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If Pay-as-bid auctions are not a solution for California, then Why not a reliability market?
dc.contributor.author | Vázquez Martínez, Carlos | es-ES |
dc.contributor.author | Rivier Abbad, Michel Luis | es-ES |
dc.contributor.author | Pérez Arriaga, José Ignacio | es-ES |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-01-15T11:20:10Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-01-15T11:20:10Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2001-05-01 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.issn | 1040-6190 | es_ES |
dc.identifier.uri | https:doi.org10.1016S1040-6190(01)00196-8 | es_ES |
dc.description | Artículos en revistas | es_ES |
dc.description.abstract | es-ES | |
dc.description.abstract | This document presents some ideas regarding the use of the pay-as-bid pricing rule in multi-unit auctions. In particular, we focus on electricity markets and on the proposals for adopting this kind of mechanism in the California Power Exchange. We find that the pay-as-bid auction has important drawbacks. Instead, we attack the recent problems in California from another point of view and propose an alternative solution. | en-GB |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | es_ES |
dc.language.iso | en-GB | es_ES |
dc.rights | es_ES | |
dc.rights.uri | es_ES | |
dc.source | Revista: The Electricity Journal, Periodo: 1, Volumen: online, Número: 4, Página inicial: 41, Página final: 48 | es_ES |
dc.subject.other | Instituto de Investigación Tecnológica (IIT) | es_ES |
dc.title | If Pay-as-bid auctions are not a solution for California, then Why not a reliability market? | es_ES |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
dc.description.version | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | es_ES |
dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess | es_ES |
dc.keywords | es-ES | |
dc.keywords | en-GB |
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