<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/" xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#">
<channel rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11531/53259">
<title>1.2. Actividad empresarial  Mercado de trabajo y Mercados Financieros</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11531/53259</link>
<description/>
<items>
<rdf:Seq>
<rdf:li rdf:resource="http://hdl.handle.net/11531/52009"/>
</rdf:Seq>
</items>
<dc:date>2026-04-30T00:41:21Z</dc:date>
</channel>
<item rdf:about="http://hdl.handle.net/11531/52009">
<title>Estimating the COVID-19 cash crunch: Global evidence and policy</title>
<link>http://hdl.handle.net/11531/52009</link>
<description>Estimating the COVID-19 cash crunch: Global evidence and policy
Vito, Antonio De; Gómez, Juan-Pedro
In this paper, we investigate how the COVID-19 health crisis could affect the liquidity of&#13;
listed firms across 26 countries. We stress-test three liquidity ratios for each firm with full&#13;
and partial operating flexibility in two simulated distress scenarios corresponding to drops&#13;
in sales of 50% and 75%, respectively. In the most adverse scenario, the average firm with&#13;
partial operating flexibility would exhaust its cash holdings in about two years. At that&#13;
point, its current liabilities would increase, on average, by eight times, suggesting that&#13;
the average firm would have to resort to the debt market to prevent a liquidity crunch.&#13;
Moreover, about 1/10th of all sample firms would become illiquid within six months.&#13;
Finally, we study two different fiscal policies, tax deferrals and bridge loans, that governments&#13;
could implement to mitigate the liquidity risk. Our analysis suggests bridge loans&#13;
are more cost-effective to prevent a massive cash crunch.
Articulo de Revista
</description>
<dc:date>2020-04-25T00:00:00Z</dc:date>
</item>
</rdf:RDF>
