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Trabajo Fin de Grado

The European Union as an International Security Actor

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU: African Union

ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy

CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy

EC: European Commission

ECHO: European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

EDA: European Defence Agency

EDF: European Defence Fund

EEAS: European External Action Service

EEC: European Economic Community

EPC: European Political Cooperation

EPF: European Peace Facility

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

ESS: European Security Strategy

EU: European Union

EUMS: European Union Military Staff

EUSRs: EU Special Representatives

FPI: Foreign Policy Instruments

HR/VP: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission

MS: Member States

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

ODIHR: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

OSCE: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

TEU: The Treaty on European Union

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UN: United Nations

WEU: Western European Union

Abstract

As a political and economic union encompassing almost 500 million citizens in one of the most prosperous parts of the world, it is only a given that the European Union (EU) influences global politics in many ways, whether it's through trade, economy, politics, or the advocacy of human rights and the rule of law, etc. Additionally, most of its Member States comprise some of the most advanced militaries in the world, as well as are members of organizations such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), emphasizing the EU's important role in international security. Moreover, with time, the European Union has managed to increase its defence capabilities and become an important actor in international relations and a valuable partner to other actors around the globe. This thesis will look at the role of the EU as an actor in International Security and will examine its history and status quo, understanding its first and actual military cooperation traces. Furthermore, the bigger picture of international security, as well as future trends and challenges will be explored, which will enable us to understand the prospects of development and how exactly, there is a possibility, the EU can take a more active position in the global security architecture of the world.

Keywords

Resumen

Como unión política y económica que abarca a casi 500 millones de ciudadanos en una de las partes más prósperas del mundo, es un hecho que la Unión Europea (UE) influye en la política global de muchas maneras, ya sea a través del comercio, la economía, la política, o la defensa de los derechos humanos y el estado de derecho, etc. Además, la mayoría de sus Estados Miembros comprenden algunos de los ejércitos más avanzados del mundo, así como también son miembros de organizaciones como la Organización del Tratado del Atlántico Norte (OTAN), haciendo hincapié en el importante papel de la UE en la seguridad internacional. Además, con el tiempo, la Unión Europea ha logrado aumentar sus capacidades de defensa y convertirse en un actor importante en las relaciones internacionales y un socio valioso para otros actores en todo el mundo. Esta tesis analizará el papel de la UE como actor en la Seguridad Internacional y examinará su historia y status quo, entendiendo sus primeros y actuales rastros de cooperación militar. Además, se explorará el panorama general de la seguridad internacional, así como las tendencias y los desafíos futuros, lo que nos permitirá comprender las perspectivas de desarrollo y cómo, exactamente, existe la posibilidad de que la UE pueda adoptar una posición más activa en la arquitectura de seguridad global del mundo.

Palabras clave

Actor de seguridad internacional, Unión Europea, CSDP, CFSP, Autoridad, "*Soft Power*"

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose

Every day global interactions are made, whether over the phone, over a purchase or by travelling, inevitably leaving traces wherever people go. This latter concept has gained importance over the years, leading to an interconnected, complex, and extremely competitive world.

In a world as such, where new actors are in play and different challenges arise at a constant and unstoppable speed, the **European Union (EU),** along with other well-established supranational organizations, such as the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),** often must reassess their role as economic, political, and social players. Additionally, the already changing social and geopolitical environment faces a multitude of risks and worldwide threats including terrorism, misinformation campaigns, global pandemics, and climate change among others.

In addressing these crises and assisting in protecting European citizens thus far, the EU has been at the forefront. However, as Josep Borrell, the current High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) said for the Handbook on **Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP):** "*we need to be aware that not all EU Member States see the problems through the same lens, as they share neither the same history nor the same geography, and as a result they do not have the same strategic perceptions and priorities*" (2022, p.10). This can become a problem as there needs to be a certain consensus regarding European security standards and objectives to effectively pursue a **strategic autonomy**[1] for the Union.

Whether there are higher or lower levels of conjunct action in the EU, what is clear is that the EU is committed to international security, seen for example by the more than thirty missions undertaken under the CSDP framework which will be studied on *Chapter*

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[1] **Strategic autonomy** understood as the ability to act independently or autonomously, when necessary, as well as with other partners when appropriate. For further information see https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/handbook-csdp_en.

3. Nevertheless, it is of utter importance to evaluate the role of the EU as an international security actor and understand European efforts on Security and Defence.

1.2 Objectives

This final degree project mayor goal is to acknowledge the EU's profile as an international security actor, while establishing the role the EU plays in security and defence issues. For this, the following thesis will investigate the development of the European Union's security policy, understanding why it is in place and the initial interest behind it; perform a diagnosis of the current state of the European Union in terms of security and defence; understand the framework behind the Common Security and Defence Policy; identify the way the EU cooperates with other actors in International Security such as with the UN, NATO, or the OSCE; and further examine future development perspectives on the EU's role as an actor in International Security.

Before going into the methodology of the project, it is crucial to specify how will the project be limited in time and space. Instead of focusing on the development of the procedure that has made the EU a security and defence player, this thesis will mainly concentrate on the current situation. It comes as a given though that some background data will be provided so that the study remains comprehensive.

1.3 Methodology

Regarding the methodology that will be reinforced, a literature review will be performed, hence relying on secondary sources, that have conducted quantitative and qualitative analysis with the study of different case studies themselves. The *Handbook of the CSDP* will serve as a guiding star throughout the thesis, given it serves as a reference for everyone with an interest in the EU's security and defence policy.

Other aspects will be evaluated throughout a bibliographic review of models previously discussed by other authors, as well as further analyses. For all this, the use of academic articles, webography and books will be used, which with a correct interpretation will allow the subsequent determination of the EU's role in international security.

2. Theoretical Framework

Once that the initial purpose, the objectives, and the methodology have been set out, the theoretical framework comes into place. The following chapter will theoretically fundament the thesis, entailing different approaches regarding the EU and international security.

For that, it will be structured into three parts: framing my thesis into one theory of International Relations, definitions of the most relevant concepts regarding our topic, the EU as an International Security Actor, and then extend on the European Union as our most important stakeholder.

2.1 Theory of International Relations

Two of the most popular theories and contesting paradigms in International Relations are **liberalism** and **realism.** Both may be employed in many ways to frame my final degree project on the role of the European Union in international security and defence.

On the one hand, **liberalism** places a strong emphasis on international organizations, complex interdependence, global governance, and **balance within the international system**. Liberal thinkers contend that collaboration and the establishment of international institutions are the only ways for states to resolve the security conundrum and attain security (Bloor, 2022). In the context of my thesis, this theory could be used to argue that the European Union is a player in international security as it is dedicated to fostering peace, stability, and collaboration in the global system. Additionally, according to a liberal point of view, the EU's participation in security missions and operations, which will be further explained in following chapters, is motivated by its aim to advance democratic principles, human rights, and the rule of law.

On the other hand, **realism** places a strong emphasis on state survival, competitiveness, sovereign states as the main players in international politics, and balance of power. Realist academics contend that nations are the main players in international politics and

that states' actions are motivated by their **desire for power and vested interests**, following the Westphalian system's traditions (Bloor, 2022). Since the European Union is attempting to safeguard its own interests and secure its existence in a world where power is shared among many players, realism could be utilized to support my thesis and claim that it is an international security actor. Moreover, it could be argued that the EU's efforts to create a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and participate in security missions and operations are motivated by its ambition to strengthen its power and influence in the global order.

Overall, liberalism and realism both have their advantages and disadvantages, and my thesis employs a combination of both to examine how the European Union functions as a player in global security.

2.2 Definitions

The successive definitions intend a better understanding of the project that will later facilitate the dialogue and discussion of the topics. The title of the thesis serves as a starting point: International Security Actor. For this, it's important to first define security and build from it.

According to professor of Security Studies Samuel Makinda (1989), **security** is the "*the preservation of the norms, rules, institutions and values of society*", implying purposeful and intentional acts to direct its efforts. It's important noting that a distinction between national and global (or international) security has been made recurrently about security.

Although there is a theoretical difference among these two conceptual frameworks, this distinction is insufficient to establish a distinct separation between them. Instead, they work together in harmony, both for those areas of local security which governments cannot resolve on their own, or similarly, for foreign problems that a domestic security organization will need to handle (Osisanya, n.d.).

