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dc.contributor.authorde Otaola Arca, Pedroes-ES
dc.contributor.authorGarcía González, Javieres-ES
dc.contributor.authorLinares Llamas, Pedroes-ES
dc.date.accessioned2024-02-23T13:14:36Z-
dc.date.available2024-02-23T13:14:36Z-
dc.date.issued2024-02-01es_ES
dc.identifier.issn0142-0615es_ES
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2023.109713es_ES
dc.descriptionArtículos en revistases_ES
dc.description.abstractEnergy, greenhouse gas emissions, or water taxes, are present in many power systems as available instruments to implement energy, environmental or climate policies. The goal of these taxes is to change producers’ optimal behavior and hence achieve a cleaner operation. However, these changes in operation are not straightforward to simulate when producers are price makers, or when assets are owned jointly by different agents. State-of-the-art models are unable to consider differentiated income taxes per technology or geographical region, in the case of price makers. In this paper, we present a novel formulation that models the individual market income of each unit using the binary-expansion technique to address the case of a price-maker agent. Unlike existing state-of-the-art formulations, our approach successfully accounts for differentiated income taxes per technology or geographical region and accurate market revenues of shared generators. The proposed model enables evaluating the rational behavior of a generation company confronting a complex yet realistic decision problem, under different types of taxes related to decarbonization or resource conservation policies. The case study incorporates the impact of the installation of carbon sequestration and storage equipment in a fleet of gas-fired power plants, yielding satisfactory numerical results.es-ES
dc.description.abstractEnergy, greenhouse gas emissions, or water taxes, are present in many power systems as available instruments to implement energy, environmental or climate policies. The goal of these taxes is to change producers’ optimal behavior and hence achieve a cleaner operation. However, these changes in operation are not straightforward to simulate when producers are price makers, or when assets are owned jointly by different agents. State-of-the-art models are unable to consider differentiated income taxes per technology or geographical region, in the case of price makers. In this paper, we present a novel formulation that models the individual market income of each unit using the binary-expansion technique to address the case of a price-maker agent. Unlike existing state-of-the-art formulations, our approach successfully accounts for differentiated income taxes per technology or geographical region and accurate market revenues of shared generators. The proposed model enables evaluating the rational behavior of a generation company confronting a complex yet realistic decision problem, under different types of taxes related to decarbonization or resource conservation policies. The case study incorporates the impact of the installation of carbon sequestration and storage equipment in a fleet of gas-fired power plants, yielding satisfactory numerical results.en-GB
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/octet-streames_ES
dc.language.isoen-GBes_ES
dc.sourceRevista: International Journal of Electrical Power & Energy Systems, Periodo: 1, Volumen: online, Número: , Página inicial: 109713-1, Página final: 109713-12es_ES
dc.subject.otherInstituto de Investigación Tecnológica (IIT)es_ES
dc.titleOptimal self-unit commitment with shared asset ownership under realistic taxation in the current decarbonization frameworkes_ES
dc.typeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articlees_ES
dc.description.versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiones_ES
dc.rights.holderes_ES
dc.rights.accessRightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesses_ES
dc.keywordsElectricity market; Tax scheme; Shared ownership; Profit maximization; Self-unit commitment (self-UC); Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS)es-ES
dc.keywordsElectricity market; Tax scheme; Shared ownership; Profit maximization; Self-unit commitment (self-UC); Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS)en-GB
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