

EUROPEAN
ASSOCIATION OF
POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS

Pioneers of

DEM OCR ACY

*Political Consulting
Made in Europe*





EUROPEAN
ASSOCIATION OF
POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS

An association looks back on 25 incredible years and, at the same time, it also looks forward to all the challenges that await. Founded in Vienna in 1996, the European Association of Political Consultants has developed into a community in which the supreme principles are learning from each other and the high values of democracy. In this book, 45 colleagues from the political consultancy sector trace the developments since 1996 and illuminate the scene from different perspectives. The core of this book comprises analyses of 25 different campaigns from the past 25 years from 25 different countries, including a contribution covering the election in Belarus 2020, which was not recognised by all Western states. In addition, this book gives a good insight into the internal structure of the EAPC. This is a book for all of those for whom political communication and political campaigning are matters close to their heart.

ISBN: 978-3-9502163-4-9



eapc

EUROPEAN
ASSOCIATION OF
POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS

PIONEERS OF

DEM OCR ACY

*Political Consulting
Made in Europe*

Imprint

This edition of "Pioneers of Democracy" is the original edition first published in 2021 and is dedicated to the European Association of Political Consultants in recognition and appreciation of the work done in the first 25 years of the association.

All contributions in this book have been written by political consultants of the EAPC. Responsibility for the content of the individual contributions lies with the respective authors.

Publisher: EAPC – European Association of Political Consultants, 8430 Leibnitz, Austria.
Project coordination: Dr Peter Frei, Switzerland, Prof. Volker Riegger, Germany, Igor Mintusov, Russia and Sepp Hartinger, Austria.

Conception of the book as well as the graphic design and printing coordination:
Hartinger Consulting GmbH, 8430 Leibnitz, Austria.

Printing: Platinum fine art print GmbH, Graz, Austria

ISBN: 978-3-9502163-4-9


Contents

6	Introduction
11	CHAPTER 1: Political Consulting as an European Invention
12	United Consultants of Europe
20	Mission, Organisation and Work of the EAPC
28	Political Consulting Made in Europe
38	European Parties and the Role of Political Consultants
42	Digital Revolution: Risk, Challenge or a Chance
54	The Role of Women in Political Consulting
69	CHAPTER 2: Twenty-five Campaigns from twenty-five Countries in twenty-five Years
70	Introduction
71	1996: Russia , Presidential Election Campaign
81	1997: Andorra , Parliamentary Election Campaign
95	1998: Germany , Parliamentary Election Campaign
117	1999: Portugal , Legislative Election Campaign
131	2000: Spain , Parliamentary Election Campaign
143	2001: Norway , Parliamentary Election Campaign
151	2002: Switzerland , Swiss UN Membership Referendum Campaign
167	2003: Sweden , Referendum to join Euro
181	2004: Luxembourg , Parliamentary Election Campaign
201	2005: Bulgaria , General Election Campaign
219	2005: Denmark , Parliamentary Election Campaign
235	2007: Finland , Parliamentary Election Campaign
243	2008: Malta , General Election Campaign
251	2010: Ukraine , Presidential Election Campaign
265	2011: Croatia , Parliamentary Election Campaign
277	2012: Georgia , Parliamentary Election Campaign
289	2013: Italy , General Election Campaign
301	2014: Romania , Presidential Election Campaign

315	2015: Greece , Legislative Election Campaign
329	2016: Austria , Presidential Election Campaign
341	2017: France , Presidential Election Campaign
353	2018: Czech Republic , Presidential Election Campaign
369	2019: Turkey , Istanbul Local Election Campaign
383	2020: Poland , Presidential Election Campaign
393	2020: Belarus , Presidential Election Campaign
409	CHAPTER 3: The Future of Political Consulting in Europe
411	Survey Results from SORA Austria
417	The Ethical Test Ahead
419	Look to the Future with an Eye to the Past
423	What the Digital Revolution Changed and How to Utilise it for Political Gain
425	The Future, the Undiscovered Land
428	The Future of Croatian Political Communication and Consulting
432	The Impact of Technologies and the Role of Political Consultants in Campaigns
445	Some Fragments for EAPC President's Welcome Address in 2046
451	CHAPTER 4: About the European Association of Political Consultants
453	Constitution of the EAPC
460	Code of Conduct
463	Charter for Democracy
464	EAPC Founding Members
464	First EAPC Board
465	Past Presidents of the EAPC / EAPC Board 2018 to 2021
466	EAPC Conferences 1996 to 2021
469	CHAPTER 5: The Authors
470	Learn more about the Authors



EUROPEAN
ASSOCIATION OF
POLITICAL
CONSULTANTS



SPAIN

Parliament Elections in Spain 2000: Conservatives Obtain an Absolute Majority for the First Time

By Roberto Rodríguez-Andrés



Initial Situation

Spain restored democracy in 1977. After forty years of dictatorship, there were free elections again that year, which were won by a simple majority by Adolfo Suárez and his Unión de Centro Democrático (Democratic Center Union, UCD) party, located at the center of the political field. Suárez narrowly won again at the following elections in 1979, but in 1982, the Socialist Party (Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE), led by Felipe González, won the absolute majority. González also easily won the elections in 1986, 1989 and 1993, being in power for more than fourteen years. Nevertheless, his government's

success regarding modernization and economic and social progress in the country was tarnished by his last term (93–96) due to a strong economic crisis and the appearance of numerous corruption cases.

This led the conservative Partido Popular (People's Party, PP) to win the 1996 elections. The government had led many polls to predict an absolute majority for them, which in the end did not happen. José María Aznar, leader of the PP, needed the support of nationalist minority parties to reach presidency. As it was coined in those days, it was a "bitter victory" for them, as the enormous expectations that they had were not accomplished.

The term did not start well for the PP, with controversial decisions, caused by the cessions to nationalists and communication problems, to the point that a year later, the polls once again placed the socialists in the lead in voting intentions. Aznar publicly recognised that the government was having difficulties in "selling" its successes. However, his economic management (managing to overcome the crisis, reduce unemployment, relaunch the economy and meet the Maastricht guidelines for joining the Euro) and the fight against ETA (Basque nationalist terrorist organisation) managed to boost his popularity, to the point that when elections were called on 12 March 2000, the PP was confident that it would improve its results and would win again.

Nevertheless, no poll assured an absolute majority for the conservatives, which at that time, and for the first time in the history of recent Spanish democracy, actually happened. Never until then had a right-wing party succeeded in exceeding the sum of all the left-wing parties' votes.

Parties and Candidates

The President José María Aznar filed again as a candidate for the People's Party. If he were true to his word (as finally happened), these would be his last elections, as before entering government, he had promised not to remain in office for more than two terms. Aznar led the PP in 1989. The historical leader of the Spanish right-wing, Manuel Fraga, saw that his image was an obstacle for the party's aspiration for power and decided to take a step back. After considering several options, he chose a young politician (36-years-old), who at that time was the Head of the Government in Castile and Leon¹.

The main objective of José María Aznar was to moderate the People's Party and guide it to the centre political spectrum, where, according to the polls, the majority of the electorate was located and, therefore, he would be able to take votes away from the socialists. This "turn to the centre" was accompanied by a renovation of the senior leadership and a profound change of its corporate image. In the 1993 elections, Aznar managed to significantly increase the results of his party, but they did not win. The PP still had an underlying problem related to leadership. In spite of the crisis and corruption, Felipe González was still the most valued leader in all the polls and that is why the People's Party focused its efforts in trying to show the Spanish people that the country did not need a charismatic leader but rather a team of honest and efficient politicians who managed to solve the economic problems and reform democracy. Regardless, the PP's strategists also tried to humanise the figure of the candidate following the classic advice of American political marketing, turning to, for example, sport or his family, who accompanied him to all his events.

