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http://hdl.handle.net/11531/9728| Title: | Nash equilibrium in strategic bidding: a binary expansion approach |
| Authors: | Nobrega Barroso, Luiz Augusto Carneiro, Rafael Dix Granville, Sergio Veiga Pereira, Mario Fampa, Márcia Helena C. |
| Issue Date: | 1 |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a mixed integer linear programming solution approach for the equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC) problem of finding the Nash equilibrium (NE) in strategic bidding in short-term electricity markets. A binary expansion (BE) scheme is used to transform the nonlinear, nonconvex, NE problem into a mixed integer linear problem (MILP), which can be solved by commercially available computational systems. The BE scheme can be applicable to Cournot, Bertrand, or joint price/quantity bidding models. The approach is illustrated in case studies with configurations derived from the 95-GW Brazilian system, including unit-commitment decisions to the price-maker agents. |
| Description: | Artículos en revistas |
| URI: | http://hdl.handle.net/11531/9728 |
| ISSN: | 0885-8950 |
| Appears in Collections: | Artículos |
Files in This Item:
| File | Description | Size | Format | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IIT-06-091A.pdf | 435,85 kB | Adobe PDF | View/Open Request a copy |
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