



Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales  
Grado en Relaciones Internacionales

Trabajo Fin de Grado

# **Jihadist radicalization and recruitment in Europe and Southeast Asia**

A comparative study

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Madrid, abril 2019

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## Abstract

While the Middle East and North Africa remain the mainland of jihadist terrorism, this phenomenon has increasingly found resonance in Europe and Southeast Asia since the 1990s. Countries like Spain, France and Belgium in Europe and Indonesia and the Philippines in Southeast Asia have been victims of numerous attacks carried out by local citizens who have embraced the principles of Salafi-jihadism and joined the networks of Islamist-extremist organizations. This final dissertation studies the main drivers that lead a European or Southeast Asian individual to embrace the Salafi-jihadist ideology, justify violent jihad and enhance terrorist activity in their homeland, either as part of a group or individually. For such purpose, the text analyzes four selected cases of study in Europe and Southeast Asia, assessing the perpetrators of each on the four psycho-social elements of homegrown Islamist radicalization that have traditionally been identified by experts as leading to an extremist behavior: grievances, ideologies, networks and enabling environments and support structures. Additionally, the study takes close look at the phenomenon of recruitment to determine whether formal jihadist organizations play an active role in the radicalization of individuals in both regions.

## Key words

Radicalization, recruitment, Europe, Southeast Asia, jihad, terrorism, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, Salafism, violence, prevention.

## Resumen

Aunque Oriente Medio y el Norte de África siguen siendo el epicentro del terrorismo yihadista, este fenómeno se ha extendido a lo largo de Europa y el Sudeste Asiático desde la década de 1990. Países como España, Francia y Bélgica en Europa e Indonesia y Filipinas en el Sudeste Asiático han sido víctima de numerosos ataques perpetrados por ciudadanos locales que han asumido los principios del Salafismo yihadista y han entrado a formar parte de las redes de organizaciones yihadistas. Este trabajo de fin de grado estudia las motivaciones que llevan a un individuo en Europa o el Sudeste Asiático a adoptar la ideología del Salafismo yihadista, justificar la yihad violenta e involucrarse en acciones terroristas en su lugar de nacimiento o residencia. Para ello, el texto analiza cuatro casos de estudio seleccionados en Europa y el Sudeste Asiático, estudiando a los atacantes de cada uno según los cuatro elementos psicosociales que definen la

radicalización al terrorismo doméstico de etiología islamista que han sido tradicionalmente identificados por expertos: agravios, ideologías, redes y ambientes favorables y estructuras de apoyo. Adicionalmente, el estudio presta atención al fenómeno del reclutamiento para determinar si las organizaciones terroristas formales juegan un papel activo en la radicalización de individuos en ambas regiones.

### Palabras clave

Radicalización, reclutamiento, Europa, Sudeste Asiático, yihad, terrorismo, Al-Qaeda, Estado Islámico, salafismo, violencia, prevención.

## Chapter 1. Theory and Metodology

### 1. State of the Art

Even though the concept of terrorism has had different connotations and meanings since it was popularized during the French Revolution, Bruce Hoffman, senior fellow for counterterrorism and homeland security at the Council on Foreign Relations, provides a modern, comprehensive definition of the term that has earned consensus among the academic community. According to Hoffman (2017 p.46), terrorism is “*the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change*”.

Throughout recent history, Hoffman’s view of terrorism has manifested in different currents or “waves”. David Rapoport<sup>1</sup> identified four of them. The first one, he explains, took place between the 1880s and the 1920s under the form of “Anarchist terrorism”. It was followed by an “Anti-Colonial” wave that came to scene in the 1920s and lasted until the 1960s. The third wave, which Rapoport places in the period between the 1960s and the 1990s encompassed a “New Left” kind of terrorism, which gave way to the fourth and last wave of “Religious” terrorism, which had already started in 1979 lasts until our days (Rapoport, 2002).

The religious wave of terrorism has had representatives of practically all faiths. Indeed, there have been violent acts carried out by Sikhs, Jews, Buddhists and Christians who said to act in the name of their beliefs. Nevertheless, Rapoport argues that Islam is the most significant religion of this wave. As a matter of fact, Islamist extremist organizations have coped the attention of the International Community over the last decades, most of which have emerged in the aftermath of a series of traumatic events in the “Islamic world” (Rapoport, 2002). Arguably, the first of these events was the Iranian revolution of 1979, which was followed by others such as the Afghan War against the USSR that paved the way for the creation of Al-Qaeda in 1988 as an organization to canalize the flow of local and international mujahideen who had travelled to Afghanistan into new conflict scenarios.

Al-Qaeda was the undisputable leader of the Jihadi Social Movement<sup>2</sup> between 2001, when it killed almost 3,000 people (CNN Library, 2018) after hijacking four planes and

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<sup>1</sup> David Rapoport is Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Los Angeles.

<sup>2</sup> According to Dr. Jerome Drevon, the Jihadi Social Movement encompasses individual Salafi jihadi groups who have similar structuring networks, share an ideological corpus and approach to

crashing them into US facilities, and 2014, when the Islamic State (from now, IS) declared an Islamic caliphate in Mosul (Drevon, 2017). During that time, the organization settled in Afghanistan and created a network of branches or subsidiaries along the Middle East and North Africa (Stenersen, 2017). It also gained adepts in Europe and Southeast Asia. In 2004 and 2005, Al-Qaeda cells carried out massive attacks in Madrid and London, killing more than 200 people. Similarly, in 2002, the Indonesian group Jemaah Islamiyah, which is said to have ties with bin Laden's organization, killed 202 people in a suicide bombing in Bali.

After IS settled in Iraq and Syria in 2014, nevertheless, a growing number of Islamist extremist individuals and organizations fell under its sphere of influence, diminishing that of Al-Qaeda (Drevon, 2017). That allowed the former to carry out terrorist attacks in practically every region of the world, even when its main struggle remained in the Middle East. There, it aimed to topple apostate regimes and take over the control of new territories.

The initial conception of jihadist terrorism in Europe and North America involved foreign-born individuals who covertly entered their host-countries after receiving training abroad. However, many of the latest attacks that have taken place in those territories, as well as in Southeast Asia, have been carried out by local citizens. In Europe, many Muslims have fallen prey of the radical Salafi-jihadist ideology and have caused severe damage to their fellow citizens in cities like Barcelona, Paris and London (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). The same phenomenon has occurred in Southeast Asia, where locals have turned their backs on their societies and attacking their own countries of origin, as happened, for instance, in a failed attempt to assassinate Singapore's Prime Minister in 2015 and in a series of attacks in several towns in Indonesia in May 2018 (Ramakrishna, 2017).

This worrying spike of national citizens becoming a threat to the security of their home States has led the academic community to set the focus on the issue of homegrown radicalization. The majority of the literature that has been produced in this regard has set the focus of the analysis in Western societies. Even if some of the models proposed by authors such as Randy Borum and Fathali Moghaddam also consider factors that are

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religion, as well as conflict issues, and use violence in their repertoires of action. For details see Drevon, Jerome, 2017. *The Jihadi Social Movement (JSM): Between Factional Hegemonic Drive, National Realities, and Transnational Ambitions*. Perspectives on Terrorism.

present in non-Western societies (King & Taylor, 2011), the lack of literary productions studying radicalization in regions like Southeast Asia presents a burden when aiming to assess the phenomenon there. Therefore, this analysis will aim to compare and contrast certain terrorist events in order to determine, through empirical data, whether Western-based models are valid to explain the phenomenon of radicalization in Southeast Asia.

Theorists of radicalization initially described the phenomenon as a linear process through which a person undergoes a series of phases that ultimately lead them to commit a violent, terrorist act. That view has been endorsed by several authors, like Randy Borum, Quintan Wiktorowicz and Fathali Moghaddam, and institutions like the Intelligence Division of the New York Police Department (NYPD), all of which agree that radicalization happens as the individual advances through a series of four-to-six stages (King & Taylor, 2011).

However, linear models of radicalization have been contested during the last years. Recent approaches towards the study of the phenomenon suggest that radicalization occurs when different factors interplay, not following a necessary order. Scholars like Marc Sageman, Mohammed Hafez and Creighton Mullins defend this view (King & Taylor, 2011; Hafez & Mullins, 2015).

As will be demonstrated in the following section of this dissertation, Hafez and Mullins' model for understanding radicalization rests upon four factors that encompass the main elements that radicalization theorists have traditionally identified in their own research. Hence, their framework provides with the necessary elements to elaborate a clear comparison between the phenomenon of radicalization in Europe, where most of previous analysis has been focused, and Southeast Asia.

