Saona Hoffmann, Paolo Rodrigo
López, Félix
2016-09-09T21:53:21Z
2016-09-09T21:53:21Z
2007-09-14
1727-9232
http://hdl.handle.net/11531/12560
Artículos en revistas
See summary in English
the aim of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of debt ownership as a mechanism of corporate governance in reducing the discretionary behavior of managers. We use earnings management and discretionary accruals as indicators of managerial accounting discretion. Our results show that corporate debt has a prominent impact on reducing earnings management. Banking debt can foster the discretionary behavior of managers whereas public debt plays no relevant role. At the same time we test
the complementary effect of some other mechanisms of corporate governance such as capital structure and ownership concentration.
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Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada España
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
Revista: Corporate Ownership & Control, Periodo: 3, Volumen: 5, Número: 1, Página inicial: 345, Página final: 354
Earning Management and Debt Ownership Structure in Spanish Firms
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
See keywords in English
Ownership structure