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Water value in competitive markets: dynamic programming and game theory

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IIT-00-107A.pdf (1.517Mb)
Date
2000-09-25
Author
Barquín Gil, Julián
García González, Javier
Román Úbeda, Jaime
Estado
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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Abstract
 
 
This article introduces a new framework for the computation of the water value in competitive market systems. This framework is based on the assumption that oligopolistic utitlities behave as profit maximizing players, being their equilibrium strategies the Nash equilibrium. From a computational point of view, the proposed methodology resembles the well know dynamic programming algorithms. A small example is also presented.
 
URI
http://hdl.handle.net/11531/5780
Water value in competitive markets: dynamic programming and game theory
Tipo de Actividad
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Materias/ categorías / ODS
Instituto de Investigación Tecnológica (IIT)
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Power systems operation, profit maximization, medium-term hydrothermal scheduling, game theory
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