Hafez and Mullins argue that, in every case of Islamist radicalization, the process towards violent extremism includes two psychological factors -grievances and ideologies- and two social factors -networks and enabling environments and support structures-. Grievances refer to personal situations that lead an individual to seek a new path of life. These can include economic marginalization, cultural alienation and personal crisis, among others. Ideologies are "master narratives about the world and one's place in it" (Hafez & Mullins, 2015: 961). In the case of Islamist extremism, individuals embrace the Salafi-jihadist ideology. According to Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism is defined by five characteristics: *tawhid*, *hākimiyya*, *takfir*, *al-wala' wa-l-bara* and *jihad*. As Maher (2017) explains,

The doctrine of al-wala' wa-l-bara establishes lines of loyalty and disavowal; takfir delineates Islam against everything else and protects it against insidious corruption from within; tawhid and hākimiyya explain what legitimate authority should look like and who it should serve; and jihad prescribes the method for this particular revolution. (p.16)

It is not the purpose of this text to go deeper in the analysis of the Salafi-jihadist ideology. Nevertheless, the fact that Salafi-Jihadism is more of a political concept than a religious one is worthy of mention. Even if it is based upon the defense and promotion of Islam (Maher, 2017), Salafi-Jihadism is promoted by radical Islamist organizations to encourage individuals to challenge the axioms of the prevailing order. For that purpose, radical proselytists appeal to symbols and narratives and frame personal and collectivist grievances to drive individuals to engage in action (in this case, violent jihad) against a certain group of people (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). For instance, proselytists aim to convince others that the West is waging a war against Muslims and give examples such as the Israeli abuses of Human Rights in Palestine. Hence, Salafi-Jihadism is an ideology of confrontation, and an individual does not necessarily need to be an expert on Islam to embrace it. In Europe, for instance, a great number of extremists are people who have returned suddenly to Islam or converts who have little Islamic background (Butler, 2015).

Furthermore, Hafez and Mullins argue that radicalization has a strong social component. The authors explain that informal networks of friendship and kinship facilitate recruitment. Therefore, radicalization tends to be local and based on interpersonal ties, which help build a feeling of trust and create a collective identity which palliates the individuals' grievances. Also, mutual trust and commitment facilitate the extremists' activities, which are often clandestine, especially when it comes to the planning and commitment of a terrorist attack (Hafez & Mullins, 2015).

Finally, enabling environments and support structures are those which “advance radicalization by providing ideological and material support for susceptible individuals” (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). Traditional structures like mosques and training camps have been limited in their scope due to governmental action and have begun to be outlined by more sophisticated ones, like the Internet. Arguably, access to social media and online sites such as forums and chat rooms where the extremist content is shared in different languages have promoted the phenomenon of “leaderless radicalization”. Such vision has been defended by authors like Sageman and Vidino, who have argued that autonomous



homegrown terrorism is growing, and that formal jihadist organizations now play a minor role in the attacks that take place in those areas out of their control. However, that assumption has been contested by renowned theorists like Hoffman and Reinares who, after studying twenty-five cases of terrorist operations and campaigns worldwide, concluded that formal organizations like Al-Qaeda are still directly involved in the management of the most important campaigns. As is observable, there is a lack of consensus regarding this dilemma, which has come to be known as the “Sageman-Hoffman debate” among scholars. To shed light on this, the analysis will pay special attention to this matter in an attempt to determine whether formal jihadist organizations play an active role in radicalization in Europe and Southeast Asia.

## 2. Radicalization theories and models

In initial approaches towards the phenomenon of radicalization, authors like Borum, Wiktorowicz and Moghaddam, as well as the Intelligence Unit of the NYPD, agreed that for an individual to commit a terrorist attack in the name of an ideology he or she ought to complete a series of preliminar, consecutive stages (King & Taylor, 2011).

**Table 1.** Linear models of radicalization

Author	Type of Model	Stages
Borum (2003)	Linear, progressive	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Social and economic deprivation</li> <li>2. Inequality and resentment</li> <li>3. Blame and attribution</li> <li>4. Stereotyping and demonizing the enemy</li> </ol>
Wiktorowicz (2004)	Linear, emergent	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Cognitive opening</li> <li>2. Religious seeking</li> <li>3. Frame alignment</li> <li>4. Socialization</li> </ol>

Moghaddam (2005 – 2006)	Linear, progressive	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Psychological interpretation of material conditions</li> <li>2. Perceived options to fight unfair treatment</li> <li>3. Displacement of aggression</li> <li>4. Moral engagement</li> <li>5. Solidification of categorical thinking</li> <li>6. Terrorist act</li> </ol>
NYPD (2007)	Linear	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Pre-radicalization</li> <li>2. Self-identification</li> <li>3. Indoctrination</li> <li>4. Jihadization</li> </ol>

*Source: King & Taylor (2011)*

Besides agreeing on its linearity, the works of the NYPD, Borum, Wiktorowicz, and Moghaddam present another significant commonality: they argue that radicalization rests upon a social-psychological process, in which emotions and social influences play a major role. For Borum and Moghaddam, the feeling of relative deprivation is key in the process. Both authors argue that an individual is prone to experiencing relative deprivation when he or she compares their material conditions to those of other groups and concludes that their own group is suffering an injustice. The same idea rests under Wiktorowicz's preconditions for a cognitive opening, which he identifies as the first phase of the process (King & Taylor, 2011). Additionally, the NYPD's and Wiktorowicz's models explain that the radicalization process involves an episode of personal crisis, related to the management of one's identity. In a study by Michael King and Donald M. Taylor (2011), both authors argue that, contrary to the common belief that such personal crisis is derived from discrimination or lack of integration, it is usually the result of the struggle of second-and-third-generation immigrants of dealing with a dual identity. This view has been replicated by experts like Reinares and García-Calvo (2018) and Provines (2017), who have as well pointed out that second and third generations of

immigrants may feel stigmatized as second-class citizens due to their foreign origins. Thus, in the search for a common identity, these individuals tend to reach out to others in their same circumstances, a situation that is likely to be exploited by radical proselytists with the ability to “sell” their extremist ideologies.

As for the social influences, Moghaddam and Wiktorowicz’s models argue that potential extremists are approached by formal jihadist organizations and eventually recruited by them during the process. The NYPD offers a different view of the same issue, stating that formal organizations do not play such an active role, and that, instead, the extremists tend to reach out to others in similar conditions and form hermetic cells by their own initiative. Lastly, Borum’s proposal, even if not directly mentioning the necessity for the individual to establish contact with others, does not close the door to that possibility (King & Taylor, 2011).

Despite their initial popularity, linear models of radicalization have been contested during the last years. Polish-born scholar Marc Sageman challenged the conception of radicalization as a pathway and suggested that the phenomenon occurs when four different factors interplay: moral outrage (perceiving events like the invasion of Iraq as moral violations against the Muslims), the frame used to interpret the world (belief that the West is waging a war against Islam), a resonance of those elements with a personal experience and, finally, the interactions of like-minded people, which help validate one’s ideas (King & Taylor, 2011). Similarly, Hafez and Mullins argue that there is a lack of evidence to state that radicalization occurs in a linear way, and that the issue ought to be assessed as the convergence of different elements that, together, may produce extremism (Hafez & Mullins, 2015).

After analyzing the views of several experts, Hafez and Mullins concluded that there are four factors to which most radicalization models constantly make reference: grievances, ideologies, networks, and enabling environments and support structures (Hafez & Mullins, 2015).

**Table 2.** Non-linear models of radicalization

Author	Type of Model	Factors
Sageman (2008)	Non-linear, emergent	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Sense of moral outrage</li><li>2. Frame used to interpret the world</li><li>3. Resonance with personal experience</li><li>4. Mobilization through networks</li></ol>
Hafez & Mullins	Non-linear, puzzle	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Grievances</li><li>2. Networks</li><li>3. Ideologies</li><li>4. Enabling environments and support structures</li></ol>

*Sources: King and Taylor (2011), Hafez & Mullins (2015)*

Hafez and Mullins therefore propose to avoid describing the phenomenon of radicalization as a “process”, arguing the absence of a clear linear pattern to explain it, and state that it should instead be understood as some kind of “puzzle”. In such puzzle, radicalization is likely to occur when the mentioned factors interact, not following any necessary order of appearance.

While the academic discussion over the intrications of radicalization continues, there seems to be consensus on the fact that there is no single approach to the phenomenon that can explain radicalization by its own (Crone, 2016). The background elements found in different Islamist extremist individuals often differ from one another, and hence the aim of establishing a single model for the phenomenon seems complicated to reach. Nevertheless, the framework provided by Hafez and Mullins includes many of the psychosocial elements that experts have traditionally mentioned in their studies. Its first element, grievances, which involves events of personal crisis that lead to seek a new path in life and is related to the disenchantment of some Muslims with their host societies, is similar to Borum’s “it is not right” initial stage, to Wiktorowicz’s “cognitive opening”, Moghaddam’s “psychological interpretations of social conditions”, the NYPD’s “self-identification” stage and Sageman’s “moral outrage” and “resonance with personal

experience”. The element of “ideologies” finds resonance in Wiktorowicz’s proposed “religious seeking”, the NYPD’s “indoctrination” and “jihadization” and Sageman’s “frame used to interpret the world”. Finally, the social aspect of Hafez and Mullins’ model, which entails the networks and the enabling environments and support structures, is as well similar to other elements such as Wiktorowicz’s “socialization”, Moghaddam’s “moral engagement” and “solidification of categorical thinking”, the NYPD’s “indoctrination” and Sageman’s “mobilization through networks”.

As observed, most radicalization models make reference to similar psychological and social factors, even though their authors might differ in their name and interpretation. Therefore, this study will work upon the basis that radicalization is a phenomenon that occurs when those factors interplay and challenge it through the analysis of four different case-studies in Europe and Southeast Asia.

As a final note, it is necessary to limit the scope of the term “radicalization”. It is widely accepted among experts that radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence. Indeed, the term has two variations: ideological radicalization, which implies a person who is influenced by extremist ideas, and behavioral radicalization, by which an individual who has already adopted a radical “world-view” engages in violence (Crone, 2016). This study will set the focus on the issue of behavioral radicalization, for it is the one that matches with Hoffman’s definition of terrorism as including the component of violence.