The team idea was one of the main trump cards that the PP presented in the 1996 elections. And this was also the central argument with regard to the reelection in 2000. The good management of the government in that term was highly valued by the Spanish people, which led Aznar's leadership to be reinforced. He was also fortunate that the Socialist Party was not going through its best moment. After the defeat in 1996, Felipe González resigned a year later as General Secretary of PSOE. His successor was Joaquín Almunia, who at that time was the Representative of the party in the Congress of Deputies and who had been the Minister of Labour and Public Administration in the socialist government².

¹ José María Aznar, attorney and tax inspector, born in 1953, was elected President of Castile and Leon in 1987. He was the head of the People's Party between 1990 and 2004, and the Head of the Spanish Government between 1996 and 2004. Since then, he is the President of the Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis (FAES).

² Joaquín Almunia, an economist born in 1948, was a socialist Representative in the Congress from 1979 to 2004. He was a Minister in the government of Felipe González, in particular of Labour and Social Security from 1982 to 1986 and Public Administration from 1986 to 1991. Over the years, he was named European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs (2004–2010) and, subsequently, Vice President of the European Commission and European Commissioner of Competition (2010–2014).

Almunia, also aware of his public image deficiency, wanted to reinforce his leadership by providing a feeling of renovation, for which he called a primary election in 1998 for the supporters to designate the party's candidate in the next elections. It was the first time that a party chose its candidate for presidency through primary elections in Spain. Almunia took this step sure that he would not have any opponents, but there was a surprise because Josep Borrell, who had also been a Minister with Felipe González, was victorious on a tight margin against all odds³.

The PSOE found then a double leadership: Almunia as General Secretary and Borrell as candidate. The media began to talk about "double representation" in the party, underlining the division and tension between them and providing an image of internal crisis. In fact, an open war between them started, which finally led Borrell to submit his resignation a few months later and, therefore, Almunia became the candidate. All these movements meant a deep wear for the party regarding vote expectations.

The People's Party and the Socialist Party were the two large parties running in these elections. The bipartisanship left few choices for other parties. The only ones with room were the communists of the Izquierda Unida party (United Left), the third large party at the national level, and nationalist parties, mainly in regions such as Catalonia and Basque Country, who have historically obtained representation in the Spanish Parliament, despite only being present in a part of the territory, thanks to the electoral system in force, had a place.

Communists, as well as socialists, participated in the 2000 elections with little positive expectations. Their historical leader, Julio Anguita, who was candidate since 1989, retired in January of that same year due to a disease⁴. Francisco Frutos was his successor, a politician little known among the electorate who, besides, had few weeks to campaign⁵.

³ In these primary elections, 207,774 supporters voted (54.18% of the electoral list). Almunia won 92,860 votes (44.67%) and Borrell 114,254 (54.99%). Josep Borrell, an aeronautical engineer and economist, born in 1947, joined the PSOE in the Spanish Transition to Democracy and performed several positions for the government of Felipe González, such as Secretary of State for Finance (1984–1991) and Minister of Public Works (1991–1996). After these elections in 2000, he was President of the European Parliament (2004–2007) and Minister of Foreign Affairs (2018–2019). Currently, he is Vice President of the European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

⁴ Julio Anguita, born in 1941, whose profession was teacher, enrolled the Communist Party in the last years of the Franco regime. He was Mayor of Córdoba, a city in Andalusia, between 1979 and 1986, being one of the little communist politicians with such a high political representation in a large city. Later, he was a Representative in the Andalusian Parliament and due to his popularity, in 1989, became the leader of United Left. He repeated as candidate in the 1993 and 1996 elections, obtaining the best results of the instruction in its entire history. He retired from politics in 2000 and returned to his profession. He died in May 2020 at the age of 78.

