Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

dc.contributor.authorGarcía Saiz, Sergio Javieres-ES
dc.contributor.authorBlanco, Ivánes-ES
dc.date.accessioned2021-09-11T14:46:56Z
dc.date.available2021-09-11T14:46:56Z
dc.date.issued01/08/2021es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0929-1199es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102005es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11531/61122
dc.descriptionArtículos en revistases_ES
dc.description.abstractEquity option markets can have a dual effect on firms' cost of debt. On the one hand, options attract more informed investors, which increases price informativeness and reduces information asymmetries in the market, facilitating firm financing. On the other, by attracting more informed investors who provide reassurance regarding managerial career concerns, options can increase the potential for risk shifting in firms. We explore these two channels via different tests on corporate bond yields and use different econometric specifications including quasi-natural experiments to mitigate endogeneity concerns. We find evidence consistent with the preeminence of the risk-shifting channel when private managerial risk-taking incentives are sufficiently high and debtholders are more exposed to expropriation.es-ES
dc.description.abstractEquity option markets can have a dual effect on firms' cost of debt. On the one hand, options attract more informed investors, which increases price informativeness and reduces information asymmetries in the market, facilitating firm financing. On the other, by attracting more informed investors who provide reassurance regarding managerial career concerns, options can increase the potential for risk shifting in firms. We explore these two channels via different tests on corporate bond yields and use different econometric specifications including quasi-natural experiments to mitigate endogeneity concerns. We find evidence consistent with the preeminence of the risk-shifting channel when private managerial risk-taking incentives are sufficiently high and debtholders are more exposed to expropriation.en-GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.language.isoes-ESes_ES
dc.rightsCreative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada Españaes_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/es_ES
dc.sourceRevista: Journal of Corporate Finance, Periodo: 1, Volumen: 69, Número: , Página inicial: 102005, Página final: 102035es_ES
dc.titleOptions Trading and the Cost of Debtes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.rights.holderes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.keywordsOptions trading; cost of debt; price informativeness; risk-shiftinges-ES
dc.keywordsOptions trading; cost of debt; price informativeness; risk-shiftingen-GB


Ficheros en el ítem

Thumbnail

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

  • Artículos
    Artículos de revista, capítulos de libro y contribuciones en congresos publicadas.

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada España
Excepto si se señala otra cosa, la licencia del ítem se describe como Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada España