of their respective diasporas not been on their side.

## **Chapter VI: Conclusion**

The current structure of the international sphere makes Waltz's (1959) systemic level an essential part not just of every state's foreign policy but also of its domestic political sphere. Diasporas are an important aspect of this, as increased interconnectivity and transnational networks are favoring the growth and spread of these groups. Such is the case of the Tibetan and Uyghur diasporas, whose voice has grown louder and has caught the attention of Chinese authorities and key international players alike. Let us address how their efforts fit in with the hypotheses and research question posed at the beginning of this analysis.

There is no doubt that the global context in which internationalization and transnational mobilization takes place influences the nature and effectiveness of transnational activity. We have seen how the UN's push in terms of self-determination has had some influence, for example, as it provided a favorable context for the Dalai Lama's quest for international support. However, this value became part of international binding human rights instruments closer to the peak of the Uyghur conflict, so timing was not as defining in the sense that this value is

still internationally important now: contrary to what we hypothesized, both minorities have benefited from more or less equal support based on this principle.

There are, however, other elements of the international context that did mark a difference between our two case studies, specifically by limiting Uyghur access to international support: perception of Islam remains mediocre at best in Western nations, which definitely limits government activity in their favor. Therefore, support for Uyghurs in states such as the US is limited, whereas in Turkey, the average citizen finds it easier to identify with the Uyghurs due to shared ethnic and religious identities. It is therefore more accurate to say that increased international intervention by Western actors, rather than by the international community in general, will remain unlikely as long as the association of Islam with international terrorism persists. Similarly, a nuance must also be added to the hypothesis regarding the role of the USSR in keeping the Uyghur issue out of the international public eye: it was not necessarily that the Soviet Union worried about hushing up the situation in Xinjiang, but rather that the geographic location of said region meant that, upon the collapse of the USSR, it was exposed to a great deal of instability that precipitated changes in the Chinese security strategy in the area, through which it was opened up to more external influences.

These are a few of the key factors that diasporas must take into account when operating as part of a transnational social movement. Some TSM structures have proven to be more effective than others, as can be seen when comparing the centralized Tibetan global movement with the efforts of the Uyghur diaspora whose effectiveness has been limited by the lack of a unified narrative strong enough to oppose the way in which Beijing presents their situation to the world. Nonetheless, their ability to garner the sympathy of public opinion for their cause in Muslim states still grants them substantial influence levels as, by causing alterations in Turkey's foreign policy, they can subsequently influence that of neighboring states. The Tibetan diaspora has pursued the US's support via a similar process, which has garnered them a lot of international support thanks to the US's influence as an international superpower. Given the nature of these processes, diaspora groups working from more developed nations have obtained a greater international presence, as the states where they operate currently hold more weight in the international sphere. This is not an independent variable, however, as the type of approach will also affect TSM effectiveness regardless of the location of its members. This is exemplified by the Uyghur groups we have examined, which achieved greater effectiveness in both Western and non-Western states after adopting a more moderate, human rights-based approach.

Building on the variables we have analyzed, it can be concluded that diaspora-based transnational social movements do indeed hold certain influence in strengthening international opposition to Chinese treatment of ethnic minorities. The Tibetan and Uyghur diasporas have achieved significant influence by generating links between their ethnic minorities and inhabitants of other nations, to the point where public opinion has influenced the foreign policy of multiple states in their favor. They have been a key element in ensuring that, despite China's increasing international influence and power, there are still states and, subsequently, international organizations willing to position themselves against China on this matter. We can see examples of this even within the United Nations, where China holds great influence due to its status as a global economic power. However, instead of this resulting in other states giving China *carte blanche* to go against generally accepted international norms such as human rights, as we might have expected, states are voicing their concern through official channels, such as the universal periodic reviews.

