Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem

dc.contributor.authorFaria, Eduardo S.J.es-ES
dc.contributor.authorGranville, Sergioes-ES
dc.contributor.authorVeiga Pereira, Marioes-ES
dc.date.accessioned2016-06-27T03:05:52Z
dc.date.available2016-06-27T03:05:52Z
dc.date.issued01/05/2009es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0885-8950es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11531/9696
dc.descriptionArtículos en revistases_ES
dc.description.abstractes-ES
dc.description.abstractThe firm energy of generation plants is a critical component in some electricity markets. It is usually calculated by the regulator and sets a cap to the amount a plant can trade in capacity markets (or auctions), in order to avoid free-riding behaviors. Firm energy is a systemic property and, in case of hydro plants, a synergy is observed whenever a cooperative operation occurs, i.e., the firm energy of a system is greater than the sum of the individual plants. This immediately raises the question of how to divide the system's firm energy among the individual hydro plants. The objective of this work is to investigate the application of different allocation methods of firm energy rights among hydro plants using a game-theoretic framework. It is shown that there is not an optimal and unique approach to make this allocation. The paper investigates the advantages and disadvantages of different methods, such as marginal allocation, average production during the critical period, incremental allocation, finally recommending the Aumann-Shapley as the allocation method. This method is tested for the Brazilian power system, which has around 100 hydro plants. The results obtained are compared with the current allocation adopted by the electricity regulatory agency of Brazil.en-GB
dc.language.isoen-GBes_ES
dc.rightses_ES
dc.rights.uries_ES
dc.sourceRevista: IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, Periodo: 1, Volumen: 24, Número: 2, Página inicial: 541, Página final: 551es_ES
dc.titleAllocation of firm-energy rights among hydro agents using cooperative game theory: an Aumann-Shapley approaches_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesses_ES
dc.keywordses-ES
dc.keywordsAumann-Shapley, cost allocation methods, firm energy rights, hydropower, power system economics.en-GB


Ficheros en el ítem

FicherosTamañoFormatoVer

No hay ficheros asociados a este ítem.

Este ítem aparece en la(s) siguiente(s) colección(ones)

  • Artículos
    Artículos de revista, capítulos de libro y contribuciones en congresos publicadas.

Mostrar el registro sencillo del ítem