



Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
Degree in International Relations

Final dissertation

**Sino-African Relations in the Horn of
Africa from 2000 to 2020**

Escaping the Dichotomy of Good or Bad

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Madrid, June, 2020

*“Throughout history, it has been the **inaction** of those who could have acted, the **indifference** of those who should have known better; the **silence** of the voice of justice when it mattered most; **that has made it possible for evil triumph.**”*

Haile Selassie

*“The most potent **weapon** in the hands of the oppressor is **the mind of the oppressed.**”*

Bantu Stephen Biko

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List of Acronyms

AU	African Union
CNPC	China Nacional Petrol Company
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
COVID	'CO' stands for corona, 'VI' for virus, and 'D' for disease.
EBSCO	Elton B. Stephens Co.
EIC	Ethiopian Investment Commission
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IR	International Relations
NIPA	National Investment Promotion Agency (Djibouti)
OEC	Observatory of Economic Complexity
PRC	People's Republic of China
PEs	Private Enterprises
PHEIC	Public Health Emergency of International Concern
ROC	Republic of China (Taiwan)
RP	Peripheral Realism
SOAS	School of Oriental and African Studies
SSIA	South Sudan Investment Authority
UIA	Uganda Investment Authority
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States of America
WHO	World Health Organization

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1. Introduction

China's presence in Africa has grown for the past two decades. There has been a shift in the support of African States from the United States to China at the United Nations (UN) level. This shift, along with the increasing presence of China in Africa, has led to very critical views of China's actions. This TFG will be offering an overview on the vast topic of Sino-African relations. Navigating into the critique of Chinese action and finally reviewing the conditionality behind China's growing presence. The aim is to escape the dichotomy of good or bad in the critique to China's actions and offer the reader a neutral perspective framed within Peripheral Realism (RP). This research study will resemble a map rather than a detailed compilation of facts explaining Sino-African relations thoroughly. Despite this fact, this TFG has a clear use and objective: guiding the reader through the millstones of China in Africa while offering a modest critique to Western perspective through the lenses of Peripheral Realism.

On the one hand, China is the strongest economic power in the world (Brooks, 2019), exceeding the United States. Industrialization in China has granted the country the opportunity and the necessity to expand its range of action abroad. China is not growing at the fast rate it used to. Now it needs of cheaper labor markets to expand its supply chain. Africa, among other continents, have been China's target for this process. China does not have a colonial past and it is considered a Southern actor. This has granted its strategy in Africa the horizontal approach Africans prefer.

On the other hand, Africa has been tight to its colonial past for economic partnerships. Conditioned to Western directives, international system, and vertical partnerships. The presence of China offers Africa the opportunity to choose between its traditional ex-colonizer partner and a new partner (Aime, Annex 1). China has sponsored the construction of the AU (African Union) headquarters; this provides African States the opportunity to unite and stand stronger towards its new partner. In addition, Chinese investments without the human rights and democratic conditionality of the Western States grants African States a new opportunity of growth on their own terms.

Nevertheless, Sino-African relations are complex and happen at three distinct levels that we will revise further on. China has detached itself from the Western type of conditionality and offers a new type of conditionality based on its own interests in the

region. Western perspective on China's conditionality has been a negative one (Condon, 2015).

Western literature demonizes China's action in Africa. This TFG aims to leave behind cultural generalizations and narrow down the facts of the economic influence of China in Africa. We will be using examples of the Horn of Africa. In order to do so, and wary of the lack of space, the essay will argue as follows: first we will express the motivations and reasons for the author to have chosen this research topic on China in Africa. Second we will revise the literature on the topic to position the reader on the current situation of China in Africa in the past 20 years, in this section we will touch on the main topics for our discussion later; third we will be explaining Peripheral Realism (RP) as our theoretical framework; fourth, the goals and objectives of this analysis will be stated; fifth we will proceed to the analysis of the Sino-African relations structure, revisiting the Western perspective of China in Africa and revising the conditionalities behind the Sino-African partnership; finally we will expose the conclusions of our research, the limitations and the future research avenues.

2. Motivations and reasons for research

The author has great admiration for the African continent's potential. In the past two years she has travelled to Uganda and Ethiopia in cooperation research programs. In these trips *the author has witnessed the presence of China in both countries*. The most noticeable aspect was the Chinese infrastructure with Chinese characters everywhere. This encouraged her interest to investigate how had this presence affected African countries in the IGAD region¹, what the literature said and if Chinese action was as negative as the Western² news portrait it.

What brought the author to do research on this topic was a mix of curiosity and need for truth. Nowadays, we are falling in a phase of over-information and contrasting sources becomes a necessity before having an opinion on anything. In this case, the action of China in Africa. The author owns a theoretical experience on Africa and Asia thanks to 5 years of IR (International Relations) studies. She did her study abroad year at SOAS,

¹ The IGAD region (Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and the Horn of Africa will be used a synonym concepts to refer to: Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda.

² Although generalizations are misleading, they can also be useful when there are space limitations. We will be speaking of the West, Western perspective, and Western actors. When doing so, we are referring to mainly Europe and the United States literature and actions.

School of Oriental and African Studies, in London. This experience, although did not make of her and expert in the field, have granted her the necessary tools of analysis and reliable sources for this research. In addition, the author has grown *eagerly passionate* about the topic in question.

The first question that encouraged this research was *if China was as “bad” or dangerous for Africa as the Western literature portrait it*. Aiming to explore this dichotomy of either good or bad, the author decided to focus on the investments, projects and relations that existed between China and Africa. The examples will be taken from the countries conforming the IGAD to better understand how the Sino-African relations work in that region and how they are affecting African countries. Since the beginning, the author had a clear interest in understanding and revising recurrent topics such as the debt trap and non-conditionality.

When thinking about Africa, one cannot imagine one, but many. Africa is a continent with 55 countries³, thousands of languages and different characteristics depending where you look at it. One of the motivations of this research was *to leave behind that generalization* explaining, nevertheless, the benefits or reasons that exist behind this generalization.

In the case of *China, the author questioned its unilateral activity*, meaning if China was as coordinated as every piece of literature seems to frame it. There are many Chinese actors, both private and public, collaborating in the African soil. Are they all coordinated towards a common Chinese policy goal? Or can we find any divergency in the Chinese action?

After a first research of talking to experts and reading some literature; this research study became more important than a simple academic requirement for graduation. *Sino - African relations have changed the post-colonial world order*. African countries grow because they have a wide range of improvement, however, they need investment. China is willing to extend the check if certain conditions are met, however, so does the West. In the past decades African countries could only trade with their ex-colonies. These

³ The AU has 55 members, recognizing the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic of Western Sahara as an independent actor with a vote. However, the UN does not recognize this State. According to the UN there are 54 countries in Africa. In this TFG we have chosen to follow AU standards and state that Africa has 55 countries. For more information: <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/african-union-au/#:~:text=Membership,%2C%20Guinea%2C%20Guinea%2DBissau.> & <https://www.britannica.com/place/Sahrawi-Arab-Democratic-Republic>

relations were mostly vertical. Even though they have been evolving into more horizontal ones. China presents itself as the alternative to the ex-colony, in terms of trading partner. It gives African countries a power they lacked in the past. The power of choosing. Nowadays, African countries have options, they can ask for better offers arguing that if they do not then they will choose a different partner.

In most literature we see *non-conditionality as the main difference between Western and Chinese investment*. Nonetheless, being very critical about this statement, the author wanted to know if there were really no conditions or if they were simply different ones. We will return to this question in our analysis.

China has developed a debt trap loan system that has not benefited African countries in the IGAD region such as Djibouti or Kenya (Were, 2018, p. 5). China is said to be offering loans that entail a debt trap. They offer an investment known to be unpayable for the country in question. The condition if they cannot pay back is the control of that infrastructure by the Chinese Government. This practice has led to many critics of Chinese action across Africa, and other parts of the globe. Could we argue that Africa is better off with leased infrastructure than with no infrastructure? How will Chinese control affect African countries? E

To understand how Sino-African relations work, and what is the process. What is the function of the function of the African Union (AU)? Do all trade agreements take place at a bilateral level? What freedoms do private companies have when reaching agreements themselves? What role does the FOCAC (Forum on China-Africa Cooperation) play? Why do some Chinese banks agree to invest, and some do not? Could this last statement be considered a breach in the unitary action of China in Africa?

The reason behind each of these motivations is a better understanding of the Sino-African relations and its effects on the IGAD region. We do not aim to answer every question exposed here. Some will be answered, and some will serve to encourage future research. We believe that although there is a considerable amount of literature, there is a need for a less Western-biased approach on this topic. In addition, touching on the topics worth mentioning will give a clearer idea of the effects Chinese investment has in Africa. We do not wish to enter into the dichotomy of good or bad, therefore we will leave it to the reader to decide whether China's action has had a good influence in the past 20 years for the IGAD region.

3. State of the Art

In this section we will review the where the literature and the professors we interviewed stand on the topic of Sino-African relations. The professors interviewed are: Dr. Elsa Aime, Professor at Universidad Pontificia Comillas and at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. She is an expert in Ethiopia (see Annex I); Dr. Iván Navarro, expert in Uganda, is a Researcher, Specialist in International Relations & African Studies and Community Development (see Annex II) and Iraxis Bello, Professor at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, expert in China in Africa Studies. We interviewed her in relation to her essay on China in African in the XX century. (see Annex III). The interviews have been summarized in the three Annexes mentioned. Regarding the literature⁴, we will revise where it stands in terms of the Sino-African relations; China in Africa; the Western perspective and “non- conditionality”. This overview along with section 4 on Methodology will help us structure and build the foundations for the analysis.

3.1. Sino-African Relations

Sino-African relations date back to late 18th century, although the first diplomatic relations took place between Egypt and China in 1956 (China Policy in Focus, 2020). In the case of the Horn of Africa, the first official bilateral relations were established between Sudan and China in the 1960's. China's diplomatic isolation is what led it to engage into relations with Africa in the 1950's. This was the start of the construction of infrastructure by Chinese in Africa (Zhao, 2014, p. 1041). Therefore, the Chinese presence in African started due to an international blockage to China. The latter had to search for new partners in Africa. Since then, Chinese investments trading agreements have strengthened the Sino-African relations.

Since the early 2000's China has surpassed the United States in terms of trading relations with Africa. “China is currently Africa's largest trading partner and trade relations between the two have risen rapidly in the last decade. Trade between China and Africa has increased from \$2 billion in 1999 to \$160 billion in 2012 (Cisse, 2012). China has been strongly investing in Africa. “\$299 billion from 2005 to 2018” (Brooks, 2019). The United States is no longer the main sphere of influence in the region, China is. As we

⁴ The author has not had access to all the literature on the topic. Therefore, the State of the Art is limited to the free journals available in addition to those provided by Universidad Pontificia Comillas EBSCO (Elton B. Stephens Co.) accessibility. For more literature of non-free access we recommend: <https://www.tandfonline.com/>

will see in the analysis, China is transitioning to a political partner in Africa from its trading partner position. The effects lay behind “non-conditionality” and are reflected in decisions taken at the UN.

“China's imports from the host country also facilitate Chinese companies' investment in Africa” (Zhang, Wei, & Liu, 2013, p. 96). China's government has already opened the path for Chinese Private Enterprises (PEs) to take over. PEs, according to these authors, are more likely to trade in countries in which the Chinese government has invested previously. This facilitates Chinese foreign policy objectives at a lower cost for the Government. Nevertheless, there is a clear presence of corruption along this process, according to Navarro (see Annex II). The quality of foreign infrastructure, not only Chinese, sees itself devaluated due to the corruption in construction contracts.

In this essay, the focus of Chinese investments will be in the IGAD region, taking Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti as key examples of this analysis. In order to find win and loses of the Sino-African relations we will focus on the security and commercial and infrastructure aspects of their relation in the IGAD region. How have these investments taken place? Who benefits? What are the commercial and trade numbers behind? Why is China building infrastructure?

3.2. The Horn of Africa

The aim of this essay is to understand the generalizations of Africa as a block. Therefore, we have chosen a specific region, the Horn of Africa⁵, which is comprised within the IGAD organization⁶. Hence, we acknowledge the usefulness of generalizing Africa as one. The Chinese relation is directed towards the whole continent through the African Union (AU). Nevertheless, we believe it was important to focus our examples on Chinese action on a specific region to avoid falling into false generalizations. Africa is

⁵ We understand the Horn of Africa as the region composed by the following countries: Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. For reasons, other than political, such as space constraints and the IGAD region members we have not included Somaliland. For more information visit: <https://igad.int/about-us>

⁶ Other organizations such as COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) also comprise these and many other countries of South-East Africa, except for Somalia, in a common free zone market. For more information visit: <https://www.uneca.org/oria/pages/comesa-common-market-eastern-and-southern-africa>

For more information on the IGAD role in cooperation and its shortcomings: Weldesellassie, K. I. (2011). *IGAD as an International Organization, Its Institutional Development and Shortcomings*. *Journal of African Law*, 55(1), 1-29. doi:10.1017/S0021855311000015
URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41149838?seq=1>

comprised of 55⁷ countries and most of the decisions regarding the action of China in Africa are made through bilateral agreements.

“China’s trade with Ethiopia currently at 1.3 billion USD annually is expected to rise to US\$3 billion by 2015” (Venkataraman & Gofie, 2015). This statement reflects how the growth in trade has a direct reflection in the countries of the Horn of Africa. In this case Ethiopia has been called China’s China. This refers to the high GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth Ethiopia has and the cheap labor available. These were two characteristics Europe saw in China a few decades ago. Nonetheless, China is not growing as fast anymore, and its middle class has grown increasing wages and making labor expensive. China is suffering the consequences of having become an industrialized country.

“China’s growing presence in Africa are very concerned as to whether the outcome of China’s new Africa adventure will leave the continent in a better or worse position within the world economy” (Lee, 2007, p. 26). This author focuses on Uganda and China relations. She analysis the activities in trade. However, argues that the impact in Africa of Chinese investments also depends on Africa’s efforts to cooperate. Local traders are being undermined, despite this fact, other advantaged such as economic growth and industrialization are common factors in Uganda thanks to the growing relation of China with the continent of Africa.

China is starting to emerge as a maritime and military power. Since its agreement with Djibuti in 2016 it has built its first military base overseas in Djibuti’s coast (Tiezzi, 2016). However, China calls it a logistic facility and denies the accusations coming from the US. They deny emerging as a military power (Headley, 2018).. The interest in that area is having control over the strait, controlling the maritime silk-route, engaging into antipiracy and anti-terrorism missions in the regions and having an eye on all the commerce and movement taking place in the area. Many though argue the Belt-Road initiative is at the basis of China’s positioning in Djibouti (Kuo, 2019).