Based on these results, it is undeniable that TSMs, the new actors on the international scene, hold a great deal of potential, not only regarding issues regarding minority treatment, but also on other global concerns, such as environmental or gender equality issues, thanks to the weight afforded to them by globalization and technological advances, particularly those regarding communications and social media. Given the evolution China in the last decades, it is especially important not to underestimate the effect that these movements can have in terms of undermining the state's rise. We have seen that they have already gained the strength necessary to oppose Chinese narratives at the international level, and now it remains to be seen whether transnational social movements are able to adapt to the changing polarity of the international system. For Tibetans and Uyghurs around the globe, the limitations being increasingly experienced by the US, especially in Asia-Pacific, and the rise of China as its main challenger, may limit the effectiveness of their current strategies, which will have to be adapted to new international structures, should they arise. Both diasporas are already undergoing shifts, towards greater centralization in the case of Uyghurs and towards a possible existential crisis due to the Dalai Lama's new position that is no longer based on pursuing statehood, in the case of Tibet. Therefore, it is in the interests of academics and policymakers to continue to pay attention to these groups, and to the evolution of their activities, both in their own right and as part of the study of the ability of norm-resistant states to re-shape global governance.

## References and Bibliography

- Adamson, F. B. (2008). *Constructing the Diaspora: Diaspora Identity Politics and Transnational Social Movements*. School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London.
- Agency on Statistics of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2011). Results of the 2009 National Population Census of the Republic of Kazakhstan: Analytical Report. Retrieved on February 18th, 2020, from [https://www.liportal.de/fileadmin/user\\_upload/oeffentlich/Kasachstan/40\\_gesellschaft/Kaz2009\\_Analytical\\_report.pdf](https://www.liportal.de/fileadmin/user_upload/oeffentlich/Kasachstan/40_gesellschaft/Kaz2009_Analytical_report.pdf)
- Albert, E. (2015). *The Shanghai Cooperation Organization*. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on May 4th, 2020, from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/shanghai-cooperation-organization>
- Allison, G. T. (1969). Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis. *American Political Science Review*, 63(3), 689-718.
- Anand, D. (2018). Colonization with Chinese characteristics: Politics of (in)security in Xinjiang and Tibet. *Central Asian Survey*, 38(1), 129-147.
- Aris, S. (2009). The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: 'Tackling the Three Evils'. A Regional Response to Non-Traditional Security Challenges or an Anti-Western Bloc? *Europe-Asia Studies*, 61(3), 457-482.
- Auriol, E., & Platteau, J.-P. (2017). *The explosive combination of religious decentralisation and autocracy: The case of Islam*. Centre for Economic Policy Research. Retrieved on April 10th, 2020, from <https://voxeu.org/article/religious-decentralisation-and-autocracy-case-islam>
- Barnett, R. (2009). The Tibet Protests of Spring 2008. *China Perspectives*, 3, 6-23.
- Bertossi, C. (2007). *French and British Models of Integration. Public Philosophies, Policies, and State Institutions*. ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society. Working Paper N° 46, University of Oxford.
- Burstein, P. (2003). The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56(1), 29-40.
- Byler, D. (2018). Violent Paternalism: On the Banality of Uyghur Unfreedom. *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 16(24), 4, 1-15.
- Carrico, K. (2017). *China's Cult of Stability is Killing Tibetans*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved on February 18th, 2020, from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/self-immolation-and-chinas-state-cult-of-stability-tibet-monks-dalai-lama/>
- Casanova, P. G. (1965). Internal Colonialism and National Development. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 1(4), 27-37. Chinapower Project. Retrieved on April 13th, 2020, from <https://chinapower.csis.org/china-un-mission/>
- CIA. (2020). *Kazakhstan*. The World Factbook. Retrieved on February 18th, 2020, from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html>
- Clarke, M. (2015). China and the Uyghurs: The "Palestinization" of Xinjiang? *Middle East Policy*, 22(3), 127-142.
- Crowe, D. M. (2013). The "Tibet Question": Tibetan, Chinese and Western Perspectives. Nationalities Papers. *The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 41(6), 1100-1135.
- Charbonneau, L. (2019). *Countries Blast China at UN Over Xinjiang Abuses*. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved on April 13th, 2020, from <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/30/countries-blast-china-un-over-xinjiang-abuses>
- Chayet, A. (2008). The Qing Dynasty (1644-1911). In A.-M. Blondeau & K. Buffetrille (Eds.), *Authenticating Tibet: Answers to China's 100 Questions*. Berkeley: University of California Press.



