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dc.contributor.authorSánchez González, Ángelaes-ES
dc.date.accessioned2025-12-16T09:03:15Z-
dc.date.available2025-12-16T09:03:15Z-
dc.date.issued2025-12-01es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0167-2681es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttps:doi.org10.1016j.jebo.2025.107334es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11531/107717-
dc.descriptionArtículos en revistases_ES
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the impact of Affirmative Action (AA) policies on workforce sorting in competitive payment schemes, workers’ productivity, and firms’ performance. Using a laboratory experiment, we analyse an environment where participants repeatedly choose between two firms with tournament-based pay or a firm offering piece-rate compensation. Experimental treatments vary based on whether participants can switch firms each period and whether one of the tournament-based firms implements AA policies. Our findings reveal that AA significantly boosts female participation in competitive settings without reducing male engagement or productivity, effectively closing the gender gap in tournament selection. However, AA firms face mild talent retention challenges. Importantly, AA induces strong sorting by gender and productivity, with highly productive women preferring AA firms and highly productive men opting for competitive environments in which AA is not in place. These findings suggest that while AA policies successfully attract more women to competitive workplaces, they may also contribute to gender-based clustering – where men and women self-select into different firms based on the presence of AA – while maintaining overall organizational efficiency.es-ES
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the impact of Affirmative Action (AA) policies on workforce sorting in competitive payment schemes, workers’ productivity, and firms’ performance. Using a laboratory experiment, we analyse an environment where participants repeatedly choose between two firms with tournament-based pay or a firm offering piece-rate compensation. Experimental treatments vary based on whether participants can switch firms each period and whether one of the tournament-based firms implements AA policies. Our findings reveal that AA significantly boosts female participation in competitive settings without reducing male engagement or productivity, effectively closing the gender gap in tournament selection. However, AA firms face mild talent retention challenges. Importantly, AA induces strong sorting by gender and productivity, with highly productive women preferring AA firms and highly productive men opting for competitive environments in which AA is not in place. These findings suggest that while AA policies successfully attract more women to competitive workplaces, they may also contribute to gender-based clustering – where men and women self-select into different firms based on the presence of AA – while maintaining overall organizational efficiency.en-GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-streames_ES
dc.language.isoen-GBes_ES
dc.sourceRevista: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Periodo: 1, Volumen: online, Número: , Página inicial: 107334-1, Página final: 107334-21es_ES
dc.subject.otherInstituto de Investigación Tecnológica (IIT)es_ES
dc.titleDynamic effects of affirmative action: Experimental evidencees_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.rights.holderes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.keywordsGender stereotypes; Discrimination; Affirmative actiones-ES
dc.keywordsGender stereotypes; Discrimination; Affirmative actionen-GB
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