⁷ When referring to Africa, some authors talk about 54 States, others of 56. We have based our 55 in the AU members to avoid entering political debates of the independence of certain territories such as Somaliland. We neither stand in favor or against, we follow the standards of the AU. For more information: <https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/african-union-au/>

3.3. Western perspective on China's action

Western literature regards China in Africa as Chinese colonialism and it is therefore negative. "China, from a Western point of view, has been seen to be a threat to Africa". (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016, p. 258). In our opinion, Chinese action is not a threat to Africa. The actions carried out by China have had positive and negative consequences in Africa. Many of the negatives are due to a mismanagement coming from both sides. A result from "non-conditionality" loans. "[T]here is no settled opinion on the issue of whether and how the China-Africa partnership impacts economic, political, and development outcomes in Africa." (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016, p. 257). Western perspective is biased by the loss of power in Africa.

The West has the right to feel overwhelmed by China's action in Africa. "The Chinese model, with no colonial past or explicit political agenda, is a legitimate challenger to the Western aid status-quo" (Condon, 2015, p. 5). The Chinese influence has surpassed that of the US. At the UN level and in the quantity of trade balances. China and Africa commerce the triple amount in dollars than the United States (US) and Africa do. In addition, Chinese culture and values are far away from the West's. China is shaping the power balance at the international level; however, no one knows what the direct consequences will be. These three arguments explain the Western perspective, the reasons behind its negativity towards China's action. Nevertheless, the global view must not blurry the small wins for Africa. The appearance of a new trading partner-

In the late years China's growing power has been clear in the economic arena. Now we see cases such as the debt trap taking place all through Africa. Although this is a well-known topic, no one is talking about how China's political and military power is growing too. China presents itself as a developing country and claims to be taking part in South-South cooperation according to Bello (see Annex III). China follows international rules in terms of security issues; however, it seems to be imposing its own standards in the trade agreements with Africa. China has the second strongest economy but has a rigid political system. How will that influence the Horn of Africa? Are we about to experience a new colonization era for the Horn of Africa?

3.4. Non-conditionality vs conditionality

"[O]nly China is consistently willing to import more from African countries with a lower governance standing. By doing so; China fills a gap left open by the other major

world economies” (Grauwe, Houssa, & Piccillo, 2012, p. 15). China has gained that position. It currently out beats the United States as a trading partner. In addition, the conditionality imposed by Western countries has not resulted as positive as expected. “Western aid approaches like conditionality have largely been development failures” (Condon, 2015, p. 5). Chinese non-interference offers a more attractive path towards economic growth. Should the West stop the request of democratic conditions? Europe and the US industrialized under imperfect democracies with breaches to human rights such as slavery, why do they not allow Africa to choose their own path towards development? Maybe human rights will be more easily respected once institutional strength and economic growth has been achieved. Despite Chinese investments being a source to strengthening trading ties, “China’s noninterference in the domestic matters of its partners has been seen as a contributor to human rights violations and bad governance in several African states” (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016, p. 260). No system is perfect. Neither Chinese nor Western. Western actors view China as a threat to Africa. Nevertheless, “Ethiopia’s traditional relationships with the industrialized nations are North to South whereas its relationship with China is South to South” (Tesfaye, 2019). This statement applies to the other African countries.

The non-conditionality presented by Chinese loans and aid has had three main conditions that have laid behind scenes: political, human rights and the debt trap. Political: “These investments paid off as African countries played a decisive role in Beijing’s 1971 entry into the UN.” (Zhao, 2014, p. 1036). China does not foresee a return of all loans. Nevertheless, their lending has grant them political support at the UN level. Human Rights: According to Professor Elsa Aime (see Annex 1), China will not intervene in Ethiopian democratization as long as their trust is not breached. Meaning, if Ethiopia does not judge China’s human rights violations or stops supporting the one China policy. Debt trap: “These loans and investments are typically made in exchange for securing access to natural resources” (Condon, 2015, p. 5). Even if loans are not expected to be returned in the form of money, some are offered with certain conditions that involve the control of natural resources or infrastructure. Therefore, “one has to watch with a critical eye the impact of the Chinese presence in the continent” (Lee, 2007, p. 26). Neither opposing Chinese actions as all being negative nor falling in the believe that China’s lending comes with no conditions. As Mattlin and Nojonen state that “there may also be more indirect forms of conditionality associated with Chinese lending practices.” (2015, p. 701).

China’s partnership has meant a new opportunity for African countries. “China is heading toward the direction which would provide openings for a multipolar dialog” (Asongu & Aminken, 2013). In the past African countries partnerships with stronger economies were vertical. African countries were left alone to the desires of their ex-colonizers wishes. China offers a fresh start, it is a strong economy, non-Western that offers African countries the possibility to enter a horizontal partnership and use the AU as their source of diplomacy to make them stronger. Albeit, “the relationship from an economic standpoint is promising and encouraging but more needs to be done regarding multilateral relations, improvement of institutions, and sustainability of resources management” (Asongu & Aminken, 2013). No relation is perfect and much needs to be done for betterment; however, China offers African countries the opportunity to choose partners. An opportunity they did not have in the past.

Asongu, expert in African governance and Aminken, researcher at the European Union, are not the only author that agree that although the partnership can be positive, Africa has a long way to go to make sure it benefits that continent. “While benefiting in the short run, African governments have the capacity to tailor this relationship and address some socio-economic matters arising that may negatively affect the nexus in the long term” (Asongu & Aminken, 2013, p. 216) Africa has benefited in the short-term, however, it remains to be seen what the effects of China in Africa are, in the long term. The author of this dissertation believes the outcome can be positive for the development of African economies if Africa takes a stand towards betterment of their internal conditions. “While economic growth is important, economic development in Africa will not be realized without internal development plans in place to enhance human development” (Lee, 2007). Therefore, the impact of Chinese actions relies also in Africa.

Table 1: Summary of the State of the Art⁸

Topic	Main authors	Main arguments
Sino-African Relations	China Policy in Focus, 2020; Zhao, 2014; Cisse, 2012; Brooks, 2019; Zhang, Wei, & Liu, 2013; Navarro, I. (Annex II)	Although Sino-African relations date back to the XIX century, in the past 20 years the relations have strengthen shaping the future of Africa. The Sino African relations take place at many levels: multilateral through the AU; bilateral relations; and Chinese PEs with local partners.

⁸ The reader will find the correct citation, of the authors mentioned in Table 1, in the bibliography.

The Horn of Africa	Venkataraman & Gofie, 2015; Lee, 2007; Tiezzi, 2016); Headley, 2018; Kuo, 2019	Generalizations of Africa are useful to explain the overall action taken by China in the region. This generalization reflects the approach China has towards the continent as a whole despite carrying out bilateral relations.
Western perspective on China's action in Africa	Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016; Condon, 2015; Bello (Annex III)	Western literature views Chinese actions in Africa as something negative for the democratic development in the area. In addition, the West is reticent to the changes Sino-African relations might accompany for the international sphere. Nonetheless, Chinese partnership has brought African countries new possibilities and more important, the opportunity to choose.
Non-conditionality	Grauwe, Houssa, & Piccillo, 2012; Condon, 2015; Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016; Tesfaye, 2019; Zhao, 2014; Lee, 2007, Aime, E (Annex I); Mattlin and Nojonen 2015; Asongu & Aminken, 2013.	Chinese partnership is preferred over a Western because is said to come with no conditions. However, although the conditions do not fall in the same area than Western ones, directed towards institutional strengthening and democratization, Chinese loans do have requirements such as: support in the UN and the one China policy, disregard for Human rights violations in China and a payback in the shape of land or infrastructure in case the African country cannot pay back a loan.

Source: Author's own elaboration based on the cited works specified above.

4. Theoretical Framework

This dissertation will have Peripheral realism (hereinafter RP, from its Spanish original *Realismo Periférico*). According to Acharyan and Buzan, theorists of non-western international relations who have focused their study in Asia, “RP has contributed substantially to an important, ongoing debate about non-Western IR theories” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). Our study looks to confront the Western perspective. This perspective argues that Chinese action in Africa is negative. Therefore, we consider RP as a suitable theory to explain the Sino-African relations and its effects in the IGAD region.

First and foremost, it is important to clarify that the study will be positioned from the perspective of Chinese foreign policy and its effects on African countries in the IGAD region. Although the State will be our unit of analysis, the approach used will be Peripheral Realism. Which defends that the State is a group of actors and interests itself

formed by the country, its institutions, its government, its people and its culture among others. This theory is a critic to neorealism that assumes that: ours is a unipolar world; countries which have a strong foreign policy disregard the well-being of their citizens; peripheral States should follow the leadership of their regional power in order to obtain the better outcome for its economy and consequently its people and, finally, that there is no such thing as a unitary approach, because the State is formed by multiple players with multiple interests. We will be using State and country as synonyms based on the RP theory.

4.1. Unipolar world

For the sake of easing our argument we will consider ours, a unipolar world⁹. Although we acknowledge that the US-Sino economic equilibrium is at stake and this could affect peripheral States at any moment. “RP remains a powerful theoretical tool for interpreting the foreign policy of weaker states” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). In our case study we will focus on African States and how they are the periphery of the periphery. Even if South Africa has a stronger role, there remains to be seen a leader player in the African continent. Therefore, China has found space to intervene and place itself as a reference for investment in Africa. China has become a substitute of the US in terms of influence in Africa. In the analysis we will see how the political support has shifted in African from the US to China.

“It seems fairly accepted [...] that citizen well-being requires sustainable economic growth and wealth redistribution, together with the protection of current levels of democracy and of each country's sovereignty” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). Whereas in African countries the priority is democracy or not depends on the country and in some it remains to be discovered. Most African States are under partially totalitarian regimes. The well-being of their citizens is partly important, they are more interested in the economic growth and on wealth redistribution at a global level not at a national level. In addition, the foreign policy of African States is fairly new although it has historically

⁹ US power is declining at it remains to be seen if the world will remain unipolar with a power shifting from Washinton to Beijing (Tammen & Kugler, 2006). Another possibility is the variation of power distribution, blurring the lines of power and entering a multipolar or bipolar setting rather by sector that by nations (Schweller & Pu, 2011). The author of this dissertation believes the latter will be a more probable scenario for the future of the international arena. As we are already experiencing the influence of Asia, and Europe remains an important player.

searched for the best investment and aid opportunities. With China as a new partner and donor, African foreign policy has had its opportunities broaden.

4.2. Chinese foreign policy

According to Escudé, “Total foreign policy autonomy = Absolute domestic tyranny” (Escudé, 2008) We could certainly apply this statement to the case of China. Will we be seeing a change in its political leadership once the economy shrinks? That would be a question for another research study. Chinese Government is free in its decision making regarding foreign policy, this grants its political leaders’ absolute power. “[N]o matter how alluring a nationalistic discourse may be, the fact remains that in a country with limited resources, a grand foreign policy will always be at the expense of its citizens (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016)”. Despite China having natural resources these are limited. Therefore, this statement applies to China, where the population does not have a voice in the decisions taken by the Government. The disregard of human rights in China could be a topic for another research study.

“[T]he national interest can often be defined in terms of economic development and citizen welfare, in contexts where a greater power provides for security and state survival” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016) This relates to China’s reality nowadays. For the first time in decades, China is not growing. This could mean the beginning to a slow decline of Chinese economic leadership. This explains why China’s survival is so dependent on economic development and not so much on security. This survival goes hand in hand with the actions carried by China in the Horn of Africa. China needs land, cheap workforce and invest in countries that are growing to secure revenues.

In addition, “elite-centered or statesman-centered regimes could lead to foreign policies that are at odds with economic development and the well-being of the citizenry” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). In the case of China, economic development is at the top of its priorities. It is in the interest of the communist regime for the economic aspect, moreover, a favorable economic growth, enables the regime to stay in place and avoid public opinion against it. Therefore, it can be argued that China does leave a side the well-being of citizens, at least, at an individual level.

4.3. How does Africa face Chinese foreign policy?

“[T]he normative conclusion of RP is that weaker states under the ascendancy of a hegemonic power should not attempt costly levels of autonomy at the expense of their

citizens” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). Escudé concludes that the best strategy would be bandwagoning. This means following the leadership of the regional power. In its research Escudé focuses on Latin America where the US plays the role of leadership. We are transposing this non-Western theory into Africa. We argue that Africa is “winning” by following Chinese leadership. This approach enables to “preserve citizen well-being and economic growth, rather than gaining foreign policy autonomy at the cost of hampering economic and political development” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). Africa’s priority is economic and political development.

According to Tickner, “Escude's peripheral realism includes the following premises: (1) the concept of national interest should be defined in terms of economic development centered around the well-being of the citizenry; (2) peripheral countries should eliminate political confrontations with core powers in those cases in which the latter's policies do not directly affect the material interest of the country in question; (3) peripheral countries should avoid unproductive confrontations with great powers, even when those confrontations do not generate immediate costs; (4) peripheral countries should avoid 'idealist' but costly foreign policy approaches; and (5) peripheral countries should examine the advantages of bandwagoning with the dominant power or a coalition of great powers.” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016)

The previous five statements help understand how RP applies to Africa and China. Even if citizenry well-being is not at the center of every country involved in this relation. China is favored by the support of its citizens and some African countries such as Ethiopia do work towards a betterment in the livelihood of its citizens. In addition, confrontations on the side of African countries would only cause them more damage than good and should focus on a soft foreign policy until they have attained the desired level of economic development. Finally, African countries are benefited from following the international rules imposed by either the West or China because they currently lack the strength to oppose them. Confronting them would only result in the detriment of their own States.

4.4. Peripheral Realism

Having chosen Peripheral Realism as our theoretical framework could seem rare for some of our readers, as it is a theory that has historically been applied for Latin American countries. Nonetheless, according to Santoro, Devés Valdés, Sanhi, Xu and Sun: “in recent times, RP has regained much attention in Latin America and beyond, in countries like India and China whose intellectual elites are exploring the possibility of

building peripheral theories more focused on how to solve the foreign policy dilemmas that their countries confront” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). We profoundly agree with this statement and we are going to apply this approach to our research.

“during the past three decades Peripheral Realism has probably been the most influential IR theory developed in Latin America; one that intends to contribute to a more general realist theory of international relations and has still much to say about the current implications of world politics for peripheral states.” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016)

We can draw a parallelism from Latin America to Africa in relation to that lack of autonomy from the global North. “RP did exactly this, reaching the conclusion that weaker states, such as Argentina, could not seek high degrees of autonomy *vis-à-vis* the superpower hegemonic in their region without damaging the well-being of their citizenries” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). African has been historically dependent of the West, and today from China. Not only of countries but additionally from a Western designed international system. African countries cannot foresee to attain autonomy without damaging themselves, they remain dependent of global north investors and donors.

What is exactly RP? How is it different to realism? We wanted to use a non-Western realist theory to understand Chinese foreign policy towards Africa. RP will help us understand why African countries have been both blessed and cursed by Chinese actions. We believed neorealism would fall short as economic reasons and hard power are not the main premises of Chinese foreign policy. China is looking to transfer its economic partner role to a more political one in Africa. Therefore, we have chosen RP as our lenses of analysis.