Having made this distinction, **international or global security** becomes the key subject. As previously commented, globalization made the world increasingly interconnected and interdependent among governments, necessitating increased cooperation and collaboration between them.

Furthermore, natural factors, shared threats, and the lack of national security agency, lead to the development of global security. International security also comprises military and diplomatic measures that states and international bodies like the UN and NATO take to protect the safety and security of one another (RAND, n.d.).

As for **international security actor,** it was significantly harder to find a unique definition that grouped the different possibilities. Nevertheless, TRIGGER, a study funded by the EU's Horizon 2020[2] analysing the EU's role in global governance dictated an international security actor could be considered as those with a "**degree of actorness**" in IR to enforce the law. Actorness considered as the "*capacity to behave actively and deliberately in relation to other actors in the international system*" following Swedish politician Jonas Sjöstedt 1977 definition.

Other attributes to describe actorness were later added by several authors creating both internal and external dimensions to actorness. These were carefully selected by TRIGGER, the EU-funded model for evaluating actorness in 2019.

On the one hand, the attributes of the **internal** dimension:

- **Authority**: relating to the legal authority the actor possesses within a certain sphere of policy. For instance, for the EU's case, the competences outlined in the Treaties of the European Union (TEU) or in supplementary agreements.

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[2] **EU's Horizon 2020**: EU initiative from 2014-2020 sponsoring research and innovation counting with almost €80 billion. For further information see https://research-and-innovation.ec.europa.eu/funding/funding-opportunities/funding-programmes-and-open-calls/horizon-2020_en

- **Autonomy**: associated to the tools and capacities for action, complimenting then the dimension of authority.

- **Cohesion**: interpreted as a coherent line of reasoning, indicating that the concerned states are "speaking with one voice" and have similar policy preferences in a particular policy area.

- **Credibility and trust**: understood as the state's abilities to accomplish desired goals and to be dependable and trustworthy when it comes to agreements. This attribute has both an internal and external dimension. Taking the EU as an example to better comprehend this, it can be seen that the EU wants internal credibility from its MS, but also external trust, wanting to be viewed favourably by its allies abroad.

On the other hand, the attributes of the **external** dimension:

- **Recognition**: related to external credibility, the actor must first be acknowledged as a participant in the international system and a genuine negotiating partner to successfully advance its own objectives.

- **Attractiveness:** seen as the readiness to collaborate with the actor, going beyond acknowledging its participation in the international system. It explains how strongly other actors believe that working with them is something that is worthwhile. It can be determined by the actor's "soft power"[3].

- **Opportunity to act:** covering the potential courses of action to take when new economic or other possibilities present themselves as well as external challenges that might endanger the peace or the economic and social wellbeing of the actor and its population.

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[3] **Soft power**: the use of a nation's economic and cultural influence to compel other nations to take action as opposed to the use of force or military power (this being **hard power**). For further information see https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/soft-power

The following matrix summarizes and categorizes actorness' dimensions:

	Internal	External
Legal Competences	Authority	Recognition
Power Relations	Autonomy	Attractiveness
	Cohesion	Opportunity to act
	Credibility / trust	

Table I: Actorness' Dimensions based on TRIGGER, 2019

With this interpretation, the EU can be considered an international security actor given its internal cohesiveness, authority, and capacity to act, furthered with its presence and recognition in the international system.

Now that these concepts have been explained, two other concepts that are related to the topic should be stated.

Firstly, **superpower,** considered as a "*state that possesses military or economic might, or both, and general influence vastly superior to that of other states*" (Munro, 2020). There is often a disagreement over the characteristics that set a superpower apart from other major powers and, consequently, on whether any other states, if any, should be classified as superpowers. Nevertheless, there are some clear examples regarding which actors can be considered as "superpower" in the past, agreeing that the United Kingdom during the Victorian era and the United States during and immediately after World War II were so (Munro, 2020).

It can be said that the most crucial factor separating a superpower from a significant power is the possession of substantially superior military capabilities. Key elements of this include the ability to project military might anywhere in the world and a strong nuclear deterrence. Nonetheless, although the phrase "superpower" is most frequently used to refer to a state whose power is superior overall, it is also occasionally used more specifically to refer to a state whose power is superior in a single field: military or economic for instance (Munro, 2020).

When it comes to the EU, there are certain points made. There seems to be an agreement over the fact that the EU is a superpower as it is the world's greatest political union and single market, and thanks to its military significance. Additionally, its ability to sway other nations and international organizations comes from its strong economy as well, considered as "**soft power**". However, others may argue that the EU's lack of cohesion is a major impediment to becoming a superpower (Anoop, 2022).

The second term is **leadership**, given that the success, failure, and leadership philosophies or styles have an impact on world events and hence on international security. This refers both to individual leadership, that of political leaders, for example, or that of an entire nation or organization. Having said this, it's not easy to determine the degree of influence of an individual's agency (Lüdert, 2018).

In addition, leadership has been alive for thousands of years, regardless of whether it was studied or even conceived as such, that is why finding a single definition or term that simplifies and summarizes it, becomes a difficult task, since leadership encompasses more than one dimension and meaning. Despite this, several writers have argued a clear connection between leadership and **influence**, where a leader encourages an individual or a group of individuals to achieve specified goals while promoting a culture of shared learning and transformation (García-Solarte, 2015).

It's also important to note that leadership is a phenomenon that is influenced by the social and historical **context** in which it occurs, acknowledging that potential environmental changes might affect the current definition of leadership (Ascorra, 2008).

Moreover, leaders must be capable of changing their ideas when they are exposed to new knowledge and alternative viewpoints. All of this makes leaders and leadership influence international relations and political spheres (Lüdert, 2018).

2.3 The European Union

Now that the previous concepts have been laid out and that the terms related to international security are clearer, our main actor, the European Union, must be explained.

The European Union (EU) is a unique economic and political partnership between 27 European countries called '**Member States'** (MS) which, together, cover much of the continent[4]. Several agreements made in the years following World War II laid the foundation for the European Union as we know it today. Building on the theory that nations that trade with one another become economically interdependent and are therefore more likely to avoid war, the first step was to **promote economic cooperation**. The outcome was the establishment of the **European Economic Community** (EEC) in 1957, which was intended to boost economic cooperation between six nations: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (European Commission, 2022).

Since that time, 22 other nations have joined (the UK leaving the EU on January 31, 2020), and a sizable **single market**, also known as the internal market, has been established and is still growing to reach its full potential. Over time, the EU also came to play a significant pan-European role in the areas of **monetary**, **social**, and **security** policy. This has coincided with the adoption of various **Treaties** that define the EU's identity and scope of authority, or also referred as its competences (European Commission, 2022).

The Union is built on the ideals of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, particularly the rights of those

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[4] For further information on MS of the EU in 2022, see *Appendix Figure 1.*

who identify as members of minorities, as stated in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). These **principles** are shared by all the MS in a society and they cherishes diversity, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and gender equality (European Commission, 2022).

The 27 Member States make up the heart of the EU. Nevertheless, the distinctive aspect of the EU is that, while each MS has its own sovereign and independent status, it shares part of its sovereignty in certain areas that benefits them. This implies that MS give some of their decision-making authority to the shared institutions they have established, allowing for democratic decision-making at the EU level regarding certain issues of common concern (European Commission, 2022).

This is possible thanks to the EU's seven institutions, specifically to four of them which are the ones responsible for the decision-making. These include:

- The **European Commission**, which consists of 27 Commissioners and represents the interests of the EU.

- The directly elected **European Parliament**, which represents the interests of European citizens,

- The **Council of the European Union**, commonly known as the Council of Ministers and represents the national governments of EU members.

- The **European Council**, which assembles EU leaders to establish the political agenda for the EU.

The Commission also oversees daily governance, as well the implementation of EU programs like the one previously commented, Horizon EU, in addition to its legislative duties. Along with two advisory organizations, the national parliaments of the MS also participate in decision-making and legislation. These include the **European Committee of the Regions**, which is made up of regional and local government representatives, and the **European Economic and Social Committee**, which is made up of organization' and stakeholders' employees and employers (European Commission, 2022).