### 3. Research Question

The following pages will assess the phenomenon of radicalization on the patterns presented by European and Southeast Asian Islamist extremists who have carried out or aimed to perpetrate terrorist attacks at home in order to determine whether there are any notable similarities between them. Hence, the main question to be answered through the analysis is:

*Do European and Southeast Asian Islamist extremists, who have engaged in terrorist attacks in their home countries, present similar radicalization patterns?*

To shed light on that core question, and following Hafez and Mullins’ framework, the study will aim to answer the following series of supporting queries:

- I. Did the attackers present any sort of personal grievances?

- II. (a) Did the attackers establish contact with other radicalized individuals in their environment?  
(b) What kind of relationship did they have with each other?
- III. Were the attackers recruited and/or guided in their actions by a formal jihadist organization?
- IV. Did the attackers embrace the ideology of Salafi-jihadism?

The first question responds to Hafez and Mullins framework's element of grievances. The second aims to investigate the networks and enabling environments and support structures of the terrorists. The third goes deeper in that sense and studies the role of formal terrorist organizations within radicalization. Finally, the last question enquires about the necessity for the terrorists to consciously embrace the principles of Salafi-jihadism before perpetrating an attack.

If the answers to these questions coincide for the selected cases in Europe and Southeast Asia, this study would arguably place the academic community closer to finding a model of radicalization that can explain the phenomenon regardless of the region where it occurs. If, by contrary, European and Southeast Asian Islamist extremists are found to present different patterns of radicalization, the models described earlier ought to be revisited or limited in their scope.

#### 4. Research Objectives

The main objective of this analysis is to determine whether the phenomenon of Islamist radicalization follows the same set of psycho-social patterns in Europe and Southeast Asia. To answer the research questions the text will:

- I. Analyze whether the Islamist extremist terrorists suffered any kind of life-changing experience that made them prone to radicalize;
- II. Analyze the environment of the terrorists and determine whether friends, family members or members of their community acted as radicalization agents and in which context they developed their ties;
- III. Analyze the role played by formal jihadist organizations in the process of radicalization;
- IV. Determine whether the terrorists consciously adopted a Salafi-jihadist mindset prior to the attacks.

The text will also provide the reader with a series of policy recommendations to be considered for preventing radicalization in accordance to the findings of the study.

## 5. Hypothesis

The initial hypothesis of this dissertation is that radicalization does not follow the same patterns in Europe and Southeast Asia. This is due to two facts. First, there is no known presence of any formal jihadist organization within the European continent, while several of them have settled down and spread their networks in Southeast Asia. Arguably, this may imply that formal jihadist organizations play a more active role in the phenomenon of radicalization in the latter.

Additionally, regarding the fact that Islam is the cornerstone of the Salafi-jihadist ideology, it seems logical to think that the ideology is likely to find more track in Southeast Asia, where 40% of the citizens are Muslim (Cornell University Library, 2017) than in Europe, where the Islamic faith accounts for only 5% of the population (Hackett, 2017).

Hence, a priori, the differences between Europe and Southeast Asia regarding (i) the presence of jihadist organizations, and (ii) the number of Muslims, seem strong enough to assert that radicalization follows different patterns in each region.

## 6. Time Scope

The study compares and contrasts the dynamics of radicalization in Europe and Southeast Asia through the study of four different jihadist events in Europe and Southeast Asia that took place between the 7<sup>th</sup> of January 2015 and the 16<sup>th</sup> of May 2018.

All the selected cases have taken place between 2014 and 2018. The decision to focus the analysis in such lapse of time responds to the shift of power that took place between 2014 and the first months of 2018 within the Jihadi Social Movement. On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of IS, declared the Caliphate in Mosul, and his group rapidly sieged vast amounts of territory in both Iraq and Syria, establishing its own rules over the population there. The growing popularity of IS made many jihadist organizations and Islamist extremist individuals worldwide pledge allegiance to it. As a result, IS shadowed Al-Qaeda, whose influence had already diminished due a US drone-campaign to target its leaders, and many of whose supporters shifted and joined IS (Stenersen, 2017). Even if IS has lost most of the territory it once controlled in the Middle East due to the military

efforts of an international coalition, it is still a reference to many extremists both within and outside the region.

Therefore, it seems appropriate to focus the analysis of radicalization in the lapse of time in which IS contested Al-Qaeda's leadership of the global jihad and even seemed to surpass its global impact.

## 7. Geographical Scope

Most jihadist groups have traditionally settled in Central Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. When Al-Qaeda emerged in the late 1980s it spread its apparatus along Sudan and Afghanistan before expanding in the Middle East through the establishment of local franchises in the early 2000s (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004). IS, which originally was a former branch of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, split from the central organization in 2014 and aimed to impose its law over Iraq and Syria through a horrific campaign of attacks until its territorial defeat in the early months of 2018. However, whilst these regions remain the "hot-spot" of such phenomena, Al-Qaeda and IS, along with other groups which have adopted their ideology have caused significant harm in Europe and Southeast Asia, two regions that have been in the peripheral focus of violent jihad since the 1990s.

Most of the jihadist attacks in Europe and Southeast Asia have been carried out by cells or groups with ties to Al-Qaeda and, since 2014, to IS. The first Islamist terrorist attack in Europe took place on 11 March 2004. That day, an Al-Qaeda cell detonated bombs in four trains in the Spanish city of Madrid, killing 193 people. Ever since, the number of people who have lost their lives to jihadist terrorist attacks in the continent accounts for more than 600 (Galán & Alameda, 2018). Of those, at least 371 have been killed since IS declared the caliphate in 2014 (Europol, 2015-2018 & Klausen, 2018). The countries that have been most damaged by radical Islamism since then have been France, Belgium and Germany. Most, if not all of these attacks have been carried out by individuals acting alone or in cells who operated on behalf of organizations based outside the continent.

Contrary to the situation in Europe, several violent Islamist organizations have settled in Southeast Asia over the last decades. The most notorious example is Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an extremist organization that was founded in 1993 (Ramakrishna, 2016) and that has caused a total of 341 deaths since that year in Indonesia and the Philippines (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2018). JI



has traditionally been aligned with the global jihad vision of Al Qaeda. Indeed, most of the organization's senior network support Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, Al-Qaeda's faction in Syria (Ramakrishna, 2016). However, since 2014 as many as thirty regional armed groups are estimated to have pledged allegiance to IS. Among these is Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD), an Islamist extremist group that conducted six consecutive attacks in Indonesia in 2018 (ICPVTR, 2018). Other IS-linked groups in Southeast Asia include Islamic State of Lanao, a Pilipino terrorist organization that sieged the city of Marawi on 23 May 2017, this being the first territory to fall under IS control outside Iraq and Syria.

## 8. Theoretical Framework

Hoffman's definition of terrorism does not specify whether the "*creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence*" (Hoffman, 2017: p.46) must be pursued by a state or a non-state actor. Still, in recent times it has often been non-state actors who have engaged in terrorist acts. Hence, a theoretical approach towards the phenomenon must recognize the significance of such actors in the international arena as well as their ability to condition the actions of States.

In that line, terrorism could be framed upon the Liberal theory of International Relations. Liberals recognize the significance of non-state actors at the international level and argue that international cooperation among all fosters economic interdependence and the maintenance of peace (Bayo, 2012). However, while this framework seems valid as to recognize the relevance of terrorist groups, it fails to provide with a structure to completely explain the phenomenon of terrorism. As terrorist organizations do not cooperate neither towards international economic interdependence nor towards the maintenance of peace, liberals marginalize terrorists, understanding that they are exclusively involved in criminal acts, and hence do not consider them central actors in the international dynamics. Moreover, liberals, like realists, argue that terrorism is a phenomenon that occurs solely in at non-state level, denying the possibility of a government engaging in State-terrorism (Bayo, 2012).

These constraints make it necessary to go one step beyond and frame this research under the perspective of the Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS). Recognizing the significance of terrorist groups at the non-state level, CTS also admits the possibility that states engage in terrorist acts against their citizens (Jackson, 2007). Even though state-terrorism is not the subject of analysis of this dissertation, it is important to acknowledge its existence.

Richard Jackson, professor of Peace Studies and deputy director at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, outlines the core principles of CTS. First, he explains, CTS adheres to epistemological commitments. These refer to the fact that terrorism knowledge can never be objective as it depends on the social and cultural context in which it emerges. Hence, a first approach towards CTS requires the acceptance of the impossibility of obtaining objective knowledge on terrorism, which is key to avoid falling prey of the political discourse and its biases. CTS also sticks to ontological commitments, by which CTS theorists remain skeptical towards the employment of the term “terrorism” as a label to emit political judgements. They understand that the term has traditionally been used in a pejorative sense, which in many cases has blocked more profound analyses, and therefore aim to study it in a more complete manner. For that purpose, CTS scholars argue that terrorism analyses ought to avoid the dichotomy by which terrorism is simply “brutal” and state-led-counterterrorism is positive. Instead, they preach the necessity of analyzing the historical, cultural and political context in which terrorism emerges in order to construct a more-complete view of the phenomenon (Jackson, 2007). Parallely, CTS regards terrorism as a tool used by states or non-state actors with a political agenda. Jackson argues that *“terrorism is [...] a continuation of politics by other means”* (Jackson, 2007: 5). This view goes in line with the explanation of the Salafi-jihadist ideology provided earlier in the text, which argued that it is used by jihadist organizations to frame their political purposes and attract others to fight for their cause. Finally, CTS also binds by ethical-normative commitments, which mainly refer to the necessity to promote universal and societal security through the cooperation of non-state actors such as activists and the civil society. CTS wants to avoid research on terrorism from being handled exclusively by governmental agencies and State-funded organizations and instead serve global purposes like the protection of fundamental human rights and the end of structural and physical violence and discrimination (Jackson, 2007).