RP is a theory that derives from a critic to neorealism. The aim of this theory is to offer peripheral States a realist theory that adapts to their situation in the unipolar world. RP has three critics to neorealism, by doing so it entails some aspects of the constructivist theory. “a) the concept of the state as unit of analysis, b) the preeminence of security in the definition of the national interest and c) the concept of anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). Except these three points RP follows the premises of the Neorealist theory.

a) RP does not agree with the confusing use of State-Country-Nation-Government in other realist theories. RP considers that both institutions and society are contained within the “country” which is the unit of analysis. These elements vary from one country to another and define each country for what it is. RP does not comply with generalizations as every country is different.

b) “[N]ational interest could be defined in terms of economic development rather than security or 'survival’” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). This statement applies to African countries, especially in the IGAD region. Although there are some tensions in different regions such as Somalia and South Sudan, the priority of these States is to achieve economic growth and political control. That is a bigger priority than security in terms of hard diplomacy.

c) “[T]he international system cannot be defined as anarchic because of the great power differentials among states.” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). This is an important difference with the realist theory. Even though we cannot see a strong supranational power, the international rules are set by the powerful countries, by the US and the Western principles and understandings. China as a “regional” power in Africa has had to comply with many of the international rules although it is starting to shape them towards its own understanding and interests. This latter statement could be good for future research but will not be part of this dissertation due to lack of space.

Finally, “[RP offers] a new explanation for the behavior and fate of peripheral states” (Schenoni & Escudé, 2016). RP sees peripheral countries as actors whose priority is economic growth and citizen well-being. This statement leaves them with little scope of action


4.5. China as a unitary actor

Does China’s action align with China’s interests? Do all Chinese actors in the Horn of Africa respond to the plan of action directed by Chinese foreign policy? These are the two questions that direct our research regarding China as a unitary or non-unitary actor.

When analyzing these questions from RP, the concept of unitary does not apply because we assume that the State is not a single actor but many. Each State has a wide variety of interests and its unitary action would have a very wide range of fluctuation to comply with the definition of unitary. In our opinion, China is both unitary and non-unitary, it all depends on the lenses of analysis we are willing to use.

The reality in China is that the Government is not the one investing billions anymore. Private companies are following the work that their Government started. Chinese Government, the export-import Chinese bank and the public-owned companies have created the basis in the IGAD region for Chinese actors to pursue business opportunities. Now that the path has been opened, there is no need for Government support. Private companies pursue their own interests within the interests of China. As we will discuss in the analysis, the purpose of China in the IGAD region is more political support and access to cheap labor rather than sole economic benefit.


Figure 1: Summary of the Theoretical Framework: Peripheral Realism theory



Source: author's own elaboration based on Escudé's work¹⁰

¹⁰ This Figure corresponds to a summary of the Theoretical Framework. The latter is based on the theory proposed by Escudé. For more information look in the bibliography.

Figure 2: Peripheral realism theory applied to China in Africa

Peripheral Realism applied to China in Africa	
<h3 style="color: #000080;">3</h3> <h2 style="color: #000080; text-decoration: underline;">Assumptions</h2>	
<p>1. The international sphere is not anarchical.</p>	
<p>Powerful Western countries impose their will over smaller countries.</p>	
<p>2. China is the regional power in Africa¹¹</p>	
<p>China has the biggest numbers in trade with the continent, even over the United States</p>	
<p>3. African States are following their interests according to RP</p>	
<p>In order for Africa to defend its citizens interest and grow economically, there best choice is to bandwagon with the international order and their regional power.</p>	

Source: author's own elaboration based in Escudé's work (Escudé, 2008).

¹¹ There is an ongoing debate on whether China is Africa's new regional power. However, for the sake of the argument we have given this statement for granted. For more information see: https://www.cfr.org/content/thinktank/ChinaandUS_Africa.pdf

5. Goal, research question and hypotheses

5.1. The goals of this essay are to:

✓ Analyze Sino-African relations on the past 20 years and debate the Western perspective that criticizes Chinese action in Africa.

5.1.1. The specific goals are:

- ❖ To define the structure of Sino-Africa relations.
- ❖ To revisit the Western critique of China in Africa.
- ❖ To debate de “non-conditionality” in Chinese partnership.
- ❖ To find the positive effects of Chinese investments in Africa.

5.2. My research question is:

✓ How are Sino African-Relations structured and how does Chinese action in Africa take place?

5.2.1. And the departure hypothesis is:

❖ China’s action in Africa has had a visible impact in commerce and infrastructure in the past 20 years that has not always been negative as the Western perspective argues.

6. Methodology

This final dissertation will use mixed methods in the analysis. The focus will be on case studies taken from the Horn of Africa and China that will allow us to build the argument provided in the previous section. In order to accomplish this structure, the arguments will be supported with qualitative research on the literature as provided in the State of the Art and on the Theoretical Framework. The latter includes three interviews that have been attached to this final dissertation as annexes. In addition, no quantitative study will be carried out, however, through graphs based on previous studies we will be able to provide numbers to support our arguments. These methods include qualitative, quantitative and case studies research approaches based on the guidelines given by the following book: *Research Methods in International Relations* (Lamont, 2015). The methodology will be divided into three sections to further comprehend these approaches: data collection and analysis, and data visualization.

6.1. Data collection and analysis

As previously mentioned, this study will use a mixed methods research approach. The use of comparative charts of IGAD countries case studies, along with tables of data collection and interviews made to experts in the field. All these will help the study narrow down its interpretative approach¹² to the action of China through different actors. Further on the literature research will allow for a deepening in the question of non-conditionality of Chinese loans. Although I will use objective data and subjective analysis found in the literature¹³. The argument will be framed within RP, offering the reader an “interpretation of reality” (Lamont, 2015) based on the assumptions stated by Escudé in his theory. In summary we will be problematizing our understanding of existing variables, in this case the action of China in Africa.

The qualitative approach will make use of literature findings. We will be focusing on topics such as, Africa’s diversity, the non-conditionality of China’s investment in infrastructure, the debt trap, the Western perspective, and the Sino-African Relations. Thus, accomplishing several empirical conclusions that will help with the interpretative analysis. The qualitative review will be based on a bibliography revision to place the reader on the current thoughts framing the situation of China in Africa. In addition, to literature the author will be revising the UN General Assembly votes registrations. This outreach to primary sources will allow the author to make a personal analysis from the RP perspective, of the results of the votes. We will be revising the votes in support of China’s government over Taiwan’s to be represented in the UN. The document used will be: A/RES/2758(XXVI). To sum up we will be looking at the human rights conditionality on Chinese action in Africa. Revising the support to human rights done in terms of death penalty¹⁴. The document used will be: A/62/PV.76. These primary sources have been indicated in the figures and maps in which they have been utilized.

¹² The interpretative approach or interpretative analysis is defined by C. Lamont (2015) as one of the sides of the empirical-interpretative spectrum. This research paper will be more interpretative within that spectrum as we have taken a social perspective of non-generalization from the beginning. Although we will use objective data to demonstrate facts; these facts will lead to an interpretation of reality based on our own perspective.

¹³ The author has read the following guide for APA citation: Normas APA, Centro de Escritura Javeriano. <https://www.slideshare.net/Docentes...1/normas-apa-sexta-edicin-centro-de-escritura-javeriano-57960955> This will be used as our guideline for APA citation throughout the TFG. In addition, the author has experience as an APA revisor for the IR journal of her University.

¹⁴ The idea is to review how the sphere of influence of the US in Africa is shifting towards China. The Human Rights issues are a significant field in the UN that shows how Africa’s “loyalty” is changing.

Moreover, this study will execute interviews to different professors that are experts in China and Africa studies. Posing five questions to each of them, the answers given will allow this work a more interpretative approach of how China's action takes place in the IGAD region. The details can be seen in the following table:

Table 2: Interviews and interviewees

<i>Interviewee</i>	<i>Prof. Dr. Elsa Aime</i>	<i>Dr. Iván Navarro</i>	<i>Prof. Iraxis Bello</i>
<i>Professional details</i>	Professor at Universidad Pontificia Comillas and at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. She is an expert in Ethiopia and the coordinator of the sub-Saharan African panel in the Fundación Alternativas	Researcher, Specialist in International Relations & African Studies and Community Development.	Professor at Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, expert in China in African Studies.
<i>Date email</i>	December 19, 2019	February 5, 2020	February 9, 2020
<i>Date interview</i>	February 5, 2020	February 21, 2020	February 20, 2020
<i>Interview method</i>	In person Recorded Transcripts	By phone Recorded Transcripts	By email
<i>Interviewer</i>	Carolina Rengifo	Carolina Rengifo	Carolina Rengifo
<i>Annex</i>	Annex I	Annex II	Annex III

Source: Author's own elaboration, based on the process of interviews and the interviewee's professional details.

The quantitative method, through numerical statistics and datasets will help empower the argument and give transparency to the study. The use graphs and tables to compare each case study in the subfields of commerce and loans will allow a more reliable positioning of our thesis. The data will be cited with APA and displayed in tables and graphs. Finally, the broader analysis will look at how the countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced Chinese action in these past two decades.

6.2. Data visualization

The data collected, along with the findings in documents, interviews and literature will be exposed in the shape of tables and graphs for a better understanding of the analysis

and to support our arguments. We will see if the results show how China's action, especially non-conditionality, is conducted in the Horn of Africa. The objectives and realities will be compared with the Chinese actors involved. Thus, concluding with a negative or affirmative response to the initial research question.

Data collection will be done from reliable sources such as the International Monetary Fund¹⁵, World Bank and the OEC (Observatory of Economic Complexity) or the UN. The aim is to give the reader a clearer and quantitative perspective on China-Horn of Africa commercial relations impact in African countries. Viewing the data on trade will enable us to reflect the type of relationship existing between both actors. Moreover, tables, graphs, maps and figures will be used to display a summary of some sections and their qualitative information. For the creation of the tables, graphs, and infographics we will be using MapChart, Excel and Word. Finally, we have used specific excel charts, such as maps and aggregated tables. We believe the visualization of the data and arguments will help the reader acquire a better overview of this TFG.

7. Analysis

In this section we will be broadening the analysis of the Sino-African relations for the past two decades. The arguments will make use of the authors mentioned in the State of the Art, the framing of our arguments will correspond to RP, as mentioned in the Theoretical Framework, finally, the methodology used will be that of case studies although mix methods will also be applied. The aim of this analysis is *to further understand Sino-African relations without falling in a biased Western view. In addition, we will be revising the question of non-conditionality with a specific focus on the Horn of Africa to avoid generalizations of a whole continent.* The argument will be structured as follows: first we will develop on the Sino-African relations since 2000; to later explain the process by which this relation takes place: multilateral through the AU, bilateral and PEs. Second, looking at the latter, we will analyze the partnership between China and the Horn of Africa countries and revise the non-conditionality of Chinese loans. Within this last section we will be looking at the Western perspective, the Western conditionalities and what China's unwritten conditions are. All the analysis will be tailored from RP (see

¹⁵For more information check the following link:
https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD

Figures 1 & 2), drawing a parallelism with our Theoretical Framework section and using the authors mentioned and exposed in the State of the Art (see Table 1).

7.1. Sino-African Relations

Sino-African relations date back to the 18th century, these have grown stronger until today, especially in these past two decades. We must not forget our analysis envisions the US as the unipolar power in the International sphere. China has been part of the periphery until earlier this decade. Since the US imposed a trade embargo on China to make pressure for political change, China looked to Africa in the late 20th century. “China is currently Africa’s largest trading partner and trade relations between the two have risen rapidly in the last decade” (Cisse, 2012). This partnership has grown since 2012 surpassing US-African trading relations in 2020.

We consider it is paramount to mention the lack of information available about this matter. Summed up to the lack of knowledge of the author of the Cantonese, Amharic, Luanda and the other African languages, has made it difficult to access primary sources. Therefore, the analysis will be based on a commentary on the bibliography found and the main arguments. This research work relies on what China and Africa have decided to make public and what experts on the field have decided to publish in either Spanish, French or English. Conscious about the limited scope of research, we ask ourselves and our readers the question of transparency. Is information being published at the will and interest of the States? We believe it is.

The lack of information has also made it difficult to focus solely on the IGAD region. Therefore, the focus will be on Sino-African relations and then we will take a closer look on the Horn of Africa to give examples of the conditionality. Our idea is that in future research other regions in Africa are studied in relation to China’s action. That way a comparative analysis can be carried out among the different African regions and countries providing with a better knowledge of how Chinese action differs in each region. This will help differentiate Africa in what it is, a continent with 55 States and leave behind the comfortable generalization of Africa as one.

China has always stated to be offering a partnership to African states and not a vertical relation. We can see this statement reflected in China’s relation to the African Union. On the one hand, China benefits from what each African state can offer: i.e. land in Ethiopia, ports in Djibouti, natural resources in Uganda, which all help China with its

Belt and Road Initiative (Chinadaily, 2019). At the same time and on the other hand, African countries are united through the African Union to work towards their Agenda 2063. Therefore, there is indeed a partnership, a win-win situation. However, as our interviewee Iván Navarro states a relation can never be fully horizontal, there are always pikes of verticality.

Chinese investment in Africa has been boosting for the past two decades. According to the China Global Investment Tracker, between 2005 and 2019, Djibouti, Ethiopia and Uganda all together received a total of \$34,98B from China in Investment and contracts (AEI, 2020). This increase in investments has been reflected in the strengthening of Sino-African relations in other sectors, such as the political level. Loans received from Chinese banks are more prone to be given to those supporting China at different levels according to Navarro (Annex II).

The unilateral perspective of China cannot be discussed from the theoretical framework of RP, nevertheless, we would like to include the perspectives offered by our interviewees Aime, Navarro and Bello on this topic (see Annexes I, II & III). On the one hand all the interviewees consider the presence of other actors in both Africa and more concretely in the Horn of Africa. However, Bello and Aime state that China is not unitary, although it has opened the path for other actors, Chinese or not, to follow their foreign policy strategy in the continent and for external actions to play in favor of Chinese interests. On the other hand, Navarro believes China is unitary, in the sense that the government does dictate the ruling interest and that the other instructions conforming the country follow the directions of the Government.

7.1.1. Multilateral level

The AU is the symbol of China in Africa, but also of Chinese strategy in the region. The AU building was inaugurated in 2012 in Addis Ababa, after more than a decade. It was a gift from China to the African States. This gesture clearly reflects the intentions of China being in good terms and be willing maintain multilateral relations. China's strategy involves all Africa, it is in its interest to have of the member states in the same room¹⁶.

¹⁶ For those interested in drawing a parallelism between European colonialism and China in Africa: During colonialism in Africa, the British had an indirect strategy. This meant keeping the institutions in place and supporting a minority into power to assure the British were needed. However, one institution they did bring in were trade unions. The British found it easier to deal with workers in the extraction of primary resources if they were organized. However, the trade unions were helped bring independence to African countries, turning against British rule. Could it be argued that helping strengthen African relations will turn against

Sino-African relations at a multilateral level serve to give direction and certain transparency to China's intentions across the continent.

Therefore, the role of the AU is to give African states certain power during negotiations and give direction to the relations with China. Navarro (see Annex II) states how China has positioned itself as a Southern country, at the level of its partners¹⁷, According to Aime (see Annex I) China is a very traditional actor and likes having stability in the region it trades with. That is why it gives especial attention to Ethiopia, as the main source of stability in the Horn of Africa¹⁸.