Every action the EU takes is based on treaties that were willingly and democratically agreed by all EU member states. The **Treaty on the European Union** (TEU) and the **Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union** (TFEU) are in fact the two major treaties that form the foundation of the European Union. These define the goals of the EU and give out the guidelines for how its institutions are to function, how decisions are to be taken, and how the EU and its Member States should interact (European Commission, 2022).

In 1957, the **European Economic Community (EEC)** was founded when the first treaty was signed in Rome. The **Single European Act** (1986), the **Treaty of Maastricht** (1992), the **Treaty of Amsterdam** (1997), the **Treaty of Nice** (2001), and the **Treaty of Lisbon (2007)** are the five succeeding treaties. The EU also prepared a **draft Constitutional Treaty** in 2003 with the intention of replacing all other treaties as the primary legal framework guiding EU operations. Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty was developed as a substitute, after votes against it in referendums were casted in France and the Netherlands in 2005. Due to the proposed treaty's unpopularity and resemblance to the abandoned EU constitution, it was defeated in an Irish referendum in 2008. Despite that, the Lisbon Treaty was later approved in a second, victorious vote in Ireland, and it became effective in December 2009 (CIVITAS, 2005/2015).

It is also worth noting that the European Union takes part in different policy areas comprising health, climate change and the environment, a stronger economy, social justice, EU's presence in the world, security, education, youth, borders, and migration among others. International affairs and security are the areas that interest us the most given the topic of this final degree project. The EU is able to speak and act as a single entity in international affairs thanks to the unified foreign and security policy, which also ensures the safety and prosperity of EU members. The **European External Action Service (EEAS)**, the EU's diplomatic tool, supports the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the EC (HR/VP) in the implementation of the policy. The ideals that inspired the EU's founding and growth, as well as those it aspires to advance in the global community, such as "peace", "democracy", "the rule of law", "human rights", and basic freedoms, serve as the foundation for the EU's external operations (European Commission, 2022).

3. State of the Art

The viewpoints of the various specialists who have written about the strategic importance of the European Union to global security differ according to their perspectives and research interests. Some of them argue that the EU's strengths lie in its **unique way of state cooperation**, whereas others claim that the EU's ability to serve as a **normative authority** in matters of global security is what gives it strategic worth.

Dr Sven Biscop[5] is a Belgian expert on strategy and the foreign policies of Belgium and the EU, who has published several articles on the EU's function as a security actor. Taking his view from his paper "*Revisiting the European Security Strategic*" he argues that the EU's strategic worth comes in its capacity to offer an **all-encompassing security approach** that integrates civil and military tools, which enables the EU to tackle security issues holistically by integrating military action with political, economic, and humanitarian initiatives. This strategy differs from those of other actors like NATO or the United States, which favour military prowess. He also points out that the EU's distinct institutional framework, which permits close collaboration between Member States and EU institutions, enables more efficient policy coordination and decision-making. All of this highlights the EU's **soft power**, and it may potentially **increase** its **efficacy as a security player** (2014).

Constraints to the **EU's strategic autonomy** are another topic of debate. The European Union may be seen as a level between its MS and the rest of the world, which consists of third-world nations, non-actor states and international organizations. Both have the potential to limit the EU's ability to act independently based on their strategic autonomy. Member States may thwart or obstruct efforts to strengthen the EU's strategic autonomy because they oppose it in a particular sector or because they value national action and autonomy and worry about the possible implications of increased EU competence. In the case of other actors, it can definitely be challenging for the EU, especially when it is dependent on other nations or international organizations for

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[5] Given his extensive knowledge, he will be cited later in *Chapter 6* as well.

certain strategic requirements or for the provision of essential resources, goods, or protection. Generally, international restrictions on the European Union's strategic autonomy have received most of the attention in recent studies (European Parliament Think Tank, 2022).

On this line, Jolyon Howorth is a British renowned professor and academic at several universities and a leading authority in the field of international security. In his book, "*Security and Defence Policy in the European Union*," Howorth makes the case that the EU's strategic significance resides in its capability to serve as a **global security actor** and advance stability, security, and democracy worldwide. He points out that the EU's normative strength, economic clout, cultural appeal, and soft power may all help make it more successful as a security player. Howorth also contends that the EU's security strategy should place more emphasis on crisis management, post-conflict rebuilding, and conflict prevention than just military action (2014).

In other numerous articles, Howorth has emphasized the significance of the EU's institutional frameworks when discussing the EU's efficacy as a security actor. He has stated that the EU's decision-making and integration procedures enable better cooperation and efficacy in dealing with security issues. In his 2019 paper "*Strategic Autonomy: Why It's Not About Europe Going it Alone*", he makes the case that above all, **autonomy** should be portrayed as "*a positive—in contradistinction to its negative, dependency*" (p.41). He believes that the EU should not depend on one ally indefinitely since doing so is neither prudent nor healthy. As so, he defends that in the long run the EU strategic autonomy should be made achievable by enhancing the EU-NATO partnership rather than by concentrating on defence efforts carried out by the Union alone, which at the same time, it will strengthen the transatlantic tie rather than erode it (2019). This idea of partnerships and external collaboration will be explored in *Chapter 7*, which studies the benefits of cooperating with other organizations.

Overall, academic arguments for the EU's strategic worth centre on its capacity to play a role in international security based on factors like its autonomy and soft power. This concept will be further challenged and developed in the subsequent chapters.

4. Hypothesis and Research Questions

The initial hypothesis for this thesis is that *the European Union's soft power is unquestionable, but its potential as a military actor in security and defence matters remains uncertain and it's still a work in progress*.

To answer this statement, these research questions will be asked throughout the project:

- What are the main pillars of the EU's soft power, and how have they helped the EU be a more effective actor in global security?

- How has the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU changed the EU's ability to be a military player, and what variables have influenced the CSDP's growth through time?

- How has the EU's engagement with other significant international organizations, such as the United Nations, NATO and OSCE, affected its security and defence policies?

- What chances does the EU have of becoming a more potent military player in the future, and what actions may be made to improve the EU's military prowess and cooperation with other international players?

To summarise, these past chapters discussed the theoretical foundation and current research on the EU's function as a player in international security. The idea has been put up that while the EU's soft power is undeniable, its potential as a military actor in security and defence is still unclear and under development. The research questions were created to investigate many facets of this theory, including the development of the CSDP and interactions between the EU and other international players. The chapters that follow will go further into each of these issues and offer a thorough evaluation of the EU's past, present situation and future potential as a player in international security.

5. Common Security and Defence Policy

Having looked at the scope of international security actors and our main stakeholder, the European Union, it is time to proceed to look at the origins of Europe's security and defence structure, dating back to World War II, which will allow to understand the current situation.

5.1 First traces of unified European Military Cooperation

Several efforts that started in the late 1940s made it possible for collaboration to expand throughout Europe. Examples include the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, which placed key resources under a supranational body, and the signing of the **Brussels Treaty** in 1948, which laid the groundwork for the Western European Union[6]. The European Community started looking into measures to coordinate members' foreign policy in the late 1960s. European leaders directed their foreign ministers to investigate the viability of further political unity during **The Hague Summit**, which took place in December 1969. (Lindstrom, 2022).

In response, the October 1970 Davignon Report introduced the idea of **European Political Cooperation (EPC)**. This paper outlined the goals of the EPC, which included position harmonisation, consultation, and, where necessary, joint measures. Additionally, it highlighted certain procedures, such as the quarterly meetings for the Political Directors who make up the Political Committee and the biennial meetings of the Foreign Affairs Ministers. EPC's overall goal was to streamline the EC Member States' consultation procedure. Moreover, the EPC allowed for the **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)** to be outlined in the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty established a unified institutional framework, the European Union, based on three pillars, the second

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[6] **Western European Union (WEU):** former grouping of 10 nations (Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) that served as a platform for the coordination of issues relating to European security and defence. It existed from 1955 until 2011. For further information see https://www.britannica.com/topic/Western-European-Union

of which was the Common Foreign and Security Policy, with its entrance into effect on 1 November 1993 (Lindstrom, 2022).

