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**THE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPLED
NEGOTIATION TO THE COLD WAR**

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ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the impact that principled negotiation methods had on the Cold War and the benefits it can have towards resolving international disputes. To do this I focus on the four summits that were conducted between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev during the period of 1985-1988. These four summits took place in Geneva in 1985, Reykjavik in 1986, Washington in 1987 and Moscow in 1988. I believe these four summits give us a vital insight into the mindset of the two men and clearly highlights the various negotiation techniques on display. These summits were closely followed throughout the world, with extreme levels of pressure being placed on both men. I believe that this thesis highlighting the use of principled negotiation in these summits will help to strengthen the claims that principled negotiation can be used to resolve international disputes. I believe there is a gap in the literature highlighting the importance of principled negotiation at these summits, with historians and scholars often focusing on other elements that helped to end the Cold War. In my literature review and discussion, I examine some of these alternative methods that scholars have highlighted. These methods include coercive diplomacy, distributive bargaining and altercating which many historians believe were the main negotiation techniques used during this era of the Cold War. Using this research, I provide my own point of view which highlights that principled negotiation was an instrumental negotiation style used by both men during this period. I use a mix of primary and secondary research to develop my arguments and analyse the benefits of principled negotiation.

The findings of research highlight the importance principled negotiation can have to resolving international disputes, providing a stable and reliable platform for both parties to achieve mutual gains, while also helping to develop the relationship. It is evident that principled negotiation is a reliable tool in resolving international disputes, with the analysis also highlighting the negative effects that alternative methods such as positional bargaining can have on a negotiation. This research contributes to the existing body of literature as it gives an alternative outlook on cold war negotiations, while also providing a case study that gives further validity to claims that principled negotiation can be used to resolve international disputes.

Key Words: Cold War, Principled negotiation, Soviet Union, United States, Gorbachev, Reagan

RESUMEN

Esta tesis investiga el impacto que los métodos de negociación basados en principios tuvieron en la Guerra Fría y los beneficios que pueden tener para la resolución de disputas internacionales. Para ello me centro en las cuatro cumbres que se celebraron entre Ronald Reagan y Mikhail Gorbachov durante el periodo 1985-1988. Estas cuatro cumbres tuvieron lugar en Ginebra en 1985, Reikiavik en 1986, Washington en 1987 y Moscú en 1988. Creo que estas cuatro cumbres nos ofrecen una visión vital de la mentalidad de los dos hombres y ponen claramente de relieve las diversas técnicas de negociación que se pusieron en práctica. Estas cumbres fueron seguidas muy de cerca en todo el mundo, con niveles extremos de presión sobre ambos hombres. Creo que esta tesis, que destaca el uso de la negociación basada en principios en estas cumbres, contribuirá a reforzar las afirmaciones de que la negociación basada en principios puede utilizarse para resolver disputas internacionales. Creo que existe un vacío en la bibliografía que destaca la importancia de la negociación basada en principios en estas cumbres, ya que los historiadores y estudiosos suelen centrarse en otros elementos que contribuyeron a poner fin a la Guerra Fría. En mi revisión bibliográfica y mi debate, examino algunos de estos métodos alternativos que han destacado los estudiosos. Estos métodos incluyen la diplomacia coercitiva, la negociación distributiva y el altercado, que según muchos historiadores fueron las principales técnicas de negociación utilizadas durante esta época de la Guerra Fría. Utilizando esta investigación, ofrezco mi propio punto de vista, que destaca que la negociación basada en principios fue en realidad un estilo de negociación instrumental utilizado por ambos hombres durante este periodo. Utilizo una mezcla de investigación primaria y secundaria para desarrollar mis argumentos y analizar los beneficios de la negociación basada en principios.

Los resultados de la investigación ponen de relieve la importancia que la negociación basada en principios puede tener para resolver disputas internacionales, proporcionando una plataforma estable y fiable para que ambas partes consigan beneficios mutuos, al tiempo que contribuye al desarrollo de la relación. Es evidente que la negociación basada en principios es una herramienta fiable para resolver disputas internacionales, y el análisis también pone de relieve los efectos negativos que pueden tener en una negociación métodos alternativos como la negociación posicional. Esta investigación

contribuye al corpus bibliográfico existente, ya que ofrece una perspectiva alternativa de las negociaciones de la guerra fría, al tiempo que proporciona un estudio de caso que da más validez a las afirmaciones de que la negociación basada en principios puede utilizarse para resolver disputas internacionales.

Palabras Clave: Guerra Fría, Negociación basada en principios, Unión Soviética, Estados Unidos, Gorbachov, Reagan

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1. INTRODUCTION

Since its publication in “Getting to Yes” in 1981, Principled negotiation has been widely used in the business and legal world. The negotiation method developed by Roger Fisher and William Ury alongside an expert team at Harvard, is an efficient negotiation process that focuses on reaching mutually beneficial agreements between parties, following a strict and formulated framework. The development of a problem solving system was a reaction to the popular positional bargaining method, which led to negative and anti-social behaviour (Nolan-Haley & Hinds, 2003). Unlike previous negotiation methods, principled negotiation allows the parties to work together to satisfy the interests of all parties involved. The method promotes fairness and equity, helping to preserve and even enhance the relationships between the parties involved. This will then lead to more durable agreements, reducing costs that would be associated with conflicts. Another factor that has led to its implementation into society is its adaptability to various contexts. Since its introduction, principled negotiation has been used to settle legal disputes, business deals, personal matters, and even international disputes. The popularity of this method can be seen throughout the world, with examples of this being seen in Ireland during the “Good Friday Agreement” in 1998 (Nolan-Haley & Hinds, 2003) and in America during the “Camp David Accords” in 1978 (Zwier, 2013). Problem solving systems have become the dominant negotiation method and many countries have adopted these techniques, including the United States. Throughout history, the United States had imposed their financial and military power on surrounding nations, often using threats and force to gain an advantage in international relations. This style of negotiation characterized much of the early “Cold War” negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. During this period the United States would have nine different presidents, with the Soviet Union being led by eight different men. This period would be defined by mistrust, fear, and hatred between the two nations, with both sides making little efforts to mend the broken relationship between the two superpowers. Presidents such as Richard Nixon did help to somewhat mend the broken relationship between the states, but real progress would not be seen until the mid-1980’s, where Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev would come

together to try and finally end the Cold War. Examples of Principled negotiation can be seen throughout this period, most notably during their four summits across various locations between 1985 to 1988. The use of a principled approach to the negotiations can be seen as a major factor in developing relations between the two countries and finally ending the Cold War, highlighting the importance that such negotiation styles can have, especially in the world today.

2. OBJECTIVES

The primary aim of this thesis is to explore the application of principled negotiation tactics in the diplomatic efforts between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Cold War and its effectiveness in dealing with international affairs. To do this I will first analyse the existing literature surrounding the negotiations styles of both Gorbachev and Reagan, and expert opinions on principled negotiation. I will then use primary research to further deepen my analysis of this topic, using my case study of the four diplomatic summits between the Soviet Union and the United States as the basis of my investigation. While the main objective of my thesis is clear, there are secondary objectives that I would like to develop that will help to deepen my analysis and give me a comprehensive understanding of the overall topic. I believe that the following secondary objectives will enable the achievement of the primary objective:

1. Identify key diplomatic interactions between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Cold War where principled negotiation was evident.
2. Analyse other methodologies and strategies used by both men during this period.
3. Evaluate the outcomes of these negotiation efforts.

These objectives are designed to investigate the role that principled negotiation played in this period of instability and tension that gripped the world for over forty years, highlighting the impact and/or lack of impact that it had on the conclusion of the negotiations. This analysis of one of the most intense and complex negotiations in living history aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of diplomatic negotiation tactics and their long terms effects on international relations. I believe this thesis will be able to highlight the power that principled negotiation can hold and the positive impact it can have on a negotiation, further cementing its position as an effective negotiation tool.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. *Research design:*

This thesis will use a qualitative approach when exploring the impact and application of principled negotiation on the conclusions of the Cold War. I have chosen a qualitative approach as diplomatic negotiations can be quite complex and nuanced and thus requires in depth analysis of perceptions, contexts, and strategies that quantitative data cannot provide.

3.1.1. *Primary sources:*

Data collection will entail an array of primary resources such as declassified government documents, extracts from speeches, and diary entries that were all written and distributed during this period of conflict. These declassified documents, speeches and dairy entries have been collected primarily from “The National Security Archive”, a non-government organisation that collects and publishes declassified documents acquired through the freedom of rights act. This organisation was founded in 1985 by scholars and journalists to combat the rising government secrecy in the United States. Amongst the staff are former Pulitzer Prize winners, further emphasizing the credibility of this source.