According to Aime (see Annex I) multilateral relations offer African countries the opportunity to unite to face a strong partner such as China. Thanks to this approach Africa can unite as one to negotiate with China. Making themselves stronger¹⁹. In the past they were left to deal with their ex-colonies alone and even if not intended these relations were paternalistic, positioning the European State above the "poor" and inexperienced African State. What China has allowed African States is to ally into a strong player, the AU, that can initiate talks at a horizontal level. Once the main outline of their partnership is drawn, every nation-state agrees the details at a bilateral level. In addition, China's partnership offers Africa the opportunity to choose. The presence of multiple possible partners gives African countries a certain power over those actors interested in doing business in the territory.

Despite the strength gained through this approach, we must not forget the RP frame in which our argument is embedded. Africa is part of the periphery and therefore the advantage comes from "bandwagoning" (Escudé, 2008) behind its regional power. Meaning that playing according to the rules imposed by the stronger countries will be in

China eventually? According to RP this would be against the general interest of the region because they are better off bandwagoning after their "regional" power, in this case China. But other theories might give a totally different response to this question.

¹⁷ In most diplomatic pictures of Sino-African relations, the African leader's hand appears up front, before the Chinese' hand. This detail is part of the Chinese strategy of positioning Africa at the same level of China. A study of the applied diplomacy and the images in the press to shape this relation could be an interesting topic for future research.

¹⁸ Power relations in the Horn of Africa are varying since these countries acquired their independence from the colonial powers. Ethiopia gives stability, Uganda neutrality and Kenya is leading development. The political positioning of each country within the continent will determine the future dynamics of the AU. For more information on power relations in Africa: <https://media.africaportal.org/documents/AfricanFuturesNo14-V2.pdf>

¹⁹ The EU's strategy towards Africa was not as effective. They wanted to make multilateral talks with individual African States according to Navarro (see Annex ii). African countries singled out felt weak and on the losing side in this type of approach. For more information on the current EU approach for cooperation in Africa: <https://africa-eu-partnership.org/en/stay-informed/news/eu-unveils-new-strategy-africa>

favor of African countries. Trying to oppose it would damage the priority of these countries. Which is, economic development and well-being²⁰.

The FOCAC is another example of multilateral relations between China and the African States. The FOCAC is a roadmap, a set of guidelines on China's action in terms of cooperation in the continent. The FOCAC could be understood as a reflection of the non-alignment movement that appeared in 1955 with the Bandung Conference (Enuka, 2011). This organization further expands the idea of China as another Southern actor and helps frame Sino-African relations at a multilateral level. One of the objectives is solving “[t]he challenge for Africa is to turn raw material exploitation into a foundation for sustainable economic development over the long term” (Enuka, 2011). Being China the main partner.

7.1.2. Bilateral level

For the past two decades there has been an increase of diplomatic visits of Chinese ministers in African countries (Enuka, 2011). These visits are happening at an annual basis. According to Aime (see Annex 1) the thick and thin of the Sino-African relations happen at the bilateral level.


One of the actors involved in these bilateral relations that have found themselves fundamental for Chinese investment, are the Investment authorities in the Horn of Africa. An investment authority is responsible to gather and attract investment into a country. In the following figure we can see the Investment authorities of the 8 countries in the Horn of Africa. Through these countries' agencies help investors know in what to invest and how to do it.

The role of Chinese financial institutions is also fundamental. They give the credits to Chinese companies operating in Africa. Moreover, directly grant the loans and financial packages for African countries. Their deals are partly subsidized by the Chinese Government to encourage investment in Africa. “These entities include the China Development Bank (CDB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) China International Trade and Investment Corporation (CITIC), China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation (CECIC), Sinosure and the China Export- Import Bank” (IDE-

²⁰ As we have mentioned previously, we are speaking of general economic growth. We do not fathom the details and priorities of each country in Africa. We assume the levels of distribution of wealth vary from country to country despite their economic growth. For more information we highly recommend the book *The Theory of Economic Growth* by W. Arthur Lewis.

JETRO, 2011). These financial institutions, subsidized by the Chinese Government have helped open a roadmap for private companies²¹ to invest privately in Africa, following Chinese's interests. We will be looking at this with more detail in the last section of our analysis.

Figure 3: Investment authorities in the Horn of Africa



Source: Author's own elaboration from the investment authorities' websites of each country²²


The Horn of Africa is a fast-growing region. Investments are placed there for obvious reasons. Revenues are granted. China is using the same strategy the West used with China when China was growing at fast rates (see Map 1), during industrialization. Nowadays China is suffering the consequences of being industrialized and needs to do

²¹ There is also a presence of national Chinese companies in Africa. Nevertheless, the investment in the hands of the government has been reduced over the last years. However, the trade has increased between China and Africa. This is due to the growing presence of private companies interested in investing in Africa by their own means.

²² For more information on the investment authorities in the Horn of Africa, find the links to their websites as follows: **NIPA**: <http://www.comesaria.org/site/en/djibouti-national-investment-promotion-agency-nipa.97.html> **Eritrean investment Centre**: <http://www.comesaria.org/site/en/eritrea.21.html> **EIC**: <http://www.investethiopia.gov.et/> **KenInvest**: <http://www.invest.go.ke/> **South West State of Somalia Free Zone Investment Authority**: <https://www.swsomalia.org/> **SSIA**: <https://fortuneofafrica.com/southsudan/south-sudan-investment-authority-ssia-2/> **Ministry of Investment of Sudan**: <https://www.sudanembassy.org/invest-in-sudan/> **UIA**: <https://www.ugandainvest.go.ug/> Both Djibouti and Eritrea have investment authorities which are promoted through the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). Other countries such as South Sudan do have a physical office but do not have a website.

outsourcing. China in Africa has opened a “road” for its private companies and other Chinese actors to seek business in Africa.

Map 1: GDP growth in China and in the Horn of Africa²³




Source: author's own elaboration (IMF, 2019)

7.1.3. Private sector level

Western actors, such as the French in the Communications sector in Ethiopia are also profoundly involved with China in Africa. Spanish and the Norwegian are present in infrastructure building according to Aime (see Annex I). According to Navarro, Dragados, a Spanish construction company, has also signed important contracts in Uganda (see Annex II). Different companies both Chinese and Western compete for the best trade agreements.

²³ Commentary on indicators to measure development: Nowadays we encounter a profound debate on what indicator measures development most efficiently. GDP is rooted in the economy. We are conscious that a higher production does not always mean a richer society (Lewis, 1958, p. 9). Distribution of wealth remains paramount. Nevertheless, and being aware about the existence of other indicators (HDI, Gini, etc.) we have chosen GDP growth. The latter is based on the economy, on revenues, and so is the China-Africa partnership. China needs to expand its growth to culminate its industrialization process; and to maintain Chinese society content with the communist party. Africa needs the investments to start industrializing. China is not interested in intervening in the internal affairs of African countries as long as these do not stand against China in Human Rights issues and do support Chinese policies at the UN.

Graph 1: Investment and contracts from China to Uganda, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.



Source: Author's own elaboration from OEC data²⁴

In Graph 1 we can see the sectors to which China exports most in Uganda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti. This is related to the actions China prioritizes in each country. China is not only interested in the oil from Sudan. It has also tried to search for oil in Eastern Ethiopia and in Uganda. We can see Chinese investment in Uganda's oil through Tullow Oil and Kingfisher is at the top of investment expenditure for China in the past 10 years (Ojambo, 2018). China has opened the road for businesses in the different sectors in the Horn of Africa.

At a social level we wanted to take a kick look at the work force and the migration flows. In most cases Chinese bring their own work force. Especially for higher posts. This is the case in Uganda's road building according to Navarro (see Annex II). The lack of involvement of local population damages Africa's economy. According to Mung there is a bigger number of Chinese workers in projects in Africa than Africans (2008). Especially, when providers are brought from abroad instead of contracting local businesses. "Over 10,000 Chinese companies operating in Africa [...] rely tremendously on Chinese migrant labor in their infrastructure and public construction jobs" (Okeke, 2019). This impact migration flows²⁵. There are more Chinese in Africa than Africans in China. If we were

²⁴ For more information: <https://oec.world/en/profile/country/eth/>

²⁵ According to Mung (Mung, 2008).

to take a closer look at the migration flows between China and Africa we can see the peoples of both actors are linked now for history. “the China” as they are known for in Ethiopia, are now part of their history and legacy²⁶.

7.2. Western Perspective on China in Africa

Western literature has a negative discourse²⁷ on the actions taken by China in Africa. China is seen as a contributor to Africa’s underdevelopment and deindustrialization (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016). China’s investments have, in general terms, increased the presence of infrastructure across Africa. Has this brought Africa a step closer towards industrialization or a step behind? This would be a question for another research study. What can be assured is that the presence of infrastructure will not hurt Africa unless the price on its economy is irreversible. However, China is interested in the sustainability of its partners, not in its destruction.

“[T]here is no settled opinion on the issue of whether and how the China-Africa partnership impacts economic, political, and development outcomes in Africa (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016). Only in the future will we be able to analyze the consequences of Chinese investments. Nevertheless, there are always sides to the story, and while some will be right stating that China has trapped some African countries into debt, it will also be true that some African countries will enter an industrialization process mainly because of Chinese investments in the past. Because as the latter cited author states: “some have seen China as Africa’s partner for development” (2016).

The West has reasons to feel threatened by Chinese presence in the African continent. It has been said that China has more to win than to lose, because of the governance system in place. Whereas Western democracies only count of maximum 8 years per presidency, which translate in short term initiatives, China’s one-party system grants them the power of long-term strategies. This fact inevitably leaves Western

²⁶ The sociological implications of Sino-African relations would be a interesting research study. What are the integration implications of the China-Africa relations?

²⁷ “Negative” or “positive” haven never been reliable indicators. In Political Science, Economics and International Relations, among other social sciences, the need for theories to frame a question and a methodology to measure is necessary. We are conscious, nevertheless, this essay does not have the space to go in depth into a debate of what quantitative indicators would be more reliable to measure development in African under Chinese influence. There are many truths, it simply depends on what is being measured: Well-being? Expenditure capacity? GDP growth? Wealth distribution? China in Africa might have a positive impact in terms of GDP growth but have a negative one in terms to well-being and wealth distribution, due to the lack of political requirements by China. We must wary of absolute statements and remember there are many truths, it all depends on the question being asked and the lenses through which the question is studied from.

countries behind in the international race to control resources in the periphery. The West is losing agency in Africa and China is winning influence.

In addition, going back to RP. Both China and the US have a strong foreign policy, however, as Escudé highlights, a stronger foreign policy is always at the expense of a weaker democracy and less freedoms (2008). For China that does not imply a problem but for democracies as the US, it does. Therefore, China has a winning position for an expansive foreign policy. Although, as we have mentioned in the Theoretical Framework, China does need to maintain a certain level of economic growth to keep its population under control.

In addition, “[w]e tend to overemphasize Chinese control over Africa” (Aime, Annex I). We must not forget that “actors increasing the Chinese presence in Africa are not only Chinese” according to Aime (see Annex I). We can draw a parallelism here with colonialism of the African continent. Many Africans were in favor of the colonialist and helped them through the process. Although this TFG does not aim to compare two very different historical moments. We find it important to mention. China is not China alone.

7.3. Western conditionality vs Chinese “non-conditionality”

Some African States that do not comply with the governance requirements expected by Western investors, prefer China as a partner because they offer a hand’s-off policy in their trade agreements and aid-packages. However, we must not confuse a non-interventionist policy with non-conditionality. China does impose its conditions as any other partner. They simply differ from those of the West. If we look at the “conditionality” from the Western States towards Africa we find a series of measures (conditions) in terms of human rights, democracy, market liberalization, etc. that the African State must comply with in order to have access to certain aid or partnerships²⁸. When looking at China’s “non-conditionality” agreements, we find a lot of conditions. The fact that they are different conditions to the ones asked by European countries does not make them less of a conditionality for the African States.

²⁸ In many cases these conditions are not effective. We can see the case of Uganda and the enforce a multiparty system. It clearly has not brought democracy to its people. The effectiveness of the conditionality in Africa is a whole different question that would need of a research work for itself. For more information: <https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2017/10/03/why-ugandas-politics-are-failing-its-people>

“Literature by Penhelt also raises questions about China’s noninterference policy and concludes that the Chinese do not take into consideration governance issues with recipients when they give them aid. China’s hands-off policy has resulted in it assisting countries with poor governance that are unable to be financially assisted by international monetary institutions.” (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016)

China’s hands-off policy has often been confused with non-conditionality. Nevertheless, this is far from the truth. Although China has different standards than traditional Western actors, it also imposes a series of subtle conditions. “China’s economic relationship with Ethiopia is in line with China’s policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of nations” (Tesfaye, 2019). China will not interfere in its partner’s affairs if its partners do not interfere in theirs. For example, “China’s bilateral lending is entirely devoid of conditionality, by showing that it involves elements of political conditionality” (Mattlin & Nojonen, 2015). We will be taking a closer look to this issue in the following section.


China has given Africa the opportunity to have a different partner than their European ex-colonizers. Giving them the option of choosing. This simple freedom of choosing was far of reach for African States a couple decades ago. Their trading partners had been allocated before the States themselves had reached their independence. The opportunity of choosing also puts pressure on the candidate partners to better their offer and develop their conditions further to the interest of African countries. According to Bello, China bases its relationship with Africa from the South-South cooperation, the respect for the country’s sovereignty and the premise of peaceful coexistence and non-intervention. (see Annex III). This grants China a clear advantage over Western actors in Africa.

7.3.1. Political conditionality

“Ethiopia offers China much in the way of political resources” (Tesfaye, 2019) The author refers to both the African Union and the UN. The AU is located in Addis Ababa, capital city of Ethiopia. As Aime states China is a very traditional actor that seeks stability and Ethiopia offers that stability in the Horn of Africa (see Annex I). On the other hand, Africa has 55 countries with a vote in the AU and the UN, which work as excellent partners for China. There is no written rule that then must support China, however, if they do not, they could be facing consequences later in terms of lack of investment. The main

political question is the “one China policy”. In the UN only one government can represent China. Therefore, the first condition we find it covers the political aspects: the mandatory support of African States with the “one-China policy” and the support of African States in the UN to Chinese proposals.

Figure 4: African countries’ support to China in the UN from 1971 to 2011



Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the UN General Assembly votes registration³³

When China wanted to access the UN there was a good deal of opposition among African States. Many recognized Taiwan over Beijing. Nevertheless, nowadays the picture has changed. Most African States have agreed to support the one China policy and

²⁹ Primary source from which the data was recovered: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/192054?ln=en> & [https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2758\(XXVI\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/2758(XXVI)) Retrieved on April 5, 2020.

³⁰ Since then Taiwan’s representation in the UN has been a question of debate that remains unresolved. Both mainland China and Taiwan claim to have control over the whole territory, the truth is they both act independently.