Although the Maastricht Treaty set forth ambitious goals for the European Union's external security and defence, it wasn't until the late 1990s, following the Balkan wars of secession, as well as a change in British policy, that specific provisions were made for a common European Security and Defence Policy with practical crisis management capabilities. As so, on June 3rd, 1999, the **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)** was launched following EU 15 European Council meeting in Cologne, strengthening the CFSP. Other summits followed, reinforcing, and specifying the priorities for civilian crisis management[7] (European Council, 2022).

The first ESDP missions and activities took place in 2003, making the program operational. Over 35 missions and activities for crisis management have been started by the EU since then. In December 2003, the EU also unveiled its first-ever **European Security Strategy**, which outlined the main dangers and difficulties confronting the continent. The policy was still in effect until a new EU Global Strategy was unveiled in June 2016 (Lindstrom, 2022).

On July 12th, 2004, the **European Defence Agency** was established, its purpose being to assist the MS and the European Council in enhancing European defence capabilities in crisis management and to support the ESDP. Nevertheless, the ESDP was renamed the **Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)** on December 1st, 2009, the day the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. Important add-ons were introduced after this treaty such as the provision for the establishment of the **European External Action Service** (EEAS)[8], delegations of the Commission in non-EU nations become delegations of the EU and

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[7] Civilian crisis management are unique missions, part of the CSDP, that aim to maintain stability, by civilian means, in conflicted areas. These can include the monitoring the fulfillment of peace accords (European Centre of Excellence for Civilian Crisis Management, n.d.). For further information see https://www.coe-civ.eu/the-coe/civilian-crisis-managment

[8] It was later launched in 2011, though made possible with the signature of the Treaty of Lisbon. For further information see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/defence-security/defence-security-timeline/

most relevantly, the introduction of two special clauses to the TEU and TFEU respectively (European Council, 2022):

- **Mutual Assistance Clause** (Article 42(7) TEU): According to this provision, EU nations have a duty to support and help any EU nation that is the target of a military attack on its territory in line with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. All EU nations must uphold this commitment (EUR-Lex, n.d.a).

- **Solidarity Clause** (article 222 TFEU): similar to the mutual assistance clause, It gives the EU and its MS the choice to collaborate; to stop the threat of terrorism on the soil of an EU nation; to help an EU nation that has suffered a natural or man-made calamity. (EUR-Lex, n.d.b).

As it can be seen, the Treaty of Lisbon improved EU member states' cooperation in addressing external challenges. On that line, in 2013, priority actions for defence were set out, however, it was not until 2016, where the **EU Global Strategy** on foreign and security policy to EU leaders was presented that significant "momentum" was placed. The strategy, "*Shared vision, common action: a stronger Europe*," provides a tactical outlook on the EU's position in the world. The plan identifies areas of agreement and offers a path ahead for both Europe and the rest of the world (European Council, 2022).

Three strategic goals were established in the field of security and defence: reacting to external conflicts and crises, enhancing partner capabilities, and defending the European Union and its inhabitants. The **Permanent Structured Cooperation** (PESCO), the **European Defence Fund** (EDF), the **European Peace Facility** (EPF) are some examples of concrete steps taken to meet these objectives (European Council, 2023).

These were furthered by the **EU Strategic Compass**, launched in 2022. This initiative seeks to clarify and provide direction for the EU's collective security and defence strategy up to 2030, as well as provide a shared understanding of the main risks and problems facing Europe in the short and medium term. The Compass evolves around its

main pillars: "partner", "invest", "act" and "secure"[9]. It is still in its initial steps though, given how it only came a reality last March 2022 (European Council, 2023).

5.2 The CSDP in perspective with the CFSP

Overall, it has been proven how the Lisbon Treaty has given the EU a bigger role, notably in the areas of budgetary and foreign policy control, as well as all the different efforts taken to provide Europe with a Common Security and Defence Policy. However, it is necessary to look further into the CSDP and its differences with the CFSP, as they are not the same entity as similar as their names can be.

As previously established, the **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP) was introduced by the TEU in 1993 and revised by the Lisbon Treaty. It was created aspiring to maintain peace, bolster global security, advance global cooperation, and build democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and basic freedoms among others (European Council, 2022).

As for the **Common Security and Defence Policy** (CSDP), it is a crucial component of the EU's CFSP, and it was put in place by the Lisbon Treaty. The CSDP is the primary policy framework through which Member States may create a strategic culture of security and defence in Europe, work together to resolve conflicts and crises, defend the Union and its inhabitants, and advance global peace and security (European Council, 2022).

Over the past ten years, the CSDP has developed policies at a very fast pace due to the tight geopolitical environment. In fact, since February 24, 2022, given Russia's action against Ukraine, geopolitics in Europe have been reset and more reasons were given for a collective European defence action (Legrand, 2022). Once the main distinction between the CFSP and the CSDP is made, further differences among them can be seen and summarised in the following table.

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[9] For further information on the Strategic Compass' pillars, see *Appendix Figure 2*. Likewise, more information regarding updates on the Compass is available in *Chapter 6*.

Institution / Characteristic	CFSP	CSDP
Full name	Common Foreign and Security Policy	Common Security and Defence Policy
Date of establishment	Treaty on European Union (TEU) in 1993 and revised in Lisbon (2009)	Lisbon Treaty in 2009
Mission	*"It aims to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter (Art.21, TEU)"*	Part of the CFSP that *"relates to defence and crisis management, including defence cooperation and coordination between EU member states"* (European Council, 2022 – further explained in Articles 42-46 in the TEU)
Main strategies and tools to achieve their mission	- Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) "Diplomacy" "Humanitarian aid" "Development cooperation" "Climate action" "Human rights" "Economic support" "Trade policy"	Military and civilian deployment through: "Conflict prevention" "Peace-keeping" "Joint disarmament operations" "Military advice" "Humanitarian assistance" "Post-conflict stabilisation"

Roles in the organization	The European Parliament reviews the CFSP and participates in its development, particularly by assisting the EU delegations, the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs), and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.	The primary institutional position is held by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who also serves as Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP). As of now, Josep Borrell, serves as the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Council, which makes decisions regarding the CSDP.
Other institutions	In the CFSP, the Commission has a relatively small impact as it doesn't have the authority to act. It can only "support" the High Representative when the Council is also consulted on matters pertaining to the CFSP (Article 30 of the Treaty on European Union). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also serves as the Vice-President of the Commission, to ensure coherence for all the EU's external actions.	Decisions on the CSDP are made by consensus between the European Council and the Council of the European Union (Article 42 of the TEU). Decisions involving the EDA (Article 45 of the TEU) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO, Article 46 of the TEU), for which qualified majority voting is applicable, are two prominent exceptions.

Table II: CFSP and CSDP differences based on European Council, Legrand and Malovec, 2022

Overall, defence is a critical component of the EU's distinctive toolkit and is essential to safeguarding European interests both now and in the future and it could not be done without the cooperation of the CFSP with the CSDP.

6. Contextualization: current state of the EU in International Security

To further understand the role of the European Union as an actor in the security and defence matters, its necessary to see the context and evaluate the current state of the EU in international security. For that, this chapter will look at the different tools that the EU has to ensure its role as a global security provider.

To go back into context, it is worth remembering that the **European Security Strategy** (ESS), the first strategy of the EU, was established in 2003, four years after the European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) came into place. Prior to then, Member States purposefully avoided having any kind of strategic discussion because of their divergent opinions on the **level of autonomy** that the EU policy should have in relation to national countries. To this day, MS frequently agree to differ on one element, allowing them to move forward on the subjects on which they do agree. This was the case for the development of the aforementioned CFSP and CSDP (Biscop, 2022).

In the next EU strategy, that of 2016, the **interests and values** of the EU were stated, and as claimed they "*go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in their interests*" (European Council, 2016, p.11). This represents a great advancement in the matter as the compromise of the EU and its MS is higher if their interests and values are intended to go together and evolve around the same ideas of **peace**, **security**, **prosperity**, and **democracy resilience**. As well, this strategy, opposed to the 2003 one, is more adapted to the international order and helps to keep them in track by prioritising the **degree of autonomy** needed to engage and ensure international security (Peña, 2020).

Having this in mind, and a collective goal set for the EU in the areas of foreign and security policy, the EU uses different mechanisms to work and settle crises, being diplomacy number one followed by the "respect for international rules", trade, humanitarian aid, and "development cooperation", among other things. In this chapter the tools that will have a bigger focus on are public diplomacy, the **European External Action Service** (EEAS) and the **European Peace Facility** (EPF). (European Union, n.d.).