Many of the declassified documents come from the meeting notes at the four summits between Gorbachev and Reagan. These summits include The Geneva summit, The Reykjavik summit, The Washington summit, and The Moscow summit. Below I have attached a breakdown of the various individuals who helped to compile the notes of the U.S. during these summits:

Name	Role
Dimitri Zarechnak	Interpreter/Notetaker
Jack F. Matlock	Notetaker
Eugenia Arensburger	Interpreter/Notetaker
William D. Krimer	Interpreter/ Notetaker
William Hopkins	Interpreter/Notetaker
Mark Parris	Notetaker
Tom Simons	Notetaker

Nelson C. Ledsky	Notetaker
Rudolph V. Perina	Notetaker

Other primary resources will include the declassified letters of Anatoly Chernyaev who served as a foreign policy advisor to Gorbachev during this period and Robert Gates who served as a Soviet Union analyst to the United States. I will conclude my primary research with excerpts from various speeches from Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev during this period.

3.1.2. Secondary sources:

My secondary sources will consist of scholarly journals, articles and books written by historians and political sources who specialize in Cold war history and international relations. These secondary sources will help me to understand in more detail the negotiation styles of both men.

3.2. Case Studies:

The thesis will utilize a case study approach, where I will examine the negotiations between Gorbachev and Reagan at the four summits, highlighting areas where I believe principled negotiation theory can be seen. Each case study selected is based on its relevance towards principled negotiation and will help me to achieve the overall objective of my thesis. I will analyse the meeting notes at these four summits using thematic analysis. This approach will help me to identify common themes, topics, ideas, and patterns of meaning that come up repeatedly.

3.3. Key Concepts:

While conducting this thematic analysis, I will try to identify common themes throughout the negotiations. Examples of these common themes will include concepts developed in Ury and Fishers “Getting to Yes”. Below I have given a brief outline of some of the concepts that I will try to identify in the negotiations between Gorbachev and Reagan:

3.3.1. Four Principles of a Principled Negotiation:

People	Separate the people from the problem.
Interests	Focus on interests, not positions
Options	Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do
Criteria	Insist that the result be based on some objective standard

3.3.2. *Seven Elements of a Principled Negotiation:*

Interests	The underlying needs, wants, fears, and desires that drive the actions and outcomes of negotiation.
Options	Possible outcomes from a negotiation of which you are satisfied with based on the interests of both parties.
Alternatives	Outcomes which arise from not being able to reach a mutually beneficial agreement.
Legitimacy	The right and acceptance of an authority, such as objective criteria
Communication	Understanding the power of words to express your idea, opinions, and interests with the other party.
Relationship	Creating a perceived connection between two or more parties to build trust, which is a vital means of securing desired actions from others.

Commitment	Starting the negotiation thinking of where you would like to end, without fixing your position.
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3.3.3. *How to Separate the People from the Problem:*

Perception	Empathetically understanding the power of the oppositions point of view and feeling the emotional force with which they believe in it. It is important to place yourself in their shoes
Communication	Listen actively and acknowledge what is being said. Speak to be understood. Speak about yourself, not about them. Speak for a purpose.
Emotion	Make emotions explicit and acknowledge them as legitimate. Use symbolic gestures which are acts that produce a constructive emotional impact on one side which often involve little or no cost to the other.

3.3.4. *Additional Definitions and Abbreviations:*

Game Theory	The study of how players strategize and make decisions
Objective Criteria	Objective criteria are independent standards used in negotiation that are factual and therefore fair to both sides.

INF Treaty	Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
SDI	Strategic defence initiative
START Treaty	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
Politburo	The supreme policy-making body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

4. LITERATURE REVIEW

4.1. *Historical Context of the Cold War*

The Cold war was a phrase coined by English writer George Orwell in his essay “You and the Atomic Bomb” (Orwell, 1945), using it to describe the looming threat of Nuclear war between the worlds superpowers. While the United States and the Soviet Union worked together during the second World War, distrust and fear was prominent in the relationship between the two. The U.S. were wary of the ever-growing communist party and feared the tyrannical style of leadership that Joseph Stalin had imposed on the Soviet Union. The phrase “The Red Scare” was used to describe the hysteria in the U.S towards the perceived threat posed by the communist party (Storrs, 2015). This phrase referred to the communist flag that dawned a hammer and sickle on a red background. Other terms such as “Iron curtain”, used by Winston Churchill in 1946, highlighted the separation beginning to evolve in Europe, and the fear that communism was striking into people around the world.

This lack of trust was not just one sided, as the Soviet Union also had their reasons to be wary of the United States. During World War II the Soviet Union felt as though they were being shunned from international politics and were not being given a leading role in the international community, despite their efforts to stop the rise of the Nazi party. They also felt a sense of anger towards the United States due to their reluctance to enter the war. The Soviet Union felt America’s delayed entry to the war resulted in the unnecessary deaths of millions of Russians during this period. This lack of trust and differing ideologies led to the increased rivalry between the two countries (Schlesinger, 1967) and this would lead to over forty years of conflict.

While no exact date can be given for the start of the Cold war, The United States made a significant and controversial statement in July of 1947. In 1947 a policy of containment was suggested by a Foreign Service Officer, George F. Keenan. Keenan explained in an anonymous article that the United States should pursue “long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” (*Milestones: 1945–1952 - Office of the Historian*, n.d.). Keenan believed this policy would discourage the communist party and would lead to the derailment of its plans to expand into Europe. The United States agreed with this outlook and incorporated the policy in “The Truman Doctrine,

1947". The Truman doctrine outlined the U.S. plans to provide immediate economic and military aid to both Greece and Turkey, who were experiencing pressure from the communist party. The Soviet Union responded to this by implementing their own policies against the United States. The Soviet Union began to invest more into the U.N and implemented a rhetorical playbook that was meant to aid smaller nations and oppressed peoples in challenging Western racism and colonialism (Keremidchieva, 2023). This back and forth between the two nations would become a constant theme over the following years.

The political tensions between the western front and the Soviet Union would continue over the following years and led to the implementation of NATO in 1949. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was introduced to combat the ever-growing pressure from the Soviet Union. The founding members included Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States (NATO, n.d.-a). NATO's fears would be ratified in the following months as on September 3rd, 1949, a team of U.S. scientists would confirm that the Soviet Union had developed and tested their first nuclear bomb (Truman, 1949). The threat of the Soviet Union and communism was growing and could be seen throughout Europe. Later this year, both the "Federal Republic of Germany" (West Germany) and "German Democratic Republic" (East Germany, Soviet controlled zone) would be established, further highlighting the ever-growing divide in Europe. As NATO continued to grow, the Eastern bloc would establish their own defence treaty, "The Warsaw Pact", which, united Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania with the Soviet Union (NATO, n.d.-b). It was clear to see that international politics was once again coming to a boiling point. The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States would continue to develop over the following years as both nations tried to influence international politics. This was apparent in 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. North Korea was backed by China and the Soviet Union, while South Korea was supported by the U.N. and the United States. It was clear to see that this was just a proxy war (a war instigated by a major power which does not itself become involved) for the Cold war (Campbell, 2014). In 1953, newly inaugurated Dwight D. Eisenhower and the United States had become disillusioned with the war, with Eisenhower stating "we could not stand forever

on a static front and continue to accept casualties without any visible results. Small attacks on small hills would not end this war” (Eisenhower, 1953). The United States would go on to flex their military power and an armistice was signed. The war was nothing more than a power showing between the world’s superpowers, leading to death and destruction, with both nations still at war today (Malkasian, 2001). It was clear to see that both the Soviet Union and the United States were capable of doing anything if it meant getting one over on the other. However, the ever-growing communist party would continue to flourish during this decade, with the Warsaw pact being signed (1955) and Fidel Castro coming to power in Cuba (1959), establishing a communist government. This would lead to the most hostile period of international politics since WWII.

The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union would reach dangerous levels in the 60’s, with the two nations coming agonisingly close to all out nuclear war. The decade began similarly to how the previous decade ended, with both sides trying to gain as much control as possible. On August 13th, 1961, “The German Democratic Party” began to build a barbed wire fence, separating the East and West of Berlin. The purpose of the fence was to keep the perceived Western “fascists” from entering the communist controlled space. The United States quickly condemned the construction of the wall, further escalating tension between them and the Soviet Union. It was clear to see that communism was growing stronger and stronger, which led the U.S. taking action to halt this growth. On April 17th, 1961, the U.S launched an attack on the “Bay of Pigs”, the South coast of Cuba. In the previous year, The U.S. had trained over 1400 exiled Cubans in preparation for this attack (*The Bay of Pigs / JFK Library*, n.d.). The invasion was a disaster, with Castros army quickly responding to the attack, capturing almost 1,200 members of the brigade. This attack would lead to the “Cuban Missile Crisis”.