In sum, CTS provides with an approach to terrorism that sets the focus on the necessity of investigating the context in which it takes place before its categorization. That view coincides with the purpose of this analysis, which aims to shed light into the phenomenon of radicalization to offer a framework to understand the reasons behind its violent manifestations.

## 9. Methodology

To determine whether the phenomenon of Islamist radicalization follows the same set of psycho-social patterns in Europe and Southeast Asia, this study will be constructed upon a comparative methodology. A comparative study has been defined as a “systematic analysis of small number of cases” that are related to each other through the comparison and contrast of certain variables (Collier, 1993; Pennings et. al, 2006).

Indeed, four cases will be analyzed in the following pages. Two of them entail jihadist attacks that took place in Europe. The first entails a shooting in Paris, France, against workers of the satiric magazine Charlie Hebdo on the 7<sup>th</sup> of January 2015 and a posterior hostage situation in a Hyper Cacher supermarket on the 9<sup>th</sup> of January. The second consists in and a vehicle ramming and shooting in the streets of Barcelona and Cambrils (Spain) on 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> August 2018. The other two cases occurred in Southeast Asia. The first, a failed attempt to detonate a bomb in front of the presidential palace in Jakarta, Indonesia, on the 10<sup>th</sup> of December 2016. The second, a multiple suicide-bombing carried out by three families in Surabaya, Indonesia, on 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> of May 2018. The four cases are related to each other, for they are all episodes of violent extremism perpetrated by homegrown Islamist radicals in places far away from the terrorist mainland. Even though there were many cases available for the study, only four have been selected because of the necessity to reduce the complexity of reality (Collier, 1993) to a size where it can be properly analyzed. Additionally, the selection of these particular cases responds to the relatively large amount of public literature that has been produced on them in comparison to other similar jihadist attacks, which is necessary for carrying out a comprehensive analysis.

The cases will be individually assessed on the four variables included in Hafez and Mullins’ framework, which are key to challenge the initial hypothesis that the phenomenon of radicalization does not follow the same patterns in Europe and Southeast Asia. Hence, for each of the selected events, the analysis will pay attention to the possible grievances suffered by the perpetrators, to their ideological engagement with Salafi-Jihadism, to the presence of other radical individuals within their personal networks and to the existence of enabling environments and support structures which catalyzed their radicalization.

## Chapter 2. Analysis of the selected cases of study

### 1. Europe.

#### I. The Paris Attacks

On January 7, 2015, French brothers Chérif (32) and Saïd Kouachi (34) entered the offices of Charlie Hebdo, a leftist satirical magazine which had received criticism from the Islamist circles for the publication of a series of cartoons portraying prophet Muhammad, and opened fire against its staff, who were celebrating a meeting. Ten people were killed inside the building: eight members of the magazine's staff, a guest at the meeting, one maintenance worker, and one police officer. While shooting, the attackers allegedly shouted the jihadist mantra "*Allahu Akbar*" (Allah is the greatest) and stated that they acted on behalf of Al-Qaeda. Once the Kouachi brothers abandoned the Charlie Hebdo offices, they shot another policeman dead and managed to escape by car (Van Goethem, 2015). After hiding for more than one day, Chérif and Saïd Kouachi were localized by the police in a printing shop in Dammartin-en-Goële, a region some 40 kilometers away from Paris. While in the shop, Chérif Kouachi established contact with BFM TV, a French news channel, and explained his interlocutor that both him and his brother belonged to Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and that Anwar al-Awlaki, one of the leaders of the organization before his decease in 2011, had financed him in the past. He also ensured that they did not intend to attack civilians, especially children and women, and that the Charlie Hebdo staff were not to be considered as civilians but as soldiers instead (BuzzVid, n.d.). Both Chérif and Saïd Kouachi were killed by the French security forces shortly after the telephone conversation finished, when they opened fire against their position (Van Goethem, 2015).

While the Kouachi brothers carried out their attack and subsequent runaway, 32-year-old Amedy Coulibaly perpetrated yet another terrorist aggression. On January 7, he shot and wounded a jogger in Paris. The next day, he shot a policeman dead, and, on January 9, he entered a Hyper Cacher supermarket in the East of the French capital carrying several firearms and knives and took 16 customers hostage, killing four. Before the police forces stormed the supermarket and killed him, Coulibaly spoke with BFM TV and stated that he had pledged allegiance to IS and that he had coordinated his acts with the Kouachi brothers. Furthermore, he also contacted the police and demanded that they let the Kouachi brothers abandon the printing shop

where they were hiding (Counter Extremism Project, s.f.). Lastly, and while in the supermarket, he uploaded a video in which he explained that his motivation to attack Paris responded to his desire to “stop the war in the Arab countries” (Counter Extremism Project, s.f.) and defend the Muslims in Palestine (BuzzVid, n.d.).

Regarding the four variables of radicalization considered in this study, there is enough evidence to assess the Kouachi brothers in each of them, the case of Coulibaly being slightly more complicated. While analyzing personal grievances can be a quite subjective matter, the Kouachi brothers present characteristics that could well be regarded as such. First, they lost their parents at a very young age. While the cause of their father’s decease remains unknown, their mother appears to have committed suicide when Saïd and Chérif were 12 and 10, respectively. The two brothers were reported to have found their mother’s dead body laying on the floor of the flat where they lived after returning home from school. After that event, both were put in foster care and later sent to an orphanage (Lichfield, 2015). In addition to those life-changing events, the fact that both Chérif and Saïd were second-generation Algerian immigrants must be considered. As has been explained in the previous sections, most experts on radicalization have traditionally pointed at dual identities as one of the trigger causes for an individual to embrace an extremist ideology, arguing that they might feel stuck between two worlds, that of their parents and that where they have been raised, and that duplicity could be hard to handle (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018).

The brothers had also established contact with other Islamist extremists within their networks. Chérif and Saïd regularly attended Adda’wa mosque in the Parisian district of Stalingrad, where, according to Chérif Kouachi, French cleric Farid Benyettou introduced him to the concept of jihad, taught him how to use firearms and encouraged him to travel to fight in Iraq. Chérif would be later arrested for his connections with an Al-Qaeda recruiting network which aimed to send young French Muslims to fight alongside Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). He spent three years in prison, where he met Islamist extremists such as Djamel Beghal, a member of Al-Qaeda, and Amedy Coulibaly, the third terrorist involved in the Paris attack. After they were all released, Coulibaly and the brothers held regular meetings at Beghal’s home, in which they planned to break Smain Ali Belkacem, a jihadist convicted for a metro bombing that took place in Paris in 1995, out of prison. Beghal was arrested and charged for the plot, but the rest were left free. Finally, between July and August 2011 Chérif and

Saïd traveled to Yemen and received training from AQAP, where they reportedly met Anwar al-Awlaki (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.). In addition, Saïd Kouachi was believed to have studied at Sana'a's al-Iman University, where he was influenced by radical preacher Abdul Majeed al-Zindani (Van Goethem, 2015). All this information proves that Chérif and Saïd Kouachi were also recruited and/or guided by a formal jihadist organization, in this case AQAP, which later claimed responsibility for the attack (Shelbourne, 2015), and that both had embraced the principles of Salafi-Jihadism. This last fact becomes more evident when analyzing the brothers' claims both during the shootout at the Charlie Hebdo offices and during the telephone interview with BFM TV, in which they adopted the Salafi-jihadist narrative and stated that they were acting on revenge for the suffering of the Muslims in Iraq, that they regarded the journalists as soldiers of the enemy and that they wanted to die as martyrs (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.; Van Goethem, 2015).

Regarding Coulibaly, there is not as much information available on his profile compared to the Kouachi brothers. It is known that he was a second-generation immigrant from Mali, which reinforces the dual-identity theory. It is also known that he had a past of criminal activity, being imprisoned in 2004 for armed robbery (Borger, 2015). It was while serving sentence when he embraced the principles of Salafi-Jihadism, as he came in contact with Beghal, first, and with Chérif Kouachi afterwards. Coulibaly's shift from criminality into violent extremism supports some authors' view that there exists a nexus between crime and terrorism. Experts have pointed that this crime-terrorism nexus often takes place when factors such as the concentration of violent extremists in prison, who may stimulate criminals to continue their involvement in crime within a new narrative, and the stigma in society against offenders, which limits their chances to reintegrate in society, are present. Coulibaly's case is no different, as he fell under the influence of radical Islamism while serving sentence with fellow jihadist inmates (Bergema et. al., 2018).

Differently from the Kouachi brothers, there is no evidence that Coulibaly formally joined any formal terrorist organization. Nevertheless, he pledged allegiance to IS both in his conversation with BFM TV and in a video that was uploaded on January 10<sup>th</sup>, and the organization claimed responsibility for his actions in a late number of Dabiq, IS former propaganda magazine. In it, IS fosters an interview with Coulibaly's wife, who fled to Syria the day prior to the attack following her husband's advice, in

which she praised the organization and encouraged others to join it (Shelbourne, 2015). The fact that Coulibaly claimed to have coordinated his actions with the Kouachi brothers is controversial, given that they were part of the Al-Qaeda network, which was back then confronted by IS since the latter decided to split up with the former terrorist group in 2014. This could explain that, while such distinctions remain relevant in the jihadist mainland, they are blurred among young, foreign jihadists who are looking for inspiration (Berger, 2015). Still, Coulibaly made clear that he had accepted the Salafi-jihadist worldview by stating that he was acting following the orders of the Prophet and to revenge France's involvement in Mali and Syria and the assassination of Muslims (Counter Extremism Project, s.f.).

## II. The Barcelona and Cambrils Attacks

On August 16, 2017, an explosion was registered in a house in Alcanar, a Catalan town in the province of Tarragona. Two men were found dead and another one was severely injured as a result. Although the incident was initially treated by the security forces as a domestic accident caused by a gas leak, later evidence proved that it was caused by the mishandling of explosives. Indeed, the two victims were Abdelbaki Es Satty and Youseff Aalla, members of the jihadist cell that would perpetrate a series of attacks against the Spanish population over the two next days. The third individual, who survived the incident, Mohamed Houli Chemlal, was as well a member of the cell (Carpio Briz, 2018).

On August 17, 22-year-old Younes Abouyaaqoub drove a van into a pedestrian area of Barcelona's main street, Ramblas, and ran over hundreds of civilians. The incident caused fourteen deaths and injured over one hundred people. The author of the attack abandoned the scenario by walk, avoiding identification due to the chaos in the street. A passport corresponding to Chemlal, the injured individual in the explosion, was found inside the van. That led the police to place him under arrest and identify the links between the two events. During his escape, Abouyaaqoub robbed a vehicle after stabbing his owner to death with a knife. Shortly after, he crashed the vehicle against a police patrol, but managed to escape again and robbing yet another vehicle before his track was lost. He would be located again on the 21<sup>st</sup> of August in a nearby location, Subirats. As the police officers pointed their guns at him and before shooting him dead, Abouyaaqoub confronted them with knives and wearing a fake explosive vest while shouting jihadist-like statements (Carpio Briz, 2018).

During the night of the 17 and 18 of August, the terrorist cell struck for a second time. Moussa Oukabir, Said Aalla, Omar Hichamy, Houssaine Abouyaaqoub and Mohamed Hichamy attempted to run over the pedestrians who were walking through the promenade of Cambrils, a town located some 100 kilometers in the south of Barcelona. They failed to hit any of them, but crashed their vehicle against a police car. Right after the crash, the terrorists, who were also wearing fake explosive vests, attacked the pedestrians with knives and axes, killing one and injuring other six. The security agents shot all the terrorists dead (Carpio Briz, 2018).

In total, ten were the extremists directly implicated in the Barcelona and Cambrils attacks. Given the complexity that an individual analysis would have presented and the limited public data on each of them, their factors of radicalization will be assessed from a broader perspective. The case of Abdelbaki Es Satty will be studied in close detail given his role as the leader of the cell. He was 45 years old at the moment of his death and, besides having worked as an imam at several mosques in Europe, he had a criminal past and had developed ties with other extremist individuals. Regarding the nine other members of the cell, who were all between 17 and 28 years old and had no previously-known connections with radical Islamism (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018), they will be analyzed altogether given their similarities.

Abdelbaki Es Satty was the leader of the cell and the main agent of radicalization of the other nine. He was born in Morocco in 1973 and emigrated to Spain in 2002 (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018). Other than him being an immigrant, with all the difficulties that can pose for someone aiming to settle down in a new society, there are no known grievances that might have conditioned his life path. He seems to have developed ties with radical Islamists since the very beginning of his stay in the southern-European country. During his first years in Spain he shared a flat with an Algerian citizen who would later travel to Iraq to die as a suicide-bomber in 2013. In 2006, Es Satty was investigated for his implication in a plot to recruit young extremists in Barcelona and send them to fight in Iraq (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018). Between 2010 and 2014 he served sentence for drug-trafficking, and reportedly established a close relationship with Rachid Aglif, a Moroccan citizen who had been imprisoned for his connections with the 2004 Madrid bombings (Somolinos, 2017). Although he had already established contact with extremists before his time in prison, it was after he was released when Es Satty commenced his period of more activity as a proselytist.



In 2015 he started preaching as an imam in Ripoll, a town in the Catalan province of Gerona. Before that, he had reportedly attended several Salafist meetings. Between January and March 2016, he travelled to Vilvoorde, a town in Belgium known for being one of the main hot spots of Islamist extremism in Europe, seeking a new mosque to preach at. Unable to find any, he came back to Ripoll, where he continued preaching until shortly before the attacks (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018).

As can be observed, Es Satty's profile meets at least two of the variables studied in this analysis. He had established contacts with other extremists, with whom he was able to develop interpersonal ties and who arguably reinforced his radical interpretation of Islam. He met them all in what could be considered enabling environments, like in prison, in conferences in his neighborhood or in his own house, all places where they were able to act in confidentiality. In addition, Es Satty embraced the Salafi-jihadist ideology as a result of these meetings and his preaching activity, which served him as a vehicle to convince others of his extremist ideas. However, neither Es Satty's suffering of personal grievances nor his contact with any formal jihadist organizations have been confirmed.

Regarding the other nine members of the cell, there appears not to be significant issues that might have caused any of them to break up with their past and seek a new path of life. If, something, all of the terrorists were second-generations of Moroccan immigrants, and only one of them, Mohamed Houli Chemlal, held Spanish citizenship. All of them were legal residents in Spain and had access to the same public facilities than any national citizen. (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018) Despite the suggestions of some scholars that second-generations might tend to find it hard to successfully integrate within their host society, evidence shows the opposite in this case. Family, friends, neighbors and local professionals with whom the terrorists had relation all indicated that they behaved as ordinary citizens. Indeed, they all were part of a program to prevent the social exclusion of people with foreign origins. Seven had completed secondary education and six had extended their formation with vocational training studies. At least three had jobs at the moment of the attacks (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018).

It is true, however, that some of them had a history of criminal history and substance abuse. three of them – Youseff Aalla, Houssain Abouyaaqoub and Driss Oukabir – had been processed by the police by different crimes. The most notable case is that of

Oukabir, who had been involved in sexual assault, robbery and domestic abuse, and had served sentence in prison until 2012. In addition, Driss Oukabir, and Youseff Aalla were reported by their families to have been usual consumers of alcohol and drugs such as marihuana and cocaine (García Rey, 2018). While it could be suggested that theirs is another case of a crime-terrorism nexus, there is no proof of any of the three individuals having embraced an extremist ideology as a result of their implication in crime. Hence, evidence is too weak to arrive to that conclusion.

Without strong evidence to suggest that the nine terrorists had experienced any kind of personal grievances that were significant enough to change their lifestyles, experts suggest that their radicalization was instead catalyzed by the influence of Abdelbaki Es Satty (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018). Indeed, Es Satty was the person in charge of gathering all the individuals together and inculcating them an extremist interpretation of Islam. For over a year before the attacks, Es Satty held constant meetings with the other nine. To gather them, he played the card of the family nexus. He started their process of radicalization by convincing first Younes Abouyaaqoub, Mohamed Hichamy, Driss Oukabir and probably Youseff Aalla because they all had younger brothers who would likely to engage once their elders were committed to the extremist ideology (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018). The plan worked, and during the course of the next months, Houssaine Abouyaaqoub, Omar Hichamy, Moussa Oukabir and Said Aalla entered the cell. The only person without any relatives within the group was Mohamed Houli Chemlal.

Besides the family nexuses within the cell, all its components were neighbors and shared the same public spaces, a factor that made it easier for them to develop trust in each other when planning their operations. Despite Es Satty preaching in the same town where they all lived, there are doubts whether the mosque played a role as an enabling environment for radicalization. According to Reinares and García-Calvo (2018), of the nine youngsters, only Mohamed Hichamy was known for being religious before the rest of the cell was radicalized by Es Satty. Other statements by representatives of the local Islamic community and relatives of the terrorists support that observation (Brunat, 2018; Carranco, López-Fonseca, & García, 2018). That suggests that the meetings of the cell took place in other locations, arguably the house in Alcanar.

That the seven young members of the cell who were not affected by the explosion in Alcanar attacked the civilians in Barcelona and Cambrils, shouted jihadist claims and pursued their own death by threatening the police officers who confronted them are all facts that prove their alignment with the Salafi-jihadist worldview. Before the attacks, some of them had externalized signs of radicalization within their family environment or in conversation with their friends. However, and as has been mentioned, their knowledge of Islam seems to have been limited. Among the objects found at the house in Alcanar there was a notebook, which seems to have belonged to Es Satty, that had been used by the imam to teach how to write and pronounce several verses of the Qur'an. Given the inaccuracy of the calligraphy, observers have concluded that Es Satty was the only member of the cell who spoke Arabic (García Rey, 2018). Other factors, such as the mentioned consumption of alcohol and drugs by several of the terrorists or the finding of numerous videos portraying Islamic State propaganda in a tablet that was shared by the cell (López-Fonseca & García, 2018) suggest that the nine youngsters barely had any religious formation and that their radicalization into Salafi-Jihadism was based on the proselytist activity of Es Satty and the attractiveness of the propaganda he had been providing them with.