Starting with **public diplomacy**, as the way to "*build bridges between the EU and the rest of the world*" as the EEAS says (EEAS, 2022b). **Collective action** is necessary to address global issues including climate change, global health, the eradication of poverty, conflict management and reaching the SDGs among others. The long-term **engagement** of citizens and potential partners throughout the world is the goal of the public diplomacy activities of the EU. By doing so, building trust, and cultivating understanding, the EU paves the way for future collaboration to address shared concerns (EEAS, 2022b).

Public diplomacy was considered as one of the strategic priorities for implementing the **EU Global Strategy**, by EU foreign ministers in October 2016. They noted "*the need of joining up efforts in the field of public diplomacy including strategic communication, inside and outside the EU*" (Council Conclusions, October 2016 cited in EEAS, 2022). This is how the cornerstones of a public diplomacy strategy for the EU were laid. Nevertheless, this won't be furthered investigated as it's day to day goal is mostly to establish **sustainable connections** between people, businesses, and services throughout the globe, rather than focusing on security (EEAS, 2022b).

For security matters, the other part of the diplomatic arm of the European Union is the strongest tools the EU has, and it is guided by the **European External Action Service** (**EEAS**). Since 2011, the EEAS, with a network of more than 140 delegations and offices, has carried out the EU's *Common Foreign and Security Policy* to advance security, stability, prosperity, and European interests across the world those settled by the strategy. The EEAS's job is to attempt to **coordinate** and bring coherence to EU's "international action" (EEAS, 2021b). The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), Josep Borrell as of now, provides **political direction** to the EEAS (EEAS, 2022b).

Working closely with the foreign and defence ministries of EU member states as well as with EU **institutions** is one of the **EEAS's strongest suits**. This conversation and closeness are crucial as the majority of decisions relating to foreign and security policy need the consent of all EU Members, under the supervision of the European Council, as the body

that makes the final decisions. Moreover, it has close working ties with the UN and other international and multilateral organizations (EEAS, 2021b).

The EU's and EEAS' involvement overseas are most evident in its **military and civilian CSDP** deployments and activities. The EU has carried out **36 foreign operations** employing civilian and military missions and operations in different nations around Europe, Africa, and Asia since the first CSDP missions and operations were initiated back in 2003. There are now **21 active CSDP missions and operations[10]**, including 9 military and 12 civilian ones. By the creation of these permanent political, military, and civilian organizations, the EU can fully accept its obligations for crisis management and operate as a **global security player,** emphasising its role in international security (EEAS, 2021b; EEAS, 2023a).

The planning and crisis response divisions for the CSDP are also part of the EEAS' competences. The HR/VP receives military and security-related advice from the **European Union Military Staff** (**EUMS**), the directorate-general of the EEAS, which serves as the primary source of collective military knowledge, providing "*early warning, situation assessment, strategic planning, Communications and Information Systems, concept development, training & education, and support of partnerships*" (EEAS, 2022a).

As part of the **Foreign Policy Instruments** (FPI), service in charge of covering operational costs in EU external action, the **European Peace Facility** (EPF) serves as an extra-budgetary tool, meaning MS contribute to it directly every year, that strengthens the EU's capacity to **guarantee global security**. It was founded in March 2021 with the goals of preserving peace, averting wars, and boosting global security through "*military operations and assistance measures*" and by the financing of "*CFSP actions with military and defence implications*" (European Commission, n.d. a). It is worth mentioning though that civil missions are not funded by the EPF and are instead covered by the CFSP budget. Back to the EPF, it is of extreme importance given how it even replaces both the **Athena**

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[10] For further information on the EU CSDP Missions and Operations, see *Appendix Figure 3*

Mechanism[11] and the **African Peace Facility[12]**, reaching new global levels and having up to EUR 5.69 billion available for the period 2021-2027 (European Commission, n.d. a).

With the establishment of the EPF, the EU is expanding its role as an **international security actor** and supporting the mission of the CSDP and that of the European Defence Fund (EDF). Moreover, it **improves the defence capabilities** of regional and international organizations as well as partner nations by distributing equipment and training. In this sense, it has been crucial as well in assisting Ukraine in its defence against the Russian military aggression (European Commission, 2022). Some of the latest EU collaborations through the EPF happened on February 3rd, after sending two brand-new off-road vehicles for moving military forces for Ukraine (European Commission, n.d. a). The EPF is still under construction and advancements are made every day, however if the EU funding becomes more available through the EPF, a quicker and more effective response to crisis and wars will be established, enabling the EU to further become an "*influential partner in international crisis management*" (Puig, 2022, p.107) and therefore a more effective and powerful international security actor.

Apart from the already mentioned tools, the CFSP also has other **agencies** and other mechanisms that help dealing with different security matters, as the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) or the European Defence Agency (EDA). All these bodies support CSDP operations and by working together with MS, they may improve and bolster their defence capabilities, **enhancing the EU's** own **collective role** in international security (EEAS, 2021b). Additionally, the EU is an advocate of a multilateralist, rules-based international system, keeping cooperation with partners at the core of the EU's strategy, apart from a strong internal coordination that has already been mentioned. In the next chapter, relations with other international organizations such as NATO and the UN will be explored.

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[11] **Athena Mechanism**: under the umbrella of the EU's CSDP, Athena was a system that funded the shared expenditures associated with military actions by the EU (For further information see https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/athena/)

[12] **African Peace Facility:** Body whose major objectives were to handle conflict prevention, management, and resolution throughout Africa. (For further information see https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/it/ip_19_3432

7. The bigger picture of International Security

As a recapitulation, within the EU, the CSDP framework is in place. This is intended to protect its Member States' citizens by joining and coordinating their defence capacities and security activities, such as "conflict prevention" or "joint disarmament operations" as seen before (European Council, 2023).

When it comes to the international sphere, the EU also believes and fights for the cooperation and coordination of Member States and global partners, including non-state actors or other international organisations, as a way of keeping and promoting peace and stability. This chapter will examine the EU's interactions with other actors and look at cases where the EU has acted as a military unit.

7.1 How does the EU interact with other actors?

7.1.1 The UN and Humanitarian Aid Efforts

The European Union, including all its Member States and Institutions, is a **global leader in providing humanitarian help**[13]. Since 1992, the European Commission has provided humanitarian relief in more than **110 nations**, helping millions of people every year, who have suffered from different conflicts or natural disasters among others. Emergency intervention sectors covered by EU humanitarian aid include food and nutrition, housing, healthcare, water and sanitation, and education (European Commission, n.d. c).

The EU-funded humanitarian aid is mostly provided in collaboration with NGOs, UN agencies, and other international organizations, and as of today they collab with more than 200 humanitarian partners (European Commission, 2022). Close monitoring of crisis situations and aid efforts is made possible by the Commission's extensive network of humanitarian professionals, which spans more than 40 countries worldwide. The European Union's emergency and disaster response is handled by the **Directorate-**

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[13] To see the timeline of EU Humanitarian Aid throughout history see https://civil-protection-humanitarian-aid.ec.europa.eu/who/30-years-eu-humanitarian-aid_en

General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), which is one of UNICEF's[14] key partners in humanitarian assistance (European Commission, n.d. c; UNICEF, n.d.).

Nevertheless, the EU and the UN cooperate as well on other issues, such as the development of peace operations and a better crisis management. Back on September 29th, 2020, the EU and the UN signed an agreement, "*Framework Agreement Between the United Nations and the European Union for the Provision of Mutual Support in the context of their respective missions and operations in the field*", enhancing collaboration and bolstering reaction in peace operations (EEAS, 2020).

This pact facilitates field missions and operations to operate in harmony and complement one another, by fostering mutual knowledge of their logistics and respective processes. The Framework Agreement reinforces the shared commitment of the EU and UN to **multilateralism** and a **rules-based** system. It also complements current cooperation agreements between the two organizations and emphasises the importance of how shared commitment strengthens strategic and operational cooperation against to global crises (EEAS, 2020).