- Choquet, S. (2017). *Models of Integration in Europe*. Policy Paper. European Issues n°449. Fondation Robert Schuman.
- Das, M. (1978). Internal Colonialism and the Movement for Bangladesh: A Sociological Analysis. *Contributions to Asian Studies*, 12, 93-104.
- Desai, S. (2017). India's SCO Challenge. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved on May 4th, 2020, from <https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/indias-sco-challenge/>
- Domaradzki, S., Khvostova, M., & Pupovac, D. (2019). Karel Vasak's Generations of Rights and the Contemporary Human Rights Discourse. *Human Rights Review*, 20, 423-443.
- Dorje, Y. (2019). *Tibetan Re-Education Camp Journal Tells of China's Tactics Now Used on Uighurs*. Retrieved on December 28th, 2019, from <https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/tibetan-re-education-camp-journal-tells-chinas-tactics-now-used-uighurs>
- Dwyer, A. M. (2005). *The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse*. Washington DC: East-West Center Washington.
- Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Namibia. (2008). *Facts and Truth about the Violence in Tibet*. Retrieved on February 18th, 2020, from <http://na.china-embassy.org/eng/xwtd/t418634.htm>
- European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (2019). *Belt and Road Initiative*. Retrieved on January 22nd, 2020, from <https://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/belt-and-road/overview.html>
- European Parliament. (2019). *Joint Motion for a Resolution*. Retrieved on April 13th, 2020, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2019-0246\\_EN.html](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/RC-9-2019-0246_EN.html)
- Fanon, F. (1963). *The Wretched of the Earth*. New York: Grove Press.
- Fischer, A. M. (2008). Subsistence and Rural Livelihood Strategic in Tibet under Rapid Economic and Social Transition. *Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies*, 4, 1-49.
- Galtung, J. (1969). Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research*, 6(3), 167-191.
- Galtung, J. (1990). Cultural violence. *Journal of Peace Research*, 27(3), 291-305.
- Gouldner, A. W. (1978). Stalinism: A Study of Internal Colonialism. *Telos*, 34, 5-48.
- Grieger, G. (2014). *China: Assimilating or Radicalising Uighurs? At a Glance*. European Parliament. Retrieved on December 28th, 2019, from [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/538966/EPRS\\_ATA\(2014\)538966\\_REV1\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2014/538966/EPRS_ATA(2014)538966_REV1_EN.pdf)
- Han, E., & Paik, C. (2013). Dynamics of Political Resistance in Tibet: Religious Repression and Controversies of Demographic Change. *The China Quarterly*, 217, 69-98.
- Hao, Y., & Liu, W. (2012). Xinjiang: Increasing Pain in the Heart of China's Borderland. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 21(74), 205-225.
- Hechter, M. (1975). *Internal Colonialism. The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*. London: Routledge.
- Hechter, M., & Levi, M. (1979). The Comparative Analysis of Ethnoregional Movements. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2(3), 260-274.
- Hepeng, J. (2004). The Three Represents Campaign: Reform the Party or Indoctrinate the Capitalists? *The Cato Journal*, 24(3), 261-275.
- Hong, F., & Zhouxiang, L. (2013). *The Politicisation of Sport in Modern China: Communist and Champions*. New York: Routledge.
- Human Rights Watch. (2019). *Joint Statement calling for Xinjiang Resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Council*. Retrieved on April 13th, 2020, from [https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting\\_resources/190305\\_joint\\_statement\\_xinjiang\\_hrc\\_0.pdf](https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190305_joint_statement_xinjiang_hrc_0.pdf)
- Huntington, S. P. (1993). The Clash of Civilizations? *Foreign Affairs*, 72(3), 22-49.