Following Kennedys failed attack on the Bay of Pigs, the Soviet Union saw an opportunity to further show their military power to the West. In July of 1962, the Soviet Union reached out to Cuba, outlining how the mobilisation of Soviet missiles on the border of Cuba would help deter any further invasion attempts from the United States. Cuba agreed, and the Soviet Union began to construct several missiles on the coast of Cuba. The plans were quickly discovered by U.S. intelligence during routine

surveillance checks, leading President Kennedy to issue a public warning to Cuba and the Soviet Union. Despite the warnings, the Soviet Union continued to construct their missiles on Cuban territory.

On October 22nd, the U.S. ordered a naval quarantine on Cuba. The same day Kennedy sent a letter to Soviet Premier, Khrushchev. The letter stated that the U.S. would not permit offensive weapons to be delivered to Cuba under any circumstances and ordered the immediate dismantling of already assembled missile bases. Kennedy would later appear on national television outlining what would happen if the Soviet Union did not comply with these demands. He said : “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union” (*Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian*, n.d.). Tension was rising, and it was clear to see that the two nations were on the brink of nuclear war. Khrushchev saw the quarantine as an act of aggression from the U.S. and ordered for the construction of the missile bases to continue. In response, Kennedy ordered military forces to be placed on Defcon 2, signalling that war was imminent.

However, the crisis took a dramatic turn, with various media sources claiming that an agreement could be reached with the Soviets. As the U.S. tried to verify the validity of these claims, Kennedy sent Khrushchev a message, outlining the catastrophic impacts another war would have on the world. Khrushchev responded by saying “to doom the world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this” (*Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian*, n.d.). However, the next day the landscape changed once again as Khrushchev sent a message demanding that the U.S. would remove their Jupiter missiles from Turkey. The Soviet Union would also shoot down a U.S jet over Cuba. Again, War looked inevitable, and Kennedy scrambled to resurrect the situation. He made the decision to ignore Khrushchev’s second message and instead sent his own message, demanding the removal of missiles from Cuba in exchange for the U.S. word that they would not attack Cuba. Kennedy assured that the U.S were planning to remove their missiles from Turkey, but he did not want it to be part of the negotiation. Khrushchev agreed and the next day declared that the Soviet Union would remove their missiles from Cuba, ending the Cuban missile crisis.

Conflict would continue into the sixties as the U.S entered into war with Vietnam, in an attempt to once again flex their military power and stop the spread of Communism. America would be unsuccessful in the war which led to calls for change around the United States. It was clear that a change in U.S. foreign policy was necessary. After this, relations began to improve between the U.S and the Soviet Union as Nixon adopted a new foreign policy. During this period a détente (relaxation of tension between countries) was imposed, with increased discussion around arms control. There was hope on the horizon as the U.S. and Soviet Union took part in the SALT treaties (Strategic Arms Limitations Talks). However many authors during this time such as Richard Rosecrance did not believe this period of détente was sustainable, as it was affecting U.S relations with Japan and Western Europe (Rosecrance, 1975). He was right as the Soviet Union would invade Afghanistan on December 24, 1979, once again igniting Cold war tensions.

4.2. The Negotiation Strategies of Gorbachev and Reagan: An In-depth Analysis

Once again it was clear to see that the U.S. needed a change to their Foreign Policy, with Reagan opting for a harsher approach to the Soviet Union. During this period Reagan would implement the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), a missile defence system that could be seen as a negotiating tool for Reagan. The Soviet Union was also developing a new identity with Gorbachev campaigning for a restructuring of Soviet society, developing policies such as Glasnost (Openness) and Perestroika (Restructuring). These two men were very different characters, but it was clear to see that both were skilled negotiators. During the period of 1985-1991 both men displayed their negotiations skills to the world, approaching talks with differing tactics and strategies. These tactics can clearly be seen throughout this period, most notably during the historical Reykjavik Summit in 1986, which involved high-stake discussion on nuclear disarmament and strategic defence, with both leaders engaging in candid and wide-ranging discussions. Tactics can also be seen during negotiations for arms control such as the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 1987. These negotiations have been examined and analysed for years with many authors coming to various conclusions which I will discuss in more detail below.

4.2.1. Review of Gorbachev's tactics

Both Reagan and Gorbachev were very capable leaders, both being described as charismatic, strategic, and innovative. However, these men also differed in many aspects, which was clear to see during their Cold war negotiations. It has been argued that Gorbachev used a conciliatory approach to diplomacy during this period, accepting that changes were needed in the Soviet Union, while Reagan was far more confrontational, often approaching negotiations with a “we win, they lose” mindset. This conciliatory approach from Gorbachev has been analysed for many years, with critics debating whether it was the right move. Below we will discuss some of the possible tactics used by Gorbachev and the reasons for adopting this approach according to various authors.

Alter casting:

In Mark Shafers and Stephen G walkers’ book, “Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics” (Schafer & Walker, 2006), they argue that Gorbachev employed the concept of “altercasting” during his negotiations with Reagan, using this tactic to manipulate public perception towards the Soviet Union and in turn pressure Ronald Reagan into changing his stance towards the Soviet Union and working towards a peace deal. Alter casting is a theory that was created by Paul Deutschberger and Eugene Weinstein in 1963. The theory is defined “as projecting an identity, (to be assumed by other(s) with whom one is in interaction), which is congruent with one's own goals” (Weinstein & Deutschberger, 1963). In essence, it is when you cast yourself or another person into a social role that they will be likely to do what you want from them. Shafer and Walker argued that Gorbachev used this tactic throughout his negotiations with Reagan in the eighties. They explained how Gorbachev attempted to change Reagan’s perspective of the Soviet Union, using a more diplomatic approach, and agreeing to concessions, unlike previous Soviet Leaders. Gorbachev portrayed himself and the Soviet Union as a country now geared towards openness and peace. Gorbachev took many steps to assure that the negotiations between the two parties were friendly and geared towards finding a solution to the problem such as proposing a unilateral moratorium on deployment of Intermediate range missiles in Europe. Reagan rejected this proposal and moved forward with his Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). However, this did not dishearten Gorbachev and he continued with his “peace initiative”. Gorbachev continued to make concessions and began to make inroads with the American public and domestic

opponents of Reagan's hard-line foreign policy. Public scrutiny caused by Gorbachev's alter casting tactic, forced Reagan into reevaluating his stance towards the Soviet Union. In the following years Reagan would have a more friendly approach to the Soviet Union, transforming international politics and ending the Cold war once and for all. However, this theory has been disputed with many critics debating that Gorbachev genuinely wanted to make a change to Soviet society and had no intentions of manipulating public perception.

Glasnost+ Perestroika:

While Mark and Stephen claimed that Gorbachev deliberately used alter casting to manipulate public opinion, other authors have interpreted his negotiation style differently. They believe that Gorbachev's intentions were not to manipulate the U.S. and Reagan, but instead actually change the Soviet Union for the better, creating an environment of openness and inclusion. Glasnost and Perestroika was not introduced as a tactic to end the cold war, but instead reform the Soviet Union. Jeremi Suri argues that Gorbachev was primarily interested in reforming Soviet agriculture and the domestic economy (Suri, 2002). This required a restructuring of Soviet society and changing attitudes towards other countries. This concept was not developed to end the Cold war, but instead the two things came hand in hand. The Soviet Union could "build socialism only if it lived at peace with its neighbours and the constituent elements of its empire" (Suri, 2002). The Cold war was draining Soviet resources and peace was required to change the Soviet Union for the better. This could explain the reasons behind the vast number of Soviet concessions during these negotiations. Gorbachev's main goal was not necessarily peace, but instead a better Soviet society. This could be described as game theory in some ways. To achieve this revamp of Soviet society, it has been argued that Gorbachev used an integrative bargaining method (win-win) as his main negotiation tactic during talks with the U.S. and Reagan (Druckman et al., 2011).

4.2.2. Review of Reagan's tactics:

Reagan differed from Gorbachev in many different aspects, with many historians claiming he approached negotiations as a "we win, they lose" scenario. These historians argue that unlike Gorbachev, Reagan chose a position and stuck with it, rarely making concessions during the process. Various authors have analysed Reagan's tactics during this period, which I will talk about in more detail below.

