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If you want me to stay, pay’: a model of asymmetric federalism in centralised countries

dc.contributor.authorClaeys, Peter Guenther Antoones-ES
dc.contributor.authorFederico, Martirees-ES
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-02T17:24:02Z
dc.date.available2023-02-02T17:24:02Z
dc.date.issued2015-04-01es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0263-774Xes_ES
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1068/c11318res_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11531/76914
dc.descriptionArtículos en revistases_ES
dc.description.abstract.es-ES
dc.description.abstractHighly centralised countries like Italy and Spain have devolved fiscal power to regions in an asymmetric way. Some well-off regions get transfers that turn them into net recipients of the fiscal system. We demonstrate in a political economy model of fiscal federalism that, in centralised countries, side-payments are used to compensate regions that are set back by the fiscal system and can credibly threaten to secede. Compensation blocks political negotiation on alternative—more efficient—fiscal systems. We study two regions, Valle d'Aosta in Italy and País Vasco in Spain, as an example.en-GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.language.isoes-ESes_ES
dc.rightsCreative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada Españaes_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/es_ES
dc.sourceRevista: Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, Periodo: 1, Volumen: 33, Número: 2, Página inicial: 305, Página final: 320es_ES
dc.titleIf you want me to stay, pay’: a model of asymmetric federalism in centralised countrieses_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.rights.holderes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.keywords.es-ES
dc.keywordsfiscal federalism, equalisation, decentralisation, secession, transfer schemes, side-payment, political economy, Valle d’Aosta, País Vasco1 IntroductionFormerly highly centralised countries like Italy and Spain have made gradual steps towards devolution. A peculiar feature of this process is the asymmetry in the fiscal treatment of different regions. Differentiation has primarily been justified by linguistic and cultural diversity, geographical circumstances, or economic backwardness. But some well-off regions receive financial resources above those of equally rich regions. They obtain special arrangements that turn them into net recipients of the fiscal system.We argue that, in centralised countries, a government that maintains a rather strict control on local fiscal autonomy agrees to compensate regions that are set back in the fiscal system and can credibly threaten to secede. We extend a political economy model of fiscal federalism with majority voting between regions to allow for secession and side-payments, following Lockwood (2006) and Harstad (2008). We derive conditions under which asymmetric fiscal arrangements or secession happen. We demonstrate that asymmetric federalism is an inefficient way of devolution as the compensation simply redistributes the available resources under centralisation.en-GB


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