- Imtiyaz, A. R. M. (2012). Uyghurs: Chinezisation, Violence and the Future. *The IUP Journal of International Relations*, 6(1), 18-37.
- ITIM. (2018). *International Tibet Independence Movement*. Tibet Online. Retrieved on January 28th, 2020, from <http://www.tibet.org/Resources/TSG/Groups/itim.html>
- Jain-Chandra, S., Khor, N., Mano, R., Schauer, J., Wingender, P., & Zhuang, J. (2018). *Inequality in China – Trends, Drivers and Policy Remedies*. IMF Working Paper, Asia and Pacific Department.
- James, J. D. (2017). *Transnational Religious Movements: Faith's Flows*. New Delhi: SAGE Publications India.
- Jiawei, W., & Gyaincain, N. (2009). The Historical Status of China's Tibet. *Journal of the Washington Institute of China Studies*, 4(1), 31-36.
- Kamalov, A. (2009). Uyghurs in the Central Asian Republics: Past and Present. In C. Mackerras & M. Clarke (Eds.), *China, Xinjiang and Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the 21st Century*. London: Routledge.
- Lawrence, S. V. (2014). *The Tibetan Policy Act of 2002: Background and Implementation*. Congressional Research Service Report. Retrieved on April 13th, 2020, from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43781.pdf>
- Leibold, J. (2016). *China's Minority Report: When Racial Harmony Means Homogenization*. Foreign Affairs. Retrieved on December 26th, 2019, from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-23/chinas-minority-report>
- Lenin, V. I. (1913). *Critical Remarks on the National Question*. Retrieved on December 28th, 2019, from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1913/crnq/index.htm>
- Lenin, V. I. (1914). *The Right of Nations to Self-Determination*. Retrieved on December 28th, 2019, from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1914/self-det/>
- Lewis, J. W., & Litai, X. (2003). Social Change and Political Reform in China: Meeting the Challenge of Success. *China Quarterly*, (176), 926-942.
- Lii, W. (2019). *Taiwan Voices Support for Uyghurs in China*. Retrieved on February 29th, 2020, from <https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/taiwan-voices-support-for-uyghurs-in-china/>
- Loring, B. (2014). Colonizers with Party Cards: Societ Internal Colonialism in Central Asia, 1917-39. *Kritika: Explorations in Russia and Eurasian History*, 15(1), 77-102.
- MacPherson, S., Bentz, A.-S., & Ghos, D. B. (2008). *Global Nomads: The Emergence of the Tibetan Diaspora*. Migration Policy Institute. Retrieved on January 28th, 2020, from <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/global-nomads-emergence-tibetan-diaspora-part-i>
- Macqueen, N. (2007). *Colonialism*. London: Routledge.
- Maurer-Fazio, M., & Hasmath, R. (2015). The contemporary ethnic minority in China: an introduction. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 56(1), 1-7.
- Middle East Monitor. (2020). *Not all Uyghurs are Terrorists, Turkey tells China*. Retrieved on April 12th, 2020, from <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200218-not-all-uyghurs-are-terrorists-turkey-tells-china/>
- Millward, J. (2004). *Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment*. Policy Studies 6. Washington DC: East West Center Washington.
- Moghadam, V. M. (2012). *Globalization and Social Movements: Islamism, Feminism, and the Global Justice Movement*. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Mukherjee, K. (2015). Comparing China and India's Disputed Borderland Regions: Xinjiang, Tibet, Kashmir, and the Indian Northeast. *East Asia*, 32(2), 172-205.
- Nandy, A. (1983). *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism*. Calcutta: Oxford University Press.