Lastly, the issue whether the cell had established any contacts with a formal jihadist organization remains unclear. Some of the attackers had traveled around Europe during the year prior to the events. Younes Abouyaaqoub had visited France three times, the last accompanied by some other members of the cell. Mohamed Hichamy and Youssef Aalla had traveled to Zurich and Driss Oukabir visited his family in Morocco. Whether the purpose of any of these trips was related to the terrorist activity of the individuals and if they contacted other terrorist networks is not known. Still, the attackers financed their own travels, which suggests that they did not receive any external support (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018).

After the attacks, the Islamic State claimed responsibility for the events through two online communiqués and a video in which a Spanish member of IS in Syria threatened Spain. However, the group did not provide any details on the attackers nor it published any evidence of them having held any kind of contacts. This suggests that the cell was inspired by IS but that it did not operate following its direct command. That would explain IS' interest in claiming responsibility for their actions but was unable to provide any evidence of their ties (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018).

## 2. Southeast Asia

### III. The failed plot against the Indonesian presidential palace

On December 10, 2016, the Indonesian counter-terrorism police forces thwarted a plot to detonate a bomb at the country's presidential palace in Jakarta. The palace is usually surrounded by tourist, and it is used as the official residence of Joko Widodo, the president of the country (Hawley, 2017). Dian Yulia Novi, who was 28 at the moment, was arrested for the plot and became Indonesia's first would-be female suicide bomber to be sentenced to prison.

Novi had been born in Bandung, Indonesia, where she reportedly lived with her parents until age 23. She was educated in the Muslim faith. Her parents were conservative and encouraged her to regularly attend a Qur'anic study group with other children during her early years. She is believed to have received a strict-Sunni education, as she reportedly rejected Shia Muslims (Firdaus, 2019). Yet that characteristic is not uncommon, as certain rivalry between Sunnis and Shias has existed for centuries. Despite her rigorous education – her parents held tight control over her during her youth –, there were no apparent signs of extremist behavior nor personal grievances that might have affected her before leaving Indonesia in 2010 (Firdaus, 2019).

That year she moved to Singapore to work as a domestic helper at the house of a Chinese Christian family. Novi remained there for one-and-a-half years; but faced with a low salary and a demanding schedule, she decided to return to Indonesia. After some months, though, she took another job in Taiwan and started to work for an elderly Buddhist couple. Novi does not seem to have had any trouble working with people with dissimilar beliefs. In her own words, “they were tolerant” and did not oppose to her covering her hair and face with a hijab (Firdaus, 2019). Nevertheless, she reportedly experienced a feeling of loneliness while in Taiwan, being on her own and lacking family and friends with whom to spend time.

According to Nair and Chong (2017), women who work as domestic helpers outside their own countries tend to find several difficulties. They point that these women tend to be subjected to stereotypes and unable to feel home in their employers' home due to a privy atmosphere. The authors point that such situations may lead these women to develop an attitude that is prone to radicalization: driven by the desire of resisting their fate and escaping their confinement, women in such situations often relay on

techniques that are easily available to them (Nair & Chong, 2017), like the use of social media, and may fall prey of extremist propaganda which offers them a way out of desperation (Firdaus, 2019).

That was the case of Novi. Indeed, she seems to have developed such grievances while working in Taiwan. There, she often spent time on platforms like Facebook, where she reportedly learnt about jihad. Curious about the extremist content posted by several jihadist profiles, she contacted some of them. A supposed jihadist woman, Fulana binti Fulan, who said to live in Syria, replied to Novi's messages, gained her confidence and indoctrinated her into the Salafi-jihadist ideology for over a year (Firdaus, 2019).

Sometime after the start of their conversations, Novi took the decision to participate in jihad herself. She explained that choice as coming from a feeling of "emptiness and incompleteness as a Muslim" (Firdaus, 2019). This decision might have come as an aggravation of her strict Sunni beliefs prompted by the discussions that she held with Fulan. She discussed the possibility of becoming a suicide-bomber with her parents, replicating the Salafi-jihadist narrative that Muslims were the objective of continued international abuse and that they had to take action in the defense of their "brothers". Although her parents opposed to the idea, Novi became certain in her desire and explained her plan to Ummi Abza, an ISIS follower who she had as well contacted in the social media. Novi then returned to Indonesia, where she met Abza and Nur Solihin, a jihadist who was part of JAD. She married Solihin, and the two of them planned the attack following the instructions of Bahrin Naim, a late Indonesian IS operative who had joined jihad in Syria, before being arrested by the police.

In sum, Dian Yulia Novi's profile meets all of the variables studied in this analysis. She seems to have developed personal grievances while in Singapore and Taiwan, feeling lonely and alienated. Those grievances led her to explore the jihadist online sphere, one of the latest and most difficult-to-track networks employed by extremist groups. She first established online contact with several extremists, who acted as her agents of radicalization and indoctrinated her. At her return in Indonesia, she met some of them in person and married one, reinforcing the personal and family bonds. For the planning of her attack, she is reported to have received direct instructions from Bahrin Naim (Reuters, 2017), a former IS top member (Gunaratna, 2018), which proves that the organization was directly involved in the plot. Finally, Novi

consciously embraced the Salafi-jihadist ideology due to her online conversations with the extremists, who exacerbated her Islamic beliefs which conditioned her interpretation of reality (Firdaus, 2019).

#### IV. The Surabaya suicide bombings

On May 13, 2018, Dita Oepriarto drove his wife Puji Kuswati and their two daughters to St. Maria Catholic Church at Ngagel Madya street in Surabaya, Indonesia's second largest city, where the three females detonated the explosive devices they were carrying. Oepriarto then blew up himself at the nearby Pentecostal Central Church. Finally, his two sons arrived by motorbike to the St. Maria Catholic Church at Diponegoro street and also detonated several explosives. All the family members died, taking with them the lives of thirteen other people (ICPVTR, 2018).

The same day, another Surabayan family composed by Anton Febrianto, his wife Puspitasari and their three children suffered an accidental explosion at their house. It was caused by the premature detonation of a bomb with which they allegedly planned to carry out an attack during that week. Puspitasari and the couple's eldest son died in the explosion, while Anton was killed later by the police forces (ICPVTR, 2018).

The next day, yet another local family perpetrated a third terrorist attack in Surabaya. This time, the five family members, Tri Muritono, his wife, Tri Ernawati and their three children, drove a motorbike into the Surabaya Police Headquartes, where they detonated a series of explosives. All the family was killed except from the youngest daughter, causing no other casualties (Schulze, 2018).

That the three events were perpetrated by families caused stir among the general public. However, the involvement of women and children in terrorist attacks was not new. Jihadist organizations like the Islamic State regard children as the future propagators of their ideology (ICPVTR, 2018) and had already used them in attacks in Syria and Iraq (Schulze, 2018). Regarding women, IS had been encouraged women to participate in jihad since 2016, when the group stated that "if the enemy enters her abode, jihad is just as necessary for her as for the man" (Schulze, 2018: 4). In addition, other women like Dian Yulia Novi had already taken the initiative to seek martyrdom on the behalf of IS in Indonesia. Hence, the participation of both collectives in terrorist attacks seems to come as a natural evolution of the jihadist *modus operandi*, and experts indicate that it is likely to repeat in the future (ICPVTR, 2018).

Public data regarding the perpetrators of the Surabaya suicide bombings is limited. This makes it difficult to assess them on personal factors such as grievances. While most of the information that has transcended indicates that the perpetrators lived normal lives and were perfectly integrated within their local communities (Lamb, 2018), it is impossible to determine whether they might have gone through dramatic events or not in the past. Nevertheless, the available information is enough to portray a scheme on how the three Indonesian families were radicalized.

The three families knew each other and, together, attended Islamic studies sessions known as *pengajian* every Sunday in Surabaya. These sessions were led by Khalid Abu Bakr, a known Islamist extremist who had tried to join IS in Syria in 2016. His plans were frustrated and he was deported from Turkey to Indonesia, after which he developed a proselytist activity and started to gather IS sympathisers during these sessions. Indeed, according to Dr. Kristen E. Schulze (2018), a professor at the London School of Economics, *pengajian* is one of the more common paths towards radicalization in Indonesia.

During the *pengajian* sessions, the three families reportedly studied an extremist interpretation of Islam (ICPVTR, 2018) and watched IS videos praising violence and martyrdom. Observers also point that the children were home-schooled to avoid outside exposure (Lamb, 2018). While Abu Bakr acted as the agent of radicalization for the families, Dita Oepriarto seems to have been the operative leader of the cell. The Indonesian security forces rapidly identified him as a member of JAD and suggested that the families had assembled a cell for the group. Indeed, JAD's structure includes not only formal branches but also sleeper cells, which are precisely coordinated through *pengajian* sessions (Schulze, 2018). Oepriarto is said to have manifested a sectarian behavior in the past, not inviting Hindus or Christians to his events (Lamb, 2018) and objecting Indonesian secular rituals for not being based on Islamic law (Schulze, 2018).