³¹ For more information on the PRC and ROC dynamics visit: https://books.google.es/books?id=S1PODwAAQBAJ&pg=PT137&lpg=PT137&dq=2019+vote+UN+PRC&source=bl&ots=AAPtDDdLSH&sig=ACfU3U3Ao2LFj7gyeKA-q7R0Pj3h6fcAYQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKewjvpO_fvePpAhWC3OAKHXHJCIQQ6AEwC3oECAoQAQ#v=onepage&q=ROC&f=false

³² China advocates for the One-China-policy since the Nationalistic Party of China fled to Taiwan after the Communist revolution. On Swaziland, Gambia, Burkina Faso and Santo Tome and Principe were the last to break their diplomatic ties with Taiwan in 2018, according to The Diplomat (Panda, 2020)

³³ The data was recovered from the UN General Assembly register. For more information see:

the Belt Road initiative. If we take a closer look to Figure 4. We can see the support to the one-China policy, in the hand of African countries increased from 1971 to 2019. Only Burkina Faso, Gambia and Swaziland supported Taiwan. It would be interesting to explore if these countries receive as much investment. Or if Taiwan is supporting them. This could be an interesting study for future research. According to Bello, Swaziland is the only country in Africa not receiving help from China (Annex III).

“[I]nvestments paid off as African countries played a decisive role in Beijing’s 1971 entry into the UN.” (Zhao, 2014). This author explains how China’s diplomatic isolation led it to engage into relations with Africa in the 1950’s. This was the start of the construction of infrastructure by Chinese in Africa (Zhao, 2014). However, political influence does not seem to go further than UN support. According to Aime, if African countries do not go against China, China will not go against democratization³⁴ processes in the region (see Annex I).

China should not be judged for defending its interests when negotiating with Africa. Western countries advocate for their own principles and standards too. However, Western conditionality is viewed less critically because it goes along the international system built by the West. China has been an economic partner and now seeks to expand its range of action in terms of politics, aid, and security. In addition, Chinese interests in the Horn of Africa, especially in Sudan’s oil, has made it use its veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) according to Bello (see Annex III). China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the biggest oil company in Darfur.

7.3.2. Human Rights conditionality

Not questioning the human rights violations in China or elsewhere benefits African countries. China will not question the freedoms in an African country if the African countries remain silent and comply with Chinese standards in this regard. According to Aime, if Ethiopia does not challenge Chinese interests³⁵ or Government in any manner,


³⁴ How is China influencing democratization in Africa? Are Chinese, non-interventionist loans slowing down the process? Or will a better economy and a growth in Africa’s middle class increase the possibility for democracy in the continent? All these questions could be interesting for future research. For more information: Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat, edited by Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner.

³⁵ Is Ethiopia wary of the range of influence China has over their actions? Could it be believed, that Tedros Adhanom, current President of the World Health Organization (WHO) and former Health Minister of Ethiopia is being very cautious with the wording chosen in its COVID-19 speech towards China in its PHEIC (Public Health Emergency of International Concern) declaration due to his knowledge in China’s capacity and actions? According to Professor Elsa Aime (see Annex I), China will not intervene in Ethiopian democratization if their trust is not breached. Meaning, as long as Ethiopia does not judge China’s

they will not have any problems with the Ethiopian Government transitioning into a democracy (see Annex 1). In the following paragraph we will be looking at a case of Human Rights at the UN level.

“When the United Nations General Assembly met in 2007 to vote on North Korea’s human rights record, only 10 of the 56 African countries voted with the U.S.-led western coalition” (Yang, 2019). In the Map 2, shown below, we have only included the African countries’ votes along with those of China and the United States. The result was 104 in favor and 54 against. Many abstained. We can see that in terms of human rights, not many dared to oppose either or of the powers.

Map 2: Resolution on human rights to temporarily ban the death penalty globally.



Source: Author’s own elaboration based on the UN General Assembly votes registration ³⁶

“China’s noninterference in the domestic matters of its partners has been seen as a contributor to human rights violations and bad governance in several African states” (Mlambo, Kushamba, & Simawu, 2016). However, the Western approach of interference towards democratization does not always have promising results. In Uganda, for example, multiparty system imposed by Western investments did not bring democracy of more participation to Uganda’s governance (Navarro, Annex II).

human rights violations or stops supporting the one China policy. But could a non-national declaration affect China-Ethiopia relations?

³⁶ For more information: <https://undocs.org/en/A/62/PV.76>, Retrieved on April 5, 2020.

Chinese foreign politics has a clear disregard for human rights. This is reflected in the help that it gives to countries in Africa that do not respect the human rights of its population. (Bello, Annex III). Sudan is an example The Government of Sudan receives financial aid and diplomatic support when it oppresses civilians in Darfur. China buys 25% of Sudan's oil. At least 7,5% of total imports of oil in China come from Sudan (Bello, Annex III). However, having a democracy in every country is a utopia. China's approach secures investments for those countries with poor governance that would not receive investments otherwise.

7.3.3. Conditionality based on China's interests

Finally, we find the conditions in the shape of interests. Such as, food security, ports, land, infrastructure, loans, etc. We must be very careful when talking about non-conditionality in China-Africa relations. The term can be misleading. The fact that these conditions differ from those imposed by Western countries does not mean that China does not impose its own conditions to African States.

In this section the cases chosen will belong to the IGAD region. As we mentioned previously, we are going to pick the examples for our arguments from this area and make the generalizations about the African continent when we find it feasible. However, we are conscious that not all the statements we will make about China and Ethiopia (for example) can be generalized to Africa. Nevertheless, all the literature tends to talk about China-Africa Relations and does not specify to what African State they are referring to. We will try not to fall in this mistake, nonetheless, we believe the generalization does help giving a holistic approach to the issue.

According to Iraxis Bellos, China is present in the Horn of Africa in three main dimensions: commerce, security³⁷ and humanitarian aid³⁸. (see Annex III). Nevertheless, we have had to avoid Humanitarian aid for space reasons. We will be focusing on commerce, infrastructure, and security, from a Chinese perspective.

³⁷ In the last years China has increased its presence in terms of security in the African continent. As Navarro (see Annex II) comments, there are many tensions in Africa and China is slowly entering the mediator role that the US had in the past. For more information: <https://thediplomat.com/2019/12/china-in-africas-peace-and-security-landscape/>

³⁸ We are aware of the important humanitarian action taking place by China in Africa. Nevertheless, this TFG has focused on economic growth and investments. For more information: <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-chinese-foreign-aid-to-africa> ; <http://www.american.edu/sis/faculty/upload/> and <http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/21429>.

a) Food security in Ethiopia

China, along with other countries such as India, have resourced to land- grabbing to secure their access to food for their large population. In Ethiopia, according to Aime, China has leased areas for 99 years, resulting in native populations being displaced. In addition, Ethiopia producer locally enough to feed its population, but because many of these products are directly exported, Ethiopia has suffered hunger and food poverty. (see Annex 1). Food security is becoming an international issue due to the growth of the population worldwide. It is expected that by 2050, Earth will be hosting almost 10 billion people increasing the demand for food. However, food production grows in a linear way while population growth does so exponentially. This means that at some point we will not be able to produce for everyone.

b) Military presence in Djibouti

China is starting to emerge as a maritime and military power³⁹. Since its deal with Djibouti in 2016 it has built its first military base overseas in Djibouti's coast. However, China calls it a logistic facility and denies the accusations coming from the US. They deny emerging as a military power. The interest in that area is having control over the strait, controlling the maritime silk-route, engaging into antipiracy and anti-terrorism missions in the regions and having an eye on all the commerce and movement taking place in the area. "China will be able to patrol areas such as the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca to protect the flow of oil or off the coast of Africa as a show of force to influence any threats to Chinese interests there" (Geis, Caine, Donaldson, Holt, & Sandfry, 2011, p. 82).

c) Access to resources in Ethiopia and Uganda

Train connecting Djibouti and Ethiopia (a good example of infrastructure investment in the Horn of Africa). Another good example is the dam built in the White Nile in Ethiopian soil that will have an impact in its neighbor Nile countries such as Egypt.

³⁹ For more information on China's security strategy: [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642232/EPRS_BRI\(2019\)642232_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/642232/EPRS_BRI(2019)642232_EN.pdf). China is also trying to increase its sea power by creating islands in the Pacific and Indian ocean. China might soon become a hard power in its region too. In the past decades, China had focused on being a soft power based on its economy, however, nowadays, we can see China expanding overseas through different sectors such as security.

However, “the emergence of China as a major financier of African infrastructure, resulting in a narrative that China is using debt to gain geopolitical leverage by trapping poor countries in unsustainable loans” (Were, 2018, p. 1). This falls into the conditions behind the loans granted. There are political interests although China will not intervene in other nation’s internal affairs. Some speak of the debt-trap, nonetheless, this “trap” is not always related to interests in terms of money.

In Uganda locals complained about the poor-quality of the new road system being built by the Chinese. The quality of roads in African is known to be precarious. According to Navarro, this is due to corruption and it is not only related to Chinese companies but also Western ones. Navarro argues that when a construction contract is signed, the African authorities at the different levels might sign a budget for a 5 layer road, however, they make the company build a 3 layer road and they keep the money (see Annex II).

d) Transport for resource extraction in Kenia

Chinese companies have invested in Kenia. Especially in the construction of roads and the airport. The main companies involved in these projects have been: “China Wu Yi (Kenya) Corporation, Sheng Li Construction Company and Sinohydro Company” (Mugendi, 2011). These are private Chinese companies. They are not State owned. However, they are not the only ones. Other companies, European ones, also compete to acquire the best contracts in Africa. “Kenyan transport sector has led to creation of employment opportunities, to establish the effects of Chinese investments on Kenyan infrastructure and its impact on gross domestic production in Kenya” (Mugendi, 2011). Once more we can see that the interest of China for trade agreements and construction projects also benefits African countries. In this case Kenyan workers, Kenya’s economy, and its infrastructure capacity.

8. Conclusion

This TFG has aimed to offer a global view of Sino-African relations through a critique of the Western perspective of China in Africa. Throughout the essay, we have included specific case studies of the Horn of Africa to better understand the partnership dynamics in that region. To accomplish this task, we have carried out a literature review, interviewed three experts and consulted primary sources. Despite this fact, we acknowledge that the lack of space has impeded a deeper analysis with more concrete data. We believe a closer look into trade contracts would have helped understand the

nuances within Sino-African relations. Nonetheless, the lack of information available in this aspect and the lack of knowledge of the native languages of the regions studies has limited our research. In addition, there is a lot of literature coming from academic papers and think tanks that we have not been able to address. Lastly, we are aware that our focus on criticizing the Western perspective in China in Africa might not have been the correct approach. In future research, studying the African and Chinese perspectives would report a better understanding of how China in Africa is conceived for the actors involved in the relation. Nonetheless, ours was a relevant approach. The goal in criticizing the Western perspective was to avoid generalizations and misconceptions of the Sino-African relations. Even though it is an external perspective, Western literature has a significant weight in IR globally.

We have concluded that Sino-African relations happen at three distinct levels: multilateral, bilateral and local. We have highlighted the AU, and how this approach has been more successful than the EU's. At the bilateral level the Chinese's visits to Africa yearly, the talks at a ministerial level and the existence of projects within one African country that might not go in accordance with the interests of other African countries and the role of the investment authorities to attract Chinese investment nationally. At the local level, we have specified certain sectors, depending on the country, and the presence of PEs. China's government investments are no longer needed at a big scale because they have opened the path for private investments. This strategy has allowed China to acquire its interests in Africa in the hand of PEs. Nevertheless, we have not had space for more concrete details in the relations. There are other actors involved at all levels, other countries collaborate in Chinese projects in Africa in all sectors. This TFG does not go in depth when addressing the presence of European actors, such as France in the communication sector in Ethiopia.

After reviewing the structure of Sino-African relations, we addressed the main critiques to the Western perspective of China in Africa. We highlighted how the US and Europe see themselves threatened by the growing presence of China in Africa. Africa is switching its economic and political ties towards China. Despite this fact, not everything China does is negative for Africa. For the first time, Africa has the opportunity to choose its partner and it is not tied to its colonial past. On the other hand, China's horizontal partnership does have peaks of verticality and this is present in the non-written conditionalities. We have divided these in three: those based on political support at a UN

level; those based on neutrality in regards to human rights violations, and; those based on China's particular interests in each African country. Our aim was drafting a neutral structure of Sino-African relations, to address the critique to Chinese action in Africa, to revise conditionality; to allow the reader to acknowledge the positives and negatives within this relation and to prevent the reader from falling the dichotomy of Chinese action in Africa being good or bad. Nonetheless, we are aware that the lack of space prevented us from addressing concepts such as the debt trap, the humanitarian aid and cooperation led by the FOCAC; the food security issue; China as a growing peacekeeping actor and the presence of China in oil-producing countries. An in depth revision of these concepts would allow for a more detailed understanding of China's interests in Africa.

The question of China as a unilateral actor in the Horn of Africa has been left aside due to the theory we chose to frame our arguments, RP. We have included the arguments of our interviewees on the topic. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the possibility to address it with other frameworks. Other theories, with different assumptions and frameworks would have other conclusions in regards to this topic and would also be valid. This is a reality that must be acknowledged in a descriptive science such as International Relations (IR). To sum up, this TFG has focused on the economic benefits without taking into account important factors such as distribution. We are aware that the use of other indicators such as HDI (Human Development Index), the happiness Index and the Gini Index would be more accurate indicators to determine the impact of Chinese actions in Africa.

The use of RP is innovative and daring. We have applied a peripheral theory for Latin America to Africa. The use of this theory has helped frame the argument and specify the variables and the assumptions. Doing so we are aware of our limitations and we offer the reader an organized analysis. The assumptions of RP were: (1) we live in a unipolar world led by the United States; (2) the international sphere is not anarchic, there are rules imposed by the powerful; (3) The State is the unit of analysis, however, we acknowledge the constructivist setup of a country with its different interests. These assumptions implied that everything that withdrew itself from the international rules imposed was a detachment from the international system in place. China has been analyzed as the new regional power in Africa, however, the US is considered as the rule maker at the international level. If China is changing these rules or if we are evolving into a bipolar world order, would be a question for further research.

Framing a TFG in one theory limits the argument to a certain scope, however, it allows the analysis to have a structure and a logical succession of arguments. In regards to the behavior of the actors involved, RP offers a proposal with which we agree. RP argues the periphery's best foreign policy is to bandwagon, follow, the regional power. This facilitates the countries development, going against the rules imposed would only harm weaker States. Applying a strong foreign policy will always be in detriment of the rights of the national population. The latter statement explains how China's breaches in human rights are aligned with its expansive foreign policy.

After the conclusions revised above, we can argue that the best policy avenues for the different actor involved in this new "scramble" for Africa are:

- ❖ According to RP China's expansive foreign policy will affect their human rights standards in their national soil. This same logic, applied to the United States which is in a "America First" dynamic, it is normal that their foreign policy is weakening.
- ❖ African States are better off bandwagoning, following the imposition of both the international system and their regional power. Nevertheless, they can play around with the interest of richer states that are willing to invest in their countries and they united as the AU. Asking for a more competitive investment adapted to African interests. Another question will be the power dynamics in the Horn of Africa the role each country plays in the region.
- ❖ Finally, the EU will need to change its strategy towards Africa if it still wants to be part of projects in Africa. Europe along with other Western actors will have to realize that democratization might not take place everywhere. They will need to understand African's wishes to make the offer that is wanted.

