Sharing economy to the rescue? The Case of Timebanking

Abstract

This chapter has conceptualized timebanking as an alternative marketplace and situated it in the context of the sharing economy. While other ventures of the sharing economy, moulded more clearly into the market logic, are success stories, timebanking faces more difficulties in surviving. According to Benoit et al. (2017) more research should be carried out about why certain sharing platforms are successful and can efficiently manage the requirements of both customers and providers. In a similar vein, it is useful to understand why certain sharing economy initiatives fail. Building on the findings of a three-year fieldwork in Spain and Greece, this chapter has provided an explanation of why timebanks collapse through the lens of neo-institutional theory and reciprocity. Timebanking is an institution in the making, moulded into plural logics. Although some of these logics are highly compatible with one another (e.g. the Political with the Social logic), our findings unveil tensions especially between the Market logic and these other two logics. These market and non-market logics imply divergent views about the goals to pursue and the means to pursue them (Besharov and Smith 2014). These incompatible views are usually resolved in favour of non-market logics although institutionalization remains incomplete. In their present form, most norms, rules or accounting practices fail to instantiate the market logic and to constitute timebanks as successful marketplaces. This is partially intentional: when timebanking is perceived as opposing the neoliberal ethos, then users reject norms or practices that, in their view, resemble the neoliberal markets. Yet, by doing this, the market is not institutionalized as users do not adopt the double role they are supposed to, they do not see functional value in the timebank and trust is not created. As a consequence, users do not exchange with one another, and the timebank may close down out of lack of activity. This chapter has shown that the institutionalization of markets nested in multiple logics is problematic when these are not compatible and prescribe contradictory fields of action (Besharov and Smith 2014). In this case, the political and social goals of timebanking can only be met if the market works, but if the market logic is adopted then the political and social values are questioned. The rules and practices that could facilitate the establishment of the market are not always respected or fully understood by users and may even be seen as a transgression of the non-market logics. Thus, timebank promoters reject to replicate market logics and dismiss devices and norms that are normally used in the marketplace. Furthermore, when social objectives are reached (i.e. creation of social bonds among members) this has implications regarding notions of reciprocity and may lead to norm transgression related the market logic. Our fieldwork shows that timebanks are often stuck in-between institutional logics and their institutional arrangement does not create a clear field of action for their members. In other words, the pragmatic and idealistic aspects of timebanking may coexist in theory but create stress and institutional complexity in practice (Battilana, Besharov, and Mitzinneck 2017). Timebanking would fit in the contested organizations discussed by Besharov and Smith (2014). The field is subject to incompatible market and non-market logics that are equally central to the organization. Moreover, the political and social goals of timebanking can only be achieved if the market is successfully enacted. Thus, as the market logic is not instantiated, timebanking is not institutionalized. The failed attempts at reconciling the opposing logics when designing the rules and practices of timebanking explain the already observed demise of the timebanks. Timebanks have not yet institutionalized a hybrid system that successfully bridges these logics so that a fully functioning market is created without conflicting with the social and political ideology behind timebanking. This chapter has shown crucial elements to be taken into account when such markets are put into practice, especially the dual role of participants and how to ensure that it is enacted; the potential conflict between logics if norms are not successfully hybridized, and the need to socialize participants in exchanges based on network generalized reciprocity so that the market is sustainable, and with it, the social and political project. Further research can delve deeper in other sharing economy platforms and their institutionalisation, namely the existence of various logics, how they are instantiated and how these affect the functioning of the platforms and their success.

This chapter has conceptualized timebanking as an alternative marketplace and situated it in the context of the sharing economy. While other ventures of the sharing economy, moulded more clearly into the market logic, are success stories, timebanking faces more difficulties in surviving. According to Benoit et al. (2017) more research should be carried out about why certain sharing platforms are successful and can efficiently manage the requirements of both customers and providers. In a similar vein, it is useful to understand why certain sharing economy initiatives fail. Building on the findings of a three-year fieldwork in Spain and Greece, this chapter has provided an explanation of why timebanks collapse through the lens of neo-institutional theory and reciprocity. Timebanking is an institution in the making, moulded into plural logics. Although some of these logics are highly compatible with one another (e.g. the Political with the Social logic), our findings unveil tensions especially between the Market logic and these other two logics. These market and non-market logics imply divergent views about the goals to pursue and the means to pursue them (Besharov and Smith 2014). These incompatible views are usually resolved in favour of non-market logics although institutionalization remains incomplete. In their present form, most norms, rules or accounting practices fail to instantiate the market logic and to constitute timebanks as successful marketplaces. This is partially intentional: when timebanking is perceived as opposing the neoliberal ethos, then users reject norms or practices that, in their view, resemble the neoliberal markets. Yet, by doing this, the market is not institutionalized as users do not adopt the double role they are supposed to, they do not see functional value in the timebank and trust is not created. As a consequence, users do not exchange with one another, and the timebank may close down out of lack of activity. This chapter has shown that the institutionalization of markets nested in multiple logics is problematic when these are not compatible and prescribe contradictory fields of action (Besharov and Smith 2014). In this case, the political and social goals of timebanking can only be met if the market works, but if the market logic is adopted then the political and social values are questioned. The rules and practices that could facilitate the establishment of the market are not always respected or fully understood by users and may even be seen as a transgression of the non-market logics. Thus, timebank promoters reject to replicate market logics and dismiss devices and norms that are normally used in the marketplace. Furthermore, when social objectives are reached (i.e. creation of social bonds among members) this has implications regarding notions of reciprocity and may lead to norm transgression related the market logic. Our fieldwork shows that timebanks are often stuck in-between institutional logics and their institutional arrangement does not create a clear field of action for their members. In other words, the pragmatic and idealistic aspects of timebanking may coexist in theory but create stress and institutional complexity in practice (Battilana, Besharov, and Mitzinneck 2017). Timebanking would fit in the contested organizations discussed by Besharov and Smith (2014). The field is subject to incompatible market and non-market logics that are equally central to the organization. Moreover, the political and social goals of timebanking can only be achieved if the market is successfully enacted. Thus, as the market logic is not instantiated, timebanking is not institutionalized. The failed attempts at reconciling the opposing logics when designing the rules and practices of timebanking explain the already observed demise of the timebanks. Timebanks have not yet institutionalized a hybrid system that successfully bridges these logics so that a fully functioning market is created without conflicting with the social and political ideology behind timebanking. This chapter has shown crucial elements to be taken into account when such markets are put into practice, especially the dual role of participants and how to ensure that it is enacted; the potential conflict between logics if norms are not successfully hybridized, and the need to socialize participants in exchanges based on network generalized reciprocity so that the market is sustainable, and with it, the social and political project. Further research can delve deeper in other sharing economy platforms and their institutionalisation, namely the existence of various logics, how they are instantiated and how these affect the functioning of the platforms and their success.