It is worth mentioning that the partnership between the EU and the UN in crisis management and peacekeeping has grown over time, and both organizations have supported different methods of cooperation. For example, they have joined their cooperation efforts in **Africa and the Middle East** since the 2003 start in the Western Balkans. As of now, they closely coordinate operations in **Kosovo, Somalia, Libya**, and the **Central African Republic**. They have also provided a coordinated help towards **Syria**, who suffered a "*protracted armed conflict*" and they have as well addressed the ongoing refugee crisis in **Turkey**, as the nation taking in the most number of refugees (EEAS, 2020; European Commission, 2022).

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[14] UNICEF is the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, which was established on December 11, 1946, to give food and medical treatment to mothers and children in nations that had been heavily affected by WWII. However, it became part of the UN system back in 1950. (For further information see https://www.unicef.org/about-unicef or https://www.un.org/en/ccoi/unicef-united-nations-childrens-fund).

7.1.2 NATO and EU Cooperation

Continuing with another key world institution, comes the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (NATO), **a political and military alliance** composed of 30 members**,** whose main purpose is to "*guarantee the freedom and security of its members through political and military means*". This includes the promotion of "democratic values", "peaceful resolution of disputes" and "crisis-management operations" if diplomatic matters failed (NATO, n.d.).

NATO and the EU share strategic interests and are confronted with similar challenges, such as terrorism or cyber threats among others. Additionally, both organisations **share most members** (21 member countries in common)**, interests,** and **values**, making them similar. As crucial partners, they collaborate and work together in "crisis management", "capability development", "political consultations", as well as providing support to their shared partners in the east and south (NATO, 2023b).

Their relation was officially **institutionalized** in the early **2000s**, expanding on initiatives launched in the 1990s with the Western European Union[15] to encourage increased European involvement in defence concerns. In fact, the WEU participated in and **helped build** NATO and it even ascended to become the EU's primary military body in the 1990s, but it gave that position up in 2001 (NATO, 2023b).

Since its formation, there have been many keystones in their cooperation, with several declarations and arrangements to further boost their partnership. The development of the European defence capabilities is essential in cooperative efforts to increase the **safety of the Euro-Atlantic region** while preserving coherence and efficiency and avoiding "unnecessary duplication" of efforts or resources. Effective use of both military and civilian means is necessary for this (NATO, 2023b).

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[15] During the time, the Western European Union (WEU) was the security and defence arm of the European Union. In 1999, the WEU handed over crisis management to the European Union. (For further information see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm under "*Milestones*").

In order to strengthen their **strategic partnership**, the EU and NATO have underlined their priorities and enhanced consultations. For this, they have signed **three Joint Declarations** as of now, outlining actions they want to take together and the different areas they want to target. The first one was signed in 2016 in Warsaw, the second one in 2018 in Brussels and the last one this past January 2023 at NATO Headquarters. (NATO, 2023b).

Charles Michel, President of the European Council, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission and Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization concluded the following on this past Joint Declaration meeting (NATO, 2023a):

> *"In signing this declaration, we will take the NATO-EU partnership forward in close consultation and cooperation with all NATO Allies and EU Member States, in the spirit of full **mutual openness** and **in compliance with the decision-making autonomy** of our respective organisations and **without prejudice** to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members. In this context, we view **transparency** as crucial. We encourage the fullest possible **involvement** of the NATO Allies that are not members of the EU in its initiatives. We encourage the fullest possible involvement of the EU members that are not part of the Alliance in its initiatives. We will **assess progress** on a regular basis."*

Their declaration exacerbates previous partnerships and plans on building even further progress in regard to the autonomy of the organisations and its Member States.

It is also important to note the cooperation in the field that the EU and NATO share. These include preventing illegal human trafficking in the **Central Mediterranean** and the **Aegean**, acting as a peacekeeping force in **Kosovo** and in other parts of the **Western Balkans,** carrying out civilian and military operations in the **Middle East**, such as in

Afghanistan[16], ensuring maritime safety by undergoing anti-piracy naval missions in **Somalia**, and others (NATO, 2022; NATO, 2023b).

Overall, even if the EU and NATO have different structures, they do share common goals, members, and challenges. As so, their cooperation increases exponentially, and they are willing to further achieve more milestones[17] in ensuring safety in the Euro-Atlantic region and providing a joint response.

7.1.3 OSCE

The **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe** (OSCE) was established after the signature of the Helsinki Act in 1975, comprising a politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimension. It has 57 participating states and 16 OSCE missions and field operations as of now (EEAS, 2021c).

The EU and OSCE work closely at all levels, including on the ground, and have a strong shared interest in collaborating on security-related debates and conflict prevention throughout Europe. The EU and OSCE encourage constant political communication among their participants and work together to pursue shared goals and find common solutions. This significate an overlap in the two organizations' agendas. More than two thirds of the OSCE's **primary budget are provided by EU Member States and the EU**, while they additionally fund a variety of extra-budgetary OSCE (EEAS, 2021c).

Examples of EU support for the OSCE include helping their Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) build national electoral and human rights institutions and managing crises, such as in the **Western Balkans**. Other present

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[16] After the fall of the Afghan government and its security forces, NATO concentrated on guaranteeing the safe departure of their personnel, both from allies and partners as well as of affiliated Afghans. However, by May 1st, 2021, the NATO Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which had closely collaborated with the EU's Rule of Law Mission (EUPOL) started to withdraw and the mission was concluded in early September 2021. (For further information see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm).

[17] To see a detailed explanation of the EU-NATO cooperation events see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49217.htm under "Milestones".

missions include **Albania**, **Bosnia and Herzegovina** or **Serbia** among others (EEAS, 2021c; OSCE, n.d.). Overall, closer relations between the EU and the OSCE are maintained and kept at stake, and together by taking diplomatic initiatives and joint decisions and operations they ensure stability, security, and cooperation in Europe (EEAS, 2021).

7.2 Case study of the European Union acting as a military unit

As it has been seen, the EU strongly cooperates with other international organizations and global partners, ensuring and fostering security, defence, and stability. The European Union has conducted military operations on several occasions as previously mentioned. In this section, a brief case study of the EU acting as a military unit will be mentioned.

The **Operation Atlanta** is an EU-led naval operation that started back in 2008 to improve maritime safety in the **North-western Indian Ocean**, particularly to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia. Some of the figures and facts they have achieved are the delivery of 3.116.862 tonnes of food and aid, the transfer of 171 pirates to competent authorities for their prosecution and the requisition of 13.809 kg of narcotics. Their budget is decided by the **European Peace Facility,** entity previously discussed on *Chapter 3 and 4*. Noteworthy, EUNAVFOR Operation ATALANTA was given a new mandate in late 2022 that **prolonged the operation through December 2024** while considering its accomplishments, difficulties, and future. In fact, this new mandate aims to elevate Atlanta to the status of a **maritime security provider** for the entire North-western Indian Ocean[18] (European Union Naval Force, n.d.a; European Union Naval Force, n.d.b).

All in all, each EU mission is a different case, and the military conduct of the EU will depend on its Member States "green light". However, as of now, the EU has played a consistent role in maintaining international security by itself and with its global partners.

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[18] For further information regarding their mission, accomplishments and how they operate, please see https://eunavfor.eu/mission

8. Where are we headed?

As it has been seen the European Union has been an important international security actor back in the days and as of now. However, it is important to look ahead to the future. In this chapter I will consider different challenges and developments that can influence how the EU plays a part in international security in the years to come.

First, the increase in **non-traditional security threats**, such as pandemics, cyberthreats, counter terrorism, migration, hybrid threats, and climate change, is a significant trend that is likely to persist. This signifies that a shift is needed, where both the EU and other international actors will need to cooperate hand on hand to successfully address these threats and look at them through a multidimensional lens (Rehrl, 2022).

Jochen Rehrl, editor and collaborator of the "*Handbook on CSDP*", wrote regarding the evolving challenges in security, especially on migration that there is an "*inextricable link between internal and external security. In the past few years, we have seen a massive influx of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and realised that **no single country can face this challenge alone**"* (p.110, 2022). This highlights how interconnected all matters are now due to globalization and how the internal sphere collapses with the external one, **erasing all types of borders** and exacerbating the need for **close cooperation** among Member States. Regarding this, Rehrl (2022) keeps on commenting that:

> "*Migration is **not a seasonal phenomenon**; the pressure will likely stay. Our systems were not built with this scenario in mind. Therefore, we are seeing overstretches of capacity, **loss of trust and credibility** in our democratic governments and as a result the rise of populist political parties taking advantage of this situation. Moreover, the **solidarity** between EU Member States, which is eloquently laid down in Article 23 and Article 3(5)4 of the Treaty on European Union, seems to have been weakened. This results in a **decrease in cohesion** inside the Union*" (p.111).