Coercive diplomacy:

After Vietnam, many felt that change was needed in the United States approach to foreign policy, with Reagan adopting a policy of coercive diplomacy (Jentleson, 1991). Alexander L. George describes coercive diplomacy as “efforts to persuade an opponent to stop or reverse an action” (using a defensive strategy) (George, 1994). While the United States previously used an offensive strategy, a defensive one was adopted. A defensive strategy does not rely on resistance, but instead using “Coercive threats” to persuade the opposition to give up something of value. According to historian this theme can be seen throughout Reagan’s administration and has been cited as one of the many reasons for the successful conclusion of negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States. Reagan and the United States did not want all out nuclear war as previously mentioned; however, they did want the Soviet Union to appreciate their military strength and during the Reagan administration they tried to emphasise this at every opportunity, undermining the Soviet Union whenever they could. Some argue that Reagan’s coercive diplomacy was apparent to see during the Reykjavik summit in 1986, with Reagan refusing to come to a compromise on his plans to develop a Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). Wayne B Howell describes how Reagan used the SDI to “prod Mikhail Gorbachev toward liberalization and democratization of the Soviet Union” (Howell, 2008). Despite Gorbachev’s “breathtaking arms reduction proposals” Reagan still refused, presumably believing that the threat of a strategic missile defence could force the Soviet Union to concede other positions.

Distributive Bargaining:

Many have argued that Reagan deployed a distributive bargaining approach towards the Soviet Union. This approach can be also referred to as Win-lose, where the parties involved are in direct conflict, meaning any positive result for one party means a loss for the other. This idea stems from Richard v Allens conversation with Reagan, in 1977 where Reagan described his approach towards the Soviet Union as "We win and they lose: what do you think of that? (Kengor, 2007). Many have argued that this could be seen during the Reykjavik summit, with Reagan refusing to compromise on his SDI plans despite Gorbachev’s fair proposals, as we have previously mentioned. However, there is not much validity behind these claims as we can clearly see, despite previous comments, Reagan did try and find a solution to the Cold war that would improve

relations between both parties and provide a mutually beneficial outcome. This can be described as integrative bargaining, where both parties aim to reach an agreement that satisfies the interests of both parties. Gorbachev also had this mindsight as previously mentioned.

4.2.3. Review of Principled negotiation

While principled negotiation is a widely recognized negotiation tactic, and one that has been used to settle disputes throughout the world it would be naïve to ignore some of the limitations of the method.

For starters, one of the main critics for principled negotiation comes from Alan Tidwell. Tidwell believed that this method of negotiation was based of generalization and that it did not take each individual case into consideration (Tidwell, 2001). For example, he believed that the first principle of separating the people from the problem was impossible as sometimes the people are the problem. In personal disputes it is often impossible to separate the people from the problem and it is the decisions of the other party that are causing you the problems. However, the book does touch on this critic, clearly identifying the use of this method even in personal situations. This method can identify that the true issue between the parties is the relationship, which may only be possible to identify once each party has separated the people from the problem. In essence, while it is difficult to apply this method in personal situations, it can help to identify that the relationship is the route of the problem. Once this has been identified the parties involved can continue moving forward with the other principles of the method.

Another critic comes from James White, who believed that principled negotiation was not applicable in cases where both parties underlying interests are incompatible (White, 1984). He believed that most negotiations contain two aspects. The first is where changes in the initial demands of the parties involved can lead to benefits for one of the parties, without causing significant change to the other party. This can be described as “exploring for mutual profitable adjustments”. However, he felt the second aspect is where one parties gain means a corresponding lost to the other. This can be referred to as “distributional bargaining” as we have previously mentioned. In this situation it is

impossible to continue in a principled manner as the parties involved are against each other, rather than together. However, Fischer responded to this critic, stating that principled negotiation is still preferable to positional bargaining in this situation as the parties involved will always have a shared interest, which is to end the negotiation in a quick and amicable manner.

Finally, many have also argued that “Getting to Yes” fails to evaluate the impact of power imbalances in a negotiation. Critics such as Boule argue that in many negotiations, one party is considerably more powerful and is able to gain an advantage through crude positional bargaining (Boule & Rycrof, 1998). Fischer has responded by saying that he agrees that he did not give sufficient attention to power in his book and that the concept of “power” is not presented as clearly as it should be (Fisher, 1983). Fisher has tried to explain how one can deal with parties more powerful than them, claiming there are six sources of power that a negotiator can develop to enhance their power in a negotiation. These six sources are:

- The power of skill and knowledge
- The power of a strong BATNA
- The power of a good relationship
- The power of an elegant solution
- The power of legitimacy
- The power of commitment

Fisher also stated that having a strong BATNA allows you to enter the negotiation with confidence and helps to resist temptations during a negotiation, even from more powerful parties. However, these techniques do not guarantee equality of power.

4.3. Conclusion of Literature review

I believe this literature review has been able to highlight the hostility and hatred that had arisen between the two nations before Gorbachev and Reagan came to power, highlighting the difficulty of the task ahead for the two men. I believe I have given a thorough analysis of some of the alternative negotiation methods that both parties used and the limitations of principled negotiation. However, in the following pages of this

thesis I will now analyse whether principled negotiation did play a part in the conclusion of the cold war, offering a different viewpoint to some of the scholars I have previously mentioned.

5. CASE STUDY – THE FOUR SUMMITS

5.1. Applicability to Cold war:

I believe that characteristics of principled negotiation can be seen in throughout the four summits conducted by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev between 1985-1988. Throughout the four summits we can see key characteristics of principled negotiation such as separating the people from the problem, focusing on interests rather than positions and insisting on using objective criteria. The four summits that we will examine are:

5.1.1. Geneva Summit (November 1985):

The Geneva Summit was the first meeting between the two men and marked a significant turning point in the cold war era. At the Summit the two men discussed an array of topics including bilateral relations, human rights, and arms control (Reagan, 1985). At this summit both men agreed that the best possible solution to this period of uncertainty was to create a nuclear-free world, paving the way for future arms reduction discussions.

5.1.2. Reykjavik Summit (October 1986):

This summit was held in Iceland in 1986, in what was originally intended to be an informal meeting between the two superpowers (Mandelbaum & Talbott, 1986). However, this was not the case as the two men discussed much broader topics. At the time many journalists labelled the submit a disaster (Mandelbaum & Talbott, 1986). In the short term it derailed the previously established U.S-Soviet relationship, with both men leaving the discussions visibly disappointed as they once again could not reach an agreement on Reagans SDI. However, historians today can now see the benefits that derived from this summit, such as paving the way for nuclear arms reduction agreements such as U.S.- Soviet treaty which banned intermediate-range nuclear forces (Goodby, 2006).

5.1.3. Washington Summit (December 1987):

This summit provided a considerable breakthrough with the INF treaty being officially signed. After the submit Reagan himself outlined the importance of the meeting stating that the talks helped to build a “*foundation for better relations between our governments*”

and our peoples”(Reagan, 1987). The summit was also monumental as it began to focus on other sources of interest for both nations, no longer solely focusing on arms control issues (Reagan, 1987). Human rights and the implementation of democratic governments were key takeaways from the talks.

5.1.4. Moscow Summit (May-June 1988):

Although the INF treaty was signed in Washington in 1987, the Moscow summit was crucial for the ratification process of the treaty. At this summit both men exchanged ratified documents, officially bringing the treaty into effect. The summit was also used to provide a platform for discussions for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), with agreements put in place to ensure that both parties would notify each other before conducting any missile testing (Whelan, 2019). The two men reached other results in fundamental areas such as space cooperation, transportation and radio navigation and international exchanges (Whelan, 2019).

5.2. Qualitative analysis

5.2.1. Geneva Summit

Throughout the Geneva summit, Reagan and Gorbachev display many examples of differing negotiation styles. Over the course of the two days, the men held multiple meetings where the basic principles of principled negotiation can be seen. While the men discussed a broad range of topics over multiple meetings, below I have attached some examples that I believe could be an indication that the pair conducted the negotiations in a principled manner:

Interests:

Throughout the meetings the pair frequently discuss their interests, clearly outlining the wants, fears and desires that drove them towards negotiating. In the first private meeting between the pair Jack Matlock, the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, describes how Gorbachev spoke about the fear of mutual destruction and how he wanted the two countries to ensure this did not happen, without changing either countries political systems, culture or ideologies (Matlock, 1985). Gorbachev also spoke about the importance of understanding each other interests to ensure that all parties needs and wants could be fulfilled. While Gorbachev wanted his own interests to be fulfilled, Matlock describes in his own words how Gorbachev believed in mutual gains. In the

meeting notes Matlock paraphrases Gorbachev's ideology saying "*We could not speak of advancing some of these interests at the expense of suppressing others*" (Matlock, 1985).