- Navarro, P. (2008). *The "Hanification" of Xinjiang*. UHRP. Retrieved on December 28th, 2019, from <https://uhrp.org/featured-articles/hanification-xinjiang>
- Noakes, S. (2012). Transnational Advocacy Networks and Moral Commitment: The Free Tibet Campaign Meets the Chinese State. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 67(2), 507-525.
- Pereira, J. C. (2001). La Guerra Fría. In J. C. Pereira (Ed.), *Historia de las relaciones internacionales contemporáneas*. Barcelona: Ariel Ciencias Políticas, Editorial Planeta
- Pew Research Center. (2006). *The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View Each Other*. Retrieved on April 9th, 2020, from <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2006/06/22/the-great-divide-how-westerners-and-muslims-view-each-other/>
- Pew Research Center. (2017). *Americans Express Increasingly Warm Feelings Toward Religious Groups*. Retrieved on April 8th, 2020, from <https://www.pewforum.org/2017/02/15/americans-express-increasingly-warm-feelings-toward-religious-groups/>
- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427-460.
- Putz, C. (2018). *Carefully, Kazakhstan Confronts China About Kazakhs in Xinjiang Re-Education Camps*. The Diplomat. Retrieved on December 28th, 2019, from <https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/carefully-kazakhstan-confronts-china-about-kazakhs-in-xinjiang-re-education-camps/>
- Rahman, A. (2005). *Sinicization Beyond the Great Wall: China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region*. Leicester, United Kingdom: Troubador Publishing.
- Rapoport, D. C. (2013). The four waves of modern terror: International dimensions and consequences. In J. M. Hanhimäki & B. Blumenau (Eds.), *An International History of Terrorism: Western and Non-Western Experiences*. London: Routledge.
- Roche, G. (2019). Articulating language oppression: colonialism, coloniality and the erasure of Tibet's minority languages. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 1-28.
- Rodríguez-Santiago, E. (2016). The Evolution of Self-Determination of Peoples in International Law. In F. R. Tesón (Ed.), *The Theory of Self-Determination*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Römer, S. (2008). *The Tibetan Government-in-Exile: Politics at Large*. New York: Routledge.
- Sánchez, Á. (2019). *El académico uigur Ilham Tohti, preso en China, premio Sájarov 2019*. El País. Retrieved on April 10th, 2020, from [https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/10/24/actualidad/1571901575\\_788696.html](https://elpais.com/internacional/2019/10/24/actualidad/1571901575_788696.html)
- Sautman, B. (2002). Ethnic Law and Minority Rights in China: Progress and Constraints. *Law & Policy*, 21(3), 283-314.
- Sautman, B. (2008). *Protests in Tibet and Separatism*. College of Social and Behavioral Science, University of Utah. Retrieved on February 10th, 2020, from <http://content.csbs.utah.edu/~mli/Economics%205420-6420/Sautman-Protests%20in%20Tibet%20and%20Separatism.pdf>
- Security Council Report. (2020). *UN Security Council Working Methods: The Veto*. Retrieved on April 13th, 2020, from [securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php](https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/the-veto.php)
- Shichor, Y. (2009a). *Ethno-Diplomacy: The Uyghur Hitch in Sino-Turkish Relations*. Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center.
- Shichor, Y. (2009b). *The Uyghurs and China: lost and found nation*. Retrieved on April 12th, 2020, from <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/the-uyghurs-and-china-lost-and-found-nation/>