⁵ Francisco Frutos, born in 1939, a farmer and metallurgy worker, was an esteemed union member as since the 1980s, he occupied positions in the Communist Party, of which he was Secretary General from 1998 to 2009, the year when he retired from politics. He died in July 2020 at the age of 81.

Strategies and Messages

The situation was favourable for the People's Party of José María Aznar. In his term, a non-official motto was coined, stating "España va bien" ("Spain is doing well"), which graphically summarised the good performance of the country, especially in economic terms. That motto was a success from the government in communication terms and managed to leave a mark on public opinion. In fact, polls stated that the immense majority of Spanish people positively valued the performance of the economy.

Aznar was able to present himself in the campaign as an efficient and austere leader and a good manager, strong but also with dialog and consensus ability, internationally recognised and surrounded by a solvent government team with noted figures who had also achieved very good valuation in the polls. His strategy was to compare his four years in government with the last PSOE stage, highlighting that they had faced the crisis and corruption reaching stability, prosperity and honesty.

With all that, his campaign was divided into two stages. In the first one, under the motto "Hechos" ("Facts"), they highlighted all the government's successes and in the second one, with the motto "Vamos a más" ("We go for more"), they announced the milestones that were still to be reached, with a big set of electoral promises. It was, therefore, a continuous and logical campaign (based especially in data and proposals), though, at the same time, appealing to the electors' feelings, trying to make them feel that if they actually reached all that in four years, they had credibility to follow that same path in the next four years. All that also stressing the possible risks if the left-wing returned to power.

Socialists, for their part, who had all polls against them, and the leadership problems as stated above, were on the basis of a complicated scene. They were not able to positively appeal to the memories of the prior socialist government, and they were opposing a conservative government supported by good numbers. That is why their strategy was to attempt to show that economic prosperity (accepting that it was real) was not meaning an improvement in public services and, overall, that it was only benefiting some people, the richest, the government's friends, and that it had not arrived at the disadvantaged classes. This way, their campaign had an ideological nuance, turning to the traditional left-right wing main idea and values such as the need of an equitable share of wealth and more investment in social expenditure.

The motto of their campaign was "Lo próximo", appealing to the two different meanings of the word "próximo" in Spanish. First, the following, what comes next, providing the idea that they would lead the future government. And, secondly, what is close, linked to the idea of closeness, kindness. They tried to show that their leader, Joaquín Almunia, was closer than José María Aznar, who they introduced as cold, distant and arrogant, and who they criticised for having "deified himself" during his term, distancing himself from ordinary people.

Surveys stated that many centre voters, who had chosen the PSOE in prior elections, could now opt for the People's Party. And, actually, that was the objective of conservatives, who in many of their promises were even getting closer to traditional progressive positions (such as in matters of social policies). Nevertheless, instead of trying to keep that electorate, socialists turned to left-wing because they saw that this vote was very demobilised and that, if they abstained, victory would be almost impossible. Therefore, they signed an agreement with the communists, who committed to support them in the investiture. It was one more step in their strategy to activate the ideological vote, what worked for them in the 1993 and 1996 elections, although this time, as we will see later, turned out to be a failure.

To start, the agreement with the communists brought back criticism in a part of the socialism. And it was also extensively questioned in the Communist Party. Its former leader, Julio Anguita, harshly attacked this union. He could not understand that the United Left threw itself into the PSOE's arms, a party they had harshly criticised in the past for forgetting the left-wing when they were governing and for having developed conservative policies. Their motto "Somos necesarios" ("We are necessary"), appealing to their position as fetching for a government change, was highly questioned by those who were concerned that United Left gave itself up to the socialists.

Finally, nationalist parties tried to capitalise on the benefits that they had obtained for their respective regions thanks to the support they gave to the José María Aznar investiture. In this field, there was an especially significant fact in this campaign, and it was that, for the first time in recent Spanish democratic history, the political party related to the terrorist group ETA (Herri Batasuna) did not run and made a call for people to abstain and boycott the elections. Even so, the terrorist threat was very present again in this campaign, just as it happened in the prior elections. A few weeks before the elections, ETA murdered the socialist representative in the Parliament of Basque Country and his bodyguard with a car bomb.