The **Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)** is already working on this matter and has shown to be a **valuable** tool in helping the EU and its MS manage migration flows, along with other options available to the EU to better handle the migratory issue.

Nevertheless, it's also necessary to **address the underlying causes** of the migration problem or of that of cyber security issues for instance and target them together, reinstituting cohesion and the Union's stability, as well as closely collaborating with its external partners, such as NATO, the OSCE of the UN, as we have seen in *Chapter 5* (Rehrl, 2022).

Second, the **multipolar world** that we live in that debilitates and complicates reviving **multilateralism**. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, multilateralism is considered the "*process of organizing relations between groups of three or more states*". And it includes an "***indivisibility** of interests among participants, a commitment to **diffuse reciprocity**, and a system of **dispute settlement** intended to enforce a particular mode of behaviour*" *(Scott, 2022).* Josep Borrell, HR/VP, in a debate on EU foreign policy back in March 2021 pronounced that "*The world today is becoming more multipolar and less multilateral*". The difficulty for Europe is to balance these aspects while adjusting to the new power structure and seeking to lessen the political division of the world into opposing extremes (EEAS, 2021a).

The configuration of power has been changing over the past 30 years, going from a bipolar world to a "**complex multipolarity**" that explores the relations of established powers and institutions such as United States or the European Union with new emerging powers, like Russia or China or other non-state or regional actors, such as NGOs or terrorist organizations. Josep Borrell concludes his speech saying that "*we are not obliged to choose between multipolarity which is a given and **multilateralism which is an ambition**",* meaning that both states and organizations should partner up with each other to collectively face challenges, improve international relations and protect global security (EEAS, 2021a).

Third, a brief mention of **sovereignty conflicts** in the European Union may be included too. The refugee crisis, efforts to maintain the euro, and the repercussions of Brexit among others, have put sovereignty-related concerns at the centre of EU politics in recent years. This has led to unprecedented **levels of disagreement** over the principles guiding the EU's shared policies and what many see as brand-new **losses of sovereignty**.

Nonetheless, the idea of sovereignty is still crucial for comprehending European integration and properly functioning as one international solid security actor (Brack, Coman, & Crespy, 2019).

In regard to this sovereignty issue, to protect citizens and the international peace and security, the **Strategic Compass of the EU**, previously mentioned on *Chapter 3,* came into place in March 2022 to further guide their collective action. As one year has passed since its approval, therefore the past March 20th, 2023, the EU's defence and foreign ministers assessed the EU Strategy Compass's **implementation's progress**. The overall conclusion of this yearly report demonstrates that the Strategic Compass performed exactly what it was intended to do: **guide the EU** in the **correct direction**, **keep them** there and **reduce the gap** between their **goals** and their actual **behaviour**[19] (EEAS, 2023b).

As a reminder, the Strategic Compass was organized on **four pillars**: "act", "secure", "invest" and "partner". In less than a year, to help their partners, the EU has **increased their visibility** and invested in new initiatives, sending three missions, and providing Ukraine for instance with both lethal and non-lethal weaponry. Furthermore, under the "act" pillar there is as well the "**adoption of a new Military Mobility Action Plan**", back in November 2022. This adoption aims to improve the EU's security, by striking for a **quick mobility of military personnel** and **their equipment** both inside and outside the Union. This action plan targets alliances, infrastructure regulatory constraints, and readiness for cyberattacks and hybrid threats. This is a mechanism to look up for in future events as it can continue to increase the "*swiftness*" and "*flexibility*" of their decision-making (EEAS, 2023b, p.9). In fact, as of now, by **speeding the requests** for proposals and frontloading the available military mobility funds, they have greatly

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[19] More concrete examples on the annual progress of the implementation of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence can be seen in *Annex Figure 4* or further investigated in https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/StrategicCompass_1stYear_Report.pdf

Likewise, updates regarding the European Peace Facility (EPF) which relate to the Strategic Compass can be found in *Annex Figure 5* or https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2023/Factsheet-EU-peace-facility_2023-03.pdf

increased their efforts to adapt dual-use transport infrastructure[20]. Noteworthy, in 2022, the Commission invested up to EUR 1 billion in dual-use transportation infrastructure for military mobility (EEAS, 2023b).

Other mechanisms or institutions that should be prioritized when looking at the future are without a doubt the **European Peace Facility** (EPF), entity discussed in *Chapters 3*, *4 and 5,* which has allowed a more "**integral**" **cooperation** with bilateral, regional, and multilateral **partners**. These include a closely collaboration with the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the African Union (AU), and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) among others that should be further enhanced. Other key partnerships that should continue to be explored in the upcoming years are those with **Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, Africa and the Indo-Pacific.** Notable**,** the **European Defence Agency** (EDA) and the **European Defence Fund (EDF)** mentioned in *Chapters 3 and 4*, should also be key institutions in the establishment of dialogue between Member States and with different partners outside of the EU, as well as the strengthening of their defence capability (EEAS, 2023b).

Additionally, the EU will only be able to fulfil the commitments and ambitions of their Strategic Compass and develop into a "**more assertive, credible**, **and decisive security provider"** (p.22) for citizens, partners, and the global community by working together, accelerating their efforts, mobilizing their political will, and using all the available resources and tools at their disposal (EEAS, 2023b).

After all, when looking into the future, the EU will have to consider the different trends and challenges that will guide the world, such as multipolarity, evolving security challenges and sovereignty conflicts. By keeping this in mind and by again working together, the Union will manage to remain a powerful security international actor.

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[20] Dual-use goods and technology are those that can be utilized for defence, intelligence gathering, and law enforcement in addition to serving various civic requirements. For more information refer to https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/dual-use-export-controls.html#:~:text=Dual%2Duse%20goods%20and%20technology,security%20risks%20and%20emerging%20technologies.

9. Conclusions

As it has been seen throughout this final degree project, the European Union has increasingly become an **important actor in international security**, as well as a **valuable partner** for other states and international organizations around the globe. With time, the EU has managed to evolve and progress in the areas of security and defence, **enhancing its capabilities and influence**, to slowly turn into a **military superpower**. While some may argue that the EU's consideration as a superpower is questionable, after having studied its "**degree of actorness**" and its **leadership style**, it can be said that the EU is a superpower that has acquired a high amount of "**soft power**" over the years of its existence. Likewise, the EU is slowly gaining more "**hard power**" and **autonomy,** confirming my hypothesis that its potential as a military actor in security and defence matters is still in progress.

Since the European Union came into place, promoting economic cooperation and fostering global relations have been at the EU's core, which has been shown through different actions. For instance, the European Union provided a **common framework** for its Member States for coordinated action on security and defence issues. Firstly, with the Maastricht Treaty (1993), the **Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)** was outlined, which was furthered and made more practical by the **European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)** following a European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999. The ESDP later became the **Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)** with the Lisbon Treaty (2009). This included the provision for the establishment of the **European External Action Service (EEAS)**, the diplomatic arm of the EU, which was launched in 2011 and oversees most **military and civilian deployments and activities**.

To promote its interests and values and to bolster international peace and security, the European Union also has **other tools** available apart from the CFSP, the CSDP or the EEAS, such as **public diplomacy**, the introduction of the **Strategic Compass**, the **European Union Military Staff (EUMS),** the **European Defence Fund (EDF),** the **European Peace Facility (EPF),** as well as many **agencies** among others. These help to coordinate and guide Member States' defence capabilities and their behaviour to

ultimately act coherently and collectively as a **strong united player**. While each instrument has a different goal and mission, they all together form the context of the current state of the EU in international security.

