Por favor, use este identificador para citar o enlazar este ítem: http://hdl.handle.net/11531/88122
Título : Remuneration mechanisms for investment in reactive power flexibility
Autor : Troncia, Matteo
Chaves Ávila, José Pablo
Pilo, Fabrizio
Gómez San Román, Tomás
Fecha de publicación : 1-sep-2021
Resumen : .
The practices for the procurement of voltage control capability need changing because of the evolution of the power system driven by the penetration of renewable sources, low carbon policies, and decentralisation. New providers have to be involved. Therefore, new mechanisms to achieve costeffective solutions have to be encouraged. To this aim, a cost-based incentive mechanism and a weighted auction are proposed for procuring additional reactive power capacity. Both mechanisms are conceived for encouraging effective investment in voltage control by reducing the overall procurement cost. Hence, the voltage sensitivity of the reactive power provider is part of both mechanisms. Voltage sensitivity is evaluated through the Multi Infeed Interaction Factors while the American Electric Power methodology is used for identifying the reactive power costs. The proposed mechanisms are general, and they can be exploited in transmission and distribution networks irrespective of the asset, which provides the reactive capacity. A case study concerning the 39-bus New-England power system is presented for providing the proof of concept of the proposed mechanisms. The analysis of the two mechanisms’ pros and cons highlights that the weighted auction creates competition and shows low risks related to the exercise of potential market power.
Descripción : Artículos en revistas
URI : https://doi.org/10.1016/j.segan.2021.100507
http://hdl.handle.net/11531/88122
ISSN : 2352-4677
Aparece en las colecciones: Artículos

Ficheros en este ítem:
Fichero Tamaño Formato  
20242519454930_1-s2.0-S2352467721000783-main.pdf1,06 MBAdobe PDFVisualizar/Abrir


Los ítems de DSpace están protegidos por copyright, con todos los derechos reservados, a menos que se indique lo contrario.