- Smith, A. D. (1979). Towards a Theory of Ethnic Separatism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2(1), 21-37.
- Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity*. London: Penguin Books.
- Smith Finley, J. (2019). Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror? *Central Asian Survey*, 38(1), 1-26.
- Smith, W. W. (1996). *Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.
- Smith, W. W. (2010). *Tibet's Last Stand? The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China's Response*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Sperling, E. (2004). *The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics*. Policy Studies 7. Washington DC: East West Center Washington.
- Stalin, J. V. (1914). *Marxism and the National Question*. Retrieved on December 28th, 2019, from <https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03a.htm>
- Taras, R., & Ganguly, R. (2002). *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension*. New York: Priscilla McGeehan.
- Tarrow, S. (1994). *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, S. (2005). *The New Transnational Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Teufel Dreyer, J. (2010). China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism. *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, 32(2), 69-86.
- The Economist. (2008). *Fire on the Roof of the World*. Retrieved on February 18th, 2020, from <https://www.economist.com/asia/2008/03/14/fire-on-the-roof-of-the-world>
- Thiong'o, N. w. (1986). *Decolonising the Mind: the Politics of Language in African Literature*. Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann Educational.
- Tieh-Tseng, L. (1956). *The Historical Status of Tibet*. Austin, Texas: King's Crown.
- Tiezzi, S. (2019). *Why Is Turkey Breaking Its Silence on China's Uyghurs?* The Diplomat. Retrieved on April 12th, 2020, from <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/why-is-turkey-breaking-its-silence-on-chinas-uyghurs/>
- Tilly, C. (1978). *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: Newberry Award Records.
- Toops, S. (2016). Reflections on China's Belt and Road Initiative. *Area Development and Policy*, 1(3), 352-360.
- Torigian, J. (2019). *Elite politics and foreign policy in China from Mao to Xi*. Retrieved on February 28th, 2020, from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/elite-politics-and-foreign-policy-in-china-from-mao-to-xi/>
- Tuttle, G., & Schaeffer, K. R. (2013). *The Tibetan History Reader*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- UN General Assembly. (14 December 1960). *General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*. Retrieved on January 20th, 2020, from <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/Independence.aspx>
- UNCHR. (2018). *Universal Periodic Review - China*. Retrieved on April 13th, 2020, from <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/CNindex.aspx>
- UNPO. (2019). *Tibet: Satellites Show New Internment Camps in Tibet*. Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization. Retrieved on February 16th, 2020, from <https://unpo.org/article/21403>
- UNPO. (2020). *Members*. Retrieved on May 4th, 2020, from <https://unpo.org/members.php>
- US Library of Congress. (2019). *Uyghurs in China*, Congressional Research Service. Retrieved on February 20th, 2020, from <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10281.pdf>
- Uyghur American Association. (2019). About UAA. Retrieved on February 18th, 2020, from [https://uyghuramerican.org/about\\_uaa](https://uyghuramerican.org/about_uaa)

- Vásquez, M. A., & Marquardt, M. F. (2003). *Globalizing the Sacred: Religion across the Americas*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.
- Viljoen, F. (2009). International Human Rights Law: a short history. UN Chronicle. Retrieved on April 9th, 2020, from <https://unchronicle.un.org/article/international-human-rights-law-short-history>
- Waltz, K. N. (1959). *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wallensteen, P. (2002). *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Wallensteen, P. (2014). Global Patterns of Conflict and the Role of Third Parties. *Notredam Law Review*, 67(5), 1409-1423.
- Wang, J. C. F. (2018). *The Cultural Revolution in China*. Beijing: Routledge.
- Wang, L. (2015). The Identification of Minorities in China. *Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal*, 16(2), 1-21.
- Weber, M. (Ed.). (1946). *Politics as a Vocation*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Wong, Y.-C. (2005). *From Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin: Two Decades of Political Reform in the People's Republic of China*. Maryland, USA: University Press of America.
- World Uyghur Congress. (2019). *Two Australian Politicians Banned from China over Criticism of the CCP*. Retrieved on February 29th, 2020, from <https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/two-australian-politicians-banned-from-china-over-criticism-of-the-ccp/>
- World Uyghur Congress. (2020). *Dolkun Isa*. Retrieved on February 29th, 2020, from <https://www.uyghurcongress.org/en/staff/dolkun-isa/>
- Wu, X. (2014). From Assimilation to Autonomy: Realizing Ethnic Minority Rights in China's National Autonomous Regions. *Chinese Journal of International Law*, 13(1), 55-90.
- Yackley, A. J., & Shepherd, C. (2019). *Turkey's Uighurs Fear for Future after China Deportation*. Financial Times. Retrieved on February 26th, 2020, from <https://www.ft.com/content/caee8cac-c3f4-11e9-a8e9-296ca66511c9>
- Yardley, J., & Wong, E. (2011). Dalai Lama Gives Up Political Role. *The New York Times*. Retrieved on May 4th, 2020, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/11/world/asia/11tibet.html>
- Zenz, A. (2018). 'Thoroughly reforming them towards a healthy heart attitude': China's political re-education campaign in Xinjiang. *Central Asian Survey*, 1-27.
- Zenz, A. (2019). *Xinjiang's New Slavery*. Foreign Policy. Retrieved on February 16th, 2020, from <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/11/cotton-china-uighur-labor-xinjiang-new-slavery/>
- Zenz, A., & Leibold, J. (2017). Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing's Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang. *China Brief*, 17(12).