At this summit it appears that Reagan was also very clear with his interests. Similarly to Gorbachev, Reagan feared mutual destruction, emphasizing the need for arms reduction (Matlock, 1985). Throughout the meetings, Reagan also emphasises the importance of trust between the two nations. In the meeting notes of the first plenary meeting, we are told of the distrust the United States and Reagan had towards the Soviet Union. In this meeting Reagan spoke about previous violations towards arms control agreements that were already signed (Matlock, 1985). Having highlighted this, Reagan clearly outlined the importance of establishing trust between the two nations.

Options & Alternatives:

From my analysis of the first two meetings of the summit between the two men, interests can be identified, with arms reduction and establishing a trusting relationship being key interests of both nations. It can be argued that having established their interests in the previous meetings, the corresponding meetings at the summit were then used to develop options and alternatives to meet these interests. During the second plenary meeting, Gorbachev and Reagan began to implement plans to reduce arms and mistrust between the two nations. Reagan outlined two options: (1) Both nations could reduce offensive weapons or (2) Both nations could use defensive systems to offset them (Matlock, 1985). We can assume that Reagan was referring to the SDI in this situation. Both these options would have helped to satisfy the interests of both parties, thus giving us another glimpse into the principled negotiation styles of both parties.

There were no solid alternatives given during these negotiations. Throughout the Geneva summit transcripts, emphasis was placed on coming to a mutual agreement as the only alternative was nuclear war. This was not a viable alternative and so it placed added pressure on the men to come to an agreement, which is against the basic principles of Principled negotiation. Gorbachev also threatened Reagan and the United States on multiple occasions, which again is against the basic principles of principled negotiation. In response to the SDI implemented by Reagan, Gorbachev said "*We will have to frustrate this plan, and we will build up in order to smash your shield*" (Matlock, 1985). He also said that there would be "*no reduction of offensive weapons*"

in this case (Matlock, 1985). While Reagan seemed to be following a principled negotiation style, Gorbachev in this instance seems to be imposing a coercive diplomacy strategy.

Legitimacy:

As this negotiation covered a broad range of topics and did not solely focus on dealing with one given problem, it is difficult to find examples of objective criteria. However, we can identify a brief conversation regarding objective criteria, that would lay the foundation for the objective criteria used at Reykjavik and Washington. This conversation took place during the second plenary meeting, where Gorbachev asked Reagan what instructions should be given to their negotiators in Geneva in response to the option of reducing offensive weapons (Matlock, 1985). Reagan replied that *“they could be given guidelines to reduce nuclear weapons, say by 50%. We could negotiate on the structure of forces, since we know the structure of our forces is different”*(Matlock, 1985). These broad instructions can be seen as the basis for a defined and impartial set of objective criteria.

Relationship:

The Geneva summit can be seen as a clear attempt to improve the relationship between the two nations, with both parties keen to establish a trusting and efficient relationship. This change in attitude towards one another was even evident at the time and spoken about in many news outlets. In an article published by the “New York Times” in November of 1985 Reagan’s tactic of *“proposing extensive people-to-people exchanges as a method of breaking down tensions between the two countries”* was highlighted (Apple, 1985). During this summit Reagan and Gorbachev conducted many social gatherings to improve the relationship between the two countries. On the 19th of November, the Gorbachev’s hosted a dinner party for the Reagans, where they discussed topics that were unrelated to the tensions between the two countries (Arensburger & Hopkins, 1985). This can be seen as a clear example of both parties trying to separate the people from the problem.

Commitment:

In terms of commitment, we can say that the Geneva summit was disjointed and lacked clear and precise plans that usually follow a principled negotiation. As we can see from the second plenary meeting, Gorbachev seemed to be focused on the issues of strategic

defences and was unwilling to engage in serious discussions of other issues (Matlock, 1985). Discussion on strategic defences dominated the summit, leading to few problems being solved. We can also see a lack of communication in the fourth plenary meeting, where both men discussed the possibility of releasing a joint statement outlining the solutions that had derived from the summit. At the end of the summit, Gorbachev recalled that the Soviets had always been prepared for a communique (Joint statement to the media) and felt that the U.S. had agreed to such a document (Parris, 1985). Reagan on the other hand objected to such a document, leaving both parties at a stalemate. These small problems could have been avoided if both parties committed at the start of the summit to addressing these small issues.

Results of the Summit:

This summit can be seen as the first step to reducing nuclear arms and building a trusting relationship between the two countries. Although no official agreements were reached, it is clear to see that these talks laid the foundation for the future IMF Treaty. From this we can also see the important role that principled negotiation was beginning to have on the negotiations. We can also see the negative effects that arise when a step of the seven elements is not used, such as commitment in this case.

5.2.2. Reykjavik summit:

Interests:

In the first meeting of Reykjavik, the importance of shared interests is once again discussed between the two men, with Gorbachev providing this general observation:

“The Soviet leadership wants to solve the problem of the nuclear arms race. Therefore, it has formulated proposals which take into account the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States. This is the only way the problem can be solved, since if proposals are one sided, it will suggest to the other side that there is an attempt to gain superiority, and this would undermine the effort to get agreements”(Matlock, 1986)

This describes the basic principles behind principled negotiation and once again highlights the importance of understanding each other’s interests to come to an amicable solution. Reagan agreed with this point of view, and we can see the negotiation continue with these interests in mind for the most part.

Options and Alternatives:

Having already established their options in Geneva, Reagan and Gorbachev entered the

negotiations with a clear view on where they wanted the negotiations to end. They knew the pressure that was on both sides to reach to an agreement as their only alternative was a continuation of the cold war or even worse, nuclear war. Throughout this summit we can see the two parties discuss the options established at Geneva, with both parties seemingly favouring the option to reduce arms instead of developing systems to protect themselves against said arms.

Legitimacy:

Two crucial elements of principled negotiation that we did not see at Geneva was “Legitimacy” and “Commitment”. However, it can be said that at Reykjavik both men placed a special emphasis on these two elements to avoid any previous mistakes seen at Geneva. Below I will examine these two elements in more detail:

After a basis was set in Geneva, it is clear to see that both men valued objective criteria and wanted to include it into their negotiations. This can be seen at the second meeting between the pair in October of 1986. At this meeting Reagan clearly outlines the need for verification measures in response to the reduction of arms in both countries (Simons, 1986a). Reagan suggested that in response to reducing SRINF missiles, both parties should agree to verification measures. He suggested these measures should consist of a (1) “comprehensive and accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter” (2) “on-site observation of destruction down to agreed levels” (3) “effective monitoring of the remaining SRNIF inventories and associated facilities, including on-site inspections (Simons, 1986a). Gorbachev seemed to agree to this sentiment and welcomed the exchange of information that had been conducted by experts. A key moment in the negotiation came when Gorbachev handed Reagan his data sheet, outlining the number of weapons at the Soviets disposal. When Reagan asked if he could keep the sheet Gorbachev replied by saying he was giving it to him (Simons, 1986a). This is a clear signal that both men were willing to negotiate in a legitimate manner, with objective criteria at the forefront. Another example of the agreement to use objective criteria can be seen when Reagan asked Gorbachev if he agreed for experts from both parties to meet in order to exchange information, to which Gorbachev said he did (Simons, 1986a).

Commitment:

While Geneva seemed to be disjointed for the most part, it seems that the two men learnt from their previous mistakes and placed special emphasis on commitment at Reykjavik, now understanding the importance of this element. Before the first of the four meetings began, Gorbachev and Reagan took a moment to discuss what they wanted to address in this summit and the events that should take place to ensure that all agreements are met. Reagan highlighted topics such as intermediate-range missiles, the ABM Treaty and defensive space weapons, nuclear testing and strategic arms reduction as the most important elements to which Gorbachev agreed (Matlock, 1986). Gorbachev then proposed that the two men could devote the first meeting to these topics and after lunch could begin to start discussions about regional, humanitarian and bilateral issues (Matlock, 1986). While the parties did eventually spend more time talking about the elements Reagan proposed, we can clearly see an improvement in this willingness to commit to a plan had on the negotiation, with the process flowing much smoother in comparison to Geneva.