Campaign Actions

The campaign in 2000 was very traditional, along the same lines of the prior elections. Spanish legislation did not allow many improvements regarding political communication, especially forbidding advertising on television. The parties only had some free spaces in public television to broadcast their spots, with no more than 45 minutes total during the campaign for each majority party.

They show in these spots their main campaign strategies. The PP was focused on meticulously detailing all the milestones achieved and launch new promises, with institutional messages from the candidate appealing to all they had achieved and all they could still achieve, with continuous references to the future. In the spots, the storytelling stated: "When I look around, I see

the future, I see myself closer to what I want, with more means to achieve it, to leave better, to communicate, to improve and to get to know. What else can I ask? I want to go further". These were unusual advertisements for a model of political communication that, at that time, appealed to send few messages very emotionally. On the contrary, the PP's spots "burdened" due to the huge amount of data, statistics and new announcements, but these were effective to provide that image of an efficient, solid government with improvement vocation to trust.

For their part, in their attempt to mobilise the left-wing voters, socialists appealed to the fear vote to avoid a new victory for the conservatives. In their spots, under the motto "They became popular by lying", they compared the triumphalist PP's data with figures that tried to prove that it was only benefitting few people. In these spots, it was repeated, for example, that the PP and its friends "wanted to keep everything", that while rich people were receiving tax reductions, for the rest of the population it was increasing ("for the majority, Aznar turns out expensive"), that while the benefits for publicly traded companies had increased by 80%, salaries and pensions slightly kept their purchasing power ("you already know what happens with the right-wing, same ones always win") and that Spain had come down to the last position regarding social expenditure in the European Union ("it is impossible to sink lower"). The spots finished with the following sentence: "We cannot continue with a right-wing president who lies, who is far from the majority's interests and ideas, who does only want to increase his power while Spain is weakening. It is time to begin a new era, with Joaquin Almunia, a person close to your way of being and thinking, a solid and trustworthy president, equally committed for Spanish men and women. We are more in the streets. To be more in the Parliament, vote your ideas on 12 March. Make it possible for progressives to rule with your vote".

The keynote shown in the free television spaces was also the one followed in the radio commercials. Regarding printed advertisement and outdoor spaces, traditional models were followed using posters with the picture of the candidate and the motto. It was a campaign very focused on public acts and public relations with media. In this field, the socialist leader participated since elections were called in 30 big acts, traversing 30,000 kilometres, opposite to the 23 of the People's Party leader and his 23,000 kilometres. The PP prioritise the provinces where polls stated that they were close to obtaining a seat or those where there were more undecided. Moreover, it rationed very well during the campaign the announcement of its electoral promises, some of them not included in the electoral programme to not disclose the exclusive, making the first moves to dominate the media agenda.

Certain about their victory, the PP's campaign team tried by hook to minimise any risk, presenting themselves as a calm winner, not entering the opponents' provocations. Aznar did not grant any interview to the most belligerent media in his candidature and also did not accept a televised electoral debate with the socialist leader. In addition, a detailed campaign guide was delivered to local executives and candidates with messages to transfer, so that anyone would step out the official line in his declarations.

In these elections, there was progress in using the Internet as a political communication tool. The first Parliament Elections in Spain in which this new mean was used was in 1996, still in an experimental way. Two years later, April 1998, the first personal web pages for political leaders of national importance were launched, in the framework of the PSOE's primary elections, in which Almunia and Borrell had their own website. The Internet continued developing during these years and, for the 2000 elections, all the parties intensified their online campaigns.