Evidence suggests that Oepriarto influenced his wife both at home and during the study sessions and convinced her to perpetrate the suicide bombings. Professors Damian Kingsbury from Deakin University and Rohan Gunaratna from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies agree that once both parents were convinced of their actions and of the fact that they would be rewarded in heaven, they decided to drag their children with them (Lloyd, 2018). In a patriarchal society such

as the Indonesian one, children are widely unprotected from their parents decisions (Chew, 2018). Similar dynamics are said to have taken place in the other two families, the fathers of each having taken the initiative for carrying out their actions (ICPVTR, 2018).

The way in which these attacks were orchestrated proves the existence of strong family and neighborhood nexuses that catalyzed the planning of the attacks. The three families, which lived in the same city and met regularly, were driven into the Salafi-jihadist ideology by Khalid Abu Bakr, who acted as an agent for radicalization. Afterwards, it was Dita Oepriarto, with the help of Anton Febrianto and Tri Muritono, who convinced their respective wives and children to perpetrate the attack against the Christian churches. That Dita Oepriarto was a member of JAD and acted as the leader of the cell indicates that the organization played an active role in the planification of the attacks. Even if there is no evidence of him having held contact with other members of JAD, the modus operandi of the group gives way for such actions to be planned in independent cells which are assembled through pengajian sessions (Schulze, 2018). Hence, it can be stated that the attackers established contact with other radicalized individuals and that they were guided by a formal organization. What remains unclear, besides the existence of personal grievances, is the fact that they had all embraced the Salafi-Jihadi mindset. While there is little doubt that the three family heads had done so and influenced their wives, it is difficult to assert that the children shared their worldview. Given their short ages and possible lack of understanding of what was going on in their surroundings (Chew, 2018), it is likely that their actions were not a product of their real intentions and that they were guided by the desire or obligation to obey their parents instead.

## Chapter 3. Discussion

### 1. Assessment of the variables

The analysis of the four selected cases provides significant evidence to assess the differences and similarities of the phenomenon of radicalization in Europe and Southeast Asia. Such assessment will rest upon the evaluation of each of the variables proposed in the framework provided by Hafez and Mullins through the answers to the research questions that were defined at the beginning of this study.



## I. Grievances

The answer to the question “Did the attackers present any sort of personal grievances?” was positive in two of the four selected cases. The only terrorists found to have experienced “personal situations that lead an individual to seek a new path of life”, as grievances are defined, were Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, who lost their parents at a very young age and spent the rest of their childhood in foster care and in an orphanage, and Dian Yulia Novi, who found herself isolated and alienated because of her working conditions outside her home country.

Still, only in the case of Novi there is enough evidence to link her dramatic personal situation with her embracing Salafi-Jihadism and the decision to engage in terrorism. It was because of her desire to escape her confinement that she contacted other extremists in the social media. The same cannot be assured in the case of the Kouachi Brothers, as there are no-known links between their traumatic experiences and their decision to engage in Islamist extremism.

As for the rest of the individuals engaged in the terrorist events analyzed in this study, there is no evidence of them having experienced such sort of personal grievances. Although this must not lead to the belief that grievances did not exist, it can nevertheless be an indicator that such grievances are not a necessary cause for an individual to engage in terrorism. In fact, as will be argued in the following section, the ability of proselytists to influence others seems to be a more decisive factor in this regard.

## II. Networks & enabling environments and support structures

The decision to group “networks” and “enabling environments and support structures” and assess them together responds to the fact that both variables refer to the social aspect of radicalization and are interconnected, enabling the possibility of a joint evaluation.

The answer to the question “Did the attackers establish contact with other radicalized individuals in their environment?” was positive in all cases. This suggests that, contrary to the opinion of some theorists who argue that self-radicalization through jihadist online content is increasing, the phenomenon usually involves the establishment of a direct relationship with other extremists. The kind of contact held between the attackers and their agents of radicalization varied from one case to

another, but there are some common patterns that must be highlighted. For all the four selected cases, the answer to “What kind of relationship did they (the attackers and their agents of radicalization) have with each other?” implied face-to-face encounters. Only in one of the cases, that of Dian Yulia Novi, radicalization was originated in the online sphere. Still, Novi did not plan her attack and develop the necessary means for carrying it out until she met some of her online contacts in person at her return in Indonesia.

The environments that made possible these encounters between the terrorists and their agents of radicalization are worthy of assessment, as it is here where some of the main differences and similarities between the European and Southeast Asian cases arise.

At the beginning of this study, it was explained that the use of traditional support structures, such as training camps or mosques, by agents of radicalization to influence others had been limited due to the efforts of the security forces worldwide. Instead, it was suggested that the Internet was replacing such structures. Evidence found in the analysis of the four selected-cases suggests that such shift might not be as evident as initially thought.

In Europe, the Kouachi brothers were known to have attended praying sessions at a local Parisian mosque directed by an extremist imam who introduced Chérif Kouachi into the concept of jihad. Similarly, Abdelbaki Es Satty was an imam himself and preached at a mosque in the same town where the rest of his cell resided. Even though there is no evidence of him spreading a radical ideology during his speeches, the fact that the leader of the cell was able to direct a public religious space is remarkable.

Another traditional structure that is thought by experts to have a decreasing impact in modern terrorism are training camps (Hafez & Mullins, 2015). While it is true that most modern-day attacks in Europe and Southeast Asia are perpetrated by individuals who have not received training at one of these facilities, the Kouachi brothers were reported to have traveled to Yemen to be instructed in the AQAP training camps.

In fact, none of the terrorists involved in either of the attacks in European soil were found to have solely radicalized online. This does not mean that they did not employ the social media as a tool to access jihadist content online, like propaganda videos or instructions on how to assemble explosives.

A non-traditional structure, prison, appears as a recurrent scenario of radicalization in Europe (Silke & Veldhuis, 2017). At least four of the terrorists had passed some time in jail before the attacks took place. Indeed, Chérif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly, both of whom attacked Paris in 2015, met while serving sentence and initiated a more proactive approach to terrorism after being released. Similarly, Abdelbaki Es Satty, who acted as the agent of radicalization and leader of the cell that stormed Barcelona and Cambrils in 2017, spent four years in a Spanish prison where he also established contact with extremists. Finally, Driss Oukabir, a member of Es Satty's cell, also served sentence in a Spanish penitentiary facility. Oukabir is the only of the four not known to have established contact with other radical inmates in prison. That indicates that such facilities have become an environment that facilitates the congregation of Islamist extremists and the propagation of their ideas among the inmates.

Besides some of them radicalizing in prison, there exists another similarity between the terrorists who attacked Paris and the ones who did so in Barcelona and Cambrils: the celebration of clandestine meetings in the surroundings of the residences of the attackers. In these meetings, they were free to develop their discussions in a private atmosphere where it was relatively easy to earn each other's trust. The Kouachi brothers and Coulibaly attended regular meetings at the house of Djamel Beghal, an extremist whom Chérif Kouachi and Coulibaly had met in prison, where they developed further plots. In Spain, Es Satty also led the celebration of similar reunions with his cell. Arguably, these meetings took place at the house in Alcanar that was destroyed as a result of an explosion and in a rural complex in Ruidecanyes, a town some one hundred kilometers away from Barcelona.

Finally, in both cases there were family ties between the attackers. As has been noted, Chérif and Saïd Kouachi were brothers and shared most of the experiences that led them to embrace terrorism. As for the cell that attacked Barcelona and Cambrils, there were four couples of brothers. It has already been explained how the relationship between the older and the younger brothers was used by Es Satty as a catalyzer for the radicalization of the latter.

Regarding Southeast Asia, the two cases present remarkable differences. Dian Yulia Novi, who was arrested before she could attack Jakarta's presidential palace, was eminently radicalized in the online sphere by extremists with whom she held intense contact. By the time she returned to Indonesia, she had already adopted a jihadist

mindset, even if she did not start planning her failed attack until she personally met other extremists. On the contrary, the three families involved in the Surabaya attacks had formed a local cell that was guided into terrorism through face-to-face *pengajian* sessions led by Khalid Abu Bakr. Completing Abu Bakr's work in the ideological sphere, Dita Oepriarto, the head of one of these families, acted as well as a catalyzer for the planning and execution of the attacks. In this sense, the radicalization of the families is similar to that of the attackers in Europe, who as well participated in clandestine encounters with their agents of radicalization.

Besides the differences, there are similarities between the failed-Jakarta coup and the Surabaya attacks. First, both events involved the active participation of women. Dian Yulia Novi took the initiative to act by her own, even if her plan was decided in collaboration with men who she met in Indonesia, one of whom became her husband. On the other side, the three adult women involved in the Surabaya attacks do not seem to have acted as the initial instigators, as they are believed to have been convinced by their husbands to participate in the actions. However, the three of them arguably played an active role in the convincement of their children afterwards. As for the daughters of these families, their young ages make it difficult to believe that they instigated the attacks.

Another similarity is the existence of family nexuses. This is obvious in the Surabaya suicide-bombings. As for the failed plot to attack the Jakarta presidential palace, Novi married Nur Solihin, one of the extremists to whom she was introduced at her return to Indonesia and planned the attack with him. She is reported to have married him because of her desire to wed before being martyred (Schulze, 2018).