Positions:

While we can see both Gorbachev and Reagan were working towards the interests and options previously established at Geneva, there are some instances where we can see positional negotiation, particularly from Reagan. During the negotiation both sides were very close to reaching an agreement on the reduction of offensive ballistic missiles. The initial draft of the agreement proposed by Reagan outlined the following:

The USSR and the United States undertake for ten years not to exercise their existing right of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, which is of unlimited duration, and during that period strictly to observe all its provisions, while continuing research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. Within the first five years of the ten-year period (and thus through 1991), the strategic offensive arms of the two sides shall be reduced by 50 per cent. During the following five years of that period, all remaining offensive ballistic missiles of the two sides shall be reduced. Thus, by the end of 1996, all offensive ballistic missiles of the USSR and the United States will have been totally eliminated. At the end of the ten-year period, either side could deploy defences if it so chose, unless the parties agreed otherwise (Simons, 1986b)

While Gorbachev agreed to the proposal for the most part, it was clear that Reagan was not considering the interests of both parties. Gorbachev protested the continuation of research and development that implied the United States could continue to develop their SDI system that Gorbachev had so heavily protested in the past. Reagan's refusal to move from his position on the SDI meant that negotiations halted. We can see Gorbachev's frustration with this negotiation style saying that Reagan had not made a single, substantial, major step in his (Gorbachev's) direction (Simons, 1986b).

Results of the Summit:

Again, this summit helped to develop the relationship between the two parties. Although progress was made on the IMF Treaty, we can see the destructive nature that a positional approach can have on a negotiation. The implementation of two crucial elements of principled negotiation (legitimacy and commitment) showed clear signs of improvement in the negotiation process, allowing the process to flow more naturally compared to the Geneva summit.

5.2.3. Washington summit:

The Geneva and Reykjavik summits were crucial in ensuring that both countries came together to reduce tensions between the nations and reduce arms. At these summits, Gorbachev and Reagan were the dominant figures, setting the template for the future IMF and START Treaties. In these summits we can clearly see the two men use a principled approach to negotiations, rarely succumbing to old habits instilled by previous poor relations between the two nations. At the Washington summit however, it was now time for the experts to get the deals over the line, Gorbachev and Reagan had played their part. Due to this, conversations between Reagan and Gorbachev don't give us clear examples of principled negotiations, as the negotiations were now in the hands of the delegations of the two nations.

However, the lead up and aftermath to the Washington summit gives us interesting insights into the mindset of the leaders. While Gorbachev and Reagan had developed a strong personal relationship during their previous two summits, the public and even members of each parties' delegations still held prejudice. During this period, there are times where both men could have abandoned their principled approach to the negotiations and succumb to the old habits that had been ingrained into their societies. However, each time the two men resisted these temptations to ensure that the

negotiations continued in a principled manner.

Anatoly Chernyaev Memorandum to Gorbachev:

On the 16th of December, Chernyaev drafted key points that could be included in Gorbachev's speech at the Politburo session the following day. In this memorandum, Chernyaev was harsh in his critic towards Reagan and the United States, using an array of personal attacks. Chernyaev discussed Reagan's "incompetence" when previously negotiating, claiming that the "*real power rests with the group of Bush, Carlucci, and others around them*" (Chernyaev, 1987). When speaking about Reagan's insistence to talk about human rights at Washington, Chernyaev said that Reagan "*had to show off in front of his own people*" (Chernyaev, 1987). These personal attacks fail to separate the people from the problems, which had become a key theme in the previous two summits and is something that is vital to a principled negotiation. Gorbachev knew that resorting to these tactics would once again damage the reputation between the two countries. Gorbachev decided to ignore the advice given by Chernyaev, and instead spoke about Reagan quite favourably at Politburo. Gorbachev also praised the American public. He claimed that the American public were now beginning to embrace perestroika, and no longer viewed it as a tactical ploy being imposed by the Soviet Union. (Melyakova, 1987). Gorbachev said the following on this topic:

"In Washington we saw for the first time with our own eyes what great interest exists in everything that is happening here, in our perestroika. And the goodwill, even enthusiasm to a degree, with which prim Washington received us, was an indicator of the changes that have started taking place in the West. These changes evidence the beginning of the crumbling "image of the enemy," and the beginning of the destruction of the "Soviet military threat" myth. That was momentous to us. And it was noticed throughout the world" (Melyakova, 1987).

It's clear to see that Gorbachev wanted to continue the good relations established between both countries at Geneva and Reykjavik. Gorbachev's ability to not get drawn into dirty tactics and personal bias was the key to ending the cold war.

Gorbachev's Gameplan: The Long View

Similarly to Gorbachev, many members of Reagan's team were still wary of the opposition side. This includes Reagan's deputy director of the CIA and one of the top U.S. intelligence analysts of the Soviet Union, Robert M. Gate. On the eve of the

Washington summit, Gates sent Reagan a four-page document analysing Gorbachev's apparent gameplan. In this document, Gates provides a scathing attack of the Soviet Union and Gorbachev. Gates predicted that the Soviet reforms were merely being used as "*breathing space*" before the resumption of the "*further increase in Soviet military power and political influence*" (Gates, 1987). He also would go on to say that Gorbachev would only agree to arms reductions so long as it protected "*existing Soviet advantages*" (Gates, 1987). This assessment was not shared by Reagan who had developed a trusting relationship with Gorbachev. Reagan knew this summit was a key point in the negotiations and ensured that he did not cause any irreversible damage to the relationship of the two nations by questioning Gorbachev's and the Soviet Union's tactics. Instead, Reagan would go on to do the opposite and would spend a great deal of time praising both the Soviet Union and Gorbachev for working so hard to reach the current point. This warmth could also be seen at the welcoming ceremony for Gorbachev and the Soviet Union at the White House. In his opening remarks, Reagan said the following:

"Today marks a visit that is perhaps more momentous than many which have preceded it, because it represents a coming together not of allies but of adversaries. And yet I think you'll find during your stay that the American people believe that a stranger is a friend they have yet to meet and that there is still a wellspring of good will here. Indeed, I know that many of our citizens have written to you and Mrs. Gorbachev and have even sent to you the keys to their homes. That honest gesture certainly reflects the feelings of many Americans toward you and Mrs. Gorbachev and toward your people. I have often felt that our peoples should have been better friends long ago"(Reagan, 1987b).

Like Gorbachev, we can see the emphasis that Reagan put on developing the relationships between the two nations, emphasizing that they were no longer enemies, but instead two parties trying to reach a common goal.

Results of the Summit:

This Summit marked a significant milestone as the IMF Treaty was signed. From this summit we can see that both men faced external forces to try and disrupt their principled style of negotiations, however both men were able to resist the temptations. As both men stuck to this principled method, we can see the clear benefits that derived, such as

further improvement and trust in the relationship. Besides the IMF Treaty, not much progress was made with human relations and the START Treaty as both men took a more informal approach to the negotiations.

5.2.4. Moscow summit:

While we have discussed the seven elements of principled negotiation and its four main principles, I believe it is important that we understand how all this was possible, which was Gorbachev and Reagan recognising and understanding the emotions of both sides. While nothing concrete was agreed in Moscow, the summit gives us a valuable insight into the emotional side of the negotiations. The Moscow summit was a highly symbolic summit that completed a certain stage in Soviet-American relations and in American foreign policy. It was at this summit the Cold war seemed to end unofficially.

Gorbachev:

The Moscow summit was very important to the Russian people and was symbolic of the changing relations between the two nations, with Reagan being the first U.S. president to step foot in Russia for almost 14 years (*Russia - Travels of the President - Travels - Department History - Office of the Historian*, n.d.). Due to this Gorbachev knew the importance of accepting Reagan and using gestures that would provide a constructive emotional impact. We can see examples of this throughout Reagans stay in Moscow. In the second one-on-one meeting between the pair in Moscow, Gorbachev offered Reagan some letters that had been sent to the Kremlin from Russian citizens (Simons, 1988). In these letters many Russian citizens expressed their admiration for Reagan, being the first U.S. president to truly try to stop this period of tension between the two nations (Simons, 1988). Many of the letters spoke about Reagan and how they decided to name their children after him and Mrs. Reagan, clearly showing that Reagan was considered more of a friend than a foe (Simons, 1988). Simons also noted that the “city, street, and apartment address were shown” on the letters, clearly indicating trust (Simons, 1988). This small gesture from Gorbachev is just one example of both men placing importance on the emotions involved in the negotiations.