There is nothing wrong with asking for conditionality that goes in accordance with one's beliefs. A partnership must be a win-win situation for both sides. But democratization is not a transferable process. Each country has its own conditions and if it democratizes it will do so its own way.

Maybe other factors will need to become a priority even development as such is a questioned term nowadays, to measure betterment in a country. Europe does not need a reformulation of the question towards Africa, but a transformation. They need to redesign

their strategy from scratch. Leaving behind previous assumptions or presumptions at the international level.

8.1. Future research questions

Every research study has a limited scope and framework. Throughout our study and acknowledging its limitations, we have recognized unresearched avenues. In this section we will be addressing some proposals of future research questions or explanatory subjects in bullet points:

- ❖ A comparative analysis between trade activities between colonial powers and their colonies and China with Africa nowadays. Are the trends similar in who imports, who exports, and what is being exchanged?
- ❖ The shift from the US to China in the sphere of influence in Africa, through UN support in the UN General Assembly and the UNSC. Is China de new agenda setter in Africa?
- ❖ The ROC foreign policy and its future as an independent country.
- ❖ The development and humanitarian field in Africa in the hands of China
- ❖ China's growing role in conflict resolution in Africa
- ❖ The Chinese influence in the democratization of African States
- ❖ Will Chinese action help Africa's development? This question entails a definition of what we understand for development. If we solely focus on economic growth China seems to be doing the job. Questions about sustainability, distribution of wealth, happiness and well-being.
- ❖ China is a world economic power. Are its foreign polices aiming to make China a political, cooperation and security power?
- ❖ Compare the results in UN resolutions on matters of Human Rights of US or China interests.
- ❖ Make a study of the humanitarian aid and cooperation packages from China in Africa, analyzing the FOCAC guidelines.
- ❖ Is China changing power dynamics at the international level?

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10.1. Annex I

Interview to Professor Elsa Aime

Interviewer: Carolina Rengifo
Date: February 5, 2020

Note of the interviewer:

The answers to the questions are draft notes taken by the interviewer during the interview. The content of the interview can be visualized in the summarized transcription bellow.

This interview was done in person, in English and it was recorded.

China and Africa Relations

General Information

Name of the interviewer: Carolina Rengifo Rodríguez Date: 05/02/2020 Time: 14.15

Name of the Interviewee: Elsa Aime González

Interviewee's position: Professor of African Studies Email: egaime@comillas.edu

Questionnaire

Question 1: **Which are China's main actors in the Horn of Africa? And in Ethiopia?**

Answer: Key areas:

- Agreements between Ethiopian government and China (bilateral relations). In regards to communication. A few years ago. Internet, mobiles, controlling media communication. (the French have been doing that as well)
- FOCAC. Instrument to coordinate Chinese relationship, which happens bilaterally.
- China has a wide foreign strategy to regards the African continent.
- It is important to specify
- Multinational dimensions: Maybe the African Union is a better link than FOCAC.

Question 2: **Do you believe China is a unitary or a non-unitary actor in the Horn of Africa? Please explain.**

Answer: Overemphasize the control exorted by the Chinese government over the Chinese actors. Nevertheless, "La Chine Afrique" by two French journalists. Curiosity: The Chinese actors in Africa, sometimes, these are Chinese descendants from Chinese exiles. However, they are aligning their action perfectly with China's action.

China is not necessary a unitary actor. That doesn't mean that those Chinese actors that did not go to China on behalf of China, aren't helping or contributing to Chinese objectives.

Question 3: Which are the main areas of action of China in the Horn of Africa?

Answer: Chinese adapt according what each African State offers. And what they can offer to each African State.

With Ethiopia, land grabbing: tendency in the last decades from States such as China, or even India (States with large populations) Those countries are scared of running out of food. These land masses are negotiated, the right to exploit for many years.

This implies displacement of local populations to make space and give the rights to a foreign company to exploit the land. This is an extremely controversial fact. These foreign states extract this food for their locals, and don't leave it for the people nationals. When there are famines...nothing is done.

In Ethiopia they hope to find oil. However, Ethiopia doesn't primarily dependent on their primary resources.

Ogaden region in Ethiopia, close to Somalia. They have been seeking for oil for decades. Its a low security area. There are Somalian requesting, secessionist movements within, and al-Shabab is involved.

A few years ago, some Chinese research for oil, died in an attack in that area. Expectations are an issue as well.

Ethiopia is the key and center of the Horn of Africa. China likes stability.

For China is important that Ethiopia remains a stable country. China is a very traditions actor that likes stability.

In regards to the democratic president. As long as Ethiopia doesn't intervene in China, and human rights in China.

Political transformations in Ethiopia, we still need to see what the outcome will be. Probably: transition.

August 16, 2020. Next general election in Ethiopia

WHO director, Ethiopian. Former minister of Ethiopian foreign affairs until 2016 (?) He declared the international emergency in regard to the corona virus. He gave a mainly political discourse. He declared the world health emergency, he kind of questions the Chinese capacity. However, avoiding a direct confrontation.

As long as Ethiopia does not question.

In terms of everything being part of a bigger picture. Of course, China has their interests in absolutely everything their do.

The “non-conditionality”

Africa counts as 54 votes in the UN.

China’s action has helped African countries to diversify their relations. Because they were dependent on the ex-colonizers. Strengthen of those

What consequences for the population?

Addis Ababa, Djibouti road have

ATTENTION: China has not always had the exclusivity. France also contributes

Question 4: What are China’s main foreign policy goals in the Horn of Africa?

Answer:

Question 5: How has the Horn of Africa been affected by China’s action in the past 20 years?

Answer:

Additional notes

Please add any further comments you wish to make.

Transcription

Duration: 35 minutes

RENGIFO The interview starts now. You can start commenting on any of the questions I sent you.

AIME Alright, so your first question was, “which are China’s main actors in the Horn of Africa?” And you ask specifically in Uganda and in Ethiopia, right?

RENGIFO Yes, exactly.

AIME So, when you say: “Chinese actors”, you are making reference to Chinese companies and things like that.

RENGIFO Exactly, Chinese banking investment authorities and other organizations such as the FOCAC. Which are the main actors that forward the action into Africa and are currently influencing the Horn of Africa. It is a broad question.

AIME It is very broad and I am not able to answer it and although I have read plenty on the topic, of Chinese presence in Africa and their role, I am cannot remember specifically right now. It is a research work in itself. In order to know specifically. Although, without being exhaustive, I am aware of key areas that China is particularly interested and that has played a role. And as far as I know there have been some agreements, at least a few years ago between the Ethiopian Government and the Chinese government with regards to communications and the control of communications. But I do not know what specific Chinese actor has been involved in that.

RENGIFO Are we then speaking of bilateral relations happening between Ethiopia and China in that matter? These agreements are not taking place at a supranational level under the FOCAC, the AU or any other, right? And when speaking about communications, do we refer to roads or to the internet and mobile systems?

AIME I am speaking about the internet, like mobiles, and particularly about controlling the media communications. Although the French have also been involved in that sector as well. It is not only China. China does not have the exclusivity. Also, I can be wrong, you will probably know more than I now that you are at the end of your TFG. But the FOCAC is an instrument for coordinating and organizing Chinese relations. The relations always take place at a bilateral basis.

RENGIFO I agree, in a first stance I was going to base my research on the FOCAC guidelines, however, they are just an outline, they are let us say, superficial.

AIME it does have a constituency dimension, it means something. It guides how Chinese and African cooperation takes place. But when things become more concrete, it all falls into a bilateral level. This means that China has a wide policy strategy in regards to each African country, an with regards to the African continent. And if you want to study the relations that take place at a multilateral level. Then you should focus on the China-African Union (AU) relations.

RENGIFO Yes I agree, I have also included it.

AIME Exactly, because the AU is the organization that represents globally the African States. It is the supranational organization at the continent. And the headquarters of the AU were built by the Chinese.

RENGIFO Yes, they were fully financed by the Chinese.

AIME They probably even have microphones and everything in the building.

RENGIFO I had not thought about that. What I find difficult in the TFG is shortening or where to stop researching because the more you know the less clear the answer becomes.

AIME It is normal in every research process. However, the better you know what your research question is, the easier It is to handle it. Here the issue is, what are you studying, Chinese foreign policy or Africa. And since you cannot analyze it at a continental level, maybe you have to focus on one African State or one African region.

RENGIFO That is why I chose the IGAD region which in my TFG is a synonym to the Horn of Africa as a region. And then I have chosen Uganda and Ethiopia as my countries to analyze. And I will look at the action taking place in those countries but from the view of Africa not from Chinese foreign policy perspective. And then conclude if the action of China in the Horn of Africa is unilateral or not.

AIME So this brings me to the second question. You ask is China unilateral or not? Do you mean if China is the one conducting the relation? Your second question is “Do you believe China is a unitary actor in the Horn of Africa? What do you mean by unitary or non-unitary?”

RENGIFO The question is directed as a critique to the Western view saying that Chinese has everything planes. Do you believe every Chinese actor is following orders from the Chinese Government? Or because of the capitalization of the Chinese economy these past decades if the private companies and banks follow their own interests. And therefore have a wider range of action than in the past. Because there are second and third generation Chinese that are profiting from the Chinese actions in the continent that do not need to respond to the Chinese Government wishes. Maybe there are breaches in Chinese actions.

AIME We do tend to overemphasize the control exhorted by the Chinese actors. Nevertheless, this is interesting, because I remember reading many years ago a book by two French journalists La Chine Afrique. And they explained in that book, is that something that is curious about the actors that are increasing Chinese presence in the continent. The Chinese that exiled themselves to Europe or other parts of the world during the communist revolution, their children ended up working in the African continent aligning their action perfectly with the Chinese Government and objectives. I say that because I think, not being a specialist in this. I would not assume that if the Chinese Government is not controlling the action of its actors in the African continent, does it mean that the action of those actors is not aligned with the global actors of the Chinese government. Is it clear?

RENGIFO yes, that is the thing for the TFG to make sense I feel I need specific information on the name of every company and why some receive more funding than others from Chinese banks.

AIME That is extremely specific, and I feel you have no time.

RENGIFO More than the time is the lack of access to Chinese resources, and also I do not speak Chinese.

AIME And the fact that you do not have time to do field work.

RENGIFO I know, that was my main objective when I started my other TFG on Uganda refugee camp management, however the organization cancelled by trip. That is why I changed my topic. But I wanted by TFG to integrate field work.

AIME That would have been wonderful but for a TFG it is not necessary. So, going back to our topic, I would say, without having the specific information you are looking for, China is not necessarily a unitary actor, which does not mean that those actors that are not working in behalf or controlled by the government, their action is not contributing to the Chinese Government goals and purposes.

RENGIFO Perfect, I just wrote it down. In the third question, well I decided to focus on commerce because everything is blurry and branching out to security or cooperation made my research to broad. So I want to focus on imports and exports, see what banks in China give out the loans. Therefore, within commerce maybe you are acquainted with other areas, such as the one you mentioned at the beginning: communications. So my third question is directed to explore in which other areas/sectors China's action is taking place.

AIME As far as I know China readapts to what each African country offers. And what they can offer to each African state. I would say that with Ethiopia there are cases of land grabbing.

RENGIFO Sorry, could you define land grabbing?

AIME land grabbing is a tendency that has been taking place from states like China or even India, with a huge population, that fear the possibility of not having enough land to grow food, So land grabbing makes reference to a process through which Indian Government or Indian companies, or Chinese ones, negotiate with the Ethiopian government the rental of huge territories, for periods of 90 years (almost a century) the right to exploit that land. This has vast consequences. Because it moves vast numbers of population. They are relocated to make space to the foreign company to exploit the land. So this is an extremely controversial practice. But it has meant that in the end those foreign companies that exploit those territories, they extract wealth exclusively to benefit the population from the countries of origin. Maybe there are famines in Ethiopia but not because Ethiopia does not have the capacity to produce the right amount of food, but because the food produced in their soil is not for local consumption. Which it is related to issues such as food sovereignty. So land grabbing has been an issue for the last few years, also communications... The problem with Ethiopia is... at least for the moment they seek to secure with the Ogedan region, at least for the moment, it is not, like its economy heavily relies on key primary products, highly wanted by international actors.

RENGIFO So Ethiopia is not dependent?

AIME It is dependent but it is not like Sudan I mean. Chinese in Sudan are among other things, particularly, buying oil, in huge amounts. But there has been issues because Chinese in the Ogedan region,

RENGIFO The one next in the Horn next to Somalia right?

AIME Yes, exactly. Since colonial times they have been seeking for oil. Last year for example, because it is a region with huge security issues, it is a region contested by Somalia, is a region where you have secessionist movements that questions Ethiopia's central governance, you have Al-Shabab, for example, well, trespassing the border. So a few years ago, there were security issues because

some Chinese that were there prospecting they were going to find oil there was an attack and some of them were killed. Some Chinese people died in the attack. So... expectations are an issue as well. And of course Ethiopia has a special role in the region because it has been said that the whole stability of the region depends on Ethiopia. And in that sense, China is a very conservative international actor and, in that sense,, it likes as well stability. For example, for china is important that Ethiopia remains a stable country. Why? Because if Ethiopia is destabilizing this can have a domino effect and have consequences in Sudan, and they are in Sudan and in the Red Sea, and well the commerce. Along the trade. So it can have... And this is something China has with other international actors...

RENGIFO So this is maybe why, I am guessing right now, China has not really intervened or complained about this new President, who was awarded the Peace Nobel. The fact that this man is trying to democratize Ethiopia. And China has clearly an opposite type of governance. Do you think there is going to be some intervention or not due to stability?

AIME I think that as far Ethiopia does not question or challenges Chinese interests in the Horn and in Africa

RENGIFO and in the UN?

AIME Yes and in the UN, then there will be no problem. I would say that for the last two years we have witnessed strong political changes in Ethiopia but we still need to see what is the outcome. And hopefully they will end in a democratization process. The turning point here is August 16 2020, which are the next general elections, then we will see. China does not have any especial problems with democracies as long as they do not start talking about human rights and things like that. For me, and maybe this is departing a bit form our topic, but I do not know if you watched, last Saturday I think, the WHO declarations, by its director Tedros Adhanom, who is Ethiopia's ex-prime minister of health in 2016. He had been previously taking care of health policies, he declared the International emergency with regards to the Corona virus. For me it was interesting listening to his speech, because it was fundamentally a political discourse, that in any manner, declaring the world health alert, in regards to the Corona Virus, it was in the line of Chinese capacity to control the virus. For me it was very interesting reading between the lines, because of course, I do not have any basis to say this, but my sensation was that he was trying to avoid any direct confrontation with China. Avoiding any questioning of China's capacity as an international actor. I am saying as the WHO director. First, he is and Ethiopian. But he is giving the speech not as an Ethiopian but as a specialist in health policy internationally. But I was wondering if the Ethiopian Government told him or if he is particularly aware of the importance of avoiding confrontations with China. This has not much to do with your TFG but to give you some hints about the issue. As long as Ethiopia does not challenge Chinese interests and Government in any manner, they will not have any problems with the Ethiopian Government transitioning into a democracy.

