Is Bank-debt Maturity Contingent on the Financial System?
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Date
10/09/2014Estado
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionMetadata
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See summary in English Purpose The purpose of this paper is to determine whether bank debt-maturity decisions are
conditioned by growth opportunities, the firms ownership structure, or the institutional environment.
Design/methodology/approach The empirical analysis is undertaken using an unbalanced panel
data of Chilean and Spanish firms.
Findings The results indicate that when banks are not allowed to become stockholders, managers
use bank debt-maturity as a corporate governance mechanism. When banks can participate in
the ownership of the firms that they finance, short-term bank debt can serve as a substitute for
a governance mechanism.
Originality/value The main contribution of this paper is the analysis of how differences in
financial development among countries modify financial decisions by firms.
Keywords Ownership structure, Panel data, Banking regulation, Growth opportunities,
Agency problems, Bank debt-maturity
Paper type Research paper
Is Bank-debt Maturity Contingent on the Financial System?
Tipo de Actividad
Artículos en revistasISSN
1012-8255Palabras Clave
See keywords in EnglishCapital structure