Reagan:

Like Gorbachev, Reagan understood the importance of the Moscow summit for both nations. The last forty years had been characterised by fear, distrust, and hatred between the two countries, with Reagan himself labelling the Soviet Union as an “Evil empire”

in 1983 (Reagan Foundation, 2009). This emotional response had a huge impact on the relationship between the two countries, and once again highlights the power emotion plays in a negotiation. Reagan himself could identify this, and while at Moscow would make a statement that would completely transform the political landscape. During his walk of Red Square in Moscow, Reagan said that he no longer considered the Soviet Union an evil empire (Reagan Library, 2016). The importance of this statement can be seen from Chernyaev's notes of Gorbachev's speech at Politburo in June of 1988. At this meeting Gorbachev praises Reagan, highlighting the fact that Reagan "*was not embarrassed to correct his previous objectionable conclusions*" (In relation to evil empire comment) (Chernyaev, 1988a). He would also go on to say that Reagans words meant "*a new turn in Soviet American relations has taken place*" (Chernyaev, 1988a). Chernyaev himself highlighted the importance of Reagans statement in his diary. In his diary, Chernyaev notes that the main achievement of the Moscow summit was Reagan's realization that the Soviet Union was no longer a Cold War adversary of the past (Chernyaev, 1988b). Considering the comments made by Chernyaev at the Washington summit in relation to Reagan, we can clearly see the impact Reagans emotional statement had on the public of the Soviet Union, including Chernyaev. While Chernyaev did not seem to agree with Reagan in most cases, he was clearly able to see the importance of Reagans comments for the improvement of the political landscape. This statement was a small act that would not have had a major impact on Reagan but would have a profound impact on the Soviet Union. For long the Soviet people had to live with this label and negative portrayal, which would have been deeply destructive to their society. Reagan's ability to recognise and understand these emotions of the Soviet people, while also acknowledging them as legitimate gives us a wonderful insight into his character.

Results of the Summit:

This Summit is symbolic to the end of the Cold War as both sides no longer saw each other as adversaries. Once again little progress could be seen from the human relations and START Treaty negotiations as both men took a more informal approach, highlighting the importance of a rigid framework like the seven elements previously discussed.

6. DISCUSSION

6.1. Summary:

I undertook this thesis to explore the application of principled negotiation tactics in the diplomatic efforts between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Cold War and its effectiveness in dealing with international affairs. From my analysis I believe that my thesis has four key findings:

- Both leaders entered the negotiations with the intentions of implementing a more principled negotiation style. We can see this particularly at the Geneva and Reykjavik summit where both men placed a special emphasis on mutual interests and creating options to fulfil these interests. Both men recalled previous negotiations that followed a more positional bargaining, which had led to mistrust between the two nations. This evaluation of past mistakes spurred on both men to follow a more principled approach.
- Although Gorbachev and Reagan understood the importance of principled negotiation, at times they did revert to more coercive tactics. For the most part Gorbachev and Reagan did use a principled approach and tried to fulfil the interests of all parties involved. However, Reagan's SDI initiative was a blip in the negotiations where both men deviated from the principled approach. During these talks Gorbachev made a series of threats towards the United States, While Reagan clearly held a position that he was unwilling to move from. Both these examples go against the very basic elements of a principled negotiation.
- Both Gorbachev and Reagan were able to identify and correct inefficiencies in their original approach to principled negotiation. Principled negotiation was quite clearly a new approach for both men, which meant that they were almost learning on the spot in most cases. From Geneva to Reykjavik, we can clearly see progression in efficiency in their approach to principled negotiation. While Geneva set the framework for both men to work towards, Reykjavik's introduction of commitment and legitimacy allowed the negotiations to flow in a more principled manner.

- Both men understood the importance of relationships and emotions to a principled negotiation. Separating the people from the problem is a fundamental part of a principled negotiation, and I believe Gorbachev and Reagan were able to express their willingness to do this in a multitude of ways. While grand gestures were needed to express their willingness to do this, such as having dinner and tea together, Gorbachev and Reagan also showed this ideology through their words.

I believe these results have successfully explored the application of principled negotiation tactics in the diplomatic efforts between Gorbachev and Reagan, highlighting the usefulness and possible limitations of the method to international affairs.

6.2. Patterns:

The findings of my thesis have allowed me to identify key patterns that have helped me to achieve a deeper understanding of my objectives. As we can see from my findings, it is clear to see that principled negotiation was applied to the diplomatic efforts between Reagan and Gorbachev. Since I have identified that principled negotiation was used, I believe I can identify the patterns in the four summits to determine why principled negotiation was successful in some respects and why it failed in others. This has allowed me to identify how principled negotiation can be effective to international relations. Through my data, I believe that there are clear patterns that can be derived. I believe my data shows that there is a correlation between the use of the seven elements of principled negotiation and reaching an amicable solution in an efficient manner. This can be seen at the Geneva and Reykjavik summits, where both negotiations tried to follow the seven elements of a principled negotiation. At these summits significant ground was made towards the IMF treaty, that would eventually lead to it being signed at the Washington summit in 1987. These negotiations followed a strict and formulated plan, with a clear conclusion being derived from each summit. However, once the IMF treaty was signed, both men seemed to abandon this strict and formulated plan. During their conversations about human relations and the START treaty there seems to be a lack of format that had characterised the previous summits. This led to few agreements being reached at Washington and Moscow and clear frustration amongst the sides. I believe that the reluctance to follow this same format was not due to the regret of previously

using this tactic, rather the reluctance on Reagan's part to get involved in another set of negotiations so close to the end of his term. From this it is clear to see that principled negotiation can be seen as an effective tool for international affairs.

I believe my analysis also shows a correlation between symbolic gestures and the strengthening of relationships between parties in a negotiation. Gorbachev and Reagan clearly highlighted the importance of building a strong relationship and both used symbolic gestures as a strategy to develop this relationship. In each instance that one of men used a symbolic gesture, we can clearly see the positive impact it had on the opposition side. A clear example of this can be seen in Reagan's retraction of his "evil empire" comments. This small gesture was a turning point in the Soviet-United States affairs, and clearly had a massive impact on the Soviet Union. Reagan's failure to account for symbolic gestures in his early days in office can be seen as a reason for the poor relationship between the two countries. When Reagan called the Soviet Union an "Evil empire" in 1981, he did not account for the emotional impact it would have on their society and how it could hamper future negotiations. Symbolic gestures are a key element of principled negotiation, thus showing how principled negotiation can be an effective tool in international affairs.

6.3. Alternative explanations:

While I believe that principled negotiation was applied to the Cold war negotiations, thus highlighting the effectiveness of this tool to international affairs, there may also be some alternative explanations for the successful conclusion of the negotiations. For starters, many scholars have highlighted that the reason the Cold War ended was due to the growing power imbalances between the two nations. Power imbalances became apparent in the 80's after the conclusion of the Afghan war in 1979, which drained economic resources and demoralized the Soviet population. In their journal, Reuveny and Prakash argue that the Afghan war had a significant impact on the Soviet Union and eventually led to its demise (Reuveny & Prakash, 1999). This could be an explanation for the end of the Cold War, as we could argue that the Soviet Union no longer had the political or military power to continue their war with the United States. Due to this it could be argued that the conclusion of the cold war was inevitable, thus making Gorbachev's and Reagan ideology insignificant. However, there is no one reason as to why the cold war ended, with principled negotiation undoubtedly playing a key role.

6.4. Implications:

6.4.1. Broadening understanding of Cold War diplomacy:

The analysis of the four summits between Gorbachev and Reagan offer an alternative view of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, challenging the traditional narratives that often depict the negotiations between the two countries as being more strategic and confrontational than interest based. In my literature review we can see that traditionally scholars have felt that the negotiations between the two men were quite one sided, with Reagan entering the negotiations with a coercive/ distributional bargaining approach (Jentleson, 1991) ;(George, 1994); (Howell, 2008). Similarly, scholars believed that Gorbachev and the Soviet Union entered the negotiations in a weak position and had to resort to underhanded tactics, such as altercating (Schafer & Walker, 2006). While these are the traditional narratives of the negotiations between the two men, I believe my research has given an alternative perspective that highlights the importance of principled negotiations techniques to the conclusion of the Cold War.

6.4.2. Contribution to Conflict Resolution Strategies on the International Stage:

As we can see from my literature review, the Cold War was a period of mistrust, fear and hatred that attempted and failed on many occasions to implement effective conflict resolution strategies. This was until Gorbachev and Reagan took a different approach to conflict resolution, implementing a more interest-based approach. I believe my case study has highlighted the ability that empathy, mutual respect, and direct communication has in resolving difficult matters, especially in relation to international affairs. These three elements were crucial to international affairs at the time, and I believe they are applicable now to the current international landscape. This viewpoint has been shared with many scholars throughout the world such as Hoa Nguyen who highlighted principled negotiation as “the final answer to the South China sea dispute” (Nguyen, 2016). In recent years there have been territorial disputes in South China involving islands, reefs, banks, and other features of the region. In Nguyen’s journal he provides the conclusion that “*applying principled negotiation, countries involved in the South China Sea dispute can resolve the problem in a peaceful and amicable way*” (Nguyen, 2016). Similarly, principled negotiation has been touted as a method to end

Kashmir conflict, a long-standing territorial dispute between India, Pakistan, and China. In their journal, Mitra and Carciumaru say that elements of principled negotiation “*can be used to simulate the multi-level negotiation one can imagine taking place between, for example, India and Pakistan currently on water, terrorism, Kashmir, drugs and trade*” (Mitra & Carciumaru, 2015). I believe my thesis has shown the validity of principled negotiation as a method to settle international disputes, giving further credibility to previous literature works that tout it as a method to end current international disputes.

