Water value in competitive markets: dynamic programming and game theory

dc.contributor.authorBarquín Gil, Juliánes-ES
dc.contributor.authorGarcía González, Javieres-ES
dc.contributor.authorRomán Úbeda, Jaimees-ES
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-15T11:28:55Z
dc.date.available2016-01-15T11:28:55Z
dc.date.issued2000-09-25es_ES
dc.descriptionCapítulos en libroses_ES
dc.description.abstractes-ES
dc.description.abstractThis article introduces a new framework for the computation of the water value in competitive market systems. This framework is based on the assumption that oligopolistic utitlities behave as profit maximizing players, being their equilibrium strategies the Nash equilibrium. From a computational point of view, the proposed methodology resembles the well know dynamic programming algorithms. A small example is also presented.en-GB
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11531/5780
dc.keywordses-ES
dc.keywordsPower systems operation, profit maximization, medium-term hydrothermal scheduling, game theoryen-GB
dc.language.isoen-GBes_ES
dc.publisherSin editorial (Funchal, Portugal)es_ES
dc.rightses_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccesses_ES
dc.rights.uries_ES
dc.sourceLibro: 6th International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems ISBN: 972-95194-1-2 - PMAPS2000, Página inicial: , Página final:es_ES
dc.subject.otherInstituto de Investigación Tecnológica (IIT)es_ES
dc.titleWater value in competitive markets: dynamic programming and game theoryes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/bookPartes_ES

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