Before jumping into the analysis of the next variable, it is relevant to assess the terrorists implicated in the case-studies in their ties with formal terrorist organizations. The answers to the question "Were the attackers recruited and/or guided in their actions by a formal jihadist organization?" differed. In two of the four cases there were individuals whose ties with the organizations to which they claimed to belong, or which later claimed responsibility for their attacks are unclear. During the Paris attacks, Amedy Coulibaly said to be acting on behalf of IS. The organization later claimed responsibility for his actions and released an interview with his wife through their own propaganda channels. However, experts have been unable to confirm any formal ties between Coulibaly and members of IS before or during his actions. This

may indicate that Coulibaly was influenced by IS and decided to take action by his own means. Something similar occurred with the cell that attacked the Spanish cities of Barcelona and Cambrils. Despite the finding of drawings of the IS flag among the belongings of the attackers, and despite IS claiming responsibility in the aftermath of the attacks (Reinares & García-Calvo, 2018), no formal links have been found, neither by observers nor by the security forces in charge of the investigation.

The rest of the terrorists involved in the attacks had either been recruited or directed in their actions by formal terrorist organizations. Chérif Kouachi had been financed by late Anwar al-Awlaki, one of the leaders of AQAP, and along with his brother he received training in one of the organization's camps in Yemen. In Southeast Asia, Dian Yulia Novi met her future husband, Nur Solihin, who had been recruited by Bahrun Naim a late IS member and JAD operative. Naim is reported to have guided both in the planning of the failed attack. As for the three families involved in the Surabaya attacks, they had assembled a JAD cell together, operationally led by Dita Oepriarto, who was a member of the organization.

### III. Ideology

The last of the variables considered in Hafez and Mullins' framework ought to be assessed through the question "Did the attackers embrace the ideology of Salafi-Jihadism?". The study of the selected cases indicates that this ideology was embraced by the perpetrators in both Europe and Southeast Asia. Some of the attackers had a wider knowledge of Islam, especially those who were clerics, like Abdelbaki Es Satty, or those who had received an extensive religious education, like the Kouachi Brothers, Dian Yulia Novi and the heads of the three Surabayan families. By contrary, the nine additional members of Es Satty's cell were reported to neither have an extensive knowledge of religion nor to have lived by Islamic principles. Still, the influence that Es Satty had in them led them to accept the Salafi-jihadist narrative of confrontation and radicalize. Finally, there is no evidence of the kind of education that the ten children of the three Surabayan couples involved in the attacks, who were between 8 and 18 years old (Schulze, 2018), had received. However, their youth suggests that their involvement in the attacks was prompted by the desire of their parents (ICPVTR, 2018). This is the only case in which the embracement of Salafi-Jihadism is not evident.

## 2. Observable patterns in Europe and Southeast Asia

This section will present the patterns of radicalization in Europe and Southeast Asia that are observable through the analysis of the four case-studies.

In Europe, radicalization has been found to entail a direct contact between the terrorists and one or several extremist agents who guide them into the acceptance of the principles of Salafi-Jihadism and the desire to commit a terrorist attack. This contact takes place in the physical sphere, the interlocutors meeting face-to-face. The meetings between them occur in both traditional (i.e.: training camps, mosques) and non-traditional facilities of radicalization. Among these, prison stands out as one of the most recurrent places of encounter. In addition, the terrorists and their agents of radicalization tend to celebrate clandestine meetings in locations that are nearby to their places of residence.

The terrorists usually act in groups or cells. Regarding the composition of these, the members often are related to each other, either by kinship or neighborhood ties. They are mostly men and the majority of them do not have formal links with any terrorist organization.

In Southeast Asia, radicalization also involves direct contact between the terrorists and one or several agents of radicalization. While this contact may be initiated in the online sphere, it most likely entails a later face-to-face phase as well. Contact between the terrorists and their agents occurs in non-traditional facilities like their homes or locations nearby where they also celebrate clandestine meetings.

Terrorism in Southeast Asia is also characterized by the existence of kinship and neighborhood bonds between the extremists, among whom there are both men and women. As a matter of fact, Southeast Asian terrorists have been found to act along with their whole families, included their children. In most of the cases, the attacks are guided by a formal organization with whom the extremists have a direct contact.

## 3. Main similarities and differences across the regions

The analysis of the case studies through the variables presented by Hafez and Mullins' framework allows for the identification of significant similarities and differences between the patterns of radicalization in Europe and Southeast Asia.

Regarding the similarities, radicalization in both regions appears to entail face-to-face encounters between the terrorists themselves and between them and their agents of radicalization, who are present in all cases. The terrorists and their agents often celebrate

clandestine meetings in locations that are not far from neither from their residences nor from their targets. There often exist kinship and/or neighborhood ties among the terrorists themselves or between them and their agents of radicalization.

As for the differences, European Islamist extremists are often second-generation immigrants, while those in Southeast Asia are descendants of nationals of their countries of birth. Whilst most – if not all – of its members are men in Europe, the Salafi-jihadist movement in Southeast Asia involves women and children as well. In Europe, these terrorists are often radicalized in early stages through meetings in traditional structures like foreign training camps and mosques. Finally, formal terrorist organizations are more involved in the planification of the attacks in Southeast Asia than they are in Europe, where most of the attackers act on their own initiative and never come in contact with members of the organizations for discussing their actions with their command.

With regard to the existence of grievances and their role in radicalization, it has already been argued that, based on the little evidence that was available, such factor does not appear to be a necessary condition for an individual to embrace the Salafi-jihadist ideology and carry out a terrorist attack.

The following table has been set up to summarize the discussed similarities and differences.

**Table 3.** Main similarities and differences across the regions

	<b>Europe</b>	<b>Southeast Asia</b>
Face-to-face encounters between attackers and proselytists	Yes	Yes
Clandestine meetings	Yes	Yes
Kinship/neighborhood relations	Yes	Yes
Sex of the attackers	All male	Male and female
Second generation of immigrants	Yes, most	No
Role of terrorist organizations in the planning and execution of the attacks	Partially active	Significantly active

*Source: Own data*

## Conclusion

The assessment of the selected cases has proven that there are both similarities and differences in the patterns of jihadist radicalization in Europe and Southeast Asia.

With regard to grievances, the study has found that they are not a necessary cause for an individual to engage in terrorism, as they were only found to have directly led one of the attackers to act violently.

Concerning networks, all of the cases implied a face-to-face encounter between the attackers and at least one proselytist extremist who acted as their agent of radicalization. Furthermore, in all cases the attackers had some sort of family or neighborhood relationship between each other, which is a sign of the likelihood for terrorists to share their plans with people of their trust. Another difference between the regions implies gender, as, contrary to those in Europe, the attackers in SEA included several women, who at least in one of the cases took the initiative to carry out an attack.

Related to networks is the role played by formal terrorist organizations, which have been found to remain active in both territories. Still, formal groups seem to be relatively more active in SEA, as they were involved in the planning and execution of all the attacks there. By contrary, the role of such organizations in Europe seems to be less intrusive, as only one (Al-Qaeda) was found to have been directly connected to an attack.

Regarding enabling environments and support structures, the terrorists in Europe have been found to still make use of traditional structures, initially thought to have lost weight in radicalization, such as mosques and training camps in the Middle East. Both Europeans and Southeast Asian radicals have, still, evolved and adopted other non-traditional structures to enhance radicalization. In Europe, prison rises as one of the major threats in this regard, with at least three of the attackers having established contact with radical inmates while serving sentence. And, both in Europe and Southeast Asia, terrorists have been found to celebrate clandestine meetings in their local environments, arguably because of the comfortability of sharing a private space where they can discuss their matters freely.

Finally, the ideology of Salafi-Jihadism was present in all cases, whether the attackers had deep knowledge on Islam or not. This is likely to imply that the confrontative rhetoric employed by extremists finds track among individuals regardless of their religiosity, and



that the non-religious arguments employed by the agents of radicalization have more weight than those solely related to the principles of Islam.

Besides the analysis of the variables, this study argued in its initial hypothesis that radicalization ought to follow different patterns in Europe and Southeast Asia because of two main reasons: (i) the larger presence of jihadist organizations in the latter, and (ii) the different number of Muslims living in each territory.

Arguably, the first of the reasons provided has been confirmed. In both the two cases analyzed for Southeast Asia, formal terrorist organizations, concretely JAD, were directly involved in the radicalization of the terrorists and on the guiding of their actions. In Europe, only two of the attackers were found to operate under the umbrella of a terrorist group (Al-Qaeda), while the rest are thought to have solely been influenced by others like IS.

Regarding the number of Muslims living in each region and their impact on the phenomenon of radicalization, the study of the variable of ideology has demonstrated that the Salafi-jihadist message has spread equally among the terrorists in Europe and those in Southeast Asia. Still, there is a significant different between them. The Southeast Asian terrorists had received an education based in the Islamic principles, while several of the European terrorists embraced Islam ad hoc, after experiencing confinement in prison or falling prey of the influence of proselytist agents. In addition, the age-range of the Southeast Asian terrorists (from children to 46-year-old Dita Oepriarto) is larger than that of the Europeans (17 to 45). Both factors indicate that the penetration of the radical-Islamist message might be relatively easier in Southeast Asia, and especially in Indonesia and fellow Muslim-majority states.

For these reasons, it can be asserted that the phenomenon of radicalization presents dissimilarities depending on the region, and hence the hypothesis seems valid. However, the strength of this validation remains untested, and deeper analyses seem necessary to delimit the extent to which each of the factors analyzed in the test are determinant in this process of psycho-social transformation.

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