Nevertheless, the European Union does not only intend to cooperate on an internal level but at an external one too. As so, the EU promotes interaction and collaboration with different actors in the **international sphere**. While the EU also seeks partnerships with non-state or regional actors, it is true that they have a stronger bond and alliance with the **United Nations (UN),** the **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)** and the **Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).** Their cooperation has enabled the EU to act as a military unit on different occasions, to provide humanitarian relief, preserve maritime security, help with peacekeeping, share efforts, and ease decision-making autonomy both inside and outside the Union.

Therefore, it could be said that the European Union is an **international security actor** and that it plays a **key role in safeguarding peace and stability** in Europe and its whereabouts. Nonetheless, looking into the future certain things must be considered such as the different **trends** and **challenges** that will most likely shape the future of the globe, and in consequence, that of the EU as an international security provider. Non-traditional threats, multilateralism in the age of complex multipolarity and sovereignty conflicts are some of the few examples.

All in all, the European Union will have to **remain together** and look into ways to face all the possible challenges and threats collectively and as a coherent whole, embracing all opportunities towards progress, innovation and a coherent integration. Already with the establishment of the **Strategic Compass** and the constant development of its institutions and mechanisms, such as the EPF, the European Union can speed up and improve its reaction capacity. With a regular review of these tools, as well as with the **exploration of new alliances** and the **deepening of current partnerships**, the European Union will be able to strengthen its defence capabilities and continue to be a **powerful and decisive international security actor** and further develop its potential as a **military actor.**

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11. Appendix

## Figure 1: Member States of the European Union in 2022

Source: European Commission, 2022. Available at https://op.europa.eu/webpub/com/eu-what-it-is/en/#chapter0

Figure 2: Strategic Compass' pillars

ACT
- Up to 5,000 strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity
- Live exercises on land and at sea
- Enhance Military Mobility
- Reinforce civilian and military CSDP missions and operations
- More rapid and flexible decision-making

SECURE
- Hybrid Toolbox and Response Teams
- Cyber Diplomatic Toolbox and Cyber Defence Policy
- Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Toolbox
- EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence
- Coordinated Maritime Presences around the world

INVEST
- Spend more and better – defence spending and incentives for cooperation
- Strategic enablers and next generation capabilities
- Boost defence technological innovation to reduce strategic dependencies

PARTNER
- Strengthened strategic partnership with NATO and the UN
- Cooperation with regional partners (OSCE, AU, ASEAN)
- Strong bilateral partnerships
- Military assistance to partners through the European Peace Facility

Source: European Union External Action, March 2022. Available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/2022-03-21_strategic_compass-factsheet.pdf

Figure 3: European Union CSDP Missions and Operations

Source: European Union External Action (January 2023). EU Missions and Operations. Available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/EU-mission-and-operation_2023.pdf

Figure 4: Infographic - The Strategic Compass one year on: an assessment

Source: European Council, March 2023. Available at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/infographics/strategic-compass-one-year-on/

Figure 5: Infographic - The European Peace Facility and the Strategic Compass

THE EUROPEAN PEACE FACILITY

In an era of strategic competition and complex security threats, the European Peace Facility (EPF) expands the EU's ability to provide security for its citizens and its partners. It enables the EU to provide all types of equipment and infrastructure to the armed forces of EU partners, in compliance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Investing in peace and security

The EPF **maximises the impact, effectiveness and sustainability** of overall EU external action in peace and security:

delivery of equipment and infrastructure

rapid support to EU partners

respect of Human Rights

€ 7.9 BILLION (2021-2027) The EPF **is a fund worth €7.9 billion** financed outside the EU Budget for a period of seven years (2021-2027), with a **single mechanism** to finance all Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) actions in military and defence areas.

SUPPORTING SECURITY AND DEFENCE GLOBALLY

With the EPF, the EU:

funds the common costs of military CSDP missions and operations;

supports Peace Support Operations led by international and regional organisations, as well as partner countries around the world;

strengthens the capacities of third States and regional and international organisations relating to military and defence matters.

MONITORING AND COMPLIANCE

The EPF includes measures to:

ensure an adequate risk assessment and mitigating measures in compliance with international human rights law, international humanitarian law and EU arms export laws;

monitor the respect of international law and commitments by the beneficiary;

allow civil society to report on violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

Assistance under the EPF can be suspended or terminated any time by the Council in case of infringement and/or abuse.

ASSISTANCE MEASURES ADOPTED IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE WESTERN BALKANS

EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD

• Ukrainian Armed Forces (EUR 3.6 billion) — military equipment (lethal and non-lethal) and maintenance, repair and refit services of military equipment to support Ukraine to defend its territory and population against the Russian aggression; (EUR 61 million) — EUMAM Ukraine: ammunition, military equipment and platforms designed to deliver lethal force as well as equipment and supplies not designed to deliver lethal force, transportation, custody, and maintenance and repair of the military equipment provided for supporting training;
(EUR 31 million) — field hospitals and medical equipment, demining and engineering equipment, ground mobility, logistical assets and cyber-defence

• Georgian Defence Forces (EUR 12.75 million) — medical and engineering equipment, ground mobility assets;
(EUR 20 million) — medical, logistics, engineering and cyber-defence services

• Armed Forces of the Republic of Moldova (EUR 7 million) — medical equipment and explosive ordnance disposal equipment; (EUR 40 million) — logistics, mobility, command and control, cyber-defence, unmanned aerial reconnaissance and tactical communications

WESTERN BALKANS

• Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUR 10 million) — demining equipment, transport and medical vehicles; (EUR 10 million) — field equipment, key tools for military engineering and CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) materiel

• Balkan Medical Task Force (EUR 6 million) — mobility assets, medical components, laboratory, IT and communication equipment

• Army of North Macedonia (EUR 9 million) — strengthening the capacities of the Army to reach NATO capability targets by providing logistics support, medical, CBRN and engineering equipment, information and communication systems, intelligence capacities and training equipment

MIDDLE EAST

• Lebanese Armed Forces (EUR 6 million) — medical and individual equipment

• Jordanian Armed Forces (EUR 7 million) — military medical services, engineer brigades and operational units in charge of securing Jordan's borders

STRATEGIC COMPASS

ASSISTANCE MEASURES ADOPTED IN AFRICA

• Mozambican Armed Forces / EU Training Mission in Mozambique
(EUR 89 million) — ground and amphibious mobility assets, technical devices and a field hospital

• Malian Armed Forces / EU Training Mission in Mali* (EUR 24 million)

- support to the Non-Commissioned Officers' Academy in Banankoro

- renovating training infrastructure in Sévaré-Mopti and non-lethal equipment**

• Nigerien Armed Forces (EUR 65 million) — increasing logistics support, communication capacities and reducing vulnerabilities, such as by the establishment of an Armed Forces Technician Training Centre and the construction of a forward operating base, as well as the development of a new signal and command support battalion in Téra in conjunction with the EU military partnership mission in Niger

• Rwanda Defence Force in Mozambique (EUR 20 million) — collective and personal equipment, costs related to the strategic airlift

• Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania (EUR 12 million) — light boats, individual protective equipment and medical equipment

Continuation of support to military components of African-led Peace Support Operations as previously funded under the African Peace Facility. Two assistance measures taking the form of general programmes for support to the African Union in 2021 (EUR 130 million) and 2022-24 (EUR 600 million), under which so far:

• African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM /ATMIS) (EUR 270 million) — support to the military component of AMISOM/ ATMIS, including troop allowances, to enable the gradual handover of security responsibilities to the Somali security forces

• Somali National Army (EUR 45 million) — military training facility and non-lethal equipment to battalions and soldiers trained by EUTM, enhancing the capacity of the Somali National Army to implement the Somali Transition Plan

• Multi-National Joint Task Force against Boko Haram - MNJTF (EUR 100 million) — enhancing operational effectiveness of the MNJTF, aiming to create a safe and secure environment in the areas affected by the activities of Boko Haram and other terrorist groups

• G5 Sahel Joint Force (EUR 35 million) — strengthening the resilience of the Joint Force and increasing its capacities for equipment maintenance with a view to ensuring its sustainability

• Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) (EUR 15 million) — support to the military component of SAMIM including camp fortifications, medical equipment, vehicles and boats, as well as technological devices

* The EU follows developments in Mali very closely.   *** Member States have decided to suspend these two components.*

STRATEGIC COMPASS

Source: European External Action Service, March 2023. Available at
https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/european-peace-facility-0_en