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dc.contributor.authorParadela López, Migueles-ES
dc.date.accessioned2025-04-22T11:26:12Z-
dc.date.available2025-04-22T11:26:12Z-
dc.date.issued2025-03-28es_ES
dc.identifier.issn2238-6912es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.22456/2238-6912.139813es_ES
dc.descriptionArtículos en revistases_ES
dc.description.abstract.es-ES
dc.description.abstractThe article analyzes the two-part strategy Russia developed to address the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 2020. First, the country helped to weaken Armenia’s position in Nagorno-Karabakh and consolidate Azerbaijan’s. Second, the Russian military deployed peacekeeping troops to the border of the two countries to stabilize the conflict, deter any new Azeri military advance in the region and improve the Russian influence in the Caucasus. Although this strategy was initially successful, as it increased Russia’s military capacity in the region, the unexpected complications Russia experienced during the invasion of Ukraine in 2022 severely weakened its role as peacekeeper and deterrence power. Russia’s involvement in a highly demanding conflict has led to considerable suffering, increased international pressure, and a deteriorated perception of its military power, precluding it from deterring the expansion of a Turkish-backed Azerbaijan. As a result, Russia’s deterring capacity failed as it was uncapable of sending a credible threat to Azerbaijan and this country could achieve historic goals in the region. Consequently, Russia severely compromised its own position in the Caucasus, and increasing pressure over Armenia should be expected.en-GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfes_ES
dc.language.isoen-GBes_ES
dc.rightsCreative Commons Reconocimiento-NoComercial-SinObraDerivada Españaes_ES
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/es_ES
dc.sourceRevista: AUSTRAL: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations, Periodo: 1, Volumen: 13, Número: 26, Página inicial: 120, Página final: 142es_ES
dc.titleRussia’s Deterrence Strategy in Nagorno-Karabakh: Implications for the Ukraine Invasiones_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.rights.holderes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.keywords.es-ES
dc.keywordsPeacekeeping Deterrence Geopolitics Conflict Influence Russia Nagorno-Karabakhen-GB
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