Saona Hoffmann, Paolo Rodrigo 2020-04-15T22:15:37Z 2020-04-15T22:15:37Z 2020-04-09 1331-677X 10.1080/1331677X.2019.1691930 Artículos en revistas See abstract in English This article analyses the impact of ownership structure features and institutional settings on real activities manipulation. The analysis is based on a sample of listed companies in the underexplored Latin American market for the period of 2004–2016. Paneldata- based G.M.M. System Estimation is used in the empirical analysis. The results confirm that the monitoring role of the majority owner is crucial in mitigating managerial opportunistic behaviour. Here, opportunistic behaviour refers to engaging in real activities manipulation that reduces the informative content of financial statements. However, analysis of insider ownership revealed that managers had a negative impact on transparency. We observed that as insider ownership increases, managers engage more actively in real earnings management. We also find that the institutional ownership and the quality of the regulatory system proved to be effective mechanisms in reducing real activities manipulation. application/pdf es-ES Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada España http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ Revista: Ekonomska Istrazivanja-Economic Research, Periodo: 2, Volumen: , Número: , Página inicial: 1, Página final: 32 Real earnings management and corporate governance: a study of Latin America info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess See keywords in English Earnings management