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Russia’s Deterrence Strategy in Nagorno-Karabakh: Implications for the Ukraine Invasion
dc.contributor.author | Paradela López, Miguel | es-ES |
dc.date.accessioned | 2025-04-22T11:26:12Z | |
dc.date.available | 2025-04-22T11:26:12Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2025-03-28 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 2238-6912 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | https://doi.org/10.22456/2238-6912.139813 | es_ES |
dc.description | Artículos en revistas | es_ES |
dc.description.abstract | . | es-ES |
dc.description.abstract | The article analyzes the two-part strategy Russia developed to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020. First, the country helped to weaken Armenia’s position in Nagorno-Karabakh and consolidate Azerbaijan’s. Second, the Russian military deployed peacekeeping troops to the border of the two countries to stabilize the conflict, deter any new Azeri military advance in the region and improve the Russian influence in the Caucasus. Although this strategy was initially successful, as it increased Russia’s military capacity in the region, the unexpected complications Russia experienced during the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 severely weakened its role as peacekeeper and deterrence power. Russia’s involvement in a highly demanding conflict has led to considerable suffering, increased international pressure, and a deteriorated perception of its military power, precluding it from deterring the expansion of a Turkish-backed Azerbaijan. As a result, Russia’s deterring capacity failed as it was uncapable of sending a credible threat to Azerbaijan and this country could achieve historic goals in the region. Consequently, Russia severely compromised its own position in the Caucasus, and increasing pressure over Armenia should be expected. | en-GB |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | en-GB | es_ES |
dc.rights | Creative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada España | es_ES |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ | es_ES |
dc.source | Revista: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, Periodo: 1, Volumen: 13, Número: 26, Página inicial: 120, Página final: 142 | es_ES |
dc.title | Russia’s Deterrence Strategy in Nagorno-Karabakh: Implications for the Ukraine Invasion | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | es_ES |
dc.rights.holder | es_ES | |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
dc.keywords | . | es-ES |
dc.keywords | Peacekeeping Deterrence Geopolitics Conflict Influence Russia Nagorno-Karabakh | en-GB |
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