If in 1996 the web pages were simple bulletin boards, with almost no interactivity with Internet users, in 2000, parties included newness in that field. Besides the use of e-mail to send informative newsletters, the main parties included sections on their websites to gather opinions about their electoral programmes, such as the PSOE's "Open Politics" and the PP's "2000 Forums". In addition, there were chats organised with candidates and there even started to be examples of volunteer mobilization through the Web as in the case of socialists.

Parties' web pages also improved their design and technical improvements, such as more pictures and short videos, Flash animations, online games and even live broadcast of public meetings, just as the PP did. In addition to institutional web pages, the parties created personal web pages for their leaders, such as the President José María Aznar, who was the first candidate for government presidency who did that. On his web page (www.aznar2000.pp.es), there was information about his biography and pictures of his private life, besides the campaign proposals. The PP was also the first party to include the URL address of the candidate's website in their electoral advertising. These novelties took many political analysts and experts in political communication to say that the 2000 elections were the first ones in Spain where the Internet had a notable role. There was still a lot to improve, and blogs and social networks did not appear yet, but it was the first step for the later development. It is true that, at that moment, the number of Internet users was still very low (just 11% of the Spanish population), so the audience was very low. The PSOE's website, for example, registered between 2,500 and 7,300 visits per day during the campaign and the PP's 2,500, very low figures that indicate that interactivity was rare. However, all the actions that parties took on the online environment had a lot of impact on traditional media, which was deep down one of the objectives at that time: show the latest image and draw the attention of journalists.

The PSOE spent 1,950 million pesetas (old Spanish currency, 11.7 million euros) in this campaign for advertising and event organisation, and the People's Party 1,900 (11.4 million euros). Both parties reached the limit of the electoral expenses established by the legislation. Furthermore, the Socialists and the People's Party spent another 900 million pesetas more (approximately 5 million euros) to send postal canvas.

Results

More than 23 million Spanish people voted in the 2000 elections, which was 68.71% of the electoral census. Participation decreased 8.7 percentage points in relation to the prior polling in 1996, confirming that a lower participation in Spain favours the conservative parties.

The People's Party of José María Aznar was the great triumphant. He won 10.3 million votes (the highest number reached by a party in Spain until then) and 183 representatives in the Congress, 27 more than in 1996, getting an absolute majority. The PP was the most voted party in 42 of the 52 electoral circumscriptions and, besides, it also won an absolute majority in the Senate. Spaniards rewarded the good performance of the Spanish economy and the moderation of the People's Party, which received a strong vote transfer among centre and centre-left electors that in prior elections trusted the socialists. Aznar was also reinforced internationally, as he continued leading one of the few centre-right governments at that moment in the European Union.

For its part, the PSOE lost 16 representatives, resulting in 125, the worst result in its whole history until that moment, which took its leader Joaquín Almunia to submit his resignation on the electoral night. The socialists did not manage to mobilise the left voters, which was their only last resort. Many of these voters increased the abstention lists and, on the other side, their union with the communists frightened a part of the centre vote that decided to go for the PP.

The communists of United Left had the same fate, they also suffered a strong electoral misfortune, they lost half of their votes and two thirds of their representatives (going from 21 to 8). It was then seen that many of its voters did not forgive its reconciliation with the PSOE, what they saw as a betrayal. For their part, nationalist parties generally kept their seats, but they lost their national political influence, as they were no longer decisive to build the government.

The absolute majority of the People's Party was all a surprise for the media and political analysts. As we already pointed out, all the polls published during the campaign had predicted a comfortable triumph for the conservatives and an increase in their vote expectations, but none had foreseen an absolute majority. Some companies of public opinion polls tried to make excuses later saying that they actually saw that possible result, but they did not dare to publish it due to fear after the fiasco that they suffered in the prior 1996 campaign, when many polls saw that absolute majority did not happen.

	Votes	Voting percentage	Seats in Congress
PP, Partido Popular (People's Party)	10,321,178	44.52%	183
PSOE (Socialist Party)	7,918,752	34.16%	125
IU, Izquierda Unida (United Left)	1,263,043	5.45%	8
Other parties with representation (nationalists)	2,575,261	11.11%	34

Source: Congress of deputies website

Conclusion

The 2000 Parliament Elections were perhaps the last ones in Spain following the traditional political marketing model, based on the determined control of the campaign elements and the supremacy of unidirectionality in political communication. As of the next elections in 2004 and,

overall, those of 2008, the model started to change towards bidirectional formulas, with more and more noted importance of citizens via the Internet and social networks. In this campaign, traditional media continued playing a main role as mediators between politicians and citizens, so the public relations tasks for the parties was still decisive.

These relations were also a clear example of one of the main elements for the turning of the political marketing throughout its history: the need to come closer to the political center as most of the electorate is in there. When assuming leadership of the PP, José María Aznar clearly outlined this objective, being aware that only from the centre, moderating the party and adapting it to the catch-all model, he would be able to win the socialists and get enough seats to rule. That was one of his great successes, joining around the People's Party a broad spectrum of voters that went from right even until the centre-left, without any other party opposing them in that space. On the opposite side, it could be seen how the reconciliation of PSOE with the communists made it move far away from the centre, showing an image of more radicalisation, which had negative consequences in their results.

These elections also showed the great importance of the economic situation regarding the vote configuration. "It's the economy, stupid", as it was popularised by the Bill Clinton team in the 1996 American elections. It is confirmed that the economic performance and, overall, how it personally affects citizens, it a powerful vote motivation, as it was shown in subsequent electoral campaigns in Spain. In this case, the memories of the strong crisis in the socialist governments and the recovery favoured by the People's Party were some of the conservative's main electoral arguments when activating the so called "rational vote", which deep down is also an "emotional vote", as it appeals to feelings such as credibility and trust.

The appearance of this economic vote also had consequences regarding leadership, which is the last point we will address in this conclusion section. Even though political marketing has favoured hyper leadership, prioritising the candidate's image over the parties and proposals, in unusual circumstances such as a strong crisis, citizens seem to take refuge in factors less based on a charismatic leadership but more in matters of honesty and efficiency of leaders and their teams. That was appreciated in the 2000 elections in Spain. In any case, Aznar had the advantage of a strong image in his party, without inner arguments. On the other side, the separation that the PSOE showed in this campaign was useful for verifying that double leadership and interior questioning in a party is only useful to create instability, which is punished in the ballot box.



Socialist Party electoral poster

United Left Party electoral poster

somoS necesari@s



Francisco Frutos
Candidato a la Presidencia

Volker Riegger, Germany



Volker Riegger (*1942) was the campaign manager of Chancellors Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. With his logos consultancy, based in Munich, he worked as a strategist for social democratic parties and governments as well as for major firms and federations. He is a professor at Berlin University of Arts and past president of EAPC from 1998–2000 and IAPC.

E-mail: volker.riegger@gmail.com

Roberto Rodríguez-Andrés, Spain



Roberto Rodríguez-Andrés is partner at the public affairs firm MAS Consulting Group and Associate Professor at the Pontificia Comillas University and Navarra University. He has been Deputy Director of the Communications Department at the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health of Spanish Government. As a researcher on political communication and electoral campaigns, he has written various books and articles in scientific journals on these subjects.

E-mail: rrodriguez@comillas.edu

Jussi Salonranta, Finland



Jussi Salonranta, as a political consultant, has extensive experience in public affairs, strategic planning and political communications. Before starting his own business, he worked as an analyst in Toivo Think tank (Toivo is a full member of Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies), and as a political adviser in the National Coalition's party HQ for several elections in 2012–2017 (strategic planning and research) and for several years within the Parliament of Finland. He was also a campaign manager for the Finnish foreign minister Alexander Stubb in the parliamentary elections of 2011 (historically elected with more than 40,000 votes). Salonranta studied economics at the University of Helsinki.

E-mail: jussi.salonranta@gmail.com