6.5. Limitations and Future lines of Research

I think the scope of my study can be seen as a limitation to my research. In this thesis I primarily focus on the tactics of Gorbachev and Reagan, highlighting how their actions helped to end the Cold War. While Gorbachev and Reagan were the main actors in resolving this conflict, the thesis may overlook the contributions of other political leaders, economic advisors, and broader international forces. As I have previously mentioned, the end of the Cold War can be attributed to a multitude of reasons, however this thesis primarily focuses on the actions of both Gorbachev and Reagan. Future research could investigate the roles of some of the lesser studied but influential figures that helped to resolve the Cold War, such as Margaret Thatcher or Pope John Paul II who supported anti-communism movements in Europe at the time. Some Historians such as Archie Brown (Brown, 2020) have discussed some of this content but I still feel there is a gap in the literature to fully evaluate and understand their role in the ending of the Cold War.

Another limitation of this thesis may be the selected coverage of events that can be seen in this thesis. Much of my analysis is centred around the four summits in Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow which provide clear examples of principled negotiation. However, the two men were in constant communication during this period of negotiation and so there may be other less significant events or tactics that have been overlooked that had a significant impact on the course of events. The main objective of the thesis was to explore the application of principled negotiation tactics in the diplomatic efforts between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Cold War and its effectiveness in dealing with international affairs, which I feel like I have successfully done, however these other less significant events may give even further insight into

some of the other tactics used. I believe there is a gap in the literature to examine in even more detail the relationship between Gorbachev and Reagan outside the four summits. An interesting path may be to examine the forty letters shared between Gorbachev and Reagan during this period. Authors such as Jack Matlock (Matlock, 2004) has given some insight into these letters, but I still feel that there is potential to delve into even more detail.

Another limitation was the meeting notes used to analyse the use of principled negotiation. While these meeting notes gave me a valuable insight into the negotiation methods of the two men, I was not able to fully analyse the communication element of a principled negotiation. This element relies on body language and active listening which is almost impossible to analyse over meeting notes.

A final limitation of my thesis is the potential bias in my sources, specifically in relation to my case study. Most of the data collected came from the American note takers due to the ease of access and the use of the English language. Unlike the online databases that the United States have, there is little to no information from the Soviet note takers online and any document that can be found are in Russian. Due to this I believe that there is a gap in the literature to explore the feelings from the Soviet side during the negotiations and see if there's any contrast in the notes taken during these summits.

7. Conclusion

In conclusion the thesis has critically examined the application of principled negotiations in the diplomatic efforts between Gorbachev and Reagan during the Cold War, most notably at the Geneva, Reykjavik, Washington, and Moscow summits. Both men clearly employed principled negotiation methods during this period, placing heavy emphasis on the relationship and human aspects of the negotiations, rarely adopting coercive or confrontational tactics. This approach led to the implementation of the IMF Treaty, which helped to reduce nuclear arms and improve the relationship between the two nations. These were crucial steps towards ending the Cold War with the Moscow Summit traditionally cited as the conclusion of the forty-year feud.

Through analysis I have identified that while Gorbachev and Reagan did adhere to principled methods during their negotiations, there was times where the traditional/positional approach to negotiations appeared. This was influenced by a variety of

factors, including economic pressures, expectations, and inherent complexities of international diplomacy. However, we can still ascertain that the prominent method during these negotiations was a principled one.

Through my limitations we can see that there are various avenues of research that could further contribute to the understanding of Cold War diplomacy. Providing a broader overview of some of the smaller events of the Cold War and the other figures involved could help further emphasise the importance of principled negotiation in resolving international disputes.

Furthermore, the thesis has helped to identify the relevance of principled negotiation in resolving international disputes. Prior to the end of the Cold War, few people could have envisioned the significant change in Soviet-United States relations. This was made possible by both men's ability to separate the people from the problem and focus on achieving the interests of all parties involved. The conclusion of the Cold War highlights the fact that principled negotiation is applicable to all negotiations, even the most complicated and intricate international disputes. Diplomats and scholars can use these insights to implement more effective and enduring solutions to the current international landscape.

While principled negotiation alone cannot be credited for resolving the Cold War, its contribution must not be overlooked. With international tension reaching alarming levels, I believe this method still holds lessons for today. As we try to resolve some of these conflicts, I believe that these theories will continue to serve as valuable tools for peace and international cooperation.

Declaración de Uso de Herramientas de Inteligencia Artificial Generativa en Trabajos Fin de Grado

ADVERTENCIA: Desde la Universidad consideramos que ChatGPT u otras herramientas similares son herramientas muy útiles en la vida académica, aunque su uso queda siempre bajo la responsabilidad del alumno, puesto que las respuestas que proporciona pueden no ser veraces. En este sentido, NO está permitido su uso en la elaboración del Trabajo fin de Grado para generar código porque estas herramientas no son fiables en esa tarea. Aunque el código funcione, no hay garantías de que metodológicamente sea correcto, y es altamente probable que no lo sea.

Por la presente, yo, Dara Brennan, estudiante de ADMINISTRACIÓN Y DIRECCIÓN DE EMPRESAS MENCIÓN INTERNACIONAL (GE-4), de la Universidad Pontificia Comillas al presentar mi Trabajo Fin de Grado titulado "[Título del trabajo]", declaro que he utilizado la herramienta de Inteligencia Artificial Generativa ChatGPT u otras similares de IAG de código sólo en el contexto de las actividades descritas a continuación [el alumno debe mantener solo aquellas en las que se ha usado ChatGPT o similares y borrar el resto. Si no se ha usado ninguna, borrar todas y escribir “no he usado ninguna”]:

1. **Brainstorming de ideas de investigación:** Utilizado para idear y esbozar posibles áreas de investigación.
2. **Crítico:** Para encontrar contra-argumentos a una tesis específica que pretendo defender.
3. **Metodólogo:** Para descubrir métodos aplicables a problemas específicos de investigación.
4. **Constructor de plantillas:** Para diseñar formatos específicos para secciones del trabajo.

5. **Corrector de estilo literario y de lenguaje:** Para mejorar la calidad lingüística y estilística del texto.
6. **Sintetizador y divulgador de libros complicados:** Para resumir y comprender literatura compleja.

Afirmo que toda la información y contenido presentados en este trabajo son producto de mi investigación y esfuerzo individual, excepto donde se ha indicado lo contrario y se han dado los créditos correspondientes (he incluido las referencias adecuadas en el TFG y he explicitado para que se ha usado ChatGPT u otras herramientas similares). Soy consciente de las implicaciones académicas y éticas de presentar un trabajo no original y acepto las consecuencias de cualquier violación a esta declaración.

Fecha: 05/06/2024

Firma: DARA BRENNAN

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9. APPENDIX:

Geneva Summit:

First Private meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc15.pdf
First Plenary Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc16.pdf
Second Plenary Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc17.pdf
Second Private Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc19.pdf
Dinner Hosted by the Gorbachev's	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc20.pdf
Third Plenary Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc21.pdf
Fourth Plenary Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc22.pdf

Reykjavik Summit:

First Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document09.pdf
Second Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document11.pdf
Third Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document13.pdf
Fourth Meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document15.pdf

Washington Summit:

Anatoly Chernyaev's Memorandum for Gorbachev	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/russian/Final1987-12-16Chernyaev_memo.pdf
Gorbachev's Gameplan: The Long View	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/usdocs/Doc%202011%20(Memo%20from%20Webster%2011.24.87).pdf
Translation of Gorbachev's speech at Politburo	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/russian/Final1987-12-17Politburo%20Session.pdf

Moscow Summit:

Second One-on-One meeting	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/20.pdf
Anatoly Chernyaev Diary, June 19, 1988	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/28.pdf
Politburo Session, June 6, 1988 (Excerpt from notes of Anatoly	https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB251/26.pdf

Chernyaev)	
President Reagan Walking in Red Square with Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow, May 31, 1988	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LZUu5WraroM