Earning Management and Debt Ownership Structure in Spanish Firms
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Date
2007-09-14Estado
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See summary in English the aim of this paper is to analyze the efficiency of debt ownership as a mechanism of corporate governance in reducing the discretionary behavior of managers. We use earnings management and discretionary accruals as indicators of managerial accounting discretion. Our results show that corporate debt has a prominent impact on reducing earnings management. Banking debt can foster the discretionary behavior of managers whereas public debt plays no relevant role. At the same time we test
the complementary effect of some other mechanisms of corporate governance such as capital structure and ownership concentration.
Earning Management and Debt Ownership Structure in Spanish Firms
Tipo de Actividad
Artículos en revistasISSN
1727-9232Palabras Clave
See keywords in EnglishOwnership structure