RENGIFO Perfect. I think we do not have time for much more. I do not know if you want to add anything else There are another two questions, but as you said I cannot focus both on China and Africa at the same time. So we can skip the question on China's main foreign policy goals on Ethiopia. Just to add one last interesting remark. My whole idea of the unitary and non-unitary aspect, from my trip to Ethiopia, where we had some lectures about food security what the lecturer said, he was a agriculture engineer, he said that China had everything under control and that is at least what it seemed. That Chinas was investing in roads and infrastructure to then have access to

the land and extract the resources they needed. So the idea that China's whole plan is covered in we are helping Africa, but that their real goal is to secure their access to the resources they want to extract. How that lecturer put it is that China had everything under its control. So when I heard that I just wanted to make sure and check if that was true.

AIME it does make sense. Normally actors they have a motivation for being actors. So why is China motivated to build roads and ports and AU headquarters. It is not only because they want to help or because Ethiopia needs the ports. It is because they understand, if they have properly responded on expectations of Ethiopian themselves, Ethiopians will be willing to be on good terms with them, to be in good terms with them, to accept the presence of Chinese multinationals for exploiting the land, okey, and things like that. Of course, China has contributed a lot in road and infrastructure building. In Addis Ababa, in plenty of places.

RENGIFO One more thing, outside of TFG, in terms of cooperation, which I find interesting. They say, that oh yes because European cooperation puts conditionality. And Chinese cooperation is with no conditionality, however I find that to be a fake statement. They do put conditionality such as support the one-China policy, support at a UN level, etc.

AIME Of course, and nowadays there is only one African State recognizing Taiwan. It is working. Ten years ago maybe there were 10 African States recognizing Taiwan. Just in a decade, it has gone down to 1.

RENGIFO I think that China has done it pretty well in terms of getting international support in the UN. Because in Africa you can account for 54 votes.

AIME Absolutely, 54 votes. And also I was just Checking and in the Addis Ababa railroad there has been Chinese investment also. Public and private companies I do not know. Because the French have been involved, China does not have the exclusivity, and a last word because I need to go. But we have to understand, usually, we have time to go back to the issue of conditionalities. It is very important to understand that consolidating African relations between African States and china. Has also been an opportunity to African States to diversify their international partners. And maybe this is not as striking in Ethiopia as in other countries in Africa. Because Ethiopia was not purely colonized. But other African states that were dependent on ex-colonizers, and on their relation with their past metropolises, extending their relations and not exclusively with China, with Turkey, India, Suadin Arabia, what we call the new actors in the African continent, which not all of them assume, it is in fact is a strength for the African States foreign policy. This is of course a strength, and we need to leave it hear, but this of course opens a question of what the consequences for the populations are, etc, etc, etc. So I am not idealizing the consequences of that.

RENGIFO Of course

AIME It is true, that form the perspective of African States, to have the option of other partners such as China instead of just the ex-colonizers. This is positive. Without going into the long term or the consequences on the population.

RENGIFO Well thank you very much

AIME You are welcome.

10.2. Annex II

Interview to Iván Navarro

Interviewer: Carolina Rengifo
Date: February 21, 2020

Note of the interviewer:

The answers to the questions are draft notes taken by the interviewer during the interview. The content of the interview can be visualized in the summarized transcription.

This interview was done through the phone, in Spanish and it was recorded.

China and Africa Relations

General Information

Name of the interviewer: Carolina Rengifo Date: 21/02/2020 Time: 17.00

Name of the Interviewee: Iván Navarro

Interviewee's position: Expert in Uganda Email : ivan_navarro@hotmail.com

Questionnaire

Question 1: **Which are China's main actors in the IGAD region? And in Uganda?**

Answer: Gobernanza y conflicto armado.

15/20 años

Última década. China presencia en Uganda

Cooperación sur-sur (non-conditionality) razones para ser un socio más igualitario

En el sentido de la condicionalidad de la europea. Política (democratización) económica (apertura y liberalización de la economía). China ha entrado con otras condiciones. Negociación en otros términos. Aportaciones más atractivas.

Ejm: Mozambique: Extracción de tierras 100 años para alimentar población china

País Africano que reconoce a Taiwán, país que no recibe ayudas

Museveni, Uganda. Presión para la apertura política. 2006 (après 20 années) a un sistema multipartidista, condición para seguir recibiendo ayudas.

Pero la realidad es que nada cambió.

China no tiene el pasado colonial, que es algo que les pesa.

Cuando llegó no había mucha presencia china, pero en 2010...

China tiene una presencia positiva, tejido industrial,

Apostado por la construcción de empresa, de bienes, servicios

Los británicos desarrollaron poco la industria. Solo se dedicaron a la extracción

Dejaron poca infraestructura, pero China sí. UK solo dejó el ferrocarril. CALIDAD

(El desarrollo a nivel de infraestructuras, espectacular

Carretera de Entebbe a Kampala, arreglada en 2008, cumbre de la Commonwealth.

DRAGADOS (esp.) España cooperó/ ganó muchos contratos desde la época de OBOTE. Los baños era marca ROCA.

Entebbe aeropuerto antiguo de los españoles.

Corrupción en las obras. Temas de corrupción, se paga a 5 inches, pero se construye a 3 inches y el dinerito de las 2 inches se lo quedan los corruptos.

Duda de si la calidad es cuestión de calidad China o de la corrupción.

Soroti a Kampala 8h. Mayor parte sin asfaltar.

También los Chinos epp Informe Uganda, DRC y epac...observatorio contra la globalización. Justicia alimentaria global

Todo está vinculado a la extracción de recursos.

China actor muy unitario. Sin duda marca la estrategia en África. A partir de ahí

Parte son empresas públicas nacionales. FOAC. (Quienes llevan el foro son los gobiernos)

China en África negocia en foros con la AU. Más fuerza para África. El no tener un pasado colonial le abre muchas puertas.

Parte de una posición privilegiada. Chinos traen su propia mano de obra. Muchos presidiarios chinos que

EFEC UE con África temas agrícolas y fondos. Bilateral. Menos fuerza un solo país

2010 Suruti....

Question 2: **Do you believe China is a unitary or a non-unitary actor in the IGAD region? Please explain.**

Answer:

Question 3: **Which are the main areas of action of China in Uganda and the IGAD Region?**

Answer: ZED book Estudios africanos. Papel de China en África.

Una relación comercial no es 100% horizontal siempre hay picos de verticalidad. Hay pros

Mucha información que no está disponible.

COOPERACIÓN Sur-Sur

Expansión China en África

Presencia baja de China en la resolución de conflictos. Pero cada vez mayor. Un Sudán del Sur 2013. Firmó acuerdos en Sudán del Sur para la extracción de petróleo, Y se ha metido más

Question 4: **What are China's main foreign policy goals in Uganda and the IGAD region?**

Answer:

Question 5: **How has the Uganda and the IGAD region been affected by China's action in the past 20 years?**

Answer: Uganda crece al 5%. Après la Guerra en el 86, han crecido espectacularmente, son un ejemplo. 2006, han encontrado petróleo en su frontera con el DRC. Pactaron con las grandes petroleras chinas

Impacto de China en Uganda a nivel de infraestructuras sí. ¿A qué coste? Social y deuda...

También... Otra opción de inversión, da un abanico más amplio de opciones

TESEO...EEUU, Sudan aliados del terrorismo, Sudan ha podido seguir construyendo

Additional notes

Please add any further comments you wish to make.

Transcription

Duration: 39 minutes

RENGIFO: Le doy a grabar.

NAVARRO: Sí, pero como te decía yo he hecho mi tesis doctoral sobre Uganda, no soy experto en China.

RENGIFO: Sin problema, perfecto. Como te comenté las preguntas son tan solo una guía para iniciar el debate. Considero oportuna esta entrevista porque mi visión del asunto desde España es muy teórica y está limitada a mis experiencias personales el Etiopía y Uganda.

NAVARRO: Vale, perfecto.

RENGIFO: Sobre todo porque China es el principal importador en Uganda. Mi idea es ver como se ha visto influenciado el Cuerno de África por China en los últimos 20 años. Tomando a Uganda y a Etiopía como mis casos.

NAVARRO: El tema de China en Uganda no lo he tocado mucho, pero estuve viviendo allí seis años. Yo creo lo que ha sucedido en Uganda con respecto a China es algo que se ve reflejado en más países del continente africano. La entrada de China en los últimos 15 años, especialmente en Uganda. Sobre todo, a través de la cooperación Sur-Sur y la “no condicionalidad”. A diferencia de las políticas europeas o estadounidenses, África se ve ante la oportunidad de un trato más igualitario. Por la postura de China y por el pasado colonial. Todo ello hace que esta relación se haya desarrollado de manera vertiginosa. Cuando yo llegué a Uganda no había mucha presencia China, pero después de estar seis años era impresionante. Las carreteras, por ejemplo, entre Kampala y Yinya que crearon para los chinos. Yo vivía en Soroti, no vivía en Kampala. Yo salí de Uganda en 2010 así que ahora tiene que ser espectacular. Era brutal la cantidad de presencia China que llegaba, la cantidad de máquinas, en fin, de todo. Significativo.

RENGIFO: Yo estuve en 2018 y la presencia era sobrecogedora. Pero era todavía mayor en Etiopía.

NAVARRO: Cabe destacar que la presencia China es importante, sobre todo a nivel de infraestructuras. Todo aquello que no hicieron los europeos, también la implantación de todo el tejido industrial les da mayor valor y presencia en África. También han invertido, en temas de bienes y servicios. Durante la época colonial, los británicos en Uganda desarrollaron muy poco la industria, cosa que los chinos sí hicieron. Los británicos no desarrollaron industria en ningún sitio, se limitaban a explotar los recursos naturales. Tampoco invirtieron en infraestructura. Solo había un poco en temas de ferrocarril y carreteras, centradas en la extracción de recursos.

RENGIFO: De acuerdo, ¿y en cuanto a Uganda?

NAVARRO: El Gobierno ugandés no ha tenido tiempo ni dinero para invertir en infraestructura, por eso los chinos están ocupando toda la industria en este aspecto.

RENGIFO Si te parece bien, procedo ahora a hacerte una serie de preguntas acerca de lo que ya me has contado. En cuanto a la falta de condiciones por parte de los contratos chinos. Si los gobiernos africanos no dicen nada en cuanto a la falta de derechos humanos, apoyar que Taiwán es parte de China o apoyar a China en los proyectos iniciados en la Naciones Unidas. Al final sí que hay ciertas condiciones no escritas. ¿Qué opinas?

NAVARRO Claro. Es correcto el apunte que has hecho. Hay condicionalidad política y económica por parte de los inversores Occidentales. Por un lado, la económica en cuestión de apertura y la liberación económica de las economías africanas. Por otro lado, la política en cuestión de

democratización y imposición de multipartidismo. Eso, por ejemplo, China no lo impone. Esas dos condicionalidades que para algunos gobiernos africanos suponen un problema. China ha entrado con otra estrategia. Yo no voy a ponerte pegas en cuanto a gobernabilidad, democracia o derechos humanos. Negociamos en otros términos. Las propuestas chinas son mucho más atractivas para los países africanos. En Mozambique, por ejemplo, en Uganda no lo he visto tanto, porque Mozambique tiene más terreno. La cesión de tierras durante 100 años. Si un país apoya a política de una china, esta sigue recibiendo ayudas de China. Sin embargo, los países africanos ven estas condicionalidades entre comillas, con otros ojos, porque lo ven desde la cooperación sur-sur. En Uganda, por ejemplo, lleva habiendo un mismo régimen desde 1980. En 2006, a causa de las presiones internacionales se abrió a un sistema multipartidista. Debido a presiones externas de los grandes donantes: noruegos, británicos. El problema es que el cambio no lo es todo, este tiene que ser efectivo ¿no?

RENGIFO Efectivamente, estoy de acuerdo.

NAVARRO Tienen que haber garantías desarrolladas para mantener la democracia y eso Uganda no lo tiene. China entra sin poner ningún pero a todo eso.

RENGIFO Hablando acerca de las infraestructuras que dejaron los británicos durante la época colonial. Cuando estuve en Uganda me contaban que mientras la infraestructura de carreteras colonial seguía en pie. La China que se había construido hace pocos años empezaba a resquebrajarse a causa de su mala calidad. ¿Es un mito que surge de la crítica y el celo de los occidentales o es una realidad que tú conozcas?

NAVARRO Yo desde que estuve en Uganda. En seis años el desarrollo de carreteras en cuanto a infraestructura fue espectacular. Mira la carretera de Entebbe, donde está el aeropuerto, a Kampala, la capital, se arregló en el 2008 en la cumbre de la Commonwealth. Yo hacía 8 horas de Kampala a Soroti. Solo la parte de Yinya estaba asfaltada. Esta es la carretera panafricana. Pero luego más adelante se asfaltó. No fueron los Chinos. Noruega una parte, bueno. China siguió construyendo desde Soroti hasta el norte del país. En ese periodo yo conocí a mucha gente de ese mundo. Expatriada y todo ese royo, de las Naciones Unidas. Y entre ellos estaba la gente, estaba la empresa española Dragados. España fue un país que consiguió muchos contratos de construcción desde la época de Obote. Dragados estaba ahí. Antes en Entebbe los baños eran Roca, marca española. Dragados había construido el aeropuerto antiguo. El aeropuerto se reformó en 2008 si no me equivoco. Este hombre de Dragados, comentaba, que allí el tema de las carreteras como comentabas era un desastre. No solo las de los chinos, sino todas. Construir allí una carretera. Esto tiene que ver con la corrupción. Nosotros decimos la carretera tiene que tener cinco pulgadas de ancho. Pero el encargado de cerrar el acuerdo te decía que no. Que tú le cerrabas el presupuesto por 5 pulgadas pero que la construías 2 o 3 pulgadas, porque el resto se lo llevan ellos. Y esto sucede y no creo que sean los chinos ni los noruegos ni los españoles. Sino que hay un sistema de corrupción de las élites políticas ugandesas, pero también del tejido empresarial también extranjera. Hay una corruptela brutal. Al final hace que la inversión que hace el pueblo ugandés se pierda por el camino. Yo ahí si tengo mis dudas de que la calidad China sea peor que la de otros. Yo creo que el problema está en la corrupción de las élites ugandesas y de las élites empresariales internacionales y los proyectos de obra.

RENGIFO que interesante. En cuando a la inversión China. La visión occidental es que China tiene un interés general, lo cual tiene sentido porque si no, no negociarían con los países africanos. Pero que tienen un plan de endeudamiento (el *debt trap*). Tú comentabas el caso de Mozambique.

Entonces, para concretar mi pregunta. ¿China es un actor unitario? Es decir, tiene a todos los actores chinos cogidos por la misma cuerda y que van por el mismo camino. O, ¿debido a la apertura económica China y creación de PEs (Empresas Privadas), estas no están tan atadas a la dirección que dicta el gobierno chino?

NAVARRO Sí, yo creo que tiene mucho sentido. Efectivamente podríamos estar hablando de un actor muy unitario, y las empresas chinas, sin dudas. El Gobierno marca el camino (las políticas) tanto para los actores chinos como para los Estados Africanos. La estrategia de la entrada de China en África era una estrategia pensada. Parte del entramado son empresas nacionales chinas. Está también la FOCAC. Que es el gobierno chino y los frentes de los gobiernos africanos. Así como apunte de las relaciones sino-africanas y como diferencia de la Unión Europea, China y África. China sí negocia a nivel multilateral con los gobiernos chinos en la UA. Y la UE, cuando firmó el tema de aranceles y políticas agrarias con África, lo que planteó fue negociar la UE con cada uno de los países africanos. De manera individual. De esta manera los países africanos no tenían fuerza para negociar. Muchos países africanos se vieron reticentes a esta estrategia porque veían que perdían. Por eso la estrategia China es más atractiva, los países africanos pueden negociar conjuntamente y con más fuerza. Yo no creo que las condiciones sean más democráticas en cuanto a negociación, sino que China también juega con el factor de no haber tenido un pasado colonial. Eso también abre muchas puertas en toda esta narrativa que lleva muchos años en África de la narrativa del no colonialismo. China parte de una posición privilegiada y además están realizando cuantiosas inversiones. También cabe tener en cuenta. ¿Quién está realizando los trabajos en las carreteras?

RENGIFO Claro, ellos. Trabajadores chinos.

NAVARRO Los chinos traen su propia mano de obra. También hay trabajadores nativos, sí, pero muy pocos. Yo cuando estaban construyendo las carreteras en Uganda, los chinos se construían unos barracones y ahí vivía la comunidad china. Había también trabajadores ugandeses. Pero una gran parte eran chinos. Algunos incluso presidiarios. Muchos eran presidiarios que cumplían condena de trabajos comunitarios de infraestructura pública.

RENGIFO perdona que te interrumpa. ¿Cómo se llamaba el tratado que inició la UE con África en cuestiones agrícolas?

NAVARRO La EPA Economical Partnership Agreement.

RENGIFO Muchas gracias, así luego lo busco.

NAVARRO Hay un informe. Hicimos un informe de Uganda, República del Congo, y la zona de los grandes lagos, acerca del impacto de las EPAs en toda esa zona. Si lo encuentro te lo envío, Lo hicimos junto con Justicia Alimentaria Global.

RENGIFO Vale.

NAVARRO Otro tema, por si te interesa. Todo el tema de China en África, si estás interesada en todo el tema de inversiones e infraestructura hay muchísima literatura escrita. Pero es interesante, en la cuestión seguridad y resolución de conflictos, China ha tenido un perfil más bajo.

RENGIFO Sí, perdona. Es que al tener que delimitar mi TFG, tuve que escoger y me he centrado en el ámbito comercial y de infraestructura. Hay demasiada información, pero no encuentro datos concretos. Sí que menciono el caso de Yibuti con la construcción del puerto naval. Pero en general todo el despliegue militar chino con la construcción de islas artificiales por el Océano Índico es impresionante. Se nota que China está apostando por todos los frentes, no solo por la parte económica y política.

NAVARRO La participación de China ha sido importante en los conflictos de Darfur.

En todo el conflicto de Sudán del Sur. China ha jugado un papel importante, también para el control de la extracción de petróleo. En Sudán de Sur, por todo el tema del conflicto. Sobre todo, en el norte del país, son los puntos más calientes.

RENGIFO De acuerdo, quizás podré hacer un apartado en cuestiones de seguridad. Permíteme un segundo a ver si me queda preguntarte algo. Sí, entonces, podríamos concluir que la acción de China en Uganda a grandes rasgos ha sido positiva, ¿no? Más conectividad en cuanto a carreteras y transporte. No sé si Uganda entra dentro de los países atrapados por el *debt trap*. Se está viendo atrapado. China dejaba de crecer por primera vez en la historia. Y eso también está afectado en la cantidad invertida por China en África

NAVARRO Yo ahí, como hace tiempo que no voy a Uganda. Uganda tiene un crecimiento de su economía entorno al 5-6%. Es más es un modelo de reconstrucción posbélica del continente africano, porque después de la guerra que acabó en el 86, luego ha habido otras. Pero ha ido creciendo y los datos macroeconómicos han sido espectaculares. Del 4 al 6%. Además, Uganda en 2006 descubrió petróleo en el este, con su frontera con el RDC. Eso le llevó a firmar contratos y ha conllevado conflictos con algunas empresas petrolíferas de EE. UU. y europeas y demás. Algunas se quedaron fuera porque se pactó sobre todo con empresas petroleras chinas. Y en cuanto si el impacto chino en Uganda ha sido positivo. A nivel de infraestructuras sí. Pero ese es un impacto que podrían haber tenido otros actores como el Banco Mundial o el Fondo Mundial si se hubiesen dedicado a invertir en desarrollarlas. Pero sí que es verdad que a qué coste. En cuando a coste social y al coste de deuda, eso habría que verlo, los datos. Sí tienen más infraestructuras, sí, pero habría que analizar los datos.

RENGIFO Efectivamente. Europa invirtió cuando se aseguró que habría multipartidismo, pero no fueron efectivas las condiciones. Tenían a china como segundo plato para evitar hacer cambios en su gobernanza de acuerdo con las condiciones Occidentales. No todos los países tienen por qué democratizarse, pero sí que es verdad que el tener a China como opción, se podría argumentar que ha ralentizado ese proceso.

NAVARRO Hay todo un debate. También habría que poner en tela de juicio las condicionalidades políticas de los actores occidentales.

RENGIFO Por supuesto.

NAVARRO Habría que ver por qué lo hacen y si dan resultado. Pero efectivamente China da una válvula de escape a otros países que ven otra opción de inversión de que el dinero entre por ciertos organismos. Ejemplo, Sudán. Tiene un bloqueo económico por parte de Estados Unidos por ser aliado del terrorismo. Es algo que ahora mismo está cambiando- Los sacan de esa lista responsables del terrorismo. Sudán ha seguido creciendo gracias al petróleo y su relación con otros actores y entre ellos China y pues la OPEC. Claro Uganda es un poco igual. Hay una serie de países sobre todo nórdicos que piden requisitos de democracia. Pues China es una mejor opción.

RENGIFO Está claro. Pues muchas gracias. ¿Está ya publicada tu tesis doctoral?

NAVARRO Sí, está publicada ya. Yo ya la subí hace un par de meses. En TESEO debería estar.

RENGIFO Fenemenal ¿cómo se titula?

NAVARRO Tiene un nombre muy largo.

RENGIFO Bueno si te parece me lo mandas por email junto con la contra documentación que me querías pasar.

NAVARRO Sí, sin problema. También te enviaré artículos de un señor, Oscar Mateo.

Él también ha escrito sobre China en África. Aquí han salido varias cosillas.

RENGIFO Fenomenal, todo lo que me envíes me viene bien así empiezo concretar.

NAVARRO ZED Book, es una editorial británica especializada en estudios africanos. Está muy bien.

Yo te envío un correo. Lo que pasa es que los libros están un poco anticuados porque son del 2012.

RENGIFO Sin problema, me vale todo lo de las últimas dos décadas. Así veo un poco la evolución.

NAVARRO Te iría bien, si te pones a buscar temas de la cooperación sur-sur. Bueno yo ahora te mando cosillas

RENGIFO Sí, eso es muy interesante, perdona que te corte. Y la cuestión de si China es un actor Sur.

Y si China está aprovechándose de esa posición de país sur, a la vez que se debate su posición como actor internacional a la altura de Estados Unidos. Ahí hay todo un debate.

NAVARRO Aparte, del papel de los BRIC. China y Rusia. No son muy sur. Pero el hecho de no haber tenido colonias hace que los países africanos los vean como países del Sur. El papel de Brasil, ¿no? Tiene muchas aristas. Algunos ya definen a China como actor neocolonialista en África. Pero hay otras partes que los Gobiernos Africanos apoyan esta colaboración. Hay que evitar estar de un lado o del otro. Por un lado, sí, pero hay otras partes. Que los gobiernos africanos defienden el argumento del porqué.

RENGIFO Estoy de acuerdo, ese fue mi argumento principal para el TFG. Dejar atrás el colonialismo vs neocolonialismo. Dejar atrás terminología del pasado que arrastra prejuicios. Y la pena de Europa que ya no puede luchar con poder material, porque China nos supera, sino desde las palabras y las perspectivas. No se trata de defender a China, pero sí de darle una visión neutra y no Occidentalista al tema. China está haciendo cosas, ni bien ni mal. Y los resultados y efectos se verán a largo plazo. Por ejemplo, las excolonias británicas han tenido luego muchos problemas de división, porque la intervención europea no fue tampoco toda mala ni buena. Entonces quien es Occidente para criticar la acción de China, cuando Occidente fue la principal causante de la explotación de recursos en África.

NAVARRO Sí y luego fijámonos en las relaciones diplomáticas y comerciales. Porque una relación comercial no es siempre horizontal. Siempre tiene picos de verticalidad. También sabiendo que hay mucha información que no es pública. Falta respuestas a muchas preguntas. Bueno, te mandaré información. Si tienes cualquier duda me puedes preguntar.

RENGIFO Fenomenal, muchas gracias por tu tiempo.

NAVARRO Adiós.

10.3. Annex III
Interview to Professor Iraxis Bello
Interviewer: Carolina Rengifo
Date: February 20, 2020

Note of the interviewer:

The answers to the questions have been written by the interviewee.

This interview was sent through email, the answers are in Spanish.

China and Africa Relations

General Information

Name of the interviewer: Carolina Rengifo Date: 20/2/2020 Time: 20:30

Name of the Interviewee: Chinese-Africa relations expert

Interviewee's position: Iraxis Bello Email: iraxis@yahoo.com

Questionnaire

Question 1: **¿Cuáles son los actores chinos que están más presentes en el Cuerno de África?**

Answer: China está presente en el Cuerno de África¹ en por lo menos tres dimensiones significativas: **Las extractoras de materia primas**, sobre todo petróleo y entre ellas la gigantesca China Nacional Petroleum Corporation; **la presencia militar** visible con la instalación de su primera base militar en el exterior ubicada en Yibuti (de suma importancia estratégica y de control para la zona entre el Mar Rojo y el Golfo de Adén considerada la principal ruta de transporte marítimo que une Europa con Asia y África, es decir, 25% de las exportaciones mundiales pasan por allí) concebida como un supuesto apoyo logístico para las misiones de paz, las operaciones antipiratería y la seguridad de sus connacionales en la zona, según Pekín, pero con innumerables interrogantes, como por ejemplo, el número de efectivos que operan en dicha base; y **las acciones de ámbito humanitario** con fuertes donaciones y personal humanitario para la lucha contra el terrorismo, contra la piratería y mayor presencia en las misiones de mantenimiento de paz.

Question 2: **¿Considera a China un actor unitario o no unitario en el Cuerno de África? Es decir, ¿está toda la acción China en el Cuerno de África alineada hacia un objetivo concreto? Por favor, explique.**

Answer: China no es el único actor internacional que opera en el Cuerno de África. Solo en Yibuti hay instaladas y operativas, bases militares de Estados Unidos, Francia, Italia, Japón y Arabia Saudí (en construcción) prácticamente una al lado de la otra. En otro ámbito, las acciones antipiratería como la Operación Atalanta (desde 2008) tiene una significativa participación de actores extranjeros, así como en las misiones de paz sobre todo en la lucha contra el grupo terrorista Al Shabab en Somalia.

¹ Algunos investigadores incluyen a Sudán y Sudán del Sur como parte del Cuerno de África. Como desconozco el alcance de su investigación los incluyo entre mis respuesta por si fuese información de su interés.

Las acciones de China en el Continente no están concentradas en el Cuerno de África. China tiene presencia, por lo menos en el ámbito económico y comercial, en todos los estados africanos menos Suazilandia que a la fecha se resiste a las bondades de la política exterior china.

Question 3: ¿Cuáles son las principales áreas de acción chinas en el Cuerno de África?

Answer: La política china en África hace caso omiso de los Derechos Humanos y de principios democráticos bajo la excusa de la no injerencia y del respeto de la soberanía de cada Estado. Esta actitud le lleva a apoyar a gobiernos cuestionados que eluden las sanciones y las reglas del sistema internacional. Prueba de ello es la ayuda financiera y el apoyo diplomático al gobierno sudanés que reprime a los civiles en la región del Darfur, y compra 25% de su petróleo. Al menos 7,5 % del total de importaciones chinas provienen de Sudán. A ello es preciso añadir la construcción de un oleoducto de 1600 Km. entre la cuenca de Melut (yacimientos petroleros del centro-sur) y Port-Soudan (puerto a orillas del Mar Rojo) y de una refinería, fuente de importantes ingresos para el gobierno de Jartum, que puede así financiar su guerra de agresión en el Darfur con las armas compradas a China y Rusia, y poder sobrevivir a las sanciones impuestas por la comunidad internacional desde 1984. Todos estos intereses explican el veto chino a todas las iniciativas y sanciones occidentales contra Sudán en el Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU. No cabe la menor duda de que es el potencial descubrimiento de petróleo en el Darfur que explica el drama actual de esta región, donde el gobierno comete, desde febrero de 2003, crímenes de guerra contra las poblaciones pertenecientes a las etnias negroafricanas por las milicias yanyawids interpuestas. La más grande empresa petrolera en el Darfur es la China Nacional Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). Es preciso subrayar también, que son las armas chinas las que alimentaron la cruel guerra entre Etiopía y Eritrea a finales de la década de los 90. También es de significativa importancia comercial y económica la construcción del tren por parte de los chinos que comunica a Yibuti con Etiopía.

Question 4: ¿Cuáles son los objetivos principales de la política exterior China en el Cuerno de África?

Answer: Objetivos geopolíticos y geoestratégicos con su seguridad como columna vertebral

Question 5: **¿Qué actores intervienen en la política exterior China en relación con el Cuerno de África?**

Answer: Si se trata de las acciones de mantenimiento de paz y antipiratería, por ejemplo, la política china en lo que va de siglo manifiesta un aparente respecto a las normas internacionales y sus regentes como Naciones Unidas. Es una acción selectiva de acuerdo con sus intereses. Si se trata de economía, comercio y extracción de recursos China se ampara en la supuesta coexistencia pacífica, la no injerencia, el respeto a la soberanía y la cooperación Sur-sur para establecer sus propios criterios de negociación.

Additional notes

Please add any further comments you wish to make.

10.4. Annex IV

Extended bibliography

Note of the author: The author has decided to include an extended bibliography for those readers interested in extending their knowledge on China in Africa. None of the following works have been cited in the TFG. As the reader will see, this extended bibliography is comprised mainly of newspaper articles. These articles have helped the author place herself in the current situation and circumstances of the region.

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